Document Type

Thesis

Degree

Master of Arts

Major

Philosophy

Date of Defense

7-14-2006

Graduate Advisor

Berit Brogaard

Committee

Jon D. Mcginnis

Andrew Black

Abstract

An ongoing debate among propositionalists centers on the question: can the truth values of propositions change over time (?). The view that says that propositions can change truth values over time has been called temporalism. The more traditional view of propositions, which denies temporalism, and goes back to Frege, has been called eternalism. Mark Richard has given forceful argument against temporalism and in favor of eternalism: the argument from belief retention. On Richard¿s view, if temporalism comes out true then it is impossible for one to retain one¿s beliefs over time. As an eternalist about propositions, I believe that all propositions in some way refer to a particular time. In this paper, I will examine Richard¿s argument from belief retention and some temporalist responses to it. Afterwards, I will introduce my own eternalist account of propositions which will i) allow for belief retention in the precisely the troublesome cases which form the basis of Richard¿s original argument contra temporalism ii) account for the temporalist intuition that some propositions contain no implicit time references.

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