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A Crisis of Culture: Isolation  
and Integration Among Turkish  
Guestworkers in the German  
Federal Republic

by

Joyce Marie Mushaben

A CRISIS OF CULTURE:  
ISOLATION AND INTEGRATION AMONG  
TURKISH GUESTWORKERS IN THE  
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

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Integration, integration, integration . . . How should this take place when foreign children are not given the opportunity to learn the German language and to find contacts among German children? . . . Children are children, they should not be made to suffer because they are foreigners.

--Erika Fekete  
Eine Chance für Fatma

Eight years ago, the Acting Lord Mayor of Berlin, Klaus Schütz, commented to a reporter from Die Zeit that he saw two problems in his city which politicians would find no reward in tackling, because they were unsolvable: the first centered on conditions at the Berlin universities, the second was the problem of the "Turkish-Ghetto" in Kreuzberg (Grunenberg, Die Zeit, 5. February 1982). The populations in both locales have continued to explode. But while the universities have ceased to occupy a prominent position on the political agenda, having been displaced by larger, more pressing economic concerns, the "foreigner problem" in Berlin and throughout the Federal Republic threatens to become a veritable "social time-bomb."

It is a rare public official in the Federal Republic (FRG) who would deny the political significance of the problems affecting the Turkish guestworkers. The recently defeated Social Democratic Chancellor candidate, Hans-Jochen Vogel, captured much of the emotional intensity, if not the political complexity surrounding the "ghetto" issue with his pre-campaign assessment, "In ten years we will have our San Salvador in Kreuzberg" (Grunenberg, Die Zeit, 5. February 1982). Growing animosity towards resident aliens (Ausländerfeindlichkeit) in the face of unprecedented postwar unemployment rates finds its parallels in other advanced industrial systems, as evinced by acts of hostility towards Asians in Britain, or attacks against Vietnamese refugees and undocumented Mexican workers in the US. But the experiences of 1933-1945 have rendered German leaders particularly sensitive to issues involving "the free development of the personality" and

the protection of minority rights. Officials must go to great lengths to distinguish between foreigners whose participation in the German economic miracle is legitimate, albeit temporary, non-nationals genuinely in need of political asylum, and those who would use the asylum channel unjustifiably to secure working papers and unlimited residential permits. As a member of the European Community, the FRG is subject to additional political constraints directly affecting its ability to regulate the free movement of labor, to establish wage levels and safety standards, and to limit access to social benefits.

The obligation to meet collectively set social benefit standards, in the areas of unemployment compensation and vocational training, for example, has served to highlight the economic significance of the guestworker issue. Plagued by severe postwar labor shortages, German industrialists actively recruited the services of foreign workers during the period of rapid economic expansion, never anticipating that they would one day have to pay the costs of maintaining these recruits in times of recession. More importantly, West German policy-makers have only recently begun to include "generosity's price," the extensive social outlays connected with the migration of foreign dependents, in their overall cost-benefit assessments (Wall Street Journal, November 1, 1982; Grunenberg, Die Zeit, 12. February 1983).

The political and economic dimensions of the guestworker phenomenon in Germany and in Western Europe have become a focus of study among policy-makers and academics alike (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Kevenhörster, 1974; OECD, 1974; Rist, 1978; Bundesregierung, Kommission "Ausländerpolitik," 1983). The socio-cultural and psychological aspects -- or what I would label the "human dimension" -- have nevertheless been subject to a case of not-so-benign neglect. It is the significance of the "human dimension" that

I seek to address in this paper, devoted to the plight of the Turkish guestworkers in the Federal Republic. The paper holds that the most serious issues confronting German policymakers to date are not those pertaining to the economic integration of "first generation" Turkish workers. Many of these imported laborers have already resided in the FRG for more than a decade, and their employment status is not as insecure as one might expect. Rather, the most pressing question of the eighties and nineties will be what to do with members of the second and third generations, the children of the guestworkers admitted to or born in the Federal Republic since the late 1960's. Schooled in conflicting world views, immersed in two languages without becoming well-versed in either, inhibited in their career choices by parents unable to decide themselves whether to integrate or emigrate, Turkish-German youth of the second generation in particular have fallen victim to what is truly a crisis of culture.

The paper begins by examining briefly the legal status of Turkish nationals residing in Germany and the FRG's position regarding integration and naturalization. Section two provides a general assessment of the economic position of the guestworkers; section three addresses the question of residential and educational integration. The concluding section elaborates further on the "crisis of culture" and considers the choices, isolation/integration, and the prospects for successful integration, as ever more second and third generation Turkish nationals attempt to enter the German mainstream.

#### 1. Legal Restrictions, In Lieu of Legal Status

To integrate or not to integrate, that is the question which gets to the root of the political-legal status problem confronting foreign workers. The presence of Turkish laborers in the FRG is neither the result of random

concerning zoning and housing. Since February of 1982 the state has undertaken to plan legislative initiatives focusing an educational integration, possible modification of naturalization requirements and measures promoting repatriation (Bundesregierung, 1983; Senator für Gesundheit, Soziales, Familie, 1982).

Official ambivalence regarding the definition of legal rights for non-nationals is further reflected in the difficulties policy-makers have had in simply finding an appropriate name for these migrant laborers. Since the mid-sixties authorities have applied a variety of labels, ranging from "alien workers," to "guestworkers," to the more recent term "foreign employees" -- implying perhaps that the "guests" have begun to wear out their welcome. The word "immigrant," however, has rarely been used (Bendix, 1983; Rist, 1978). The Kohl government has yet to discover a suitable legal construct designating second and third generation family members who are in the process of applying for visas to the FRG (Bundesregierung, 1983).

While the term "integration" appears with growing frequency in official documents addressing the problems of guestworkers, the reference is generally restricted to members of the third generation or to those first generation workers who have resided in the FRG ten years or more. Federal statistics reveal that among the latter group, this amounts to a striking fifty percent (Bundesregierung, 1983: p. 105). As defined by the government's Commission on "Foreigner Policy," integration "does not mean the surrender of one's own identity, but rather a relatively tension-free form of coexistence among foreigners and Germans" (Bundesregierung, 1983: p. 105). For parliamentary leaders in Berlin, integration moreover means

that the foreigners feel themselves [to be] a part of our society,  
that Germans and foreigners feel comfortable and at home with each  
other here and live together in mutual respect. It also means that

events nor the outcome of strictly private decisions, but rather the product of policies advanced by officials at the highest levels. Under the circumstances, one might have expected the German government to develop a catalogue of legal and political rights for foreign laborers, particularly once it chose to abandon the "rotation system" in the mid 1970's. Instead, the behavior of the national government has sooner been characterized by a degree of "structural ambivalence" and a desire to postpone any longterm decisions that would ensure guestworkers formal legal status or offer fundamental participatory rights, as in the Swedish case. In contrast to the major influx of East European refugees during the fifties, the manpower movement initiated in the late sixties was never intended to produce a permanent change of residence for Southern European nationals. As Rist explains, guestworkers embarked on "a migration not of conviction, but of expediency" (Rist, 1978: p.6).

Legislation designed for the purpose of regulating work and residency permits, outlining procedures for asylum-seekers and specifying the conditions under which family members may be admitted to the Federal Republic has been piecemeal in nature. The Aliens Act of 1965 (Ausländergesetz), promulgated in conjunction with the Promotion of Labor Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) of 1969, offered ground rules, but no definition of guestworkers' formal legal status. Subsequent legislation included a nationally imposed hiring freeze in November, 1973; a revised Aliens Act in 1975; a clarification of foreigners' residency status contained in an administrative amendment to the Aliens Act in October, 1978; alterations in the cut-off dates for admitting family and dependents in April, 1979; guidelines issued by the government for the development of a coordinated "foreigner policy" in March, 1980; a contingency act against the abuse of asylum rights in June, 1980; a resolution concerning the visa status of children over 16 in December, 1981; and specialized decrees



members of guestworkers, along with guidelines to protect the children of mixed marriages.

The legal status of the guestworkers remains uncertain, largely because the state is unwilling to encroach upon the rights of individuals and their families who must themselves determine -- free from coercion -- whether they wish to remain in Germany or desire to return to the homeland. Paradoxically, it is the government's failure to define more precisely the legal status of non-nationals which has deprived foreign workers of the very certainty and protection against future sanctions that would enable them to decide in favor of permanent resettlement and thus facilitate integration. This is an untenable position in a society which has been characterized for centuries as a Rechtsstaat, a "state of law" in which rights must be codified in order to be recognized. To make matters worse, the guestworkers' legal uncertainty has been exacerbated by a growing sense of economic insecurity over the last few years, the next topic of discussion.

## II. Spurious Connections: Economic Integration and German Unemployment.

Historically speaking, the purpose behind the importation of labor was not to challenge the opportunities afforded German workers in their efforts to achieve social mobility and economic stability, but rather to secure them (Rist, 1978: p. 121). Since 1970, Turkish laborers have made themselves indispensable to critical sectors of the West German economy, the efforts by right-wing groups to attribute the national unemployment rate of 7.6 percent to the presence of foreigners notwithstanding. An estimated 4.67 million foreigners currently reside in the Federal Republic, comprising 7.5 percent of the total population. Turkish nationals account for 1.6 million of those officially registered. Table 1 provides data on the growth of the foreign population, 1955-1981, along with the strength of different national groups.

non-rationals who wish to stay here permanently with their families should be apprised of the provisions for acquiring citizenship (Senator für Gesundheit, Soziales und Familie, 1982: p. 6).

In short, integration is not to be equated with assimilation. Rather, the kind of integration foreseen by the German government amounts to a type of institutionalized peaceful coexistence, whereby efforts would be made to recognize and maintain separate cultural identities.

In contrast to the United States where being born on American soil automatically affords all the privileges of citizenship, the Federal Republic makes use of the lineage principle in determining one's nationality. Hence, even those children born to foreign workers already living in Germany are subject to complicated visa and registration rules. A ten year residency requirement is only the first step in applying for German citizenship (Einbürgerung); consequently, most foreign workers are more likely to aspire to permanent resident-alien status. There is a "catch 22" connection, however, between the acquisition of special and general work permits, on the one hand, and the procurement of limited and unlimited residency permits (Aufenthaltsurlaubnis/Aufenthaltsberechtigung), on the other, the details of which cannot be examined here. Although 84 percent of all Turkish workers have already made their homes in the Federal Republic for more than eight years, the minimum requirement for permanent resident status, only 1.7 percent have actually been granted an Aufenthaltsberechtigung. Only 16.4 percent can boast of an unlimited residency permit, for which they become eligible after five years. Another 46.3 percent hold permits valid for two years; 19 percent must renew their permits annually. Only 6.2 percent express an interest in acquiring citizenship (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung survey, reported in Die Zeit, 12. February 1982). The Bonn government has nevertheless recognized that it needs to devise a special class of visas and residency permits for family

TABLE 1 - GROWTH OF THE FOREIGN WORKERS  
POPULATION, 1955-1981.

Year	Italian	Yugoslavian	Greek	Turkish	Total <sup>a)</sup>
1955	74,000	2,000	600	-	80,000
1960	122,000	8,800	13,000	2,500	279,000
1965	360,000	64,000	182,000	121,000	1,164,000
1970	375,000	389,000	229,000	328,000	1,839,000
1973	450,000	535,000	250,000	705,000	2,595,000
1975	297,000	419,000	204,000	553,000	2,071,000
1977	281,000	377,000	162,000	517,000	1,889,000
1979	300,000	367,000	140,000	540,000	1,934,000
1981	291,000	340,000	123,000	580,000	1,929,000

a) Excludes Spanish laborers and other nationalities only minimally represented. Figures do not include family members unless they also hold work permits.  
Statistics compiled by John Bendix, "On the Rights of Foreign Workers in West Germany," unpublished manuscript, Indiana University, March, 1983, p. 48.

TABLE 2 Foreign Residents in Selected Cities In the German Federal Republic  
(Statistics compiled September - December, 1981)

Ausländer in ausgewählten Städten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland  
(Stand: 30.09.1981 - Berlin - (West): 31.12.1981)

Major Metropolitan Area Name der Großstadt	Wohnbevölkerung in 1.000 Population in 1000's	Proportion of Foreigners		Largest Foreign Groups		
		darunter Ausländer in 1.000	in %	Größte Ausländergruppe Staat Nationality	absolut in 1.000	Anteil an allen Aus- ländern in %
1. Frankfurt/Main	626,9	138,6	22,1	Jugoslawien	28,2	19,5
2. Stuttgart	578,5	103,0	17,8	Jugoslawien	28,5	26,8
3. München	1.291,8	215,7	16,7	Jugoslawien	53,5	23,9
4. Köln	1.014,8	150,2	14,8	Türkei	65,0	44,0
5. Duisburg	571,5	74,9	13,1	Türkei	47,8	62,4
6. Düsseldorf	589,1	76,0	12,9	Türkei	14,8	17,0
7. Berlin (West)	1.990,7	246,0	12,4	Türkei	118,3	48,1
8. Hannover	540,8	54,6	10,1	Türkei	20,0	36,7
9. Hamburg	1.637,1	157,2	9,6	Türkei	48,7	32,1
10. Dortmund	609,8	57,3	9,4	Türkei	22,5	39,7
11. Bremen	553,7	41,3	7,5	Türkei	22,2	53,0
12. Essen	645,0	35,7	5,5	Türkei	12,2	34,3

Quelle: Statistisches Landesamt

Reported in: Senator für Gesundheit, Soziales und Familie - Ausländerbeauftragter, Hrsg.  
MITEINANDER LEBEN - AUSLÄNDERPOLITIK IN BERLIN. Berlin: 1982, p. 72.

Despite a national hiring freeze and labor importation ban (Arbeitsstopp) imposed in 1973, the Federal Republic has witnessed a 75 percent increase in the total number of resident Turks during the last decade, owing to marriage, family migrations and applications for asylum. The geographic concentration of foreigners depicted in Table 2 have given rise to a new construct among political and economic analysts, referred to as "Kuhn's Rebellion Threshold." The "threshold" concept derived from a remark made by Heinz Kuhn, the former Federal Minister without Portfolio for Foreigner Questions, to the effect that "when the proportion of resident aliens exceeds ten percent of the total population, every folk is likely to rebel" (Grunenberg, Die Zeit, 5. February 1983). The foreign population is expected to total 5.74 million by 1990 and 7 million by the year 2000 (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung estimates).

The concentration of Turkish laborers in particular industrial sectors is even more skewed than their geographic distribution reveals. Neither the mines nor the automobile industries could get by without the services of foreigners, who make up 25 percent and 35 percent of their respective workforces; imported labor supplies 27 percent of the workers in foundries. About 22 percent are employed by restaurants and hotels, 19.5 percent by textile manufacturers, and 16 percent function as civil engineers (Kemmer, Die Zeit, 8. October 1982). In all likelihood, that very symbol of German order and efficiency, the Deutsche Bundesbahn, would cease to run on time if it were suddenly deprived of the 16,700 foreigners among its 342,000 employees (Der Tagesspiegel, 27 May 1982).

German economists agree that the rapid departure of the foreign labor force would do little to alleviate the problems of close to 2 million unemployed nationals. Reports that for the most part, those Germans who are currently without jobs would either lack the skills required by the

specialized industries such as mining or construction, or would be unwilling to perform "the dirty work" traditionally assigned to foreign laborers (Der Tagesspiegel, 27 May 1982). In this respect, the economic position of the guestworkers appears relatively secure; the unemployment rate among foreigners is only slightly worse than that for Germans, 11.9 percent in contrast to 7.6 percent. Moreover, the 11.9 percent figure compares quite favorably with unemployment in the homeland, estimated officially at roughly 25 percent. In view of the \$2 billion in foreign currency remittances sent home each year, "Germany may want its Turks to leave, but Turkey clearly prefers that they stay where they are" (The Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1983). Nevertheless, the DM 6 billion in social service expenses which accrue to the Federal Republic in the form of unemployment compensation, retraining benefits, etc. are likely to strengthen resistance to the further integration of the foreign population along economic lines. Despite their ostensibly indispensable contributions to German production processes, Turkish laborers can expect to hear a more extensive discussion of possible repatriation-premium schemes, than talk of additional economic integration measures, such as job security schemes, supplementary pension plans, etc. (Kemmer, 1982). Although it would appear that a measure of economic integration has already been achieved, many problems resulting from traditional hostility to immigrant labor, language barriers between work groups, stark differences in motivation, job qualification and industrial experience, along with union exclusion and work-place segregation, have yet to be resolved (Castles and Kosack, 1973).

### III. Social Isolation, Educational Integration and the Clash of Two Cultures.

Much to its credit, the West German government has made a sincere effort to secure the economic rights of first generation Turkish laborers, by

enforcing wage contracts and applying sanctions against employers hiring illegal workers, for example. The more scathing criticisms are reserved for the government's lack of foresight with respect to the problems of family migration and socio-cultural isolation. Residential segregation affords the best measure of social isolation, the government's inability to guarantee decent, affordable housing for the migrants and their dependents bears testimony to the lack of foresight, in this, a "social market economy."

It would be unfair, however, to accuse the Federal Republic of blanket discrimination and utter lack of concern for Turkish workers and their dependents. Decent, affordable housing is a scarce commodity in most of the major metropolitan areas, owing to the combined effects of World War II and the baby-boom. Based on a three month living experience in one of the "better" guestworker neighborhoods in Berlin-Tiergarten, I can attest to the fact that showers, private toilet facilities and central heating are the exception rather than the rule for block after block. There are an estimated 1500 to 2000 people without leases in Berlin, another 17,000 to 20,000 who are "urgently in need" of housing in welfare agency parlance. Some 50 percent of the inhabitable dwellings depend on coal ovens or space heaters, 25 percent lack baths and 10 percent must share toilets with other units. Roughly 17 percent of the housing stock was constructed during the 1800's (Borghorst et al, 1981; Senator für Bau- und Wohnungswesen, 1980). The argument that some people are "used to/comfortable with" these conditions holds no more true for Turkish nationals than for middle class, American political science professors.

Federal policy dictating that workers show proof of adequate accommodations prior to granting entrance visas to family members was intended to guarantee the welfare of the dependents. Regulations promulgated in 1971 and 1973, respectively, produced the opposite effect. In an attempt to

preclude the formation of foreign ghettos, authorities enabled cities whose concentration of foreign workers bordered on six percent to request permission to restrict residency in those areas; in areas with a twelve percent concentration, cities could act on their own to ban registration in those areas (every individual who stays more than three months is required by law to register with the local police). Table 2 above illustrates the density of the foreign population in twelve major urban areas; Table 3 below shows the distribution pattern in Berlin. Certain neighborhoods, such as the Frankfurt Innenstadt, the Kalk suburb of Cologne, and North Kreuzberg in Berlin have concentrations ranging from 30 to 31.3 to 40.1 percent (Fekete, 1982; Rist, 1978; Borghorst, et al, 1981).

As the result of short supply, language barriers limiting access to tenants' rights organizations, and the need to discover a ready-made sense of community for dependents, guestworkers are likely to congregate in the same areas, where they pay exorbitant rents for substandard housing, administered illegally by inscrupulous landlords or by land speculators waiting to have their buildings condemned (Schindele, 1980). The search for adequate housing is further complicated by the fact that Turkish families, on the average, tend to be much larger than German ones - and minimum space requirements for additional children are impossible to meet at the lower income levels. Hence, family reunions are hindered, mobility is hindered, the incorporation of new arrivals into the community of foreign workers is hindered . . . The goal was distribution and minimizing of social costs. The reality appears to be the creation of isolation, illegality, and further marginality (Rist, 1978: 154).

The isolation and marginalization of Turkish workers and their families inevitably gives rise to negative stereotypes, if not to a ghetto mentality.



Foreigners are just as eager as German nationals to move into better neighborhoods, even at market rates. A survey conducted in Berlin 1977-1980 indicates that although resident aliens already expend a larger portion of their incomes for rent than their German counterparts, more were intent on finding dwellings with central heating (86.3 to 70.4 percent, respectively) and modernized kitchens (80.8 to 50.8 percent), even at higher cost (Borghorst, 1981. pp. 13-14). A 1974 Frankfurt sample revealed that 21 percent of those questioned preferred a German neighborhood, but a house shared with fellow foreigners; 37 percent hoped for a mixed apartment complex, and 21 percent for a building in which only other Germans lived (Rist, 1978: pp. 167-168). This would indicate that foreign workers and their families are interested in contacts with native citizens, that if given a real choice, they would opt for integration rather than segregation. The official response, however, is one which tends to treat the victim as the source of the problem. Policies tend "not to work toward the elimination of such inequalities and discriminatory practices, but rather to scatter the persons involved so as to keep the concentrations at lower and more manageable levels" (Rist, 1978: p. 81).

As implied earlier, residential segregation is only the physical manifestation of more fundamental forms of social isolation. The housing crisis has been precipitated by a development which is also taking its toll on the German educational system, a sector that is still licking the wounds inflicted by the reform controversies and political realignments of the sixties and seventies. Thanks to the baby-boom, the heated challenges awaiting federal authorities in this policy area make the housing issue look almost manageable, to the extent that tangible solutions do exist, i.e. in the construction of additional dwelling units.

The 1973 hiring freeze helped to stabilize the number of "first

Table 3 : POPULATION OF RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS IN BERLIN (WEST),  
JANUARY 1975 AND JANUARY 1982

Districts Bezirke	Total Pop. Bevölkerung	Foreigners		A u s l ä n d e r			
		absolut	in % der Bevölkerung	Darunter T ü r k e n		Bevölkerung	
				absolut	in % der		
					Ausländer		
1	2	3	4	5	6		

1. Januar 1975

02 Tiergarten	101.894	15.561	15,3	7.746	49,8	7,6
03 Wedding	175.880	31.178	17,7	20.798	66,7	11,8
06 Kreuzberg	167.926	41.553	24,7	28.155	67,8	16,8
07 Charlottenburg	209.194	16.853	8,1	4.340	25,8	2,1
08 Spandau	214.018	10.343	4,8	3.812	36,9	1,8
09 Wilmersdorf	161.874	10.116	6,2	1.067	10,5	0,7
10 Zehlendorf	103.644	5.416	5,2	544	10,0	0,5
11 Schöneberg	171.438	17.435	10,2	7.150	41,0	4,2
12 Steglitz	201.484	7.530	3,7	1.630	21,6	0,8
13 Tempelhof	183.572	6.285	3,4	1.453	23,1	0,8
14 Neukölln	304.453	19.298	6,3	8.967	46,5	2,9
20 Reinickendorf	262.599	8.987	3,4	2.286	25,4	0,9

1. Januar 1982

02 Tiergarten	93.990	16.758	17,8	7.883	47,0	8,4
03 Wedding	154.348	30.250	19,6	20.212	66,8	13,1
06 Kreuzberg	150.822	40.234	26,7	26.784	66,6	17,8
07 Charlottenburg	195.700	24.429	12,5	7.599	31,1	3,9
08 Spandau	212.710	15.657	7,4	7.803	49,8	3,7
09 Wilmersdorf	158.856	13.395	8,4	2.320	17,3	1,5
10 Zehlendorf	105.427	6.770	6,4	844	12,5	0,8
11 Schöneberg	165.263	28.584	17,3	13.658	47,8	8,3
12 Steglitz	195.355	10.667	5,5	2.603	24,4	1,3
13 Tempelhof	188.335	9.395	5,0	3.262	34,7	1,7
14 Neukölln	305.911	36.269	11,9	20.461	56,4	6,7
20 Reinickendorf	254.165	13.546	5,3	4.918	36,3	1,9

Reported in: Senator für Gesundheit, Soziales und Familie, Hrsg.  
Op. cit., p. 70.

generation" Turkish workers. The policy permitting non-nationals to move their dependents to Germany after one year of residency and regular employment was to ensure stability of the socio-psychological sort among otherwise isolated, predominantly male laborers. As Nermen Abadan-Unat reports, among the 82 percent who were married, only 4.6 percent of the Turkish workers in the FRG were living with their spouses in 1972; of the 22 percent married women, 88 percent shared dwellings with their husbands (Abadan-Unat, 1976: p. 10). Of particular significance were the guidelines concerning the immigration rights of Turkish children. Children under the age of 18, later reduced to 16, had little trouble gaining entry through the early seventies. A 1975 law extending child-subsidies (Kindergeid) facilitated and encouraged a major migration of Turkish minors. Indeed, with one half million dependents still eligible for visas under existing rules, "it is a wonder that not all Turkish-children have come. For the parents it would be economically much more advantageous" (Grunenberg, Die Zeit, 5. February 1982). A guestworker whose five children live in a village outside Ismir can collect DM 225 child support per month in Germany; if those children moved in with their parents, the subsidies would amount to DM 890 per month! Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the balance between Germans and non-nationals in Berlin, along with their age group distributions.

It was anticipated that the "second generation," children born in Turkey and brought to Germany, would return to their homes along with their parents once work contracts expired. Since most of the guest workers were under 35 at the time they were recruited, many tended to send for brides and begin families once they settled into Germany. This younger group of children, the "hyphenated-Germans," constitute the "third generation" in official parlance. These two groups account for the explosion in the number of Turkish residents over the last 10 years, one that has unfortunately coincided with the national baby boom. The problem now is that no one knows how long the numbers

Table 4 : GERMAN AND NON-GERMAN RESIDENTS IN BERLIN (WEST), 1973 - 1981

Year's End Jahres- ende	Total Population Bevölkerung insgesamt <sup>1)</sup>	Germans Deutsche <sup>2)</sup>	Non-Germans Nichtdeutsche <sup>3)</sup>	
			absolut	in % der Spalte 1
	1	2	3	4
1973	2.149.948	1.971.610	178.338	8,3
1974	2.125.987	1.935.432	190.555	9,0
1975	2.086.837	1.901.278	185.559	8,9
1976	2.052.706	1.868.010	184.696	9,0
1977	2.028.826	1.838.950	189.876	9,4
1978	2.011.706	1.815.434	196.272	9,8
1979	2.004.250	1.793.776	210.474	10,5
1980	1.998.230	1.765.219	233.011	11,7
1981	1.990.669	1.744.715	245.954	12,4

Table 5 : OFFICIALLY REGISTERED RESIDENTS IN BERLIN (WEST) AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1981  
ACCORDING TO AGE GROUP AND NATIONALITY

Melderechtlich registrierte Einwohner in Berlin (West) am 31.12.1981 nach Alters-  
gruppen und Staatsangehörigkeit (deutsch/nichtdeutsch)

Alter in Jahren	Age in Years	Insgesamt Total	Deutsche German	Ausländeranteil Foreignes	
				absolut	%
unter 6		103 773	77 459	26 314	25,4
6 bis unter 15		186 185	146 990	39 195	21,1
15 bis unter 18		86 791	73 103	13 688	15,8
18 bis unter 20		59 796	51 213	8 583	14,4
20 bis unter 25		155 697	133 044	22 653	14,5
25 bis unter 30		162 719	134 677	28 042	17,2
30 bis unter 35		176 911	145 107	31 804	18,0
35 bis unter 40		172 380	146 362	26 018	15,1
40 bis unter 45		192 245	170 969	21 276	11,1
45 bis unter 55		245 244	226 149	19 095	7,8
55 bis unter 65		195 547	190 302	5 245	2,7
65 oder mehr		443 594	439 553	4 041	0,9

Reported in: Senator für Gesundheit, Soziales und Familie, Hrsg.  
Op. cit., p. 67, p. 69.

represented in earlier tables are going to stay in the FRG.

The educational system seems to have adopted the approach "improvisation rather than integration" (Grunenberg, Die Zeit, 12. February 1982). This is not surprising, given the speed with which enrollments have been increasing: the number of school enrollments among foreign children climbed from 35,135 in 1964 to 165,000 in 1976, to 650,000 in 1982, 58 percent of whom are Moslem. Of the 68,838 in Bavaria alone, 60 percent are of Turkish descent (Jungblut, Die Zeit, 16. April 1982). The tragedy is that despite compulsory education laws to which non-nationals have been subject since 1964, 60 percent of the foreign students quit school before acquiring some type of secondary certification, in contrast to 25 percent among German adolescents (Frackmann et al. 1981).

As John Bendix has pointed out to me, existing literature on the topic discloses six general reasons for the poor showing among guestworker offspring. First, the socio-economic situation of the family and underprivileged status contributes to poor school performance, especially if both parents are working and have little time (and probably few of the skills necessary) to help with homework, etc. Secondly, foreign children face a special set of socialization problems at home and in school. The combined effect of structural changes in the home (mothers working, dependence on the nuclear family alone) affect performance, but find little recognition or understanding in the educational system. The ability of children to master the German language more quickly than their elders often has ramifications for existing "power relations" and conflicts within the family. A third problem is the sense of rejection and the "outsider" status Turkish children experience among their classmates, which precludes their taking a more active part in discussion and instruction or keeps them from seeking help from peers. Fourth, a number of disturbance factors are seen to rest in the need to adjust themselves and adapt to a new school system as well as to a completely new

culture, after relatively short periods of residency. Fifth, and perhaps most critical, is the issue of dual-language proficiency. While kindergartens and nursery schools would be the best place to begin acquiring the language, there are simply not enough places to go around. (I will return to this point shortly.) Finally, there has been insufficient pedagogical training on the part of school personnel, who have little or no background in bilingual education. The demands on the children themselves are exorbitant, particularly if they must attend formal native language classes in addition to a full day of German instruction. In short, the problems confronting foreign children in German schools have only exacerbated all the existing deficiencies of the system as a whole, problems of overcrowded classrooms, inadequate teaching materials and provincialized curricula (Fekete, 1982; Heye, Die Zeit, 14. January 1983).

In principle at least, the type of language instruction offered should correspond to the degree of integration authorities and parents hope to attain. If the children are also to be considered as guests, the emphasis would be on providing rigorous training in the native language, history and culture, with enough German on the side to permit "functional" communication. If complete integration is the desired end, immersion in German language, culture and customs beginning at an early age would be in order. Alternatively, one could foster the education of "hyphenated Germans" based on truly bilingual and bicultural pedagogical methods. The most untenable posture, assuming that there are "two souls struggling in a single breast" has unfortunately come to dominate educational efforts to date. The policy dictating that "the children are considered Germans for the period of German instruction and foreigners for the instruction of the mother tongue and life in the homeland . . . assumes a dichotomy whereby the two cultural identities are at odds within the individual" (Rist, 1978: p. 193). If Wolfgang von

man (Jungblut, Die Zeit, 16. April 1982).

Moreover, Turkish adolescents are aware that numbers are stacked against them. The second generation has reached employable age, which has intensified a very serious youth unemployment problem in the FRG. The number of Germans aged 15-30 increased by 1.7 million between 1965-1980. By 1985 this group of potential job hunters will expand its ranks by another 1.7 million. Official statistics show that 90,000 youths under 20 were unemployed in 1981; an estimated 200,000 were unable to find suitable apprenticeships. Among foreign youth, only 40,000 of 160,000 15-19 year olds were involved in vocational training (Frackmann et al, 1981: p. 33, p. 42, p. 68). Tables 6 and 7 present the grim profile of youth unemployment in Berlin.

This does not mean, however, that Turkish adolescents are devoid of ambition - on the contrary, their exposure to "the German way of life" has altered their own expectations to the point that, if they stay, they will be just as reluctant to take on "the dirty work" as their German counterparts. A survey by Czarina Wilpert from the early 1970's reveals that when questioned about their career hopes, 39.6 percent of the Turkish adolescents aspired to jobs requiring academic training, while an additional 24 percent expressed interest in salaried/clerical positions (Wilpert, 1976: pp. 270-71). The gap between aspirations and opportunities may very well be construed by this so-called "lost generation" as "the deliberate intergenerational perpetuation of a prejudicial and discriminatory social system" (Rist, 1978: p. 187).

Above and beyond the integration problems that exist with respect to housing, education and youth employment, a very special type of cultural crisis confronts the young female offspring in the second and third generations. To the extent that roles and behaviors within the family are oriented to Turkish norms, the daughters of the guestworkers are subject to more significant restrictions on their freedom of movement than either their

Goethe was unable to lay to rest the two struggling souls, can any more be expected of 6 to 15 year olds, in two languages simultaneously?

While educators have come to agree that language instruction should be undertaken "the earlier, the better," only 28 percent of guestworker children were enrolled in kindergartens in 1978, in contrast to 60 percent of the German children. In light of much higher birth rates, Turkish children face a double bottleneck. Lack of funds makes kindergarten places a scarce commodity for all. The ratio of pre-schools to urban residents ranges from 1: 2378 in Cologne, to 1: 4783 in Berlin, with even worse ratios of 1: 7262 in Munich and 1: 10,234 in Essen (Fekete, 1982: p. 80). In some areas up to 80 percent of the children on waiting lists are foreigners. A "backlash" of sorts has caused educational officials to place a 20 percent ceiling on the number of foreign students in one classroom, for fear that the quality of instruction would produce adverse effects for German children - hence the second bottleneck: Turkish children are competing with other Turkish children for a disproportionately small number of pre-school openings.

Inadequate language training leads to poor elementary and secondary performance, which results in higher drop-out rates; without certification, Turkish adolescents have no access to vocational training programs, much less to higher education. Since apprenticeship programs are the province of the states, a lack of formal education is only the first hurdle for the second generation in its search for gainful employment. Bavarian selection procedures are especially outrageous:

The Turkish and Greek [apprentices] not only have to submit to a test of their manual skills in taking a certification exam, they must also answer, for example, questions about the Bavarian state constitution that would surely embarrass the likes of many an established career



Table 6 : REGISTERED UNEMPLOYED YOUTH UNDER 20 YEARS OF AGE IN BERLIN (WEST)  
- PROPORTION OF FOREIGN YOUTH

Arbeitslos gemeldete Jugendliche unter 20 Jahren in Berlin (West)  
- darunter Ausländer -

Date Stichtag (jeweils Monatsende)	Unemployed Youth Arbeitslose Jugendliche		Foreigners Ausländer in % Sp. 1 (3)
	Total insgesamt (1)	Number of Foreigners darunter Ausländer (2)	
Mai 1978	2.809	687	24,5
Sept. 1978	2.673	540	20,2
Mai 1979	1.956	438	22,4
Sept. 1979	1.859	428	23,0
Mai 1980	1.851	446	24,1
Sept. 1980	2.073	652	31,5
Sept. 1981	4.160	1.630	39,2

Quelle: Strukturuntersuchung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit  
über Arbeitslose und offene Stellen

Table 7 : DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF APPRENTICESHIP AND VOCATIONAL  
TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES IN BERLIN (WEST) AND PROPORTION FILLED  
BY FOREIGN YOUTH

Entwicklung der Gesamtzahl der Auszubildungsverhältnisse in  
Berlin (West) und Ausländeranteil

Number of Available Apprenticeships

Date Stichtag	Ausbildungsverhältnisse Foreign Youth		
	Total insgesamt 1	absolut 2	in % 3
31.12.1974	17 546	592	3,4
31.12.1975	18 416	595	3,2
31.12.1976	22 332	588	2,6
31.12.1977	25 706	652	2,5
31.12.1978	29 420	723	2,5
31.12.1979	31 546	863	2,7
31.12.1980	34 099	1 173	3,4
31.12.1981	35 359	1 562	4,4

brothers or the German girls with whom they may befriend themselves. Family structure requires Turkish girls to assume household responsibilities at an earlier stage, shortening the period of female adolescence that tends to be heavily emphasized (through advertising, etc.) among German teens. The need to maintain contacts with German friends is likely to be nipped in the bud. A desire to engage in what are "normal" leisure activities, such as class excursions, is sure to produce family conflict. Turkish girls may copy those activities of their German friends over which parents have no control during school hours, for example, or those tolerated by parents, i.e., adopting hairstyles or music, in an attempt to "process" German cultural influences (Pokatsky, *Die Zeit*, 11.March 1983).

But there is also evidence that Turkish girls are much more conscious of the differentiation of sex roles which leads them to begin isolating themselves at an earlier age to avoid such conflicts. Given additional religious strictures intended to safeguard female virtue, a Turkish girl in Berlin is more likely to be confined to the home, whereas in the Anatolian village she could move about more freely under the watchful eye of extended family members (Welsche-Alexa, 1978; Fekete, 1982). Hence, Turkish girls and Turkish women suffer from isolation in a two-fold sense: they are cut off from the Germans, and they are cut off from their own kind. The cultural crisis as it affects women gives birth to a dual identity crisis. Significant differences have already manifested themselves in the expectations and behaviors displayed between females of the second and third generations (Fekete, 1982). Turkish girls and women become the active preservers of Turkish cultural tradition in Germany. The question is whether or not that tradition can be preserved if its bearers are themselves unable to escape a crisis of culture or to cope effectively with a personal role crisis.

#### IV. Conclusion: Integration and the Lost Generation.

On February 24, 1983, the West German government published a 220 page report compiled by a Federal Commission on "Foreigner Policy" under the auspices of the Interior Minister. The report consists of a 17 page introductory section outlining the need for a more coherent policy towards resident aliens, 174 pages of detailed recommendations on family migrations, work and residency permit status, and 24 pages of reactions to the proposals by state, community, charitable and church organizations (Bundesregierung, 1983).

The recommendation that has provoked the most negative response among the largest number of agencies appears to have been the one which calls for a reduction of the age after which children are no longer to be admitted to the FRG under anything beyond a limited-visit visa. Now set at 16, the age cut-off under the new proposals would drop to age 6, on the assumption that a child who runs the gamut of the German educational system will be ripe for integration and eventually for naturalization. Implicit in this recommendation and occasionally surfacing throughout the report is the notion that integration efforts must concentrate on the third generation, namely on those children born and raised in the Federal Republic. The second generation, whose socio-psychological problems would appear to be the most pressing at this point, are the topic of a more "legalistic" debate (regarding their rights to bring in spouses, incapacitated parents, etc.). It is as if the FRG would like to find some way to repatriate this source of potential youth unrest and employment bottlenecks, but would have less objection to assimilating those "Germanizable" Turks who will account for 25-35 percent of the total birth rate by 1990.

And yet, it would be a risky policy move

to assume the second generation is indeed lost, and that an upswing in the conditions of the guestworker communities will only come with the advent of the third generation. To wait for social improvements to come in the third generation is to choose a policy of inaction (Rist, 1978: p. 2450).

Years of inaction have produced the socially explosive state of affairs that now exists, as well as the corresponding economic burdens that have compelled the government to undertake a major investigation. No matter how extensive the measures that leaders in Bonn are now prepared to consider, they will never serve as just compensation for that generation of guestworker children who did not choose to come and cannot choose to stay. The clash between two cultures -- one a highly meritocratic, advanced industrial society, the other a religious-fundamentalist, underdeveloped society with a strong communal orientation -- has been internalized by its least protected and probably most sensitive representatives.

The dichotomizing effects produced by these cultures in conflict are summarized by one Turkish youth:

Every day I make the trip from Turkey to Germany. When I leave my parents' home in the morning, I abandon Turkey. I go to my workplace or to my friends, and with that I am in Germany. In the evening I return to my parents and am once again in Turkey. I never relate at home what I have experienced in school or done with my friends. I do what my parents demand of me. When I am with my friends or at school, I rarely talk about my parents - I accommodate myself to what my friends are undertaking (Zeitschrift für

Kulturaustausch, Heft 3, 19810 p. 338).

This is the voice of one among many who are unlikely to find a psychological "home" in either the Federal Republic or in their native country. They have acquired German tastes, consumer patterns and behaviors in their efforts to "accommodate." Externally, they are the "hyphenated Germans" to whom Rist refers; internally, they adhere to Turkish values and role orientations, for which they are sometimes under attack. Perhaps these individuals will be treated as "hyphenated Turks" following repatriation.

As Rist has argued

The continual slippage between the pronouncements of a concern for integration and well-being of the foreign workers [and their children] and the realities of policies that tend to produce opposite outcomes can only reflect the deeper ambivalence of the Federal Republic toward the foreign workers.

The cumulative impact of these and other regulations make the life of the guestworker full of stress. The difficulties are plentiful: the lack of residential mobility; the lack of opportunity to live among friends and relatives; never knowing how long one will be even tolerated, let alone welcomed . . . (Rist, 1978: p. 88).

No one actor or group can be blamed for having precipitated a state of cultural schizophrenia among Turkish nationals in Germany. Likewise, no single group should be made to bear the cost. The prognosis does not appear to be an especially bright one; fearing as much, 50,000 Turkish citizens chose to emigrate in 1982 (Wall Street Journal, May 9, 1983). But many of the guestworkers are prepared to stay -- up to 78 percent among those recently surveyed in Berlin (according to Borghorst et. al., 1981, p. 14). The only

thing that is certain, however, with respect to the future of Turkish migrants in Germany is that two questions, what does integration mean and how it will be achieved, have supplanted the more rhetorical query: to integrate or not to integrate? It is an unsolvable problem whose time has come.

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