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Joyce Marie Mushaben
mushaben@umsl.edu

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Innocence Lost: Environmental
Images and Political Experiences
Among the West German Greens

by

Joyce Marie Mushaben

INNOCENCE LOST: ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGES AND
POLITICAL EXPERIENCES AMONG THE WEST GERMAN GREENS

Joyce Marie Mushaben
Department of Political Science &
Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri 63121, USA

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The new [character of social movements] does not make its appearance as a comprehensive program, as a winged utopia, as an irresistible wave; rather, it manifests itself as an expression of doubt with respect to current conditions, as an apprehensive search for a more fulfilling way of life, as new forms of human communication, as citizen initiatives against large-scale technocratic insanity, as an argument involving [those developments] that have not yet been argued against, as a new map [for society] upon which no final destination has yet been drawn, one that indicates in any event the very next stopping point and the township after that.

--Erhard Eppler

Wege aus der Gefahr

A "failed connection" between established political parties as the agents of representative government, on the one hand, and the requisites of the "New Politics" grounded in quality-of-life issues, on the other, has contributed to an increase in the protest potential found within the West European industrial states.¹ For many environmental protesters of the 1980's, nuclear power has become a European metaphor for the destructive forces of unbridled

technological development and unrestricted corporate growth. Among elements of the newly formed ecology or "Green" parties, in particular, nuclear technology simultaneously invokes the images of Hiroshima, the China Syndrome, the Pentagon, Big Science and Big Business in collusion with Big Government; it moreover calls forth visions of economic exploitation and mass deprivation associated with arms sales to Third World nations.

In surveying what now appears to be a rather well-entrenched coalition of environmental, peace and anti-nuclear groups, one is tempted to presume a degree of continuity exists between protest movements past and present. At issue is whether or not the veterans of protest from the late sixties and early seventies have reemerged from their respective political closets, intent on rallying a "successor generation" to address long-standing social grievances.

Leftist protesters of the 1960's campaigned for radical system transformation. Their frustrations, anger and critiques were directed against the performance failures of the capitalist system per se. Their sense of urgency has persisted, but it is no longer based on the idealism of protests past, but rather on the will to preempt the next crisis, for fear that it could be the last. The scale, the scope and the quasi-institutionalized character of the protest events that have charged the political climate since 1980 suggest the presence of something new, as well as something borrowed. Against the backdrop of the relative ideological purity that ultimately led to the self-destruction of the sixties' movements, protesters of the eighties appear to comprise a rather motley crew. They are inclined to form ostensibly bizarre coalitions around a complex of disparate issues; on occasion they have been known to adopt contradictory strategies and tactics. In the process of adopting and assimilating new protest themes, subsequent generations of

political activists have nevertheless become increasingly conscious of a need to express their opposition to specific policies through behaviors consonant with their substantive goals. What is striking about this new wave of protesters is that they seem committed to taking on the powers-that-be on their own turf, the environmentalist David assaulting the capitalist Goliath. They call for a transformation from within, rather than the overthrow of "the system." Nuclear anxieties and postmaterialist values, e.g., the emphasis on self-actualization and greater individual autonomy, have effected significant changes in attitudes towards participation and protest among citizens at large. They have called forth a new sensitivity with respect to environmental issues, along with new images of progress and reform.

This essay attempts to develop a catalogue of images critical to the evolution of the Green and Alternative movements in the Federal Republic of Germany. Locating the roots of contemporary peace and ecology movements in the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (APO) experiences of the fifties and sixties, the first section addresses the question of linkages between anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons groups of the eighties; these links are seen to derive from shared organizational and political learning experiences. The second section discusses the emergent body of environmental images prevalent among the Greens, focusing on the constructs of Ökopax, Ökopolitik, Ökosozialismus and Ökotechnik (that is, Eco-peace, Eco-politics, Eco-socialism and Eco-technology, respectively). The essay concludes with a short synopsis of basic economic, political and environmental relations that apparently bind protesters to the system while also enabling them to pursue a rapidly evolving Eco-ideology.

I. NEW PROTESTS, NEW POLITICS AND NUCLEAR POWER

Protest sentiment in the Federal Republic reached an all-time postwar

high during the "hot autumn" of 1983, both in terms of the intensity of the debate and the extent of citizen participation in protest events held throughout the country. Targeted against the 1979 NATO decision to deploy additional theater nuclear forces in Western Europe, a rapidly mobilized peace movement was quick to find its roots in a thirty-year tradition of peace and extra-parliamentary protest.² Peace protests gained momentum in 1952 in conjunction with proposals set forth by Occupation officials for the possible rearmament of Germany under an integrated NATO command structure. Drawing support from pacifist factions within the Lutheran Church as well as from the ranks of the German Trade Union Federation, mobilization efforts intensified in 1957 when it was learned that rearmament would not be limited to conventional weapons -- in fact, by March, 1957 it was discovered that a number of American-supplied tactical nuclear weapons had already been deployed on West German soil.³ Opposition became quasi-institutionalized (with identifiable national "leaders") by way of a "Fight Atomic Death Campaign" that attracted thousands of participants between 1957 and 1959.

By 1958 nuclear arms opponents began to realize that protests articulated through the normal channels of parliamentary debate, petitions, referenda and public opinion surveys were unlikely to compel a positive response from Konrad Adenauer, the "Chancellor of the Allies." After losing a critical Bundestag vote in late 1957, anti-deployment activists resorted to a strategy of "extra-parliamentary" mobilization that included such tactics as silent marches, nation-wide May-Day demonstrations and work stoppages. Support from the Social Democratic Party declined rapidly following a series of electoral losses at the Länder level, and the forces of organized labor withdrew not too long thereafter.

It was a 1958 Federal Constitutional Court decision prohibiting

Land-level plebiscites on the nuclear issue that led to the movement's ultimate demise. In retrospect, the "Fight Atomic Death Campaign" nevertheless proffered an important learning experience for subsequent protest generations. In shifting to unconventional forms of political articulation and assembly, once the normal channels for participation no longer guaranteed recourse, anti-nuclear activists of the 1950's set an important precedent for a second wave of protesters that emerged in the late 1960's.

Cold War tensions between the superpowers increased considerably at the outset of the sixties, but the domestic scene remained relatively quiet (by German standards) during the early part of the decade. Two major exceptions were the reactions to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the mobilization of the Easter March movement, modeled after the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. The Easter Marches initially served as a forum for protests of conscience revolving around a vaguely defined peace issue but later developed into a vehicle for manifesting opposition to specific security policies (after a twelve year pause, the Marches were revived in 1982). Profiting from the spread of German student protests, March coordinators witnessed a rapid expansion of their organizational base and, consequently, a marked increase in their mobilizational capacities.

Rebaptized the Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament, the Easter March movement underwent a substantive transformation as more participants joined in the struggle against new "Emergency Powers" legislation deliberated by the Bundestag in May, 1968. The new laws were seen to add significantly to the powers of the Chancellor in the event of a national crisis; this was construed by opponents as a first step in the preparation for West German involvement in Vietnam through NATO.⁴ Anti-Emergency Powers groups joined students and others in opposing Bonn's support for the Shah's regime in Iran and backing of

American engagements in Southeast Asia. This fusion of causes and groups gave birth to a new school of protest-thought more critical of the system as a whole; its outward manifestation was an Extra-parliamentary Opposition movement -- Ausserparlamentarische Opposition or APO, as it was dubbed by its constituents. While Willy Brandt's election to the Chancellorship in 1969 raised the reformist expectations of some, the formation of the Grand Coalition (1969-1972) was judged by others to have eliminated the prospects for voicing "fundamental opposition" within the parliamentary chambers themselves: hence, dissenters perceived a need to step outside the established institutions for greater political leverage.⁵

What began as a "free speech" movement at the universities soon became a campaign for a more radical democratization of major political and economic institutions; this theme -- implying an assault on monopoly capitalism -- was soon meshed with opposition to alleged American-imperialist encroachment in Vietnam. An ambitious university expansion and reform program was scaled down considerably (for reasons described at length elsewhere),⁶ and the Vietnam War ended rather abruptly in 1972; the level of mobilization among campus leftists was still quite high, their ideological fragmentation notwithstanding. About this time, the newly elected social democratic-liberal coalition announced its intention to continue with a major nuclear energy plant construction program; it was caught off guard when thousands of critical, politicized, newly enfranchised citizens suddenly shifted their protest focus and redirected their organizational skills against nuclear power and environmental hazards. The economic shock waves generated by the 1973 oil embargo made the Bonn coalition all the more determined to continue the development of indigenous nuclear energy capabilities, despite growing opposition. The post-embargo recession put a virtual halt to the university expansion program just as an

explosion in student enrollments was in full swing; hence, the universities remained a caldron of political disaffection and potential recruitment grounds for ongoing movements.

Many of those who had contributed to the "spirit of '69" nonetheless completed their personal marches through the academic institutions and moved on to the labor market, and to "real life" issues as well. Between 1972 and 1977, West German society witnessed a transfer of protest momentum from one social movement to another, as students, farmers, feminists, experienced pacifists and blooming ecologists found common cause in the threat of environmental destruction. A new form of protest organization emerged, namely, locally-based citizen action groups or Bürgerinitiativen (described below). Residents' opposition to nuclear energy plants at specific sites, in particular, was a driving force in the proliferation of protest initiatives at the local and regional levels.

The younger, university-educated segments of the movement began to emphasize what they considered to be a logical connection between the dangers inherent to both the civilian and military applications of nuclear technology. Leftist and pacifist groups of the fifties and sixties, in contrast, had responded more or less supportively to atomic research for civilian purposes ("Atoms for Peace"), at the same time rejecting outright nuclear research and development of a military character.⁷ While radical trade union elements brought much of the German Trade Union Federation in line with the anti-atomic marchers of the fifties and sixties and solidified the protest-bonds during the anti-emergency laws campaign, the spectre of mass unemployment split the protest front a half decade later; many individual unions were seen to forge coalitions with pro-nuclear power forces, especially after the 1973 energy crisis.

Throughout the seventies, the organizational tactics as well as the issue focus proved much more effective in rallying the forces of protest with respect to the Anti-Nuclear Energy movement (AKK) than had the student and pacifist movements of earlier decades. Successful (at least temporarily) efforts to block plant construction at Wyhl, Brokdorf, Grohnde, and elsewhere conveyed the lesson that smaller, locally based groups were able to mobilize more demonstrators, much faster. Organizers learned that a decentralization of protest activities generated alternative sources of information for consciousness-raising purposes; it also proved less intimidating to less well educated supporters whose lives were nonetheless directly affected, e.g., area farmers, elderly nature lovers. Smaller units moreover presented an antidote to a growing sense of bureaucratic alienation and disillusionment with the SPD at the national level. Thus, it can be argued that dissatisfaction with policy outcomes, and a growing demand for more citizen participation in the policy process gave the AKK movement a dual causa belli.

The first "citizen initiative" groups formed during the late sixties (opposing highway construction through a certain neighborhood, or establishing "anti-authoritarian" day care centers, for example) were viewed at the outset as political action committees appended to a not-yet-entrenched SPD; their activism in the environmental field, especially, was expected to complement efforts to add this plank to the party's platform. By the mid-seventies, the Bürgerinitiativen (BI's) had become an autonomous force; in view of Bonn's commitment to nuclear power, they assumed the role of a reincarnated extra-parliamentary opposition in their dealings with the "system parties."⁸

By 1980, there were an estimated 38,000 such BI's in the Federal Republic, claiming a collective membership of 2-3 million, backed by some 15 million "sympathizers."⁹ They are loosely housed under a national

Confederation of Citizen Initiatives for Environmental Protection (BBU) forged by 15 local groups in 1972 (now over 1,000) to serve as a communicating, coordinating, networking center. Their ranks include many former activists from the APO/Long March generation. Membership studies indicate that participants share upper-middle class backgrounds; they are highly educated, often scientifically savvy, critically conscious and self-confident with respect to their own political-organizational skills.¹⁰ Over the last ten years, BI activists have gradually developed a more systematic political critique of the perils and costs of unrestricted economic growth and technological, nuclear-based destruction of the environment -- a theme they have come to share with the born-again peace movement.

Reignited by the NATO Double Decision of 1979, the current anti-nuclear weapons movement evinces far less ideological purity than did the peace groups of two decades ago. Comprising the grassroots of what has loosely been labeled "the movement" is a strong religious component, an expanding ecological component, and a small but influential "alternative culture" movement. Thus far, the peace movement appears to have passed through three identifiable mobilization phases. Insecurity based on rising unemployment figures and outbursts of youth unrest set the stage for initial surges of peace protest in June, 1981 when some 150,000 uninvited youth descended upon the 19th annual Congress of the German Evangelical Church in Hamburg. Grounded in a growing, albeit amorphous sense of existential Angst, this wave peaked in a nonviolent demonstration of 300,000 church and ecology group activists in Bonn on October 10, 1981. Statements attributed to Ronald Reagan concerning the prospects for a conceivably "winnable," limited nuclear war later that month gave rise to a second phase, during which nuclear Angst acquired a concrete foundation as Central European residents discerned how

"flexible response" would affect them. Additional ecological, political and professional groups began to ally themselves publicly with the peace cause; their efforts culminated in the June, 1982 anti-Reagan demonstrations in Bonn and Berlin. An ex officio national Coordinating Committee dominated the third stage, when Helmut Kohl's election to the Chancellorship in March, 1983 cleared the path for the initial Pershing II deployments at the end of the year. This stage -- saying "No" to a specific NATO decision -- climaxed with a nationwide "Action Week," October 15-22, 1983 that rallied 2-4 million direct participants. The Coordinating Committee, which began to experience splits along traditional lines (i.e., church groups backing away from hard-core communists and violence-prone "autonomous" groups, ecology groups who feared cooptation by Social-Democratic elements), disbanded in November, 1984. Local and regional mobilization efforts are continuing on both the religious and ecological/alternative fronts, often overlapping.

The Green Party, formally constituted as a national party in 1980, has played an important role, but not the dominant role in the resurgent peace movement. Against the backdrop of an estimated 2-3 million peace movement activists, die Grünen boast an official membership of roughly 25,000-30,000; a larger percentage of supporters identifies with the Social Democratic Party.¹¹

Nonetheless, by projecting themselves as the explicitly political wing of the ecology movement and as the only party waging an unqualified opposition campaign against recent and future deployments, the Greens have made impressive electoral gains over the last five years. This is especially true at the state and local levels, the spring, 1985 defeats in the Saarland and in Northrhine-Westphalia notwithstanding.¹²

Resurrected political causes, critical consciousness and newly acquired organizational skills are now being rechanneled into the political

establishment through the Green, Ecology and Alternative Parties that have taken root not only in the Federal Republic, but in Sweden, Britain, France, and Italy as well.¹³ The electoral peculiarities of the combined single-member district and proportionately representative party-list ballots used in the FRG have unlocked the doors to new parties; but the numerical imperative of the "5 percent clause" prevented the Greens from crossing this threshold at the national level until 1983. Regional and local progress has nonetheless been substantial. Pro-ecology parties have thus far attained legislative seats in Hamburg (1978), Bremen (1979), in the CDU-stronghold of Baden-Württemberg (1980), in Berlin (1981), Hesse (1981), Lower Saxony (1982) and Schleswig-Holstein (1983). Continentally, the Greens generated 3.2 percent in the first direct elections to the European Parliament (1979), followed by an impressive 8 percent showing in 1984.

Having attained national representation for the first time in March, 1983 (27 seats in the Bundestag), the Greens remain a very loose confederation of pro-ecology, anti-nuclear, grassroots democrats who lack a coherent ideological base in the traditional (e.g., Marxist) sense. Characterizing themselves -- still -- as an "anti-party party," they are as committed to a radical democratization of the established decision-making structures and procedures, as they are insistent that substantive policy outcomes rest on "deep-ecology" principles.¹⁴ To these ends, they have adopted a dual strategy: as an official party, they are undertaking the "long march through the institutions" of government to achieve the latter; as an anti-party, their key responsibility is to enhance the strength and to open new channels for participation sought by the extra-parliamentary opposition qua citizen initiative forces.

The relative strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures of the

aforementioned movements leading up to the founding of the Greens cannot be analyzed in detail here. At a minimum, however, it can be argued that the coalition-building skills, the sense of political efficacy and the demands for greater citizen participation -- all of which have contributed to the fusion of diverse protest movements in recent years -- are indicative that the political culture of the Federal Republic has undergone a fundamental transformation since May 8, 1945. While ecology has clearly become their pivotal focus, neither the Greens' political objectives nor their images of postindustrial society are limited to the environmental dimension. I now turn to examine four dominant classes of images being advanced by the West German Greens, the rudiments of an emerging Eco-ideology.

II. ECO-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE RISE OF THE SUPERINDUSTRIAL STATE

A. Organizational dynamics

The Green and Alternative List (AL) Parties are tied to each other and to many additional protest groups by virtue of their common emphasis on autonomy, direct participation, solidarity, environmental compatibility, transparency of decision-making and variety. Diversity is reflected in the fact that there are free-Greens, red-Greens, brown-Greens, black-Greens and multicolored-Greens, though members have tried to avoid splits along ideological lines by proclaiming they move "neither left nor right but forwards."¹⁵ Disparate positions regarding the acceptability of more radical direct action tactics and the role of violence produced significant confusion among the ranks during the early eighties, although this issue has apparently since been laid to rest.¹⁶ The Alternative List-Berlin best exemplified this ambivalent stance in midsummer, 1982. After expressing its public support for an illegal anti-Reagan demonstration involving punks, squatters and assorted "autonomous" radicals, the AL had to crawl out from under the debris --

literally and figuratively -- following a retaliatory firebombing of its headquarters.¹⁷

Even more significant, however, is the ongoing struggle between the Party's two major factions, the environmental Fundamentalists or "Fundis" and the political pragmatists or "Realos." The main point of contention is whether or not Greens would compromise their own principles and betray grassroots elements by joining in a coalition with the Social Democratic Party. The "Fundis" are unwilling to accept formal positions within such a government under any circumstances, while the "Realos" would be willing to participate under specific conditions. The tendency up to now has been to "tolerate" a minority SPD government; two of the more actively cooperative experiments conducted in Hamburg and Hesse lasted less than a year. Now that the SPD has proved capable of securing an absolute majority in the Saarland and in Northrhine-Westphalia (spring 1985), the question may become a moot one. "Moderate" Greens who stand opposed to a reideologization and renewed left-right polarization (in contrast to an ecology-first orientation) distance themselves from the orthodox communists, the "relics of yesteryear." Formerly called the K-groups, the latter have nonetheless carved out their own intra-party niches, now labeled "Group Z."¹⁸

With respect to the "failed connection" mentioned at the outset of this essay, one can argue that through the late 1970's and early 1980's (given the resurgence of protest and the violence associated with it), that the West German SPD seemed to expend more energy distancing itself from its own radical youth wing, the Jusos, than it did cultivating new recruits. SPD executive director Peter Glotz summarized the problem thus: "The Party awakened false hopes that parties could change lives and alter the relationships among human beings."¹⁸ With respect to recent German developments, Glotz and others now

picture a society divided into "two cultures" -- the political establishment and the "alternative scene."

Who or what is "alternative" has consequently become the new 64 million D-Mark question, as political scientist and Netzwerk Selbsthilfe cofounder Joseph Huber points out. The "alternative" spectrum encompasses a plethora of "people, milieus, motives and opinions."²⁰ The "second culture" appears to consist of three strata, with three strategic orientations. Neither the Long March nor the APO strategy has been completely abandoned by the politically disillusioned of the eighties. Their strategic repertoire has in a way been expanded by the addition of the "drop-out" option. The last category is not limited to the teen and squatter scene. A more low-profile variety includes many former sixties' activists and once-radical commune dwellers. These individuals live in Wohngemeinschaften, buy their Müsli and bread in alternative shops, patronize cooperative bookstores, read only newspapers from leftist presses, baby-sit in anti-authoritarian day-care centers, work in small self-organized businesses, view old Bogart movies in "off-cinemas," and are ultimately proud of the fact that they have had no contact with "the outside" for several years.²¹ Among the consciously organized groups, a few are radicalized, some operate nation-wide; many are depoliticized, all are decentralized and decidedly post-materialistic. Those who continue to engage in politics locate along an ideological spectrum stretching from left-wing social democratic, to radical democratic, to anti-parliamentarian.

Alternative groups concern themselves with everything from religious sects to therapy groups, from agricultural life-styles to urban welfare services, from civil liberties to Third World initiatives. Huber estimates that there are over 11,500 projects in the FRG, involving 80,000 activists. If all sympathizers are taken into account, the figure falls between

300,000-400,000. The breakdown of project types finds 12 percent devoted to "production," 70 percent to "services" and 18 percent pursuing "political work"; 29 percent entail handwork, 71 percent of the projects call for mental labor.²² From this vantage point, the amount of media coverage devoted to the estimated 25,000-30,000 registered Greens over the last few years has been quite disproportionate to the degree of influence they actually command within the alternative, protest and citizen initiative movements. A similar disproportion exists with respect to the Greens and the West German peace movement, the dimensions of which I now turn to consider.

B. Okopax

For obvious historical reasons and because of its now-powerful standing within the European Community, the Federal Republic has come to occupy a pivotal position among the Western peace movements. A widescale deployment of Soviet SS-20's carried out in 1977-78 induced then-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt -- an outspoken opponent of nuclear weapons during the 1950's -- to push for a US response to the Warsaw Pact modernizations. The outcome of subsequent discussions, based on perceptions of Soviet nuclear superiority in the European theater, was the NATO "two-track" decision of December 12, 1979.

The kaleidoscopic nature of the anti-nuclear protest coalition dictated a lowest common denominator strategy in the determination of peace movement goals in the FRG through 1983: the single shared objective was the prevention of the initial deployments following the breakdown of US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva. The common conviction was and remains that additional theater nuclear forces will render the Federal Republic a "ground zero" in the event of a superpower confrontation. But the tactical questions regarding the future course of the movement are unresolved, now that the "minimal consensus" on No-to-Pershings has self-destructed. Individual groups hold conflicting

opinions with respect to the desirability of unilateral or multilateral disarmament agreements. They differ internally as well as externally as in regard to the definition of parity and the logical limits of deterrence. Supporters are divided over whether or not to demand simultaneous reductions in the Eastern bloc, and uncertain how to deal with nuclear proliferation in the Third World. No clear answer emerges to the question whether or not a build-up of conventional forces offers a morally or politically acceptable alternative. Nor does one discern a single position with respect to the feasibility of a nuclear-free zone, prospects for alternative defense concepts or the inevitability of a political-bloc concept of security. It has therefore been necessary for organizers to avoid mobilizing around a single political party, which could put an end to the tenuously balanced mass base. Emergent tensions are nonetheless judged to be less lethal than the prospects of a nuclear exchange. Perhaps the movement's most important contribution to date rests with the fact that it has ended a 40-year tabu on a public debate of national security issues.

Green images bearing on the relation between peace and ecology are intellectually grounded in the works of Robert Jungk, Jonathan Schell and Erhard Eppler. Jungk's 1977 book, Der Atomstaat, painted a vision of advanced industrial futures dominated by "nuclear energy imperialism," the hazards of which allegedly know no bounds.²³ In spelling out the relationship between the need for guaranteed energy supplies and questions of national security, Jungk maintained almost a decade ago:

From now on, any discussion of nuclear technology must confront the issue that there cannot be any separation of its peaceful and military implications. Recognition of this fact has come slowly -- perhaps too slowly -- but the weight of experience allows no other

conclusion.²⁴

Hence, "eco-peace" evinces both an international and a domestic component. The focus is not limited to the potential destruction of the physical environment, but also encompasses a grave threat to civil liberties in light of possible acts of nuclear terrorism or domestic sabotage. Jungk sounded the ominous warning, "clearly, the atomic age is made to order for totalitarian states. Such governments are not plagued by citizens' inquiries or protests."²⁵ He anticipated "the creation of a new type of man or woman who would function as tirelessly, insensitively, and automatically as a cog in a machine" -- the "liveware" (as opposed to "hard" or "software") of nuclear technology.²⁶

Schell's reflections on The Fate of the Earth have supplied the biological underpinnings for the fears of nuclear destruction among European ecologists already fueled by the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979.²⁷ Schell develops the empirical case for Jungk's thesis that the major difference between nuclear destruction and other industrial or toxic accidents rests with the complete irreversibility and the much longer range nature of the consequences such an "accident" will inevitably produce. The prospects of a "nuclear winter" represent the ultimate linkage between peace and ecology policies pursued by national governments, thus linking domestic with international concerns.

In his search for "the ways out of danger," Eppler has echoed many of the connections outlined in the Brandt Commission's North-South Report, emphasizing the threat to global peace posed by arms proliferation, capital exploitation and human suffering in underdeveloped nations.²⁸ Formerly a high ranking Social Democratic Party official, Eppler stresses the relation between domestic unrest and the lack of meaningful employment opportunities at home.

He moreover dismisses as untenable the proposition that disarmament can be achieved only through the development and deployment of ever more horrendous and sophisticated weapons systems, based on depersonalized, computerized Techno-Commandos intended to sanitize the ultimate political-military decision.

Eppler also touches upon a dimension of the "Okopax" phenomenon that has gained in salience and notoriety over the last few years, namely, the German-national or "neutro-nationalist" thrust behind the peace movement. Survey data indicate that Greens and their supporters are interested in decoupling German foreign policy priorities from the self-interested, globalized wranglings of the two superpowers. A 1981 survey showed that 70 of 100 Green voters were prepared to become or already were actively involved in the peace movement; while 52 percent rejected the NATO Double Decision in particular, 82 percent supported the concept of a neutral Germany in general, committed to neither the Atlantic nor the Warsaw alliance, only a slight drop from the 85 percent who oppose outright the construction of additional nuclear energy plants.²⁹ The emphasis on a German withdrawal from NATO is not universally shared by constituent groups within the peace movement, however. A February, 1983 poll analyzed by Rattinger found 73 percent of the Greens questioned (66 percent for the SPD and FDP, and 40 percent for the CDU, respectively) opposed to any new deployments in the FRG. Asked whether NATO is/is not necessary for German security in May, 1983, 56 percent of the Greens responded affirmatively, 43 percent negatively.³⁰

The Federal Republic has witnessed a proliferation of public opinion surveys on security-related topics since 1980. The fact that during the preceding thirty five years, citizens had virtually no say in either the decisions to deploy theater nuclear forces or to develop nuclear energy capabilities has figured significantly in the political image advanced by the

Greens, considered next.

C. Ökopolitik

The Greens recognize ongoing threats to the eco-system as the product of a persisting set of sociopolitical power relations; in short, what policies are adopted are seen as a function of how political decisions are formulated and implemented. The quality of a democracy is perceived to depend on its ability to fulfill a number of substantive as well as procedural prerequisites simultaneously. The political and programmatic alternatives advocated by the Greens are founded upon four "pillars": the New Politics will be ecological, conducive to social welfare, decided in a grassroots, non-violent manner (ökologisch, sozial, basisdemokratisch, gewaltfrei). Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, Joseph Huber, and Martin Janicke offer cogent summaries of Basisdemokratie as a statement of principles for a threefold democratization. At issue are 1) the extension of participatory rights throughout advanced industrial society at large; 2) the redefinition of party-representation and majority-minority relations within parliament; and 3) the establishment of greater party-internal democracy. Time and space constraints permit only a brief synthesis of their findings here.³¹

In their 1980 federal platform, the Greens defined grassroots politics as a development leading to the strengthened implementation and actualization of decentralized, direct democracy, in a way that ensures the Basis (grassroots) pre-eminent influence in the decision-making process. Decentralized units, easy to monitor and electorally accountable at township or county levels are to be guaranteed autonomy and the right to self-determination.³²

With respect to the democratization of society-at-large, Green supporters call for the repeal of numerous statutes inhibiting free speech (specifically, §88a, §90a and §130a of the Criminal Code) that have frequently been invoked

by the state to intimidate citizens protesting nuclear energy and construction of the now infamous airport runway in Frankfurt, Startbahn-West.³³ They call for a strengthening of the federalist principle, to warrant a steady flow of financial resources to the regional, communal and local levels, and for increased access to the information collected and used by state and county-level officials for the purpose of land-use planning. At least one faction also expresses strong support for more frequent utilization of polling, referenda and other plebiscitarian instruments. Finally, eco-politicos recognize the need to democratize economic as well as state power structures through extended participatory rights at the workplace.

The 1983 national elections allocated 27 seats (5.6 percent) to the Greens, entitling them to active participation in the Bundestag for the first time since their founding in 1980. While direct representation in parliament can be construed as a major mobilizational victory, the Greens view their involvement in parliament as but one aspect of their commitment to a dual political strategy. Although they continue in the sixties' tradition of instigating a "long march through the institutions," the Greens ascribe only secondary importance to their parliamentary engagement; the more important function of engaging citizens in acts of extra-parliamentary opposition rests with the Burgerinitiativen who comprise their electoral constituency. Labeled everything from an "Anti-Party Party" to a "Party of the New Type," the Greens-in-Parliament remain half movement-half party, committed to the role of "fundamental opposition," their ambivalence regarding coalition politics notwithstanding. The Greens seek to destroy the "information barriers" erected by self-interested bureaucrats, lobbyists and establishment-oriented media, in an effort to render parliamentary decision-making more transparent. In stark contrast to the anti-democratic charges mounted against them by

leading elements of the "system parties," Green supporters argue that an extra-parliamentary emphasis should not be equated with an anti-parliamentary orientation. The need to identify with a party of their own making sooner indicates a fundamental commitment to democratic institutions and constitutional principles.³⁴

Ecopolitical elements argue that an internal democratization of existing party structures is a prerequisite for the maximization of external participatory opportunities. Hence, measures to attain a higher level of internal party democracy have led the Greens to adopt six rules for the establishment of a "party organization of the new type." They include: 1) Mitgliederoffenheit - Membership and participation in official meetings committees and plenary sessions are open to all. 2) Imperatives Mandat - Parliamentary delegates are required to vote "the party line" at all times, as determined by the membership plenum. 3) Rotation - All political offices are subject to the rotation of their respective occupants, on a two to six year basis, whereby an individual office-holder may be granted a one-time-renewal under extraordinary or extenuating circumstances. 4) Keine Ämterhäufung - No accumulation or simultaneous office holding is permitted, e.g., combining posts in party and government or entertaining a position of leadership at both the local and regional level. 5) Ehrenamtlichkeit - Office holders are entitled to compensation for official expenses; in some cases they may receive a salary amounting to no more than the average wage of a skilled laborer. The remainder of one's MP earnings are paid into the party coffers to cover extraparliamentary expenses. Delegates are not permitted to collect consulting fees or personal honoraria. 6) Minderheitenschutz - Protection of minority groups within the party is to follow from the procedural emphasis on consensus building, in contradistinction to the majority vote principle.³⁵

In theory, all decision-making occurs on the basis of the consensus principle; debate in the local and plenary assemblies (Mitgliederversammlungen) continues until a common position emerges. With two years' experience in the Bundestag and three to five years of direct engagement at the land and local levels now behind them, the costs of a strict adherence to these principles have become all too apparent (e.g., lack of experience). In particular, the rotation principle has generally been subjected to reformulation to permit delegates to complete at least one full term.

Elected representatives are often caught between internal direct-democratic procedures (requiring them to check back frequently with the Basis), on the one hand, and the imperatives of the parliamentary process (calling for an emergency or unscheduled vote), on the other. A decision to abstain until a consensus has evolved at the grassroots may sooner serve the purposes of an even less acceptable partner than the SPD, namely, the CDU government. Orders to boycott specific parliamentary debates in those instances where all the available policy alternatives are deemed unacceptable by the base denies Green delegates the right to be taken seriously as legislators in the long run. The anti-professionalization stance that is implicit in the rotation principle hinders effective parliamentary action, as delegates have already discovered with respect to the Bundestag committees and caucuses where most of the legislation tends to be pre-formulated. Furthermore, the larger the regionally-based parties grow, the harder it will be to adhere to "fundamentally-democratic" decision procedures. Consensus is much harder to reach in a plenum of several thousand than in one of several hundred. Michels' spectre of oligarchy lurks in the political wings.

The ultimate barrier to a redistribution of political resources and

opportunities, however, is just as likely to lie in the structure of economic power, where a number of alternative conceptions have also begun to evolve.

D. Ökosozialismus

Critics have sought to disparage the Greens among potential, more conservative constituencies by designating them a "melon party" -- green on the outside, red on the inside. The juxtaposition of an environmental focus and an ideological consciousness becomes especially evident in the debate over ecological preservation versus economic growth. Green elements are fairly united in their rejection of Western monopoly capitalism and the perpetuation of socio-economic inequalities it engenders; but they are just as adamant in their rejection of the Eastern models of "real existing socialism" (with the exception of "Group Z" adherents). The entrepreneurial spirit evinced within the context of many "alternative" projects speaks to an image of an ecologically-sound "free market" that has in fact been liberated from vested conglomerate interests. The state is not expected to "wither away," but it will have its regulations and supervisory functions redefined. In short, the Greens are not interested in the kind of head-on confrontation with either "capitalist" or "communist" ideology that served as their quixotic windmill during the late sixties.

One member of the Eco-socialist camp, exiled GDR-dissident Rudolf Bahro testifies that the Greens are perhaps not as ideology-free as they might presume. Bahro holds that the "Socialists need the Greens because the guarantee of survival is the condition under which their objectives of old remain attainable. The Socialists are likewise needed by the Greens, because survival can only be assured when the driving mechanisms of monopoly competition have been rendered inoperative."³⁶

But the economic planks set down in the party's 1982/83 platform (e.g.,

plans to revise the patent laws to prevent the monopolization of scientific innovations by a particular interest-bloc, to provide for independent sources of consumer information) also convey an implicit compatibility with certain fundamentally "capitalist" principles. The emphasis is on demonstrating that environmental conservation need not be sacrificed on the altar of economic growth. As Eppler contends, the two are highly interdependent, not mutually exclusive options:

If economics is the lesson of managing households and budgets, and [the search for] a method to utilize scarce resources purposively and effectively, if ecology deals with the relationships of living things among each other and with their organic and nonorganic environment, then it does not follow from the definition, why the two must necessarily stand in contradiction to each other. After all, we know from biologists that nowhere are materials and energy more efficiently budgeted than in nature....When ecology asks how living beings -- including human beings -- should behave in relation to each other, if their existence and their variety are to be secured, if economics is really supposed to question how mankind can come to those goods and services it needs with a minimum of investment, then the presumption emerges that a rational approach to economy and rational use of ecology have more to do with each other than we have been conscious of to date.³⁷

The tentativeness of core elements of the Greens' economic platform is best illustrated by the description of their policy objectives regarding taxes, currency, securities and capital-financing. Whereas all of their priorities and initiatives under the subheadings of labor market, technology, energy, peace, agriculture, etc. take up two pages each in the Bundesprogramm,

under "Taxation..." stands only the cursive note, "this part of the platform is still being [reviewed and] revised."³⁸ Insofar as the economic platform advanced by the Greens is not yet as fully developed as the ecological agenda, learning to live with the apparent inconsistencies between the two positions cited above is simply part of what it takes to become and to remain a Green Party member.

Members do agree that selective growth, not wasteful competition and unfettered industrial expansion, is the key to environmental preservation, one that can provide a source of new employment opportunities as well. The interdependent character of economics and ecology is manifest even in those instances where the two might appear to feature a classic confrontation: citizens opposed to the construction of Startbahn-West, for example, have seen fit to adopt "system-conform" economic arguments; they note the cost of millions of trees destroyed to benefit an investment whose profitability remains a dubious proposition in light of rising fuel prices and growing airlines deficits. Similarly, arguments against the skyrocketing costs of nuclear reactor construction have been used to turn the tables on proponents of the "hardpath" energy alternative.³⁹

Eco-socialism, in contrast to the more orthodox Marxist position, does not amount to a call for state ownership of the means of production or even control by a "vanguard" party. On the contrary, the focus is on the social function as well as on the redistributive aspects of new modes of enterprise. Based on the concept of self-help, the economically solidaristic social function comprises an attempt "to provide alternative and complementary services in an increasingly bureaucratic, professional and inflexible social and medical system; and to indicate ways in which to compensate the decay of traditional family structures with new ways of living together...."⁴⁰ In

other words, although the Greens have not yet forged a consensus with respect to a preferred set of economic structures and relationships, it is clear that any balance between market forces and state subsidization they may eventually deem acceptable will have to proclaim as a primary aim the enhancement of the "quality of life."

In distinguishing prospective "new enterprises" from more conventional forms of market interaction, political scientist Hans Maier looks beyond those businesses whose activities are limited to filling particularistic consumer gaps through new or improved products, e.g., the baker who begins to sell whole-wheat bread to accommodate those dissatisfied with the "uniform Wonderbreads" sold in supermarkets. Maier sets the parameters for an eco-socialist economy by proposing three criteria. A truly alternative entrepreneurial system is one that promotes: 1) the development of new models of property ownership which serve to transform the conventional owner/employee relationship; 2) the development of new, collective models of work-organization among colleagues that downplay hierarchy and incorporate flexible work-hours; 3) the planning, production and distribution of goods and services deemed socially safe and useful, as well as the development of ecologically and socially adjusted technologies and production processes.⁴¹

The overall organizational thrust is geared toward the creation of a more decentralized, humanized working environment, "to achieve smallness within large organisation." From this "small is beautiful" orientation, one may correctly infer that the writings of E. F. Schumacher are an off-quoted source, if not required reading for eco-entrepreneurs.⁴² The preference for small, self-managed enterprises rests on a belief that democratic decision-making can only occur in the presence of decentralized economic relations.

But decentralization is no substitute for capital formation, and small businesses as a rule are less likely to find easy access to credit. Hence, one question that provokes dissension among many ecology-minded producers is whether or not to accept state subsidies for alternative projects. Some fear cooptation, others are adamant in their rejection of the system as a whole. Netzwerk Selbsthilfe has provided one alternative source of capital for projects, based on sympathizers' voluntary contributions to a multi-purpose fund. Their erratic criticisms of monopoly capitalism notwithstanding, eco-activists have also been known to make trips to the public troughs, about which some are more red-faced than others. Huber estimates that less than 40 percent of the organized "alternative" projects are self-financing, while 30 percent receive direct subsidies from church or state institutions and another 30 percent are dependent upon indirect subsidies, grants, "solidarity-collections" and private incomes.⁴³ As Maier points out, however, those who reject any form of state subsidization may in fact be the most politically consistent among the alternative producers, insofar as their "drop-out" lifestyle itself reflects a total rejection of the system and, therefore, a radical concept of political economy.

Neither Huber nor Maier overlook the class dimension inherent to the creation of a secondary or "dual" economy. On the one hand, many of those seeking greater personal fulfillment in self-owned and -operated businesses are representatives of a new, professional middle class who lack neither the motivation nor the skills necessary to pursue the alternative careers route. These are the true "post-materialists" who have enjoyed so much academic attention of late.⁴⁴ But the alternative economy also draws a significant number of recruits from the ranks of the socially marginal, e.g., unemployed youth, potential delinquents, drug users and Ausgeflippten, embittered or

resigned academics.⁴⁵ While attempts to incorporate the broad array of alternative business ventures and projects into a loosely coordinated "Self-Help Network" system (replete with its own financing mechanisms and revenue sources) may enhance their economic significance in the short run, some fear that the network can just as easily be reduced to a kind of surrogate welfare system, relieving both the state and the private market of their social security and service responsibilities. In light of the "self-help" orientation, it is not surprising that the conservative CDU has offered both moral and fiscal support to alternative entrepreneurs in Berlin, for example.⁴⁶ The theoretical parallels aside, the actual products and technologies advocated by Ökosozialismus proponents are less likely to enjoy the widespread support of more conventional industrialists, however.

E. Ökotechnik

Not surprisingly, the works of Alvin Toffler as well as the Global 2000 Report compiled under the Carter Administration are frequently cited in European ecological circles -- probably to a greater degree than they are in their country of origin.⁴⁷ Techno-optimists find themselves pitted against Eco-pessimists, Zero-Growthers and Pro-Thirdworlders, in a confrontation that has been rendered much more direct by the reverberations of the 1973 energy crisis. Efforts to move beyond crisis management to more comprehensive reforms have in part been stymied by divisions within the scientific community called upon to weigh economic consequences against ecological imperatives. At the basis of an Eco-technological image of society is a recognition on the part of the Greens that, rather than juxtaposing the dictates of Nature and Technology, there is a pressing need to determine the proper relationship between the two. Ecologists no longer concentrate on a generalized criticism of all forms of technology and innovation; they object instead to specific

technologies, especially those controlled by major corporate powers. Criticisms stem from those who have participated in technological development, as well as from groups immediately affected by it. Moreover, the reaction to technology involves not solely negative criticisms, but also positive recommendations and alternatives (outlined below), which have only become possible through the processes of advanced industrialization.

The premise behind Eco-technology advanced by Huber is that "there are alternatives in the industrial society, there are no alternatives to industrial society."⁴⁸ This position is analogous to the mixed-economy inclinations cited earlier. The objective is not to wipe out the system per se, but to go far beyond a mere treatment of disruptive symptoms in the body politic. No one can afford to or wants to oppose ecology openly. The main problem is one of establishing a consensus regarding what kind of environmental policies and prescriptions will benefit society most. The "limits to growth" climate is expected to have a braking effect on superindustrialization, that is on the spiraling development measured in terms of "ever more, ever further, ever bigger and smaller, ever harder..."⁴⁹

The long journey to the land of Ökotechnik, according to its theorists, must begin with the not-so-small task of dealing with the pollution problems of here and now, initially, at least, the attainment of this objective will require the enlightened regulatory services of the state. The primary, if not most primitive form, of Eco-technology entails the disposal of garbage, chemical and nuclear wastes. The techniques range from burning to filtering, water treatment, soundproofing, rechanneling effluents, etc. The second category of eco-techniques includes the sorting, reprocessing and recycling of organic and nonorganic substances, such as plant waste, paper, glass, old oil, thermal wastes and electrical conversion. The third level calls for more

scientific measurement and more rigorous record-keeping with respect to the effects of toxic substances in water, in the air and food chain, and on climate. This would permit controlled experiments ranging from satellite observations down to genetic research. Eco-technologies would be applied to improvements in the areas of urban revitalization; local, regional and international transportation systems; and the promotion of alternative energy policies. The emphasis on "soft paths," e.g., solar, would permit decentralization, providing both new jobs and greater citizen control, in contrast to capital-intensive, centralized "hard paths," viz., nuclear energy.

"Okotechnik proponents such as Huber and Toffler have interjected the new concept of "3-D growth:" Durchbrechertechnologie, Dualwirtschaft, Dienstleistungsökonomie (breakthrough technology, dual economy and service industries).⁵⁰ The "breakthrough" character of Eco-technology looks to microelectronics, biomass/biochemistry, telematics, genetic technology, space colonization, and labor-saving computerization. In other words, they presume that advances in the high-tech fields need not be detrimental to the eco-system by definition; conversely, concerns for the environment may be seen to stimulate new types and new applications of advanced technology.

The images of a society dominated by such eco-technological wonders are not, of course, shared or welcomed by all who identify with the Green and environmentalist groups, e.g., elements of the "Eco-Right" who are committed to a zero-growth strategy. The common position that does emerge is that alternatives are available, that the risks involved in non-action are greater than those inherent to innovation and reform, and that the costs of preserving the environment should fall primarily to those who have in the past socialized abuses and injuries while privatizing profits. Greens and their sympathizers further share a belief that the assessment of environmental risk is a

political process in and of itself. Attempts made to "quantify" risk in terms of potential human casualties, safe levels of physical exposure to toxic substances, or even in terms of maximal financial liabilities for public or private sector actors -- based on imprecise indicators at best -- often obscure an unfair distribution of risk among diverse segments of society. Qualitative variables receive little attention for lack of "accurate" measuring devices, as defined by the system. "Political ecology" is perceived as an integral component of "political economy," fusing social-legal rights with technocratic interests and assessments of likely economic outcomes (e.g., the cost of clean-ups versus the price of accident prevention). Jungk's vision of a nuclear police-state offers one illustration of a possible failure to weigh the risks of maiming loss and limb against a permanent loss of civil liberties. Under the emerging ecological paradigm, the burden of proof would necessarily fall to the risk creator, who would have to demonstrate that potential technological benefits outweigh actual, "acceptable", risks.⁵¹

The four images outlined above, -- as unrefined as they may appear on particular points -- are but the pillars upon which the environmentalist "vanguard" (in Milbrath's terms) hope to construct a new society. Implicit in the discussion of these four images are two additional dimensions which have yet to evolve separately, but which this author believes nonetheless provide distinct rallying points and potential linkages for the panoply of coalescing social movements. They are "Öko-feminismus" and "Öko-internationalismus" (Eco-feminism and Eco-internationalism, respectively); for reasons of space these constructs cannot be developed here, but both have accounted for some rather dramatic media coverage during the relatively short life-span of the Greens.⁵² The key question is whether either the actions or the images of this young but feisty party will leave its imprint on the political system at

large.

IV. INNOCENCE LOST: POLITICAL EXPERIENCES AND THE GREENING OF GERMANY

Protests movements are primarily reactive in nature and hence cannot be divorced from the socio-economic environment in which they unfold. Moreover, opposition movements in recent decades have rarely developed in isolation from one other. In the short-run, protesters may fail to achieve specific movement objectives. However, this does not preclude the possibility of successfully effecting less easily discernible changes in the long-run, either in public consciousness or in the structure of political opportunity. The integration and assimilation of certain protest "experiences" can lead participants themselves to develop a sense of the evolutionary character of their movements.

The purpose of this paper was to shed light on the changing socio-political context that has fostered the growth of the German "Green" movement, as well as to present its images of an alternative society which cannot be divorced from a complex web of international, political, economic and technological developments. While the images and strategies adopted by West German anti-nuclear groups find their roots in earlier protest movements, they have undergone a significant transformation. What were once viewed as irreconcilable ideological differences have begun to converge under the preface "eco." The most significant dimensions of that transformation can only be quickly summarized below.

The days are gone when political leaders could try to compare the ecology movement with earlier, single-issue protests, such as the campaign against the 1968 Emergency Legislation, in the hopes that protests would die down with time or get lost in a plethora of other social problems. The unifying factor among protest movements and citizen initiatives of the 1980's is no longer an

overarching ideology, typifying the century-old struggle between the socialist left and the capitalist right. More important are the substantive and procedural connections that participants are discovering as each movement evolves, with environmental issues providing a centripetal force. Neither anti-nuclearism nor political alienation per se can be seen as the key issue that has driven the German public into the arms of alternative movements. At best, one can argue that the sixties' call to "dare more democracy" directed the active public's attention to environmental issues which, upon closer socio-economic scrutiny, fueled their sense of being shut-out of the political decision-making process. Protesters' substantive and procedural demands have become mutually reinforcing.

The rudimentary Eco-ideology outlined above is significant in that it holds the potential for binding together the many and sundry social movements that have crossed the West German political stage over the last ten years. But the Greens have a long way to go before they can be expected to produce an internally consistent, politically comprehensive platform. After all, as a Party the Greens are only five years old, and are just as entitled to commit political blunders and tactical miscalculations as the so-called system parties. Furthermore, their fundamental commitment to self-determination precludes the adoption of a majority-imposed ideology. In fact, "the many real differences between these groups should not be seen as a sign of weakness, but as proof of the movement's vitality."⁵³

Eco-activists have played down the repressive character of "capitalism" in the recognition that the end of the industrial system as we know it also portends significant changes in the existing economic structures. It is not only capitalist corporations and multinationals, but large-scale organizations in general that are being rejected in favor of self-help projects and communal

arrangements. West German activists of the eighties are much less naive about accepting further technological "progress" as the solution to fundamental social problems; but neither do they accept technological development as the exclusive domain of traditional, profit-seeking interest conglomerates. They oppose the abuses and inequities perpetuated by capitalist domination over the production processes (as well as those filed under "real existing socialism"). Ironically, they are nonetheless outspoken proponents of the personal freedoms and self-actualizing consumer choices that capitalism in theory claims to guarantee.

If Toffler's and Huber's reflections on the "third wave," the post-industrial/high-tech revolution, herald the end of advanced industrial society as we know it, then this transformation will also mean an end to the system of party politics that has prevailed to date. As early as 1977, Johanno Strasser came to the conclusion that slower economic growth and less affluence need not automatically or inevitably result in the decline of democracy, a point likely to meet with strong but ambivalent reaction in a twice-devastated Germany.⁵⁴ The converse would also appear to hold, that higher rates of economic growth and greater wealth (the Wirtschaftswunder) is not perceived to have automatically guaranteed a larger measure of participatory democracy and personal freedom. With respect to the question of balance between growth and freedom in the 1980's, "the answer one hopes to find lies in personal engagement and in the political actions undertaken today."⁵⁵ Participation is the lifeblood of the movement that recognizes each individual as an indispensable "expert" in relation to his/her own needs.

As Marcuse predicted over a decade ago, environmental and peace protesters have learned that political power brokers and economic forces cannot be pushed aside, they must be combatted on their own grounds.

This means that, from the beginning, the personal and particular liberation, refusal, withdrawal must proceed within the political context, defined by the situation in which the radical opposition finds itself, and must continue, in the theory and the practice, the radical critique of the Establishment within the Establishment.⁵⁶

Therein lies the significance of "innocence lost." The relations between politics, economics and ecology must extend beyond the limits to intimacy heretofore imposed by either the right or the left. If ecology is to have a future, it can only do so by losing its "industrial innocence," viz., it cannot call for a "return to the pastures." It must accept industrialization for the benefits it provides and find ways of minimizing the inherent environmental and human risks. The future growth prospects of business and industry, in turn, will depend on their ability to adapt to a wide range of environmental concerns and constraints. The relation must become a reciprocal one, which the Greens believe can only be achieved on the basis of qualitative changes in the structure and function of political and economic power.

Huber's conclusions with respect to the German Greens in particular can easily be extended to West European environmentalists in general:

One thing is clear, who claims to be a "Green" today doesn't tell us much. The Greens are everywhere. But what kind of Greens are they?...Do they wish to escape from history and break with industrial development, or do they wish [to participate in] another development of industrial society? Ecology is not the end of industrialism, and in the final analysis, it is not even its antithesis. Rather, ecology is the destiny of industry and its further fulfillment. Ecology has lost her political innocence. She must now reveal her true colors.⁵⁷

The kaleidoscope of orientations that lie at the root of this emerging Eco-ideology will make the tasks of revelation and synthesis difficult to be sure. The potential benefits to be derived from the alternative future(s) projected by these "Oko-images suggest that it is a task worth undertaking nevertheless. Given the interdependent character of the many pressing problems that have dominated the campaign agendas of even the system parties since the creation of the Greens especially acid rain, NATO deployments and structural unemployment, this task may amount to an exercise in survival -- for the parts as well as the whole.

Notes

1. Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Anti-Politics in Western Europe in the Seventies," Daedalus, Winter 1979, pp. 27-50.
2. Lorenz Knorr, Geschichte der Friedensbewegung in der Bundesrepublik (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1983); Reiner Steinweg, Hrsg., Die neue Friedensbewegung - Analysen aus der Friedensforschung (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982).
3. William D. Graf, The German Left Since 1945 - Socialism and Social Democracy in the German Federal Republic (Cambridge, UK: Oleaner Press, 1976), p. 177.
4. Knorr, loc. cit.
5. This corresponds with Kirchheimer's anti-systemic "opposition of principle." See Otto Kirchheimer, "Germany: The Vanishing Opposition," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven/London: Yale University, 1966), pp. 237-259.
6. Joyce M. Mushaben, "Reform in Three Phases: Judicial Action and the German Federal Framework Law for Higher Education of 1976" in Higher Education 13, July 1984, pp. 423-438.
7. Karl Otto, Vom Ostermarsch zur APO (Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, 1977). For a useful, non-specialist's introduction to West German nuclear policy, see Karl G. Tempel, Kernenergie in der Bundesrepublik (Berlin: Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 1981).
8. Bernd Guggenberger, "Bürgerinitiativen: Krisensystem oder Ergänzung des Systems der Volksparteien?" in Joachim Raschke, Hrsg., Bürger und Parteien - Ansichten und Analysen einer schwierigen Beziehung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), pp. 150-151.
9. Marianne Gronemeyer, "Aufgewacht aus dem Tiefschlaf. Von der

Unzufriedenheit zum Protest," in Kursbuch 50, Bürgerinitiativen/Bürgerprotest -- Eine Neue Vierte Gewalt? (Berlin: Kursbuch/Rotbuch, 1977), pp. 85-86.

10. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, "Social Movements and the Greens: New Internal Politics in Germany" in the European Journal of Political Research, forthcoming 1985.
11. Ibid.
12. For post-election assessments, see Der Spiegel articles, Nr. 12, 18. March 1985, p. 24ff (Saarland); Horst Bieber, "Schlappe der Ideologen," Die Zeit, 24. May 1985 (Northrhein-Westphalia); and "Der Spass am Grün-Sein ist 'raus," Die Zeit, 10. May 1985.
13. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel presents an overview of the emerging parties in "Ecology Parties in Western Europe," West European Politics 5, No. 1, January 1982, pp. 68-74.
14. Fritjof Capra and Charlene Spretnak, Green Politics (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1984). Milbrath defines "deep-ecologists" as those whose holistic approach immerses them emotionally and philosophically in nature, while environmentalists in general are viewed as a rapidly expanding vanguard force for political change. See Lester W. Milbrath, Environmentalists -- Vanguard for a New Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).
15. Detlef Murphy, "Grüne und Bunte -- Theorie und Praxis 'alternativer Parteien'," in Joachim Raschke, op. cit., p. 325.
16. An important exception was the uproar raised when two Green Bundestag delegates wrote a personal letter offering to visit incarcerated members of the (formerly Baader-Meinhof, now) Red-Army Faction terrorist group. See Der Spiegel interview, Nr. 13, 25. March 1985, pp. 66-78.

17. Die Tageszeitung, 18. June 1982.
18. Capra and Spretnak, op. cit., p. 5ff.
19. Glotz is cited in Reimar Oltmanns, Du Hast Keine Chance, Aber Nutze Sie -- Eine Jugend Steigt Aus (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1980), p. 114.
20. Joseph Huber, Wer Soll Das Alles Ändern? Die Alternativen der Alternativbewegung (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1981).
21. Tilman Fichter and Siegward Lönnendonker, "Von der APO nach TUNIX" in Claus Richter, Hrsg., Die Überflüssige Generation - Jugend zwischen Apathie und Aggression (Königstein: Athenäum, 1979), p. 137.
22. Huber, op. cit., p. 29 ff.
23. Robert Jungk, Der Atomstaat (München: Kindler, 1977). All subsequent citations are taken from the English translation, The New Tyranny: How Nuclear Power Enslaves Us (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1979).
24. Ibid., p. 114.
25. Ibid., p. 33.
26. Ibid., p. 60.
27. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Knopf, 1982).
28. Erhard Eppler, Wege aus der Gefahr (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1981). And, Willy Brandt, Chairperson, North-South. A Program for Survival (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980).
29. Werner Harenberg, "Sicherer Platz links von der SPD? Die Wähler der Grünen in den Daten der Demoskopie" in Jorg R. Mettke, Hrsg., Die Grünen -- Regierungspartner von Morgen? (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982), pp. 39-43.
30. Hans Rattinger, "The Federal Republic of Germany: Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing" in Gregory Flynn and Hans Rattinger, eds., The Public and Atlantic Defense (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), p. 164, p. 167.

31. Wolf-Dieter Hasenclever, "Die Grünen und die Bürger -- Ein neues Selbstverständnis als politische Partei?" in Joachim Raschke, Hrsg., op. cit., pp. 309-322. Joseph Huber, "Basisdemokratie und Parlamentarismus - Zum Politikverständnis der Grünen" in Aus Politik-und Zeitgeschichte, January 1983. And Martin Jänicke, "Parlamentarische Entwarnungseffekte? Zur Ortsbestimmung der Alternativbewegung," in Jorg Mettke, Hrsg., op. cit., pp. 69-81.
32. Die Grünen, Das Bundesprogramm, Bonn, 1980, p. 4.
33. The legal sanctions follow incidents of mass protest, where the West German police can hardly be accused of using a "light touch" with demonstrators. Incidents of police brutality have often increased the number of movement sympathizers, e.g., at the Startbahn West location. A number of unsettling examples are found in Horst Karasek, Das Dorf im Floresheimer Wald - Eine Chronik vom alltäglichen Widerstand gegen die Startbahn West (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1981).
34. For two starkly contrasting views regarding the "democratic" potential of the Greens, see Wolf-Dieter Narr, "Andere Partei oder eine neue Form der Politik? Zu Zerfall und Stabilität des bundesrepublikanischen Parteiensystems oder den Erfolgchancen der Grünen," in J. Mettke, Hrsg., op. cit., pp. 242-271; and J. F. Pilat, "Democracy or Discontent? Ecologists in the European Electoral Arena," Government and Opposition 17, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 222-233. The middle position is argued by Volkmar Lauber, "Ecology Politics and Liberal Democracy," Government and Opposition 13, No. 2, Spring 1978, pp. 199-217.
35. These principles are summarized in J. Huber, "Basisdemokratie," op. cit. For an overview of problems pertaining to their practical application,

- compare Ernst Hoplitschek, "Partei, Avantgarde, Heimat - oder was? Die 'Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz' in Westberlin," in J. Mettke, Hrsg., op. cit., pp. 82-100.
36. Translations are my own. Rudolf Bahro, Elemente einer neuen Politik. Zum Verhältnis von Ökologie und Sozialismus (Berlin: Olle & Wolter, 1980), p. 58. For an American perspective on these linkages, see Richard Worthington, "Socialism and Ecology: An Overview" in New Political Science, Winter 1984, pp. 69-83.
37. Eppler, op. cit., p. 181.
38. Die Grünen, Das Bundesprogramm, p. 10.
39. This has proved especially true in the case of the reactor project at Kalkar. Cf "Historischer Marktplatz und Schneller Brüter," Die Tageszeitung, 18. June 1981.
40. Hans Maier, "Who are the New Entrepreneurs in the F.R.G. - An Excluded Minority or an Avant-Garde Elite?" Occasional Paper, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin/Internationales Institut für Management und Verwaltung (Berlin, October 1981), p. 4. Further, Huber, "Was wäre, wenn...? Ein Szenario," in Joseph Huber, Hrsg., Anders Arbeiten - Anders Wirtschaften - Dualwirtschaft: Nicht jede Arbeit muss ein Job sein (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer), 1979.
41. Maier, ibid., p. 6. Die Zeit ran a particularly interesting series of articles on specific examples of the "counter economy" at work. See "Gegenwirtschaft - Die Firma ohne Chef" in the December issues of Die Zeit, 1981.
42. E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful - Economics As If People Mattered (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).
43. Wer Soll Das Alles Ändern?, op. cit., p. 44.

44. See Ronald Inglehart, "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity," American Political Science Review 75, December 1981, pp. 880-899.
45. Joseph Huber, "Anders arbeiten - anders wirtschaften. Die Zukunft zwischen Dienst- und Dualwirtschaft," in Anders Arbeiten, op. cit., pp. 17-35. See also, Huber, "Am Ende des Regenbogens," Netzwerk Rundbrief, Nr. 15, 14. December 1981, pp. 24-28.
46. Joachim Nawrocki, "Frischer Wind in Schöneberg," Die Zeit, 9. July 1982.
47. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (Toronto/New York: Bantam Books, 1980). Also, The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-first Century (New York: Allen Land/Penguin, 1982).
48. Joseph Huber, Die verlorene Unschuld der Ökologie (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer, 1982), p. 10.
49. Huber, ibid., pp. 103-106. Eppler, op. cit., p. 190 ff.
50. The authors envision a society revolving around breakthrough technologies, based on a dual-economy with an emphasis on advanced industrial service functions. Huber divides societal development into five historical-technological ages, Toffler is content with "three waves."
51. Roger Kasperson, "The Neglect of Social Risk Assessment in Energy Policy Making" in Dorothy S. Zinberg, ed., Uncertain Power - The Struggle for a National Energy Policy (Elmsford, New York: Pergamon, 1983), pp. 69-91.
52. Green delegations have undertaken trips to Washington, D.C., Israel, India and, most recently, to the People's Republic of China. The feminists scored a major victory by assuming all posts on the 6-person executive board in 1984. Male Greens, according to inside-female reports, have a long way to go in abandoning patriarchal practices. See Der Spiegel, Nr. 12, 18. March 1985, p. 47-58.

53. Jungk, op. cit., p. 177.
54. Johanno Strasser, Die Zukunft der Demokratie. Grenzen des Wachstums - Grenzen der Freiheit? (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1977).
55. Huber, Die Verlorene Unschuld, op. cit., p. 173.
56. Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (London: Penguin Press, 1972), p. 49.
57. Huber, Die Verlorene Unschuld, op. cit., p. 208.