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Introduction

Authors of international relations texts have concentrated on the study of certain "bedrock" concepts such as "balance of power," "collective security," "systems," and "nationalism." Researchers have used these concepts and the "theories" developed around them (e.g., the "realist" power and "power transition" theories—see respectively Morgenthau, 1967; and Organski, 1968): indeed, international relations seems unique in having basic concepts derived from textbooks.

Such emphases in and uses of textbooks pose at least two major problems. First, since textbooks are not designed as basic research studies, the concepts included in them are often untested, ambiguous, and unmeasured. Despite this, concepts are often presented without criticism or qualifications, as if they were meaningful and empirically valid. Sometimes, with concepts such as the "balance of power," ambiguities are noted and qualifications given (for instance, as to whether the "balance of power" of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries ever existed in the nineteenth), but seldom do authors ask, "Why study such a notion in the first place?" Those that do ask such questions often substitute other untested concepts for the shopworn balance of power.

Secondly, because authors concentrate so heavily on explicating concepts, texts are often extremely difficult to use for specific educational objectives. Concepts are often presented without adequate efforts to equip students to deal with them or to develop other
student skills. The fact that researchers use texts indicates that authors may not be writing primarily for student audiences. Texts are often valuable historical and analytical resources, but are seldom attuned to the learning problems of various types of students.

Determining the educational objectives of textbooks is a little like determining the objectives of colleagues' courses; they all seem to aim at improving students' "understanding" of world politics, making students "aware" of the rapid changes going on in the world, acquainting students with the "concepts of world politics," treating basic "patterns of world politics" (rather than current events), and, in the case of many newer books, "carrying the student from fundamental topics on toward the challenging, empirical and theoretical frontiers of the international relations discipline." (Puchala, 1971, p. viii)

As international relations teachers, we all probably strive for these general objectives, but they are neither specific nor flexible enough to guide us as we encounter students' varying needs and capabilities. To promote greater understanding of world affairs we might have to teach a student to think in the abstract, to make logical inferences, to distinguish important from secondary problems, to make simple comparisons, to see problems from various perspectives, and to use many other specific skills. Unfortunately, current international relations textbooks hardly equip students to deal with the concepts they cover, and offer little help to teachers trying to do so.
This paper proposes certain educational objectives for undergraduate and graduate international studies education. It will investigate the interrelationships of these objectives, and will evaluate the appropriateness and adequacy of current texts for such objectives. Such evaluations will clarify the two basic problems of today's texts: inadequate conceptualization and vague educational objectives. Since researchers have adopted many textbook concepts, this criticism should interest them as well.

All English language university level textbooks of which the author is aware published or appearing in revised edition in the last five years (i.e., since 1967) will be evaluated according to the educational objectives which are pursued by the author or which might be pursued by a teacher. For purposes of this paper, a textbook is defined as a book containing reasonably comprehensive explanations of numerous concepts, problems, processes, and relationships in the field. Books dealing only with various countries' foreign policies, histories with minimal treatment of contemporary problems, and books on world politics in only one type of system (for example, in a bipolar world) are excluded. Books solely on the theory (as opposed to practice) of international relations are also excluded, as are anthologies.

Educational Objectives

Criteria for evaluating textbooks' educational utility vary according to the level of student. Obviously beginning texts should be written with simpler syntax than advanced texts. Furthermore, beginning
texts may have to stress definitions of basic concepts more strongly than advanced texts. Perhaps beginning texts should emphasize improvement of student comprehension skills, skills that might be assumed for more advanced students (although students, their abilities and deficiencies, must be evaluated individually). Advanced texts, on the other hand, might dwell more intensively on analytical and theory-building skills than beginning texts. Distinctions can be made even finer by the four-fold classification of beginning undergraduate, advanced undergraduate, beginning graduate, and advanced graduate students. Distinctions between students with and without professional interests in international studies, and between students with and without teaching ambitions are other complicating factors. In formulating educational objectives, we must specify which objectives relate to which level of students.

Although criteria may vary according to the level of students, a significant number of educational objectives may be appropriate regardless of level. Indeed, after reading some of the educational objectives, needs, and priorities of American primary and secondary schools, it is evident that many of the same objectives are appropriate at college and graduate school levels. (See, for example, Becker, 1969; Anderson, 1968; and Boulding, 1968) Teachers from kindergarten through postgraduate education would do well to "develop the capacity of students intellectually and emotionally to cope with continuous change and marked diversity in their world environment." (Anderson, 1968)

1Professional interest can include graduate work, research, teaching, business, or government service. Just as certain objectives are necessary for prospective teachers, specific objectives may be necessary for prospective diplomats.
1968, 647) Thus, standards applied to college level international relations textbooks will include objectives also pursued at the secondary and primary school level as well as objectives peculiar to the college level.

Four basic objectives seem appropriate for texts dealing with international political material (or with any material, since the objectives encompass basic thinking tools): (1) equip students to think critically; (2) equip students to conceptualize; (3) equip students to test generalizations empirically; and (4) equip students to theorize. Obviously, these four are not mutually exclusive: on the contrary, they depend very much on each other.

Regarding the appropriateness of various objectives for various levels of students, it seems that the first two are most important for undergraduate years one and two (although many graduate students have not mastered these skills), while objectives three and four become important for more advanced students. Students must be able to criticize their own and others' work and to conceptualize before they can hope to test generalizations and theorize. All four sets of skills are important for prospective researchers, teachers, business people, diplomats, and for people without career interest in international affairs. However, certain of the four objectives may be most crucial for each. As we divide the four general objectives into more specific skills, perhaps we can see which ones might be most crucial for certain individuals and careers.

Critical thinking entails the ability to detect the strong and weak points of arguments and concepts, and the habit of questioning
myths and assertions. The student should be able to detect logical flaws in arguments (including his or her own), and should come to demand evidence for assertions and tests of concepts. Also, students should be able to determine the importance (or lack of importance) of topics for study, and should demand that such importance be demonstrated. This requires that the student develop criteria by which he or she judges importance. Perhaps the criteria will be the effects of phenomena or policy on human life, or effects on the local football team; regardless of the criteria adopted, they should be derived by the student through debate with him or herself and with others, and they should be defended with evidence. This means that students should be encouraged to debate all sides of issues, and to pose alternative arguments for themselves. Comparison and organizational skills are necessary, as well as the ability to detect and state premises underlying arguments. These are skills necessary later when the student—in the process of theorizing—must consider alternate "plausible hypotheses."

Conceptualization skills clearly relate to critical skills. Students must be able to understand concepts before they can criticize them. They must be able to compare and contrast before they can pose alternative arguments. Students should be able to express, and demand that others express, limited, usable, measurable, and empirically verified concepts. Thus, concepts must not be so imprecise that people cannot agree on a definition (e.g., "power"), and should be limited enough so that people can tell when and where concepts are empirically meaningful (if "influence" is "getting someone to do something he or
she would not have done otherwise," it is a useless concept, since we can never know what might have happened or what people would have done).

As mentioned above, students should demand that concepts be tested, i.e., that evidence be provided to show that a given concept has been meaningful in human relations (we still do not know whether the "balance of power" system ever existed; what evidence we have indicates it did not; yet governments continue to base policy on it as if it were a proven way to maintain security).

This same dissatisfaction with untested generalizations should be extended to all matters under study. In order to test generalizations empirically, students must be able to determine what evidence is relevant to the problem, to find such evidence, and to determine what it reveals about the problem. This means measuring phenomena as precisely as possible, and rigorously determining the relationships between such measured phenomena. Quantitative skills become important, along with study design ("pre-test," "post-test," etc.), and data generation. But skills mentioned above are also important: the student must be able to pose alternative explanations for his or her results, and formulate alternative concepts. He or she must be able to criticize data sources and analysis techniques. Testing is choosing—what to study, how to measure, what data to use, how to analyze it, how to explain results. Choosing is discarding—what not to study, how not to measure, what data not to use, how not to analyze, what explanations to discard. Thus, critical thinking is a major part of empirical study.
The ability to test empirically should go hand-in-hand with the ability to theorize. Students able to theorize must not only detect logical flaws in others’ arguments, but must build logical arguments of their own. This means formulating propositions which fit into a deductive sequence, even if they are not derived deductively and even if all antecedent propositions are not known or tested. A student should be able to say why he or she believes that two or three variables are related, to provide theory to account for posited relationships. Students should learn to think in terms of independent, dependent, and intervening variables, and to formulate testable propositions (which in turn relates to empirical—measurement—skills, as well as to conceptualization and criticism). Variables should not be so general as to defy measurement. Students should also learn that explanation, at least theoretically, entails control, that we know have verified a relationship when we can (at least potentially) intervene to manipulate an independent variable and produce an expected change in a dependent variable. (See Keenan, 1968, Ch.2)

There are two basic ways textbooks might address these educational objectives. First, through the power of example, authors might put students in the habit of being critical, empirical, and logical. Second, by developing specific exercises and sets of study questions, authors might give students practice in these important skills.
In the area of critical thinking, authors should rigorously criticize their own concepts and generalizations (pointing out weaknesses in evidence or theory, as well as strengths); they should compare their own concepts and generalizations to those of other scholars or statesmen. In this way, students would be alerted to the subjectivity and controversies connected with various ways of viewing the world. Formal critiques of myths or assertions about world politics might be included, and students might be encouraged to develop their own critiques. In this connection, formal exercises might be provided; students might be asked to compare and contrast various concepts or statements, to detect logical or factual flaws (related to the theory and empirical objectives as well), and to determine the biases reflected in statements. Exercises might be of the following form:

"Compare and contrast the following two statements:

(1) 'The fact that nations feel they have their own collective interests that differ from the interests of other nations does not mean that these interests are necessarily in direct and constant conflict with one another.'

(2) 'A nation as such is obviously not an empirical thing. A nation as such cannot be seen. What can be empirically observed are only the individuals who belong to a nation. Hence, a nation is an abstraction from a number of individuals that have certain characteristics in common, and it is these characteristics that make them members of the same nations.'"
It would be difficult for an author to help improve student conceptualization without himself providing delimited and measurable concepts. Merely repeating and refining "standard" international relations concepts without demonstrating their validity is not sufficient to promote student understanding of world politics (although many practitioners of world politics seem to believe in unsubstantiated concepts such as "balances of power"). Texts must demonstrate that concepts help explain international behavior; if concepts do not help explain, learning them is an empty exercise (except for critical purposes). In addition, students should be made aware of the complexities of world politics, and of the probability that one concept (such as "bipolarity") is unlikely to satisfactorily account for world political and economic behavior.

To stress the importance of empirical tests, authors must consistently test and provide evidence for major generalizations and assertions. One way to validate concepts is to test them empirically. It is useless to argue, as some authors do, that the world is "unipolar" (one super power dominates), or "bipolar," or increasingly "multipolar" unless we can show two things: (1) that polarity makes a difference in world politics; and (2) that we can measure polarity. Efforts to measure tend to immerse the measurer in the complexities of world politics. If students are en-

taken respectively from Duchacek, 1971, p. 177; and Morgenthau, 1967, p. 97)
couraged to measure and shown how to measure, they may come to see that world politics may be characterized and analyzed in many ways simultaneously—that the world is at once unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar, and that regions of the world may have their own characteristic patterns. Exercises could be provided to give the student practice in measurement and experimental design. (Exercises might be similar to those suggested by Coplin and Rochester, 1971, and McGowan and O'Leary, 1971.)

It might be a bit more difficult to devise exercises in theory-building, although exercises in logic could be used. Mathematical statements might be used to illustrate axioms, propositions, and deduction. Students could be given scenarios of world politics about which to develop testable hypotheses (students would have to suggest the variables and data that might be used to measure relationships posited in propositions). Sample theories could be presented for student criticism. Abilities to generalize could be improved by having students contrast results of case studies with those of aggregate data, cross-cultural, time series, or longitudinal studies (this could be related as well to exercises in criticism, empiricism, and measurement). Authors should encourage students to learn theory by doing, but should also take students step by step through the arduous process of hypothesis testing so that students may also learn by watching others do. Authors should relate theory to problems which, through rigorous critical and empirical analysis, they have shown to be important (with
criteria of importance specified and backed by logical argument and evidence; see Meehan, 1971).

Educational Objectives and Today's Texts

Now that we have specified criteria by which to evaluate texts, it is easier to see the strengths and weaknesses of the latest books. Most authors deal very inadequately with critical, conceptual, and empirical objectives, while authors of some newer texts begin to deal with theory objectives. Although nearly all texts cover many concepts of international relations, few cover them critically and empirically.

Critical Skills

Authors writing during the past five years do not, on the whole, question myths and concepts of international politics. Organski (1968) and others have used empirical (though seldom quantitative) tests to strongly and effectively criticize certain notions (such as the "balance of power"). However, Organski goes on to introduce his own "power transition" notion, and provides only anecdotal historical evidence that the "power transition" helps explain the outbreak of major wars. Both Organski and Karl Deutsch (1968) propose to measure "national power" and to relate such measurements to political behavior. Both caution that "power" is very difficult to measure and admit that their measurements are "very rough." But neither carries criticism very far; neither points out that "power" may depend on situation; neither se-
riously considers and tests the possibility that physical, industrial, or reputational power may have very little to do with whether a government can convince another government to do something; neither points out difficulties in determining why governments behave the way they do (though Deutsch covers the influence of domestic factors on foreign policy, he does not show how this complicates measurement of international influence; leaders play many different "power" games simultaneously); neither carefully considers the ways in which the "weak" control the "strong;" neither thoroughly considers the possibility that coincidence, instead of influence, may account for international compliance or agreement (governments may agree with each other for various reasons—did the U.S. and Peoples' Republic of China agree on all aspects of policy in the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict; did they influence each other; and did they agree for the same reasons?).

As international relations specialists we may not yet be in a position to accurately measure all concepts or to account for behavior, but we are in a position to criticize any approaches which ignore or gloss over the difficulties and controversies in such measurements and explanations. Under what circumstances does the "power transition" between satisfied and dissatisfied countries account for war? In what regions is this the case? How many times has the transition gone smoothly? How "dissatisfied" and intent on conflict with England was the Kaiser in 1914? If Organski cannot provide the answers to these questions as yet, at least he and others should be asking them.
Organski and Deutsch are far from uncritical in dealing with many international relations concepts; indeed, Organski's systematic criticism of the "balance of power" is probably the best available in any text. Deutsch includes an excellent, though short, critique of game and strategic theory. Puchala (1971) and Harold and Margaret Sprout (1971) are also careful to criticize some traditional concepts (e.g., Puchala carefully compares various views of "imperialism"). Obviously, however, one or two thorough critiques do not set the tone for an entire book; many major assertions go unquestioned in these texts, and most major assertions go unquestioned in other texts.

Questioning is important at least in part because failure to question imparts a certain bias to textbooks. Nearly all recent texts deal with the "power" concept, and, thereby, imply that power is useful in the study of world political behavior. Yet few authors bother to specify exactly what the notion of power is useful for, and under what circumstances it might not be useful. Does "power" (most texts provide a fairly specific definition) change peoples' minds about various policies? Is it important that peoples' minds be changed? Does the exercise of power accomplish political goals (such as preventing the spread of "communism")? Can the United States government force, punish, threaten, or reward peasants in the south of Vietnam into paying "allegiance" to a government located at
Saigon? Few texts consider the irrelevance as well as the relevance of concepts they cover. Texts fail to include alternate possible explanations. By concentrating on concepts like "deterrence" and "threat," authors neglect to consider and evaluate potential benefits in "under-reaction" and reward. Hence they reflect a bias in the positions they take about these concepts.

Such bias is more blatant in some texts than others; some authors are more willing to qualify and question their views than others. Students are rarely confronted with the possibility that deterrence does not deter (Deutsch, Crabb, and Organski explicitly consider this point), and that the whole notion of "peace through punishment" is subject to grave doubt. Most authors seem to believe that the "balance of terror" has increased caution in the world; only Organski, and to a lesser extent, Puchala question this point. A number of texts still utilize concepts such as "status-quo" vs. "change" foreign policies, without seriously questioning their empirical validity. Can foreign policies be both "status-quo" and "change" oriented—-or neither? How do governments view their own or other governments' policies? Under what circumstances do policies change? What is the intellectual or policy benefit in characterizing foreign policies?

A number of authors (e.g., Spanier, Hartmann, Pedelford and Lincoln) are uncritical of and provide little convincing evidence for their foreign policies: Interpreting certain countries' actions for the United States, the foreign aid
program is a matter of security. Many of the new states are located around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. If they should 'go Communist,' the entire Eurasian continent, with the exception of the relatively small European peninsula, would be under Communist control. And it is questionable how long Europe could preserve its independence in these circumstances. There is no question that the weak states of Africa would not be able to withstand the overwhelming Communist pressure." (Spanier, 1967, p. 268.)

(For criticism, see, among others, Tanter, 1969, 153-79.)

Logical and factual flaws abound especially in treatments of Communist states' foreign policies:

"Communist Chinese aggressive policies have included massive intervention in the Korean war, participation in the overthrow of French power in Indo-China, the subjugation of Tibet, military incursions along the border of India and the small states to the south, hostility to the Western powers, active support of the Communist Party in Indonesia, and bold adventures in Africa." (Padelford and Lincoln, 1967, p. 281.)

Uncritical accounts are not limited to authors conspicuously suspicious of communist intentions. Harold and Margaret Sprout (1971) are critical of some old concepts and provide welcome coverage of long overlooked concepts in world politics: the pollution crisis, world interdependence (and concepts like sovereignty which may be outmoded), the "ecosystem," and the "dilemma of rising (consumer) demands and insufficient disposable resources." This is one of the few texts to criticize the processes of industrialization and the notion of "peace through power," pointing to disastrous consequences for the
ecological and social environments. Nevertheless, the validity of these criticisms and assertions is more often assumed than demonstrated or questioned. Are demands rising all over the world, or in just some regions? How do we know they are rising? Are they being effectively communicated to governments? To what extent and by what measurement are domestic politics more influenced by foreign events today than they were fifty or one-hundred years ago?

Although they deal with the effects of industrialization and interdependence on the world as a whole, the Sprouts do not provide a close-up picture of various regions' specific problems (lack of regional coverage is a problem with many texts; thus, many of the most important issues for states such as Jordan, Burma, or Ethiopia may not be covered; authors providing regional coverage include: Crabb, Hartmann, Jordan, Palmer and Perkins, Stoessinger, and Schuman). The "ecosystem" in a region specializing in crude oil production may be different from the ecosystem in a mainly agricultural region specializing in coffee, peanuts, bananas, wheat, etc. These differences and the problems they entail (e.g., resource depletion) may have much to do with the political priorities of governments in various "less developed" states.

The Sprouts consider a number of familiar international relations concepts, in some cases providing refreshing new slants on them, and in other cases presenting them rather uncritically. Despite their exploration into the 1970's, the
Sprouts occasionally lapse into somewhat uncritical use of concepts typical of the 1940's and 1950's. This is especially true in their treatment of geography and geopolitical theories. Though the Sprouts note that technology constantly modifies the effects of geography on policy, they fail to present evidence that geography is an important determinant of specific types of government policies. Indeed, the Sprouts put less stress than some other authors (notably Coplin, Edwards, Deutsch) on trying to explain why decisions are made. In discussing geography, the Sprouts try to illustrate the importance and vulnerability of earth as a political environment. This point gets lost in the arrays of maps and geographical projections, however. These displays illustrate the fact that world politics is based not on the environment as it is, but on the environment as it is perceived by decision makers. However, more detailed examples of such perceptions' effects on policy might have made the point more effectively. The Sprouts' coverage of "crisis decision-making," nationalism, and communications is somewhat shallow. On the other hand, "power" is given some careful refinements. The authors assert that power depends not only on the relationship between influencer and target, but also on the context and nature of the situation. Thus, a country can be strong and influential on one set of issues and "powerless" on another (Padelford and Lincoln, 1967, pp. 294-295; Legg and Morrison, 1971, p. 97 also make this point). The burdens as well as the benefits of large population are
emphasized. The fact that large populations are often under-utilized (because of poverty as well as bigotry) is highlighted. The Sprouts' penchant for pointing out alternative or opposite interpretations of evidence could be object lessons for students, leading them to search for empirical tests and to question the results of such tests. The ability to pose and debate alternative interpretations of evidence is one of the major aspects of successful criticism. Books like the Sprouts' by challenging some traditional concepts and policies, and by posing and debating some relatively new ones, provide important examples to students.

The Sprouts make at least one very important contribution to the critical analysis of foreign policies; they suggest criteria by which to evaluate policy. They distinguish between policies' primary and secondary effects. Secondary effects may be unintended or unexpected. If government B demands something of government A, the demand may produce a direct response in terms of "compliance, compromise, or rejection." There may be many indirect and secondary impacts as well, however—on A or B's military forces, economy, population, public mood, territorial possessions, or international legal status. (Sprout and Sprout, 1971, p. 159.) Although the Sprouts do not further develop this categorization and inventory of impacts, it is important because texts rarely consider secondary effects of policies. Yet cumulative secondary effects may be responsible for many of the world's environmental and social problems.
Policy evaluation depends on judgments of what is important in world politics (or any politics):

We suggest that the most elemental values of all are those associated with biological existence: level of health and length of life. In more specifically ecological terms, but still in the context of a world community, or ecosystem, these values can be summed up as the need to make the earth a reasonably safe and salubrious place to live, not only for ourselves but also for our descendants, and not only for one or a few nations but for all." (Sprout and Sprout, 1971, p. 28; emphasis in original.)

The Sprouts present these basic values without much debate (they presume that most people in the world might agree on them), and fail to consider some of their paradoxes and weaknesses (in the quest for a "safer and salubrious" place to live men have attacked other countries for "liebensraum," spent huge resources for "defense," fought wars, killed wild animals until few remain, and opted for jobs and industry as opposed to clean air and water). Nevertheless, along with Duchacek, Morgenthau (despite his reputation as an "implacable power theorist"), Schuman, Palmer and Perkins, Ierche and Said, Hartmann, and Kulski, they at least consider and debate moral (value) issues in international politics. Debates are often incomplete or one-sided (Duchacek's is perhaps the most thorough), and many authors conclude that such moral issues only cloud policy choices. Yet, it seems that debate of major values is necessary in order for students to decide their own policy priorities and establish their own standards for policy evaluation.
A number of texts reflect efforts to provide reference points for students deciding what is important to study about world politics. This is usually done by creating "frameworks for analysis." Holsti (1968) utilizes a systems framework; Leff and Morrison (1971) extend systems study to consider institutions and norms; Reynolds (1971) deals with both "micro" and "macro" systems analysis; Deutsch (1968) asks ten "fundamental questions"; Hartmann (1967) deals with the pursuit of "national interest"; Morgenthau (1967) deals with the pursuit of interest as "power"; Organski stresses national "development" and "power"; Padelford and Lincoln (1967) take an "eclectic" approach dealing with the world political structure, the "forces" cutting across units and the relationship between foreign and domestic policies; Lerche and Said (1970) link the motives and tactics of actors to the actors’ systemic environment and to the substance of actors’ policies; Stoessinger (1969) deals with conceptual paradoxes—the struggle for power vs. order, the divergence between image and reality in world politics, and the struggles of "East" vs. "West" and "nationalism vs. colonialism"; and Spanier (1967) claims that three "revolutions"—the revolution in military technology, the "permanent revolution of Communism," and the "revolution of rising expectations" (the last two being taken for granted) are the key factors in world politics. All of these authors emphasize their notions of what is important in order to "explain world politics": only the Sprouts stress the importance of standards by which to evaluate international policy and behavior. This focus on policy evaluation (in addition to explanation) allows the Sprouts to criticize policy myths as well as conceptual myths; for example, they note that statesmen’s familiar claim that there "was no choice, no alternative"
to the actions taken (heard from Presidents Eisenhower—Lebanon, Kennedy—Cuban missile crisis, and Johnson—Vietnam) is "nonsense." (Sprout and Sprout, 1971, p. 76.)

Although the Sprouts are not as consistently critical of their own points as they might be, they provide or cite a good deal of evidence to back their points. They weave evidence effectively into their textual discussion making effective use
of and fully explaining tables and relevant citations from other authors. (Other authors integrate illustrations with their discussions. However, some, like Legg and Morrison, present evidence and illustrations with little or no explanation. This can hardly aid student criticism.)

Few texts display consistently critical analysis, and even fewer provide the student with examples or practice in comparison and organization—two important skills in criticism and argument. Holsti (1967) compares politics in several historical systems, and, although he does not show evidence of systems' effects on behavior, he does show variations in configurations of issues, conflicts, and coalition patterns across time. This approach, along with Holsti's historical system characterizations themselves, have been "borrowed" in some newer texts.

Edwards (1969), in an effort to aid student theorizing (discussed below), shows how generalizations are derived. He compares the Cuban missile and Berlin crises, as well as various types of alliances, while building propositions about these phenomena. His treatment of any topic is necessarily limited, however (as well as based on an assumption of "rational" decision-making), and, therefore, comparisons may not be historically and conceptually valid.

No author shows the student how to avoid "comparing apples and oranges." Comparison of crises should include careful historical analysis to isolate similarities and differences. Various ways of looking at similarities and dif-
ferences (economic vs. military policies, for example) should be explored. When asked to compare the Lebanon and Berlin crises of 1958, a student could conceivably begin in any of the following ways: (1) "They occurred in the same year;" (2) "They were in different regions;" (3) "Both involved troop movements;" (4) "President Eisenhower was strongly involved in both, but Chairman Krushchev strongly involved in only one;" (5) "There were no similarities;" etc. Students taking any of these or other approaches probably need a great deal of guidance as to what is important to consider in comparing items supposedly of the same genre. Students get very little guidance from authors who simply assume that the Warsaw Pact and NATO were formed for similar reasons (Edwards' generalizations about alliances are derived without careful calculation of the policy orientations of all alliance members; they reflect a decided great power orientation and very little evidence is provided to support contentions). Generalizations based on comparison of diverse cases must be thoroughly justified and questioned, since political contexts may vary according to region, time-period, or particular countries involved.

In addition to comparative skills, organizational skills are necessary for effective criticism. Students should be able to organize a logical and coherent argument, and to determine when others have not done so. Only one text, Coplin's (1971), provides any sort of practice in organizing. Coplin presents a chapter outline at the end of each chapter. The student can
follow the organization and use the outline as a study
guide.

Edward's treatment of alliance formation should alert us to the need for careful analysis of assumptions implicit in certain arguments. If students are to criticize generalizations and arguments, they must be able to pick out such assumptions. Arguments premised on "rational man" conceptions of decision-making will differ greatly from arguments based on "bureaucratic" models. (See Allison, 1971.) Authors often fail to make their assumptions explicit (although some argue that their values are "apparent" in their text). Students at all levels probably need more practice in detecting implicit assumptions than they get in current texts. Statements common in some texts could be turned into exercises for students:

Determine the underlying assumptions implicit in the following statement: "The collapse of Europe in the wake of World War II and the rise of an expansionist Soviet Union left Washington with no choice but to react and to contain Soviet expansionism." (Spanier, 1967, p. 385.)

Conceptual Skills

It should by now be evident that partly because of critical shortcomings, few authors have consistently utilized easily defined, easily measured, and useful concepts. Some concepts, such as "security," "goals," "nationalism," "nation," "state," and "nation-state," are intricately dissected and defined in many texts (although some authors fail to point out the abstract nature of such constructs and to specify when these constructs
are important or unimportant in explaining behavior—especially since individuals, not states or nations, behave. However, even when abstract concepts are carefully defined, they are very difficult to measure. How "influential" is one goal as opposed to another? Does "security" mean the same thing to Canadians as to Venezuelans? Does context change the meaning or strength of a concept? Most authors recognize that "nationalism" or "security" may have changed greatly between the 19th and 20th centuries, and that nationalism is different in "developed" vs. "underdeveloped" parts of the world. (e.g., see Padelford and Lincoln, 1967, Ch. 4.) But is "nationalism" greater in one country than another? It is difficult to assess the impact of a variable on behavior unless the variable actually varies. Does nationalistic feeling ebb and flow, and if so, when and why? Padelford and Lincoln (and others) mention that the nationalism of newly independent countries tends to be "weak." This evidently means that relatively few people in these countries are conscious of their common heritage and destiny. We are left to ask, "What would a weak nationalism be like in older polities?" Perhaps Padelford and Lincoln mean to imply that nationalism is never weak in older societies. On the other hand, "weak" nationalism could mean any or all of the following: disloyalty, supranational loyalty, apathy, subnational loyalty, lack of "xenophobia," or lack of consciousness. Indeed, any of these could conceivably describe "weak" nationalism in new states as well as old. We gain little from distinc-
tions between contexts unless they are thorough and careful and unless the concept itself is workable.

Obviously, the more loosely constructed the concepts appearing in a text, the more complications and confusions they cause. In dealing with "developed" vs. "underdeveloped" states, few authors consider the "developed" aspects of the latter and the "underdeveloped" aspects of the former. Thus, when "development" is related to types of "nationalism," major errors are likely. The nationalism of poor vs. rich Americans is seldom compared to the nationalism of poor vs. rich Indians (at least in world politics textbooks). Yet precisely such comparisons are necessary if we are to understand Indian or American, rich or poor, nationalistic or non-nationalistic politics. Thus, if concepts cannot be applied to specific populations, or if they cannot be shown meaningful in human affairs, they should be excluded from study.

Most texts contain sections on "foreign policy-making." Sometimes authors point out uncertainties as to whether leaders make decisions on the basis of goals and "rational" assessments of cost. (See, for example, Sprout and Sprout, 1971, pp. 111-17.) The student rarely sees decision-making in action, however. Deutsch (1968, Appendix) includes an account of decision-making in the U.S. State Department. This may be one of the most effective ways to relate concepts to decisional processes, since it reveals complexities such as lack of information, bureaucratic pressures, shortage of
defined goals and instructions, domestic political pressures, and personal biases and idiosyncracies.

The student might thereby see that behavior is not just the result of interplay among well-defined concepts. The "national interest" approach to world politics is, as most authors note, vague and misleading (since "national interest" is an ephemeral concept). Many authors treat national interest (with reservations) as a general motivation for government behavior. But the "national interest" concept arises from a general view of decision-making; the underlying premises as well as the resultant concept must be questioned. The student must be made aware of the complex influences on decisions; the national interest approach basically presumes only goal-oriented influences. Many influences may have little or nothing to do with goals, and decision-makers, for various reasons, may studiously avoid forming and articulating goals. The student should also be aware that "decisions," as clearly discernable phenomena, may never be made (President Truman is reported to have answered, "What decision?" when asked when the decision to intervene in the Korean war was made). Thus, in the effort to refine and measure concepts (such as "interests" or "decisions"), authors may mislead students about "reality." Evidence that concepts relate to human concerns must be presented to supplement and validate efforts to measure concepts. For this reason, diplomatic history of the type presented by Schuman (1969) is an important
adjunct to conceptualization. It is not enough to rigorously define and measure concepts; the nuances and influences of various contexts must be explored.

To help students evaluate conceptions, authors should compare their own treatment of concepts to those of other authors. Some authors, like Organski, do this rather consistently, while others seem oblivious to alternate conceptual interpretations. This is well illustrated by the treatment of "national interest" by Hartmann on the one hand, and Padelford and Lincoln on the other. Hartmann (1967, p. 261) argues that:

"... acting from the same initial point of departure i.e., the national interest, states may embark upon the most diverse foreign policies imaginable. Although nations often follow policies vis-à-vis given problems over long periods of time, especially where the problem and its surrounding is more striking among the phenomena of international relations than the enormous diversity of policies implemented by states over a long period."

Taking a somewhat different view, Padelford and Lincoln (1967, pp. 210-11.) maintain:

"The fundamental interests of states tend to persist, but the means by which they are expressed and the methods used to promote them are adapted to circumstances. ... Conceptions of what the national interest requires can change radically."

Few terms have presented more definitional and measurement difficulties than "national interest." Hartmann defines vital (and presumably national) interests tautologically, saying:
"The test of whether an interest is considered vital is simply this: will a nation, unless it feels hopelessly outclassed in terms of power, ultimately go to war to preserve it? If the answer is affirmative, it is considered a vital interest. (p. 71.)

Yet he also agrees with the Padelford-Lincoln view that national interests are somewhat enduring, and thus somewhat objective: "A nation may choose to fight over what to objective observers is a secondary or even trivial interest." (p. 71.) It might be assumed that since vital interests are whatever a nation chooses (Hartmann fails to realize that nations do not choose) to fight about, an observer can make no a priori generalizations about such interests. Yet, in the next breath Hartmann says: "Vital interests are in the first instance predominantly and essentially conservative." (p. 71.) Any concept that is at the same time subjective, objective, fixed, changing, indescribable, and describable cannot be of as much use to students as it evidently is to academics, and should probably be discarded.

Yet, we find Hartmann (p. 470.) telling students that the national interest should have guided us in Vietnam, while Padelford and Lincoln (p. 209.) tell them that President Johnson tried to establish a national consensus when none existed about what national interest in Vietnam was.

**Empirical Skills**

In order to demonstrate the usefulness of concepts and contexts in explaining human behavior, evidence must be gathered,
populations must be tested, calculations must be made, and relationships must be established. This requires development of empirical skills. There are a variety of such skills, ranging from bibliographic to quantitative. Few of today's international politics texts touch any of them. For this reason, few of the texts are adequate for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses (although because of certain critiques or conceptualizations, some texts would make valuable supplementary reading for advanced students).

No author shows the student how to conduct quantitative analysis, or how to design a study. Even authors aiming at the development of testable theory, such as Edwards and Coplin, fail to discuss problems of measurement, data evaluation, or statistical analysis (although Coplin's text is designed for use with learning packages that briefly discuss such techniques, and both Edwards (1970) and Coplin (with Kealey, 1971) have produced accompanying books of readings, some of which utilize statistical analysis.) Edwards (1969, p. 16, note.) provides references to data sources, and Palmer and Perkins (1969, p. xxii.) at least list various quantitative approaches and data sources. Nevertheless, there is need for a comparative and critical text reviewing quantitative techniques appropriate to various types of hypotheses and data in international studies. This need is especially important as more data and learning packages become available to the instructor for classroom use.
To adequately form and test hypotheses, investigate the validity of concepts, compare conceptualizations, or interpret results, the student should be able to conduct his or her own literature search. This requires some familiarity with books, journals, and other information resources (e.g., Deadline Data on World Affairs). While most texts provide lists of suggested readings or bibliographies, only a few (Frankel, Coplin, Edwards) include annotations. Coplin provides the most bibliographic help, leading students to useful articles as well as books. Legg and Morrison (1971) provide quite extensive citations at the end of each chapter, with sources categorized according to subject-matter.

Theoretical Skills

Theory-building depends on the three sets of skills reviewed above. Since none of the texts comprehensively treats any of the previous categories, none effectively treats theory-building. Edwards' text is most explicitly aimed at theory-building, but conceptualization is simplistic, underlying assumptions are not criticized, and data is lacking. Although Coplin stresses empirical study, he does not offer the student examples of measurement techniques (for concepts such as "open" or "closed" political systems) or data generation. Coplin helps the student criticize by distinguishing between "value-laden" and "value-free" arguments. Many of Coplin's generalizations are testable propositions, and although Coplin does
not set out to build formal theories (as Edwards does), most of such propositions could be worked into deductive frameworks. A student wishing to build theory would need much supplemental reading on theory construction, however. Coplin bases much of his foreign policy discussion on frameworks similar to Rosenau's "pre-theory." (Rosenau, 1966.) Students could fit propositions into this pre-theory, perhaps modifying and improving it as they tested it. One such proposition is:

"Partisan influencers tend to have broader images of international affairs than most bureaucratic and interest influencers if only because their function is to aggregate the interest of mass and interest influencers. However, images of partisan influencers vary for open and closed political systems."

Although simplistic, especially regarding "open" and "closed" systems (as is Rosenau's pre-theory), this formulation could lead creative students to further questions, tests, and criticism. Such criticism could have been facilitated if Coplin had presented data to support his case about influencers' perceptions.

Since many of the newer texts stress empirical investigation of behavioral phenomena (although authors do not show the student how to conduct such investigation and seldom formulate hypotheses rigorously), useful comparisons can be made between the theoretical arguments they contain. For instance, Deutsch (1968) also describes foreign policy influencers, but presents a model somewhat different from Coplin's. Deutsch adapts communications theory to the policy-formation process and derives
a "cascade" model of information flow. Socio-economic elites, governmental elites, mass media elites, opinion leaders, and the population at large are depicted in a hierarchical system, with information flowing up and down the hierarchy. Deutsch goes on to posit strong or weak links between various levels in this hierarchy (pp. 104-10.) Deutsch's influencers can be compared to Coplin's. Coplin posits only four influence sectors in polities: partisan, mass, bureaucratic, and interest. He does not arrange these in a hierarchy, but does predict (on the basis of implicit theory) that certain of the four will be most influential, depending on the type of issue (national security, economic policy, ideological-historical, or procedural) and the type of political system (open or closed). (Coplin, 1971, pp. 86-87.)

Neither of these "models" qualifies as rigorous deductive theory, but both have aspects of theory which lead the authors to various predictions about foreign policy influence. The student could be asked to criticize each model (Coplin, for instance, has not included domestic issues which impinge on foreign policy, nor has he distinguished among sectors of the "mass public" or between types of interest groups), to compare the two (dealing with implicit assumptions, conflicting interpretations, correspondences between the models, etc.), to test either or both, and to provide the theoretical postulates that either precede or follow from the models.

Authors of recent texts have moved away from normative considerations and toward more empirical and behavioral skills. Legg and Morrison, Organski, Puchala, and Spanier all try to increase students' ability to theorize about world politics. Some authors, like Kulski, disclaim efforts to produce formal theories of international politics because of the difficulties involved.
(Kulski, 1968, p. ix.) Others, like Hartmann, who do very little formal theorizing and present very few testable propositions, claim to provide "... a careful combination of theory with historical and other data. ..."

(Hartmann, 1967, p. viii.) The idea of theory-building has had great impact on textbook authors. Legg and Morrison's statement of purpose has become quite typical of recent texts: "Our intention is not to try to persuade the reader what the world should be like or how it should be organized or how any given state should behave, but to increase the reader's understanding of how nation-states and political systems do in fact behave and why." (Legg and Morrison, 1971, p. ix.)

The Legg and Morrison approach has much to recommend it, but certain basic problems are overlooked. Students and scholars would do well indeed if they could understand how and why nation-states and political systems behave. However, judging from the current state of conceptualization in the international relations field, any author who claims to provide such understanding is presumptuous indeed. Legg and Morrison incorporate many concepts typical of other texts: conflict, goals, capabilities, and systems. Yet they are little more critical of such concepts and little more careful to break them down into describable and measurable characteristics than any other authors. Incomplete conceptualization leads them as it leads others, to the following type of proposition: "National-state units ... that are poorly endowed with natural resources, isolated from other states, and behind the rest of the world in the level of technological know-how are not as likely to exercise as much influence in conflict situations as are those states that are well-endowed with natural resources, strategic locations, and technological knowledge."

(Legg and Morrison, 1971, p. 64.) One wonders how such states as North Vietnam...
survive, or how such states as Ghana can expel Soviet officials, or how such states as Peru and North Korea can defy American sea power! Is it, as Legg and Morrison continue, because "... such poorly endowed states are likely to adopt the goals of establishing international norms to protect weak states from strong or increasing their power by economic development or alliances with other weak states or with a powerful protector state? The student cannot evaluate such theoretical deductions or answer such questions until more of the subtleties, ramifications, and connotations of concepts like "power" are revealed, measured, and explored. (See, for example, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, Chs. 1-2.)

Authors may claim that their values, norms, and biases are either eliminated from their analyses or made explicit, but until concepts are thoroughly criticized and balanced by alternatives, all kinds of unstated and confounding biases will be imported into analyses and texts. Significant recent research has appeared which challenges the effectiveness and "thinkability" of traditional theoretical approaches such as strategic and deterrence theory. (See, for instance, J. I. Coffey, 1971; Anatol Rapoport, 1964; John R. Raser, 1969, pp. 432-41; and Dean G. Pruitt, 1969, pp. 392-408.) Deutsch (1968, p. 151.) fleetingly discusses the theory that escalation processes are wound down by unilateral concessions or conciliation, but does not pursue it. Such innovative theories are found in few other texts, and students are usually confronted with only one point of view on crucial issues of policy and analytical concern.

To be useful in solving world problems, theories should relate to issues shown to be important aspects of such problems. A student is entitled to
ask why it is important to find out how much influence "poorly endowed" states have in conflict situations. Adequate theorizing entails enumerating the areas of human concern which are affected by variables in theories. If Malawi exercises or fails to exercise international influence in a certain type of conflict, how will that affect anyone's life inside or outside of Malawi? Unless we can begin to answer such questions and begin to determine what impacts on human life are important, we and our students will waste valuable time and effort building esoteric theories with little policy value.

Edwards (1969, p. 11.) has a desirable ambition: "We want, eventually, not only to know what happens when nations interact ... and to understand why, but also to improve our ability to control them." It is difficult enough to control any aspect of world politics (Edwards is unable to bring us much closer to that goal); our efforts should at least be concentrated toward controlling the most important aspects. This requires discussion and determination of criteria of importance.

Despite Kulski's warnings, it is possible to theorize about international politics. Once concepts become specific, measurable, and refined (to show complexities and human behavioral variations that broad concepts cannot cover), students are in a better position to theorize. There are even theories to account for the human idiosyncrasies (which some authors feel make international political generalizations impossible). One such theory deals with "cognitive dissonance" (see Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967.) Deutsch mentions "cognitive consonance" in dealing with ideology, and is able to show that misperception frequently characterizes decisions about war:

"During the half century from 1914 to 1964, the decisions of major powers to go to war or to expand a war, and their judgments of the relevant intentions and capabilities of other nations, seem to
have involved major errors of fact perhaps in more than 50 per cent of all cases. Each of these errors cost thousands of lives; some of them cost millions. The frequency of such errors seems to hold for monarchies and republics, democracies and dictatorships, non-Communist as well as Communist regimes." (Deutsch, 1968, pp. 51-52.) In this way, theory and major world problems are joined. The student obtains some idea of where we might intervene, if we could, to help solve world problems and to help advise policymakers. From here, he or she may be motivated to formulate and test more specific propositions about perceptions. Puchala (1971), as well as other authors, have tried to incorporate findings from empirical and behavioral literature in their texts; this is an important and encouraging trend. Psychological, sociological and experimental studies (in addition to aggregate data analyses) relate well to international problems. (See, for example, Kelman, 1965.) They are starting points for students wishing to theorize about international concerns, and students should be made aware of such approaches. Propositional inventories would be valuable additions to texts dealing with theory.

Conclusion

International relations texts provide very little systematic coverage of four major types of educational objectives. Clearly, no one text adequately covers all four categories, and few cover any of them adequately and consistently (some authors, like Coplin, strive to be critical and stress empiricism, but leave important concepts uncriticized and unmeasured). It can be argued that we may never have a completely comprehensive text, especially since texts are not designed as research studies to include data analysis. Also, various educational objectives become more important at various undergraduate and graduate levels. Texts should be matched to such levels. Yet, to demand that texts
treat criticism, conceptualization, empiricism, and theory is not to require that they become research studies. Instead, they should fully reflect current results and approaches. This means that authors should at least raise questions and illustrate techniques related to criticism, conceptualization, empiricism, and theory.

One of the obvious needs is for an advanced text. The books perhaps coming closest to such a text, James Dougherty's and Robert Pfaltzgraff's, Contending Theories of International Relations (1971); and Nigel Forward's, The Field of Nations (1971), have not been reviewed here because they dwell mainly on theoretical schools of international studies as opposed to processes of international politics. Another new volume, Michael Nicholson's, Conflict Analysis (1970), is a rather sophisticated and reasonably comprehensive (though brief and inadequately developed and documented) introduction to one aspect of international studies—conflict research. These books provide valuable insights into the "state of the field" of international studies, and would be valuable in advanced undergraduate and introductory graduate courses. In addition to these, edited volumes deal with both processes of and approaches to world politics. (See Rosenau, 1969; Singer, 1968; Kelman, 1965; Kaplan, 1970; Kaplan, 1968.) However, no textbook has been attuned to the needs and skills of advanced students. Treatment of quantitative research techniques is particularly lacking. No text simultaneously deals with the concepts and theories of international relations, and only one (Edwards, 1970) shows the student how to derive such theory (and then only at a very elementary level). There is need for a text taking students step by step through the process of hypothesis formation, measurement, data generation, choosing an analysis technique, data analysis, and interpretation of results. There is also need for a text showing
how a good critique is formulated. Advanced students need to know the history and intellectual controversies of international studies, and most existing texts do not cover these matters comprehensively.

Ideally, the latest texts would have been rated according to objective tests of their educational effects on students. It is more interesting and important to test rather than speculate about texts' effectiveness in dealing with educational objectives. Perhaps more thorough textual criticism would have little or no effect on students' ability to criticize or conceptualize. Unfortunately, there are no readily available tests for students who have read various texts. It would be very difficult to test development of student skills, though probably somewhat easier to gauge students' abilities to discern changes in the field of international studies.

Thus, the next step in the objective evaluation of textbook strengths and weaknesses should be to develop and apply such tests to student groups (experimental and control) which have read various combinations of textbooks. Such testing could then be extended to experimental and control groups which have been exposed to various combinations of textbook and in-class instruction techniques. This is an area in which educational testing specialists should be consulted. Perhaps then we can learn the most effective teaching technique for various educational objectives.
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Textbooks


* Indicates paperback edition.

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