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The Impact of Globalization on Global Civil Society Expansion

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The Impact of Globalization on Global Civil Society Expansion

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ABBREVIATIONS

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
HIC	High Income Country Model
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
IGO	International Governmental Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
LIC	Low Income Country Model
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
TRIMS	Trade Related to Investment Measures
TRIPS	Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
UIA	Union of International Associations
UN	United Nations
UNDEF	United Nations Democracy Fund
WTO	World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER ONE – An Introduction

“Our times demand a new definition of leadership – global leadership. They demand a new constellation of international cooperation – governments, civil society, and the private sector, working together for the collective global good” (United Nations 2009).

This statement by United Nations’ Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon at the 2009 World Economic Forum heralded a shift in international relations from a state-centered approach to a recognition of the growing influence of non-state actors.

In recent decades, global civil society actors have emerged as important players in global governance. Global civil society has elevated the international policy agenda profile of human rights, women’s rights, and environmental concerns (O'Brien, Goetz and Scholte 2000, Reitan 2007). Global civil society campaigns have overcome the objections of powerful state actors, including the United States, to establish the International Criminal Court and the Mine Ban Treaty (English 1998, Short 1999, Davenport 2003). Global civil society activists have also successfully opposed unfavorable policies, putting a halt to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and stopping the progress of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Development Round (Smith and Johnson 2002). These notable successes demonstrate the need for a better understanding of global civil society’s motives and its role in international public policy.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY LANDSCAPE

What is civil society and can it be global? The idea of civil society is useful not because it identifies a specific type of human interaction, but because it defines the space in which people engage individually and collectively to protest, negotiate, deliberate, and

collaborate on a wide range of social, economic and political issues (de Tocqueville 2000 [1835], Kaldor 2003, Bartelson 2006, Jad 2007, Edwards 2011). While distinct from both government and the market, civil society regularly interacting with both (Habermas 2001). The idea of civil society developed within the conceptual framework of the nation-state, relying on its relationships with the government institutions and the market to provide both context and legitimacy (Hall 1995, Perez-Diaz 1995, Giner 1995). Some scholars maintain that once divorced from the nation-state the concept, of global civil society, is “a greater distraction than aid to understanding the world in which we live” (Thomas 1998, 62). However, interpreting civil society globally does not require isolating it from governmental or market forces, but acknowledging that these forces have already transended national boundaries. Likewise, civil society needs to be freed from national boundaries.

Global civil society describes the same discursive sphere of activity as domestic civil society. The shift is more a matter of scope than of substance. The activities of global civil society and domestic civil society are comprised of the interaction between pressure groups and policy makers, only the scale of the policy debated changes. The adoption of the Landmine Ban Treaty and the creation of the International Criminal Court signifies that global civil society is able to move beyond rhetoric and exert its influence on the global stage along side unquestioned powers such as nation-states and multinational corporations (Kumar 2007, 431).


Framing global civil society as an arena of discourse and action emphasizes that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. However, such a broad concept complicates analysis. Much as ecologists gain insight about an ecosystem by studying its inhabitants,

the current study seeks to understand global civil society by analyzing the effects of political and economic globalization on international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) as inhabitants of global civil society. The United Nations and the Union of International Associations (UIA) define INGOs as not-for-profit voluntary citizen groups, which operated in at least two countries, to address issues in support of the common good (United Nations 2015). These best-documented inhabitants of global civil society provide a medium for understanding the multifaceted concept of global civil society.

In various forms global civil society has always existed. World War II emphasized the dangers of indifferent and isolationist public policies. Nation-states realized that interdependence and collaboration could make the world safer and more prosperous. This climate of cooperation promoted the advancement of global civil society. Since the 1950's the number of INGOs has grown rapidly, both bolstering and being bolstered by globalization (Carothers 1999).

Across the globe the number of INGOs has increased exponentially since the middle of the twentieth century. Prior to 1954, the total number of INGOs was less than 500. By the end of the 1980s, the number of INGOs expanded to nearly 100,000. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the INGO population doubled reaching more than 200,000 INGOs by 2011 (Union of International Associations 2012). Pronounced spikes in the growth of INGOs accompanied major changes in international political landscape. In the 1970s, decolonization produced an uptick in the number of INGOS as new nations emerged. Another spike occurred in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The turn of the century, following the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle designated a marked recovery in the number of INGOs globally. (Figure 1)

FIGURE 1




Source: Union of International Associations

The expansion of INGOs has not occurred in isolation but during a period of rapid globalization. Globalization, defined as “the stretching of social, political, and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions, and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe” (Held, McGrew, et al. 2000, 69), has considerably reduced the costs of cooperation. Waves of democratization empower people to exercise new freedoms of expression and association. Technological advances make it possible to communicate across continents as easily as communicating across the dinner table. Economic growth has reduced the cost of technological advancements, making them available to more people. The current study seeks to identify which global forces promote global civil society and which forces impede its progress, thereby enhancing our understanding of the ramifications of greater global civil society involvement in public policy.

Global civil society is truly global. INGOs are active in every country, even the most isolated. In 2013, the World Policy Institute identified the ten most isolated countries based on the following five criteria: direct flights to other countries, internet connectivity, tourism, immigrant population, and imports. Korea DPR, Myanmar, Madagascar, Somalia, and Burundi make up the top five (World Policy Institute 2013). While these countries have relatively small numbers of INGOs compared with more connected countries, four of these countries show significant growth in the number of INGOs especially since 2000. Only Somalia, which has the smallest INGO presence experienced flat growth.

FIGURE 2




Source: Union of International Associations

Global civil society is largely a developed world phenomenon. However, over the past thirty years, global civil society, as measured by the number of INGOs, has proliferated more rapidly in middle and lower income countries. In 1985, 45% of all

INGOs operated in just twenty-seven high-income countries including, Western Europe, Canada, United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; by 2010, this percentage dropped to 39%.

FIGURE 3




Source: Union of International Associations

The map (Figure 3), illustrates the pattern of global civil society expansion. In 1985, INGOs were concentrated in Europe, North America, Japan and Australia. By 2010, we observe global increases in every country, but with more pronounced changes in developing countries, particularly in South America, Central America, and Southeast Asia. We also observe smaller, yet substantial increases in Africa. These observations highlight the influence of differences in income levels and geographic location on the number of INGOs, but what other factors explain the variation in the growth in the numbers of INGOs.

Scholars have proffered numerous explanations for globalization's effect on the growth in the number of INGOs and global civil society's scope and influence. They have suggested causal relationships among the proliferation of democratically governed nations (Boli and Thomas 1999, J. Smith 1998, Omelicheva 2009, Chandhoke 2009), the expansion of international cooperation through governance regimes (Edwards and Hulme 2013, Fowler 2011, O'Brien, Goetz and Scholte 2000), the increased interconnectedness of the world economy, and the ease of movement of information across the globe (Glasius and Players 2013, Castells, et al. 2006). The majority of civil society scholars substantiate these relationships with case study based evidence. While these studies provide insight into specific global civil society activities, they lack the rigor to generalize these theoretical assumptions to a wider population of global civil society actors.

FIGURE 4



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

The similarity in the trend lines of these forces of globalization would seem to support relationships between these variables and INGO growth (Figure 4). However, these relationships remain untested. In addition, the lack of concurrent testing of these anticipated relationships makes it difficult to determine if the similarities in growth patterns are discrete or the result of a common intervening variable. The current study closes these research gaps by analyzing all four competing explanations in one study.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY

The first explanation examined by the current study is the perceived relationship between the proliferation of democratic forms of government and global civil society. This explanation gains support from democratization theory, which measures democracy, at least in part, by a citizen's ability to freely associate and individually or collectively appeal to political leaders and institutions (Dahl 1971).

The democratic governance explanation envisions global civil society as populated by organizations which serve as schools of democracy. Such organizations facilitate the gathering of information on policy options, the formation of policy preferences, and the expression of those policy preferences to public officials (Fung and Wright 2001). These organizations also provide citizens with the opportunity to learn leadership and legislative skills (Baiocchi 2001).

The literature is mixed on the causal direction of the relationship between democracy and a thriving global civil society. Some scholars focus on the prerequisite of basic civil liberties and the rule of law to foster a vibrant global civil society (Carroll and Carroll 2004). Other scholars examine the ability of global civil society to promote and sustain democratic transitions (Przeworski 2004, Linz and Stepan 1996). The current study test two reciprocal hypotheses in an attempt to establish a causal direction.

The first democracy hypothesis proposes that as a country moves from autocracy toward democracy the number of INGOs will increase. The premise of this explanation of global civil society growth is that once citizens are free to assemble, act collectively, and engage with their government, without fear of reprisal or repression, they will.

INGOs organize and amplify individual desires to express political views and to seek policy outcomes that align with those views (Ehrenberg 1999, Habermas 2001, de Tocqueville 2000 [1835]). We should expect this civic engagement to foster political participation.

The reciprocal democracy hypothesis states that INGOs operating in a country will support and stabilize democratic traditions and institutions thus enabling a country to move closer to democracy. This hypothesis assumes that INGOs increase the political participation, especially of marginalized groups by training citizens in democratic principles, thereby stimulating and emboldening democratic transitions (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Linz and Stepan 1996). Global civil society's support of democratic principles and institutions is observable at the international level.

Democracy theory presumes that global civil society has the ability to make global governance more democratic. According to this explanation, INGOs are conduits for learning the philosophies and methods of democracy (Boli and Thomas 1999). Also, INGOs reduce the personal and social costs of political participation by facilitating access to information while enhancing solidarity (Sorensen and Torfing 2005). Chapter three provides a thorough analysis of the relationship between democratic governance and the growth of global civil society.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION

The next relationship investigated, by the current study, is between a thriving global civil society and international political integration. Political integration is a measure of how invested a country is in the international political system. In other

words, to what extent does a country participate in international government organizations or sign and adopt international treaties. This explanation finds support in the principles of new public management, which maintains that public/private partnerships can mitigate the deficiencies in public bureaucracy, making participation in the international policy arena easier (Milward and Provan 2000). The present study hypothesizes that nations active in the international political system will have a larger global civil society presence. When countries face increased administrative responsibility, they will seek to partner with global civil society actors to meet those administrative burdens (Edwards 2011, Tvedt, 2002, Fowler 1998).

The political integration explanation conceives of global civil society as comprised of actors whose primary purpose is to deliver responsive and efficient public services. According to this theory, when INGOs increase participant buy-in, global governance becomes more responsive. Advocates of this approach cite the upsurge in the use of INGOs to administer international aid programs as an illustration of this phase of global governance (Fredericksen and London 2000). Chapter four provides a thorough analysis of the relationship between political integration and the growth of global civil society.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The third relationship explored by the present study is the relationship between economic integration and a dynamic global civil society. Economic integration is a measure of how much a country's economy depends on trade or foreign investment. This relationship is based on the work of two distinct groups of economic scholars. Neoliberal

scholars analyze civil society through the lens of supply and demand, (Steinberg 2006) by contrast, alternative development scholars analyze civil society through the lens of economic self-determination (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, Evans 2008). Both of these groups identify the origins of civil society as arising from the separation of political life from both commerce and labor (Boyd 2013).

The neoliberal economic approach focuses on global civil society's ability to mitigate market failures. Global civil society is most effective at correcting three specific types of market failure: the provision of public goods, contract failure, and an outlet for philanthropic demand (Salamon and Anhier 1998, Teegen, Doh and Vachani 2004). Since global civil society organizations are exempt from the drive to maximize profits, they can meet the demand for public goods, which have nonexistent or low profit margins. Examples of public goods frequently provided by global civil society organizations include delivering healthcare to the poor or subsidizing cultural activities.

Global civil society actors help mitigate contract failure, not by enforcing the legal fine print, but instead monitoring companies' commitment to their loftier obligations of honesty and transparency. For example, watchdog organizations invest the time and effort necessary to determine if Starbucks' coffee is traded fairly or if Nike shoes are manufactured in sweatshops. Global civil society actors attempt to empower consumers to make informed choices.

Lastly, global civil society also provides a market for the expression of philanthropic impulses. Classic economic theory cannot explain why someone would willingly work without compensation or give money away without expecting a return

(Hansmann 1987). The market is incapable of creating institutions that direct these behaviors – civil society fills that gap both nationally and globally.

Alternative development scholars draw support from Karl Polanyi's double movement theory, which explains that social pressures arise when the state becomes too enmeshed with business interests and fails to buffer citizens from negative externalities of market activities (Polanyi [1944] 2001). For example, when a government fails to regulate pollution adequately for fear of losing industry to a neighboring country with weaker environmental protections, global civil society can empower people to demand a healthy environment through public awareness campaigns and protests. As a country integrates into the global free-market economy, its economic policy autonomy, as well as its ability to buffer citizens from the negative impacts of market force, is reduced. This lack of government responsiveness will lead to an increased number of INGOs as society organizes to challenge the state's relationship to business interests (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009).

These two seemingly incompatible approaches to understanding economic integration are measured by the same variables – trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, both measured as a percent of GDP. Not only do these economic activities require interaction with other countries, but they often come with specific rules of engagement, which limit the policy choices. Chapter five provides a thorough analysis of the relationship between economic integration and the growth of global civil society.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND NATIONAL CAPACITY

The national capacity explanation predicts that a particular level of national capacity is essential for supporting global civil society. Modernization theory validates the national capacity relationship. Modernization theory predicts that industrialization and economic development lead directly to positive social and political changes. Global civil society is an example of one of the anticipated changes (Lipset 1981).

According to modernization theory, economic advancements, particularly the division of labor, will free up both time and treasure that can be invested in pursuits beyond subsistence. In a modernized economy a larger proportion of the population has the leisure time and wealth to devote to civic engagement. National capacity is a measure of the material resources and technological capability available to a country to support global civil society organizations. The current study will measure modernization in terms of wealth, access to technology, social capital index (life expectancy, educational attainment), and the size of urban population.

The hypotheses generated by the national capacity explanation predict that as the resources available to support global civil society increase the number of INGOs operating in that country will likewise increase. There is a logical connection between wealth and global civil society because global civil society organizations rely heavily on contributions or grants to fund activities (Edwards 2011). The higher the number of people whose income exceeds their basic needs, the greater the resources available to support global civil society organizations.

Access to technology can positively influence the promotion of global civil society by reducing the costs of collective action. The proliferation of the internet and mobile phone usage allows people to access a vast array of information for pennies at any time of the day or night. For example, the successful campaign to stop the Multilateral Agreement on Investment at the OECD used the internet to coordinate massive protests and direct mail campaigns in just a few days (Reitan 2007). Chapter six provides a thorough analysis of the relationship between national capacity and the growth of global civil society.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The premise of this research project is that by understanding which international forces contribute to global civil society's growth, as measured by the number of INGOs, we can better understand the motives of global civil society organizations. As our world becomes more interconnected and our problems become more pervasive, the solutions needed to address these problems must become more holistic. If we are to encourage the international policy process to become more representative, we need to understand what motivates these new actors.

As discussed earlier, the literature identifies four competing explanations for the exponential growth of global civil society: democratization, enhanced political integration, increased economic integration, and modernization. The validity of these explanations has not been tested. The present study fills this gap in the literature, by selecting a 29 year panel regression analysis to evaluate the predictive powers of each

competing explanations. Chapter two provides a comprehensive explanation of the data selection and methodology.

The findings presented in this paper provide support to the idea that global civil society has democratic foundations. Global civil society also has a strong relationship to political integration and national capacity. The results of the current study finds little support for the relationship between global civil society and economic integration. The political integration relationship is open to interpretation. The optimistic interpretation casts global civil society as a facilitator of increased participation, helping marginalized populations influence policy decisions that impact their lives. The pessimistic perception questions the loyalties of global civil society actors. To whom are these organizations accountable – the marginalized populations they claim to serve or the donor countries who pay the bills? Reality lies somewhere between these extremes, but the findings are enough to encourage due diligence when vetting organizations for participation in the international policy process.

Based on the results national capacity can also encourage global civil society growth. However, the impact of national capacity diminishes over time. The same level increase in wealth and technology produces larger increases in the number of INGOs in lower income countries than more wealthy countries.

The current study found limited support for the economic integration explanation. These results are interesting because much of the case study literature explores global civil society's efforts to alter the global economy. While many global civil society

organization's mission address issues of economic integration, economic globalization offers little to explain global civil society's rapid growth and expansion.

These results confirm that the similarity in growth trends observed between globalization and global civil society expansion is not a spurious one. Instead it is the result of substantive causal relationships. These results further indicate that much of global civil society's growth can be attributed to the expansion in global governance institutions and regimes. While global civil society can claim roots in a democratic impulse, its exponential growth is related to the more practical concern of public administration.

CHAPTER 2 - METHODOLOGY

The study of global civil society is a relatively new field. Most of the research has occurred in the past fifty years. Scholars from diverse academic fields, including sociology, political science, international relations, and economics, have all attempted to understand this emerging phenomenon, producing a wealth of scholarly literature. This chapter provides a review of the literature focusing on the quantitative study of global civil society. It also includes a detailed explanation of panel regression method and the three models used to assess the four competing explanations.

Several studies influenced the methodology of this research project. The work of Hagai Katz (2006) and Thomas and Boli (1999) guided the current study's research question and hypotheses. The work by the Center for Civil Society Studies at Johns Hopkins University and Helmut Anheier guided variable selection and measurement. The research conducted by Smith and Wiest (Smith and Wiest 2005). Informed the scope and scale of the present study and provided additional support for variable selection. Lastly, the current study's overall structure was influenced by a 2010 study by Lee (Lee 2010). Both studies use similar data and methods of analysis to explore the growth in INGOs, but specify globalization from different perspectives.

METHODOLOGY - Literature Review

The research conducted by Katz used network analysis to map the links between 10,001 activist INGOs. Katz tested two competing models based on Gramscian theory of civil society. The basis of Gramscian theory, as applied to global civil society, is that social movements could serve two contradictory functions. They can, willingly or

through cooptation, serve the existing power structure (hegemonic), or they can sustain an alternative power structure (counter hegemonic).

Katz's study concluded that the observed network relationships offer partial support for both the hegemonic and counter hegemonic models of Gramscian theory. He concluded that global civil society was in a transitional phase. The concentration of INGO networks in high-income countries support a hegemonic interpretation of global civil society, in contrast the rapidly growing and highly integrated links between activist INGO networks in developing countries support a counter-hegemonic understanding of global civil society (Katz 2006). Global civil society infrastructure has the potential to support a slowly emerging counter-hegemonic global civil society.

Katz's study prompted this question, what should the geographic distribution of global civil society look like based on the prediction of each of the four selected theoretical approaches? For example, do countries active in global governance regimes indeed have a stronger global civil society presence than more politically isolated countries? To test each approach the current study expanded the definition of global civil society beyond activist INGOs, as well as gathered data over time.

Boli and Thomas's 1999 study, employed both longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis to explore the relationship between globalization and INGO proliferation. However, they reversed the direction of the causality between INGOs and globalization (Boli and Thomas 1999). Instead of assuming that globalization created an environment conducive to global civil society expansion, Boli and Thomas hypothesize that global civil society created the indispensable environment for the dissemination of shared

values, norms, and practices, commonly referred to as globalization. Boli and Thomas confirmed their hypothesis about global civil society's ability to disseminate the shared values essential to international cooperation by identifying significant INGO growth across the globe especially in the developing world (Boli and Thomas 1999).

Their findings support a more constructivist explanation of global civil society growth. Global civil society is the conduit for developing, establishing, adapting, and disseminating values, principles, standards, and norms that form the foundation for international cooperation (Boli and Thomas 1999). The authors developed World Polity Theory, which considers INGOs as the physical manifestation of an emerging and consolidating world culture (Boli and Thomas 1999).

Helmut Anheier, a prominent civil society scholar, has focused on the challenges of defining and measuring civil society at both the national and global level. In a 2007 article Anheier observed that when we draw the conceptual boundaries of global civil society based on normative assumptions, we limit the field's ability to conduct unbiased empirical research (Anheier 2007).

“At issue here is the basic distinction between global civil society as some form of normative ideal ... and global civil society as an empirical phenomenon that can be studied using competing and evolving definitions and approaches...” (Anheier 2007, 13).

In a 2009 study, Anheier posed the question “What kind of Nonprofit Sector, What kind of society?” He observes three trends in civil society engagement: nonprofits as service providers, nonprofits and social capital, and social accountability (Anheier 2009). Similarly to Boli and Thomas, Anheier theorizes that the nonprofit sector and

society are in a mutually constructive relationship. Anheier's research supports the current study's inclusive definition of global civil society, as well as the idea of concurrent testing of four competing explanations of its growth.

The Johns Hopkins Center for Global Civil Society's *Comparative Nonprofits Sector Project* investigates national level data using a consistent methodology, which allows for broad-based comparison between diverse countries. A 2004 book, Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, released the findings of a cross-sectional comparison of 36 national studies. The intention of the Johns Hopkins' study was to determine how the national environment influences the operational structure of the nonprofit sector. The most striking cross-national similarity identified, by the 2004 study, was that nonprofit sectors are major economic forces in almost every country. Nonprofits meaningfully contribute to the gross domestic product by employing a substantial number of people and leveraging volunteer resources (Salamon and Sokolowski 2004).

Despite these similarities, the structure and activities of nonprofit organizations varied greatly across countries. Nonprofits in developed countries relied more heavily on volunteer labor, whereas nonprofits in developing countries tended to use more paid staff. Nonprofit organizations engage in a wide variety of activities, including providing social services, supporting art and culture, and advocating for public policy. The nature of the relationship between the nonprofit sector and the government determined which activities dominated in a particular country. For example, nonprofit sectors that relied heavily on government funding engaged in far less political activism (Salamon and Sokolowski 2004).

Another study from the Center for Global Civil Society by Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier tested five theories regarding the connections between social demographics, trust in government, and public goods provision on the size and composition of nonprofit sectors in seven industrialized countries. Their study concluded that none of the five theories, individually, could adequately account for the variation in the nonprofit sectors across the countries. However, the government failure/market failure theory demonstrated the best predictive ability. The authors acknowledged that the limited numbers of observations could have contributed to the lack of results (Salamon and Anheier 1998). The research of the Johns Hopkins Center for Global Civil Society provided further support for investigating the effect of social, political, and economic forces on global civil society. Instead of comparing national nonprofit sectors, the current study looks at the influences of governance and the market globally, expanding both the scope and scale of the Salamon and Anheier study.

The 2005 study by Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest influenced the method of analysis for the present study by using panel regression to explore the geographic distribution of transnational social movement organizations. Smith and Wiest found that countries with strong democratic traditions and high levels of integration into global governance regimes were better represented in transnational social movements. However, they found little support for the influence of economic integration on participation in transnational social movements (Smith and Wiest 2005). The current study tests several of the same theories: democratization, political integration, and economic integration, but differs from the work of Smith and Wiest by using a more generalizable sample of global civil society organizations and a longer research period.

A 2010 study conducted by Teadong Lee shares numerous similarities with the present study. His research compared the explanatory powers of the top-down (influenced by external actors) and the bottom-up (internally motivated) perspectives of globalization on the increase in the number of INGOs. Lee's study looked at 126 countries, using an eight-year panel regression of the number of INGOs. He found evidence to support both interpretations of globalization.

Lee's study found that a fusion of the top-down and bottom-up approaches explain the proliferation of INGOs better than either approach separately. In addition, Lee found that political globalization has a larger impact on the number of INGOs than economic globalization. Consequently, countries with democratic governments and high levels of political integration have the most active civil society, while economic integration, as measured by trade and a country's reliance on official development assistance (ODA), had little influence (Lee 2010).

The present study differs from Lee's work substantively as well as technically. Substantively, it approaches the question of global civil society growth by assessing a country's position in the international political arena and the global economy. It tests four distinct theories of political and economic globalization instead of differentiating between globalization from above and globalization from below. The other major substantive difference is the conceptualization of social, political, and economic pressures as truly global forces and not an issue of national adaptation.

Technically, the current study expands the scope and scale of Lee's research by using a 28-year time span, thereby capturing the impacts of globally significant events

such as the transition of former Soviet and Yugoslav states and the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals. In addition, it gathered data on 60 more countries allowing for the comparison of the disparate impact of political and economic globalization in developing countries and those already developed.

METHODOLOGY- DATA SELECTION

Research on INGOs and the global civil society they inhabit is fraught with ambiguities and assumptions. There is little agreement about what makes an organization “nongovernmental” and even less consensus about what makes their actions “civil”. Scholars often use value-laden terminology and supportive theories to highlighting some organizations while excluding others. As a result of these biases, scholars claiming to study the same phenomenon end up selecting samples from profoundly different populations. This lack of common ground has limited global-scale analysis and frustrated the sharing of scholarship across disciplines.

If we limit our discussion of civil society only to those organizations we consider to be “civilized” or those that conform to some predetermined normative value, then it is easy to overlook a broad spectrum of collective action. This oversight could encourage scholars to champion civil society without fully appreciating all of its ramifications (Amoore and Langley 2004). The present study contributes to the establishment of a common ground by testing the theories underlying many of the normative assumptions employed by the various disciplines.

The current study uses an inclusive definition for global civil society and broadly identifies an INGO as a not-for-profit voluntary citizen group that operates in at least two

countries in order address issues in support of the public good (UIA 2012; UN 1945).

This definition establishes a consistent unit of measurement free from national variances in nonprofit certifications.

The use of such a broad definition has its strengths and weaknesses. A strength is that the sample selected contains a diverse assortment of INGOs including Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the World Chess Federation, the Catholic Church, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, and the International Dance Organization. This diversity makes it possible to test the generalizability of the four competing explanations. However, this inclusive definition sacrifices some detail to gain generalizability – it is unlikely that all the types of INGOs presented above will respond to globalization in the same way. A weakness is that this definition produces a bias toward formal organizations, or those organizations that have a legal presence. Such organizations are more likely to report their information to the UIA. However, this weakness is not too harmful. Since the purpose of the current study is to analyze civil society on a global scale, a bias in favor of organization with the resource to act at the global level contributes to the validity of the research.

The INGO count for all three models comes from annual censuses conducted by the UIA, which has been compiling and disseminating information on international organizations since 1907. Each year the UIA compiles and edits self-reported organization descriptions. The average response rate is 35%, ensuring highly reliable data. Information from websites, annual reports, and newsletters supplement the organization descriptions. (Union of International Associations 2012) This vast collection of information is published in the Yearbook of International Organizations.

UIA tracks INGO activity in 354 countries, territories, and disputed regions. To insure consistency in measurement the number of countries was reduced to 195. As a result of pairwise grouping 122 countries are included in the regression models. The vast majority of territories and disputed regions (212) were omitted. Another twenty countries were excluded due to a lack of data on all salient variables¹. Geopolitical shifts during this timeframe have caused several countries either come into existence or cease to exist, resulting in substantive missing data in certain years.²

In addition to providing the data for the dependent variable, the UIA also provides the data for the independent variable -number of IGOs (Union of International Associations 2012). Data for treaties signed came from the United Nations Treaty Collection (United Nations 2013). The data for all other independent variables came from the World Bank's Global Economic Indicators.

The collection of data for both the dependent and descriptive variables is inherently biased against lower income countries. National wealth dictates the data available; less developed countries have fewer resources to devote to curating and

¹ Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Curacao, Faeroe Islands, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Korea DPR, Marshall Islands, Mayotte, Monaco, Palau, San Marino, Sao Tome – Principe, St. Martin, Timor-Leste, Turks-Caicos, Tuvalu, Virgin Islands

² German Reunification in 1990, the data for the German DR covers only 1983-1990, while data coded as Germany includes data from the former FRG. The Union of Soviet Socialists Republics dissolves in 1991 creating 15 new countries: Belarus (semi-autonomous status data year 83-11) (data years 92-11) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia data includes prior to 1992 USSR, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. In 1991 Yugoslavia (data years 1983-2007) descended into warfare, several new nations finally emerged. Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia have data covering the years of 1992-2001. Bosnia-Herzegovina has data from 1993-2011. Montenegro has data from 2003-2006 as reported as Serbia-Montenegro and 2006-2011 as just Montenegro. Kosovo has data covering the years of 2009-2011. Serbia has spotty data, but covers the years of 92-98 and 2003-2011. In 1993 Czechoslovakia (data years 83-93) separated into two countries: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

reporting of national data. In addition, GDP has a significant impact on how the data interrelates. GDP is correlated to several other descriptive variables, but not to an extent that it jeopardizes the quality of the analysis. A regression pre-test identified that GDP alone, could explain 95% of the variation in global civil society geographic distribution. The current study corrects for the bias in the data by formulating three models based on national wealth. These three models allow for concurrent testing of the theories, while providing the ability to compare results across income levels without the added complication of interactive variables.

The dataset initially collected 5385 country-year observations of the dependent variable. The dataset produces unbalanced panels. The use of pairwise groupings preserves the most information, yet some observations are excluded from the models. The first model is the inclusive model (INC), which analyzed 2761 country-year observations regardless of income level. This model includes the most diverse sample of countries the data will allow. This model includes wealthy countries and poor countries, urbanized countries and rural countries, engaged countries and isolated countries, yet these dissimilar countries all participate in global civil society to one degree or another.

The second model focuses on wealthy developed countries. The high income country model (HIC) includes countries classified annually as either high income or upper middle income countries by the World Bank. This model analyzed 1402 country-year observations.

The third model concentrates on lower income developing countries. The low income country model (LIC) includes countries designated annually as middle income,

low middle income, low income, and least developed countries by the World Bank. The LIC analyzed 2255 country-year observations.

Some countries moved between income categories. The movement of countries between categories is the result of economic changes in each country as well as a shift in the Atlas gross national income (GNI) levels used by the World Bank in a given year. These three models will allow for concurrent testing of the theories, while providing the ability to compare results across income levels. The purpose of these income-specific models is to determine if these global factors have a similar effect on countries at different stages of economic development.

For the sake of clarity, this study represents the INGO count as a whole number and not a ratio, normalized by population. It controls for the effects of population by including it as a descriptive variable in every model. Population is statistically significant in all three models. A 1% increase in population produces a 17% increase in INGOs in the inclusive model, a 9% increase in the high income country model, and a 17% increase in the low income country model.

METHODOLOGY – METHOD OF ANALYSIS

This study uses a 29-year panel regression of 122 countries to identify relationships between economic, political, and technological characteristics for each country and the number of the INGOs active in each country. This method of analysis is useful since it allows for the exploration of the relationship between the growth in the number of INGOs and the specific globalization measures, not only across time but also cross-nationally. The 29-year timeframe allows for adequate observation of longitudinal

changes and includes the two most recent growth spikes in 1992 and at the turn of the twenty-first century.

Panel data analysis relies on several assumptions regarding error terms to ensure reliability. The first is a constant error variance of error terms. In other words the predicted value of the explanatory variable is not linked to the predicted errors; the errors do not increase or decrease together. Secondly, there is no serial correlation. In other words, the error in one country-year observation is not influenced by the error in previous observations. Thirdly, there is no spatial correlation. That means the error terms in one country vary independently from errors in every other country in the current study. When the data violate these assumptions, the analysis can predict false positive relationships (Beck and Katz 1995). To summarize panel data analysis assumes that observations are independent.

International relations datasets do not easily meet these assumptions. Large scale, long term, fixed unit datasets, such as the one used in the current study, tend to violate these assumptions. First, these studies frequently observe durable phenomena. INGOs tend to have a life span longer than one year; as a result the number of INGOs in a country in any one year will be similar to the number of INGOs in that country in subsequent years, regardless of global influences. Secondly, countries are neither truly independent nor unique. Any study of globalization rests on the assumption that nations interact and influence one another. Whether connected by a common language, religion, trade relations, political alliances, or geographic proximity, it is reasonable to expect country cohorts to respond to globalization in similar ways.

The current study uses a panel corrected standard errors regression to correct for the inherent incompatibilities between the data and regular panel regression analysis. Developed by Beck and Katz, the process generates standardized errors “so the variance and covariance of the errors are proportional to the corresponding variance and covariance of the independent variable” (Beck and Katz 1995, 641). The panel corrected standard errors method produces more reliable results without sacrificing observations to lagged data or robust regressions (Johnson 2004).

This analysis is not trying to assess the outcome of a specific intervention, but to identify general relationships between the descriptive variables and the dependent variable (number of INGOs). As a result, random effects analysis was used in the research, allowing the models to reflect the full variance in the dependent variable based on the influence of each descriptive variable.

This study also must address the issue of error correlation. Globalization is a complex and interconnected process. As a result, many of the measures used to quantify its influence are also related. National income, as measured by GDP per capita, is correlated with other explanatory variables such as social development, technology, and urbanization. (See Appendix) Correlation increases the likelihood of false negative results by siphoning off some of the explanatory power of related variables. Since the literature anticipates a strong relationship between national wealth and size of global civil society, as measured by the number of INGOs, it is essential to include GDP per capita in all three regression models. The inclusion of GDP per capita increases the confidence in the statistically significant identified relationships. In other words, if the analysis

discovers a relationship between technology and INGO growth, that relationship must therefore be robust to overcome the explanatory power of income.

The time span covered by this study contains several historical events of global significance, such as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia; as well as the adoption and pursuit of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals. The literature predicts that these events influenced global civil society's development. This study includes year dummy variables to identify year-specific shocks.³

SUMMARY

In conclusion, the diverse field of global civil society studies benefits from the rigorous testing of the assumptions behind the prevailing explanations for global civil society expansion. The analysis presented here is a step toward establishing common ground by providing a foundation for increased collaboration and coordination across the varied disciplines. Panel regression analysis provides the best tool for testing these hypothesized relationships. This study developed three models to control for the overarching influence of national wealth on global civil society expansion to ensure that developed country trends did not overshadow changes in developing countries. The results presented in the following chapters support for the accretions that democratic

³ The following year is significant in all three models – 1992. This year is also substantively significant since it marks the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This small decrease is likely the result of changes in number of countries with data as opposed to a meaningful change in the distribution of global civil society for that year.

The following years are significant in the inclusive model – 1986, 2009-2010. The small decrease in 1986 is also seen in figure 1 indicating that it is likely a sampling anomaly, since no substantive event occurred that year to justify another interpretation. The small increase observed in 2009-2010 does have a possible substantive explanation. These years mark the beginning of the “great recession;” global civil society could have been mobilizing to meet the increased demands of this economic downturn.

governance, political integration, and national capacity promote global civil society growth, as measured by the number of INGOs. However, the results offer less support for a strong relationship between political integration and global civil society expansion. The full model results are reported in the appendix.

CHAPTER THREE – Global Civil Society and Democracy

The United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF) was established in 2005 to fund civil society organizations providing democratic training in emerging democracies (United Nations 2005). What better place to support a democratic transition than Myanmar? After decades of military rule, in 2011 Myanmar took its first tentative steps toward democracy. One of the first civil society efforts to teach political skills was Debate Education for Democracy. Debate Education for Democracy believes that learning how to debate would allow youth to develop their critical thinking skills and encourage them to stand up for their rights. This project has conducted training sessions in six regions of Myanmar and created a public space for the sharing and discussion of ideas (United Nations 2015). A documentary clip highlighting the work of Debate Education for Democracy illustrated the impact of even this small program. A recent debate competition brought together more than 130 youth and was attended by hundreds of spectators. One of the program's trainers and first time voter stated that his work with Debate Education for Democracy gave him hope for democracy in Myanmar (United Nations Democracy Fund 2015).

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: LITERATURE REVIEW

Global civil society traces its origins back to the Greeks and Romans. Classically, civil society and the state were inseparable. Civil society was how man escaped savagery by organizing political, economic, and social life into a unified whole.

“There is then in all persons a natural impetus to associate with each other in this manner, and he who first founded civil society was the cause of the greatest good” (Aristotle 1921, Politics: Book 1 Ch II, 295).

Enlightenment scholars refined the concept of civil society by introducing the idea of the social contract. Citizens can voluntarily choose to participate in civil society. For Locke and Rousseau civil society was a contractually produced and politically guaranteed instrument empowering people to attain security cooperatively and protect public property.

“The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their property” (Locke 1980 [1690], VIII:95).

It was not until the 19th century that scholars theorized a more distant relationship between the state and civil society. The American and French revolution redefined citizenship, changing the relationship of the governed to government. Citizens claimed the right to participate actively in governing. Civil society became a sphere of intermediate associations that intercedes between the individual and the state.

“The people, instructed in their true interests, would understand that to profit from society’s benefits, one must submit to its burdens. The free association of individuals could then replace the individual power of nobles, and the state would be sheltered from both tyranny and license” (de Tocqueville 2000 [1835], Volume I Introduction 9).

These mediating groups served as training grounds for governing skill and as a conduit for the formulation and expression of political preferences (Ehrenberg 1999, Elliott 2003, de Tocqueville 2000 [1835], Madison 1787).

To understand the contemporary uses of the term global civil society fully, we must also address the concept of pluralism. Pluralism assumes that groups are the principle units of political life. Pluralism offers an alternative to leadership by elites,

theorizing that to understand politics you must examine the collective actions and preferences of groups (Truman 1951, Meyer and Lupo 2007).

“Pluralism’s central project was explaining how private interests can be organized and expressed without the destabilizing politics of social class. Private desires ... are “aggregated” by interest groups, voluntary associations, political parties, and parliaments and represented to appropriate governmental elites for adjudication and compromise. Intermediate bodies and overlapping forms of membership become a defining quality of modernization as intellectuals proclaimed the end of ideology and explained how citizens’ apathy could enable elites to lead mass societies in conditions of social reform and political stability. A consumer society without historic parallel was taking shape in the United States, and pluralism helped lower the temperature as it demonstrated how nonpolitical interests could serve social integration” (Ehrenberg 1999, 200).

The relationship between global civil society and democracy is reciprocal. To flourish civil society requires at least basic associational freedom provided by democratic governance. In return, democracy becomes more robust through the active participation of citizens facilitated by civil society. Democracy has become the gold standard for good governance. Failure to embrace this global norm can result in sanctions by or even exclusion from the wider international community (Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008). A robust global civil society can encourage the formation and enhance the stability of democratic governance at both the national as well as the transnational level. “...Chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations” (Lipset 1981, 77).

What is democracy exactly? At its most basic, democracy is government ruled by the people in pursuit of the public good. This definition contains several contested concepts: direct rule and public good. First, direct rule by the people is easier to imagine than to implement. Secondly, what constitutes the public good is open to interpretation. For the sake of observational consistency, scholars have simplified the idea of democracy

to include, at the bare minimum, the people's ability to express their approval or disapproval of the actions of government through competitive elections (Schumpeter 1942).

At the heart of democracy is the idea that the governed participate freely, openly, and as equals in the selection of government officials. Robert Dahl in his classic work identified the following three necessary conditions for democracy: first, that the governed be able to form preferences; second, that the governed be able to signify these preferences both individually and collectively; and third, that these preferences carry equal influence in the process of governing. To this end, Dahl further identified the freedom to found and join organizations as one of the eight guarantees for democratic institutions (Dahl 1971). Civil society organizations facilitate the process of preference formulation and expression, thereby enabling government to respond to these demands. (Carroll and Carroll 2004).

Civil society activities are not limited to the confines of the nation-state, but transcend political boundaries promoting political participation at the national, as well as transnational, level. Recognizing political engagement beyond national boundaries, requires a conceptualization of democracy outside the confines of the nation-state.

Globalization is altering the characterizations of democracy and national sovereignty. National communities no longer make decisions and policy in isolation, nor do national policy decisions affect only those living within that country's borders. For example, the decision to increase interest rates to counter inflation may seem to be only a domestic policy; however, due to the interconnectedness of the financial network, such a

decision has economic ramifications in other countries. “The possibility of democracy today must be, in short, linked to an expanding framework of democratic states and agencies” (Held 1995, 106). The cosmopolitan definition of democracy relies on the principle of autonomy not citizenship.

“Persons should enjoy equal rights and accordingly equal obligations in the specification of the political framework ... of deliberation about the conditions of their own lives and in the determination of these conditions, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others” (Held 2006, 264).

The principle of autonomy achieves its full potential through the “double democratization” of both the state and civil society (Held 2006, 276). Both spheres of public life must work cooperatively to ensure open participation in public discourse. In addition, both spheres must insure transparency in their actions to curb potential excesses. Removing democracy from the confines of the state raises accountability questions. Global civil society has been suggested as a way to ease democracy’s transition beyond the nation-state borders (Miszlivetz and Jensen 2013).

Democratic values and institutions spread rapidly following the end of World War II. In 1946, there were approximately twenty democratic nations; by 2010, there were nearly 100 (Center for Systemic Peace 2014). Huntington’s influential work identifies three distinct waves of democratization between 1828 and the late 1980s. These waves marked sea changes in the global political environment, facilitating the formation and stabilization of democratic governments (Huntington 1991).

Scholars have expanded on Huntington’s work to include the tidal wave of democratization that accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the rippling

effects of the Arab Spring (Glasius 2012, Glasius and Players 2013). Regardless of where you draw the dates, the key premise remains unchanged. Both internal and external factors affect a country's ability to achieve and maintain democratic governance (Doorenspleet 2000).

According to this research, specific structural conditions make the adoption of democratic principles more likely. These conditions include the following: an industrialized economy, freedom of association, high levels of literacy, urbanization, and relative economic equality (Huntington 1991, Przeworski 2004, Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008). The regional and global political climates can facilitate or impede a country's realization of its democratic potential. Regionally, the level of political and social stability, as well as democratic governance of neighboring countries, impacts the democratizing progress (Doorenspleet and Kopecky 2008). Globally, wars and decolonization can impose democratization on a country (Huntington 1991). The current study investigates how global civil society mediates between internal democratic potential and the international political climate.

During the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, civil society plays a pivotal role. Civil society is a necessary, yet insufficient, condition for the transition from authoritarian to democratic governing.

“A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages of the democratic process, therefore, a lively and independent civil society is invaluable” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 9).

Global civil society empowers people to test the boundaries established by governments and reclaim the public space. Global civil society leverages moral authority, earned by their consistent opposition to the authoritarian regime, to foster openness and resist backsliding (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

What can be learned from the most recent “fourth” wave of democratic transitions about the democratizing potential of global civil society? Based on a review of Eastern European dissidents’ writings, Glasius identifies three attributes of civil society that enabled it to facilitate the transition process: solidarity, transparency, and pluralism. Solidarity manifests as a sense of shared identity or shared grievances. Global civil society provides the venue for people to connect based on shared views and policy preferences regardless of ethnicity or religious distinctions. Transparency, in the words of Vaclav Havel, is about “live[ing] in the truth”, (Glasius 2012, 350) in other words, emphasizes civil society’s ability to make the actions of government and society open to evaluation. Civil society distributes information to an ever-widening circle of stakeholders (Glasius 2012).

In the aftermath of World War II, victorious nations led by the United States set about establishing the institutional framework for a new world order. These new international institutions were empowered to counteract the nationalistic excesses and secretive alliances that precipitated both world wars. Democracy gained prominence as the preferred mode of governing not because it insures perfect agreement on diverse values, but because it offers the best framework for evaluating competing values through an open public process (Held 2006, 261).

These international institutions embedded full employment and free markets as principles of democratic governance and national sovereignty (Ruggie 1983, Bernstein 2007). Global civil society performs a necessary function in the spread of democracy by facilitating the creation, dissemination, implementation, and monitoring of these embedded liberal principles. Global civil society brings together like-minded individuals across national boundaries to engage in the global governance process through advocacy campaigns and participation in forums and conferences (Boli and Thomas 1999, Ruggie 1983).

To understand the impact of democratization on global civil society fully, we first review the foundational literature addressing political opportunity structure. This literature contends that collective action occurs in relation to the opportunities and constraints imposed by the prevailing political environment. Global civil society does not develop in a vacuum; instead, it is the creation of specific combinations of historical context and political environment (McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). When new access points for engagement emerge, previously marginalized groups work to capitalize on these opportunities to contest the policy process (Tilly 1978). State structures create stable opportunities for collective action by increasing access points for policy discussions, reducing information costs, and routinizing changes in leadership (McAdams, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).

State institutions and actions intentionally, as well as unintentionally, influence the formation of groups (Skocpol 1983). “Movements may largely be born of environmental opportunity, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own action” (McAdams, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 15). Global civil society seeks to develop a

repertoire of tactics to capitalize on political opportunity, as well as reduce the barriers to collective action. Olson observes that collective action is rarer and more uneven than the pluralism theory supposes. Olson offers an alternative to the “orthodox theory of pressure groups” based on the work of scholars such as Bentley, Truman, and Latham. According to these scholars,

“Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single individuals are expected to act on behalf of their personal interests” (Olson 1965, 1).

Pluralists believe the collective action occurred spontaneously in response to a policy change or the actions of a competing pressure group. Olson argues that collective action is a calculated decision. Members evaluate the costs and benefits of potential outcomes before acting (Olson 1965). Olson’s research suggests that collective action can be motivated by either coercion or selectively applied incentives, and not solely the traditional idea of solidarity or shared interests (Olson 1965).

Ostrom expands on Olson’s work by looking at not only the mechanisms which promote collective action, but also the institutions that establish the rules of the game. She concludes that selective incentives can encourage collective action, just as Olson theorized. However, that is only part of the story; institutions have a more fundamental influence over how the game is played and not just who joins which team (Ostrom 1990).

Social capital scholars offer a different explanation for collective action. They see collective action as motivated by a sense of solidarity and the build-up of trust. Social capital scholars such as Robert Putnam expanded on DeTocqueville’s work, theorizing that the trust garnered through collective actions transfers to the larger society (Brewer

2003, Putnam 2000). The question at the heart of this argument is the degree to which thick trust, the trust generated through regular close interaction within close-knit communities, transfers into thin trust, a weakened sense of solidarity associated with larger diverse communities (Newton 1997).

In Fukuyama's, book *Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. He explores the influence of social solidarity and trust on a society's ability to work toward the common good. Fukuyama disagrees with Olson's reliance on incentives, maintaining that groups organized around narrow economic interest, such as those discussed by Olson, could inhibit the development of trust. Members of these groups will put their individual benefits, derived from free riding, ahead of the interests of the group as a whole. However, when collective action is motivated by a blend of shared economic interests and social solidarity, it can be the catalyst for promoting prosperity and change (Fukuyama 1995).

Engaging in voluntary organization is not a universal practice; most of this collective action occurs among middle and upper class individuals, raising doubt about the inclusiveness of global civil society (Newton 1997). An additional study discovered that a direct relationship between social capital and democracy was hard to quantify because most investigations focus on the individual level. However, if social capital is aggregated up to the national level, scholars identify a more robust relationship between generalized trust and political trust as well as a correlation with the level of satisfaction with democracy (Zmerli and Newton 2008).

A prerequisite of the present study is to justify the extension of these predominantly national theories and structures to the international or transnational level.

“[T]he democratic procedure no longer draws its legitimizing force only, indeed not even predominantly, from political participation and the expression of political will, but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative process” (Habermas 2001, 110).

Habermas theorizes that global civil society is a discursive public sphere. It is within this “marketplace of ideas” where intermediate associations vie to influence policy process. Some scholars contend that intermediate associations lose meaning when divorced from a national setting (Bartelson 2006). Bartelson offers an overly restricted interpretation of de Tocqueville’s observations; interpreting de Tocqueville’s theory outside of a national context does not change its substance only its scale. Many scholars recognize that in response to the pervasiveness of international governance, collective action must engage at the international level, yet the inspiration and support for action may remain rooted in local and national concerns (Kaldor 2003, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow 2006).

The idea of political opportunities easily translates across boundaries of domestic political structures. What is the overall political environment available to global civil society actors? The international political system is a dense network of social and power relationships creating structural inequalities and injustices that favor insiders over outsiders. When the target of global civil society has a global focus, it is only reasonable to investigate that collective action from a global perspective.

The literature alludes to a reciprocal relationship between democracy and global civil society. In the previous section, the present study discussed the effects of democracy

on global civil society development. The next section of the literature review will look at civil society' ability to promote and sustain democratic transitions. Scholars have theorized that civil society can educate stakeholders about policy issues and empower them to express these policy preferences. Researchers have identified numerous specific tasks performed by global civil society that enables it to foster and enhance democratic governance on the national, as well as international level.

Nationally, civil society is a vital agent of political socialization, encouraging citizens to understand better and utilize the tools of citizenship.

- Global civil society can promote political rights and facilitate political participation through active engagement at all levels of the political process (Omelycheva 2009).
- Global civil society multiplies the access points to the global political system by providing information and resources to political actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Omelycheva 2009, J. Smith 1998).
- Global civil society can contribute to social welfare by raising concern and awareness of economic injustices, socio-economic inequality, and environmental damage (Omelycheva 2009, J. Smith 1998).
- Global civil society can promote peace, tolerance, and democracy by cultivating and transmitting global cultural norms, thereby transforming public consciousness (Boli and Thomas 1999, Omelycheva 2009).

Globally civil society is uniquely positioned to enhance and deepen a cosmopolitan interpretation of democracy. Since global governance lacks the formal mechanisms of citizenship, such as voting, global civil society organizations provide a venue for expressing support or disapproval of public policies. However, "if organized [global] civil society is to serve as a bridge between decisions-makers and the global

citizenry, it must provide organizational plurality representing diverse and balanced interests” (Piewitt 2010, 468). To provide this bridge:

- Global civil society increases the number of access points to the policy process through demands for inclusion in international conferences and the creation of “shadow” conferences when access is denied (Chandhoke 2009, J. Clark 2010, Clark, Friedman and Hochstelter 1998, Fung and Wright 2001, J. Smith 1998).
- Global civil society institutionalizes participation through training and sustain social movements (Fung and Wright 2001, Baiocchi 2001).
- Global civil society facilitates the translation of policy preferences into policy proposals, which then must vie for legitimacy and support (Fung and Wright 2001).
- Global civil society creates an intermediate level of sub-elites, which help balance power between the people and established elites (Sorensen and Torfing 2005).
- Global civil society improves the problem solving and decision making capacity of governing institutions by increasing bottom-up participation (Sorensen and Torfing 2005).
- Global civil society establishes bridges of communication and understanding within a diverse network of political actors (Sorensen and Torfing 2005).
- Global civil society increases governmental accountability by monitoring elections, political parties, government officials, and fellow global civil society organizations (Chandhoke 2009).

Global Civil Society can not guarantee democratic outcomes. Even when civil society functions according to deTocqueville predictions, associational freedom can result in less than progressive results. For example, Weimar Germany had a vigorous associational life, but rather than reducing social cleavages, these organizations increased fragmentation, weakening fledgling democratic institutions (Berman 1997).

For this reason, global civil society is insufficient to insure democracy. One possible deficiency of global civil society organizations, particularly large complex organizations, is that they can place organizational survival ahead of the best interests of the constituents they claim to represent. Global civil society has been “promoted as the vehicle by which democratic and humanitarian values, human rights, ecological sustainability, economic development, gender and labor divisions, and various other concerns will be addressed and remedied” (Bowden 2006, 157).

Not all scholars are convinced that the democratizing powers of civil society can translate from national to the transnational level. Bowden identifies a problem with internationalizing civil society – a vibrant civil society results from the interaction among all three spheres, civil society, political and economic. Key features of these spheres are lacking at the transnational level most glaringly the lack of a transnational equivalent to the rule of law. Bowden states that, “a global civil society that is free to operate without regulatory restrictions – as provided by the state at the domestic level – may be prone to doing more harm than good” (Bowden 2006, 157). Bowden does not encourage the dismissal of global civil society’s ability to increase participation in global governance issues; rather he offers a cautionary tale that global civil society should not be exempt from criticism or oversight.

Armstrong offers a more optimistic assessment of global civil society’s ability to enhance democratic rule. “... Civil society at the global level is ethically superior to its seedbeds, at the national level, for global civil society overcomes the exclusionary tendencies of Westphalian citizenship” (Armstrong 2006, 351). Global civil society has yet to realize its full potential to cultivate global democratic egalitarianism. It still faces

barriers in the spread of universal human rights and universal human responsibility across the globe. Furthermore, global civil society has not been able to transcend traditional power relationships between countries and multinational corporations (Armstrong 2006).

Case study research confirms that global civil society is a necessary, yet insufficient contributing factor in the democratization process. The success or failure of global civil society to live up to the theories has met with varying results. Global civil society has increased accountability and transparency, promoted civility in public discourse, educated the electorate, and supported the rule of law, but is insufficient to bring about democratic governance on its own (Carroll and Carroll 2004). Frequently global civil society fills the role of critic, calling attention to the deficiencies in international negotiations, international laws, and transnational economic activities. It still lacks the capacity to implement alternative public policy without the cooperation of nation-states (Falk 1995).

A nascent civil society frequently exists before democratization begins. The factors that influence the evolution of civil society are political, social, and economic. Several political factors shaping the outcome of civil society include the degree to which the state is supportive, repressive, or ambivalent toward civic groups, basic legal and political rights are afforded to citizens, and the rule of law has developed (Nord 2000).

Social factors influencing the development of civil society include the effect of the religious community and the autonomy of universities. Religion plays a significant role in the evolution of civil society. Religious organizations can be a catalyst for social engagement. However, religious cleavages can also diminish the actualization of a robust

civil society by emphasizing in-group solidarity. Autonomous universities provide the perfect venue for the civic engagement by educating citizens in critical thinking and promoting spirited discourse (Nord 2000).

Economic factors also influence the development of modern civil society; urbanization tends to contribute to the development of the civil society. As the community differentiates along economic lines, the political and social concerns of farmers and workers diverge. Economic booms tend to promote growth of civil society as people, freed from survival considerations, engage in other aspects of civil and political life (Nord 2000).

Pivotal factors such as war and revolution can change the relationship of people to their governments, with mixed results for civil society. They can open the door for increased civil society activity or provide the incentive for governments to repress social activism (Nord 2000).

Scholars have observed the effect of these factors on global civil society's ability to promote and sustain democratic transitions in Africa, Asia, Central Europe, and South America. To varying degrees, these scholars find that while civil society promotes participation, entrenched political institutions and existing power relationships can limit its overall impact (McNulty 2012).

In a comparative study of Southeast Asian countries, Loh observed that global civil society promotes political participation. His study further concluded that increased political participation has long lasting effects on the overall political environment. The global civil society movements in Southeast Asia brought about changes in government

infrastructure ranging from an increased recognition of civil and political rights to the creation of formal institutions such as constitutions and the rule of law.

However, a change in infrastructure does not necessarily result in a change in existing power relationship. Entrenched leaders can remain in place, leaving new institutions vulnerable to cooptation or corruption (Loh 2008, 135). Loh (2008) found that alterations in citizen's expectations of involvement in government showed the most durability. He observed that even when formal political channels are blocked, civil society groups remain active in the "extra-electoral realm of everyday politics. " NGOs can create an alternative political dialogue by linking diverse groups: political parties, unions, religious organizations, and ethnic groups in a collective public space" (Loh 2008, 136).

Another study from Southeast Asia found similarly positive results. "Civil society activism contributes substantially to increasing transparency, building the legal infrastructure for democracy, and providing voice and advocacy in support of reform" (Antlov, Brinkerhoff and Rapp 2010, 435). However, both societal and organizational factors moderate civil society's capacity for change. On the societal level the political environment, social norms and values, socio-economic conditions, and the legal and regulatory framework affect the ability of social movements to produce substantive change. Organizationally, a lack of leadership, resources, network linkages, and organizational capacity can limit the ability of global civil society organizations to boost democratic transitions (Antlov, Brinkerhoff and Rapp 2010).

Studies of South Korea's democratic transition found a similarly positive relationship between a robust civil society and democratization. These studies focus on global civil society's role as a carrier of civic culture. According to Kim (2000), civil society provides citizens with access to political training, information, opportunities, linkages to other organizations, and resources thereby enabling them, to consolidate democratic transition.

Koo (2002) elaborated on Kim's research by identifying key historical factors, which contributed to the Korean people's readiness to embrace civil society. The 1987 democratic transition finally provided the Korean people with the resources and the opportunity to restructure state power according to their national ideals and values. A history of colonization and occupation resulted in a tradition of strong central government, but it also brought about a strong and highly politicized society. Because outside forces wielded state power for most of Korea's history, a clear separation between state and society formed. The Korean people also developed a strong sense of national identity, providing a foundation for civil society. Koo further credits the ability of Korean civil society to consolidate the 1987 democratic transition to the support received from global civil society. Korean civil society drew organizational and ideological support from its links to global civil society organizations (Koo 2002).

Still other scholars have observed less encouraging results for global civil society's democratization efforts. Success is not guaranteed, and much depends on the democratic nature of the organizations that make up global civil society (Omelicheva 2009). Ndegwa (1996) observed in a case study of Kenyan civil society that while civil society has the potential to advance democratization, nothing insures that global civil

society organizations operate according to democratic traditions, most significantly the willingness of global civil society leadership to pursue a democratizing agenda. He observed that some organizations find it easier to accomplish their mission by cooperating with the national government, even when the government is repressive (Ndegwa 1996).

DeZeeuw (2005) also offered limited view of global civil society's ability to promote a democratic transition. He found that post conflict states face a particularly difficult transition. While donor funded training offered by global civil society organizations seems to embolden the initial transition, their effects diminish rapidly and become largely insignificant in the overall democratization process. Democracy assistance can create organizations capable of facilitating governmental reform, but organizations alone are not enough to assure a stable democratic institution.

The effectiveness of civil society to support a democratic transition, therefore, depends on the political and social environment in which it operates. Civil society can serve as a training ground for increased participation, but it can also perpetuate existing economic and social cleavages, thereby preserving the political status quo (Armony 2004, Foley and Edwards 1996). A strength of civil society organizations is their tendency to function outside the traditional corridors of power. Outsider status allows civil society to utilize a varied repertoire of political engagement, but it can also allow exclusion from the formal policy process (Langohr 2004).

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: HYPOTHESES

To reiterate, the relationship between global civil society and democracy is a symbiotic one. Global civil society cannot reach its full potential without a minimal level of political autonomy and political freedoms, best realized in a democracy. Nor can a democracy survive without the active participation of its stakeholders and citizens in the policy process, facilitated by global civil society. The first hypothesis proposes that global civil society needs a modicum of democracy characterized by associational freedom, as well as a basic respect for the rule of law to flourish. The current study expects to find that democratic nations are more active in global civil society, demonstrated by the larger numbers of INGOs within those countries. Democratic nations have more open political opportunity structures, enabling people to exercise their associational rights fully. Authoritarian governments repress civic engagement, thus reducing the associational space in which INGO's operate. As countries open up the political system, civil society has room to flourish.

The current study employs a second model to test for reciprocity in relationship between democracy and global civil society, using the democracy measure as the dependent variable and number of INGOs an independent variable, while keeping all other variables constant. This model tests the hypothesis that countries with large numbers of INGOs will have higher democracy scores on the Polity IV index. Political participation, regularly facilitated by global civil society, is essential for democratic governance. Both global and domestic civil society improves the stability and longevity

of democracy by increasing participation in political life, promoting civic education, aggregating policy preferences, and reducing information and opportunity costs.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: VARIABLES


As discussed earlier, democracy is a complex phenomenon, this study uses the Polity 2 score from the Polity IV index to measure the variation in governing structures for the countries observed. The Polity IV project codes the governing characteristics of nations for the purpose of comparative quantitative analysis. The Polity project has proven its value to researchers over the years, becoming the most widely used resource for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority.

The Polity IV Index measures institutionalized democracy based on three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can effectively express preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and acts of political participation. The polity project defines autocracy as a lack of regularized political competition and political freedoms. Subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score produces a country's polity score ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2013).

Box plots illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the explanatory variables, as well as demonstrate the influence of outlying values. The horizontal line at the center of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the relative extreme values. The individual points identify outlying values.

Descriptive statistics cannot identify the precise direction of causality between democracy and size of global civil society, but they illuminate statistical and substantive differences between democracies and autocracies. Democracies have a wider range for the numbers of INGOs covering (70-4036) compared to a range of (24-1334) for autocracies. In addition, democracies average 1174 INGOs, nearly three times as many INGOs as autocracies (392).

FIGURE 5



Source: Union of International Associations and Center for Systemic Peace

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY: RESULTS

Democratization: As a country becomes more open the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase


H1 - As a country moves from a classification of autocracy to democracy on the Polity IV Index the number of INGOs operating in the country will increase

H2 – As a country increases its participation in global civil society, as measured by the number of INGOs operating in that country, the country's Polity 2 score will move closely to the full democracy score.

The democratic expansion explanation for the growth in global civil society is predicated on the idea that government institutions and policies either encourage or impede associational freedom. Democratic forms of government provide citizens with the means and the reasons to participate in political life. Democratic governments promote freedom of speech and assembly, which make it possible for civil society groups to organize. In addition, democratic governments encourage a myriad of policy proposals, providing citizens with a range of policies to support or oppose.

Authoritarian forms of government profoundly restrict citizens' ability and incentive to participate in political life. Authoritarian regimes either prohibit freedom of speech and association outright or place overwhelming restrictions on the exercise of these rights, effectively preventing their exercise. At the same time, authoritarian regimes severely restrict policy options, rendering political participation moot.


FIGURE 6



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

The current study found that democratic change is both statistically and practically significant in both the INC model and the LIC model. In both models, when a government moves one unit from a strongly authoritarian (-10) to strongly democratic (+10) Polity 2 score the number of INGOs in that country increases by nearly 2%. This finding may seem like a minor change, but when examined in relation to the complex and multifaceted changes that must occur to produce any change in the Polity index, even a small statistical shift is indicative of a larger substantive change in the openness of the political environment. This result is also practically significant, since even a 1 unit change on the Polity 2's 20 point scale is the result of significant and cumulative change in election processes, rule of law, and civic rights. The majority of countries in the current study changed less than 2 units on the Polity 2 scale over the 28 years of this study.

FIGURE 7



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

The democratic expansion explanation does not achieve statistical significance in the HIC model. The lack of statistical significance can be attributed to the nature of the analysis and not failure of the theory. The 1402 country-years in this model show very little variance in the Polity 2 scores. Most of the countries maintain a fully democratic score of 9 or 10 throughout the period covered by the study. Thus, there is little for the Polity 2 score to explain in these countries.

DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE RESULTS


The literature on democratic development indicates that the relationship between democracy and global civil society is a reciprocal one; as a result, it is hard to determine the direction of causality for this relationship. The present study runs a supplemental model to identify the direction of causality between the number of INGOs and a

country's Polity 2 score. These results indicate a .02% increase in the Polity 2 score for every 1% increase in the number of INGOs. Again we find a small change, yet considering the complexity of democratic change even this small change should be considered a substantive contribution.

We also see that treaties signed, GDP per capita, and social development index are also statistically significant predictor of democracy. A one percent change in the number of treaties signed increases the Polity 2 score by .01%. A one percent change in GDP per capita increases the Polity 2 score by .002%; whereas, a one unit increase in the social development index will increase the Polity 2 score by .90 scale units. These results support the reciprocal relationship between civil society and democracy since treaties signed, and GDP are also statistically significant for global civil society growth.

One variable raises questions. The number of IGOs is statistically significant, but with a negative impact on the Polity 2 score. For every additional IGO the Polity 2 score decreases by .12 scale units. This finding is counter intuitive based on the positive relationship observed between other variables of political integration (treaties signed and INGOs) and democracy. A possible explanation for this result could be that fragile states may receive more interventions from the global community in the form of IGO outreach. Additional research is needed to identify other possible explanations.

FIGURE 8



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

SUMMARY

In summary, democracy clearly plays a necessary role in the growth of global civil society, but it alone is not sufficient to explain the exponential growth over recent years. Both the statistical as well as the anecdotal evidence support a strong mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy and civil society, particularly at the national level.

Taking these findings to the global level is trickier, primarily because there seems to be a lack of traditional democratic mechanisms, such as elections or representative government. However, the results from the reciprocal models provide some compelling evidence that global civil society can have similar effects on global governance,

especially when we see that other variables for political inclusion are also statistically significant for promoting democracy.

The results identify a clear and mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy and growth of global civil society. This democratic connection lends further support to those voices calling for an enhanced role for global civil society actors in the international policy process. UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon was on the right track by suggesting that international policy problems can best be solved by an inclusive network of global actors, of which INGOs are a vital part.

CHAPTER FOUR: Global Civil Society and Political Integration

What do Princess Diana, Cambodian farmers, and hundreds of school children have in common? They were all part of the thousands of ordinary citizens who mobilized to create a mine free world. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was created to ensure the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty. Its member organizations were able to use their firsthand knowledge of the indiscriminate damage wreaked on civilians by abandoned landmines and cluster bombs to raise the international profile of this issue. Song Kosai, a landmine survivor and ICBL ambassador summed up the devastation produced by these indiscriminate weapons. "Sometimes as a child I dreamed that I had two legs again and I ran freely in the rice fields, feeling the grass under my toes. I really wish that soon children can play without danger, with no more mines in our fields" (International Campaign to Ban Landmines 2013).

As a non-state actor, the campaign was uniquely positioned to shift the issue of landmine reduction from a military matter to a humanitarian concern. This ground swell of public support overcame the superpowers' insistence that landmines were a matter of national security to be resolved between sovereign countries. ICBL provided 'moral' cover allowing states that were already sympathetic to the issue to 'fast-track' the treaty, limiting the ability of countries such as the United States and Russia to water down the agreement (English 1998).

The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in ten months, a historical record; 40 states signed the treaty in December of 1997, achieving the necessary number for ratification by October of 1998. The treaty entered into force in March 1999. As of 2009,

156 states have signed the treaty, 39 states remain outside of the agreement, including the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan (Short 1999). ICBL was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1997 for their efforts.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: LITERATURE REVIEW

The political integration approach to global civil society is a recent development. In the 1960, international governmental institutions began taking a hands-on approach to national development. Led by the United Nations, the subsequent “development decades” have created a demand for international public administrators, which INGOs answered. Global civil society organizations are active at every level of the policy process from formulation to implementation (Coate 2009, Kotschnig 1968).

The political integration approach views civil society as a remedy for the governmental failures. Governments often struggle to provide and maintain public goods and common spaces (Ostrom 1990). This approach theorizes that civil society is better able to administer public good and services because it is closer to the recipients of these services. Global civil society provides a venue for the expression of public goods preferences when normal citizenship channels are not available, especially at the global level.

The New Policy Agenda approach to global governance casts civil society as a network of associations, organizations, and movements, which interact with government as both partner and critic, seeking to ensure a more equitable and responsive public policy (Cohen and Arato 1992, Keane 1998, Fowler 1998, Keck and Sikkink 1998,

Fowler 2011, Edwards and Hulme 2013). The participation of non-state actors in global governance does not necessarily signal a transfer of power away from the state to non-state actors, but rather a change in the logic of government. Global civil society is no longer just a tool of government, but an independent sphere of “self-associations” exercising political influence over how decisions are made (Sending and Neumann 2006).

Global civil society has several attributes that enable it to excel at the provision of public goods and services. These include close ties to the community, a tendency toward policy innovation, specialized expertise, and a commitment to long-term monitoring and accountability. First, global civil society has closer ties to the recipients of public goods and services than governments, and especially IGOs, international governmental organization. Global civil society organizations, which are created by members of the community or at least encourage participation from community members, are in a better position to respond to the community’s needs and concerns (Fowler 1998).

Second, these organizations are less bureaucratic than government institutions, enabling them to innovate and alter programs in response to the needs of beneficiaries. These nimble organizations are better positioned to make midcourse program corrections, based on participation feedback, than more cumbersome bureaucracies. Since these organizations operate on a smaller scale than national governments or IGOs, they have the flexibility to customize programs (Broome 2009).

Thirdly, like bureaucracies, global civil society actors possess expertise and skill. Enabling global civil society to preserve the bureaucratic assets of know-how and efficiency, while correcting for bureaucratic deficits such as isolation and detachment

(Brautigam and Segarra 2007). Therefore, these organizations tend to focus on specific causes or missions. As a result they become knowledgeable about this specific issue area, providing them with expertise that might be lacking from a more generalized governing institution. Mastery of specialized knowledge have enabled global civil society organizations have become vital partners in policy networks and epistemic communities (Cooper and Hocking 2000).

Fourth, global civil society organizations are willing to commit time and resources to long term monitoring of policy issues. As a watchdog organization, global civil society draws on all the previous stated attributes. Global civil society organizations leverage mission, community ties, autonomy, and resources to gather information and hold governing institutions accountable for policy outcomes (Smith and Korzeniewics 2007).

For the purposes of this study, once again the feasibility of analyzing the political integration approach to civil society at the global level needs to be established. This interpretation of civil society easily translates to the global arena. Since citizenship has never been a pre-requisite for being a stakeholder, this approach makes a smooth transition from national to global policy. Anywhere public policies are implemented this theory can be explored.

“Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common condition gives rise to diverse outcomes. ... At times the absence of centralized international authority precludes attainment of common goals... Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy” (Oye [1986] 2009).

The 1930-40s represented a time when nations realized a profound need for cooperation. Isolationism and “beggar thy neighbor” policies resulted in a demoralizing global economic depression and a cataclysmic world war. Nations created institutions with the international authority to establish protocols, promote cooperation, and sanction transgressions to prevent future devastation. These institutions include the United Nations System, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These new international governmental institutions provided a recognized structure to govern international peace and security as well as economic relations, thereby providing nation states with the stability necessary to pursue appropriate policies of economic recovery or industrialization (Oatly 2008, Stiglitz 2002).

Soon after the creation of this new system, scholars began analyzing how “global governance” functioned. Theoretically sovereign states invested these institutions with credibility derived from their individual authority (Keohane 1998). However, this pooled sovereignty did not result in a complete transfer of legitimacy. Scholars observed a disconnection or “democratic deficit” between the technocratic management of these institutions and the nations/people impacted by their policies. Democratic deficit became short hand for the lack of transparency and accountability associated with IGOS (Marjone 1998).

These same scholars have looked to civil society to mitigate the democratic deficiencies in international institutions. Global civil society can increase transparency by collecting, analyzing, and distributing information about the inner workings of global governance. In addition, global civil society uses advocacy and public information campaigns to attract the attention of global policy makers to the plight of marginalized

people (O'Brien, Goetz and Scholte 2000). Global civil society has not only exerted its influence in the areas of human rights, development, and the environment, but also in the traditionally state-centric areas of security (Cooper and Hocking 2000, Davenport 2003).

Distrust of policy makers and administrators associated with “big government” has prompted the devolution of responsibility and authority toward non-state actors from the private and civil society sector (Fukuyama 2004, Cooper and Hocking 2000). The core objective of privatization is to reinvent government; making it more efficient for taxpayers and hopefully more responsive to constituents (Jones and Thompson 1997, Peters 1994, Mishra 2012).

Privatization is not without its critics. Critics point out that there are fundamental differences between the public and private sectors. The foundation of this difference, according to Moe ([1987] 2007), rests on the concept of sovereignty. As a sovereign the state has responsibilities and obligations that are completely absent from the private sector. For example, a sovereign has sole right to the legitimate use of force or coercion. By extension, it has an obligation to protect its constituents from illegitimate use of force or coercion. The issue of sovereignty dictates that privatization within the public sector comes with inherent sacrifices. A government cannot enter into an agreement with a non-state actor without running the risk of sacrificing some measure of its control, power, and legitimacy.

During periods of crisis or governmental collapse, global civil society organizations have replaced the state machinery (Jareg and Kaseje 1998). When states transfer too much authority to non-state actors, they run the risk of becoming irrelevant,

what Milward and Provan (2000) referred to as the “hollow state”. Poorly managed public/private partnerships lead to unacceptable results, confused accountability, and ultimately a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. When public/private partnerships work effectively, they can enhance a state’s flexibility, responsiveness, and efficiency (Milward and Provan 2000, Fredericksen and London 2000, Batley and McLoughlin 2010, Fredericksen and Levin 2004, Cerny 1995).

Much of global civil society’s credibility, according to public administration theories, rests with its autonomy from both governmental and market forces. Autonomous global civil society actors should be motivated by the interests of their members instead of votes or profits (Sending and Neumann 2006). When global civil society organizations partner with IGOs a close relationship develops. Some say too close. Sometimes this closeness leads to global civil society organizations mimicking the practices of funders (Smith and Fetner 2007). Professionals even alternate working in both sectors. While this type of exchange can increase communication, it can also stifle innovation and constituents’ participation (Brautigam and Segarra 2007, Jareg and Kaseje 1998).

Another area of concern over the too-close relationship between global civil society and institutional or governmental funders is cooptation. Can global civil society organizations speak truth to power if they are financially dependent on government grants and contracts? It is the classic dilemma of serving two masters. How can an organization effectively represent marginalized populations when the national government or large foundations are paying the bills (Howell and Lind 2009, Sending and Neumann 2006, Hoksbergen 2005, Mallaby 2004)?

Competition for government or donor support, as well as fiscal uncertainty, can subvert the efforts of global civil society organizations, perpetuating ineffective programs, enabling corruption, and exacerbating competition. These factors leave global civil society organizations vulnerable to cooptation by authoritarian regimes. Competition does not always lead to increased efficiency. When global civil society organizations compete for contracts, they tend to mirror the structures of their funding agents; reducing their comparative advantages and undermining their credibility with constituents (Cooley and Ron 2002).

How do these public/private partnerships manifest themselves in relation to IGOS? Increasingly, IGOs have turned to global civil society organizations to deliver services, consult on the formation of policies and programs, and monitor the effectiveness of international programs and agreements. In 2011, global civil society organizations administered \$19.3 billion or 14% of official development assistance compared to \$17.3 billion on average over the period 2008-2011 (OECD 2013). This public/private partnership is essential to the programs of the development aid regime (Fowler 2011).

Questions arise about the effectiveness of global civil society organizations in managing successful development campaigns. Many of the same attributes, which recommend them as partners in development could also limit their effectiveness. Most glaringly, an organization's mission can present ethical dilemmas. Administering ODA can divert attention away from core missions such as human rights or the environment. Often a loss of mission focus leads to miscommunications with funders and host governments resulting in ineffective or unresponsive programs. Clients of these programs can end up worse off than when the program began (Winkler 2008).

International governmental organizations support public/private partnerships by providing funding, training, and access to decisions makers. However, the structure of partnerships varies significantly depending on the organization. Some IGOs encourage close cooperation with global civil society organizations. Others experience distant, sometimes contentious relationship with global civil society organizations. This next section will briefly discuss the civil society engagement programs of the United Nations, World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Consultation with non-state actors is codified in the United Nations' charter.

Chapter X, Article 71 states,

“The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangement for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Members of the United Nations concerned” (United Nations 1945).

This relationship with global civil society has grown closer in recent years. The United Nations not only directs funding through global civil society's to provide services, but also directly supports global civil society organizations to enhance capacity and improvement (Reimann 2006). Currently more than 30,000 global civil society organizations have established formal relationships with the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies (United Nations 2015).

The World Bank began to interact with civil society in the 1970s by collaborating with global civil society organizations to address environmental concerns over funded programs. The World Bank learned that including global civil society organization in development projects enhances the projects performance by contributing local

knowledge, providing technical expertise, and leveraging social capital (Brewer 2003). For several decades this relationship remained limited to environmental issues.

World Bank's interaction with global civil society gained additional momentum on its 50th anniversary. Global civil society launched the intensive "50 Years is enough" campaign in 1996. In an attempt to neutralize the negative public perception generated by these protests, the World Bank launched implemented a more comprehensive program for global civil society engagement (Engler 2003, J. Smith 2002, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002).


The World Bank has been relatively successful in engaging global civil society. In 2001, less than 100 global civil society organizations participated in the World Bank's annual meeting, by 2011 that number had grown to more than 600 organizations representing 85 countries. In 1990, a little over twenty percent of World Bank projects involved consultation with global civil society. By 2012, more than eighty percent of projects included global civil society representatives (World Bank 2013).

The WTO has struggled with how to engage global civil society effectively. The Marrakesh Agreement of 1994, which established the WTO, acknowledged a need for "consulting and cooperation" with nongovernmental organizations (Scholte 1998). The WTO's membership structure of the makes difficult to include global civil society organizations in the formal deliberations. Only members are allowed to participate in negotiations or seek redress of trade infractions through the dispute settlement process. In an attempt to established more formal means of communication with global civil society. The WTO has established regular civil society briefings by the Director General and a

mechanism of global civil society organizations to submit friend of the court briefs in the dispute settlement process (Esteve 2011).

Since 1998, civil society organizations have submitted over 500 position papers to the dispute settlement process. In recent years participation in this program has decreased dramatically, over ninety percent of the position papers were submitted before 2005 (World Trade Organization 2014).

FIGURE 9



Source: WTO Dispute Settlement Process Website

Determining the precise cause of this drop-off in global civil society participation would require a separate study. However, two factors have likely contributed to the decline. First, negotiations in the Doha trade negotiation round languished for more than ten years prompting some to question the relevance of the WTO. Secondly, the dispute settlement process rules keep all but the litigants of each case at arm's length leading to frustration

and discouraging participation. These two factors could have led global civil society to focus their engagement with the WTO on more productive activities.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has the least formal program for civil society engagement. The IMF consults with civil society on an as needed basis. Global civil society organizations are encouraged to participate in parallel conferences, which take place at the same time as the World Bank's annual meetings (International Monetary Fund 2014).

Whether the relationship is cooperative or antagonistic, global civil society regularly interact with IGOs. This study tests the nature of this relationship by looking for a correlation between the number of IGOs operating in a country and the number of INGOs active in that same country. Where applicable, this study also looks at the impact of funding opportunities in the form of official development aid.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: HYPOTHESES

The next theory examined in this study maintains that global civil society expansion can be attributed to the increase in international political integration. The end of World War II, ushered in an era of unprecedented cooperation. The Great Depression and World War II provided graphic illustrations of the failure of isolationists' policies and the dangers of secretive alliances. A new paradigm of international relations was needed to help the world recover. New institutions of global governance were created, resulting in a proliferation of international treaties and agreements.

This study examines the relationship between a thriving global civil society and international political integration, hypothesizing that nations that actively engage in the

international political system will have a larger global civil society presence. Three variables are used to measure political integration: the number of international treaties a country has signed; the number of IGOs in that country, and net ODA per capita in all but the HIC model, where the majority of countries do not receive development aid.

The literature predicts that increased political integration, particularly in the form of increased treaty commitments, will increase the need for countries to partner with global civil society to help meet the administrative demands of implementation and compliance (Fowler 1998, Edwards 2011, Tvedt, 2002). As the number of treaties signed by a country increases so will the number of INGOs operating in that country.

IGOs also increase political integration. They are instrumental in negotiating, implementing, and monitoring international treaties and agreements. In addition, they often provide funding for and encourage participating nations to enter into public/private partnerships with INGOs to facilitate the administration and monitoring of the progress of these programs. This study hypothesizes that as the number of IGOs operating in a country increases so will the number of INGOs operating in that same country.


Lastly, measuring net ODA per capita, focuses the impact of public/private partnerships on a specific global governance regime – foreign aid. The literature supports using the development aid regime to illustrate the new policy agenda in action. Aid granting organizations, such as the World Bank, IMF, USAID, and the OECD often contract with INGOs to deliver the assistance. These partnerships are intended to achieve two key objectives. The first is to provide donors with a clear and direct line of accountability, something that might be lacking when working with host country

governments (Batley and McLoughlin 2010). The second is to provide a mechanism for beneficiaries to influence the structure of programs. INGOs often incorporate direct participation from clients in the development and implementation of programs, thereby creating more responsive and effective interventions (Clapp 2005, Edwards and Hulme 2013, Fowler 1998). Based on this literature, this study hypothesizes that as the amount of ODA received by a country increases, the number of INGOs operating in that country will also increase.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: VARIABLES

The following box plots illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the explanatory variables, as well as demonstrations the influence of outlying values. The horizontal line at the center of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the relative extreme values. The individual points identify outlying values.

FIGURE 10



Sources: Union of International Associations and the United Nations' Treaty Database


This study utilizes data from the United Nations treaty database to obtain the number of treaties signed by a country. This online database provides information on the status of over 550 major multilateral treaties and agreements recorded with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. These treaties and agreements cover a range of subject matter including human rights, disarmament, commodities, refugees, environment, and the Law of the Sea. The number of treaties deposited with the Secretary-General continues to grow. This database tracks the status of each agreement, regarding if member states have signed, ratified, acceded, or lodged reservations/objections (United Nations 2013).

Treaty adoption comes with administrative and compliance obligations. If a country is unable to meet these obligations, INGOs with an interest in the success of the treaty will offer assistance. The case study of negotiations, ratification, and monitoring of the Mine Ban Treaty illustrates the potential of INGO/Member State partnerships (Davenport 2003).

High treaty adopting countries are those countries that have signed more than the median number of treaties (115). Figure 10 shows that high adopting countries have a higher average number of INGOs 1197 compared to lower adopters, which average 281 INGOs per country year. There is also greater variance in the number of INGOs among high adopters, with the number of INGOs ranging from 119-4025, whereas low adopters tend to cluster tightly at the lower end of the range with the number of INGOs ranging from 5-1290.

This study further measures political integration by the number of IGOs working in a country, IGOs are organizations composed of sovereign states, or of other intergovernmental organizations established by treaty, charter, or other agreement. Examples include the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, and OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Union of International Associations 2012). These organizations frequently collaborate with global civil society to deliver services and monitor program success. The data used to measure the number of IGOs is collected by the UIA (Union of International Associations 2012).

FIGURE 11




Source: Union of International Associations

Once again, we see a significant difference between highly politically integrated countries, those with 43 or more IGOs active in any country year and less integrated

countries. Highly integrated countries host three times as many INGOs (1195) as less integrated countries (310). Once again, we see that variance is greater among highly politically integrated countries while less politically integrated countries cluster near the lower end.

Lastly, this study looks at the impact of participation by recipient countries in the international development aid regime on global civil society. The literature predicts a strong positive relationship between receiving development aid and a strong global civil society presence. However, in a bivariate analysis we see no difference in mean between countries that receive high amounts of ODA, more than \$92 per person, and those countries that receive lower amounts of economic assistance.

FIGURE 12



Sources: Union of International Associations and World Bank Global Economic Indicators

The box plot does illustrate some interesting characteristics of these data. The first is that nearly four times as many countries are categorized as low ODA. In addition a significant number of observations are outliers falling outside the measure of central tendency in both categories.

One possible explanation for the lack of difference in means is categorization. The literature does not offer a definition of high or low aid recipients. Without direction from the literature, the current study chooses to classify these countries based on the mean to reduce selection bias. The regression analysis identified a more detailed relationship between ODA and global civil society.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION: RESULTS


Political Integration Explanation: As a country integrates into international policy regimes, particularly the ODA regime, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase
H2a - As the number of multilateral treaties to which a country is a signatory increases, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H2b - As the number of IGOs with an office in a country increases, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H2c - As ODA, measured as a percentage of the GDP, increases, the number of INGOs operating in recipient countries will increase.

The regression analysis finds evidence to support a strong, positive relationship between political integration and global civil society. All three variables testing these hypotheses are significant in two of the three models. ODA is not included in the HIC model because only a fraction of the observations in this dataset have data for this

variable. Inclusion of this variable generates too many errors to run the panel regression effectively.

In the inclusive model all three factors: treaties signed, number of IGOs, and ODA, measuring international political integration are statistically significant. For every 100% increase in the number of treaties signed by a country the number of INGOS increases by 35%. For each additional IGO operating in a country the number of INGOS increases by 3%. For every 100% increase in the Net ODA per capita the number of INGOS increases by 21%. The ODA result is particularly interesting since higher income countries included in the INC model do not receive ODA. In fact, 30% of the observed country-years do not have data for this variable.


FIGURE 13



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

Treaty adoption and IGO presence remains statistically significant in the HIC model. In fact treaty adoption has a greater impact on high income countries. A 100% increase in the number of treaties signed increases the number of INGOs active in high income countries by 60%. IGO presence has less of a substantive effect; adding each additional IGO increases the number of INGOs by slightly less than 3%.

FIGURE 14




Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

The LIC model generates findings consistent with the inclusive model for treaties signed and IGO variables, but the ODA measure has a greater substantive impact on

global civil society growth in low income countries. This effect is not surprising considering the availability of the data. For every 100% increase in the number of treaties signed by a country the number of INGOS increases by 32%. For each additional IGO operating in a country, the number of INGOS increases by 3%. For every additional 100% increase in the Net ODA per capita the number of INGOS increases by 33% in low income countries.

FIGURE 15



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

The literature suggests that this growth has less to do with the actual treaties or the presence of IGOs, but more to do with the programs and funding these interactions

bring with them. Global civil society, in its roles as service providers and policy watchdog, is essential to the implementation and monitoring of international agreements. Countries turn to global civil society organizations to fill administrative gaps. International government organizations contract directly with global civil society organizations to deliver these programs.

Global civil society organizations are essential to service delivery in the international aid regime. In 2011, global civil society organizations administered \$19.3 billion or 14% of official development assistance. (OECD 2013) This involvement has been steadily increasing since the late 1980s.

SUMMARY

In summary, the analysis presented above supports a strong relationship between global governance and global civil society. These results are remarkably similar across the models. A positive interpretation of these results suggests that political integration provides the opportunity for global civil society actors to make global governance more responsive by increasing public awareness of policies and encouraging participation, especially from marginalized populations.

A pessimistic interpretation of the results could be summarized as an “if you fund it they will come” interpretation of global civil society’s growth. This interpretation raises questions about how much of this growth can be ascribed to a bottom-up associational revolution and how much of its expansion is attributable to a top-down mandate from funders. This interpretation of global civil society growth raises questions about whose interest these organizations serve, the recipients of these programs or the

fundings. While both groups are motivated by a common desire to address an issue, they often have different approaches and agendas.

Political integration has greater substantive significance in high income countries. When the number of treaties signed increased by 100%, the number of INGOs increased by 60%, compared to 35% in the inclusive model. However, the results for IGO influence remain consistent. For every additional IGO the number of INGOs increased by 3%, the same as the inclusive model. These results indicate that outsourcing administrative duties to INGOS is not solely a developing world phenomenon even though ODA is matters most for lower income countries.

CHAPTER FIVE: Global Civil Society and Economic Integration

Protestors, trade ministers, and sea turtles, oh my! A massive anti-globalization demonstration, dubbed the “Battle in Seattle” shocked the world and put the WTO and other economic IGOs on notice that “our world was not for sale”. Their theatrical and combative tactics, widely photographed protestors dressed as sea turtles, garnered publicity across the globe. This amorphous, often politically deadly, collective mobilizes public pressure, to achieve key objectives. In 1999, their objectives were to challenge the secretive and back room negotiation practices of the WTO, demanding to be heard (J. Smith 2002).

These activists did not feel adequately represented by their government official. They were further angered by the covert inclusion of business interests in the drafting of international trade rules. Fresh off their success defeating the Multilateral Agreement of, these largely labor and environmental groups set out to proclaim that they would no longer be ignored (Reitan 2007).

The Seattle ministerial marked a newly antagonistic era in trade negotiations, characterized by the laborious 14-year long Doha Development Round (Bhagwati 2001). A counter movement comprised of global civil society organization and developing countries refused to have the pathways for development dictated to them by the Washington Consensus.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMICS: LITERATURE REVIEW

The economics approach includes two distinct camps of scholars. Neoliberal scholars analyze civil society through the lens of supply and demand. Alternative

development scholars analyze civil society through the lens of economic self-determination. Both of these groups identify the origins of civil society as the result of splitting political life from both commerce and labor (Boyd 2013).

Neoliberal economic scholars connect the concept of civil society to the work of Adam Smith. However, for Adam Smith civil society was rather different from the modern use of the term. It referred to a specific historical moment when man moved from savagery to community. In his classic work *The Wealth of Nations*, Smith comments more on the principle of civility. Commerce polishes away the rough edges of human nature and leads to cultivation of civility and manners. By increasing familiarity with those outside the core group, economic exchange reduces parochialism and cultivates a shared sense of humanity (A. Smith [1776] 2009).

The neoliberal economic approach to global civil society focuses on civil society's ability to mitigate market failures. Global civil society is most effective when countering three significant aspects of market failure: the provision of public goods, rectification of contract failure, and satisfaction of philanthropic demand (Salamon and Anhier 1998, Teegen, Doh and Vachani 2004).

Public goods are those goods that remain available to all regardless of ability to pay. Classic examples of public goods include public safety, national security, public parks, and clean air. Public goods are antithetical to the principles of the market. The market typically will not provide these goods, but that does not mean that public goods are not in demand. Governments attempt to meet the demand for public goods. However, as discussed in the previous section, government often does a poor job of fulfilling these

demands. In a democracy the provision of public goods tends to focus on the needs of the median voter; leaving much unsatisfied demand (Weisbrod 1977). Civil society organizations can leverage both financial capital and social capital generating the resources and relationships necessary to meet the demand for a diverse range of public goods and services (Steinberg 2006).

Another market failure addressed by global civil society is contract failure. Global civil society does not enforce the fine print. It monitors business's broader commitment to honesty and transparency, assessing if Starbucks's coffee is fairly traded or if De Beers's diamonds come from war torn countries. The information provided by global civil society empowers consumers to make educated choices.

As mentioned in the previous section, global civil society often acts as a watchdog. This role is not limited to tracking government actions. Global civil society deploy their expertise to monitor whether economic actors are operating ethically as well (Hansmann 1987). Since civil society organizations are viewed as being motivated by more than just profits, they garner trust. This trust in turn provides their observations with credibility (Salamon and Anhier 1998).

Market failures tend to focus on unmet demand. However, some scholars propose that there may also be an unmet supply of philanthropic impulse. The philanthropic impulse arising from a feeling of solidarity or religious passion does not have a ready outlet in the market. Global civil society organizations offer a way to express this impulse toward a larger community. They also provide a way to maximize the impact of philanthropy through collective actions (James 1987). According to neoliberal economic

understanding, global civil society is a self-interested realm of freedom, production, and exchange. These groups coalesce to enable members to fill unmet needs or achieve specific rational goals (Ehrenberg 1999).

The alternative development group of scholars envisions a different global civil society. For these scholars global civil society becomes a way to counter balance the negative effects of capitalism. The anti-globalization movement offers an example of global civil society actions organized around this theoretical framework. Civil society is a network of associations, organizations, and movements, seeking to amplify the voice of marginalized populations in a global economic system. These scholars draw their theoretical foundations from scholars like Karl Marx, Fredrick Hegel, Antonio Gramsci, and Karl Polanyi.

Both Marx and Hegel considered civil society and the state to be under the influence of the market (bourgeoisie). According to Hegel, civil society is an alienating and unjust sphere that leaves the individual powerless to determine whether his needs are filled (Ehrenberg 1999). Marx concurred, “Civil society ... develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organizations evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis of the state” (Marx [1846]1978, 163). Marx considered the democratization and liberation of civil society as a core objective of the proletarian revolution for general human emancipation. Human emancipation could only be led by that group in society that sets itself apart from the status quo. The proletarian revolution would not only reform modes of production, but civil society as well, replacing the bourgeois markets based network with an associational space that quashes all class based antagonism (Ehrenberg 1999, Cohen and Arato 1992). Contemporary scholars present the

anti-globalization movement as the manifestation of a liberated civil society now free to contest the markets control over the government as well as the economy.

Antonio Gramsci theorized a complex role for civil society, mediating between the political and economic realms (Katz 2006). Gramscian civil society includes not only organizations, which contest the current political economic climate, but also those with an interest in preserving the status quo. The Gramscian understanding of civil society provides the foundation for skepticism about the ability of global civil society organizations supported by developed countries to adequately represent the interests of marginalized populations in the developing world.

Karl Polanyi offers a more empowered understanding of global civil society. His work expands on Marx's idea of a liberated civil society.

“Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the result of a double movement... While on one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe and the amount of good involved grew to unbelievable dimensions, on the other hand a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to labor, land, and money... a deep-seated movement sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy. Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system – this was the one comprehensive feature in the history of the age” (Polanyi [1944] 2001, 79-80).

Global civil society represents the second phase of the double movement. As a result of increased economic integration, the state is limited in its ability to buffer society from the devastation of the market. Global civil society actors prompt the state to remember its responsibilities to all its citizens. By “movement”, Polanyi means something more than organized protests, petition drives or lobbying; he means a

hegemonic struggle to define the cultural and ideological underpinnings that determine the general direction of society (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009, 597).

Peter Evans identified four traits global civil society should exhibit if it is to function as the second half of Polanyi's double movement. First, global civil society must transcend not only national boundaries, but the development divide as well. Secondly, global civil society must promote a holistic response to economic liberalism, weaving a network of diverse constituencies without losing the capacity for focused collective action. Third, global civil society must be equally capable of engaging with the policy processes at the national, regional, international, and transnational levels. Lastly, global civil society must communicate its message in a framework that can capture the collective imagination (Evans 2008, 287).

“The reduction of transnational barriers to economic exchange forces states to revoke long-standing social contracts that protect citizens from the ruthlessness of the free market” (Danzer 2001, 53). According to the alternative development approach civil society and the state should be mutually reinforcing. However, when the state primarily serves the market, civil society becomes isolated. Civil society must act as a communal response to impersonal economic forces. The cooptation of the state by the market pushes civil society into an antagonistic relationship with the state.

Both economic approaches to global civil society easily translate to a global perspective. Since the market is a global phenomenon, a civil society responding to either its failures or its excesses would need to operate at the global level as well (Evans 2000). Global civil society influences policy through a multilevel approach initiating protests of

international economic organizations such as the World Bank and the WTO as well as leveraging domestic power relationships to endorse policy alternatives (Broome 2009).

The economic integration of the new millennium has come with a specific free market agenda. International trade agreements regulating investment (TRIMS), services (GATS), and intellectual property (TRIPS) have constrained the development strategies of less developed countries. The result is that the “development space” for emerging economies has shrunk (Wade 2003, 621-622).

There is much debate about neoliberal economic reforms’ ability to produce economic development for all countries. The traditional neoclassical theory predicts that economic liberalization of both trade and investment will promote economic development (Cleeve, Debrah and Yiheyis 2015). A 2013 study by Lehnert, Benmamoun, and Zhao identified a positive relationship between FDI inflows and the host country’s social wellbeing. They confirmed that FDI encourages a transfer of knowledge and technology between the investing corporations and the host country. However, this positive effect is limited by the host country’s ability to absorb the information spill-over (Lehnert, Benmamoun and Zhao 2013).

A study by White and Leavy indicates that there may still be significant room for national discretion in economic policy. Their analysis of twenty countries found that adopters of neoliberal economic reforms did indeed perform better economically than those countries that continued to operate command economies. However, they did not find any significant difference between countries that weakly adopted these policies and

those countries that whole-heartedly embraced economic liberalism (White and Leavy 2001).

Still other scholars contend that countries that have achieved the most success in the globalizing economy are countries that have cultivated a distinctive system of economic liberalization - the East Asian development states. These states have the administrative capacity to control the manifestation of foreign investment in their economies (Evans 1997, Haggard 2004).

Another group of scholars identify a country's position in the international production structure as accounting for their ability to develop autonomously. Commodity producers' position in the international production chain limits their ability to convert raw materials into value added products such as steel, plastics, or microchips, placing them in a position of economic dependency. These countries are prevented from implementing similar protectionist practices previously employed by developed nations to nurture domestic industries (Chang 2002, Stiglitz 2002, Stiglitz and Charlton 2005).

“We see that the alleged backwardness of these economies is not due to a lack of integration with capitalism, but that to the contrary, the most powerful obstacles to their full development come from the way in which they are joined to this international system and its laws of development” (Dos Santos 1970, 235).

Global civil society can overcome collective action barriers, which reduce the effectiveness of developing nation cooperation (Wade 2003). There is strength in numbers. A single developing nation can exert only minimal influence over international economic negotiations, but collectively developing countries can bring economic negotiations to a standstill, as they did with the 2001 Doha development round. Global civil society helps developing states overcome administrative deficits, which reduce their

ability to influence the nature of economic development within their borders (Evans 1992).

Scholars have observed global civil society in action as facilitators of business development opportunities for the poor. When the market fails to provide a service, not due to a lack of demand, but due to an unappealing profit margin, global civil society organizations step in and fill this market gap (Matkita 2009). One of the most glaring market gaps is the underutilization of women in market activities. Global civil society stepped in to address this unmet need, providing employment opportunities as well access to credit and other banking services directly to women (Sen 2000, Yunus 2003). Another area of global civil society involvement has been in health care. Global civil society expedites the provision of basic health care, particularly HIV/AIDs medications.

Global civil society also mitigates information asymmetry within the market by pressuring multinational corporations to adopt socially responsible modes of business. It was instrumental in launching the United Nations Global Compact, which established a framework of practices that comply with “universally shared norms” regarding human rights, labor protections, environmental stewardship, and corruption (May 2006, Huws 2006, Ward 2007). Global civil society provides difficult to obtain information, such as the origins of diamonds, sweatshop labor practices, and environmental impact of forestry and mining practices directly to consumers, enabling them to make more informed economic decisions (Pegg 2006, Webb 2006, Brooks 2005).

Some scholars question both the motives and capacity of global civil society to correct market failures or ensure development. “By promising what they cannot deliver

... “rich world activists prolong the true nightmare of poverty” (Eberly 2008). Other scholars have questioned if the development alternatives proposed by global civil society are actually in the best interest of the marginalized countries they purport to represent. Global civil society has been accused of valuing abstract moral imperative over the practical needs of the people. Global civil society’s intransigence has been blamed for stymieing economic growth and blocking global trade negotiations (Bhagwati 2001, Bhagwati 2004, Mallaby 2004, Mallaby 2004).

Global civil society is permeated by the ethos of the capitalist market, that of self-serving and instrumental action. Furthermore, global civil society’s alternatives still require nation-states to enact laws or regulations to achieve full effect. Some global civil society organizations resist attempts to make their actions and operations transparent, at the same time they demand transparency from other corporations and government (Chandhoke 2002). Susan Sell proposes that business agents and global civil society actors do not require separate frameworks to explain their actions. Both organizations seek to frame/market their ideas to secure material support whether in the form of donations or payments. In addition, she points out that some global civil society actors, such as unions, offer purely materialistic benefits (wage increases) exclusively for members (Sell and Prakash 2004).

Some scholars are also critical of global civil society’s ability to offer an alternative development model to economic liberalization.

“Organizations are formed by agents who seek to resist or moderate the expansion of the market into various realms of social life, but these organizations may act in ways that, unwittingly perhaps, support the logic of the market and its further expansion” (Lipschultz 2004, 748),

Global civil society cannot exist without a liberal system; a liberal system cannot exist without global civil society. They are both supported by the classic liberal tenants of autonomy and the rule of law. They are mutually constituted, the legitimacy of each enhanced by its interaction with the other (Lipschultz 2004).

Jurgen Habermas focused on global civil society as an inclusive and open discursive space. Marginalized populations need organizations to intercede on their behalf with their governments as well as international governing institutions.

“[T]he democratic procedure no longer draws its legitimizing force only, indeed not even predominately, from political participation and the expression of political will, but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative process” (Habermas 2001, 110).

Global civil society increases the economic discursive space providing countries with room to develop a customized policy (Evans 2004). Its greatest influence is on public opinion; maximizing its ability to raise awareness over environmental and social impacts of economic policies (Anner 2004, Turner 1998).

Much of the research on global civil society alternative globalization efforts comes from case studies of anti-globalization campaigns. The case study literature has identified profound differences between global civil society’s actors originating in developing countries (South) compared to those originating in developed countries (North). These groups differ in regards to bonds of solidarity, resources, preferred policy outcomes, and the relationship to the state. The ability of global civil society to bridge these differences determines their success.

Particularly in the global justice movement, southern actors in global civil society are bound by identity solidarity. This type of solidarity develops when people share the

same fate, threat, or suffer equally the harm of the injustice. Northern actors are bound by reciprocal solidarity that comes when actors make a connection between the suffering of others and their plight (Reitan 2007).

This difference in solidarity produces different policy preferences for addressing issues of global economic injustice. Since economic injustices tend to threaten the way of life directly in developing countries, southern global civil society organizations tend to operate from a materialist perspective. Since the harm of the injustice tends to have a more indirect effect on northern global civil society groups, they tend to operate from a post-materialist perspective. For example, when addressing issues of tropical deforestation southern global civil society actors will highlight issues of sustainable agriculture and food independence, in other words, “environmentalism of survival and livelihood”. On the other hand northern global civil society actors may focus on issues of endangered species or global warming, in other words, the “environmentalism of affluence and enhancement of quality of life” (Faber 2005).

The minimal success and ultimate dissolution of the Jubilee 2000 movement illustrates this tension. The movement was successful in securing \$110 billion in promises of debt forgiveness for highly indebted poor countries; however, this “success” split the movement along north-south lines. Northern activists viewed the offer of debt forgiveness, despite the strings attached, as victory, whereas southern activists could not accept the structural adjustment programs required by the debt forgiveness plan (Reitan 2007, Donnelly 2002).

Global civil society is not a homogenized, universal force. Failure to acknowledge diversity risks undermining its power to motivate change (Macdonald 2005). Despite differences, global civil society has demonstrated its ability to bridge gaps in ideology, resources, and motivations. The success of the World Social Forum exemplifies the ability of global civil society to promote cooperation without requiring a convergence of message, method, or structure (Wood 2005).

The disparity in the distribution of global civil society between developed and developing countries, as well as their divergence in framework and tactic, validates the need for multiple models. This study divides the inclusive dataset based on World Bank income classifications to see if globalization indicators behave differently when examined in divergent economic setting.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: HYPOTHESES

The economic integration hypotheses predict that to attract foreign investment and trade opportunities a country must make certain concessions to the doctrine of economic liberalization. These concessions limit a country's ability to protect the environment, domestic businesses, and labor from the destructive potential of competition. This explanation draws support from the theory proposed by Karl Polanyi that when a state becomes too enmeshed with the market; it fails to buffer citizens from negative externalities such as environmental destruction, falling wages, and lacks occupational safety regulations. Societal forces organize to pressure government for those protections (Polanyi [1944] 2001). As a country integrates into the global free-market economy, its economic autonomy, as well as its ability to buffer citizens from the negative impacts of

market force is reduced. This lack of government responsiveness will lead to an increase in the number of INGOs as society organizes to challenge the state's relationship to the market (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009).

Other scholars argue that participation in the global economy does not require countries automatically to adopt international policy preferences at the domestic level. The research of Garret and Lange (1995) identified several factors, including a country's position in the global economy, national socio-economic, and formal public institutions that influence that country's ability to adapt to changes in the global economy. Swank (2001) found little evidence that capital mobility exerts downward pressures on the provision of public services and other welfare state programs. Both of these scholars observed that certain types of public services such as infrastructure improvements and income inequality reduction can actually make the national economy more attractive to foreign investment (Garrett and Lange 1995, Swank 2001). However, implicit in both these studies is the reality that some countries have more economic policy freedom than others. Less developed countries are more likely to lack the economic clout and the national institutions necessary to chart a customized development course.

This relationship is measured by two components of economic liberalization, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). The present study hypothesizes that as trade, when measured as a percent of GDP, increases the number of INGOs will also increase. The same is assumed for FDI inflows. As the amount of FDI coming into a country increases, the number of INGOs operating in that country will also increase.

Both the neoliberal and the alternative development theories predict that increased economic integration should promote global civil society growth. The neoliberal theory stresses global civil society's ability to mitigate market failures, whereas the alternative development theory focuses on global civil society ability to buffer society from the negative impacts of a self-regulating market.

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: VARIABLES

This study tests the relationship between integration in the global economy and the vibrancy of global civil society. To measure the degree to which a country's economy is impacted by international trade and, by extension, the rules and obligations governing trade, this study utilizes data from the World Bank Global Economic indicators (World Bank 2012). Economic integration will be measured by two factors: trade and FDI inflows. Not only do these economic activities require interaction with other countries, but they also often come with specific rules of engagement that can limit economic policy options.

The literature predicts that a greater reliance on trade will increase a country's vulnerability to externally induced economic shocks. The literature also suggests that international rules governing trade limit the economic policy options available to trade dependent economies, especially when those economies are still developing. This literature suggests that countries with a higher percentage of GDP derived from trade will have a larger global civil society presence (Evans 1997),

Both classical as well as alternative development economic theories inform this line of investigation. Classical economic theory proposes that global civil society can


address issues of market failure. These organizations form to meet needs that are either unprofitable or unmanageable and thereby not provided by market forces. Arts and cultural organizations frequently conform to this theory.

Alternative development theory, building off the work of Karl Polanyi, predicts that global civil society represents society's reaction to the negative impact of market forces. In order to participate in the global economy, countries must comply with certain international agreements, which lay out the rules of the engagement. These rules limit both fiscal and economic policy options available to countries. These limitations are particularly burdensome for developing countries, because they block off paths to development employed by developed nations, such as certain types of protectionism, creating a disconnection between the government and its people, while at the same time, making domestic economies more vulnerable to international shocks (Evans 2008, Chang 2002).

The box plots illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the explanatory variables, as well as demonstrate the influence of outlying values. The horizontal line at the center of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the relative extreme values. The individual points identify outlying values.

Highly economically integrated countries are defined as countries that rely on trade for more than 50% of their GDP. The descriptive statistics indicate little difference between these two groups. Highly integrated countries tend to host fewer (617) INGOs on average than less integrated countries (890). The data for both groups shows little variance with much of the data concentrated around the mean.

FIGURE 16




Sources: Union of International Associations and World Bank Global Economic Indicators

Another measure of economic integration is foreign direct investments. The pursuit of foreign investment is fraught with even more policy compromise than trade agreements. Host countries need to create a “favorable” business climate, which usually entails low tax rates and limited regulations.

Again, we see (Figure 17) no difference in mean number of INGOs between countries with low rates of FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP (<3.6%) and countries with higher reliance on FDI inflows. In fact the data distributions for the two groups are remarkably similar.

FIGURE 17



Source: Union of International Associations and World Bank Global Economic Indicators

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: RESULTS

Political Integration Theory: As a country integrates into the neo-liberal global economy and exercises less economic autonomy, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase.

H3a - As trade, measured by the percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), increases in a country the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase

H3b - As the gross inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), measured by the percent of GDP, increases in a country, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase

This study finds little support for the theories that predict a relationship between economic integration and the expansion of global civil society. Normally the lack of statistical significance would not be remarkable; however, due to the prevalence of this explanation in the case study literature, this finding is substantively interesting.


In the inclusive model neither trade as percent of GDP nor inflows of foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP, is statistically significant. Although not statistically significant the direction of the relationship is interesting. The relationship between trade and INGO numbers is negative, which is counterintuitive to the literature and theories. The negative relationship identified in the inclusive model, as well as the low income country model, raises the question of how economic integration can reduce the influence of global civil society. The theories offer no explanation for how or why trade might reduce global civil society impact.

A statistical reason for this incongruent finding is easily explained. After reviewing the scatter plots of the data, the explanation for the reversal of the direction of causality is likely a factor of the data. A majority of the observations cluster around the lower end of the trade, increasing the likelihood that these same countries will have relatively smaller numbers of INGOs, thereby causing the negative relationship. However, a substantive reason for the finding is less obvious.

. Again the literature and theory, particularly Polanyi's work, predict a relationship between the loss of policy autonomy and a rise in collective action to protest this loss of economic independence. Even though previous attempts to capture this relationship have used the same variables, trade and FDI inflows may not accurately

measure a loss of policy autonomy. How a country adapts to the process of economic liberalization may be unique, thereby best captured in case study analysis.


FIGURE 18



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

Unlike the INC model economic integration is supported by the LIC model. The FDI inflows variable is statistically significant and the positive direction of the relationship is consistent with both theories of economic integration. For every additional unit increase in trade as a percent of GDP the number of INGOs increases by .01%. However, this result is not substantively significant. Trade would need to increase dramatically before adding a single INGO.


FIGURE 19



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

One possible practical explanation of differing results across the models, is that lower income countries tend to have less diverse economies. Less economic diversification means that each sector of the economy has more singular influence, making developing economies disproportionately vulnerable to economic shocks, such as commodity booms and busts. It is likewise reasonable to expect FDI to have more influence on lower income countries, since these countries will have less domestic investment to offset the influence FDI.

FIGURE 20



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

Trade is statistically significant in the HIC model. A one unit change in trade as a percent of GDP increases the number of INGOs by .1%. However, this is a substantively minor change. An exponential increase in the percent of GDP derived from trade, would be required before adding a single INGO.

SUMMARY

The findings of this study raise questions about the explanatory power of the economic integration approach to global civil society expansion. Has the anti-globalization movement underestimate the degree of policy freedoms possible within an

economic liberalization agenda? The results are mixed. Neither of the variables, trade or FDI inflows, used to measure economic integration is statistically significant in the inclusive model. However, FDI is statistically significant for lower income countries and trade is statistically significant for high income countries, but the substantive change is so small as to make the findings weak.

These findings are not enough evidence to refute the economic integration explanation or the case study evidence, but they do encourage skepticism about global civil society's presumptive "white hat" status. Global civil society might not be the manifestation of Polanyi's double movement; instead global civil society might be motivated by its own material concerns such as self-preservation. The *raison d'être* for the anti-globalization movement is that they speak for those excluded from the benefits of economic liberalization. These findings indicate that a closer examination of global civil society's motives in the area of economic policy might be useful.

CHAPTER SIX: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY and National Capacity

The revolution will be televised, or at least tweeted. Interactive communications in a practically wireless world gives voice to the previously voiceless. Flash mobilization has played an important role in citizen uprisings. Examples of cyber activism include text messages inciting people into the streets during Manila's 2001 "People Power II" protests (Castells, et al. 2006); the efforts of the cyber hacktivist group Anonymous to protect net neutrality (Glasius and Players 2013); and most memorably, the viral video of Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation, which sparked the Arab Spring of protest (Al Jazeera 2011). A new era of global civil society activism has been born.

Advances in technology have drawn the world closer than even before. Global civil society has used these new tools to distribute information, to develop a common language for articulating demands, to encourage repertoires of contention, and to provoke action. The world could watch a live Facebook feed of the protests in Tahrir Square, producing instant awareness and possibly a sense of cyber-solidarity.

NATIONAL CAPACITY: LITERATURE REVIEW

This study tests competing explanations for the recent dynamic growth of global civil society in both numbers and influence against each other. However, it is possible that none of these normative theories actually explain the reason for global civil society's expansion. It is possible that democratic advancement, economic integration, and increased international political cooperation are all positive side effects of a modernizing world. Simply put, countries with more resources can support an active and growing global civil society. National capacity could explain most of the disparity between the

numbers of INGOs operating in developed nations as compared to developing nations. The national capacity explanation received theoretical support from modernization theory.

Modernization theory connects economic advancement with the institutionalization of property rights leading to demands for political rights. Modernization theory and civil society share a common concept that government and the market should be separate, allowing each to function in its own sphere. Instead of a normative justification, modernization scholars see individual utility as the organizing principle of civil society. Individuals seeking to maximize their utility will work collectively to improve the chances of achieving their objectives. Since the focus of this explanation is on the individual, this explanation easily extends civil society to a global phenomenon.

Modernization theory maintains that industrialization, urbanization, and economic development lead directly to positive social and political change represented in this case by a thriving civil society. “Thus the factors involved in modernization or economic development are linked to those which establish legitimacy and tolerance” (Lipset 1981, 79). Critics of modernization theory maintain that its structural-functional approach to development focuses on the system to the exclusion of agents whose power derives from their success in competing over limited resources (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992).

The first stage of modernization is for a country to abandon feudalism or other forms of caste organization. Individuals without ownership of their lives are incapable of

developing meaningful and lasting associations. Not all paths of modernization produce an environment conducive to the growth of civil society. Barrington Moore identified that economic modernization led by the middle classes was more likely to lead to a more open and inclusive society (Moore 1966).

“Capitalist development furthers the growth of civil society – by increasing the level of urbanization, by bringing workers together in factories, by improving the means of communication and transportation, and by raising the level of literacy. Strengthening the organization and organizational capacity of the working and middle classes serve to empower those classes and thus change the balance of class power” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992, 6).

On the other hand modernization led by elites will tend to lead to fascism. This path of modernization may exhibit the trappings of democracy including elections and the semblance of civil society, as seen in the Weimar Republic, but still exclude the poor and middle classes from full political participation. Elite led economic modernization completely lacks the associational freedoms necessary for a vibrant civil society due to the entrenched interest of the ruling elite (Moore 1966).

Technological advancements have reduced the cost of communication and travel, enabling individuals to act outside of national boundaries (Glasius and Players 2013). Nations face policy problems that defy unilateral solutions. Regional and global interconnectedness challenges the viability and accountability of unilateral decision-making. At the same time, supranational governing bodies reduce the range of decision-making options available to national governments (Evans 1997).

A sub-field of research on global civil society has explored the specific implications of technological on global civil society. “Interactive electronic communication, and practically wireless communication provides a powerful platform for

political autonomy” (Castells, et al. 2006, 266). Modern communication encourages people to speak out in more freely than ever before. Castells et al. also observed that the ease of communication reduces geographic distances; allowing members of a diaspora community to participate in social movement via the internet (Castells, et al. 2006).

Not unlike globalization itself, media activism is nothing new, but the recent manifestation is more interactive and independent than previous incarnations. Television provided vivid images of the suffering in the Cambodian killing fields and the Ethiopian famine (Sotharith 2002). Today’s media is different; never before has there been so much direct control over the timing and content of the coverage. With a smartphone, protestors can become their own reporters, videographer, and distributors, enabling them to circumvent media censorship and official government spin.

This new cyber-civil society is not without its limitations. The World Wide Web can overcome barriers of time and space, but at the same time it can obstruct authenticity. There is a logical reason why technologically enhanced experiences are referred to as virtual. They are not real, raising questions of the authenticity and durability of internet enhanced social movements. These “‘new’ social movements tend to emphasize long-term utopian visions over the attainment of immediate, concrete, and limited goals” (Glasius and Players 2013, 562). These pie in the sky aspirations can lead to frustration when these visions are not realized.

The digital divide is alive and well in global civil society. The internet has the potential to increase citizen participation by reducing the major barriers to participation, such as “no one asked”, “do not have enough time”, and “do not know enough about the

topic”. Internet campaigns can overcome all three of these barriers. A well-crafted email can entice citizens to want to take action; provide them with the justification for that action; provide them with the mechanism to take action; and allow them to take that action anytime day or night (Scholzman, Verba and Brady 2010). However, not everyone has access to these technological advancements. Socio-economic status is an essential determinant of political participation. A person’s status not only determines their ability to access the hardware necessary to benefit from technology, but it also influences that person’s capacity to comprehend complex policy issues (Scholzman, Verba and Brady 2010).

NATIONAL CAPACITY: HYPOTHESES

This study does not apply an orthodox interpretation of modernization theory, but uses it as the foundation for examining the resources necessary to support and maintain a flourishing civil society. To test this assumption this study includes measures of income, social development, urbanization, and technology in all three models.

Based on the national capacity explanation, we would expect to see a positive relationship between each of the variables measuring national capacity and global civil society. An increase in GDP means that a nation has the monetary resources to support global civil society, so an increase in GDP per capita should produce a corresponding increase in the number of INGOs operating in that country. Likewise increased access to technology reduces some of the costs of political participation. As the technology index for a particular country increases, so should the number of INGOs operating in that country. Countries with high level of social development will have more human capital

resources available to support global civil society development, so as the social development index increase so will the number of INGOs operating in that country. Lastly, as a country's population becomes more urban, their reliance on traditional arrangements of social support will be replaced by formal organization, often member of global civil society. As a result we should see the number of INGO increase as the percentage of people living in urban conditions also increases.

NATIONAL CAPACITY: VARIABLES

National capacity measures economic, social, and technical capacity to capture its influence on global civil society advancement. Economic capacity will be measured by GDP per capita. Social capacity is measured by urbanization and an index that includes measures of education and life expectancy. Technology capacity is measured by an index calculated based on the number of users of the internet and cellular phones.

Once again the World Bank Global Economic Indicators database provides the data for all variables measuring modernization. (World Bank 2012) Modernization in this study is focused on measuring the resources available for a country to support global civil society activity. Economic development is measured using gross domestic product per capita. While not a perfect measure of economic development, this variable is consistently calculated and available for most countries. The ability of a country to support global civil society through donations is reliant on a nation's wealth.

Social development is measured by a simple index incorporating life expectancy and percent of the population enrolled in secondary education. These two factors are intended roughly to assess the human capital of a country. The United Nations Human

Development Index (HDI), incorporates similar variables and includes a measure of quality of life gross national income (GNI) (United Nations Development Programme 2013). The current study chose to calculate an alternative index to reduce correlation with the GDP per capita measure and the HDI. In other words do countries have the organizational and intellectual capacity to support global civil society?

Urbanization is another indication of modernization. This study uses the percent of population living in urban environments. In modernization theory urbanization is seen as an indicator of a shift away from a primarily agrarian economy to a diversified economy. As people migrate from rural smaller communities to the larger cities, they are also moving away from tradition sources of social support such as the clan and toward less intimate sources such as churches, ethnic societies, and recreational clubs. In other words, a more urbanized population is more likely to rely on civil society to meet social needs.

Finally, technical modernization is also measured with a simple index including the number of internet and mobile phone users per 1000 people. There is a high correlation between internet and mobile phone use because many people access the internet using a mobile phone. For that reason an index was essential to minimize the distortion caused by high correlation. This variable is intended to measure the degree to which a country will benefit from reduced information and travel costs and participate in the new cyber civil society.


These variables are not only important for testing the national capacity explanation, but are essential to test for spuriousness in the other relationships. As

observed earlier global civil society tends to be concentrated in economically developed countries. If national capacity reduces the explanatory power of the other approaches, it is reasonable to assume that the relationships correlate with national wealth.

The box plots, below, illustrate the distribution and dispersion of the explanatory variables, as well as demonstrate the influence of outlying values. The horizontal line at the center of the box marks the median value. Whiskers indicate the relative extreme values. The individual points identify outlying values.

Since neither social development nor urbanization achieve statistical significance in any of the models those variables will not be discussed here. It is likely that their lack of significance could be attributed to the level of correlation between these variables and GDP.


FIGURE 21



Source: Union of International Associations and World Bank Global Economic Indicators

The box plot illustrates significant differences between global civil society operating in developed and developing countries. Developed countries are defined as countries with GDP per capita above the dataset median of \$2,224. Likewise developing countries are defined as countries with a GDP per capita at or below the dataset median. Developed countries host an average of three times as many INGOs (981) as developing countries (397). Developed countries also offer the widest variance in observations, while developing countries' observations tend to cluster around the mean.

FIGURE 22



Source: World Bank Global Economic Indicators

There is also a statistical difference in mean for the technology index. High tech countries are defined as those countries with a tech index score above the mean of -.098

and low tech countries are those countries with a tech index score below the dataset mean. High tech countries average nearly three times as many INGOs (1263) as low tech countries (543). The box graph also indicates that low tech have a smaller range than high tech countries. Outlying observations also influence the mean of low tech countries.

NATIONAL CAPACITY: RESULTS


National Capacity – a control thesis: As a country modernizes the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H4a - As a country's GDP, measured per capita, increases, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H4b - As the technological capacity, measured by number of internet and mobile phone users per 1000 people in a country, increases the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase.
H4c - As a country develops human capital, as measured by education and life expectancy, the number of INGOs operating in that country will increase
H4d – As a country becomes more urbanized the number of INGOs will increase.

In the inclusive model two of the four variables are statistically significant - wealth and access to technology. In the case of GDP per capita, a 100% increase in GDP per capita also increases the number of INGOs by 15%. Since GDP per capita tends to correlate with social development and urbanization, it is not surprising that other variables used to measure national capacity did not achieve statistical significance. (See Appendix)

In the case of access to technology a one unit change toward greater technological access on the index results in a 19% increase in the number of INGOs. A significant amount of literature has focused on the role that technology, particularly mobile

communication and internet access, has played in recent expression of global civil society. Mobile phones and social media were essential in coordinating the protests of the Arab Spring from Tunisia to Tahrir Square (Glasius and Players 2013).

FIGURE 23




Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

The national capacity explanation produces similar results to the LIC model. When GDP per capita increases by 100% it generates a 13% increase in the number of INGOs, which is less than the 15% increase seen in the INC model. On the other hand access to technology seems to have a greater impact on low income countries than it does on the world as a whole. For every one unit change toward greater use of technology on the index, the number of INGOs increase by 31% as compared to a 19% increase in the inclusive model. One possible explanation for this difference is second mover advantage. In less developed countries people are experiencing a qualitative difference in access,

moving from no phone access to a mobile phone as opposed to simply moving from landlines to a newer version of telecommunication.


FIGURE 24



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

In the HIC model none of the modernization variables achieve statistical significance this is likely because there is less variation in these variables among wealthier countries.

FIGURE 25



Sources: Union of International Associations, World Bank Global Economic Indicators, and the United Nations' Treaty Database

SUMMARY

The present study confirms that national capacity plays an important role in the growth of global civil society. The ease of the transfer of information has drawn the globe together as never before. The smart phone has made it possible for protestors to not only be activists but media outlets as well. While not every variable measuring national capacity was statistically significant, those that are produce substantive change in the number of INGOS; increasing the number of INGOS by 9-17%.

National wealth plays an important role in global civil society development. The result reported here supported by the variation in the results observed across the three models. Not only does GDP per capita achieve statistical significance in two of the three models, it produces the variation in results of another significant variables – technology. The results would indicate that technology’s impact reaches a tipping point and then produces less dynamic results. We see that technology has a profound influence on global civil society for less developed countries, where a one unit change in the tech index produces a 31% increase in the number of INGOs. However, technology is not statistically significant for high income countries.

CHAPTER SEVEN – Conclusion

In conclusion the current study successfully tested the four dominant explanations for the dynamic growth in number and influence of INGOs since mid-century: democratic expansion, political integration, economic integration, and national capacity. The inclusive model found that democracy, political integration, and national capacity variables significantly increased the observed number of INGOs, supporting three of the four explanations; only economic integration variables did not achieve statistical significance. The current study contributes significantly to our understanding of global civil society's motivation and provide insight into how well these explanations predict the distribution of INGOs globally. However, these findings are not without caveats and limitations. The following chapter will review the key findings and contributions of this study, while discussing its limitation and proposing a research agenda to address some of these limitations.

A critical finding of this study is that political integration overwhelmingly influences global civil society vitality. The political integration explanation is the only one to achieve statistical significance across all three models, with surprisingly dramatic increases in high income countries. The political integration results can be optimistically or pessimistically interpreted. The optimistic interpretation suggests that INGOs make global governance more responsive. By partnering with international governmental organizations, global civil society organizations insure that marginalized populations have a say in the implementation of international policy, if not in the formulation. As service providers they can customize programs to meet local needs and expectations.

Advocates of global civil society organizations have promoted global civil society's ability to preserve the environment, reduce poverty, and speak for the oppressed. What if the positive relationship between political integration and the number of INGOs is not the result of a more inclusive international political system, but instead the result of developed countries outsourcing their "noblesse oblige" to global civil society.

A more pessimistic interpretation of the political integration results is that global civil society organizations pursue missions that align with the available funding from international governmental organizations. For example, an organization interested in stopping the practice of dowry deaths in India might not find adequate funding to support this cause; however, this organization discovers significant funding available for programs encouraging political participation among women in India. As a result, its mission begins creeping away from the original intent to stop dowry deaths and toward matters of political empowerment. Both missions could improve the lives of women in India; nonetheless, the original problem of dowry deaths has become an afterthought.

Skeptics of global civil society have questioned the true altruism of global civil society organizations' actions. An organization needs to remain in business in order to accomplish its mission, yet when self-preservation becomes the focus of the organization its purpose is lost. Public/private partnerships become less genuine, when the private partner owes greater allegiance to the public funding source than to the beneficiaries of the services. These findings by no means discount the potential empowering contribution of global civil society to global governance, but they do cast enough doubt to encourage careful evaluations of public private partnerships.

These findings are especially useful in light of the second major contribution comprehensive testing of the explanation of global civil society growth. The vast majority of research on civil society has been narrowly focused, dealing with a small sampling of countries or a specific mission subsection of organizations. While these studies provide insight into a sub-section of global civil society, they are not generalizable to the sector as a whole. Studies that compare the nonprofit sector of developed countries can tell us little about how these organizations function in less developed countries. Studies of global civil society organizations focused on human rights can tell us little about those organizations committed to changing the global economy and vice versa.

Based on a survey of the literature, this study is only the second study to analyze a broad cross section of countries and use an inclusive definition of global civil society. As a result the findings of this study are informative about global civil society organizations working in any country addressing any policy area. This broad based approach is the best method for evaluating the competing explanations, because it is free from ideologically influenced subject selection. The findings contribute to the establishment of common ground to facilitate the sharing of research across disciplines and subject areas. These generalizable results do not undermine the more targeted research, but instead help establish theoretical framework for the sharing and comparing of targeted research.

A caveat to this research is the influence of national wealth on global civil society distribution. Nearly half of all INGO operate in the 27 developed countries including Australia, European countries, Canada, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom. As a result of this developed country dominance, national wealth plays a

significant role in global civil society distribution. This study measures national wealth using Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, which tends to be correlated with other measure of economic activity. To help adjust for this influence this study sought to confirm the findings by retesting the theories on two additional datasets that control for national income. Most of the findings were replicated; however, the results for democracy and economic integration were more income dependent.

A preponderance of global civil society research focuses on specific policy areas or cadres of countries. Such research provides depth of information, but sacrifices generalizability. In comparison the current study, sacrifices a degree of depth for generalizability. The finding of this study can be applied broadly to the global civil society as a whole, but by pursuing a broad understanding, it sacrifices some specifics of each of these organizations. For example, this study knows the overall number of INGOs operating in a country, but it does not know how many of those organizations provide social services, or provide recreational opportunities, or provide environmental protection. It is reasonable to assume that some of these theories may do a better job of describing a particular subset of global civil society organizations, rather than the sector as a whole.

At least one of the three models in this study finds support for each of the four explanations; however, the support for economic integration is weak. The democratic explanation has support from two of the three models. The inclusive model finds that democratic countries have more INGOs. This effect is also observed in the low income country model and produces a similar rate of increase. However, this effect is absent in the high income country model. A comparison of the findings indicates that global civil

society's relationship to democracy has a tendency to plateau. Once democracy reaches a level of stability, it no longer promotes significant growth. This finding should be further investigated to determine the tipping point for democratic governance. An analysis of global civil society in the newly democratizing countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia could provide that insight.

The political integration explanation offers the most dramatic findings. An increase of one INGO produces a 3% increase in the number of INGOs regardless of income level. Treaty adoption has a profound influence on INGO growth. For every 100% increase in the number of treaties signed, the number of INGOs increases by a little over a third for the inclusive and low income country models, and the effect nearly doubles to 60% in high income countries. The final variable, Net ODA per capita, is statistically significant in both the inclusive model and the low income country model; it is not significant in the high income country model because none of the observations have information. A 100% increase in Net ODA per capita increases the number of INGOs by 21% for all countries and by 33% for low income countries. A more detailed analysis of the composition of global civil society may help unravel the question of whether these results should be interpreted with an optimistic or pessimistic outlook. For example, if further analysis find more INGOs committed to an advocacy watchdog mission than to service delivery, the optimistic interpretation is more valid, but if further research observes more organizations dedicated to service delivery, such as healthcare or food pantries, then a more pessimistic interpretation might be warranted.

The results from the national capacity explanation, like the democracy results, indicate that national capacity, particularly national wealth, has a threshold for

encouraging global civil society development. This study finds that GDP per capita increases the number of INGOs in the inclusive model and for low income countries, but not for high income countries. A one percent increase in GDP per capita produces a 15% increase in the number of INGOs in the inclusive model and only a slightly smaller increase of 13% in low income countries. GDP per capita is not statistically significant for high income countries.

Technology, another measure of national capacity, is statistically significant in two models, but not statistically significant for high income countries. As citizens gain greater access to technology in the form of internet and cellular phone usage the number in INGOs increases. A one unit increase on the index increases the number of INGOs by 31% in low income countries; increases the number of INGOs by 19% in all countries. These findings support the conclusion that national capacity is initially critical to supporting global civil society growth, but become less influential as country's economy modernizes. Further study into the INGO growth in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, otherwise known as the BRICS, countries could provide additional detail to this general finding.

The results from the economic integration explanation provide the opportunity for further investigation. These results are interesting because of what they do not show. The models shows little statistical support for the economic integration explanation. Both variables measuring economic integration are not statistically significant in the inclusive model. The income specific models find statistical support for both trade and FDI, but not in the same model.

In the high income country model only trade as percentage of GDP is statistically significant for every unit increase in trade as a percent of GDP, the number of INGOs increases by less than one-tenth of one percent. In practical terms, for most countries, trade would need to contribute 10% more to GDP before adding a single INGO. Since the high income model includes countries with GDP measured in billions and trillions, this would take a massive increase in trade to produce a minimal change in the number of INGOs.

In the low income model FDI inflows, as a percent of GDP per capita, become statistically significant; every additional 1% of GDP contributed by FDI inflows increases the number of INGOs in that country by one-tenth of one percent. In practical terms FDI inflows would need to contribute 10% more to GDP before a single INGO would be added. Although GDP in this model is lower, measured in millions and not trillions, the total number of INGOs is also lower, so a comparably massive increase in FDI inflows is necessary to produce a minor change in the number of INGOs.

While these findings are at odds with the case studies in the anti-globalization social movement literature, the current study concedes that the lack of findings could be more technical than substantial. The real question at the heart of the anti-globalization movement is do countries sacrifice too much economic policy autonomy when they join the global economy and accept the neo-liberal doctrine of free trade and minimal regulations. Adherence to this doctrine restricts policy options available to national governments. This lack of policy autonomy is not limited to matters of tariffs and interest rates, but also to matters of worker and environmental protection. The variables used in this study might not accurately capture this lack of policy autonomy. Until a more

reliable measure of economic and fiscal policy freedom can be created at the national level, it might not be possible to test the economic integration explanation on a global level.

Correcting this measurement discrepancy suggests the need for further research. It might be possible to create an economy policy autonomy index, which could account for policies such as tariff rates, joint venture requirements, intellectual property enforcement, and relative strength of labor or environmental protections as a way to uncover the extent to which policy choices are actually curtailed by participation in the global economy. With this new measure studies could identify if global civil society actors organize efforts to counteract limitations in these specific policy areas.

This study does the unglamorous work of theory verification, providing the most inclusive analysis of global civil society and globalization. The results confirm that the relationships between democratic expansion, political integration, and national capacity are genuine and generalizable. This study contributed to the foundation of global civil society research. However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, to achieve generalizability this study necessarily sacrificed a degree of specificity. These general findings encourage additional focused research to add context, thereby enhancing the practical use of this research.

Appendix

Inclusive Model Correlation Results 1

```
. cor ngo polity2 igo treaty trade gdppc socdel pop tech urbanpop fdiin fdiout netodapc  
(obs=1281)
```

	ngo	polity2	igo	treaty	trade	gdppc	socdel	pop	tech	urbanpop	fdiin	fdiout
ngo	1.0000											
polity2	0.3305	1.0000										
igo	0.5142	-0.1464	1.0000									
treaty	0.7632	0.3271	0.4401	1.0000								
trade	-0.3060	-0.1145	-0.4171	-0.2481	1.0000							
gdppc	0.2795	0.0731	0.0293	0.1678	0.2628	1.0000						
socdel	0.4357	0.2373	0.0607	0.3260	0.1965	0.5736	1.0000					
pop	0.3717	-0.0921	0.1160	0.2912	-0.2343	-0.1321	0.0150	1.0000				
tech	0.3447	0.1660	0.0962	0.4385	0.1448	0.4428	0.4284	-0.0406	1.0000			
urbanpop	0.4086	0.1033	0.2939	0.2568	0.0499	0.5956	0.6430	-0.1479	0.2739	1.0000		
fdiin	-0.0699	0.0086	-0.2431	0.0186	0.3324	0.1227	0.2391	-0.0528	0.2599	0.1089	1.0000	
fdiout	0.0004	0.0201	-0.0201	0.0203	0.0758	0.1003	0.0601	-0.0124	0.1009	0.0259	0.0881	1.0000
netodapc	-0.3536	0.0093	-0.3485	-0.2938	0.1908	-0.0130	-0.0260	-0.1787	-0.0275	-0.0323	0.1761	0.0206
	netodapc											
netodapc	1.0000											

HIC Model Correlation Results 1

```
. cor ngo polity2 igo treaty trade gdppc socdel pop tech urbanpop fdiin fdiout netodapc  
(obs=370)
```

	ngo	polity2	igo	treaty	trade	gdppc	socdel	pop	tech	urbanpop	fdiin	fdiout
ngo	1.0000											
polity2	0.5087	1.0000										
igo	0.4948	0.0181	1.0000									
treaty	0.8196	0.6088	0.3912	1.0000								
trade	-0.3963	-0.2791	-0.4914	-0.3891	1.0000							
gdppc	-0.0416	-0.1874	-0.1661	-0.0340	0.3232	1.0000						
socdel	0.2373	0.1314	-0.0591	0.2448	0.1349	0.4365	1.0000					
pop	0.6469	0.2248	0.5562	0.5253	-0.4243	-0.2148	-0.0309	1.0000				
tech	0.3196	0.1640	0.1486	0.4559	0.0308	0.3062	0.2373	0.0205	1.0000			
urbanpop	0.2699	-0.2942	0.3078	0.0179	-0.0371	0.1835	0.2853	0.1549	-0.0736	1.0000		
fdiin	-0.0316	0.0203	-0.2152	0.0418	0.3331	0.2360	0.2338	-0.1400	0.2655	0.0131	1.0000	
fdiout	-0.0451	0.0302	-0.0415	0.0024	0.0798	0.0544	0.0399	-0.0480	0.1016	-0.0602	0.0674	1.0000
netodapc	-0.2457	-0.1596	-0.2725	-0.2166	0.1652	0.2228	-0.0192	-0.2612	-0.0762	0.0775	0.1315	0.0674
	netodapc											
netodapc	1.0000											

LIC Model Correlation Results 1

```
. cor ngo polity2 igo treaty trade gdppc socdel pop tech urbanpop fdiin fdiout netodapc
(obs=911)
```

	ngo	polity2	igo	treaty	trade	gdppc	socdel	pop	tech	urbanpop	fdiin	fdiout
ngo	1.0000											
polity2	0.1868	1.0000										
igo	0.5637	-0.2169	1.0000									
treaty	0.7451	0.1786	0.4559	1.0000								
trade	-0.3377	-0.0340	-0.4425	-0.1987	1.0000							
gdppc	0.2956	0.1752	0.0665	0.3015	0.1799	1.0000						
socdel	0.4095	0.2272	0.0453	0.3190	0.1921	0.5828	1.0000					
pop	0.5237	-0.1127	0.1109	0.3402	-0.2701	-0.1039	0.0887	1.0000				
tech	0.2541	0.1228	0.0559	0.4077	0.2029	0.5854	0.4425	-0.0153	1.0000			
urbanpop	0.3070	0.1892	0.3142	0.3051	-0.0121	0.6057	0.5921	-0.1307	0.3049	1.0000		
fdiin	-0.1029	0.0024	-0.2534	0.0081	0.3524	0.1662	0.2771	-0.0514	0.2809	0.1710	1.0000	
fdiout	0.0115	-0.0727	-0.0770	0.0609	0.1121	0.1092	0.0629	0.0229	0.1155	0.0381	0.4665	1.0000
netodapc	-0.3964	0.1013	-0.3658	-0.3092	0.2414	-0.0041	0.0432	-0.2112	0.0486	0.0250	0.1946	-0.0331
	netodapc											
netodapc	1.0000											

FIGURE 26: Regression Table

<p>Four Model Comparison</p> <p>Effects of Globalization on INGO Growth</p> <p>Prais-Winsten Regression (PCSEs)</p>								
	Inclusive INGO Model		Inclusive Democracy Model		High Income Country Model		Low Income Country Model	
Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
INGO (ln)	-	-	2.401183*	.5864354	-	-	-	-
Polity 2	.0167325*	.003069	-	-	.0085703	.0046458	.0140506*	.0029422
IGO	.0289845*	.0030545	-.119109*	.0200657	.0274337*	.0027277	.0301692*	.003089
Treaty (ln)	.3500274*	.0664361	1.214769*	.2560518	.5496883*	.0628047	.3290121	.0774111
Trade	-.0001913	.0003068	-.0060278	.0030896	.0009941*	.0004202	-.0006994	.0003788
GDP per capita (ln)	.1482396*	.0220378	-.2465446	.2524978	.0235005	.0269345	.1270463*	.024372
Social Development	.0182362	.0337553	.9047491*	.256568	-.0262297	.0227139	-.0266571	.0356361
Population (ln)	.1648962*	.0177808	-.4552569	.2264139	.0879157*	.0236055	.1733647*	.0187235
Technology	.1929986*	.055597	.9815896*	.4936424	.0294781	.0455365	.3103152*	.0998119
Urban Population	.0016656	.0014282	-.0140813	.01396	.0016741	.0017172	.0004428	.00320389
FDI in flow	.0007421	.000429	.0052329	.0050234	.000689	.0012214	.0010631*	.0004491
Net ODA per capital (ln)	.2149657*	.0488886	1.69794	.5196162	-	-	.3349334*	.0698122
N	2761		2761		1402		2255	
Group N	122		122		75		100	
Rsqr.	.97		.20		.98		.97	
Wald	6863.79		1431.52		4961.34		24959.77	
_cons	-1.853739*	.3871687	-15.42592*	4.43186	.6498611	.4319603	-2.337453	.480906
Rhos	.8559366	.8698936	.543256	.6725326	.2981332	.9044333	.8697335	.8678687
*P < 0.05								

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