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A PERCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERVENTION

Frederic S. Pearson
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INTRODUCTION

Princes have always interfered clandestinely and overtly in the politics of each other's domains, and their interference has included use of military force. Patterns in the use of force have varied at different historical periods. At some points, force was used most often to conquer foreign territory, at other points most often to reunify populations (an action which may also involve territorial conquest) or to coerce or prevent specific changes of policy in other countries (On types and frequency of wars, see Luard, 1968; and Wright, 1965); these varieties are not necessarily mutually exclusive, of course.

Foreign military intervention is a form of international interference, and can be hostile or friendly to the target country's government. Military intervention is a broader concept than "war," since it may include troop movements to reinstate foreign governments overthrown in coups, to evacuate foreign citizens from a target country, to pursue refugees fleeing to foreign states, to eliminate terrorists operating from foreign territory, etc. Therefore, military intervention becomes an extremely important concept for the analysis of post-World War II international violence, since "conventional" forms of warfare have been increasingly augmented by a wide variety of traditional as
well as innovative coercive techniques undertaken by national military units, including reprisal raids, "national liberation wars," "counter-insurgency warfare," border skirmishes, "peace-keeping police actions," etc.

If the undesirable effects (especially on lives and living conditions) of such violence are to be eliminated, researchers must: (1) determine the roots of foreign military intervention, i.e., the variables which influence such intervention, and especially those variables which might be manipulated to control interventions' occurrence; and (2) determine interventions' consequences for citizens of intervening and intervened-in states, or bystanding countries, as well as for world or regional systems. This study is an initial approach to the first of these tasks.

There is increasing interest in a "scientific" approach to the study of military intervention. (See Rosenau, 1969) In this connection, a number of works have appeared specifying hypotheses about the occurrence or non-occurrence of foreign military intervention. (See Sullivan, 1969; Rosenau, 1968; Rosenau, 1971; Tillema, 1973; Young, 1968; Zartman, 1968; Paul, 1971; Mitchell, 1970.) This developing field of inquiry has produced many hypotheses and propositions about intervention, but as yet no one has connected the multitude of hypotheses to form a larger explanation of various types of interventions in various circumstances. Nor has anyone provided a theoretical framework which would link and reconcile the divergent propositions about intervention generated so far in the literature. Such a framework would not be an explanation of intervention, but rather would constitute
a way of looking at interventions and identifying the variables that could be related to form an explanation.

This study is based on a perception of cost-benefit framework which allows many of the current intervention propositions to be coordinated and expanded. Certain propositions apply to intervention in general; others apply best to various categories of intervention; and others fit certain stages of the intervention decision-making process. The perception-of-cost-benefit framework allows researchers to specify the particular facet of interventions to which a given proposition applies. Other frameworks conceivably could offer the same advantages, but the perception-of-cost-benefit framework is broad enough to encompass divergent approaches to intervention explanation (ranging from individual decision-maker to world system levels of analysis).

Until now, it has been very difficult to develop general explanations of military intervention because the concept, as used in the literature, has been vague. Few researchers have noted instances of intervention not included in their definitions, and few have bothered to tailor their hypotheses to particular types of intervention; the intervention concept, by nature, is very broad, covering a wide variety of force utilization, and the concept must be broken down into specific types of intervention, neither so general as to be meaningless nor so particular as to be theoretically uninteresting.

The perception-of-cost-benefit framework should facilitate explanation and control of interventions because it shows that certain hypotheses relating certain variables will affect certain perceptions of
intervention cost or benefit. Even a small change of decision-makers' calculations of such and benefits could prevent or modify interventions in certain circumstances. This study is designed to afford a better idea of which variables relate to specific types of interventions and perceptions about interventions. It is assumed, of course, that decision-makers operate on the "reality" they perceive, rather than on some objective set of "facts." It is also assumed that one of the shortcomings of previous intervention study has been a failure to clarify the intervention concept by specifying types of intervention, and to realize that intervention is not necessarily one phenomenon.

The essence of the foreign military intervention notion is that troops of one country undertake military action inside another (target) country; any such action affects the sovereignty of the target country. After a review of such military actions since 1948 (listed in the Appendix and derived from the New York Times, regional chronologies such as the Middle East Journal and African Research Bulletin, previous conflict studies such as Bloomfield and Beattie's in 1971, and from scholarly histories of certain conflicts), foreign military intervention has been redefined in this study to include cases overlooked in previous intervention analyses and to specify particular types of intervention, each of which seems to stem from particular sets of circumstances or to entail particular sets of consequences. As the perception-of-cost-benefit framework is applied to each type of intervention, many of the variables which might help predict or control and
many of the variables affected by that particular type of intervention will be specified. Some of these predictive, controlling, or consequential variables seem to be different for different types of intervention. Some of the variables have been identified previously by scholars theorizing about intervention; in this study they are fitted for the first time to particular types of intervention. In addition, many other variables, not often mentioned in the literature, were identified in a review of the intervention cases listed in the Appendix.

Briefly, foreign military intervention is defined as the movement of troops or military forces by one independent country (or a group of countries in concert) across the border of another independent country (or colony of an independent country), or action by troops already stationed in the target country. Direct military interventions are troop movements or force projections (bombing, shelling, etc.) entailing combat or military maneuvers with implications for the target state's authority structure (support or oppose government or rebel groups), domestic or foreign policies, or domestic conditions (including what may be attempts to eliminate conditions in the target which offend or harm the intervener). Thus, direct military intervention means direct military actions affecting policies or conditions through the use (or open demonstration) of force. Indirect intervention, on the other hand, affects target's policies or conditions less overtly; stationing troops on bases inside the target or providing military advisers or training missions to the target are examples of indirect intervention. In this study the perception-of-cost-benefit framework is applied to direct foreign military
interventions, since their effects and the variables associated with their occurrence may be more readily detectable than those of indirect intervention.

Direct interventions may be categorized as hostile (opposing the target government or supporting rebel groups), friendly (supporting the target government or opposing rebel groups), or neutral (favoring no faction—an extremely rare circumstance).

Direct hostile, friendly, or neutral military intervention may be further classified according to the political circumstances of the intervention: (1) interventions in domestic disputes in target states (disputes in which a faction threatens to overturn the government in an irregular power change); (2) interventions in the absence of or apart from domestic disputes in the target, with implications for target's foreign or domestic policies or for conditions in the target state; and (3) evacuations of foreign citizens from the target (divisible into evacuations which are or are not combined with interventions affecting domestic disputes or policies and conditions).

At least six general issues may be of concern to intervening governments (as evidenced by the behavior of their troops once inside the target and by historically valid accounts of interests involved): (1) territorial acquisition or domain; (2) protection of social groups in the target (including irredentist claims); (3) protection of economic interests in the target (business enterprises or natural resources); (4) protection of diplomatic or military interests in the target (such as military bases, embassies, or diplomats); (5) ideology
organized belief systems and doctrines); and (6) regional power balances. Regarding ideology and regional power balances, the intervener's concern might not be with policies or conditions within the target so much as with the way the target fits into broader international priorities. Although the categories (hostile-friendly-neutral) and subcategories (domestic disputes--policies and conditions) are respectively mutually exclusive (evacuations may or may not overlap the other two subcategories depending on whether only evacuations with no further political consequences are studied), several of the six issues may be involved in any given intervention.

THE PERCEPTION OF COST-BENEFIT FRAMEWORK

Explanation, in part, consists of identifying the variables most closely associated with and which tend to bring about the phenomenon to be explained (the dependent variable). The perception-of-cost-benefit framework is designed to help in explaining interventions by showing how specific variables fit into the intervention decision-making process. Hopefully, some of these variables will prove manipulable (Meehan, 1968), and hopefully the likely effect of changes in certain independent variables on the dependent variable can be determined.

Certain basic assumptions about military intervention in general must be specified before identifying variables which may affect specific types of intervention. These assumptions basically constitute the perception-of-cost-benefit framework. It may be assumed that military intervention decisions are based on six sets of perceptions:
(1) perceptions of the degree of threat to major values or of the opportunity for promotion of major values entailed in the situation preceding the intervention decision; (2) perceptions of plausible alternatives to intervention to deal with the threat or opportunity; (3) perceptions of the costs of interventions vs. the costs of the alternatives; (4) perceptions of the costs of not intervening; (5) potential intervener's perceived cost tolerance (See Rosen, 1970:215-37); and (6) perception of the probable "success" of intervention in attaining desired objectives. These perceptions may be held by various actors in any given scenario: decision-makers or influential elites in the potential intervener; decision-makers or influential elites--including opposition groups--in the potential target; decision-makers or elites in other countries. The most crucial perceptions for any given intervention are probably those of intervener and target governmental leaders, and of opposition groups in the target (if there is a "domestic dispute" in the target).

Bureaucratic influences on decision-making should not be ignored in a perception-of-cost-benefit framework for intervention. Decisions are seldom made by one man at one time, and individuals, especially in bureaucratic settings, have diverse incentives for their decisional inputs (to further their own careers, their own agencies, etc.) (See Allison, 1971; and Halperin and Kanter, 1973). Some of these incentives can be seen as costs of intervening or not intervening, however. Cost calculations need not concern only the international strategic setting.

The perception-of-cost-benefit framework does not necessarily imply that decisions will be rational. Costs may be weighed against
benefits in merely the roughest form of calculations; information may be missing or distorted; perceptions may be distorted or selectively recalled. It is assumed, however, that decision-makers will consider the implications of possible interventions on the basis of what they consider to be the relative costs and benefits.

Britain's failure to intervene militarily in Rhodesia, after the unilateral declaration of independence, may be understood as a cost calculation. Most people seem to concentrate on the cost of intervention in this case—the geographic distance from Britain, likely Rhodesian resistance, capabilities of Rhodesia's army, memories of costs at Suez in 1956, etc. The other side of the cost calculation, cost of non-intervention, should also be examined. There is some doubt that Britain's major interests were threatened in the Rhodesian case. Costs of non-intervention—possible public opinion backlash, possible African regional "instability," possible economic losses, displeasure of black African states, etc.—probably did not seem great. Before concluding that Britain is unlikely to intervene in future conflict situations, the various costs and major values in a given situation must be analyzed.

Cost tolerance is also a major factor in intervention decision-making. This is a combination of willingness and ability to pay the perceived cost of intervention once such a cost has been calculated. For potential interveners, cost tolerance probably depends on certain domestic conditions as well as on level of perceived threat and perceived probability of success. Cost tolerance for parties seeking outside intervention may depend on the severity of the domestic dispute
in which they are engaged, as well as on their own perceived probability of success without help. For both interveners and those seeking intervention, ability to pay helps condition willingness to pay—though other factors condition motivation as well (e.g., war-weariness, level of threats to major values, etc.). Motivation also conditions perceived ability to pay. While observers have argued that Britain's cost tolerance for foreign interventionary adventures has decreased with its increasing monetary and production problems since the 1950's, John Burton argues that Britain has never been wealthier than since World War II, and that its interventionary restraint must be due to factors other than capability, factors such as welfare demands and British acceptance of foreign self-determination. (Burton, 1968:196-97). Of course, Burton might have added U.S. influence as a potential restraint on British interventions, but nevertheless it is clear that willingness, and even perceptions of ability to pay, may be based on political decision about what is important to pay for—indeed on the establishment of major values in the first place.

Another important calculation is overlooked by almost all intervention theorists: perception of plausible alternatives. Any decision to move troops to another country is complicated; costs are not singular—there are many types of costs for intervention or non-intervention. Military intervention may be viewed as a "last resort" technique by leaders of some countries, especially countries large and resourceful enough to attain goals by other means. Some leaders, however, depending on their country's resources, their own goals, and the nature of the perceived threat to or opportunities to further major values, may view intervention as the only available alternative—or even as the preferred
alternative (for instance, if justifying expenditures on armed forces is a desired objective, a leader may resort to force against a weak target even before seriously considering negotiations).

Hypotheses current in the literature on intervention and in the media pay insufficient attention to plausible alternatives to troop movement. Scholars and reporters have hypothesized that certain changes within states or within the international system make intervention more or less probable in different time periods. The New York Times has reported, "Because of the change in internal political situation [of the U.S.] and the international climate, the United States virtually rules out any repetition of the forceful support for pro-Western governments in the Middle East that was undertaken by the Eisenhower Administration ... in 1958." (New York Times, September 17, 1970, p. 19). Some might conclude that a U.S. military move to Jordan in 1970 was precluded by U.S. domestic disruption, by international criticism of military intervention, or by decreased Soviet strength. However, looking closely at the events, we see that other means were available, and that in the area of major values, the entire Middle Eastern region did not seem imperiled in 1970 as it had in 1958 after the fall of the Iraqi monarchy. Reportedly, Israel was prepared to intervene in Jordan if Syria had crossed the Jordanian border in strength. There were even rumors that the U.S. would cooperate in this venture by protecting Israel's shores during the operation.

State Department officials interviewed recently by the author stressed the importance of alternatives for intervention decisions;
some felt that Vietnam and similar experiences made new U.S. interventions unlikely, while others felt that each situation is so unique and intervention decisions are so complex that no predictions about the future (including those that rule out intervention) are possible unless context is fully specified. Negotiations were often cited as a plausible alternative to intervention. Action through the C.I.A. and/or I.T.T. appear to have been alternatives to military intervention against the Allende government in Chile, 1970—though the New York Times attributed restraint to the fact that, "Many officials believe that any United States interference could lead to a civil war in Chile and a surge of anti-United States feelings in Latin America as well as to domestic protest comparable to the demonstrations that followed last spring's incursion into Cambodia." (New York Times, September 21, 1970, p. 2.) For the U.S., forceful intervention may have been quite conceivable in 1970; the existence of a reliable proxy state or of economic levers may have constituted alternatives to direct intervention.

The sixth factor affecting intervention decisions—the probable success (or failure) of intervention—relates to the gains the intervener can foresee. Conceivably, major values could be threatened, perceived cost of intervention could be reasonable, perceived costs of not intervening high, alternatives few, and yet intervention might not occur because expected gains might be low—military intervention may not seem an appropriate means toward desired ends. This is perhaps the most subtle of the six factors, and perhaps the one decision-makers most often ignore. It involves preparation of clearly stated
objectives. As argued below, inter-relations of the six factors in the perception-of-cost-benefit framework make it unlikely that if five factors pointed toward the need for intervention, the sixth would seem discouraging to the decision-maker. In addition, time constraints, especially under conditions of high perceived threat, may preclude much thought about appropriateness and likely success of a military response. If interveners desire to take foreign territory or punish adversaries, or if they perceive few alternatives to intervention, little thought may be given to long range impacts and consequences. In some instances, military or civilian advisers may provide decision-makers with favorable and optimistic evaluations of success probability when actual success probability is low. This may be due to conflicting objectives, inter-agency rivalry, bureaucratic conformity, failure to reevaluate decisions or policies, desire to curry favor or obtain more of the budget, or blind faith in militarily coerced solutions or in others' advice.

HYPOTHESES AND PERCEPTIONS OF COST AND BENEFIT

There may be inter-relationships among the six major factors, and hypotheses from decision-making and intervention studies may be fitted together to discover some of these (Figure 1). Bear in mind that few, if any, of the hypotheses or links in Figure 1 have been empirically verified for intervention data. All relationships specified are meant to be suggestive for further empirical study.

(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE)

Decision-making and crisis studies have noted that increased threat perception shortens perceived decision time, and therefore, tends to lessen the number of alternatives considered (although some
FIGURE 1
PERCEPTIONS AFFECTING INTERVENTION DECISIONS

- Cost Tolerance
  - Perceived Ability To Pay
  - Willingness to Pay
- Perceived Cost of Not Intervening (or calling for INT)
- Perceived Plausible Alternatives
- Perceived Success Probability
- Threat/Opportunity Perceived

Decision To Call For Outside Intervention
Decision To Intervene
argue, as well, that the greater the costs and risks or uncertainty in a decision and the more significant the changes in method and goals involved, the more intense is the search for information.) (See Hermann, 1969:129,158 and 161; and Burton, 1968:76-77). In a sense, states are always in crises, and all decisions are made under pressure. Thus, Figure 1 shows the hypothesized link between level of perceived threat or opportunity to promote major values and perceived plausible alternatives to intervention (correlations or relationships especially subject to controversy are indicated by dotted lines). In general, also, the greater the perceived threat to or opportunity to promote major values, the greater the perceived cost (political, military, social, or economic) of not intervening.

There is also a hypothesized positive relationship between level of perceived threat or opportunity and cost tolerance for intervention. This tends to work through willingness (motivation) to pay. The more important values are, and the more they seem threatened, the more people will be willing to sacrifice to protect them. (Paige, 1968:300). In the pattern in Figure 1, it is hypothesized that increased threat perception operates through increased perceived cost of not intervening to increase willingness to pay, as well as several other variables.

It also seems likely that the higher the perceived value of intervention (threat or opportunity) and perceived probability of successful intervention, the greater the willingness to pay the costs of intervention. People seem likely to refuse to pay even a low price for something they have very little expectation of receiving (raffle tickets notwithstanding). Costs may also be evaluated in terms of the prospective gains, and if gains are expected to be great, costs may seem small.
Two more hypotheses are drawn from "cognitive dissonance" theory, which posits that individuals are likely to distort incoming information to fit their pre-existing beliefs and expectations. First, threatening conditions or perceived opportunities may affect people's estimation of what remedies cost. People feeling threatened or perceiving great gain in intervention may refuse to believe intervention costs as much as they are told it costs. Hence, a negative causal link between perceived threat or opportunity and perceived cost of intervention is posited in Figure 1, along with an indirect link through perceived cost of not intervening. A negative two-way causal link is also posited between perceived probability of success and perceived costs—an interaction effect in which higher expected cost of intervening leads people to lower estimation of success (while higher expected cost of not intervening leads them to raise estimated success probability), which in turn leads them to higher estimation of intervention cost (and lower estimation of non-intervention cost). Furthermore, a higher level of perceived threat and resultant need for success entailed in perceived cost of not intervening may lead, because people tend to cling to and expand any hope, to increased estimation of success probability.

Many other relationships among the six perceptual factors may be reciprocal. For instance, cognitive dissonance may work two ways, so that greater perceived cost of not intervening leads to lower estimates of intervention costs, while low estimates of such costs may also lead to greater perceived cost of not intervening (e.g., expected adverse public opinion at home if government fails to act at low cost and situation in target worsens). The reciprocal relationship between
perceived cost of not intervening and perceived success probability, as well as between willingness to pay and perceived success probability, reflect what may be a tendency for wishful thinking in decision-making. Furthermore, decision-makers who are already willing to pay the price of intervention may be likely to perceive (or point to) great cost in not intervening and may perceive (or point to) few alternatives. Perceiving few alternatives probably also leads to greater willingness to pay.

This is obviously a tangled web of mutual causation, although many of the hypothesized links could drop out with empirical testing. Some direct links may drop out or some indirect links may be replaced by direct links. Furthermore, some links probably do not exist; for instance, number of perceived plausible alternatives seems unlikely to lead to changes in perceived ability to pay, though conceivably a link may exist (empirical testing could show this). Working the other way, however, those states most able to pay for intervention may also be those perceiving the most non-military alternatives (with more economic resources, they may be able to economically penetrate or influence foreign countries). In some circumstances, however, leaders who perceive their own inability to pay may seek more alternatives. Thus, hypothesized positive and negative correlations between ability and alternatives should both be tested.

The complex interconnections are typical of human perceptions. Obviously, though, perceptions are not "simply" influenced by other perceptions; environmental conditions impinge as well. These make a complex causal problem even more complex, and yet at the same time
often include manipulable variables which could change perceptions. Many of these environmental variables relate differently to different categories of intervention (defined above). In discussing these complex influences, the value of breaking intervention into more specific units of analysis can be seen, and the strengths and weaknesses of the particular categorization presented here can be determined. Figures 2-7 illustrate factors, mentioned in the intervention literature or derived from a review of cases in the Appendix, which may affect each of the six major perceptions (the links shown in Figure 1 are not included in these figures, and the readers should remember to add them for fuller explanation of any of the six perceptions; if a variable directly affects one of the six perceptions, and that perception in turn affects another of the six, then the variable indirectly affects the other perception).

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH LEVEL OF PERCEIVED THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE MAJOR VALUES

Threat or opportunities perceived by those calling for outside powers to intervene on their behalf may be distinguished (Figure 2) from threat or opportunity perceived by prospective interveners, both large powers (on the basis of GNP, super powers--US and USSR--great powers--UK, France, China, Japan, West Germany) and medium or small powers. It seems that the caller's perceptions are most intimately linked to the severity of the domestic dispute in which it is engaged. Severity of dispute in turn is made up of at least five specific (and probably intercorrelated) variables: (1) scope of dispute (whether it covers just a part of the country or most of the country); (2) duration of the dispute; (3) ideological content of dispute (whether or not it is a
FIGURE 2

VARIABLES DIRECTLY AFFECTING THREAT TO OR OPPORTUNITY FOR MAJOR VALUES

- Previous Intervention in Target
- Other Large Power Intervention
- Intervener Has Territorial Or Irredentist Claims
- Intervener Desires Regional Influence
- Geographic Proximity Intervener/Target
- Transactional Links
- Ideological Links
- Threat/Opportunity Perceived by Large Potential Intervener
- Share Alliance Membership With Target
- Threat/Opportunity Perceived by Small Potential Intervener
- Affective Links (including ideology)
- Intervener’s Lateral Pressure For Territory
- Pressure, Opposition (including intervention), or Approval of Other States
- Threat/Opportunity Perceived By Faction Potentially Calling For Intervention
- Severity of Target’s Domestic Dispute
- Level of Violence
- Scope Duration Ideology Structural
conflict of formal ideologies); (4) structural vs. non-structural nature of the dispute (whether the dispute concerns the structure of the government in the country—as opposed to "authority" or "personnel" disputes over arrangement of roles and those who fill those roles in the country—See Rosenau, 1964); and (5) level of violence (perhaps measured by number of people killed or wounded in combat or terror-related incidents).

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Notice that some of the variables constituting severity of domestic dispute also may affect potential intervener's perception of threat or opportunity and willingness to pay in such disputes. Rosenau maintains that, "Structural war... has a high probability of attracting foreign intervention." (Rosenau, 1964:63-64). This is often the result of perceived threats to potential intervener's major values. Ideological disputes probably work the same way in certain circumstances—for both large powers (USSR into Hungary) and small powers (Egypt into Yemen). (Zartman, 1968:188 and Boals, 1970). Of course, such disputes can also be used as justifications for interventions planned for other reasons, such as trying to impose policies on a target state or to affect regional power balance.

Scope of dispute (areal) may also affect level threat or opportunity perceived by potential interveners, especially when geographic distance between potential intervener (especially small power interveners unable to project military power very far) and target is small; conflict tends to spill across borders—refugees escape and are pursued, and germs of discontent may spread, while territorial issues may be raised. Thus,
scope of dispute may relate to territorial gain, as well as social protection, regional power balances, and desire to preempt or remedy threats (affect policies and conditions in the target). Geographic proximity and widespread domestic disputes in target may increase the probability of all these types of intervention, though since scope or severity of disputes may increase perceived costs of intervention as well, especially for small powers (see below), intervention may not always occur.

Geographic proximity may also increase the probability of intervention to change certain policies even in the absence of a domestic dispute in the target; the effects of many policy decisions—including ideological, social, regional, or administrative policies—are likely to be felt first by immediate neighbors. On the other hand, economic interests seem less likely to be influenced by geographic distance, since most states are unlikely to find resources and markets close to home. Interventions for evacuation of foreign nationals or for protection of embassies and other diplomatic-military interests also seem likely to be relatively independent of geographic distance; large powers seem most likely to have such interests far from home and are capable of pursuing them even at great distances.

Most small power interventions seem likely to entail territorial or social interests close to home, while larger power interventions may be more concerned with nearby or distant military, strategic, and economic interests. Sullivan points to the probability of major power economic intervention: "In a situation where one nation is economically dominant over another, the occurrence of disruption in the latter is likely to raise fears in the dominant nation that its economic position
will be affected and perhaps ended. . . it will resort to intervention in the hopes of influencing the domestic conflict." (Sullivan, 1969:7). Large powers do not seem as likely as small powers to undertake territorial or social protective intervention because such issues have probably been settled for most great or super powers. Many small powers press territorial or irredentist claims stemming from colonial times (many other small states are devoted to the territorial status quo for fear of other states' claims), and the need to press them may be increased by population ("lateral") pressure on land and resources (on lateral pressure, see Choucri and North, 1972); obviously, in some cases, small power territorial ambitions can include economic interests, as when Iraq seeks to annex Kuwait. Because of such regional territorial grievances, certain small powers may be less interested—and others as much or more interested—in regional "stability" and power balances than large powers. Large or small power regional interventions may also serve as signals or warnings to nearby states (perhaps warnings to change certain policies) as well as affect policies or conditions in the target state. On the other hand, both small and large powers may perceive threats in the interests and potential intervention of other states in a particular target. Preemptive or preventive intervention could follow to deter such third party interventions.

For great powers (Britain, France, China, West Germany, Japan), distant interventions may be especially conditioned by ex-colonial ties. Such ties lead to what Mitchell (1970) calls "transactional" links. (Mitchell does not apply his categories to the intervention
proclivities of major as opposed to minor powers.) These include international transactions such as educational, economic, military, and political exchanges, in which people or goods move back and forth between countries. Obviously transactional linkages also grow between countries that have never been in a colonial relationship. Major powers are likely to have relatively many transactional links as compared to small powers. Many major powers transactions are with smaller powers, and major powers would have the military capability to intervene to protect economic or diplomatic-military interests in small states or to evacuate citizens.

Small powers, on the other hand, are likely to have few transactional links with other small states, and relatively many with powerful states. (This is not to say that if transactional ties exist between small states they will not affect intervention probability or that small states may not seek to obtain material interests in other small states, but rather that such ties are unlikely to be very strong or frequent among small states.) Small powers are not likely to be in a power position to intervene and protect such transactional interests in strong target states. Instead, small powers' interventions are probably conditioned (more than large or medium powers' interventions) by what Mitchell calls "affective" links, in addition to territorial and regional political disputes. Affective links consist of ideological and religious similarities, family, clan, and tribal links, and ethnic or racial ties. African (Somalia-Ethiopia), Asian (Indonesia-Malaysia), and even European or Middle Eastern (Greek-Turkey-Cyprus) interventions have often related to such affective linkages. "Personal ties" may be added to the affective list for small powers, since leaders sometimes
intervene on behalf of old friends (because of differences in levels of bureaucratization, small power interventions may be influenced more than large power interventions by personal ties, though even great or super power interventions may sometimes relate to personal connections; the New York Times reported personal ties between de Gaulle and certain African leaders he defended).

Ideology should also be separated from other affective variables, since it characterizes interventions by large as well as small powers. Rosenau (1969:168) hypothesizes that, "When ideological rivalry is intense, decision-makers are more likely to attach greater import to possible governmental changes abroad than is the case when blueprints of the future are less salient features of international life. . . Indeed, when politics is highly ideological, the desirability of governmental changes abroad may generate interventionary behavior even if the possibility of such changes is extremely remote."

Thus, it is hypothesized that large powers are likely to be quite sensitive to perceived threats to or opportunities to advance ideological and transactional interests, and are likely to consider interventions to promote strategic interests in the "stability" of certain regions. Such interests are likely to seem threatened by severe ideological and structural disputes in states where there are many military, ideological, strategic, and economic large power interests. Also, if such potential target states change policy quickly, or if "ominous" conditions develop in the economic, ideological, strategic or military areas, large powers may perceive threats or opportunities even in the absence of domestic disputes in the target.
Small powers may be most sensitive to perceived threats to or opportunities to advance "affective" (including social group) interests in other small countries, as well as territorial or social interests in nearby states. Leaders' personal interests in other countries, or perception of threats to regional influence may also lead to small power interventions. These interests may seem threatened by domestic disputes in nearby foreign states or by such states' policy changes or domestic conditions. In addition, leaders of both large and small powers are likely to perceive threat in physical attacks upon their territory or citizens by governments of or groups in foreign states, and hence, may be tempted to retaliate by intervening. The pattern of interventions since World War II listed in the Appendix tend to bear out these predicted patterns.

Obviously, threats can become more specific, especially for countries with certain characteristics. Allied states are likely to perceive considerable threat in news that an alliance member plans to leave the alliance (Paul, 1971). Previous intervention may lead large powers to future interventions, as they build up stakes in the survival of favored factions in the target and, hence, perceive greater threats or opportunities for influence. Intervention by other large powers may lead a large power to competitively (or cooperatively) intervene, as major values seem threatened. However, competitive intervention also may lead to greater perceived costs (perhaps more extensive fighting) for both large and small powers; thus there may be a deterrent effect to counteract the effect of threats or opportunities to advance major interests.
FIGURE 3

VARIABLES DIRECTLY AFFECTING PERCEIVED COST OF NOT INTERVENING

- Own Perceived Relative Organizational Strength and Leadership Quality
- Perceived Importance of "Commitment and Credibility"
- Level of Alliance Cohesion (Intervention in Ally)
- Domestic Popularity Among Masses and/or Elites (Including Military)

- Cost Of Not Calling for Intervention
- Cost of Not Intervening
Two factors are commonly cited by American scholars and statesmen as affecting perceptions of costs of failing to intervene: consequences for "commitments and credibility," and/or alliances. These factors have been included in Figure 3 as possible roots of intervention, but there remains serious doubt about their importance for US or other states' interventions (hence the dotted lines). The commitment factor may be related to interventions protecting target states from other foreign governments' attacks (a form of intervention affecting target's policies or conditions). However, states are free to ignore such "commitments" when political considerations override, so that the importance of commitments for intervention is questionable. Arab states had made commitments of solidarity and alliance in 1956 and 1967, but these commitments did not bring Saudi Arabia and other states into the fight against Israel.

Even alliance ties may not be reliable predictors of interventionary behavior. Large powers have intervened frequently inside smaller power allies (viz., USSR-Czechoslovakia or US-Dominican Republic), but the question is whether both alliance and intervention stem from the perceived geo-political importance of the target, as well as the power ratios of intervener and target. (On alliance commitments, see Fedder, 1973 and 1968:65-86). If so, alliance itself is not the key to intervention likelihood; the US did not seem ready to intervene in France when de Gaulle's policies seemed to weaken NATO logistically, if not politically. Empirical analysis must determine whether threats to alliance cohesion are sufficient to bring on interventions in situations that might not have bred intervention without an alliance.
In this connection, the author's recent analysis of interventions (defined as in this study) occurring since World War II (see Appendix for list and categorizations of interventions) shows that, in general, alliances may be arenas for intervention. In 41 percent of interventions, intervener and target were allies; 43 percent of alliance interventions were in domestic disputes. Only eight percent of alliance interventions were hostile to the target government. This seems to indicate that a considerable percentage of post-war interventions consisted of governments assisting allies, often in domestic disputes. On the other hand, in approximately 50 percent of interventions in domestic disputes (codable for alliance membership), intervener and target were not military allies, with 44 percent of these being friendly interventions. Thus, while most interventions by non-allies in each other's domestic disputes were hostile, friendly interventions were not infrequent even in the absence of alliance ties. Political strategies rather than formal alliance commitments may be the reason for friendly interventions. However, alliance membership may be a good predictor of friendly vs. hostile interventions. It is striking that most interventions among allies, either in domestic disputes or to affect target's policies or conditions, have been friendly (support government or oppose rebels), while most interventions—regardless of category of intervention—among non-allies have been hostile. Interestingly, only two of 28 post-war territorial interventions have been among allies, while 25 have been among non-allies.

While alliance ties may make friendly intervention seem less costly or costs of non-intervention seem somewhat greater, potential
interveners may look most often to their domestic scenes to calculate costs of non-intervention (or of intervention, as explained below). Depending on the success of the endeavor and public or elite awareness of the issues involved, decisions to move troops run the risk of public disapproval at home. But failure to intervene while a favored foreign state suffers may seem likely to increase the dissension in the public, among elites, or in the armed forces. Depending on the nature of public, elite, or armed forces discontent, leaders may read discontent as a sign that non-intervention will threaten their political future (if discontent concerns alleged governmental softness in foreign policy) or as a sign that intervention will threaten their political future (if discontent concerns governmental "adventurousness" or neglect of domestic concerns). It is important to examine the state of domestic public opinion when leaders have decided either to intervene or not intervene.

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED COST OF INTERVENTION

As mentioned above, increases in perceived cost of intervention may lead to searches for alternatives to intervention, and cost of intervention may be weighed against cost of non-intervention. Not all calls for outside aid are answered and not all domestic or ideological disputes attract foreign intervention. Variables appearing in Figure 4 may affect perceived costs for various types of intervention.

(FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE)

When interveners oppose target governments, one of the most important of these costs is likely to stem from power imbalances between intervening and target states. (Young, 1968:180-81). Roughly, power imbalance may be measured through gross national products or comparative
FIGURE 4

VARIABLES AFFECTING PERCEIVED COST OF INTERVENTION
military capabilities. Generally, the greater the advantage of prospective intervener over target, the less costly intervention (especially hostile intervention) will seem to the intervener. By the same token, small powers are unlikely to intervene in more powerful states. As the list in the Appendix shows, there have been few hostile small-to-large power interventions since 1945. They have occurred mainly in colonial possessions of the large powers. Furthermore, large powers rarely intervene in states their own size.

Power ratio and geographic distance both are likely to affect cost perceptions. Despite technological breakthroughs, there are still substantial costs in moving men and material great distances. Major values indeed must be involved to warrant such expenditures; as argued previously, major values (excluding economics) are most likely to be threatened or involved close to home. Thus, few very distant interventions of any type may be expected, and only major powers seem able to afford intervention at great distances. In a study of the relation between geographic proximity and intervention probability, it was found that leaders of even major powers evidently must feel assured of considerable power advantage over targets before attempting hostile interventions far from home. (See author's citation, 1973, in References).

Furthermore, the perceived cost of intervention may increase or decrease, depending upon whether prospective interveners are supported or opposed by statements or actions of other powerful states. Leaders of great and small powers may also be reluctant to risk the cost of intervention in targets close to other major powers. Spheres of
influence could preclude interventions either hostile to or friendly to target governments. In general, it has been hypothesized that, "Isolated nations or nations with very limited international contacts... are apt to be the targets of interventionary activity." (Sullivan, 1969:7.) Also, Sullivan's hypothesis that, "... underdeveloped nations become prime targets for intervention because of the likelihood that civil disruption occurring there will become an international problem" (it might be better to say "international concern") seems well-founded, especially since such states are unlikely to be in a favorable power ratio to prospective interveners.

Intervention costs may also seem to rise if there is a prospect for resistance in the target (as well as from other outside powers). Interventions to influence target's policies or conditions are likely to be much more difficult if there is active popular or military resistance in the target--though leaders of major powers may feel able to weather such resistance if other major powers can be kept out. Severity of disputes in the target can also raise costs, since a prospective defeat of a favored faction may be offset only with considerable effort.

Notice also that common alliance membership between prospective intervener and target may reduce intervener's expected costs. There seems to be a certain de facto legitimacy to intra-alliance interventions as compared to interventions in non-aligned or hostile states, at least from the Soviet and American viewpoints. Also, competitive intervention by a member of an opposing alliance may seem unlikely, and leaders of a large power intervening--either pro- or anti-government
--in an ally's internal affairs probably do not much fear effective international organization or major power opposition. This may increase the "intervention proneness" of small states in alliances --but not to competitive intervention.

The discussion of cost is not meant to imply that "deterrence" always works. States without clear power advantages have been known to use military force. Cost is just one factor in the decisional framework. If threat or opportunity is perceived as sufficiently great, governments might be expected to intervene abroad despite probability of a difficult fight with poor prospects for success.

Discussion so far has dealt mainly with interveners' cost calculations. What about costs perceived by parties calling for outside aid in domestic disputes? These may also be affected by power disparities. Even rebel groups may be reluctant to call upon the aid of major powers if this will hurt them politically--if there would be domestic resentment of powerful foreign "intruders," or if they suspect that the major power might attempt to dominate them later. This is why popularity at home may be a factor influencing decisions to call for intervention as well as to intervene (intervener will want to know that public and elite opinion at home supports or at least tolerates the intervention). Perceived costs are raised if the outside power--whether large or small--is identified by the local population as "foreign"--if affective links are lacking between intervener and target state. Also, rebels' perception of costs of outside intervention may depend on the prospects for a quick governmental takeover. If outside aid could assure quick takeover, there might not be time for public or regional resentment of "foreign
intruders." Perceived costs may increase greatly if prospects are for a prolonged struggle, though the costs of such a struggle without outside support may increase as well. Finally, interveners may insist on greater effort or policy reform by factions calling for aid; factions may have to prepare for the increased financial or political costs in complying with these requests.

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH COST TOLERANCE FOR INTERVENTION

Costs may be perceived as low and yet there may be no intervention, or costs may be perceived as high but intervention may still occur. Leaders' cost tolerance (and in prolonged interventions, that of mass publics) helps determine whether the price will be paid. As noted, cost tolerance probably depends on level of perceived opportunities or threats, and is determined by willingness and ability to pay. Other variables may be involved as well (Figure 5), and once again, variables affecting cost tolerance for potential interveners may differ from those affecting the tolerance of those calling for outside help.

(FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE)

For parties seeking outside aid, the severity of the dispute in which they are involved, together with their prospects for winning unaided (depending on their organization and popularity), and the importance of the dispute to them may be the most important determinants of willingness and perceived ability to pay the potential costs of such aid. It can be hypothesized that the greater the severity and salience of the dispute to the parties, the greater their willingness to pay
FIGURE 5

VARIABLES AFFECTING COST TOLERANCE

- Shared Alliance Membership
- Pressure, Opposition, Or Approval Of Other States
- Ideological Links
- Transactional Links
- Military Power Ratio Intervener/Target
- Perceived Ability To Pay
- Cost Tolerance For Large Potential Intervener
- Perceived Ability To Pay
- Cost Tolerance For Small Potential Intervener
- Intervener's GNP And Military Expenditure
- Willingness To Pay
- Previous Attacks From Or Lingering Dispute With Target
- Domestic Popularity Among Masses And/Or Elites (Including Military)
- Affective Links (including Ideology)
- Severity Of Dispute In Target
- Structure
- Ideology
- Level Of Violence
- Scope
- Duration
political costs in calling for outside aid—costs such as popular re-
sentment at foreign intrusion or potential outside domination of the
country (hence the possible negative relationship between power ratio
and factions' cost tolerance). This is especially true of governmental
decisions to seek outside support; severity of dispute (including threat
to governmental structures even if level of violence is not very great)
signals governmental weakness, and it often signals rebel strength.

For those contemplating intervention, willingness to pay may be
determined by more complex factors. Large powers' transactional, ideo-
logical and alliance links to targets may be important, as they prob-
ably increase, or at least indicate large powers' willingness to sacri-
fice to affect targets' policies, conditions, or factions. Qualifica-
tion is necessary here, though, since allies have, in the past, refused
to come to each others aid and ideological stances have been quickly
changed to fit changing political circumstances. Thus, the effects
of alliance membership and ideological similarities on all categories
of intervention, as well as the impact of intervention decisions on
alliance policy and ideological positions should be further examined
empirically.

Desire for regional influence also probably increases large and
small powers' willingness to sacrifice for foreign policy goals, and
increases willingness to intervene for regional power balances. Small
powers' affective links (including ideology) to foreign states would
be likely to increase their leaders' willingness to act militarily in
those states, especially to intervene in domestic disputes. The per-
ceived need to compete for leadership of "pan" movements (e.g. "pan-
Arab") may spur small states to intervene to protect "progressive" or
oppose "reactionary" regimes as well as to affect target's conditions. Egypt's Yemen intervention came soon after the breakup of Egyptian-Syrian UAR, and Nasser may have wanted to prove his militancy in defending Arab socialism and unity in the face of Syrian taunts. This intervention seemed to fit both regional power balance and ideological classifications.

Depending on whether intervention in domestic disputes supports governments or rebels, the severity of domestic disputes is likely to influence the zeal of small power potential interveners. Widespread and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes would seem to discourage pro-government, while encouraging anti-government interveners, as governmental weaknesses are highlighted. For those backing them, rebels may seem a good bet in such severe disputes. Small power potential interveners may be especially attuned to severity of the target's dispute, since they could become embroiled in a war of attrition, especially if backing a beleaguered government. As mentioned below, though, perceived alternatives to intervention are probably increased with increased viability of favored factions in domestic disputes. Thus, while willingness to intervene to support a viable government or viable rebels may increase, the perceived necessity to intervene decreases. Intervention in such circumstances may be unlikely.

For intervention in domestic disputes to occur, interveners may have to ignore the weakness of parties they propose to aid. Usually interveners will intervene for their own interests rather than for those of foreign factions. They may attempt to strengthen factions
Almost as a by-product or necessity of intervention. Sometimes, as in certain US or USSR interventions, they will actually invent a faction where none exists, so as to "legitimize" intervention (here, investigation is required to determine whether domestic disputes ante- or post-date the intervention).

Lingering grievances against target governments or factions and power advantage over them may increase intervener's willingness to pay for hostile intervention. Such grievances may stem from previous attacks (physical or political) by the target state, target's territorial or social policies, or failure of the target to expel terrorists or refugees offending or attacking the aggrieved state. Territorial interventions may also be spurred by "lateral pressure" within the intervening state, i.e., by the pressure of population on scarce land and resources.

Cost tolerance depends on perceived ability to pay in addition to willingness, and here, for potential interveners, material factors weigh heavily. In a shorthand measurement, these factors may be entailed in intervener's GNP, military capability, and domestic tranquility. It will be difficult for poor and dissension-ridden countries to send many men abroad. The army might not be considered trustworthy, and/or could be needed for domestic purposes. The Egyptian-Yemen experience shows the sacrifice poor countries can make; the US-Vietnam experience shows the efforts governments of dissension-ridden countries can muster. But the odds seem great against intervention by any country with both problems.
Finally, the perceived ability of disputing factions to pay the political price of obtaining outside aid seems closely related to their motivations to pay, and somewhat less related to material than to political factors. The material resources of factions are important if intervener requests greater effort from the faction in return for intervener's support. In this connection, factions' willingness to pay may influence intervener's willingness to pay. However, factions' ability to pay also depends on political skill (in avoiding outside domination), on the strength of the faction's organization, on the ineptitude of the faction's opponents, and on the willingness of the population to accept that faction's rule—even if the majority does not necessarily desire it. If these political circumstances seem favorable to the faction, its leaders may feel quite able and willing to pay the costs of outside aid—though if the political situation seems favorable enough, the perceived need for outside support may decrease (depending, of course, on the military situation as well).

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

Determination of the plausible alternatives to intervention depends on the circumstances of specific cases. If costs of intervention seem high, or if cost-tolerance is low, more alternatives will be sought and more will seem acceptable. Openness to alternatives depends, in part, on parties' willingness to negotiate short of intervention. In turn, willingness to negotiate depends on factors such as cost tolerance for intervention, fatigue, value placed on goals, public pressure (or the pressure of domestic disputes) on leaders, past interventionary experience, and the support or opposition of
other countries. When large powers have already intervened in a target, other large or small powers may find reasons not to intervene; they may look to such alternatives as international organizations to avoid spreading the conflict. Thus it is hypothesized that factors increasing the perceived cost of intervention, or decreasing cost tolerance, will indirectly increase the search for alternatives by interveners or factions calling for intervention.

When large powers intervene on behalf of factions involved in domestic disputes, costs of intervention may play less of a role than when small powers intervene, however. If the faction calling for aid seems to be holding its own, and if the dispute does not seem very severe, while intervention might cost little, the large power may opt merely to aid the faction with money or equipment. If the dispute is severe, however (measured by scope, duration, ideology, level of violence, or structural threat), or if the favored faction seems to be fading, few alternatives to direct intervention may seem effective for major powers. This seems to have been President Johnson's perception about Vietnam in 1965; the fall of the Saigon government seemed imminent. Thus the perceived threat to major values seemed to outweigh cost calculations (though certain US decision-makers seem to have expected a relatively short Vietnam intervention in 1965, and hence, perhaps relatively low cost). It could be argued that intervention to prop up a losing side is foolhardy; yet perceived threat to or opportunity to advance major values may bring such interventions, as alternatives seem diminished. (Major US values were evidently not implicated in the fall of Biafra.)
Small powers, however, may be deterred from and may seek alternatives to direct intervention to support the government of a target undergoing widespread upheaval, especially if the government seems to be losing, since a prolonged war may be very costly. President Nasser's perception of the risks in Yemen should be studied in this connection, since he may have shown less caution and considered fewer alternatives than might have been predicted. Perhaps he felt that the UAR held a power advantage over adversaries in Yemen, regardless of the severity of the dispute, or perhaps he did not at first see the dispute as severe and likely to persist.

Large powers probably have more alternatives to intervention than small powers, alternatives stemming mainly from their transactional links with many target states (Figure 6 portrays factors which may directly affect perceived alternatives.) It is often less costly to manipulate economic or political levers than to "send the Marines." Major powers may also utilize covert subversive measures to affect politics in a target state. Small powers may lack the resources for extensive intelligence operations, and probably lack effective economic leverage as well; their leaders may see little alternative to threatened or actual military intervention, provided the expected costs are reasonable.

(FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE)

It has been hypothesized (Sullivan, 1969:7) that international organizations may increase alternatives to direct intervention by large or small powers. This hypothesis requires careful testing, however, since, remembering such cases as Ethiopia in the 1930's and Hungary in the 1950's, we may doubt the efficacy of international organizations
FIGURE 6

VARIABLES DIRECTLY AFFECTING PERCEIVED PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

- Shared Multilateral Alliances
- Plausible Alternatives Perceived by Large Potential Intervener
  - Transactional Linkages
  - Plausible Alternatives Perceived by Small Potential Intervener
- Target I.O. Member
- Parties Willing To Negotiate
- Plausible Alternatives Perceived by Faction Potentially Calling for Intervention
in this regard; they may increase the available alternatives to intervention if governments genuinely wish to avoid direct intervention. The UN was an alternative to major power intervention in the Congo, though the bitter UN experience may tend to preclude such operations in the future, especially in cases of domestic disputes.

Factions within a state may seek alternatives to inviting foreign intervention in domestic disputes if the costs are too high and the benefits too few (see Figures 2, 4, and 5). It is reasonable that factions will call for outside help mainly as a last resort, since the need for such help is a sign of weakness and may represent a grievance for the local population. Popular and well-organized factions may see many alternatives to inviting intervention; unpopular or disorganized factions may see few alternatives. However, even relatively popular or well-organized small power governments may invite foreign troops to help protect them against opponents in the army at home or against other foreign countries (e.g., Kenyan and East African requests for UK direct intervention in 1966).

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED SUCCESS PROBABILITY

A potential intervener or faction calling for intervention may have considered the alternatives in a threatening situation, understood the costs, determined it could pay them, and yet intervention could be vetoed because it seems very unlikely to work. As noted, threat, opportunity, or cost perception, as well as willingness or unwillingness to pay those costs, may lead to wishful thinking or exaggerated pessimism about success probability, but perceived success probability depends on other factors as well. One of these might be
previous interventionary experience, with the target in question or other targets (see Figure 7). Memory of such experiences or negative consequences associated with them may be distorted, of course, if pressing needs seem to call for intervention. Decision-makers often seem to recall precedents that justify policies they have already decided upon--Munich, Greece, and Korea, as opposed to Laos, were frequently cited precedents for Vietnam.

(FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE)

Prospective interveners may look seriously at the domestic conditions or disputes they hope to influence in the target state, and may decide that military means are not likely to bring success. They may note the organizational strength and leadership quality of certain factions in the target state. They may note the advantages certain factions have in popular support, and intervention may be encouraged or discouraged, depending on their hostility to or friendship with such factions. Furthermore, affective linkages with the potential target may encourage an intervener (especially a small power) to believe that it will be welcomed and successful in the target. If a hostile intervention is contemplated, however, the intervener's size advantage over the target may encourage intervention despite probable strong resistance. Likely support or opposition by other states, especially large powers, may also affect perceived success probability indirectly by raising costs. The USSR did not have to fear forceful US opposition to the 1968 Czech intervention because of the clear lesson of the 1956 Hungarian intervention; here previous interventionary experience probably affected estimated success probability.
FIGURE 7

VARIABLES DIRECTLY AFFECTING PERCEIVED SUCCESS PROBABILITY

Perceived Probability Of Target's Resistance

Perceived Success Probability For Large Potential Intervener

Perceived Success Probability For Small Potential Intervener

Military Power Ratio Intervener/Target

Faction's Domestic Popularity In Target (incl. Popular Toleration)

Perceived Success Probability For Faction Potentially Calling For Intervention

Perceived Relative Organizational Strength And Leadership Of Factions

Affective Linkages

Previous Intervention Experience

Duration

Severity Of Target's Dispute

Scope

Level Of Violence

Ideology

Structural
The issues involved in an intervention may be important in determining success probability, and leaders may not fully take stock of such issues. Territorial interventions may succeed if the intervener musters superior armed forces (though territorial administration is a political rather than military problem). Social protective intervention may be more complicated than territorial, and may be likely to bring on competitive intervention by other powers (e.g., Greece vs. Turkey in Cyprus). Indeed, the goals of such interventions may be so vague that it is difficult to know when an intervener succeeds (when are minorities protected?). Protecting a military base or embassy may be somewhat easier than protecting an entire population group. Changes in ideology may be achieved by eliminating certain individuals, and affecting regional power balances may seem to require installation of new governments. Affording legitimacy to new leaders and governments may be far more difficult than installing them, however. Finally, protecting economic interests through military force may require permanent occupation; it seems extremely difficult to forcefully compel a target government to pay reparations or denationalize properties.

PROPOSITIONS AND TYPES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

A series of hypotheses, derived from the literature on foreign military intervention and deduced from the post-World War II history of foreign military interventions, has been related to the types of cost-benefit calculations that might explain the occurrence or non-occurrence of various types of military intervention. The typology of military intervention presented has been based on the affect of
intervention (hostile-friendly-neutral), the political circumstances of intervention (in domestic disputes, affecting target's policies or conditions, or entailing evacuations), and the political, economic, or social issues involved in the intervention (territory, economic, social, or diplomatic-military protection, ideology, or regional power balances). Perceptions of costs and benefits, as well as other variables which affect such perceptions, may help predict the occurrence of particular types of interventions, and, perhaps more importantly, help derive explanations of interventions; it may be possible to manipulate certain variables in order to affect perceptions, and, thereby, the probability of various types of intervention.

So far, hypotheses have been related to the perception of cost-benefit framework without clear specification of the types of intervention to which they apply. However, if it is useful to break the general intervention notion into specific categories, and if control of various categories of intervention is to be achieved, it should be possible to relate these hypotheses about perceptions and factors influencing them to the specific categories of intervention. In this way, particular variables which may affect particular types of intervention may be revealed, and some of these variables may prove manipulable. A list of propositions and their sources (where no source is specified, the proposition is attributable to the present author) discussed in this study or prominent in the intervention literature is presented below and divided into those propositions most applicable to intervention in general and those most applicable to specific types of intervention.
Propositions may apply to more than one category of intervention and the reader should search for propositions under broader categories (such as hostile or friendly) which might also apply to more specific intervention issues (such as territorial interventions). Few, if any, of the propositions have been substantiated empirically. Furthermore, some propositions are stated with clearly specified and defined variables, variables which may be readily measured, while other propositions contain vaguer concepts and less rigorous relationships between concepts. This reflects the unevenness of the present state of intervention theory. Propositions must be refined and variables must be made more specific and measurable.

PROPOSITIONS APPLICABLE TO INTERVENTIONS IN GENERAL

1. Intervention decisions are conditioned mostly by idiosyncratic characteristics of individual leaders, the roles, and situations that leaders find themselves in, and the international system characteristics confronting leaders. Societal variables and governmental structure variables have relatively little to do with the probability of intervention. (Rosenau, 1969:165-67.)

2. The longer intervention continues, the more important societal variables may become for the outcome.

3. The perceptions most important in leading decision-makers to intervene concern the cost of intervention, the plausible alternatives to intervention, leaders' cost tolerance for intervention, and the probability of successful intervention.

4. Leaders contemplating foreign military intervention will weigh, though perhaps not rigorously, perceived costs of intervention, including costs to their own careers or the interests of their own
bureaucratic agencies, against perceived costs of non-intervention, especially as affected by perceived threats to major values or perceived opportunity to advance major values.

5. For leaders contemplating intervention, tolerance of the costs of intervention consists of willingness as well as ability to pay those costs, and depends on certain conditions within their own country (such as elite, public, and military support) as well as on perceived threat and perceived probability of successful intervention abroad.

6. Leaders' perception of their own ability to pay the costs of intervention help condition their willingness to pay those costs. In turn, their willingness to pay those costs helps condition their perceived ability to pay. Their perceived ability to pay depends in large measure, as well, upon their estimation of their own material and military resources.

7. Perceived alternatives to intervention are very important determinants of intervention decisions and are likely to be affected by perceived economic, military, and political means of influence short of intervention. Perceived alternatives are likely to be greater for leaders of wealthy than for leaders of poor countries.

8. Time constraints, especially under conditions of high perceived threat, may preclude thought about the appropriateness and likely success of a military response.

9. Increased threat perception tends to shorten perceived decision time, and therefore, tends to lessen the number of alternatives considered by leaders contemplating intervention. (Herrmann, 1969:129,158 and 161.)
10. The greater the costs and risks or uncertainty in a decision and the more significant the changes in methods and goals involved, the more intense is the search for information by leaders contemplating intervention. (Burton, 1968:76-77.)

11. When objectively the success probability of interventions might be low, optimistic and distorted evaluations of success probability may be given to leaders because of advisers' conflicting objectives, inter-agency rivalries, bureaucratic conformity, failure to reevaluate decisions or policies, desire to curry favor or obtain more of the budget, or blind faith in militarily coerced solutions, or in others' advice.

12. The greater the perceived threat to or opportunity to promote major values, the greater the perceived cost (political, military, social, or economic) of not intervening.

13. The higher the perceived value of intervention (threat or opportunity) and perceived probability of successful intervention, the greater decision makers' willingness to pay the costs of intervention.

14. The higher the perceived threat or opportunity in a situation, the higher the perceived cost of non-intervention, and the lower the perceived cost of intervention. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

15. The higher the expected cost of an intervention, the lower the perceived probability of successful intervention; the higher the perceived probability of successful intervention, the lower the expected cost of intervention. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

16. The greater the threat or opportunity perceived in a situation, the higher the perceived cost of not intervening, and the greater the perceived probability of successful intervention; the greater the
perceived probability of successful intervention, the higher the perceived cost of not intervening. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

17. The greater the perceived cost of not intervening, the lower the perceived cost of intervention; the greater the perceived cost of intervention, the lower the perceived cost of not intervening. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

18. The greater a leader's willingness to pay the costs of intervention, the greater the probability of successful intervention perceived by that leader; the greater the probability of successful intervention perceived by a leader, the greater that leader's willingness to pay the costs of intervention. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

19. The greater the perceived cost of not intervening, the greater the willingness to pay the costs of intervention; the greater the willingness to pay the costs of intervention, the greater the perceived cost of not intervening. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

20. The greater the perceived cost of intervention, the greater the number of perceived plausible alternatives to intervention.

21. The greater a leader's willingness to pay the costs of intervention, the fewer plausible alternatives to intervention perceived by that leader; the more plausible alternatives perceived by a leader, the greater the reluctance of that leader to pay the costs of intervention. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

22. The greater a leader's perceived ability to pay the costs of intervention, the lower the costs of intervention will seem to that
leader; leaders' perceiving great costs in intervention will be likely to perceive their own inability to pay the costs of intervention. (Derived from cognitive dissonance literature.)

23. The greater a leader's perceived ability to pay the costs of intervention, the more plausible alternatives to intervention that leader might perceive (since such leaders are likely to have significant economic and military resources), but perhaps such leaders will fail to see increased alternatives since they need to see fewer alternatives --they think they have the ability to pay.

24. Leaders of both large and small powers are likely to perceive threat in physical attacks upon their territory or citizens by governments of or groups in foreign states, and hence may be tempted to retaliate by intervening.

25. As major values are threatened, intervention by certain large powers may lead other large powers to intervene competitively (or cooperatively).

26. Intervention by certain large powers may cause leaders of other large powers to perceive great costs in competitive intervention, thus decreasing the amount of competitive intervention.

27. Previous interventionary experience in a certain target may cause leaders to perceive greater or less threat or opportunity in certain situations in that target.

28. Depending on the nature of public, interest group, elite, or armed forces discontent in their country, leaders may read discontent as a sign that non-intervention will threaten their political future (if discontent concerns alleged governmental softness in foreign policy).
or as a sign that intervention will threaten their political future (if discontent concerns governmental "adventurousness" or neglect of domestic concerns).
29. Common alliance membership between prospective intervener and target probably reduces the cost of intervention expected by the intervener.
30. The costs of intervention perceived by a leader may increase or decrease depending upon whether that leader is supported or opposed by the statements or actions of leaders in other powerful states; by increasing or decreasing costs, such support or opposition, especially by large powers, may affect leaders' evaluation of intervention success probability.
31. Usually interveners will intervene for their own interests, as opposed to the interests of foreign factions; they may attempt to strengthen foreign factions almost as a by-product or necessity of intervention, sometimes inventing a faction where none exists, so as to "legitimize" intervention.
32. Leaders of countries that are both poor and dissension-ridden are unlikely to undertake foreign military intervention.
33. Leaders' willingness to negotiate short of intervention depends on factors such as cost tolerance for intervention, public or military fatigue, values placed on goals, public pressure (or the pressure of domestic disputes), and the support or opposition of other countries.
34. Factors increasing the perceived cost of intervention, or decreasing cost tolerance, will indirectly increase the search for alternatives by interveners or factions calling for intervention.
35. If leaders perceive the availability of a cooperative proxy state close to and powerful enough to intervene in a target, they may perceive more plausible alternatives to their own direct military intervention.

36. Generally, international organizations may increase alternatives to direct intervention perceived by large or small powers. (Sullivan, 1969:7)

37. Previous interventionary experience in a given target may affect leaders' evaluation of the success probability of future interventions in those targets.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT HOSTILE FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION

1. The greater the economic and military power advantage of prospective intervener over target, the less costly the intervention, especially hostile intervention, will seem to intervener's leaders.

2. Small powers are unlikely to intervene, and especially to undertake hostile intervention, in more powerful target states. (Derived from Young, 1968:180-81.)

3. Only major powers seem able to afford intervention at great geographic distances from home, and even they must feel assured of considerable power advantage over target before attempting hostile intervention at great distances.

4. Leaders of great and small powers alike may be reluctant to risk the cost of intervention, especially hostile intervention, in targets close to other major powers and friendly to those powers.

5. Isolated countries or countries with very limited international contacts are apt to be the targets of hostile military interventions. (Sullivan, 1969:7.)
6. Intervention costs perceived by prospective interveners may seem to rise if there is a prospect for resistance in the target or from outside powers.

7. If a hostile intervention is contemplated, the intervener's power advantage over the target may encourage intervention despite likely strong resistance.

8. To leaders contemplating intervention in a foreign state which is allied to their country, intervention costs may seem minimal because competitive intervention by a member of an opposing alliance may seem unlikely and because international organizations or opposing major powers may be reluctant to interfere in "alliance politics;" thus, leaders may undertake even hostile intervention in the affairs of an ally.

9. Widespread and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes in a country would seem to discourage pro-government while encouraging anti-government interveners, as governmental weaknesses are highlighted.

10. Lingering grievances against target governments or factions and power advantages over them may increase interveners' willingness to pay for hostile intervention.

11. Hostile interventions are likely to seem costlier to a prospective intervener than friendly interventions.

**PROPOSITIONS REGARDING FRIENDLY FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION***

1. Small powers may be deterred from and may seek alternatives to direct intervention to support the government of a target undergoing widespread upheaval, since a prolonged war may be very costly.

*See also Propositions about Hostile Interventions, Interventions in Domestic Disputes, Interventions Affecting Policies or Conditions in the Target, and Interventions in General.
2. Leaders of small countries, with personal or affective ties to individuals or groups in a target state, may find many threats or opportunities in these countries, and may anticipate low costs and be willing to pay high costs when intervening in these countries. Threats or opportunities to advance personal or affective interests could lead to interventions in structural disputes, or in authority and personnel disputes, since favored individuals may be displaced from their jobs in such disputes. Small powers will be more prone than major powers to intervene for such interests.

3. Friendly interventions will be perceived by prospective interveners as less costly than hostile intervention.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC DISPUTES

1. The severity, magnitude, or issues involved in a domestic dispute are conditioning factors for foreign interventions in that domestic dispute. (Sullivan, 1969:4)

2. Scope (area) of domestic dispute affects potential interveners' perceived threat or opportunity, especially when geographic distance between potential intervener and target is small.

3. Geographic proximity and widespread domestic dispute in target may increase the probability of interventions in domestic disputes, as well as for territorial gain, social protection, regional power balances, and desire to preempt or remedy threats.

4. Scope or severity of domestic dispute may increase the costs of intervention perceived by leaders contemplating intervention (since a prospective defeat of a favored faction may be offset only with considerable effort), especially leaders of small powers; thus, the probability of intervention may decrease.
5. In a domestic dispute, appeals for outside intervention will be made when the perceived threat to a faction's major values entailed in "going it alone" exceeds the perceived cost of calling upon an "external ally." (Mitchell, 1970:177-78.)

6. Cost tolerance for parties seeking outside intervention depends on the severity of the domestic dispute in which they are engaged as well as on their own probability of success without help.

7. Structural war has a high probability of attracting foreign intervention. (Rosenau, 1964:63-64.)

8. Ideological domestic disputes have a high probability of attracting intervention by both large and small powers. (Zartman, 1968:188; and Boais, 1970.)

9. Ideological disputes may serve as justifications for interventions planned by those interested in imposing policies on a target state.

10. In a situation where one nation is economically dominant over another, the occurrence of disruption in the latter is likely to raise fears in the dominant nation that its economic position will be affected and perhaps ended; it will resort to intervention in the hopes of influencing the domestic conflict. (Sullivan, 1969:7.)

11. Threat or opportunity to advance major values perceived by leaders of a faction planning a request for outside intervention may be increased by increases in the severity of the domestic dispute confronted by the faction.
12. If factions involved in intra-national disputes are well organized and can count on at least the tolerance (if not support) of large segments of the local population, there may be little need to call for outside intervention and little perceived costs (probability of losing the fight or popular support) in not calling. (Derived in part from Leites and Wolf, 1970.)

13. Underdeveloped nations become prime targets for intervention because of the likelihood that civil disruption occurring there will become an international concern. (Sullivan, 1969:7.)

14. Rebel groups may be reluctant to call upon the aid of major foreign powers if this will hurt them politically, for example, if there would be domestic resentment of powerful foreign "intruders," or if the group leaders suspect that the major power might attempt to dominate them later. Thus, a faction's popularity at home as well as the number of affective links between the faction's home country and the prospective intervening country may influence decisions to call or not to call for foreign intervention.

15. Rebels' perception of costs of outside intervention may depend on the prospects for quick governmental takeover; if outside aid could assure quick takeover, there might not be time for public or regional resentment of "foreign intruders;" perceived costs may increase greatly if prospects are for a prolonged struggle, though the costs of such a struggle without outside support may increase as well.

16. The cost of intervention, as perceived by a faction potentially calling for outside intervention, may be increased or decreased by the pressure, opposition (including intervention), or approval of other states, and may be decreased by shared alliance membership with the potential intervener.
17. The greater the severity and salience of the domestic dispute to the factions concerned, the greater their willingness to pay political costs in calling for outside intervention; thus, the greater their cost tolerance. This is especially true of governmental decisions to seek outside support.

18. Small powers' affective links (including ideological links) with a target would be likely to increase their leaders' willingness to act militarily in that target, especially to intervene in domestic disputes.

19. Widespread and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes would seem to discourage pro-government, while encouraging anti-government interveners, (especially small power interveners) as governmental weaknesses are highlighted.

20. Alternatives to intervention perceived by prospective interveners are probably increased with increased viability of favored factions in domestic disputes in a target; while willingness to intervene to support a viable government or viable rebels may increase, the perceived necessity to intervene decreases and intervention in such circumstances may be unlikely.

21. For factions calling upon outside interveners, ability to pay for intervention depends on political skill (in avoiding outside domination), on the strength of the faction's organization, on the ineptitude of the faction's opponents, and on the willingness of the population to accept that faction's rule, (even if the majority does not necessarily desire it).

22. The ability and willingness of factions in domestic disputes to pay the costs of outside intervention may be decreased if the power ratio
between prospective intervener and target state is high; for a government involved in a domestic dispute, willingness to pay the costs of outside intervention may be increased if prospective intervener shares an alliance membership with the government and may be increased or decreased by pressure, opposition, or approval of other states.

23. When large powers intervene on behalf of factions involved in domestic disputes, costs of intervention may play a smaller role in their decisions than in the decisions of small power interveners.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERVENTION AFFECTING TARGET'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES AND DOMESTIC CONDITIONS

1. Both large and small powers may perceive threats in the interest and potential intervention of other states in a particular target; preemptive or preventive intervention could follow to deter such third party interventions.

2. If major powers have many military, ideological, strategic or economic interests in a foreign state, leaders of the large power are likely to perceive threats warranting intervention if leaders of the smaller state change policy quickly, or if conditions in the economic, ideological, strategic, or military areas in the smaller state change rapidly --even in the absence of domestic disputes in the small state.

3. Geographic proximity between prospective intervener and target states may increase the probability of intervention to change certain policies in the target even in the absence of a domestic dispute in the target.

4. Leaders of small powers may perceive threats warranting interventions in foreign states if leaders of the foreign state change policy quickly or domestic conditions in the foreign state change quickly
PROPOSITIONS ABOUT EVACUATIONS

1. Interventions for evacuation of foreign nationals or for protection of embassies and other diplomatic-military interests seem less likely than other forms of intervention to be influenced by geographic distance calculations; large powers seem most likely to have such interests far from home and are capable of pursuing them even at great distances.

2. Leaders of both large and small powers are likely to perceive threat in physical attacks upon their citizens by governments of or groups in foreign states, and may be tempted to intervene to protect such citizens; however, since many alternatives to direct intervention can also achieve evacuation of threatened citizens, it is likely that no direct intervention without the permission of the target government will take place unless the intervention also concerns domestic disputes or policies and conditions in the target.

3. If governmental leaders are engaged in a severe domestic conflict and seek outside help, it is likely that the initial rationale for such foreign intervention will be evacuation of endangered citizens.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT TERRITORIAL INTERVENTIONS

1. If interveners desire to take foreign territory or punish foreign adversaries, little thought may be given to the long range impacts and consequences of the intervention on intervening and target states.

2. If a state is undergoing a severe domestic dispute, nearby states may raise territorial issues and claims, especially if the conflict tends to spill across borders.

3. Most small power interventions seem likely to entail territorial or social interests close to home.
4. Large powers do not seem as likely as small powers to undertake territorial or social protective intervention because such issues have probably been settled for most great or super powers.

5. Territorial interventions may be spurred by "lateral pressure" within the intervening state, i.e., by the pressure of population on scarce land and/or resources. (Derived from Choucri and North, 1972.)

6. Territorial interventions may succeed if the intervener musters superior armed forces so that control of the territory may be wrested from the opposing armed forces; territorial administration and long-range control, however, is a political rather than military problem and requires the employment of civil servants and administrators as well as occupying military troops; probability of successful long-term administration is low if administrative control continues to rest with "foreigners."

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT ECONOMIC PROTECTIVE INTERVENTIONS

1. Most states' economic interests are unlikely to be concentrated in nearby states, since most states are unlikely to find resources and markets close to home; therefore, interveners and targets involved in economic protective interventions are unlikely to be located near each other.

2. Large powers are more likely than small powers to undertake economic protective intervention.

3. Most large power interventions are likely to be concerned with nearby or distant military, strategic, and economic interests in smaller states.
4. If one nation is economically dominant over another, the occurrence of disruption in the latter is likely to raise fears in the dominant nation that its economic position will be affected and perhaps ended, and it will resort to intervention in the hopes of influencing the domestic conflict or protecting the economic interests. (Derived from Sullivan, 1969:7.)

5. Small powers are likely to have few transactional links with other small states and relatively many with powerful states; however, power disadvantage is likely to discourage small power economic-protective interventions. Large powers' transactional as well as ideological and alliance links to targets may increase large powers' willingness to sacrifice to affect targets' policies, conditions, or factions.

6. Large powers have more alternatives to intervention than small powers, alternatives stemming mainly from their transactional links with many target states; these links may increase the threat perceived to economic or diplomatic-military interests, but may also increase the perceived available alternatives to deal with those threats.

7. Protecting economic interests through military intervention may require long-term or even permanent military occupation of the target or of the area containing the economic interest.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROTECTIVE INTERVENTIONS

1. Most small power interventions seem likely to entail territorial or social interests close to home.

2. Large powers are not as likely as small powers to undertake territorial or social protective intervention.
3. The probability of small powers pressing territorial or irredentist claims may be increased by population pressure on land and resources. (Derived from Choucri and North, 1972.)

4. Social protective intervention may be more politically complicated than territorial intervention, may require repeated military interventions, and may be likely to bring on competitive intervention by other powers.

5. Widespread and severe domestic disputes in a country may lead foreign states to intervene if segments of the mass public are threatened or attacked by disputing political factions.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT DIPLOMATIC-MILITARY PROTECTIVE INTERVENTION

1. Because the diplomatic and military interests and installations of major powers extend to many countries around the globe, major power interventions are more likely than minor power interventions to concern diplomatic-military interests, and such major power interventions are not likely to be influenced by the geographic proximity of the target.

2. The strategic concern of state A for state B is likely to be reflected in or increased by the number of A's military and diplomatic installations inside B; many such installations mean that A is likely to perceive greater threat to or opportunity to advance major interests in events in B as opposed to other countries and that A's willingness to intervene in B will be greater than in other countries.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUTIDEOLOGICAL FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION

1. Ideological disputes in a country have a high probability of attracting foreign military intervention by either large or small powers. (Zartman, 1968:188; and Boals, 1970.)
2. Ideological disputes may serve as justifications for interventions planned for other reasons, such as trying to impose policy changes on the target state.

3. When international ideological rivalry is intense, decision-makers are more likely to attach greater import to possible governmental changes abroad than is the case when blueprints of the future are less salient features of international life. (Rosenau, 1969:168.)

4. Large powers are most likely to perceive threats, warranting consideration of intervention (to affect policies, conditions, or domestic disputes), to ideological and transactional interests in other countries, as well as to strategic interests in the "stability" of certain regions; such interests are likely to seem threatened by severe ideological and structural disputes in states where there are many military, ideological, strategic and economic large power interests.

5. Interventions by small powers are often conditioned by "affective" links to the target including ideological ties or conflicts.

6. Affective linkages with the potential target may encourage an intervener, especially a small power intervener, to believe that it will be welcomed and successful in the target.

7. Widespread and prolonged structural and/or ideological disputes in a target state would seem to discourage pro-government while encouraging anti-government interveners as governmental weaknesses are highlighted.

PROPOSITIONS ABOUT INTERVENTIONS AFFECTING REGIONAL POWER BALANCES

1. Large powers are most likely to perceive threats, warranting consideration of intervention, to ideological and transactional interests, as well as to strategic interests in the "stability" of certain regions.
2. Small powers may perceive threats to interests in the "stability" of their own region if they are involved in ideological competition in the region or have a long-standing territorial or social dispute with another small power in the region.

3. Desire for regional influence probably increases both large and small powers' willingness to sacrifice for foreign policy goals including intervention in foreign states; such interventions may often be based on conceptions of a desirable regional balance of power.

4. Interventions affecting regional balance of power may seem to require either inflicting a severe beating on the target state's military power or installing a new government in the target state; the costs of such interventions may, therefore, seem great; the perceived success probability of interventions to install a new government in the target state may seem low if prospective interveners are aware of the political complications that might arise.

CONCLUSION

Obviously, the quality of propositions about foreign military intervention varies and this presents problems in trying to combine propositions to form explanations. An explanation requires that we be able to say why we think a certain generalization is true, and express the reasons in specific propositions or hypotheses which can be linked logically to produce the generalization in question. In this sense, the present study does not constitute a complete explanation of foreign military intervention. However, the redefinition, classification, and perceptual framework presented here constitute a first
step toward explanation because certain specific types of interventions are linked to certain types of independent variables.

The variables which seem most likely to affect hostile intervention, are those having to do with the potential strengths of the target state and its government. Hostile intervention decisions, related to regional strategic interests or concern about policy or conditions or disputes in the target, are likely to be affected by the perceived military power ratio between intervener and target as well as by geographic distances and likely resistance inside the target. The position of major powers, particularly those in the region of the target, will also be weighed.

Decisions to undertake or not to undertake friendly interventions (also related to regional strategic interests and policies, conditions, or disputes in the target) on the other hand, seem more influenced by the affective links between intervener and target, and by the evident viability of the target state's government, in the case of small country interveners and by transactional ties expected viability of target government in the case of major power interveners. If the government seems a good bet to survive, especially in a domestic dispute, friendly intervention becomes more thinkable. In general, decisions about intervention in domestic disputes will relate to the severity (level of violence, areal scope, duration, etc.) of the domestic dispute. Severity will influence the probability that factions inside a state will request outside intervention and that outside interveners will respond to such requests. At the same time, the decisions of outside interveners are likely to depend, in part, on the kinds of
interests they have in target states, and these interests will vary according to the level of power of the intervening state. Small powers are likely to be concerned with territorial and social interests in nearby states, as well as with affective and ideological ties to those states. Major powers, on the other hand, are less likely to be bound by geographical restraints to their international interests, and will be concerned about economic, ideological, regional balance of power, and military-diplomatic interests in states in various regions. Small powers under certain circumstances, may also develop keen interests in regional power balances and diplomatic interests in their own region.

The categories of intervention used in this study seem to describe the pattern of interventions since World War II. Certain variables may be associated with the occurrence of some types of intervention and not others, and certain types of states seem most likely to undertake certain types of intervention. For these reasons, the typology of intervention presented here seems useful in distinguishing typical patterns of intervention and various consequences of intervention. Interventions in domestic or social disputes, for instance, seem to entail long-term involvement in the politics or social relations of the target state. Indeed, 13 of 14 hostile and 23 of 42 friendly interventions (codable for duration) in domestic disputes since 1948 (see Appendix) lasted longer than six months. Troops, present in the target for long periods are likely to influence the economy of the target state and to add to political and social resentments. While some interventions affecting targets' policies or conditions (as opposed to domestic disputes) may be prolonged, disruptive impacts on targets' polity, economy
and society may not arise as often from relatively short term evacuation interventions, reprisal raids to influence policies or conditions, or territorial interventions as from social protective intervention or intervention in domestic disputes. More empirical study of interventions' impacts are necessary, but the categorization presented here seems likely to distinguish different types of impacts rather well.

Thus, intervention profiles emerge. The intervention syndrome of the small power intervener, the small under-developed country target, the major power alliance member, the small power alliance member, the former colonial power (which has retained economic interests abroad), and other types of states can be distinguished. Typical patterns of interventions in domestic disputes as contrasted with interventions affecting policies or conditions in the target can be identified.

Complete explanations for various categories of intervention remain elusive: perhaps some categories will have to be further refined and subdivided in order to produce more homogeneous units of analysis --perhaps Israel's interventions to affect targets' policies or conditions are different from those of the United States or Ethiopia (indeed, Israel seems very prone to "preemptive" or "remedial" intervention in dealing with Arab terrorists--interventions often bypassing the government of the target state in order to directly eliminate offending conditions or groups inside the target). Diplomats might argue that each intervention has its own particular explanation, and that generalizations are dangerous if not impossible. The social scientist, on the other hand, would argue that at least some generalization is possible and desirable; the problem is to determine what incidents can profitably be compared. Careful study of the actions of
troops in various target states, the consequences of the interventions, and the cost-benefit calculations of decision-makers allows more effective comparison.

We now have some idea of the variables which might be important in affecting certain intervention decisions. The next step is to look at specific decisions and determine whether the predicted variables actually were influential. Were decision-makers undertaking hostile interventions aware of and optimistic about the force capabilities of their own country vs. the target or third countries? Were friendly interveners mainly preoccupied with and optimistic about the staying power of favored factions inside the target? Were factions involved in domestic disputes inclined to call for outside interventions at times when the disputes were severe as opposed to mild? Were interveners more inclined to respond to calls when disputes were severe as opposed to mild?

Perceptions are quite difficult to measure. Content analysis of speeches and statements as well as official documents could reveal the way decision makers structured the world/though analysis of their private communications, diaries, interviews, and other sources must be used to derive conclusions about perceptions. The rigorous research methods of the historians must be adopted to supplement the aggregate data analysis frequently used by international relations specialists. It is necessary to determine what troops actually did when they entered a country and what decision-makers thought the problems and interests inside that country were.
In addition, researchers must be more creative and resourceful in measuring variables associated with interventions. Certain variables, such as factions' organizational strength or leadership qualities, public toleration of factions, affective links, desire for regional influence, or interests in regional stability may be very difficult to measure. It may be easier to determine leaders' or observers' perceptions about such variables than to measure them "objectively." Factions' organizational strength, as reported by media, may be an important consideration for decisions about interventions in domestic disputes, and may be easier to determine than some "objective" assessment of organizational strength. Perceptual, behavioral, and aggregate data must be used in the study of intervention to measure variables from different angles. Certain variables, such as geographic distance, levels of economic investment, duration of domestic dispute, may be measured relatively easily (although important measurement problems will remain), and these variables should soon be tested in accounting for the variance (occurrence and non-occurrence) of each type of intervention. Also, inter-relationships among predictor variables must be specified. For example, the existence of transactional linkages between countries is probably related to levels of gross national product or military capability, and such an inter-relationship could affect analyses which included all of these variables in predicting intervention variation. Accounting for such inter-relationships is part of good theorizing; perhaps some variables could be eliminated while others could be combined to simplify and reconcile propositions containing the most important variables predicting interventions.
Finally, some of the variables identified in the perceptual framework may be manipulated by those interested in controlling the effects of intervention. Military power ratios and the prospects for resistance in targets may deter interventions under some circumstances; states may seek to change such ratios or prospects. Level of perceived threat to certain interests could be eliminated by certain changes in policy. If foreign leaders express concern about threats to their interests in a country, leaders of that country might try policies of reassurance and might take steps to remedy the grievance. Transactional linkages could be diminished in some cases to reduce threats to certain interests (e.g., limiting foreign investment or ownership of property). Leaders may attempt to change public opinion in order to lessen costs of non-intervention. Citizens may attempt to raise the cost of intervention by open opposition to interventionary policies. International organizations may prove useful alternatives to direct intervention. Certain policy changes may make certain factions in domestic disputes more popular or efficient, thus affecting intervention cost and success probability calculations. Reforms of bureaucracies and decisional processes may decrease the probability of severely distorted perceptions. In general, it is possible to take advantage of the complex inter-connections among intervention perceptions by manipulating variables affecting one type of perception so that it may, in turn, affect other perceptions—as when increased perceived costs lead to greater search for and perception of alternatives to intervention. Further study of the consequences, political, social, and economic, of various types of intervention in various targets may afford better ideas of the most necessary and effective controls on intervention.
APPENDIX

A data setting with interventions was available as this study was undertaken, but it was thought best to re-collect, re-code, and augment the data because of certain conceptual and methodological problems. Therefore, all events in the existing data lists were checked in the New York Times and other sources. Additional information about the events and surrounding political circumstances was provided by scholarly histories of the interventions (Indonesia-Malaysia, for example). Every event was provided with a specifiable political or conflict context, thus eliminating unexplained or perhaps random skirmishes or incursions (such as an apparently isolated border incident). In addition, the data were supplemented with interventions reported by Luard and Bloomfield (1968:62-54, 96; Luard, 1970:8-9; Bloomfield and Beattie, 1971:33-46) and in several regional chronologies.

The final data list used in this study is presented and categorized in this Appendix; the original data were used only as a starting point, and they have been changed so much that the author alone bears responsibility for the results. In the final data set, distinction is made between interventions alleged by some government or faction, and those reported "factually" (still not completely substantiated, of course) by non-government media, by scholars, or admitted by intervening governments. Political and conflict context were determined from statements by governments involved, and by issues reported in the press or by scholars.
Here are the sources used in deriving this data:

1. New York Times
2. Associated Press
3. Asian Recorder
5. Middle East Journal
6. Middle Eastern Affairs
7. Hispanic American Report
8. Radio Free Europe Files
9. Facts on File
10. African Diary
11. L'Annee Politique
12. Keesings Contemporary Archives
19. **St. Louis Post-Dispatch**

20. **The Economist**


List of Interventions, 1948-67

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<th>TARGET</th>
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Rosenau, James N. "The Concept of Intervention." *Journal of International Affairs*, 22 (1968), 165-76.


FOOTNOTES

1 Sullivan, "International Consequences," Sullivan's data are included in Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators II, (New Haven, Connecticut, and Ann Arbor, Michigan: Yale University and Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 1970). Sullivan measured "armed attack events," but such events do not correspond to the definition of intervention used in this study. Armed attack events were "military actions involving military activity within the borders of another country." Sullivan points out that this was, at best, a rough estimate of intervention as he had defined it: attempts to affect the authority structure of the target. Such measurement increased the ambiguity about what constitutes an intervention, and especially about the duration of interventions. For instance, in coding American intervention in the Dominican Republic, Sullivan presented a multitude of armed attack events. Every time (or nearly so) American troops went to downtown Santo Domingo and were shot at, Sullivan coded a new "intervention." As defined above, however, interventions continue as long as troops remain, political purposes remain relevant to the intervention, and no step-level change in commitments is made. It seems reasonable to conclude that the Dominican Republic incident was a single US intervention. Sullivan included neither Vietnam nor Korea in his data, probably because the "armed attack events" in these instances were so numerous as to defy codification. It seems reasonable, however, that both Vietnam and Korea were important post-War interventions (not simply by the US), and that they should be coded. The year 1965 marked a step-level change in Vietnam, and a new US intervention could be coded; however, there seems little need to code more than two
or three such new interventions either for Vietnam or Korea. Much of Sullivan's coding evidently came from the Index of the New York Times, and on occasion was quite inaccurate. For instance, an intervention was coded as the Index reported that US planes went into action in Haiti; the story in the Times, however, indicated that these were Haitian aircraft, built in the US but not piloted by US military personnel.
To obtain some idea of what might have been missed by starting from an existing data set instead of completely re-collecting the data, the New York Times Index was completely rechecked for the years 1948 and 1964, and all events which fit the intervention definition for all countries in the study were recorded. For 1948, the existing data included all New York Times interventions except those concerning the Palestine War. For 1964, all Times-reported interventions except UK into Uganda and UN into Cyprus appeared in the original data. Thus, on the basis of the two sampled years, the existing data set, while not complete, offered a reasonable starting point for careful recoding and augmentation. An intra-coder reliability check was run on a complex subset of the recoded and augmented data (dealing with the Ethiopia-Somalia intervention) and it was found that agreement on all 52 substantive variables was 96%.