Document Type

Article

Abstract

A common presupposition in the concepts literature is that concepts constitute a singular natural kind. If, on the contrary, concepts split into more than one kind, this literature needs to be recast in terms of other kinds of mental representation. We offer two new arguments that concepts, in fact, divide into different kinds: (a) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to explain different sets of relevant phenomena; (b) concepts split because different kinds of mental representation, processed independently, must be posited to explain responses to different kinds of category. Whether these arguments are sound remains an open empirical question, to be resolved by future empirical and theoretical work.

Publication Date

10-1-2006

ISSN

0031-8248

Publication Title

Philosophy of Science

Volume

73

Issue

4

First Page

390

Last Page

409

DOI

10.1086/516806

Included in

Philosophy Commons

Share

COinS