A Spectre Haunting - New Dimensions Of Youth Protest In Western Europe

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A SPECTRE HAUNTING:
NEW DIMENSIONS OF YOUTH PROTEST
IN WESTERN EUROPE

JOYCE MARIE MUSHABEN
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IN WESTERN EUROPE

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Abstract

This paper rests on an introductory study involving the new dimensions and new strategies of European protest movements during the 1980's. The author focuses on the peace, anti-nuclear and ecology movements, the drive for autonomous youth centers, in Switzerland, racial disturbances in Britain and unrest among the urban squatters in the German Federal Republic. The analysis of specific social rebellions is limited to a treatment of six dimensions. The "substantive" dimensions include a) depoliticization; b) postmaterialism; and c) nationalism; the "strategic" dimensions are a) radicalization; b) decentralization; and c) institutionalization of protest. Protests of the eighties are found to differ from movements of the sixties in relation to the ever more violent nature of confrontations between the citizen and the state, and with regard to a growing contingent of very young demonstrators, who have become a mobilizing force in their own right. The paper concludes that the willingness to engage in the process of system transformation is declining rapidly among protesters aged 15-24, at the same time it is growing among those old enough to have witnessed or participated in the movements of the sixties. Both groups of protesters pose a significant challenge, if not an existential threat, to the established political parties in West European Systems.

Acknowledgment

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A spectre of protest is haunting Europe, the likes of which have not been witnessed in advance industrial societies since the late 1960's. In regard to the latest wave of demonstrations in major European cities, one might be tempted to assume that many of the same activists, the old vanguard of the late sixties and early seventies, have reemerged from their ideological closets with the intention of mobilizing a "successor generation" of sympathizers around historical socio-political controversies. Both the scale and the scope of protest movements which have so charged the European political climate in recent months nonetheless attest to the fact that the spirits behind the outbursts of social unrest from Amsterdam to Zurich bear little family resemblance to those of earlier years. What is striking about these incidents of mass protest is that the present-day participants constitute a very motley crew, in contrast to their more ideologically-pure predecessors. The activists of the eighties are rallying to form often bizarre coalitions around a complex of disparate issues and goals. They are moreover committed to a broad range of organizational tactics and sometimes even contradictory political strategies.

This paper undertakes an introductory study concerning the new dimensions and new strategies of political protest in Western Europe. Based on field research conducted in Berlin, London and Zurich from May to July, 1982, it presents explanations which are admittedly exploratory in nature and conclusions which are tentative at best. In an effort to cultivate the Weberian tradition of Verstehen as a research skill, this author chose an eclectic strategy: data have been derived on the basis of participant observation at demonstrations, walking tours through affected neighborhoods, and informal interviews with people inside and outside "the scene," to complement her more orthodox documentation searches and media analyses.

The paper provides a broad overview of European protest developments in an effort to assess the degree of continuity that might exist between the dissident movements of the sixties, the seventies and the eighties. The "key issues" considered here include the peace-, anti-nuclear and ecology movements, the drive for autonomous youth culture centers, racial disturbances in Britain and the urban squatters' campaigns in the Federal Republic of Germany. The work begins by raising questions about the character of protest movements, 1980's-style, and their relation to democratic political systems. The analysis of specific social rebellions, found in Parts Two and Three, is limited to a treatment of six dimensions of protest, divided into two categories. The "substantive" dimensions considered include: a) the degree of (de)politicization or ideological orientation; b) the emphasis on materialist versus "post-materialist" values; and c) trends toward nationalism and questions of political identification. The second category consists of "tactical/strategic" dimensions: a) "radicalization" versus less militant forms of protest; b) the role of (de)centralization and consensus-building; and c) the "institutionalization" of protest, the long-march strategy versus dropping-out. The final section of the paper considers the nature of the State's response to protest, the linkages between conventional and unconventional forms of participation and the metamorphosis of the democratic process in Western Europe.
I. INTERPRETING PROTEST, THEN AND NOW

There is, in fact, a thread of continuity running through the protests of earlier years, both with respect to the movements' actual participants and with regard to the political "causes" activists have sought to represent. The peace demonstrations of the 1980's draw upon the traditions of the Easter Marches and the Anti-Nuclear Weapons Campaigns of the 1950's. The battles over the creation of autonomous youth centers in Switzerland date back to the fund-raising efforts of the fifties as well. Squatters in Amsterdam, Frankfurt and Berlin can draw upon the Wohngemeinschaften experiences in communal living shared by students of the sixties, should the original model, the Paris Commune of the 1800's, prove too remote.

But a comparison of protest activities across three decades also reveals significant variations. The general thesis of this paper reads, that while there is an element of "something old... something borrowed" to be found in the latest wave of "demos" and campaigns, the resurgence of social unrest also involves "something new" and not necessarily cloaked in red, as was Marx's spectre of 1848. New to the protest scene is the expectation that dissent increasingly leads to violent confrontations between citizens and the state. Also new is the realization that a growing contingent of alienated, non-university youth, aged 15-20, has become a mobilizing force in its own right. The addition of these two features poses qualitatively different problems for democratic theorists, policy-makers and preservers of the established public order.

Ronald Inglehart's 1971 analysis of "The Silent Revolution" in Western Europe began with the premise that "individuals pursue various goals in hierarchical order -- giving maximum attention to the things they sense to be the most important unsatisfied needs at a given time" (Inglehart, 1971, p. 991). Intergenerational conflict is in some respects inevitable, to the extent that members of successive age cohorts, socialized under different political-economic conditions, develop different needs and are likely to retain a correspondingly different value hierarchy throughout adulthood. Political values may undergo substantial modification, however, depending upon the interaction of cohort, life-cycle and period effects; value modification, in turn, is subject to time lags, the length of which may also be a function of interactive effects (Inglehart, 1981, pp. 880-883).

Intergenerational conflict has given rise to many a social rebellion in Western nations, from the Young Hegelian Movement of the 1840's to the sexual revolution of the 1960's. Protests mobilized by and confined to a specific cohort are likely to evince more internal homogeneity and commonality of purpose than those cutting across generational lines, the differentiating effects of class notwithstanding. Protest developments of the 1980's almost defy efforts at systematic analysis; ideological and organizational patterns tend to be much more complex than those witnessed two or three decades ago. Their complexity owes to the fact that, while the "causes" of protest find a traditional base in the generation gap between established politicians and newly enfranchised citizens, it is also true that protest developments in Western Europe are characterized by significant intergenerational conflicts within and among the dissident groups themselves.

The response, therefore, to the fundamental question, whether there exists such a thing as the European protest movement, is a resounding NO. As demonstrated below, political dissidence is a many-headed, multi-tailed animal, nourished by numerous and conflicting groups, tactics and goals. Very significant differences are observed in relation to the degree of politicization; commitment to a specific ideological direction is more prevalent among the late forties to early fifties cohort than among those born after 1960. Among the latter, protest tends to be much more "existentialist" in nature (Haller, 1981, pp. 202-203). Further variations are manifest in the degree of radicalization, that is, the proclivity toward more violent forms of political action.
This raises a second important question: do the European outbursts of social unrest have anything in common? What has enabled these externally diverse and internally fragmented groups to chalk up many a successful mass mobilization campaign -- from the 21 French and German citizen groups, who joined forces to resist plans for the Marckolsheim chemical plant on the French side of the Rhine in 1972 (Nelkin and Pollack, 1981, p. 60); to the 150,000 Germans who floacked "to the biggest demonstration ever seen in Wiesbaden" in November, 1981 to oppose construction of the Frankfurt runway Startbahn 18 West (Himmelheber, 1982, p. 6); to the 300,000 German, Dutch and "other" demonstrators who rallied for peace in Bonn on October 10, 1981 (Deile, et al, 1981, p. 9ff)? Two elements permeate the movements. First, germane to all is the sense of radical opposition to fundamental premises and practices dominating their respective political-economic establishments. Secondly, the fusion of the dissident movements is grounded in common political learning experiences, positive and negative, which have subsequently been adapted to suit other protest needs. Organizationally successful occupations of nuclear plant sites at Wyhl and Kaiseraugst, for example, have raised public consciousness, and have moreover resulted in administrative court victories for protesters (Nelkin and Pollack, pp. 61-64; Aubert, 1982, p. 143). They have even contributed to discussions of possible Pershing II and Cruise Missile site occupations in 1983 among more militant, anti-armament factions, according to interviews conducted by this author.

The integration and adaptation of past learning experiences to new "struggle" contexts poses a third question, namely, what is the longer-term significance of protest in the eighties, in contrast to earlier movements? After 20+ years of leftist-inspired activism the participants themselves are developing a sense of the evolutionary character of these movements, which are definable in terms of

... a social process that unfolds in a situational context. Protest groups emerge as a result of structural changes in society and as a movement develops, its organization, ideologies, and tactics adapt to the environmental and political circumstances in which it evolves. In the course of broadening its constituency and developing its strategies, a social movement also becomes a source of further structural change, though often in directions that may be neither anticipated nor intended (Nelkin and Pollack, p. 6).

References to social evolution and structural change per se do not provide complete answers to a fourth important question, as to why political malcontents of the eighties have resorted to ever more violent forms of protest. Violence and "direct action" have become the rule rather than the exception, especially among elements of the squatters' and culture-center scenes -- in other words, among those not yet of voting age. More violent outbursts have in turn been accompanied by the "criminalization" of a wider range of nonconventional forms of participation by state officials. The proclivity toward violence can neither be simply interpreted as an outflow of excess libidinal energy among adolescents, nor glibly ascribed to failed experiments in anti-authoritarian education. Further, it is not merely the product of poor police-community relations, as some have tried to argue in explaining the Brixton riots, for example (Scarman, 1981). One hypothesis worth exploring is that the guerilla-warfare mentality now common to innercity unrest offers a delayed confirmation of Marcuse's prognosis on the rise of "surplus repression" (Mar­cuse, 1972, p. 52). The violence is sooner rooted in the complex nature of pressing socio-economic problems; the spread of violence poses a threat to the stability of the system and hence requires a specifically political interpretation.

Charles Tilly's analysis on the role of collective violence in Western Euro­pean political development suggests the existence of a "standard cycle" that leads to a fusion of social protest and structural change. Historically,

... a relatively integrated traditional society breaks up under the stress and movement of industrialization, the stress and movement stimulate a
wide variety of violent reactions -- at first chaotic, but gradually ac-
quiring a measure of coherence. New means of control and ways of rein-
tegrating the displaced segments of the population into an orderly social
life eventually develop, and finally a mature industrial society held to-
gether by widespread, generally pacific political participation emerges.
In such a theory, the stimulus to collective violence comes largely from
the anxieties people experience when established institutions fall apart
(Tilly, 1979, p. 87).

Perhaps the cycle repeats itself under the "stress and movement" of post-indus-
trialization.

Violent forms of protest are not merely the by-product of industrialization
and social displacement; rather, they derive from new struggles over established
positions in the political structure of power. Tilly maintains that

Even presumably nonpolitical forms of collective violence... are normally
directed against the authorities, accompanied by a critique of the au-
thorities' meeting of their responsibilities, and informed by a sense of
justice denied to the participants in the process (Tilly, p. 87).

As a direct challenge to authorities, violent protest may be seen to accompany and
complement more organized, peaceful efforts by the aggrieved to realize their own
political objectives. Violent protest functions as a metering device with respect
to perceived political legitimacy.

A fifth question worthy of consideration involves the special role of adoles-
cent protest, a new class of "pro-anarchy/no future" citizens, whose first direct
contact with the state is more likely to have been a burst of tear-gas rather than
a trip to the ballot box. Youth in the postwar period has become a powerful meta-
phor for social change, the personification of new life-styles and values -- which
consequently poses another direct challenge to the existing authority structure.
But the position of youth in post-industrial society and its prospects for self-
actualization have also undergone a radical transformation. In a study of post
World War II youth subcultures, British sociologists have noted that

in the 1950's, 'youth' came to symbolise the most advanced point of social
change ... youth was the vanguard party ... social change was seen as gen-
erally beneficial ('you've never had it so good') ... in the early 1960's,
the most visible and identifiable youth groups were involved in dramatic
events which triggered off 'moral panics', focusing, in displaced form,
society's 'quarrel with itself' ... In this crisis of authority, youth now
played the role of symptom and scapegoat (Hall and Jefferson, 1982, pp.
71-72).

The late 1960's gave way to counter-culture, student protest and street poli-
tics; youth lost its reputation as a positive agent for change and acquired the
image of a subversive minority, which the Law and Order Society sought to control.
Economic recession, educational reforms gone haywire and rising unemployment figures
in the 1970's and 1980's have since ascribed to youth a much more static role --
as a case for social workers and psychotherapists (Oltmann, 1980, pp. 40-45;
Giesecke, 1981, p. 6). Alienated, unemployed adolescents moreover serve as living
proof that politicians have failed to meet their social responsibilities, i.e. by
not fulfilling their electoral promises of equal opportunity and sustained economic
growth (Frackmann, et al., 1981, pp. 7-9).

Last but not least, an overview of West European Social movements must also
inquire as to the "meaning" of protest for the political system as a whole. This
raises questions regarding the effects of protest on the understanding of democracy in specific national contexts. It further questions the long term prospects for (re)integrating individual activists into the established political institutions. Political socialization research points to party identification as the area in which early-instilled political preferences are most likely to persist (Inglehart, 1971, p. 992). The proliferation of "alternative" parties, combined with a strong anti-politics orientation among the youngest generation of protesters may indeed become an important source of structural change.

II. THE SUBSTANTIVE DIMENSIONS: WHO'S PROTESTING WHAT?

A major survey sponsored by the German Shell Corporation confirmed that "Youth '81" evinces little of the dynamism, optimism or the care-freeness one would expect of those to whom "the future" allegedly belongs. Of the 1075 15-24 year olds interviewed, 95 percent do not believe that wars will one day cease to plague the human race; nor do 95 percent believe that it is possible to create a secure, worry-free society. At least 80 percent anticipate a future of scarce resources, economic crises and famines; 78 percent hold human equality for an unattainable goal; 76 percent presume that chemistry and technology will indeed destroy the environment (Jugendwerk, 1981, p. 384). If the prospects are really so grim, then there is a measure of political realism in youth's depiction of itself as the No Future Generation. Hence, the young people's claim that "we want everything and indeed subito" (Giesecke, 1981).

A. Dimension "Depoliticization" and the Drive for Autonomous Youth Centers (AJZ)

In contrast to the anti-imperialist, anti-Vietnam campaigns of the 1960's, movements of the 1980's are unique in their combination of "traditional" protest activities (demonstrations) with a multitude of concrete, pragmatic efforts to develop new work-and-life-styles (Giesecke, p. 4). The dominant theme is "No Power to No One." Activists' negative orientation to politics, fused with a preference for bizarre, countercultural behavior underlines the importance of problems and contradictions for which money provides no solution. This refocusing on values (human closeness, individual freedom) becomes a source of great discomfort to established powers committed to efficiency and technocratic expertise. Their language is decidedly anti-ideological, anti-intellectual -- i.e. delights in grammatically incorrect wordplay -- and even the New Socialization Type: Student is consciously inimical to "theory."

The anti-politics orientation derives from a recognition that gaps between theory and practice are the rule rather than the exception. Criticism is not directed against the abstract values of a majoritarian society (freedom, social justice); protesters question instead whether it is possible for Big Politics to develop a clear orientation to these values. Secondly, the apolitical behavior of the younger generation stems from experience; the under-aged are powerless in their efforts to exercise political influence through normal channels. Thirdly, not only the content of politics, but also the manner in which politicians and administrators deal with citizens is perceived as destructive to the individual. Fourth, the web of bureaucratic rules and regulations concentrates more on the security of the state than on the protection of citizens; final decisions are more sensitive to juridical imperatives than to individual needs. Fifth, the image of future society is one based on a single set of values, criteria and behaviors, brought into harmony with technological development. The majority culture denies minority and alternative cultures the right to exist. Protesters reject the notion that alternative values may apply in the personal sphere as long as majoritarian standards prevail in the productive sector. Further, the commitment to large-scale political organizations has resulted in a "leveling" of social problems and a "monotonizing" of
culture. Moreover, the special problems of youth -- the need for more humane schools and better vocational training, high youth unemployment and the shortage of affordable, decent housing -- have been exploited for electoral purposes, but subsequently ignored by office-holders. Finally, younger people feel that they have been denied a chance to organize themselves and to learn from their own mistakes. "Youth policy" has been conducted for, but not in communication with those most affected (Giesecke, 1981).

The struggles involved in the efforts to create autonomous youth centers (AJZ) in Switzerland and Germany (which can only be summarized here) lend an empirical base to these criticism. The AJZ activists express a commitment to principles of self-responsibility and grass-roots democracy; they militate against the coldness of established, subsidized culture. "Pack Ice" and "Concrete" images symbolize the sterility and lack of individual warmth of the dominant culture. Leitmotif: "Too bad concrete doesn't burn."

The drive to establish special centers in Switzerland began with the formation of the Initiative Committee for a Zurich Youth House in 1949. Various fund raising activities were instigated by adolescent groups through the fifties and netted a center fund of Fr. 800,000 by 1960, while city fathers argued over a possible site. In 1968, the younger generation took to the streets several times to express its impatience; the June Anti-Police and Globus demonstrations resulted in violent physical confrontations. Attempts to "occupy" buildings were unsuccessful, until the City Council agreed in 1977 to provisional centers in the Rote Fabrik and Schindlergut, both in need of substantial renovation. Large scale protests occurred frequently over the next three years, culminating in a demonstration of 8,000 on June 21, 1980. Shortly thereafter, officials announced a decision to provide a credit of 60 million Franken for renovation of the Zurich Opera House. On June 28, politicians consented to an Autonomous Youth Center in the Limmatstrasse, to the tune of Fr. 40,000. Unrest continued throughout the summer, spreading to Bern and Basel. A September 4 police raid on the Center led to a finding of 230 grams of hashish, a quantity of "powder resembling heroin," 2 pistols and an air gun, resulting in the immediate closing of the AJZ. On September 8, the local council approved a Fr. 170,000 expenditure for a new high-pressure waterhose. In November, an Eidgenössische Kommission published its Theses on the Causes of Youth Unrest, openly denounced by Zurich's Educational Superintendent, Alfred Gllgen. (Howald, 1981, p. 133). By January, 1981, 1400 demonstrators were subjected to criminal investigation. The AJZ was reopened in April, 1981, under the sponsorship of the Social Democratic Party and a church-related group, Pro Juvente, with a subsidy of one million Franken; it closed again a few months later owing to drug traffic. On March 23, 1981, the building in the Limmatstrasse was demolished; the site remains empty -- all physical reminders that politicians failed to deal effectively with youth problems in Zurich have literally been eliminated.

Confrontations at the Youth Center Komm in Nuremberg may have been less prolonged, but the results have been no less depressing for urban adolescents. What Zurich youth sought for decades to acquire had come into being some eight years ago, under the auspices of a relatively progressive SPD Cultural Director, Hermann Glaser. The Communication Center, not far from McDonald's, had an annual budget of DM 600,000, of which DM 210,000 was spent on four full-time secretaries, programs and advertising. For the CSU Opposition in City Hall, Komm served as an "Agitation Center" and a "switchboard for rabblerousers" (Aust, 1981, p. 67). Komm visitors were known to arrange discussions on drug- and-squatter-related problems, and many no doubt had personal connections to "the scene."

In February, 1981, Bavarian CSU Minister President Franz Josef Strauss advised his Interior Minister Tandler to adopt a hard line against youth unrest, in light
of "the serious transgressions of the rioting, brutal chaotics in Berlin, Frankfurt, Göttingen and Hamburg" (Aust, p. 62). It became standard procedure by March to station several police units around the Center every time a special event was scheduled. On Friday, March 5, in spite of a cityfathers' Verbot, two Dutch guests showed a film dealing with squatter developments in Amsterdam, to which the police sent a number of V-Männer (from the Constitutional Protection Office) to record the discussion on the tactical use of force. A spontaneous disturbance involving about 150-200 exiting youngsters broke out after 25 vans of police attempted to block off surrounding streets; the majority then sought asylum back in Kom. At 3:30 a.m. 164 occupants were taken into police custody, against 141 of whom identical criminal charges were filed. Many were transported to detention centers in Bayreuth or Munich, their parents first informed after the weekend (DIE ZEIT, 11. December 1981). Reports indicate that at least 70 adolescents were known to have been drinking tea, playing chess or listening to music at the time of arrest (Aust, p. 72). The first trial proceedings in November, 1981, were postponed when important evidentiary police transcripts suddenly "disappeared" (DIE ZEIT, 2. April 1981). Due to controversy over "legal irregularities" in the selection of judges, a substantial number had yet to be tried by late spring of 1982.

If established politician Franz Joseph Strauss sees fit to summarize his reaction to youth disturbances with the phrase, "Democratization is the beginning of anarchy" (Howald, p. 193); when the President of the Zurich City Council announces to thousands gathered in front of City Hall, "Do not take it for granted that we have to come out here" to discuss the demonstrators' demands, it comes as no surprise that they should lose faith in the political process.

The "depoliticization" of youth protest has two components. The first involves disinterest in the established political system, which is expected to prevail among the youngest, as part of the life-cycle effect. A 1977 Shell study shows this to be especially true in Germany (Table I).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very Strong</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Somewhat Interested</th>
<th>Hardly Interested</th>
<th>No Interest</th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13 years</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>308</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18 years</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23 years</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>341</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>266</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The second component involves an active distrust, manifested in an unwillingness to join political organizations of any sort; distrust is more likely to be a function of negative experiences, now being made by ever younger members of the polity. As Table II indicates, these early experiences may counteract family-instilled political preferences and, consequently, eliminate the rationale for party identification.
Table II: Party Participation (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Most Certain</th>
<th>Possibly</th>
<th>Probably not</th>
<th>Very improbable</th>
<th>No response</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>854</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>years</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fr.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>332</td>
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<td>17-18</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>342</td>
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<tr>
<td>22-23</td>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>341</td>
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<tr>
<td>years</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


among the young. The Institut fur Demoskopie in Allensbach has reported that of 5.4 million German 17-23 year olds, 760,000 are dropouts, 2.7 million are disillusioned with domestic conditions and 1.13 million (21 percent) have no intention of voting (STERN, Nr. 38/1979). There is something much more fundamental than "the end of ideology" at stake, and the spray-painted anarchy symbol has appeared in all major European cities. Is this an era of "No Politics" for a "No Future" generation?

3. Dimension "Post-Materialism" and the Pursuit of Happiness Among the Squatters

An active distrust of politics is a trait shared by ADJ protesters and members of the Hausbesetzer scene. The squatters differ from center supporters in that their search for solidarity extends beyond weekends and recreational periods. Given the hours invested in squatter-council discussions, physical repairwork and constant efforts to avoid forceful eviction by police, the occupation of houses becomes "a real full-time job" -- with overtime (Aust, p. 11).

The idea is to live better with less, to arrange satisfying work-and-living conditions, rather than to overcompensate one's "Fruist" through consumption. Collective action becomes a key weapon against social isolation. The question is whether the 15-24 year olds really have a choice regarding the idea of "living with less." They feel marginalized by their Not-Yet-Status, see few prospects for becoming affluent adults. Their only positive role is Youth-as-Consumer. In the Federal Republic, the 12-21 year olds reportedly have a purchasing potential of DM 18 billion per month -- those lucky enough to have jobs (Oltmanns, 1981, p. 25).

Youth unemployment has reached catastrophic proportions in Great Britain, where it is estimated that one half of all school-leavers in 1982 will be without jobs, and that less than 50 percent of those 16-17 year olds eligible for the new Youth Training Scheme in 1983 will find permanent positions (House of Commons, 1982, p. 22). The picture is not nearly so grim in Switzerland, where job market pressures have been relieved at least temporarily by the decision to send home one million guestworkers in the mid-1970's. Swiss youth may face a waiting period up to two years for highly desired apprenticeships, but they are available. The German statistics on youth unemployment fall in between, though the outlook is far from
Table III. Unemployed Youth, Ages 15-20 and 20-25, in the Federal Republic of Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Month</th>
<th>15-20</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>20-25</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent General Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1967</td>
<td>19,212</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>24,322</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1970</td>
<td>7,522</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>10,653</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1973</td>
<td>20,960</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>30,041</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1975</td>
<td>115,753</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>171,620</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1977</td>
<td>105,900</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>161,873</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1978</td>
<td>92,030</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>153,931</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1979</td>
<td>68,693</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>123,709</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1980</td>
<td>81,065</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>143,526</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


encouraging, as Table III illustrates. Though German rates are not high in international comparison, historical experiences with unemployment and inflation add weight to the problem (Scharpf et al., 1982).

The number of Germans aged 15-30 increased between 1975 and 1980 from 1.7 million to 13.8 million; by 1985 this age group of potential job-hunters will add another 1.7 million. Official unemployment figures among those under twenty reached 90,000 in the summer of 1981: an estimated 200,000 have not yet found suitable apprenticeships (Frackmann, 1981, p. 33, p. 42). Among the children of foreign workers, only 40,000 of the 160,000 15-19 year olds are completing vocational training (Frackmann, p. 68). The alternatives may be fatal. Reimar Oltmanns reports that over 150,000 young Germans have joined religious cults; 80,000 are known to be narcotics addicts, with the world’s Number One heroin-death rate of 600 annually; 180,000 still in school regularly consume alcohol; 300,000 have juvenile criminal records; some 3 million suffer serious psychological problems; and by 1979, the number of suicides in the 15-25 group topped 1500 annually (Oltmanns, pp. 40-43).

Another alternative, communal living experiments based on the illegal occupation of vacant buildings, has attracted political attention because of the violence generally associated with the evictions. Despite their image as storm-trooping anarchists, the squatters actually comprise at least four distinct groups: 1) the urban-political elements, cultivating cooperative efforts among city planners, architects, social workers and tenant organizations (Mieterinitiativen); 2) self-proclaimed supporters of the Punk, “Sponti” and Anarcho-Scenes; 3) individuals attracted out of "existential necessity," including 1500-3000 drug addicts, runaways and homeless; 4) political trend-followers and sympathizers, students, apprentices and intellectual part-timers (Giesecke, p. 17).

The illegal take-overs and make-overs by young activists are justified on the basis of genuine shortages of affordable, "livable" housing in major urban centers. Protest against planned obsolescence and land speculation on the part of owners and developers also plays a role. In Frankfurt (known to the scene as Bankfurt or Frankfurt), 1000 luxury apartments stand empty, while 20,500 people are registered as "homeless" (Haller, 1981, p. 77). In Zurich, where the occupations have a more limited, symbolic function, a one room apartment easily commands a monthly rent of Fr. 1000-2000, circa $500-$1000 (Howald, p. 154).

The Amsterdam Kraakers (the sound of a bolted door being opened with an iron wedge) have served as a role model for would-be squatters across the continent. As early as 1971, the Dutch High Court guaranteed already settled activists a legal
"right to peaceful occupancy," making prevention of take-overs the main focus of police activity. Over 10,000 apartments have been occupied in 10 years by 30,000 people; over 60,000 "hardship cases" continue to search for suitable dwellings. The squatters tend to enjoy widespread support, despite the shockwaves produced by violence during the investiture of Queen Beatrix in April, 1981 (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 2, 1981). The Kraakers claim to have learned valuable organizational lessons during the "Brokdorf-conditioning" days; that Dutch squatters also participate in anti-nuclear energy demonstrations "can be taken for granted" (Haller, p. 131).

West Berlin, Nikolas Ritter argues, "has a good chance of becoming the Drop-Out City of Western Europe: (DER SPIEGEL, Nr. 11/1979). That Berlin has more Hausbesetzungen than any other German Land is due to the fact that the housing shortage is also more extreme (TAGESSPIEGEL, 31. July 1982). A major construction scandal that forced Major Dietrich Stobbe's resignation in 1980 only underlined squatters' cynicism regarding SPD promises to remedy the problem. Interim Reigning Mayor Hans-Jochen Vogel was relatively successful in reestablishing local peace on the basis of his "Berlin Line" policy. Building owners were required to provide concrete proof and imminent dates of renovation plans before evictions would be undertaken. The Berlin government meanwhile attempted to arrange for "property-use contracts" between individual households and landlords. Popular sympathy initially rested with the squatters, especially in neighborhoods where urban renewal was long overdue and the trade union controlled developing company Neue Heimat was engaging in legally questionable tactics (Schindele, 1980). Despite Vogel's short-term success, the saliency of the housing catastrophe and the list of policy failures in other areas was too long to prevent the SPD's defeat in the 1981 special elections.

This city of 1.9 million inhabitants was found to have over 800 empty apartment buildings in various stages of decay by the late seventies, along with 1500-2000 individuals without leases and 40,000 registered as "urgently in need" of housing (Haller, p. 105). In the Kreuzberg neighborhood alone, of the 16,000 rental units requiring major repairs in 1963, 2,400 had been torn down, 1400 newly constructed and 14 renovated by 1973 (Aust, p. 30). According to official statistics, 248 buildings have been occupied since 1979; 727 persons are "registered squatters" in 30-40 core houses (TAGESSPIEGEL, 9. July 1982). The new CDU Mayor Richard von Weizsäcker promised to uphold the "Berlin Line," after assuming office in May, 1981. Nevertheless, the number of forceful evictions has increased dramatically over the last year, and the remainder are subject to frequent "searches" by the police. As of August, 1982, the number of besetzte Hauser stood at 123. Since 1979, police have "investigated" 1600 persons and initiated 5791 court proceedings in conjunction with eviction-related street battles (TAGESSPIEGEL, 9. July 1982).

Conditions in the occupied buildings are generally quite primitive; many lack windows and doors, most lack showers; private toilets and depend on coal ovens for heat. More important for these urban protesters, however, is the chance to create their own space and develop their own life-styles. The "period effects" of a declining economy are likely to have a much stronger impact on the value preferences of young squatters than on well-housed adults, owing to their greater economic vulnerability.

A high level of perceived physical insecurity could, in theory, lead to a renewed interest in materialist values. In fact, Inglehart has already registered a decline in the ratio of Post-Materialists to Materialists in the youngest group surveyed between 1973 and 1976 (Inglehart, 1981, p. 888). The shift away from Post-Materialism, however, cannot be interpreted as a gain for the Materialist camp. Inglehart argues that insecurity has recently arrested the spread of Post-Materialism, leading to a renewed emphasis on reindustrialization and reunification. He fails to mention that it is the older, established generation that is again supporting...
these goals at the policy-making level. As the 1981 Shell survey demonstrates, there is still a high degree of commitment to environmental protection, greater individual freedom, support for women's rights and the peace movement among youth. This suggests that there are perhaps two classes of Post-Materialists: those aged 25-34 who have "made it," are now established in careers and can devote their energies to political causes; and those who are under 25 who are resigned to not attaining satisfying professions and expensive possessions, who have opted for a more extreme set of anti-materialistic values. Could this be the generation of Post-Post-Materialists?

C. Dimension "Nationalism" and the Advent of European Racism

Throughout the sixties, the repression of blacks in the United States was a common topic and stimulus to "anti-Americanist" sentiments among elements of the European Left. Students as well as trade unionists also stood more or less united in their opposition to exploitation of Third World workers by the multinational corporations. The influx of foreign students at European universities, along with the importation of guestworkers in the mid-sixties, was construed as a form of development assistance, which, of course, conveniently served domestic economic needs. The physical presence of these foreigners undeniably raised consciousness with respect to the plight of the Third World. The "guests" appear to have worn out their welcome. In light of serious economic crises in the developed counties, the continued presence of Asians, Africans and Turkish nationals has produced psychological as well as complex socio-economic problems for the host nations.

The problem of racism is intimately connected to the resurgence of right-wing groups and neo-nationalism. Surprisingly, however, ultra rightist, racist tendencies are finding expression among different age groups in Great Britain and in the Federal Republic. In both cases, though, economic insecurity seems to lie at the base. Non-nationals are increasingly viewed as illegitimate competitors in the struggle for access to scarce housing and job opportunities.

Great Britain, the textbook case of a democratic, albeit "deferential society," experienced major outbursts in nine cities during July of 1981, and additional unrest in Toxteth/Liverpool in July, 1982. The disturbances were triggered by race-related incidents. Having stalwartly shouldered "the white man's burden" through the nineteenth century, Britain has proved unprepared to conquer the problems posed by the influx of New Commonwealth citizens in the mid-twentieth century. Unlike the guestworkers in Germany on temporary visas, the Afro-Caribbean and Asian residents cannot be sent home, many of the youngest constituting the third generation. Little attention was paid to integration schemes through the fifties and sixties. Since 1968, the focus has been on legislative devices geared to restricting future immigration -- in a country where it is "still respectable in the House of Commons" to describe ethnic minorities as "aliens" and "genetically different" (Behrens, 1982, p. 126). Since the seventies, attention has turned to Law and Order Legislation, i.e. the "sus" law, in effect affording police and the courts much discretion in responding to delinquency among young blacks (Husband, 1982, pp. 304-305; Hall and Jefferson, pp. 73-74).

The Southall demonstration of April 23-24, 1979, in the public's eye, is classified as an incident distinct from confrontations between ethnic groups and police through the summer of 1981. In this case, sympathy fell to the Asian community in its reaction to unprovoked acts of white racism. A variety of Asian-Indian, community and youth groups planned a peaceful sitdown before the Town Hall to protest an election meeting of the ultra-right National Front Party there. The aggressive behavior of the police toward those intent on a "march for unity and peace" dealt a severe shock to the community as a whole, which was relatively well-integrated (Dummett, 1980, pp. 7-15).
The National Front Party, formed in 1967, pursued a political program centered on "racial purity" and other values repugnant to British democracy. Up until 1979, the NF nevertheless adhered to democratic rules and procedures (Husband, p. 261). The 1979 elections were proclaimed to be "a supreme test" of right-wing strength. The results were disastrous, 1.6 percent for the NF, even outdistanced by the new Ecology Party (Taylor in NEW COMMUNITY, No. 2, Autumn, 1981). The NF then abandoned its democratic tactics in favor of physical attacks on the Asian community, so severe that the Home Office felt obliged to commission a special investigation (Home Office, 1981).

These developments created a framework of tension for the Brixton disorders of April 10-12, 1981. The riots were set off when police attempted to assist a young black whom they thought had been stabbed. As crowds began to gather, rumors spread that the police had inflicted the injury. Over two days of rioting, burning and looting, 7,472 police were brought into a community generally serviced by 710 (NEW SOCIETY, 3. December 1981). The nation breathed a sigh of relief when the publication of Lord Scarman's Report in November provided an Official Answer to the causes of unrest. This report, which focused on events in only one of four wards, saw the main problem in poor communication between the police and the black community; the fact that white youths sided with the blacks in three other wards and uptown looting was overlooked (Interview with MP John Tilley, former Shadow Minister of Race Relations). Other factors, general unemployment in Brixton which stood at 13 percent, for blacks under 19 at 55 percent and homelessness among 200-300 blacks, were mentioned as "background" (Scarman, 1981, pp. 25-27). Lord Scarman regretted the results of "delay and lack of vigour," "unimaginative and inflexible policing" (Scarman, pp. 100-101). He concluded: "Institutional racism does not exist in Britain: but racial disadvantage and its nasty associate, racial discrimination, have not yet been eliminated" (Scarman, p. 209).

Racist sentiments and attraction to ultra-right, neo-nazi groups are a long-standing tradition among white working class youths in the UK. The "Teddy Boys" were the recognized instigators of the 1958 Nottingham race-riots (Hall and Jefferson, p. 83). The "skin-heads" of the late sixties emerged from the rapidly worsening economic situation among the lower working class stratum. The intensified feeling of Us-Then led to a search for solidarity along "territorial" lines. These self-proclaimed "Mobs" cultivated a collective, macho identity, for which football and the particular brand of violence associated with mass sporting events provided an arena for expression (Hall and Jefferson, p. 101). Their own sports, "Paki-Bashing" and "Queer-Bashing," entailed ritualized attacks on the community's most obvious scapegoats and gained in popularity following the NF's electoral fiasco of 1979. Officials generally feared renewed white outbursts as the youth unemployment picture continued to darken.

In 1979 a split occurred among the ultrarightists, the 30-40 year olds continuing their support of the National Front as a non-constitutional movement with a strong pro-police orientation. The younger elements gravitated to the British Movement, which has adopted a more anti-police stance and has acquired functions akin to a "Youth Club." The NF has not dared to make waves in Brixton since 1978 (Interview with MP Tilley). Right-wing potential nonetheless remains anchored in the younger "lumpenproletariat."

Renewed efforts to organize among right-wing extremists in the Federal Republic are also characterized by a growing animosity toward foreigners (Ausländerfeindlichkeit), especially toward Turkish nationals. The Shell survey nonetheless holds that only one percent of the 13-24 year olds identify with and 3 percent find the neo-nationalistic groups "very good," while 33 percent of the sample are prepared to "struggle against" and 41 percent "dislike" these groups (Jugendwerk, 1981, p. 17). Those who do identify come from lower socio-economic
backgrounds. A 1979-81 Berlin survey of 160,000 school children found 60 eighth to tenth graders classified as ultra-right (TAGESSPIEGEL, 10. July 1982). Given a different historical burden, German political leaders have taken an active interest in counteracting radical-right tendencies, especially in the schools. The Berlin SPD devoted a full day of discussion to the relation between youth unemployment, limited historical knowledge of the Holocaust and anti-democratic tendencies among those under 18 (TAGESSPIEGEL, 2. July 1982).

Anyone familiar with the West German music scene is likely to have trouble digesting the findings of Shell without a substantial dose of Morton's product, however. The punks, bikers, rockabilllys, the heavy metal and new wave groups echo a very different refrain: "you never get bored when you're frightened." At the Punk's version of "the Met" -- Berlin's Metropol -- the less empty beer cans thrown at performers, the more appreciated the "sound" is judged to be. Texts are brutal and contain strong fascist overtones, especially among the New German Wave. But these are not Nazis in the traditional sense. As one concert promoter stressed, "they look like Hitler Youth, they are Hitler Youth, only they don't know who Hitler was." Moreover, "the record companies go along without skruples, as long as they can make good money" (DIE-ZEIT, 16. July 1982). The shift in musical taste involves another ironic, nationalist twist. After three decades of domination by the American rock-market, new wave bands are out to reject "foreign" music, helping German recording firms out of the recession in the process. Researchers at the Heidelberg Sinus-Institut take the musical metaphors seriously, having conducted a survey in which 40 percent of the 14-18 year olds would "tolerate" the neo-nazis (DIE NEUE, 9. July 1982).

As a recruitment source and battleground, the schools are also important to the neo-nazi party, the NPD. A "citizen initiative" calling itself Aktion Ausländer Stopp has appeared before the Nordrhein-Westphalen Constitutional Court for its efforts to impose the principle of "native language instruction" in grade schools. Limited access to German higher education and professions would presumably increase guestworkers' willingness to return home. Heading the drive is an engineering professor from Hagen, a known NPD ward leader (DIE ZEIT, 28. May 1982). Fifteen other university professors have signed the Heidelberg Manifesto of 17. June 1981, protesting the "infiltration of the German folk by foreigners," especially Turkish residents unwilling to assimilate (DIE ZEIT, 12. February 1982). In contrast to Britain, organized neo-nationalist potential in Germany seems to be stronger among older, more established strata.

The Federal Center for Political Education recently published a free brochure, projecting that the departure of 4,629,800 foreign workers would open up 1.9 million jobs. It then demonstrated that most of the Germans currently unemployed would be unqualified, i.e. for work in the mines, construction and automobile industries (TAGESSPIEGEL, 2. July 1982). The guestworkers and their children have maintained a low profile during the periods of urban unrest, although the problems of youth unemployment and substandard housing affect them most directly. Berlin-Kreuzberg has become a "Little Istanbul" of 80,000; already one fourth of Berlin's school-aged children are of Turkish parentage. Although the welcome mat was rolled up five years ago, less than 4 percent of these families are now interested in returning to the homeland (TAGESSPIEGEL, 28. July 1982).

The low profile has not prevented the rise of antipathy towards these especially hard-to-assimilate aliens. The Godesberg Institute for Applied Social Sciences found that 49 percent of the FRG citizens are hostile towards the foreign presence, 22 percent are ambivalent. Those who admitted to prejudice tended to have no direct contact, yet considered themselves "well enough informed" about the guestworkers' plight. Antipathy increased in relation to the age of those interviewed; it correlated negatively with higher levels of education, however. The majority of respon-
dents under 20, most likely to experience competition for scarce jobs, were "friendly" in their orientations, 65 percent of those expressing hostility were retired individuals. Among academics, 28 percent were sooner negative; of those with only grade school educations, 60 percent were disposed toward hostility. Meanwhile, the state government in Stuttgart has purchased 1000 Deutschland-Ober-Alles record albums for distribution in Baden-Württemberg schools, and a 1978 Bavarian Law requires all would-be teachers to learn the entire text of the national hymn by heart (Oltmanns, p. 80).

Both Great Britain and the Federal Republic are saddled with unique, albeit different historical burdens in regard to ethnic minorities. Both countries evinced a strong sense of national identity up until World War II (problems with the Scots, Welsh, Irish and maybe Bavarians notwithstanding). Neither hesitated to open its doors to alien workers in the face of serious labor shortages. According to one MP, "the Mother Country welcomed them when there was work to be done," recruiting citizens from Barbados for the London Transport and Asian nurses for the National Health Service in the 1950's. German recruitment of Turkish, Yugoslavian and Italian workers for heavy industry was delayed a decade, by the imperatives of reconstruction. One must bear in mind, however, that the "melting pot" is an American invention, not a European tradition; historically, the dominant propensity for decades was to close national borders, not to integrate.

The effects of economic recession, combined with the day-to-day exposure to alien cultures in one's own land are causing adolescents to ask what it means to be "British" or "Deutsch," if only indirectly. Class-based frictions remain strong in Britain, and very gloomy economic prospects give rise to a more aggressive identity search. The concept of "neutro-nationalism," used in conjunction with the German peace movement, the relative leveling of class differences after the war and increased access to higher education after 1965 could conceivably lead to a more positive orientation among the young: as vanguards of the European peace movement, being "German" may not be all that bad -- if one wants to identify at all. Table IV explores pre-peace movement trends:

Table IV: National Pride (In Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Very Proud</th>
<th>Proud</th>
<th>Amazed</th>
<th>Don't Care</th>
<th>No Response</th>
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<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
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<td>44</td>
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Source: Jugendwerk der Deutschen Schill, JUVENTUS IN EUROPA, Band 11, 1977, p. 83.

III. STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS: WHO'S PROTESTING HOW?

The initial phases of the European student movement in the mid-1960's bear little strategic resemblance to the radicalized leftist protests of the late 1970's.
For the most part, students adopted the non-violent tactics of the American civil rights movements: Marches, sit-ins, teach-ins and boycotts. Following the death of Benno Ohnesorge during a 1967 anti-Shah demo and the 1968 assassination attempt against Rudi Dutschke in Berlin, the movement resorted to more militant tactics; but violence was directed expressly against property, not against persons. The intensity of the anti-Vietnam protests staged by a very fragmented Left, coupled with the rise of Baader-Meinhof-style terrorism, eliminated this distinction by 1972 (Mushaben, 1980). The terrorist segment actually commands very limited support; a larger group, i.e. peace-movement activists, reject violent tactics altogether. The remainder share an implicit acceptance of more militant forms of protest, including force against individuals, when other tactics have failed. It is a passive acceptance: the violence against people is a reaction to acts of physical force used by the state itself against protesters.

Protest strategies of the eighties derive from two decades of organizational experience. The new activism has no single tactical preference; rather, it depends on a curious mixture of long marches through the institutions, extraparliamentary opposition and acts of "civil war" (Bürgerkrieg) against the state.

A. Dimension "Radicalization" and the Criminalization of Dissent

In terms of socialization experiences affected by political-economic conditions, individuals born during the 1950's and 1960's, and those who were raised during the war and reconstruction years are literally worlds apart. The under-35 generations have never experienced right-wing dictatorships first hand. They see the division of the world into capitalist and socialist spheres of influence as a fact of political life. Youth's image of the "free-democratic basic order" includes Berufsverbot, legislated limitations on free speech and assembly, textbook censorship in the schools, bureaucratic penetration of the private sphere and physical blows meted out by the long arm of the law (Oltmanns, p. 69).

The "sins of youth" committed during the seventies and eighties result in criminal records and life-long career consequences, once the physical wounds have healed. The sins of earlier generations have been curiously overlooked: former SS-officer in the Ukraine, Rudolf Weber-Lortsch is a justice on the Federal Administrative Court; SS-volunteer Helmut Fuchs became president of the Mannheim Administrative Court in 1978. Ministerpresident of Baden Württemberg Hans Filbinger, infamous for his campaign against "young Communists" in his home state, was finally forced to resign after his record as a Nazi-marine judge was uncovered. Former NSDAP-member Karl Carstens currently sits as President of the Federal Republic; over 1000 Nazi judges returned to the bench after the war (Oltmanns, pp. 76-77).

The number of arrests and the extent of physical injuries accompanying protests, for which Table V provides examples, find no parallels in the sixties or early seventies.
Table V: Injuries and Arrests at Protest Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Nature of Protest Involved</th>
<th>Taken into Custody</th>
<th>Convictions</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>House Occupations,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forceful Evictions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 12, 1980</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1 death, 200 demonstrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70 police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September, 1981</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Pending</td>
<td>10% police; number of demonstrators not revealed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 1979-82</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>5791 trials</td>
<td>pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Reagan Demonstration, June 11, 1982</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>pending</td>
<td>240 demonstrators</td>
<td>87 police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Nature of Protest Involved</th>
<th>Taken into Custody</th>
<th>Convictions</th>
<th>Injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brixton</td>
<td>&quot;Race&quot;</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
<td>42 known demonstrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 10-12, 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>401 police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>Startbahn-West</td>
<td>several hundred</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October-November, 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuremberg</td>
<td>Komm-Youth Center</td>
<td>165/141</td>
<td>66 pending</td>
<td>none serious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 5, 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southall</td>
<td>Asians/NF &quot;Race&quot;</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1 death, 93 known demonstrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 22, 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>97 police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zurich</td>
<td>Autonomous Youth Center</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>680 pending</td>
<td>3 known to have lost an eye. Other figures unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1980)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Figures are compiled from press reports and summaries from works cited in this paper.

In light of the mass turnouts at protest demonstrations, from thousands to hundreds of thousands, the number of arrests alone is not particularly significant. Shocking, however, are the calls raised by public officials -- whose task it is to keep the peace -- for a major build-up of police weapons to be employed against demonstrators. From May 30 to September 12, 1980, Zurich police used 2,263 tear-gas pellets for pistols, 1,699 tear-gas grenades, 94 refills for tear-gas "launchers," 60 liters of tear-gas solution for high pressure hoses, 189 cans of tear-gas spray, and 1,650 loadings of rubberbullets, at 35 shots a loading (Haller, p. 57). Police at the occupied site of the proposed Frankfurt airport runway have "experimented" with a variety of crowd-controlling instruments, including: CN gas (outlawed in 44 countries by the Geneva Accords of 1925), in the form of chemical mace, gas pistols, grenades and "pepper fog generators;" high pressure water hoses with CN solution; blinding "shock grenades;" new wooden clubs, 1.2 meters long; plus 600 canisters of "regular" tear-gas and riot gear (Himmelheber, 1982, pp. 87-88). Interior Minister Heinrich Lummer wants to outfit Berlin’s police with rubber bullets and a nerve-gas solution, CS, for the city’s high pressure hoses (TAGESSCHAU, 28. July 1982).

If the physical deterrents fail to keep demonstrators off the streets, legal devices also come to the rescue of besieged politicians. Court proceedings against the 141 adolescents in Nuremberg have dragged on because of a 1977 anti-terrorist act preventing lawyers from representing more than one client -- not enough criminal defenders in Nuremberg! Squatters in Berlin have been -- illegally -- charged with breach of peace against the state (Landesfriedensbruch) under §125/§125a of the Criminal Code, instead of with trespass (Hausfriedensbruch) under §123. Those with no prior convictions have been denied constitutional rights to "equal treatment," e.g. to a suspended sentence under §56 (Wesel in Kursbuch #55, p. 34ff). Inhabitants of communal apartments are indicted for "foundng a criminal organization," §129. Demonstrators carrying lemons to protect against tear-gas or wearing masks are arrested for "intentions to engage in violent behavior." The AJZ disturbances in Zurich have also generated a tightening up of the Criminal Code (§259,
\(\text{§265 StGB}, \text{ denial of habeas corpus and limitations on the right to demonstrate (Schneider, 1982). As Swiss psychotherapist Paul Parin claims, "In the Federal Republic, officials behave as if they would like to prevent the rise of more terrorists; in Zurich, they behave as were it their aim to produce terrorists"} \) (Interview July 20, 1982). Youth responds: "Without the police, no riots!"

Radicalization among protesters is the direct result of the criminalization of dissent. Criminalization occurs in stages: 1) first those who disagree with established policies and decisions are denied access to conventional political channels (e.g. referenda); 2) dissenters receive negative, often consciously inaccurate media coverage; 3) demonstrators are subject to provocation by police-in-civilian clothes at rallies, put under constant observation, etc.; 4) police attired as walking arsenals provoke fear that leads to threatened use of force or panic, which ends in counterforce; 5) participants are labeled and written off as chaotics, communists and criminals.

These stages summarize, in a nutshell, the chronology of events, the mobilization of over 220,000 "average citizens" protesting the removal of 300,000 trees for the construction of Frankfurt's Startbahn West (Himmelheber, 1981; Karasek, 1981).

The youth scene is particularly sensitive and quick to react to hardline tactics and ever harsher sentencing by the state. Repressive measures by the state escalate the willingness among demonstrators to engage in acts of violence. When politicians themselves violate the rules of the game, more citizens respond with legal-illegal-scheissegal. Findings of an Infratest study on protest potential in the FRG might serve as a warning to decision makers, as seen in Table VI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>General population</th>
<th>Teachers Total</th>
<th>Left Teachers with protest potential</th>
<th>Students Total</th>
<th>Students with Left protest potential</th>
<th>Unemployed with Postsecondary matriculation</th>
<th>Unemployed without Postsecondary matriculation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In every democratic society there are certain conflicts which must be resolved through the use of force&quot; Disagree</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Every citizen has the right if necessary to protect her/his convictions out on the streets&quot; Agree</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A citizen loses her/his right to strike and to demonstrate, when s/he endangers the public order&quot; Disagree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


B. Dimension "Decentralization" in the Peace and Ecology Movements

Campaigns against materialism may have been morally uplifting during the sixties, but they rarely served to mobilize Herr and Frau Müller of the Silent Majority as much as the Anti-Nuclear Energy (AKK) Movement has. One of the most valuable lessons gleaned in the struggles at Wyhl and Brokdorf was that smaller, locally based groups could mobilize more demonstrators, faster. Decentralization lent itself to a focus on practical politics; at the same time, it became an antidote to bureaucratic alienation and generated alternative sources of information. The "actions" in opposition to Startbahn West alone have engaged the energies of over 66 local "citizen initiatives" (Bürgerinitiativen-BI) and regional ecological groups (UMWELT EXPRESS, February, 1982).

Nuclear power has become the European metaphor for the destructive force of unbridled technology and unrestricted corporate growth. It simultaneously invokes the images of Hiroshima, the China Syndrome, Big Science and Big Business in collusion
with Big Government and, ultimately, Third World deprivation in favor of arms proliferation. Where nuclear fervor may have serviced as a "surrogate for nationalism" in the 1950's (Nelkin and Pollack, 1981), nuclear opposition has become a stimulus for internationalism in the 1980's.

What the AKK groups, the peace activists, the "spontis" and the squatters all have in common is their Betroffenheit, a feeling of being immediately affected by environmental destruction. They attest to a logical connection between the dangers involved in civilian as well as in military uses of nuclear technology, whereas Leftists of the sixties tended to support civilian applications in opposition to military nuclear development (Otto, 1977). The nuclear question has subsequently split the labor movement. Both the German DGB and the British TUC joined the anti-atomic marchers in the late 1950's (Heim, 1982; Duff, 1971). The fear that thousands of jobs are at stake has found segments of both forging coalitions with pro-nuclear forces in the 1980's.

The peace movement has a 25 year tradition, which began with the "Struggle Against Atomic Death Campaign" 1956-1958 and the first CND sponsored Easter March of 1959. The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament favored the long march through the nation as a prelude to a long march through the institutions via the Labor Party. Germans were less hopeful of an SPD electoral victory, and thus based their lessons on the direct action strategies of the British Committee of 100 (Pestalozzi, 1982, p. 28).

No longer a NATO weakling, the Federal Republic enjoys a focal position among peace activists. The Cold War question, posed for so long, "What will we do when the Russians come?" has been reformulated: "What will we do if the Americans stay?" The movement has hit the FRG in two waves. The Evangelical Church Symposium of June, 1981, drew 120,000 to Hamburg to discuss Fear in a Nuclear Age; that wave culminated in the non-violent Bonn demonstration of 300,000 on October 10, 1981. The Reagan pronouncement in late October, 1981, regarding the conceivability of a (winnable) limited nuclear war provided additional impetus to the movement. The second wave culminated in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June 10, 1982 in Bonn and Berlin.

The mobilization of hundreds of thousands owes directly to the proliferation of grass roots groups. Successful "actions" are manifold: the number of German applications for conscientious objector status rose from 3,000 in the 1960's to 55,000 in 1981; several hundred "peace weeks" and workshops on "nonviolent action" have been locally planned and executed; Green and Alternative Parties with Peace Manifestos of their own have scored electoral successes. Moral support stems from parallel demonstrations in neighboring countries, including the German Democratic Republic (Buscher, et al., 1981). Rallies drew 400,000 in Amsterdam in November, 50,000 in Bern in December, 1981, and 200,000 in Paris, June, 1982. Over 2 million people have signed the "Krefelder Appeal," calling for a European peace referendum. Public figures such as Erhard Eppler and Rudolf Bahro add saliency to information meetings. Over 300 disarmament-related proposals were submitted at the 1982 SPD convention in Munich, after the SPD conducted its own Peace Forum in Bonn on August 27, 1981. Altogether there are over 2,300 local, national and international initiatives and institutions serving peace activists in Europe (listed in Pestalozzi, pp. 344-376). All organizers stress their contacts and cooperation with protest groups in the US as evidence that the campaign is not an exercise in Anti-Americanism.

The numbers involved dictate a strategy of settling for the lowest common denominator: the single shared objective is to prevent the 1983 stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, as required by the NATO Double Decision of December 12, 1979. Their common conviction is that Theater Nuclear Forces will render Europe a prime target, that Germany will become Ground Zero in a confrontation between the super-powers. The object is to place the home governments under as much
pressure as possible, insofar as pro-disarmament forces are denied direct access to NATO decision makers.

The tactical questions are unresolved. Contradictory opinions exist with respect to preferences for unilateral or multilateral disarmament agreements; debates are waged over the definition of parity and the logical limits of deterrence. Activists are divided over whether or not to demand simultaneous reductions in the Eastern bloc, and how to deal with nuclear proliferation in the Third World. No clear answer emerges to the question whether the build-up of conventional forces is a morally acceptable proposition. There is no single position on the feasibility of a European nuclear-free zone, on prospects for alternative defense concepts, or regarding the inevitability of a political-bloc strategy.

Activists have therefore made a conscious effort to avoid a party-political organizational modus, which could mean an end to the mass base. Party-political stances within the peace movement are still too preponderant (Pestalozzi, p. 95). For this reason, groups have rotated responsibility for the coordination of major events. Action Reconciliation/Peace Services orchestrated the "10.10.81" rally in Bonn, while the Berlin Initiative for Peace, International Balance and Security has sponsored other events.

The notion that this is a movement "made in Moscow" is undermined by the degree of church support it attracts, particularly in the FRG. Arrangements for the June, 1982 anti-Reagan demonstrations fell largely to the Evangelical Student Community. Church support is thus far limited to local parish initiatives in Britain, despite the 1982 formation of a Christian CND section -- in addition to a Green-CND wing -- at the national level. The Church of England has agreed to add "peace" to its General Synod agenda in February, 1983.

As the primary peace organization in the UK, the CND is supported by the European Nuclear Disarmament Committee, founded in April, 1980. With a national membership that has grown from 3,000 to 36,000 between January, 1980 and June, 1981, the CND relies on the efforts of 1000 locals, encompassing a quarter of a million sympathizers.

Even the peace movement in Switzerland is growing, slowly but steadily. Organizers attribute the delay to the tradition of Swiss "neutrality," to the emphasis on conventional defense and, in part, to the direct-democracy orientation. European disarmament is not subject to the outcome of referenda at the Cantonal level. Decentralized decision-making has nonetheless benefited the anti-nuclear energy campaign (Aubert, 1981). Swiss "Jusos" are spearheading a drive to introduce alternative military service -- the only other country in the Western continental camp besides Turkey without a C.O. option.

An estimated DM 2.2 billion will go to create the necessary infrastructure for the NATO deployments, the German share amounting to DM 10 million. This has added a new element to the campaign against Startbahn-West, because of the obvious connection between the Frankfurt airport and Rhein-Main Air Force Base, as Foreign Minister Genscher openly admitted this year (STERN, 18. February 1982; Himmelheber, pp. 7-9; Hechler, 1981, pp. 165-174). Thus, another link has been forged between the peace and ecology movements.

The emphasis on decentralization has proved organizationally effective. The large number of initiatives involved conveys the impression of a unified political front. In reality, however, activists will have difficulty finding a new set of common objectives, once the deployment deadline has passed in 1983 (especially if all goes according to NATO's plan). Decentralization is nonetheless significant for ideological reasons as well. Both anti-nuclear drives have instilled in hundreds of thousands a different understanding of the role of participation in democratic society.
C. Dimension "Institutionalization" - From Alternative to Initiative to Party

For the leftists of the late sixties, the Long March and the Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) were not exactly mutually exclusive propositions. In Germany, the SPD remained the clear favorite throughout the Grand Coalition 1966 - 1969, and the Social Democrats were helped into power by the newly enfranchised voters they had actively recruited. Brandt's extensive platform of social reforms in 1969 led leftists to believe that the SPD could be used as a vehicle for cracking open formerly elite institutions, such as universities. They took seriously Brandt's exhortation to "dare more democracy."

By the 1980's, European social democratic parties -- along with their more conservative competitors -- seem to expend more energy distancing themselves from their own radical youth factions than they do cultivating new recruits. Primary examples are the SPD Junos and the Labour Party's Militant Tendency (LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES 28. June 1982). SPD Bundesgeschäftsführer Peter Glatz summarizes the problem: "The Party awakened false hopes that parties could change lives and alter the relationships among human beings" (Oltmanns, p. 114). For Germany, Glatz and others now picture a society divided into "two cultures" -- the political establishment and the "alternative scene."

Who or what is "alternative" has consequently become the new 64 million D-Mark question, as political scientist and Netzwerk co-founder Joseph Huber points out. The "alternative" spectrum encompasses a plethora of "people, milieus, motives and opinions" (Huber, 1981, p. 9). Among the organized groups, a few are radicalized, some are nationalized, many are depoliticized and all are decentralized and decidedly post-materialistic. Those who continue to engage in politics locate along an ideological spectrum stretching from left-wing social democratic, to radical democratic to anti-parliamentarian.

Alternative groups concern themselves with everything from religious sects to therapy groups, from agricultural life-styles to urban welfare services, from civil liberties to Third World initiatives. Huber estimates that there are over 11,500 projects in the FRG, involving 80,000 activists. If all sympathizers are taken into account, the figure falls between 300,000-400,000. The breakdown of project types holds 12 percent devoted to "production," 70 percent to "services" and 18 percent pursuing "political work," 29 percent entail handwork, 71 percent of the projects call for mental labor (Huber, pp. 28-30).

The second culture appears to consist of three strata, with three strategic orientations. Neither the Long March nor the APO strategy has been completely abandoned by the politically disillusioned of the eighties. Their strategic repertoire has in a way been expanded by the addition of the "drop-out" option. The last category is not limited to the squatter scene. There are also those in Wohngemeinschaften, who buy their Müsli and bread in alternative shops, patronize cooperative bookstores, read only newspapers from leftist presses, baby-sit in anti-authoritarian day-care centers, work in small self-organized businesses, view old Bogart movies in "off-cinemas," and are ultimately proud of the fact that they have had no contact with "the outside" for several years (Fichter and Lonnendoncker, in Richter, 1979).

One question which provokes dissension among many groups is whether or not to accept state subsidies for alternative projects; some fear cooption, others are adamant in their rejection of the system as a whole. Netzwerk Selbsthilfe has provided one alternative source of capital for projects, based on sympathizers' voluntary contributions. As Hans Maier from Wissenschaftszentrum/IMM Berlin pointed out, this stratum of drop-outs may in fact be the most consistently political of the three, insofar as the life-style itself reflects a radical concept of political-economy. The work in small, self-organized undertakings rests on a belief that democratic decision-
making can only occur in the presence of decentralized economic relations. The Netzwerk system enhances their economic significance, but also runs the risk of turning the alternatives into a secondary, integrated "free market system."

Citizen action groups, the Bürgerinitiativen, constitute a reincarnated extra-parliamentary opposition to the established party system. At the same time, they also fit the "institutional" image in the lobby or pressure group tradition. As the first initiatives organized during the late 1960's, they were viewed as political action committees appended to the SPD. Their extraparliamentary engagement in the environmental field was expected to complement party platform efforts. By the mid-1970's, the BI's had become an autonomous force, indeed a source of direct opposition. The anti-Startbahn initiatives will likely catapult the SPD from power in Hessen, come the September 1982 elections (Schiller-Dickhut, et al., 1981).

There are an estimated 38,000 Bürgerinitiativen in Germany, backed by at least 15 million sympathizers. Membership figures outstrip those of the established parties, and the model has been emulated by citizens throughout Western Europe. The unifying factor is the Ecology Movement, coordinated through a national roof organization, the Federation of Citizen Initiatives for Environmental Protection (BBU). Over the decade, the BI's have developed a more systematic political critique directed against unrestricted economic growth and the destruction of the environment via technology -- a theme shared with the peace movement. BI membership shows a substantial overlap with the original APO and Long March generation. Participants share an upper-middle class background, are highly educated, well-informed, and self-confident with respect to their own political skills.

Resurrected political causes, self-confidence and acquired organizational skills are being rechanneled into the political establishment through the Green, Ecology and Alternative Parties, that have taken root in Sweden, Britain, France, Italy, as well as in the Federal Republic. The relative strength of these parties is in part a function of the respective electoral system. The proporz principle in Switzerland, has maintained a stable, four-party coalition since December, 1959, driving ecologists back into these parties (Aubert, p. 223ff). The winner-take-all tradition in Britain, already under fire from the new SDP, leaves little room for parliamentary activity by the nascent Ecology Party there. The combined proportional representation and list systems in the FRG have unlocked the doors to new parties, but the "5 percent clause" has prevented the Greens from crossing the threshold at the national level. Substantial progress has nonetheless been made; alternative parties have attained legislative seats in Berlin (May, 1981), Bremen (October 1979), Hamburg (June 1978) and in the CDU-stronghold of Baden-Württemberg (March 1980). Continentally, the Greens even garnered 3.2 percent in the first direct elections to the European Parliament (June 1979).

The Green and Alternative List (AL) Parties are tied to other protest groups by virtue of their common emphasis on autonomy, direct participation, solidarity, environmental compatibility, transparency of decision-making and variety (Raschke, 1982). Diversity is reflected in the fact that there are free-greens, red-greens, brown-greens, black-greens and multicolored-greens, though members have tried to avoid splits along ideological lines by proclaiming they move "neither left nor right but forwards" (Raschke, p. 325). Moderates favoring depoliticization distance themselves from the communist groups, the relics of "yesterday."

Radicals seeking repoliticization have now created another party, the Democratic Socialists -- a mirror image of the SDP/Labour Party split -- through the efforts of Martin Coppik (TAGESZEITUNG, 18 June 1982). Disparate positions on tactical radicalization and the role of violence have also produced confusion among the ranks. The Alternative List - Berlin offered an extreme example this summer, as it literally crawled out from under the debris of a violent, illegal anti-Reagan demonstration and the subsequent firebombing of its headquarters (TAGESSPIEGEL, TAGESZEITUNG, 10-15 June 1982).
The regionally based AL/Green Parties are the unique product of two decades of protest experience. They constitute an Extraparliamentary Opposition-Within-Parliament. Outside the legislative assembly, they work actively with the BI's. Inside parliament, they view their participation as a vehicle of support for the extraparliamentary movements (Schiller-Dickhut, pp. 147-149). Decision-making rests on the consensus principle; debate in the local and plenary assemblies (Mitgliedervollversammlungen) continues until a common position emerges. Whether the Alternatives/Greens prove institutionally effective in the long run will depend on whether or not they are able to reconcile their own direct-democratic procedures with the imperatives of the parliamentary process. A conscious non-decision in the absence of consensus has little effect if the parliamentary majority refuses to wait until one evolves. Further, the larger the parties grow, the harder it will be to adhere to "fundamentally-democratic" decision-procedures. Michels' spectre of oligarchy lurks in the political wings.

The Alternative Parties enjoy substantial support among otherwise apolitical youth. The 1981 Shell study reveals that, following the 32 percent who identify with no party, 20 percent back the Greens, as opposed to 24 percent for the SPD and 18 percent for the CDU/CSU (Jugendwerk, 1981, p. 674). Green sympathizers evince higher levels of unemployment and are more pessimistic about the future than established party supporters. Twenty percent is not bad for a party founded in 1979/80. It signifies an identification too new to have been conveyed through traditional parental channels. Curiously enough, the British SDP has also picked up young supporters by virtue of its image as an "alternative" to the major parties. More importantly, that support has risen from 6.3 percent in 1980 to 24.6 percent in 1982 -- among white working class youth who also sympathize with the National Front and British Movement! (Cochrane and Billig, 1982). The Alternative Movement, and the parties mobilizing behind it, may be the only agent still capable of catching young rebels and offering them a degree of social integration and Lebenssinn (Oltmanns, p. 275). The No Future generation might otherwise become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

IV. PROTEST AND THE METAMORPHOSIS OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES

A. The Parties, the People and the Democratic Process

Protest potential in Western Europe has increased, as has extremist potential (Infratest, 1980). Protest is on the rise, as Suzanne Berger notes, because of a "failed connection" between the established parties, on the one hand, and the requisites of the new politics, on the other (Berger, 1979). Perhaps the two most fundamental questions facing democratic systems today are 1) to what extent can this growing protest potential be integrated into the existing political system; 2) to what extent is the state willing to integrate a variety of protest-generated initiatives?

Post-Materialist values, e.g. the emphasis on self-actualization and greater individual autonomy, have already effected changes in citizen attitudes toward participation and protest. If Modell-Deutschland offers any insights as to future trends, however, the political leadership can rest assured that leftist protest potential "is ideologically still firmly bound to the democratic system" (Infratest, 1980, p. 106). The change in orientations toward democracy rests with a greater acceptance of non-conventional forms of participation; the New Politics differs with respect to means, not ends. This growing acceptance is a European-wide phenomenon, as Tables VII and VIII illustrate.
Table VII: Acceptance of Unconventional Forms of Participation in the Federal Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unconventional Participation</th>
<th>Scale Value</th>
<th>Persons who express support for unconventional forms and who would be prepared to engage in such under certain conditions N=4000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in a petition drive</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in a “Citizen Initiative”</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining in a licensed political demonstration</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in a Boycott</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withholding of Rent, Interest or Taxes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blocking traffic with a demonstration</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in a wildcat strike</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking over/occupying factories, offices, public buildings</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of private property</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of physical force against persons</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Items with a scale value 4-6 classified as Political Activism.
Items with a scale value 7-10 coded by Infratest as Protest Potential.

Table VIII: Orientation to Political Behavior and Acceptable Forms of Participation (In Percent) (1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Apolitical</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Only Conventional</th>
<th>Only Unconventional</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Republic</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Max Kaase finds a positive correlation between the scales for conventional and unconventional types of political behavior. He interprets this as a sign that nonconventional participatory forms expand the citizens' political repertoire, thus allowing for more flexible involvement in the decision-making process (Kaase, p. 183). The data also make clear "that the established actors in the political process, above all the political parties, no longer have the chance to exercise a monopolistic claim over involvement in the political consensus-building and decision-making process" (Kaase, p. 184). They are unlikely to relinquish this monopoly with style and grace, however.

The "intellectual head-movement" of the late 1960's which has found a home in protest campaigns for peace and environmental protection perhaps unwittingly -- is pursuing a path outlined by Marcuse over a decade ago. They have learned that political powerbrokers and whole systems cannot be pushed aside, they must be combatted on their own grounds. This means that, from the beginning, the personal and particular liberation,
refusal, withdrawal, must proceed within the political context, defined by the situation in which the radical opposition finds itself, and must continue, in the theory and practice, the radical critique of the establishment within the Establishment (Marcuse, 1972, p. 49).

The dual strategy adopted by the Alternative and Green parties, along with the extensive use of petitions and referenda, etc. indicate that protesters are willing to have their causes integrated into the system; to what degree is still uncertain.

Through the vehicles of protest, initiatives and alternative projects, activists have discovered, however, that the majoritarian parties are unwilling to rework their ideologies, programs and decisional structures. Increasingly it is the Catch-All parties themselves that are recognized as "insurmountable obstacles to the satisfaction of important social needs ... in fact they limit, constrain and undermine" (Berger, p. 40). Established parties have undertaken a common effort to prevent voter losses which stand to benefit the Alternatives and Greens. Those efforts have ranged from ridicule ("romantic idealists") to scare tactics ("a Green vote is a lost vote - the CDU will come to power"), to outright denunciation and criminalization (Genscher/FDP: "coalition of growth-rejectors" TAGESSPIEGEL, 6. July 1982; Stoiber/CDU: "same rhetorical methods as the Nazis" TAGESSPIEGEL, 25. July 1982).

If new actors, policy preferences and values cannot be integrated into traditional political institutions -- this in the face of an ever-expanding state -- then the great missed opportunity of the last decade may actually eliminate the established parties sooner than the protest groups themselves. The Greens may yet do to the SPD what Franz Josef Strauss failed to accomplish in the late seventies -- in the spirit of David stalking Goliath.

B. "Something Old and Something New" - From the Old Left to the New Left to the NonLeft

After this lengthy march through the European protest landscape, I will only attempt to highlight a few of the differences observed along the way from the sixties to the eighties.

Protesters of the 1960's campaigned for radical system transformation. Their frustrations, anger and critiques were directed against the performance failures of the capitalist system in the past. The Long March strategy they adopted reflected a degree of trust in the state's ability to master crises and to accommodate social change, however. The economic and technological developments of the last decade have intensified the desire as well as the need for radical changes in the political system.

But the willingness to engage in the process of system transformation is declining rapidly among the younger class of today's protesters, at the same time it is growing among those old enough to have witnessed or participated in the earlier movements. The depression, alienation and anger of youth protesters in the 1980's concentrates on their perceived lack of future prospects. These rebels trust neither the Left nor the Right, nor are they directly interested in overthrowing the state. They want to be left alone, to choose their own life-styles. They scoff at the '68-grandpas who still haven't registered that we aren't fighting for the public, but for us!" (Kursbuch, p. 15).

The New Left rejected the Old Left at the end of the sixties for its traditional commitment to hierarchy and vanguardism. The Soviet bureaucratic monolith no better suited the New Left's utopian image than did the rat race of competitive capitalism. The NonLeft of the eighties rejects the New Left and the old APO as
elements of an intellectual "head movement," which indeed they were. The APO of 1968 directed its charges against, but also addressed itself to the established institutions. The "class of '68" was told that its language was incomprehensible (it was). The degree to which students have lost prominence in the new movements is best illustrated by the fact that "the campus of Berlin's Free University nowadays resembles the abandoned parking lot of an office building on weekends" (Gottmanns, p. 89).

The punks, rockers, rostas and squatters are alleged to have no language at all. But they speak the visceral language of Angst, to which politicians dare give little expression. "We have enough reasons to cry without your tear-gas" - and their fear has a rational and active core. The Angst is not over growing old; rather, it relates to the serious problems facing society as a whole, such as nuclear proliferation, environmental destruction and structural unemployment. Paradoxically, support among the young for the peace and ecology movements is great, but their active participation is limited. Their initial political experiences have been negative and physical.

The unifying factor among the protest movements is no longer an overarching ideology, but the substantive connections that participants are discovering as each movement evolves. The repressive character of capitalism per se has been downplayed; it is not only the corporations, but large-scale organizations in general that have been rejected in favor of communal, self-help projects and groups. The activists of the eighties are much less naive about accepting further technological development as the solution to fundamental social problems. The emphasis is placed on human dignity, sensitivity and solidarity.

Learning experiences for the over-30 activists have been of a more positive, organizational character. Through the BI's, they seek to draw political decision-making back into those spheres, down to those levels where they can hope to exercise collective influence. This group rejects preprogrammed political decisions which politicians try to legitimize on the basis of technical or budgetary imperatives. They are still demanding that the system dare more democracy.

Not exactly a '68-Grandma" myself, I passed my 30th birthday amidst the anti-Reagan activists in Berlin, observing the generation gap first hand, as former APO's with baby carriages, groups of guestworkers and even church leaders lined up to demonstrate 70,000-80,000 strong with students, punks and squatters. In search of Verstehen (and in need of some moral support as I sprang the 30 threshold), I returned to Marcuse for an explanation of what was happening "then" - only to discover that the Essay on Liberation mirrors more closely the protest events of "now:"

The militants have invalidated the concept of "utopia" - they have denounced a vicious ideology. No matter whether their action was a revolt or an abortive revolution, it is a turning point. In proclaiming the "permanent challenge"... the "permanent education," the Great Refusal, they recognize the mark of social repression, even in the most sublime manifestations of traditional culture, even in the most spectacular manifestations of technical progress. They have again raised a spectre (and this time a spectre which haunts not only the bourgeoisie but all exploitative bureaucracies): the spectre of a revolution which subordinates the development of productive forces and higher standards of living to the requirements of creating solidarity for the human species (Marcuse, 1969, p. ix).

That spectre is indeed haunting Western Europe.
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