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Joyce Marie Mushaben
mushaben@umsl.edu

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
by

Joyce Marie Mushaben

PEACE AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION:
A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
"COMMUNITY OF RESPONSIBILITY" BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES

Joyce Marie Mushaben
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, and
Fellow, Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri 63121
USA

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This Government assumes that the questions facing the German people, which derive from the Second World War and from the National betrayal [that occurred] through the Hitler regime, can ultimately be resolved only in the context of a European peace order. No one can talk us out of [our belief], however, that the Germans have a right to self-determination, as do all other peoples.

--Willy Brandt

Regierungserklärung,
28. October 1969

The year 1985 may well go down in the postwar annals of German-German relations as a period of unanticipated and -- more importantly -- largely unnecessary political turbulence. Three developments in particular, namely, a protracted debate over whether/when/where/how to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the war's end, a resurgence of inflammatory rhetoric regarding the (im)permanence of the Oder-Neisse borders, as well as the media hype and bitter reaction surrounding Ronald Reagan's controversial Bitburg visit, have occupied the center stage at the expense of other reconciliation issues. All three have taken their toll on the short-term prospects for a dramatic improvement in the relations between the two Germanies.

The resulting turbulence was unanticipated insofar as the two preceding years had witnessed an intensification of efforts on the part of Helmut Kohl and Erich Honecker to "limit the damage" inflicted by the deployment of additional theater nuclear weapons on German soil as of 1983. The turbulence may be judged unnecessary to the extent that the cooling of these damage-limitation efforts was neither a function of a general escalation in East-West tensions, nor the unavoidable byproduct of a specific crisis situation. Rather, it appears that a chilling of German-German relations was an artifact engendered by ultra-conservative forces found within Kohl's own party, whose provocative rhetoric can best be interpreted as one last-ditch effort to turn back the clock of Ostpolitik.

Four decades have passed since the would-be Thousand Year Reich became

two Germanies condemned to a state of "permanent provisionalism." Instead of closing the book on one particularly ignominious chapter of German history, the events marking the observation of the fortieth anniversary of May 8, 1945 have in many respects only served as a reminder that the world has yet to devise a "final solution" to the once-and-future German Question. Still, the global community remains most reluctant to leave the determination and the implementation of such a final solution up to the Germans themselves, even if that solution has at its core a vision of two separate-but-neutral states.

The forces of German nationalism have many times over given birth to a state of war in Central Europe. It is only recently that a new creed seems to have taken root in a now-divided Germany, one which holds "that war shall never again be launched from German soil," and that "war shall never again be fought on German soil."¹ If German nationalism can be historically construed as a catalyst to war, then it seems logical that its antithesis, namely, German neutralism, might someday serve as the best guarantor to peace in the region. It is therefore ironic that the calls for a neutral, nuclear-free Germany advanced by peace movement activists in both the Federal Republic (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) have met with such a hostile response from the superpowers. The latter assume that the fortunes and the future of East-West relations depend on a balance of forces that only clearly discernible alliance structures can provide; hence, the Soviet Union and the United States are inclined to view any moves towards European neutralism, as inherently destabilizing -- especially if they are coupled with German-German rapprochement.

This paper focuses on a limited number of critical linkages between nationalism, neutralism and the future course of German-German relations. The author begins with the premise that a unique geo-strategic location,

demographic polarization and a shared "missing" national identity accords to the East and West German peace movements a political significance not witnessed in other European systems since the pacifist movements began to develop momentum in 1979. She therefore sets out to explore the immediate and longer-term perspective of separate but related German peace movements and to study how the post-1983 deployment of additional theater nuclear forces in Europe have affected the conduct of German-German affairs over the last few years.

The essay begins with a brief overview of significant peace movement developments occurring in the two German states from 1979 to the present. It then outlines recent pacifist proposals for a New European Peace Order that sees in neutro-nationalism (alternatively, national-neutralism) a hopeful and positive response to the historical conundrum known as the German Question. The third section of the paper surveys the character and the scope of measures undertaken by political leaders to intensify and normalize contacts between the two states after 1979, measures which for a short time at least seemed to take precedence over other pressing items on their respective foreign policy agendas. In the fourth and final portion of the paper, the author bemoans the lack of an adequate conceptual framework for use in determining the next steps that might be undertaken to improve further relations between the two Germanies. She argues that one construct, born of a desire to "limit the damage" once peace movements proved unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent deployments, heralds the possibility of a new type of Entspannungspolitik. Known in German as the Verantwortungsgemeinschaft, the idea of a "Community of Responsibility" between the two Germanies eschews a traditional attachment to the concept of national sovereignty but does not deny the importance of system-affect, as an inducement to the creation of a truly European peace.

I. Peace Movement Dynamics in the Divided Nation

Individually and collectively, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are faced with a unique security paradox. On the one hand, both are expected to engage in frequent and public disavowals of each other's domestic and foreign policy achievements in order to demonstrate their fidelity to the ideological system imposed by their respective superpowers. On the other hand, the very division of Germany that holds the two states hostage to insecurity unter sich has become one of the stablest elements in the ongoing, unstable confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs.² Both history and geography make it impossible for either German state to divorce questions of national security -- and the issue of its postwar half-national identity -- from the dialectic of international relations.

The motive forces behind the West and East German peace movements, as they have evolved over the last five years, have been anything but unidimensional. Their ranks include a kaleidoscope of religious, ecological, feminist, Third-World-solidarity and "alternative culture" groups. In challenging specific national and collective security policies adopted by their political leaders, as well as the manner in which defense doctrines have been (externally) determined and imposed, mobilized publics in both the FRG and the GDR have opened a political Pandora's box containing more than one German Question. Why is the national identity issue, for example, suddenly generating so much academic interest and media attention, and why is the reaction against this resurgence so strong?³ Who or what is German, why does it need to be defined now? How is it related to significant displays of "extraparliamentary opposition" and religious activism associated with the anti-nuclear and pacifist movements? What accounts for the breakdown in

consensus among leading West German politicians as to whether their German Question is open or closed? Is East Germany as immune to a nationalist renaissance as it would like to believe? And should either side worry about "anti-Germanism" abroad?⁴

Pierre Hassner gives voice to one speculation that establishes a sense of kin among the disparate spirits escaping from the Pandora's box of nationalism. Not implausibly, he posits that,

if both German states have to deal today with a protest movement that brings into play the antithesis between East and West, as well as the division of Germany...then they might also have an interest in quelling these movements either together or separately, in order to preserve their respective [new] identities. If, on the contrary, under the influence of these movements or on their own, they evince a tendency to get closer or to provide mutual support, then they may find a common interest in so shaping their relations as to achieve an optimal balance between cooperation and **demarcation**, in order to reconcile simultaneously the preservation of one German identity with their own specific identities; [they would do this] in order to balance out the obligations to their alliances and respective superpowers by means of a certain type of autonomy to be gained by playing out inter-German relations in the right way.⁵

Were the two Germanies to succeed in their efforts to a) define the parameters of that "optimal balance," b) draw a fine line between a shared albeit general historical identity and their separate, system-bound postwar identities, and c) design a set of procedures that would allow them to pursue the first two objectives without detonating the traditional landmines of fear in the field of East-West relations, they would undoubtedly come to enjoy a

more positive international image. The qualitatively different type of political leverage such a development might afford the two Germanies at the global level raise a second and equally intriguing question with respect to the "new social movements." At issue is

Whether it is really pacifism and environmental consciousness that gives impetus to a national-community feeling, or whether it is not the reverse, that by invoking...the special responsibility of the two German states, it is the "national feeling" that is attempting...to express itself and to legitimize itself at home and abroad.⁶

I have argued at greater length elsewhere that the first alternative appears to be the most plausible; that is, nuclear anxieties and ecological concerns, coupled with a rather abrupt changing of the generational guard, have fostered a sense of neutro-nationalist interdependence and have awakened interest in a special "German" responsibility for preserving the peace in Central Europe.⁷ Rather than recount the detailed and varied histories of contemporary peace movements in the FRG and the GDR, I will only highlight briefly a number of important developments which over the last five years, appear to have influenced the political opportunity structures in both states.⁸

In this respect it can be argued that the peace movements have (at least indirectly) brought about a change in the political climate that is more conducive to German-German rapprochement.

Rooted in a thirty-year tradition of peace protest, the West German Friedensbewegung represents a unique fusion of anti-rearmament, pro-ecology, extra-parliamentary opposition and alternative-party forces that by 1983 had succeeded in mobilizing the largest protest coalition ever witnessed in the Federal Republic.⁹ The lifeblood of what has loosely been labeled "the

movement" is a commitment to citizen participation in consciousness-raising and protest activities at the local and regional levels. A reticulate structure consisting of thousands of parish and "citizen initiative" groups for peace and against nuclear technology of any kind ensures a measure of ideological heterogeneity and diverse perspectives on appropriate mobilizational strategies. Naturally, decentralization and diversity have their costs as well as benefits in a campaign designed to reverse national security decisions taken at the highest levels of government.

The catalyst to a mass mobilization campaign for peace in the Federal Republic was the now-infamous NATO Double Decision of 12. December 1979. Issued in the form of a communique among NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, this 1979 resolution (instigated by none other than a 1950's rearmament-opponent by the name of Helmut Schmidt) foresaw the deployment of 572 Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles as a response to the Soviet SS 20 deployments of the late seventies.

The first surge of peace protest in the FRG flowed rather unexpectedly out of the 19th annual synod of the German Evangelical Church, which attracted some 150,000 uninvited young participant-observers to Hamburg in June, 1981. Coinciding with a sharp increase in youth unemployment figures and a proliferation of squatters' movements, this phase was characterized by a growing, if still amorphous, sense of existential Angst, particularly among the young. It peaked with a nonviolent demonstration attracting over 300,000 to Bonn on 10. October 1981. Statements attributed to President Reagan in late October regarding the "conceivability" of a winnable, limited nuclear war unleashed a second wave of protest, drawing in many "survivors" of past protest movements. During this phase, expressions of nuclear Angst acquired a concrete foundation as Central European residents began to comprehend what

"flexible response" held in store for them. A wide range of ecological and professional groups opposed in principle to nuclear weapons and NATO's general strategy of deterrence swelled the protest ranks substantially; their efforts culminated in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June, 1982, held in Bonn and Berlin.

The peace movement entered a third phase with Kohl's March, 1983 election to the Chancellorship which essentially cleared the way for a positive Bundestag vote on the initial deployments. This phase -- saying "No" to a specific NATO directive -- climaxed with a nationwide "Action Week," followed by a "Besieging of the Bundestag," during the months of October and November, 1983; activities during the final weeks of the "Hot Autumn '83" rallied an estimated two to four million direct participants. Efforts to follow up with further Hot Autumn activities in 1984 were less successful; the "minimal consensus" between and among the panoply of groups began to disintegrate once the initial deployments were complete. The ex officio national Coordinating Committee disbanded in November, 1984, but "the movement" is by no means over. Rather, it has shifted its focus back to the local levels, town councils and parish organizations, in the hopes of cultivating a new, positive, grassroots consensus on political alternatives to current defense doctrines.

What the East German peace movement lacks in terms of breadth and body counts, it makes up in patience, determination and personal courage. As in the Federal Republic, the Eastern movement has come to encompass a broader array of societal problems and discontents, especially among an increasingly restive youth population.¹⁰ Just as importantly, the peace movement is interested in political process as well as in policy outcomes. Activists intent on making maximum use of very limited channels for participation and expression of dissent have discovered a rare opportunity, one that serves to

promote political learning among citizens as well as among party leaders. In a system which has yet to recognize the concept of a "loyal opposition," turnouts ranging from 2,000-7,000 signify an important testing of the political waters.

As a general rule, peace activists in the GDR have made a conscious effort not to create a highly mobilized, mass-based organization, the appearance of which would only provoke a major crackdown by the authorities against alleged enemies of the state. Despite the low-keyed, highly decentralized nature of their protests, pacifists to the East have succeeded in sensitizing the party leadership to the fact that "the movement's" progress and how the SED chooses to respond to it can hold long term consequences for the system. With no leading dissidents to expel, the SED risks losing the "hearts and minds" of the many second and third generation GDR-citizens who have begun to grant the system -- and in particular, statesman and Premier Erich Honecker -- a measure of legitimacy and grudging respect.

An iron-fisted approach banning further public appeals for peace at home would moreover be inconsistent with the party's practice of using Neues Deutschland to report enthusiastically on anti-NATO protests in the West since 1979. The anti-Pershing II and cruise missile theme finds some expression in the East, but cognizant of their Warsaw Pact membership, few East Germans would expect to influence or hinder these deployments. They perceive themselves to be similarly constrained with respect to developing an anti-SS 20's theme, as vulnerable as the GDR has become through the counter deployment of nuclear weapons on its own soil for the first time as of December, 1983. The real issue for peace activists in the East is a "home-grown" one, namely the focus on and protest against the increasing militarization of socialist society itself.

Much of the early momentum for the East German peace campaign derived from parental opposition to paramilitary instruction modules made part of the polytechnical school curricula in the early 1960's. Protestations intensified with the introduction of obligatory military or paramedic training sessions for Abitur classes in the early 1970's. Like its counterpart in the FRG, the East German Lutheran Church more or less unintentionally became a conduit for opposition to the arms race; it began with efforts by individual clergy members to counsel would-be conscientious objectors and draft resisters in a universal conscription system that has refused thus far to consider a non-military alternative service option. The mid-seventies added many intellectuals to the ranks of potential movement sympathizers, with the state taking some pains to isolate those said to have contracted the "Helsinki fever" from increasingly rowdy youth groups. The latter began to clash with police over the ban on rock concerts and to protest the intensified regimentation of "free time."

The developmental phases (from Angst, to general opposition, to focused protest) have been less pronounced within the East German movement, but there are nonetheless a few important parallels to be drawn relative to mobilization efforts in the West. The Dresden Forum sponsored by the Evangelical Church in February, 1982 served as the East German equivalent to the Hamburg synod of 1981, attracting roughly 5,000 young participants; commemorating the Dresden bombings, the general theme was one of nuclear Angst. Six months later the Church publicly distanced itself from the party's position on nuclear deployments. In an attempt to squelch an autonomous peace movement, the SED started to stage its own rallies and appeals, using the communist youth group (FDJ) as its vanguard. The leadership meanwhile began to intimate that NATO deployments might hold dire consequences for German-German relations, inducing

feelings of a more concrete threat among Eastern activists. By the time counter-deployments to the Pershing II's were initiated, individual dissenters saw fit to protest this Warsaw Pact move more directly, in letters to Neues Deutschland, for example.

The "national question" began working its way into the peace discussion on both sides in late 1981. The catalyst, appropriately enough, was an officially sponsored meeting of 100 East and West German writers, artists and scholars in Berlin-East. The dialogue initiated at the Hotel Stadt Berlin has since been transferred to larger, even cross-national forums. Its participants are making an effort to understand where the German Question stands in relation to the creation and maintenance of a "New European Peace Order." In other words, the question is raised whether Deutschlandpolitik is the functional equivalent of Friedenspolitik ("peace policy"). Does an improvement in relations between the FRG and the GDR constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for the preservation of peace in Europe? The link between Deutschlandpolitik, under the new label of neutro-nationalism, and broader plans for a European peace order is outlined in the section below.

II. Divided but Disengaged: German Neutro-Nationalism

The connection between the problem of a divided Germany and the prospects for peaceful coexistence in Europe was emphasized by Willy Brandt as early as 1969. Mindful of the tenuous nature of the balance between the two, the first Social Democratic Chancellor noted:

Twenty years after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, we must prevent a growing-apart of the German nation and must also attempt, by way of regulating our [existence] next to each other, to come to a [condition of living] with one another. This is not only a German interest, because it

has its significance for the peace in Europe and for the state of East-West relations as well.¹¹

Brandt aspired to rapprochement between the "two-states-in-one-nation," not to reunification at any cost. The desire to integrate Germany into a democratic, peace-loving Europe superseded the wish for a return to the sovereign and independent nation-state.

Largely the work of leftist intellectuals, the 1980's resurrection of the "two states/one nation" debate has already given rise to a number of specific proposals designed to secure the European peace. The following outline of three fairly representative samples is merely intended to whet the reader's appetite, rather than to satiate his/her hunger for a comprehensive analysis of each. The proposers themselves are primarily interested in providing a framework for discussion; specific tactics have yet to be devised.

In a characteristically impulsive fashion, members of West-Berlin's Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection or AL [a radical party variant of the Greens] began devoting energy and platform space to the Deutschlandfrage prior to the 1981 city-state elections. Spearheading the drive for a four-point disengagement program for Berlin, in particular, is a true child of Ostpolitik, Peter Brandt, the son of the Nobel Prize winning Chancellor himself. While this proposal does not preclude the long-term possibility of reunification, it is more attuned to enhancing the prospects for German-German self-determination at present.¹²

In essence, members of the AL's Work Group on Berlin- and Deutschlandpolitik have decided to issue a four-dimensional challenge to the status quo of German division. Along the military dimension, the AL advocates the creation of a German nuclear-free zone, the withdrawal of all but a symbolic contingent of occupation forces from both sectors of Berlin, and the

termination of FRG and GDR membership in NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively. On the political front, the proposal foresees a loose confederation that would permit greater cooperation in the areas of economics, environmental protection, transportation, urban development, culture, science, sports and Third World assistance. With respect to economics, the AL recommends an extension of the "special ties" concept established in the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971; this would enable the GDR to participate in GATT arrangements, provide a basis for the convertability of the East German mark and foster West Berlin's integration into the East German economy. Regarding the legal dimension, the Alternatives are prepared to push for a formal peace treaty along the lines of the "Austrian model," while eliminating a priori prohibitions on reunification talks. The mode of reunification would be determined by the Germans themselves. The AL has assumed a more aggressive stance to avoid a repetition of the Left's historical mistake of leaving the "German Question" open to the demagogic manipulations of the Right.¹³

"Nationalism from the left" has a neutralist core, revolving around the concept of Paktfreiheit. The interest in a disengagement of the two Germanies from their respective blocs has not only been voiced by alternative-party members, left-wing Social Democrats and at least one elected official (Oskar Lafontaine, new Minister-President in the Saarland) in the West.¹⁴ It is an interest also shared by radical-democratic intellectuals in the East. In an open letter to Brezhnev in September, 1981, GDR-dissident Robert Havemann wrote of the pressing need to conclude a peace treaty and withdraw all occupation troops from both parts of Germany.¹⁵ Signed by 200+ supporters, this appeal was reiterated and the catalogue of demands expanded in a public letter to Erich Honecker composed by East Berlin Pastor Rainer Eppelmann less than a week later. Eppelmann outlined sixteen measures for mitigating the

threat of a European nuclear holocaust; included were a ban on the production and sale of war-toys for children, the elimination of paramilitary modules in the schools, and the creation of a non-military alternative service. Three additional measures called upon Honecker personally to advocate publicly the creation of a Central European nuclear-free zone, to support the withdrawal of all foreign troops from all European states, and to work openly towards a step-by-step total disarmament.¹⁶

Proposals developed in the FRG and the GDR are mirrored in the plan for a New European Peace Order, the parameters of which have been set by participants at a series of annual European Nuclear Disarmament conferences (most recently in Perugia, during the summer of 1984). The collective consensus among European peace movement activists rests on a 5-step plan for reducing the prospects of a nuclear holocaust at their expense. The centerpiece is a non-aligned, if divided Germany; but the plan would also bring about a fundamental restructuring of security relations throughout the region. The first step is a Stop! or an immediate freeze on the testing, production and deployment of any further nuclear weapons on European soil. Step two involves the creation of a nuclear free zone, initially extending 300 kilometers on either side of the German-German border, and eventually stretching "from Poland to Portugal." The third step ordains the creation of "tank-free" zones, on the assumption that a replacement of nuclear devices by ever more horrendous "conventional" weapons (including chemical and bacteriological ones) would pose an equally grave threat to European residents. Step four would have the two German states undertake a simultaneous withdrawal from their respective blocs, to be followed by the formation of a regional security system. The fifth step, not necessarily last in terms of timing, entails the establishment of a European Security Council a

la Helsinki. An institutionalization of security talks is intended to guarantee that the superpowers will be seeking a reduction in arms on a permanent basis (in view of the hiatus in INF negotiations experienced between October, 1983 and March, 1985). It is also to ensure the direct and active involvement of the European states in those negotiations upon which their own survival depends.

At a minimum, one can argue that the German Question has been modified and transformed by peace movement developments, as reflected in these proposals. It is difficult to delineate where German nationalism ends and neutralism begins, or where neutralism ends and nationalism begins, even for analytical purposes. The new (neuro)nationalism is not rooted in a drive for reunification defined in terms of a single German nation-state. Rather, it bespeaks a search for a national identity to be shared by two Germanies and to be developed with an eye to their mutual survival needs. The threat of an impending nuclear holocaust may be bringing many of these sentiments to the surface, but one can also argue that they have been longer in the making. Indeed, they may have been born of a period of relative stability in East-West relations, as Richard Lowenthal has ascertained:

What has created the striking sense of a common political interest between the two German states of very different political structures and ideologies has been, first, the revival of a sense of common nationhood during the period of detente, and second, the rising sense that they face a common threat as detente has given way to confrontation between the superpowers.¹⁷

Thus, both "good times" and "bad times" in reference to East-West relations have contributed to a growing preoccupation with the national question in Germany. Ostpolitik and detente marked the beginning of a mutual

self-discovery process; improved relations led to an increase in self-confidence for both sides, along with domestic support for further cooperation in areas of common concern. A subsequent breakdown in communication between the superpowers seems to have strengthened German-German determination to hang on to gains long sought and painstakingly negotiated.

Has this turn for the worse in superpower relations, on the one hand, and a growing public demand for further normalization, on the other, had any observable impact on inter-German relations since 1979? Can improvements in FRG-GDR relations be divorced from the state of US-Soviet relations? What room for independent maneuvering do these two states find, and what risks are they prepared to take to advance the cause of normalization? These are the questions addressed in the section below.

III. Deutschlandpolitik as Damage-Limitation

Ostpolitik served to eliminate some of the more painful symptoms of postwar division, but subsequent developments prove that it was not the ultimate cure. As Kiep points out, improved FRG-GDR relations "coincided with a weakening of the desire for reunification among Germans, and as a consequence there was a tendency in many countries to misunderstand Ostpolitik as being in itself a settlement of the German Question."¹⁸

The foundation stone for a normalization of relations between the two states was the Grundlagenvertrag ("Basis of Relations Treaty") initialed in December, 1972 and implemented on 6. June 1973. Owing to superpower entanglements in other parts of the world, notably Viet Nam, the Question of postwar questions ceased to be source of urgent concern at the international level. On the domestic front, however, the pressures for change began to build in the sixties, especially in the Federal Republic. The SPD and the FDP were able to capitalize on the realization that Bonn's rigid adherence to a

policy of non-recognition of the "socalled GDR" was costing the FRG materially, e.g., in the form of lost trade opportunities. More importantly, the conservative leadership could not demonstrate to its own citizens that its policies had actually led to substantial improvements in the quality of life for Germans on the other side.¹⁹ The gains that East and West German leaders hoped to derive from the Grundlagenvertrag were contradictory from the start. The miracle is that both sides felt some 10 years later, that they had achieved their respective objectives, at least partially.

For the GDR, the Grundlagenvertrag was a significant step towards normalization. It allowed for the establishment of the "ties" judged necessary for implementing its own concept of "peaceful coexistence," defined as "the regulation of interstate relations between socialist and capitalist countries based on equality between the states, mutual respect for their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and non-intervention in their internal affairs."²⁰ The de facto recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state moreover opened the door to diplomatic recognition internationally, lifting restrictions on her integration and participation in intergovernmental organizations and global affairs. International recognition was moreover a sign that the FRG had failed in its efforts to isolate and discriminate against the GDR; consequently, the FRG was compelled to shift its own foreign policy orientations. Finally, the normalization of relations and the growing sense of self-confidence it brought to the leadership encouraged the GDR to strengthen its grip on East Berlin, which it boldly proclaimed to be its capital city.

From the FRG's perspective, the Grundlagenvertrag became an instrument for the pursuit of further accords, as well as the legal justification for demanding occasional concessions to alleviate the personal hardships born of

division. The ten years following its promulgation proved that agreements and treaties on single issues could be adopted on a step-by-step basis, despite the diametrically opposed positions held regarding larger goals. The treaty established the necessary preconditions for the regulation of specifically German problems in the context of international efforts to promote East-West cooperation. Thus, both German states could render their own special contributions to the reduction of global tensions. Further, the status of West Berlin was secured in conjunction with the Quadripartite Agreement. Finally, mindful of the constitutional imperative to uphold the goal of reunification, West German leaders were satisfied that the language of the Grundlagenvertrag left the German Question "open," in juridical as well as in political terms.²¹

These perceived successes notwithstanding, the Grundlagenvertrag has not been without its strong critics on both sides; nor has it laid to rest serious problems of interpretation relating to the national question and "citizenship" since 1972. For the Federal Republic, the German Question was, is and will remain "open;" for the German Democratic Republic, it is principally "closed."²² The GDR leadership has shifted from a two-states-in-one-nation thesis to a belief in two German nations, one capitalist, the other socialist, whose relations -- until 1983 -- were not to differ from inter-national patterns elsewhere. The FRG adheres to a belief that two states with different social systems continue to comprise one nation. Even once-reluctant conservatives have accepted Brandt's 1969 thesis that, "although there now exist two states in Germany, they are not foreign countries to each other, and their relations can only be of a special kind."²³

The agreement to pursue "good, neighborly relations" (later institutionalized with the creation of permanent representative missions in

Bonn and East Berlin in 1974) generated a flurry of negotiations between 1970 and 1975. The result was a complicated network of accords and protocols, the most significant of which are summarized in Appendix A. Irreconcilable differences began to reassert themselves in other areas, producing a standstill in negotiations until late 1977. Especially problematic issues included legal standing and juridical proceedings, citizenship, the Prussian "cultural possession" [art treasures], free exchanges of artists and writers, cooperation in science and technology (which the GDR wanted to limit to the natural, industry-relevant sciences), environmental protection, the Wall (and automatic shooting devices along the border), and human rights.

Talks resumed in 1977 to determine what areas might have grown "ripe" for further negotiations. By this time existing agreements had already resulted in a number of tangible improvements. "Success" was measured in terms of an increased number of visitors, phone exchanges, expanded East German access to West German media, transfer payments, trade balances and other items listed in Appendix B.

In 1980, the East German leadership abruptly changed its course, primarily in response to the destabilizing effects of the Polish crisis (and not in direct relation to the NATO Double Decision). In early October, the GDR Finance Minister unilaterally doubled the minimal currency exchange requirement for visits to the East, and Premier Erich Honecker articulated a set of non-negotiable demands at Gera. The "unalterable prerequisites" for a further normalization were to include the formal recognition of GDR-citizenship, the elimination of the Central Reporting Station on Border Violations at Salzgitter,²⁴ the immediate regulation of a problematic Elbe River border, and the upgrading of the permanent missions to embassy status (based on the 2-nations thesis).

An equally abrupt reversal occurred in 1981, as the NATO theater nuclear decision increased in saliency and the topic of disarmament gained momentum as a focal point of German-German relations. In a February, 1981 address in East-Berlin, Honecker spoke of a possible "unification" of the two German states (albeit in more ominous than optimistic tones).²⁵ At the spring trade fair in Leipzig, he proclaimed that difficulties afflicting East-West relations should not be permitted to disrupt German-German relations, as if decoupling were a possibility. Honecker then met twice with the new Permanent Representative to East Berlin, Klaus Bolling -- in earlier years such a meeting had served as a prelude to new negotiations. The former Representative Gunter Gaus, reporting and writing on his own experiences in the East, began to call upon West German citizens to learn more about the GDR, and to stop treating "the other Germans" as an invisible albeit hostile phenomenon.²⁶

The German-German dialogue not only resumed, it actually intensified. The imposition of martial law in Poland cut short a Werbellinsee summit meeting between Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker, 11-13. December 1981. The degree of consensus reached on a number of key points was nonetheless substantial: No new treaty, but a mutual understanding that if the international situation did not deteriorate further, a continuation of normalization efforts between the two states was possible. A second point, found in the joint communique, stressed that "both sides are conscious of their great responsibility for securing the peace in Europe." Last but not least, both leaders reiterated their conviction, "that war can never again be launched from German soil."²⁷ Honecker's recommendations for disarmament and rumblings against pending NATO deployments were presented in the GDR-media as a "Program for a Constructive Contribution by both German States to Peace and

Disarmament" [my emphasis].²⁸

Schmidt was compelled to devote ever more energy to the irreconcilable differences besetting his own party in relation to the deployment question. Honecker accepted an invitation to visit in 1982 (no concrete date was set) and thereafter stepped out front as Deutschlandpolitik's most active proponent -- in stark contrast to the recalcitrant, even bockig posture assumed by the East German Premier at the outset of Ostpolitik. Honecker's detailed "Program" had no Federal Republican match. He urged both states to support:

earnest and substantial negotiations between the USSR and the USA concerning questions on medium-range nuclear missiles, so that tangible results can be attained in the shortest time possible; an agreement on a moratorium for the duration of the Geneva negotiations over the deployment of new medium-range missiles in Europe...; a prohibition on the neutron bomb; adoption of a declaration for the denunciation of first-strike use of nuclear weapons...; continuation of the SALT-process; the convening of a conference on the relaxation of military tensions and disarmament through the Madrid meetings; formulation of an initial agreement at the Vienna negotiations to exclude nonreconcilable issues; preparation of the second special session of the UN on disarmament through the Geneva Committee [which will deal] above all with a halt to all nuclear weapons testing, a ban on neutron weapons, on chemical and radiological weapons, as well as with the strengthening of a security-guarantee for the non-nuclear states.²⁹

Reconciliatory gestures followed rhetorical appeals. On 11. February 1982, the GDR expanded its catalogue of "pressing family matters," used to permit East Germans to make emergency trips to the West. December marked the

tenth anniversary of the Grundlagenvertrag, but by then the party responsible for its inception, the SPD, had already been forced from the political stage in Bonn. The next question to arise was what changes, if any, would accompany the CDU's return to power in 1982-1983 -- the party that had once vehemently opposed the whole concept of Ostpolitik.

Given the ferocity of its assaults on Brandt's initiatives between 1969 and 1972, the reinstated CDU/CSU government displayed surprising restraint during its first year in office, even though this period witnessed a dramatic escalation in tensions between the superpowers. In his inaugural address to the Bundestag on 13. October 1982, the new Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, confirmed his interest in a continuing German-German dialogue at all levels. Even the CDU candidate who had sought to unseat Brandt through a non-confidence vote in 1971, Rainer Barzel, emphasized that the new government would seek "discussion, not polemics, results, not headlines."³⁰ In light of sentiments expressed during the June, 1983 debate over the Government's Report on the State of the Nation, the new administration had no real alternative but to continue implementing existing policies.

The international climate, as well as the domestic political-economic picture, had changed considerably since 1969; moreover, public acceptance of Ostpolitik had acquired a more or less permanent character. Kohl sought to accommodate a small but vociferous anti-conciliatory faction within his own party by adopting the formula "continuity with new accents." Hidden behind the new label was nonetheless a dual strategy; the first strategic component was declarative in nature, paying unbending, rhetorical homage to the goals of self-determination and the "unity of the nation." The second element involved a more pragmatic approach, a continuation of the step-by-step "politics of negotiation" practiced since 1970.

The first "new accent" came into play less than six months after the special elections confirming Kohl's selection as Chancellor. To almost everyone's surprise, Franz Josef Strauss -- once a most vehement critic of Ostpolitik -- traveled to East Berlin and arranged for a spectacular DM 1 billion credit deal in July, 1983. Neither the amount nor the credit mechanism utilized was all that extraordinary; but the fact that the normally belligerent Strauss undertook this deal without first seeking the approval of the CSU's sister party, the CDU, amazed the opposition and gave rise to public expressions of irritation among members of the government. The CDU had its own brand of continuity which rested on the principle of Leistung-Gegenleistung ("you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours"). Strauss was criticized by his own for having extended the credits without demanding immediate concessions. At least one analyst has argued that Strauss' behavior can be interpreted as an act of "preemptive compensation," that is, an attempt to bolster German-German relations in anticipation of a marked deterioration likely to follow the Euromissile deployments.³¹ Indeed, concessions of a voluntary, "preemptive" nature were not limited to one issue, nor to one state.

As deployments neared, the efforts to communicate seemed to increase exponentially. In August, Honecker rolled out the welcome mat for opposition-leader Hans-Jochen Vogel and for Ostpolitik's former shuttle-diplomat, Egon Bahr. The GDR invited Bundespräsident Karl Carstens to attend the Luther anniversary celebrations in East-Berlin (he declined for reasons of location). Vogel proposed inviting East German Volkskammer delegates to visit the Bundestag, and negotiations on an environmental protection treaty were resumed. In September, 1983, the GDR announced the elimination of the minimum daily currency exchange requirement for children

aged 6-14, with a later reduction for pensioners from DM 25 to DM 15. Once deployments commenced in December, it was Erich Honecker who began to speak of a Verantwortungsgemeinschaft ("community of responsibility"), while Kohl called for a "partnership of reason" and the SPD stressed the need for a "security partnership."³²

In February, 1984, all Bundestag parties (with the exception of the Greens) agreed to support a common foundation for what had become a two-way Deutschlandpolitik. The document to which they lent their approval began: "Our land is divided, but the German nation continues to exist ... We cannot change this condition by our own power. We can only make it more bearable. This condition will only be changed within the framework of a durable peace order in Europe."³³ Kohl and Honecker met for two hours on the occasion of Andropov's funeral in Moscow, with Honecker commenting that the GDR was prepared "to do everything in its power to build down the existing international dangers."³⁴

Chernenko's return to a hard-line stance toward the West, in addition to the counter-deployment of tactical nuclear devices on East German soil, should have lessened the willingness to "dialogue" and should have acted as a constraint on Honecker's room to maneuver. Instead, these developments merely seemed to strengthen his resolve to intensify German-German communication. Rather than settle in to a new ice-age, Honecker immediately embarked on a course of "damage limitation," meeting with Strauss, Lambsdorff, Zeyer and Lafontaine in the spring of 1984 and allowing letters from religious dissidents who condemned the counter deployments at home to be printed up in Neues Deutschland.³⁵ Moscow's decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympic games came as a harsh blow to the "sports-state GDR." Honecker jabbed back by replacing four pro-Moscovites in the SED Politburo with personal supporters,

including "independent" Herbert Haber, a specialist responsible for relations with the Federal Republic.

The Kohl government, meanwhile, was charged with ineptly handling an additional DM 950 million credit deal which inadvertently "overlooked" the exclusion of Berlin in the concessionary easing of travel restrictions.³⁶ It had done a much better job of averting a near-catastrophe during the spring and summer of 1984 when 18 GDR citizens occupied the US mission in East Berlin and later 161 asylum seekers implanted themselves in the West German embassy in Prague. Despite the fact that "free movement" and human rights head the CDU/CSU's list of "non-negotiable" demands, the Bonn government adopted a sensitive, low-key response; the crisis was successfully resolved without a loss of face for either side. During the first half of 1984, the GDR opened the gates to 31,352 Germans seeking to resettle in the West, up to 40,000 by the end of the year. It also dismantled automatic firing devices along 175.7 kilometers (40 percent) of the inter-German border.³⁷

Paradoxically, one development that should have contributed to a further cementing of German-German rapprochement began to chip away at the "partnership of reason" upheld by Kohl and embraced by Honecker throughout 1984. The East German Premier's decision to accept an invitation to visit the Federal Republic for the first-time (since leaving his birthplace in the Saarland) soon became a tool for poisoning the climate in the hands of anti-reconciliation elements in Kohl's own camp. High-ranking conservative officials engaged in "unworthy and denigrating" pronouncements [e.g., Dregger's "our future doesn't depend on the honor of a visit by Mr. Honecker"] and also began to question publicly the sanctity of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland.³⁸ Far from enthused about Honecker's pending visit from the start, Moscow availed itself of an opportunity to hurl charges of

"revanchism" toward Bonn (actually thinly disguised admonitions directed at East-Berlin). In an act of rather courageous defiance, Neues Deutschland failed to fall in line by automatically reprinting harsh criticisms from Pravda.

The discrepancies between Kohl's "Sunday sermons and work-week activities," the two elements of the dual strategy, made the Chancellor unwilling and/or unable to muzzle the increasingly vociferous ultra-conservative wing of his party. Honecker withstood intense pressure from Moscow up until two weeks prior to the scheduled visit; but ultimately, "East-Berlin dared too much, Bonn helped too little."³⁹

In short order, Kohl's policy of "continuity with new accents" gave way to the practice of "continuity with old accents." Moderates among journalists and pundits charged Kohl with permitting polemics for lack of a Deutschlandpolitik concept of his own.⁴⁰ By December, 1984, pronouncements that "the existing situation, the core of the East-treaties must be changed," and a new emphasis on "the openness of the German Question," began to raise doubts about "continuity" altogether.⁴¹

After January, 1985, it became almost impossible to discern elements of "partnership" and "reason" in either the rhetoric or the actions of the conservative government. The "national question" was swept back on to center stage in January when Kohl accepted an invitation to address the annual reunion of postwar refugees from the Eastern border regions. Claiming ignorance of their theme "Schlesien remains ours" (an explicit demand for a return to pre-1937 borders), the Chancellor refused to back down, pushing instead for a revised motto, "40 years of banishment - Schlesien remains our future - in a Europe of free peoples."⁴² Apparently not content with merely slowing down the pace of diplomatic initiatives towards the GDR,

ultraconservative elements seemed to have little trouble jostling Kohl into a policy of "continuity with new barriers" that amounted to an assault on FRG-East European relations in general. Two regularly scheduled state visits to Poland were cancelled; Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary expressed serious concern to visiting Willy Brandt. Observer Peter Bender noted the "democratic arrogance" of the older conservatives behind the Schlesien-affair who were intent on freeing the Poles in 1985, as if Germans had liberated and democratized themselves in 1945.⁴³

With the nationalist and anti-communist flags being hoisted side-by-side in Bonn, the fortieth anniversary of the war's end acquired greater significance as a propaganda device than as an opportunity for advancing the idea of a "community of responsibility" serving the cause of European peace. Kohl sought to play the event two ways by calling for quiet religious observations, on the one hand, while proclaiming, on the other, "the whole world will look at Germany on May 8th."⁴⁴ By inviting Reagan to visit the Bitburg cemetery, the Chancellor turned the second point into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Kohl's ambivalence regarding the "openness" of the German Question versus the permanence of the postwar borders appears to substantiate the critics' charges that he seeks a German "commonality without a solid concept."⁴⁵ One possible interpretation accounting for the dramatic shifts in word and deed between 1983 and 1985 may be that Kohl, as a newcomer to national office, recognized the post deployment period for what it was, namely a grave, immediate threat to the gains made in FRG-GDR relations over a period of ten years. By mid-1984, the euphoria of the conservatives' return to power after 13 years wore thin, and Kohl was hard pressed to span the gap between factions within the CDU/CSU camp. After the scheduling of the Schulz-Gromyko visit in

January and the announcement that the US and the Soviet Union would return to the negotiating table in March, 1985, Kohl could presume that the worst of the East-West crisis had passed; hence, he was free to go back to "business as usual." Too young to have participated personally in the events of 1933-1945, he appears to be caught between a desire to exonerate the postwar generations of a direct responsibility for the Nazi experiences, while trying to convince the global community that the lessons of that period have been duly learned and accepted -- except for the permanent division of the German nation-state, that is.

For Honecker, on the other hand, the 1983 deployments seem to have marked a critical political as well as a conceptual turning point. As late as 1980, the GDR leadership demonstrated at Gera that a serious destabilization in the region or an all-too-eager FRG compliance with plans for a further arms build-up could and would put the GDR back on the offense-defensive path of demarcation (Abgrenzung). The first (known) tactical nuclear weapons deployed on East German soil as a counter to Pershing II and cruise missiles in 1983 not only increased the GDR's physical vulnerability -- it probably meant a tightening of the reins from Moscow, itself made insecure by the unresolved leadership succession question. Unlike Kohl, Honecker spent the years 1935-1945 in a Nazi prison, and is inclined to see in the German division a barrier against resurgent fascism -- just as the twentieth passing of 13. August 1961 was noted in East Berlin with banners supporting the "anti-fascist protection wall." Reformist Gorbachev's rapid but smooth rise to the top in the Soviet Union has given the East German Premier grounds for cautious optimism. In recent months Honecker has cleverly resorted to courting prominent SPD figures, ever since Social Democratic electoral victories in the Saarland and Northrhine-Westphalia have put the SPD back in the running for

the Chancellor race in 1987.⁴⁶

Instead of resorting to "business as usual," Honecker has emerged from the initial deployment crisis a more self-confident statesperson intent on quietly improving relations with other states in the region. While the Bonn government has struggled to pull itself by the pigtail out of its own nationalist (but certainly not neutralist) quagmire, Honecker has met with other potential, anti-deployment partners from Austria, Japan, Canada, Greece, Spain and Italy, including the Pope.⁴⁷ His favorite themes are reportedly disarmament, renunciation of first strike, renunciation of force and the creation of nuclear-free zones.

In his apparent effort to push for a "club of small nations," Honecker seems to be venting "a deep-seated neutralist instinct" [source: West German Foreign Minister Genscher]. It is by design, not coincidence, that Honecker has been photographed with prominent national-neutralists from the West German anti-nuclear movements, e.g., Petra Kelly, Gert Bastian, Jo Leinen and Oskar Lafontaine. He is apparently willing to incur the risk of adding momentum to the unofficial peace and ecology movements springing up at home -- a sign of growing confidence in his own leadership capabilities, based on perceived public support for his diplomatic initiatives. In the evaluation of one Western observer, East German citizens "would like most of all to pack up their country and build it up anywhere else, far outside the pull of the power blocs."⁴⁸ More realistically, Honecker has chosen to cultivate an emergent "fundamental understanding, if not consensus, a respect and a feeling of not yet clearly definable, but nonetheless common interests" between the two Germanies.⁴⁹ The key to a further improvement in German-German relations is seen to rest in the concept of the Verantwortungsgemeinschaft, explored in the concluding section below.

IV. Whither Deutschlandpolitik? "Responsibility" Redefined

Implicit in the concept of a Verantwortungsgemeinschaft ("community of responsibility") is the belief that answers to the German national question and the search for effective peace-keeping mechanisms throughout Europe are inexorably linked. As Brandt maintained in 1969:

The practical political test that now lies ahead of us in upcoming years will be to secure the unity of the nation, to see that the relationship between the parts of Germany are relieved of their present cramping. The Germans are not only bound together through their language and their history -- with its glory and misery. We all find our home in Germany. We also have further common tasks and a common responsibility: toward the peace around us and in Europe.⁵⁰

Improvements in German-German relations since 1969 have steered clear of directly promoting the unity of the nation, but this has not prevented the two states from establishing a complicated network of legal, economic, cultural and environmental ties. Leaders in both states acknowledge that the best approach to normalization is a multi-faceted one, and that negotiations to date have had a cumulative effect on their willingness to cooperate further. Each side must not only recognize the special stakes confronting the other; the two states have also come to realize that there are special stakes separating Deutschland from the rest of Central Europe. As Bruns hypothesizes, the stronger the emphasis on mutual interests and the larger the number of reciprocal benefits that can be built into the mechanisms for cooperation, the more likely and the more effective the implementation of treaties, accords and exchanges will become.⁵¹

The successes to date and the recognition of mutual interests give rise

to a new set of questions for the 1980's and beyond. The two Germanies have built up a legally complex "zone of activity," but have yet to develop a positive concept of peace: even if the absence-of-war is a satisfactory state of affairs for the other powers of Europe, for the Germans-divided this will not suffice. What is the goal of Deutschlandpolitik? Where are the improvements in German-German relations supposed to lead? What is to be the mutually acceptable strategy, and what further, concrete steps will follow from that strategy? How can a variety of ostensibly irreconcilable interests of the two states be so connected with each other so as to provide a set of mutual incentives to a further normalization of their interactions. Thus far, the two states have made the critical transition from a strategy of Gegeneinander (against-each other) to one Nebeneinander (next-to-each-other); at issue is whether both are able and willing to cross the threshold to a strategy of Miteinander (with-one-another).

Clearly these questions are the "stuff" out of which dissertations are made -- they cannot all be adequately answered here. One reason there can be no definitive solution to the German Problem is because ultimately the decisions will not be left up to the two states themselves. The actions of the GDR leadership toward the FRG depend in part on the behavior of the West German leadership. At the same time, Honecker's freedom to maneuver is a function of and a reflex reaction to internal political developments. Problems of legitimacy within have sooner resulted in policies aimed at isolating the GDR citizenry from disruptive external influences; Abgrenzung (demarcation) was the vehicle by which the GDR sought to establish its status as a sovereign nation-state. It therefore appears that an internally consolidated, self-confident East German leadership would be a much more flexible, amenable negotiations partner for the FRG than an insecure one. In

this respect, the best strategy for Bonn would be to undertake measures that ensure internal stability and grant external recognition to the government in East Berlin. The final, critical variable determining GDR behavior is, of course, the Soviet Union, which is not beyond using an improvement in German-German relations to service its own political-economic needs.

The Federal Republic has had less qualms about its "right to exist" ever since the promulgation of the Basic law, that is, fewer problems establishing its legitimacy internally, despite the "provisional status" it defined for itself in the constitutional preamble. Bonn's behavior towards the other German state seems to have been less dependent on GDR actions towards the FRG and more subject to influence by the balance of party-political forces. While certainly sensitive to pressures from Washington, D.C., FRG officials have been able to fall back on the European Community and diverse positions held by NATO alliance members to guarantee a greater degree of autonomy in the conduct of foreign policy since the late 1960's.

It is somewhat ironic that Honecker would develop the most persistent sales-pitch for the notion of a "community of responsibility," for two reasons. First, the GDR abjures the principle of "collective guilt" as far as people within its own borders are concerned. "Responsibility" has an historical as well as a futuristic dimension. Considering itself the bastion of anti-fascist resistance, the GDR has divorced itself from the events of 1933-1945; but recent efforts to rehabilitate Luther and even Bismarck are difficult to justify, since no "normal" state can selectively identify with its own historical and cultural legacy in this fashion. Honecker tends to emphasize the present and future responsibility of the two Germanies in preventing the outbreak of a third world war. Secondly, the idea of Gemeinschaft implies something closer than a set of inter-national relations.

The GDR which has long eschewed the existence of a "special relationship" and has insisted upon its sovereignty as a nation, now seeks to promote an international/regional recognition of that "special relationship."

Through its postwar indemnification policies (Wiedergutmachung), the Federal Republic has acknowledged historical responsibility towards the victims of Nazism. Its integration into the Western bloc is upheld as a device for avoiding a repetition of that dark chapter in German history. Paradoxically, those who would suggest that the division is not a permanent condition are accused of treason (e.g. former Minister of Justice, Jurgen Schmude)⁵² -- but how a reunified Germany would do more to secure the future of peace in Europe is never spelled out. The belief in "community" or alternatively, in two-states-in-one-nation has not been borne out by the earlier practices of ignoring or denying the "so-called GDR's" existence; nor has it been supported by the "cooperative indifference" or the widespread ignorance about conditions there underlined by Gaus.⁵³

The Verantwortungsgemeinschaft strikes a resonant chord among peace activists in both states, producing support for both the "community" and the "responsibility" components. As Greens' spokesperson Antje Vollmer contends, "neutralism is no curseword" -- [it is] rather a legitimate political possibility for two German states who draw their lesson out of their common history."⁵⁴ The situation of the 1980's necessitates something more than a return to the ohne mich neutralist sentiments of the 1950's. "Community" implies an active pursuit of cooperative relations, not a dropping-out process. Prominent SPD member Herbert Wehner speaks of an inneres Ausland, an untranslatable phrase positioning FRG-GDR exchanges halfway between intra- with intersystemic relations.⁵⁵

German-German relations were characterized by isolation and demarcation

during the fifties, followed by direct ideological confrontation during the sixties. The paradigm shifted with Ostpolitik, rendering normalization the strategy for the seventies. The diplomatic innovations of that period have lost their glow. The eighties threaten to become an era of routinized and administered relations, should the Verantwortungsgemeinschaft fail to provide new directions.

The controversies surrounding Reagan's Bitburg visit and Kohl's attendance at the Schlesien reunion did not in and of themselves resurrect the "national question." Nor have the East and West German peace movements alone reopened Pandora's box. The lid was never fully closed. Weidenfeld argues rather convincingly that the Lautstarke (loudness) of the present debate over the born-again German Question signals the waning of past political perspectives -- the need for bona fide postwar identity combines the questions, "where are we coming from?" and "where are we going?"⁵⁶ Schweigler is no doubt correct in asserting the existence of separate FRG- and GDR-identities, both of which allow successor generations to comprehend from whence they came.⁵⁷ This does not preclude the possibility of a second identification with a larger community that seeks to assume greater responsibility for its own security in the future. In a climate of exacerbated international tensions, against a backdrop of possible nuclear annihilation, the more important question for the citizens of these two permanently-provisional systems remains: Deutschlandpolitik wohin?

Appendix AMajor German-German Negotiations and Signed Accords, 1970-1979

- Accord over the Regulation of Costs for Postal and Telecommunication Services (20. April 1970)
- Protocol for the Negotiations Regulating Postal and Telecommunications Traffic (30. September 1971)
- Treaty regarding Questions of Transport (25. May 1972)
- Treaty over the Basis of Relations (Grundlagenvertrag) from 21. December 1972
- Accords regarding the Principles for Detoxification and Preservation of Water Resources on the Borders (20. September 1973) [specific negotiations have ensued regarding water-quality for the Spree and the Havel (Berlin), the Elbe, the Werra-Weser and the Roden (Coburg)]
- Protocol regarding the Establishment of Permanent Diplomatic Missions (14. March 1974)
- Accords regarding the Transfer of Personal Support Payments and Personal Estates in Special Cases (25. April 1974)
- Protocol over the Regulation of Sports Relationships between the Deutschen Sportbund and the Deutschen Turn- und Sportbund (8. May 1974)
- Agreement in the field of Public Health (25. April 1974)
- Agreement regarding Fishing Limits in one part of the Lubecker Bay (29. June 1974)
- Protocol Note regarding the Positioning of the Borders between the Coastal Waters of the FRG and the Coastal Waters of the GDR (29.6. 1974)
- Accords regarding Improvements in the Traffic Thoroughfares to and from Berlin-West (19. December 1975)

- Agreement regulating the area of Postal and Telecommunication Services (30. March 1976)
- Accords governing the Cross-border Mining of Brown Coal in the Locale of Helmstedt/Harbke (29. May 1976)
- Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on Tax and Fee Exemptions for Street Vehicles; Protocol for a Comprehensive Payment for Personal Vehicles utilizing Thoroughfares in the GDR (31. October 1979).
- Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic over the Construction of the North-Autobahn Berlin-Hamburg; the Repair of the Transit Canal to Berlin and the Reopening of the Teltow Canal; the Determination of Transit Visa Fees from 1980 to 1989 and Currency Transfers (16. November 1978)
- Agreement regarding Cooperation in the field of Veterinary Medicine (21. December 1979)
- Negotiations over the Conclusion of Treaties concerning Legal Processes (since 10. October 1973)
- Negotiations on the Conclusion of Treaties over Non-commercial Payment and Financial Accounting Processes (since 10. October 1973)
- Negotiations on the Conclusion of an Agreement for Environmental Protection (begun 29. November 1973)
- Negotiations on the Conclusion of an Agreement Promoting Cooperation in the fields of Science and Technology (begun 30. November 1973)
- Negotiations on the Conclusion of an Agreement for Culture (since 27. November 1973)
- Negotiations regarding Economic Questions (ongoing)
- Meeting of the Experts regarding Traffic near the Borders (ongoing)

- Negotiations over the Improvement of Transportation Ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic
- Negotiations over the Use of Natural Gas Discoveries in Wustrow/Salzwedel

Agreements Pertaining to the Status of Berlin

- Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin (3. September 1971)
- Agreement regulating Traffic to and from Berlin-West (17. December 1971)
- Agreement between the Berlin Senat and the Government of the GDR regarding Travel and Visitor Traffic, and the Regulation of the Question of Enclaves (20. December 1971)

Bilateral and International Treaties Related to Ostpolitik

- Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics renouncing the Use of Force and Normalizing Relations (12. August 1970)
- Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland over the Basic Principles for the Normalization of Reciprocal Relations (7. December 1970)
- Treaty over the Reciprocal Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia (11. December 1973)
- Helsinki Accords, concluding the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1. August 1975)
- Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Reciprocal Support between the GDR and the USSR (7. October 1975)
- Communique of a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO: Theater Nuclear Forces, December 12, 1979.

In the 1980's, some 6,000 West German firms sign an estimated 50,000 individual contracts annually

Footnotes

1. These statements were made by Helmut Schmidt and Erich Honecker, respectively, following their December 1981 summit meeting at Werbellinsee, GDR.
2. Michael Sturmer, "Kein Eigentum der Deutschen: Die deutsche Frage," in Werner Weidenfeld, Hrsg., Die Identitat der Deutschen (Munchen: Carl Hanser, 1983), pp. 83-101; further, Richard Lowenthal, "Stabilitat ohne Sicherheit. Vom Selbstverstandnis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Der Monat, Heft 1, 1978. Also, Jurgen Leinemann, Die Angst der Deutschen. Beobachtungen zur Bewusstseinslage der Nation (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982).
3. The West Germany weekly Die Zeit has run a series of debates pertaining to the national problem, as well as a number of interpretive essays on the significance of the 8th of May 1985. For a sample, see articles by Theo Sommer (24. August 1984; 1. January 1985); Saul Friedlander (15. February 1985); Karl Kaiser (6. April 1984); Karl-Heinz Janssen (12. April 1985); Michael Sturmer (1. February 1985). For a more extreme perspective, see Armin Mohler, Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, 3. Auflage (Krefeld: Sinus, 1980).
4. Helga Pross, Was ist heute deutsch? Wertorientierung in der Bundesrepublik (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982); Rainer Roth, Was ist typisch deutsch? Die Deutschen - Image und Selbstverstandnis (Freiburg: Ploetz, 1979); Anton Peisl and Armin Mohler, Hrsg., Die deutsche Neurose - Uber die beschadigte Identitat der Deutschen (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1980). On the issue of anti-Germanism, see Anita Malinkrodt, "Medienberichterstattung uber die Bundesrepublik in den USA," Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B29-30/84, 21. July 1984, pp. 15-29.

5. Pierre Hassner, "Zwei deutsche Staaten in Europa. Gibt es gemeinsame Interessen in der internationalen Politik?" in Weidenfeld, op. cit., p. 300.
6. Ibid., p. 298.
7. Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Security and the Successor Generations: Youth and the National Question in the East and West German Peace Movements" (forthcoming 1985).
8. For a detailed chronology, see Joyce M. Mushaben, "Cycles of Peace Protest in West Germany: Experiences from Three Decades," West European Politics 8 (January 1985) pp. 24-40; and, "Swords to Plowshares: The Church, the State and the East German Peace Movement," Studies in Comparative Communism XVII (Summer 1984), pp. 123-135.
9. Mushaben, "Cycles...", ibid.
10. Mushaben, "Swords to Plowshares...", loc. cit., Wolfgang Buscher and Peter Wensierski, Null Bock auf DDR - Austeigerjugend im anderen Deutschland (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1984).
11. "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt am 28. Oktober 1969," cited in the documentation, Die Deutsche Frage, Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, Hrsg. (Hannover: 1982), p. 115.
12. Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, Hrsg., Die Linke und die nationale Frage - Dokumente zur deutschen Einheit seit 1945 (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981); and, Arbeitsgruppe Berlin- und Deutschlandpolitik - Alternative Liste, Hrsg., Paktfreiheit für beide deutsche Staaten oder Bis dass der Tod uns eint? Berlin, 1982.
13. Paktfreiheit, ibid., p. 114.
14. Oskar Lafontaine, Angst vor den Freunden. Die Atomwaffen-Strategie der Supermächte zerstört die Bündnisse (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983).

15. This letter is reprinted in Wolfgang Buscher, Peter Wensierski and Klaus Wolschner, Friedensbewegung in der DDR - Texte 1978-1982 (Hattingen: Edition Transit, 1982), pp. 181-184.
16. Eppelmann's appeal also appears in Buscher et al., Friedensbewegung..., *ibid.*, pp. 178-180.
17. Richard Lowenthal, "The German Question Transformed," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85, p. 313.
18. Walther Leisler Kiep, "The New Deutschlandpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85, p. 316.
19. Wilhelm Bruns, Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen. Pramissen - Probleme - Perspektiven (Opladen: Leske, 1984), p. 30.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
22. Two sample statements by prominent politicians in 1975 illustrate the gap between their respective positions. Foreign Minister Han-Dietrich Genscher (FRG): "We cannot accept division as the last word of history over the German nation." Contrast, Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer (GDR): "With respect to the national question on German soil, history has rendered her decision." Both are cited by Bruns, *loc. cit.*, p. 37.
23. "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt", *op. cit.*, p. 115.
24. Salzgitter is a symbolic irritant, the number of border incidents reported having dropped to almost zero. See Dietrich Strothmann, "Unsere Ausbeute ist Gleich Null - Streit um Salzgitter," Die Zeit, March, 1984.
25. Bruns, *op. cit.*, p. 126; Neues Deutschland, 16. February 1981, p. 3
26. Gunter Gaus, Wo Deutschland liegt - Eine Ortsbestimmung (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1983), and Die Zeit, 30. January 1981, p. 3ff.
27. Cited in Bruns, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

28. Bruns, op. cit., p. 142; Neues Deutschland, 16. December 1981, p. 1ff.
29. Ibid.
30. Bruns, op. cit., p. 146.
31. Bruns himself takes this position, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
32. Elizabeth Pond, "Finding Detente in unlikely places," The Christian Science Monitor, 22. February 1984.
33. Marion Graf von Donhoff, "Zuviel der Sorge, zuviel der Hoffnung - Was ist los mit den Deutschen?" Die Zeit, 23. March 1984, p. 1.
34. Joachim Nawrocki, "Die Freiheit des treuen Vasallen. Trotz der Raketenstationierung betreibt Ost-Berlin umsichtig Westpolitik," Die Zeit, 2. March 1984.
35. Christian Schmidt-Hauer, "Der lange Papierkrieg der roten Bruder - Die Chronik der Krise zwischen dem Kreml und die ostdeutschen Kommunisten," Die Zeit, 17. August 1984; Neues Deutschland, 17. August - 14. September 1984;
36. Joachim Nawrocki, "Berlin Kommt zu kurz - Die neuen Besuchsregelungen: Hat Bonn schlecht verhandelt?" Die Zeit, 17. August 1984.
37. Kiep, op. cit., pp. 317-318.
38. Rolf Zundel, "Herbe Spruche und ein wenig Trauer - Jetzt gerat der deutschlandpolitische Konsens in gefahr" Die Zeit, 14. September 1984; also, Marlies Menge, "Wie steht er jetzt den da? Die Sorge ist gross, dass die deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen leiden müssen," Die Zeit, 14. September 1984.
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40. Gunter Gaus, "Die Stunde der Wahrheit kommt bestimmt. In der Deutschlandpolitik müssen der Kanzler und seine Partei bald Farbe

- bekennen," Die Zeit, 20. July 1984; Klaus Bolling, "Tagespolitik reicht nicht aus - Der Kanzler muss endlich sein Konzept für die Deutschlandpolitik deutlich machen," Die Zeit, 27. July 1984; and Marion Graf von Donhoff, "Wie Vertrauen verspielt wird - Polen und die Leichtfertigkeit der Bonner Ostpolitik," Die Zeit, 21. September 1984.
41. Theo Sommer, "Alte Krämpfe - Ostpolitische Schaumereien schaden nur," Die Zeit, 7. December 1984; Gunter Hofmann, "Die Wunschdenker auf dem Vormarsch" Die Zeit, 11. January 1985.
 42. "Schlesier ändern Motto für Treffen," Frankfurter Rundschau, 23. January 1985; Theo Sommer, "Grenzen, Erdbeeren und Sauerkirschen. Hinter dem Streit um das Schlesier treffen: Streit um die Ostpolitik," Die Zeit, 8. February 1985.
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 45. Kurt Becker, "Dünne Decke - Gemeinsamkeit ohne feste Grundlage," Die Zeit, 28. September 1984.
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50. "Regierungserklärung", op. cit., p. 115.
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