Document Type

Thesis

Degree

Master of Arts

Major

Philosophy

Date of Defense

4-15-2026

Graduate Advisor

Billy Dunaway

Committee

Eric Wiland

Annie Corbitt

Abstract

Matti Eklund's challenge to normative realism in Choosing Normative Concepts (2017) turns on the possibility of "alternative normative concepts"—concepts that play the same normative role as ours but have different extensions. Eklund argues that the ardent realist cannot express what he calls “the further question” about which concepts to use without either trivializing the answer or changing the subject. I argue that this challenge rests on an unstated assumption about how normative concepts are differentiated. I call this the Fragility Assumption. What I seek to show is that this assumption is not obligatory; there are live views of normative concepts which reject the Fragility Assumption. And, if the Fragility Assumption is rejected, the normative realist has a straightforward solution to Eklund’s challenge because the supposed alternative concepts are no alternative at all. My central thesis is that theorists are not required to adopt the Fragility Assumption; so, Eklund must argue for it in order for his challenge to put genuine pressure on the normative realist.

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