Title

The Virtue of Happiness as Affective State and its Centrality to Well-Being

Document Type

Thesis

Degree

Master of Arts

Major

Philosophy

Date of Defense

4-18-2011

Graduate Advisor

Anna Alexandrova

Committee

Wiland, Eric

Brunero, John

Abstract

Daniel Haybron has argued that welfare perfectionism articulated in Aristotelian terms is not plausible since it does not pay sufficient attention to one’s emotional state as a central constituent of well-being. To this end he provides counter examples which suggest that the Aristotelian account of well-being cannot possibly be right. In this paper I respond to the difficulties leveled against the perfectionist by arguing that the they should endorse a specific conception of happiness as a virtue, and that as a result the perfectionist is able to provide a more attractive and plausible account of well-being wherein happiness and moral virtue are its central constituents.

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