Document Type

Article

Abstract

Computationalism—the view that cognition is computation—has always been controversial. It faces two types of objection. According to insufficiency objections, computation is insufficient for some cognitive phenomenon X. According to objections from neural realization, cognitive processes are realized by neural processes, but neural processes have feature Y, and having Y is incompatible with being (or realizing) computations. In this article, I explain why computationalism has survived these objections. To adjudicate the dispute between computationalism and its foes, I will conclude that we need a better account of computation.

Publication Date

12-1-2010

ISSN

0031-8248

Publication Title

Philosophy of Science

Volume

77

Issue

5

First Page

852

Last Page

861

DOI

10.1086/656549

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Philosophy Commons

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