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TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE

Viewed historically, alliances tend to be ephemeral institutions, being established to deal temporarily with shifting political events. Alliances tend to be most efficacious at the moment of creation, not at later dates. Referring to NATO, Edgar Furniss said "...the Alliance had already emerged when the Treaty was signed. Like most treaties, the North Atlantic Pact publicized and made official the pre-existing relationship." Alliances tend to suffer atrophy over time unless the conditions attending creation remain constant or a given alliance reflects the dynamic change experienced by the political actors themselves. If NATO and/or the Warsaw Pact continue to be viable, they must have accommodated the changes in the structural and behavioral environment; else they would have suffered the same fate as CENTO and SEATO they would have become anomalies awaiting final abrogation.

The political process is dynamic, witnessing changes fueled by technological innovations and demographic transformations that occur with accelerating frequency and pressure. New economic and social catastrophes occur before the last have been understood, much less dealt with adequately. Economists debating the causes of and solutions for inflation bear striking resemblance to their medieval precursors concerned about angels and pinheads. Their solutions are often so contradictory as to belie
credibility. Yet remarkably, economics is far more successful in dealing with multivariate analyses and mathematical modeling than are other political and social sciences.

Apparently, the type of subject we are most concerned with simply defies pseudo-molecular reduction permitting examination of parts of the whole to determine phenomenal behavior. We must examine the "big picture" leading to the temptation of enlarging the composition to global dimensions projecting pseudo-systemic observations greatly exceeding our intellectual grasp. Conceptualizing a global system requires assumptions of national and regional behavior that can only be defended by exaggerated ambiguity. Thus alliances and political blocs become actors distinguishable from their members and occasionally superior to them. This is sometimes said: Because of her membership in NATO, France (or A,B,C,...n) must pursue a policy of x in y. Rumania must do x because of her position in the Warsaw Pact. Students ask, "What is NATO's position regarding Namibia or the Middle East?" and we tend to utter plausible generalities when truthfully, NATO does not conduct foreign policy but is part of the foreign policy of each discrete member state.

The essential actors in international politics are nation states, not individuals, international organizations or other coalitions. The predominant mode of interaction in world politics remains bilateral despite the proliferation of multilateral organizations since World War II. Even an
alliance such as NATO is basically a set of bilateral relationships encased in a multilateral framework: NATO comprises 105 dyads — a rather complex network indeed. Obviously not all dyads are equally interesting or important, yet one can almost never be sure which dyads might assume importance at certain times.

Of the multilateral alliances entered into since World War II, only NATO and WTO remain viable and significant, largely by reason of mutual reinforcement. Were one to disappear the other might well vanish to be neither missed nor yearned for save by those of us who invested so much time and thought.

Interrelationships change over time resulting in concomitant changes in dyadic relationships. The basic elements of the rationale for NATO and WTO remain: US-USSR conflict and East-West bloc conflict. Of course, NATO was founded in 1949, the height of the "Cold War" and 1979 is marked by "détente", yet, stripped of rhetoric, the two conditions are not all that dissimilar. "Cold war" and "détente" are but two sides of the same coin: superpower rivalry and conflict.

Cold wars typically develop between the strongest allies in a recently ended war so we need not agonize about causes of US-Soviet hostility, it arose out of victory over Germany and Japan. Upon ending a major war as debilitating as World War II, exhausted victors cast suspicious glances to see if any threats lurk in the wings. Only Russia and America could threaten each
other and the threats loomed more ominously as their exhaustion passed. Germany was dismembered and occupied, Japan was occupied and once mighty Britain and France were prostrate as though they had lost the war. No state posed a threat to the superpowers save for each other and they lapsed into a condition of mutual fear and suspicion that far exceeded rational bounds.

Fear was endemic among governments of the period and provided the necessary and sufficient conditions for forming alliances that were to prove to be enduring and relatively stable. The postwar alliances reflected the conditions attending their formation, providing adequate justification for discrete national decisions to ally.

US-USSR relations provided a necessary but insufficient justification for the formation of hostile alliances. WTO, having been created in response to NATO, needs little elaboration at this point. But the justification for NATO must be sought in the diverse motivations reflected by the adherents to the pact.

Several factors must be examined: first, Europe had been devastated by the war; second, power shifted away from traditional European power centers; and third, the motivations for accession were complex rather than simple. Each of these items will be taken up briefly -- the format of this
paper proscribes detailed analysis.

Little need be said about the devastation wrought by the war. Each of the European belligerents was in dire economic straits and most forecasters predicted that relative privation would continue indefinitely and that the burgeoning US economy would be invulnerable to challenge, that the US economy would dwarf all others forever. No one believed that European states would regain their earlier lead, although Britain was generally assigned an outside chance of achieving a role of some significance.

Of course, fears generated by immediate economic distress proved short-lived; however, those fears played a large part in motivating the European founders of NATO. Their vulnerability to possible Soviet aggrandizement was enhanced by the scarcity of economic and military resources available to them. They were not, nor would they likely ever be self-reliant vis-à-vis the USSR. European security required American participation to offset Soviet power.

NATO, we must keep in mind, was a European not an American product, having been based so closely upon the model provided by the Brussels Pact (1947). American participation in the alliance resulted inevitably in the Americanization of the pact - there was no gainsaying US hegemony.

This brings us to the second factor listed above, the shift of power from European to non-European centers, if I may refer to the Soviet Union as a non-European power center.
Prior to the two World Wars (which may appropriately be viewed as one epochal phenomenon), Central and Western Europe were unrivaled as the power center for world politics. Most of the world was parcelled out to diverse European imperial domains or influence spheres. The United States and Russia were variously excluded or excluded themselves from playing a major role and Japan's dreams of becoming an imperial giant were dashed by the second war.

The European decline was traumatic, expensive and destabilizing. Transfers of power were not always magnanimously or gracefully accomplished. Diverse European withdrawals were forced upon the British in Palestine, India and Burma, the French in the Levant, and the Dutch in Indonesia, to mention but a few cases. In each of these instances, withdrawal was promoted and abetted by American (and Soviet) pressure and support for national independence. America's leaders were largely untutored in the role of world leadership, were inexperienced in the often Byzantine rites of world power manipulation and were frequently clumsy in projecting national goals and policies.

Power center movement from European to non-European actors was not a cosmetic change; rather, the consequences for Europe were profound and pervasive. European concerns were sublimated to the rivalry between two superpowers who were only secondarily preoccupied by Europe. US officials were not always sensitive to the needs of European govern-
ments as was demonstrated by the style and content of American deportment vis-à-vis the British re Skybolt (1961), the French at the Geneva Conference (1954), and Britain and France at Suez (1956), the Dutch in Indonesia, for example.

American policy expresses and projects US interests, not interests of a coalition of states except as such interests coincide with American design. By reason of its hegemonic position in NATO, especially in the first two decades, US strategic policy was coterminous with alliance strategic policy. Changes in US strategic policy were expressed, in part, as changes in alliance policy because NATO was an instrument of US foreign policy and because the European members were dependent upon the US. That dependence has diminished in intensity over the years but American strategic hegemony remains in effect.

Dependence in the early post war period was a profound influence in formulating the diverse national foreign policies among the European powers and with the superpowers. But dependence was not a sufficient element in determining national motivation for alliance, the third factor mentioned earlier.

Motivations underlying foreign policy are difficult to identify and are never as simple as we often like to pretend. For convenience, I shall distinguish among core and flank members: the former being those former members of the Brussels Pact plus West Germany, Canada and the US; and the flank comprising Denmark, Norway, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Iceland.
I distinguish the flank members as those who were attracted to or recruited for the pact because of their strategic locations in NATO's posture vis-à-vis the USSR.

Of the core members, the US and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are most critical and have been from the beginning, well before FRG membership in NATO. France and the Low Countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg -- BENELUX) particularly sought to commit a US military presence in Europe to police Germany whose renascence was promoted by the Americans almost immediately upon the defeat of the Nazis.

US policy reflected conviction that West Germany had to be established as a viable economic and military force if European recovery were to be achieved. Little concern was evidenced among Americans about possible German revanchism. In typical American problem solving fashion, we were convinced that the problem posed by German militarism and ultranationalism had been solved by World War II. Now European recovery must be achieved, else Europe would be vulnerable to Soviet aggrandizement. From late 1945 and early 1946 through the coup de Prague (1948), US policy makers became more and more convinced that the USSR would march into Western Europe or would otherwise extend her dominion whenever such a move would not meet with too costly resistance. The utter devastation and prostration of European armies and societies whetted American fears of Russian depravity. Only a restored Western Europe buttressed by a remilitarized, renovated, albeit
truncated Germany could provide a stable guarantee against such Russian action.

To France and her BENELUX neighbors, American designs for Germany complicated policy making since the permanence of German defeat was not taken for granted. For France the old problem of rationalizing resource production and distribution between Lorraine and the Ruhr remained unresolved and the disposition of the Saar Basin was yet to be determined. These issues helped to fuel prior Franco-German wars and they could not be dismissed lightly.

Traditionally, the economics of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have tended to be dominated by that of Germany; indeed, the latter two particularly have tended to be extensions of the German economy. With postwar economic recovery especially coupled with anticipated German recovery, German economic hegemony would likely be restored also. Without German recovery, the Low Countries could anticipate only a truncated level of indigenous growth. Thus, as with the French, these governments were faced by a paradox: German recovery was both required and feared.

Faced with growing US pressure for German normalization (including military) and with German economic regeneration, France and Belgium, particularly and severally, pressed the need for a continued US presence upon the Americans. Paul-Henri Spaak said that Belgium inevitably would be dominated by a hegemonic power and that the US would likely be more...
benign than either France or Germany, if only because of their propinquity. On its part, France insisted upon US participation in the Western Alliance as the price for acquiescence in FRG militarization.

Other political and economic costs (opportunities?) were imposed upon Germany as the price of assuming a more normal role, including: (1) renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons; (2) acceptance of indefinite stationing of foreign troops in FRG territory; (3) acquiescence in French (and BENELUX) penetration of FRG economy; and (4) sublimation of FRG political initiative and ambition in the guise of European integration. None of these items were forced upon Germany -- each was agreed to voluntarily and with some real alacrity by Chancellor Adenauer and his successors. But this set of items defines a subordinate role for Germany that belies present reality.

Renouncing nuclear weapons in 1954 was neither daring nor limiting in a world comprising but two principal nuclear powers, the US and USSR (plus Britain, of course). With increasing proliferation of nuclear powers in the last decades of this century, a non-nuclear Germany could be at some disadvantage.

While providing some guarantee of assistance in the event of a Russian invasion, the various allied military forces upon German territory prolong a subordinate military role that is becoming anachronistic. Britain's ages-old dream of stationing an army on the continent was finally achieved with the British Army of the Rhine -- but such a feat was analogous
to a conquest post impotence -- it has hardly been noticed.
As de Gaulle understood when he evicted NATO offices and
personnel from France, the mere stationing of foreign military
personnel restricts and limits national freedom of action.

Starting with the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), the diverse institutions of the newly evolving
European Community have provided disproportionate benefits to
Germany's associates. The ECSC provided France with Ruhr ore
while giving Germany access to coking coal that was inferior
to that which the FRG continued to obtain from Sweden.
Similarly the Common Market opened the German hinterland to
Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourgeois penetration. And the Common
Agricultural Policy was a triumph for French agriculture
imposing net costs upon the other members of the community,
particularly upon Germany and, eventually, the United Kingdom
(UK).

Obviously, Germany has not suffered by reason of associa-
tion. The Wirtschaftswunder was the rapid prosperity of the
German economy of this period. None can say that FRG pros-
perity would have been greater had Germany chosen to follow
a solitary path. We cannot know how things would have
developed had conditions been different because they were not
different.

Sublimation has resulted in an FRG posture as if it has
no policy separate from her allies in NATO and/or fellow
members in the European Community. Since NATO does not make
policy and the EC is not an integrated, supranational entity, FRG sublimation is more mythical than realistic. The posture resulted in the maintenance of a low profile which was quite instrumental until recent developments which will be discussed subsequently.

III

Conditions within and without the alliance have changed significantly since NATO was created some thirteen years ago. The principal changes have transformed the roles, stature, and salience of the USSR, the US and the FRG and have created concomitant changes in the structure and behavior of alliances.

In the first quarter century after World War II, the USSR restricted activities to regions adjacent to Russian territory - a not insignificant area but certainly not one likely to challenge US power directly. Increasingly over the years the Russians have asserted a much more active role, projecting themselves as a truly global power challenging the US in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. The challenge has even extended to the Caribbean with the appearance of Soviet naval vessels challenging the traditional American naval supremacy in the area. The development of Soviet naval power to the extent that it challenges American hegemonic control over the seas signaled the arrival of the
Soviet Union to parity with the United States as a super-power.

Once parity had been achieved, the basic structure of the world political system was modified. The traditional role - the role that had been asserted as traditional - of the United States as the global power containing Soviet political-military actions to the Eurasian arena was no longer operant. The Russians are now capable of and engage in challenging America's domain in all regions. Once challenged, the American domain was unmasked for what it really was all along; that is, a mythical domain not a truly imperial domain in the manner, say, of the British in the nineteenth century.

With the new structure of world politics the diverse elements of regional arrangements have been modified significantly also. Europe becomes more important in some respects and far less important in others. While Soviet power and influence was confined to the Eurasian land mass, Western Europe was the focal point for US-Soviet interaction because of the geographic proximity of their military forces. Even as recently as the Yom Kippur War (1973), it was difficult for the Russians to express a presence because of the lack of delivery vehicles for transporting troops, etc. Within the next five or six years, the Russians were able to demonstrate a significant capability to intervene in force in distant places with the action in Ethiopia during her war with Somalia.

Both relatively and absolutely, the US role was diminished
by the increased salience of Soviet power. Yet more important for the United States role were several other factors: first, the war in Vietnam and its consequences; and second, the demise of American hegemony in the international economic arena. The principal result of American involvement in Vietnam was the frustration of American policy (which had never been adequately defined) and the concomitant depletion of American military and economic resources at home and abroad, particularly evidenced in the gradual decline of the efficacy of American forces in Europe. The American public was soured on the utility of intervention and the Congress proceeded to enact legislation attempting to delimit the presidency, particularly regarding the discretionary power to implement and execute policy. These are ephemeral items and we have already witnessed some degree of dissatisfaction among the public and the Congress for the reduction of American resolve and the performance of the presidency; however, the Carter Administration's anti-imperial stance reflected well the climate of opinion at the time of President Carter's election to office. Americans apparently do not like what they opted for, but it seems to me that Carter expressed very well and continues to express very well what they wanted.

In the economic arena, the end of the Bretton Woods era has not been replaced by something equally instrumental or effective. The Bretton Woods system relied upon the United States dollar as, virtually, the sole hard-currency, the
reserve currency upon which all non-socialist political systems based their economies. The fixed exchange rate for the dollar remained the basis for the international economic system which has been in some turmoil since the dollar was permitted to float. Of yet more importance, the alacrity with which the United States proceeded to finance the Vietnam war in large measure by processing the payments deficit particularly with other industrial countries has come home to roost. The chronic deficit in American balance of payments has been used in large measure to finance American economic growth and was used as an option to raising taxes and paying for Vietnam out of current accounts. The result was an enormous increase in the holdings of dollars abroad which fueled inflation in the United States and elsewhere. The devaluation of the dollar in 1971 followed by its float against other currencies resulted in the reduction of American indebtedness abroad by cheapening the value of the currencies being held by others. The hard dollar became rather limp.

Four principal factors have contributed to the relative diminution of the US role in Europe:

1. Gaullism and its successors;
2. OPEC;
3. The British malaise; and
4. German economic resurgence.

While interrelated each is a significant element which might
have sufficed in itself to diminish the American role. The combination of the four factors was rather overwhelming.

Having its origins in France under the presidency of General de Gaulle (hence the name), Gaullism today finds its expression best in British policy. Gaullism stressed the independence of each member of NATO from the United States. It reasserted nationalism when all save for de Gaulle paid homage to Monnet's grand design. De Gaulle understood that European integration was a dream, not a policy, and that pursuit of the dream diverted attention from the burgeoning penetration and control of Europe's economies. Championing L'Europe des Patries, developing of the Force de Frappe, evicting NATO offices and personnel from French territory and vetoing British accession to the treaty of Rome dramatized independence from the US, while carefully retaining French membership in the alliance. De Gaulle stressed the primacy of (French) national interests while promoting continuation of the alliance and of the US role in Germany.

The Gaullist view was an alliance that was back to its essentials prior to the increase in functional activities during the fifties and sixties. That made eminently good sense if the Russians were not expected to launch a conventional attack against Western Europe and if the allies agreed to the continuation of the military presence in Germany. NATO absorbed the French shift in policy so readily because it did not in fact change the design, structure or potential performance of the alliance in any way. It did emphasize
the central position of Germany in the alliance but that emphasis was not a surprising phenomenon for any observers.

The impact of the (threatened) partial Arab oil embargo during the Yom Kippur War (1973) coupled with OPEC success in cartelizing the world oil market reinforced burgeoning efforts at national separation from and identification with the US. It became apparent that each of the European states had to make its own deals with Arab oil producers else it suffer interruption of oil supplies as a consequence of Arab reactions to American policy.

While the Dutch did not in the first instance make a deal with the Arabs independently and the European Community (EC) sought to adopt a common policy in dealing with the Arabs, both Britain and France early on decided to go it alone because of their long and superior experience in dealing with the Arabs. But, most important, the Europeans wanted to avoid having oil sanctions implemented against them as a consequence of American policy decisions in the Middle East.

Once the United States decided to resume resupplying Israel during the October War, the vulnerability of American supply was magnified by the refusal of, eventually, all European Allies to permit the United States to use European or NATO bases for such efforts. Only Portugal permitted shipment (via the Azores) and that was prior to the revolution. None of the structural changes made since 1973 (the
International Energy Agreement, for example) has lessened the impact of the changes wrought upon US-European relationships resulting from the above events.

Of the third factor listed above, the British malaise, little need be said. Whether Britain's economic misfortunes result from poor economic management, excessive welfare statism, low and declining productivity, or from archaic labor practices, Britain's role in the world economy has declined, is declining, and will likely continue to decline despite North Sea oil and policy pronouncements. Obviously the development of the North Sea oil fields has improved the British balance of payments situation and has resulted in some improvements which are likely to have effect for the next decade or two; however, the impact of the relative decline of the British level of living (compared principally to those of Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland), industrial competitive disadvantage, and structural weakness of the pound (despite recent improvements) combine to heighten perceived insecurity, leading to attempts by British Governments to follow an independent course at a time when such independence may not be fulfilling. Not even Churchillian or Rooseveltian metaphor is available to succor the public with dreams of better times. And memories of special relationships with the US that never were, offer no compensation since the US is perceived to be in apparent decline also.

British participation in the European community is
ambivalent at best. Harmless as it is likely to be, the European Monetary System (EMS) is deemed too limiting. Certainly if the pound continues to appreciate, British participation would be on a stronger basis, however the push for British participation would be lessened, not increased, by the appreciation of the pound. The relative strength of German and other continental economies irritates and exacerbates the sense of inferiority that seems almost palpable at times.

The fourth factor, German economic resurgence, is the most important of these items. Until recently, at international meetings, one was always made aware of the preoccupation of Europeans with the pervasiveness of American economic hegemony. Largely unnoticed, the US economic role in Europe has been succeeded to by the Federal Republic of Germany. The FRG is the strong man of Europe. The Deutsche mark provides the underpinning for most of the Western economies, including those of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, and even France. Of benefit to German policy, the Deutsche mark has not become a principal reserve currency for the European countries, the dollar and the Eurodollar remain as the reserve currency for Europe. As has been seen, reserve currencies are very vulnerable to policy changes, including collateral attack, as the British learned and the Americans are learning rather rapidly.

Recent German "immunity" from inflation results in large part from policy initiatives entered into at the expense of
the US and, to some extent, the UK, Italy, Canada, et al. FRG economic policy discourages imports and encourages exports while resisting pressures to permit the Deutsche mark becoming a reserve currency. This is part of the motivation behind Germany's championing of the EMS. If EMS were successful and European Currency Units (ECU) were to take the place of dollars as some hope, pressure on the dollar would accelerate while the Deutsche mark would still be protected from overexposure and vulnerability.

For the near term, the political economies of Europe will be dominated by West German economic policy. And global trading patterns will reflect the vacillating fortunes of the American dollar buffeted by the winds of change in Europe and elsewhere.

IV

The implications for NATO have been and will continue to be profound. Political, military, and strategic policies cannot be kept independent from economic policy. Chancellor Schmidt's assertion of a political role arises because the stakes for Germany no longer permit the game to be played as if Germany has no policy. Of course Germany has had policies since the days of Chancellor Adenauer; the self-effacing reluctance to be forthcoming has been removed. Detente, we should remember, received its impetus
from Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik initially condemned by Dr. Kissinger who later became its champion. Détente continues to be the most important aspect of German foreign policy because Germany is so exposed geographically. But détente for Germany requires stronger, more assertive policies by the US than have been forthcoming in recent years. Unilateral cancellation of the B1 bomber and of the development of the neutron warheads, apparent vacillation in Angola, Somalia, Iran and Korea all endanger détente because they diminish American bargaining power to entice the Russians to lessen their military buildup. Indeed the neutron decision came only after inducing Chancellor Schmidt to go out on a limb in favor of deployment of the weapons.

Henry Brandon said it this way: "What has profoundly upset Schmidt is what is perceived here as a basic and misguided change in US foreign policy toward the western allies, namely Carter's reluctance to assume responsibility for the stationing of medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles in Europe". Schmidt has argued that Russian introduction of SS-20 missiles has altered the European theater balance and that the Europeans need their own medium-range deterrent capability.

Carter's response to Schmidt's Alistair Buchan lecture (October, 1977) was to say that if the Europeans want such a special deterrent, they should assume full responsibility for it. Largely unnoticced and poorly reported in the
United States at the time, this response by the American president should have sent shock waves through the establishment. Carter's response constituted an abdication of American leadership since, in the past, the US always accepted responsibility for strategic decisions. The United States cannot simply discard its role as a strategic hegemonic power without expecting serious consequences. The responsibility derives, as indicated earlier in this paper, from the essential relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is not based on a moral interpretation of what the United States role should be in the best of all possible worlds; rather it is a role developed out of the ashes of World War II, nurtured by three decades of American policy and has formed parts of the basis for European strategic, military, political and economic policies in that interval. There seems to be no question but that the Europeans, especially the West Germans, are prepared to accept US leadership if the United States will continue to accept that responsibility and pay some attention to European interests. If US leadership falters, the FRG has recovered sufficient economic strength to exercise leadership, albeit with some reluctance.

The tension between the United States and Germany is palpable and results from changing political economic realities more than from differences between Schmidt and Carter. Schmidt is said to be disillusioned in the process
of European integration leading to an EC with real political power. Brandon quotes a "senior aide" to Schmidt: "We don't want to see EC develop into a technocratic Europe, mainly concerned with the development of steel, alcohol or agricultural markets. We want it to give Western Europe a greater political vitality, not just a network of rules of how to operate markets."

Schmidt is concerned by British "insularity" in the EC and with UK failure to support and enhance a political role for Europe. So Germany, the champion of British accession to the EC, turned to France whose hostility to the US since de Gaulle has continued unremittingly. So too has Germany pressed for the EMS hoping it would provide the needed impetus for progress in developing a European community. More important, EMS was, according to Schmidt, "an attempt on Bonn's part to lose the stigma of being a suburb of Washington".

The EMS is not likely to make Schmidt less restive because it is not likely to be significantly more effective than the snake. The political economy of West Germany requires German assertion of leadership because the economic stakes for Germany are so great and because the funding of approaches alternative to the United States are available in Europe only to Germany because only Germany could afford to finance a major shift in policy.
The vitality of West Europe sought by Schmidt must find its principal leadership in Germany. American initiatives in Europe must account for and reflect German needs and policies else they will be frustrated by German nonparticipation. Accommodating the interests of the US and Germany will not be easy nor tranquil; tensions must be expected to increase since the accommodation of Germany amounts to a transfer of power within the Western alliance from the United States to Germany and such a transfer of power will perforce produce anxiety in both partners and among the other allies.

Tensions with the USSR on the part of the US, FRG, and other EC members are likely to increase for historic and geopolitical reasons. If Chancellor Schmidt is correct in his assessment of the need for a European deterrent to the SS-20 and if the US continues to take responsibility, will Germany accept the burden? If Germany remains convinced of the need for a European deterrent and of US reluctance to provide the means to meet this need, we must anticipate German willingness to do what is necessary to accomplish the ends of policy. And what is necessary for Germany may not be necessary or desirable for the United States.

Transformation in Germany's roles in NATO and in Europe make the alliance more difficult to manage and complicates relations with the Soviet Union. As I stated earlier, the essence of détente rests with the US-USSR relationship. This is an overarching relationship within which Soviet/Warsaw pact
interactions with Germany and the rest of Europe take place. US-Soviet relations are global and essentially bilateral as they have been since World War II. The new element rests in the fact that agreement between the two super-powers does not automatically mean that the allies will agree. Similarly, conflict between the two major powers does not imply conflict between blocs, as was demonstrated so effectively in October, 1973. While conflicts in regions beyond NATO's territorial jurisdiction never apply directly to NATO, US hegemony imposed strategic modifications upon the alliance. This no longer holds; indeed, the US today is the target for pressure by the French and Germans particularly to modify American policy in regions quite distant from NATO; the Middle East, for example.

Germany's new status in NATO and the world requires stable relationships among the major powers and increases the FRG stake in détente. Geopolitical vulnerability requires German seizing of initiatives which may make stabilization quite tenuous. Were Germany to develop a unilateral response to the SS-20, the European and global balance would be altered significantly.

Germany's new status causes structural changes in the alliance that are not amenable to cosmetic changes in the alliance's organization. To be sure, Germany would be more secure if responsibility for strategic modifications were borne by a European entity or by the US -- Germany's.
position would be less exposed. But the reality of the situation, and this is terribly frustrating for Schmidt, indicate that a unified European response is not at all likely nor is the United States likely to act as a surrogate for Germany.

Despite the recent changes in constituency representation for the European parliament, the introduction of the European monetary system, and the broadening of membership in the community, there is little likelihood that significant European integration will occur. There is no Europe that can be juxtaposed to the Soviet Union but there is a Soviet Union that is immensely more powerful than that which helped to trigger the formation of the alliance. The Soviet threat that attended the formation of NATO has been supplanted by one which is far greater in terms of Soviet capabilities, and in terms of the aggressiveness and venturesomeness of Soviet policy.

While I do not think the danger to Western Europe is posed by the threat of military invasion of West Europe, Soviet policies may be more dangerous politically since the USSR can and does challenge the United States globally. As the Chinese have noted on many occasions, NATO may be a very important element in helping to modify and delimit Russian geopolitical aspirations, if such aspirations can be inferred from Soviet conventional and nuclear capability increases.