Document Type

Article

Abstract

The present study considers Ibn Sînâ's (Lat. Avicenna) account of induction (istiqra') and experimentation (tajriba). For Ibn Sînâ induction purportedly provided the absolute, necessary and certain first principles of a science. Ibn Sînâ criticized induction, arguing that it can neither guarantee the necessity nor provide the primitiveness required of first principles. In it place, Ibn Sînâ developed a theory of experimentation, which avoids the pitfalls of induction by not providing absolute, but conditional, necessary and certain first principles. The theory of experimentation that emerges though not modern, does have elements that are similar to a modern conception of scientific method.

Publication Date

7-1-2003

ISSN

0022-5053

Publication Title

Journal of the History of Philosophy

Volume

41

Issue

3

First Page

307

Last Page

327

DOI

10.1353/hph.2003.0033

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