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Identity-Formation in the German
Democratic Republic

Joyce Marie Mushaben

NATIONALITY: GERMAN, CITIZENSHIP: GDR
The Legitimizing Functions of Postwar Identity-Formation
in the German Democratic Republic

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Formation in the German Democratic Republic

Joyce Marie Mushaben

Mit der sozialistischen Revolution und der Gestaltung der sozialistischen Gesellschaft wurden in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik auch Grundlagen, Inhalt und Formen des nationalen Lebens qualitativ verändert... geführt von der Arbeiterklasse, hat das Volk der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in Übereinstimmung mit dem geschichtlichen Übergang zum Sozialismus sein Recht auf sozialökonomische, staatliche und nationale Selbstbestimmung verwirklicht. In der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik entwickelt sich die sozialistische deutsche Nation.

-- Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei
Deutschlands

In an August 3, 1989 interview with the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, West German Chancellery Minister, Rudolf Seiters, urged leaders of the German Democratic Republic to increase significantly the number of youth allowed to participate in a variety of exchanges with their Western counterparts. Seiters reported that 70,000-80,000 FRG adolescents had crossed the border between 1987 and 1988 to engage in a variety of cultural, touristic and sporting activities sponsored in the East. During the same period, the number of young GDR citizens permitted to attend Western music festivals, educational, athletic and sister-city events was limited to an estimated 3,800-5,000.¹

Two weeks later, Seiters rushed off to a Berlin meeting with East German Foreign Minister Krolikowski, this time in an effort to crisis-manage a tidal wave of GDR vacationers opting

artificially created, albeit internationally recognized sovereign state, with all the rights and duties of citizenship regulation accorded thereto. Although the two Republics differ significantly in the long-range "national" aspirations they espouse, both will pay a tremendous domestic price if the exodus conflict and subsequent mass outbursts of protest within the GDR itself are not soon resolved to the mutual satisfaction of leaders in both states. The ostensible intervention of Gorbachev in conjunction with the GDR's fortieth anniversary celebrations suggests that the East-West balance remains ever-sensitive to the reverberations of the German Question(s).³ The Great Völkerwanderung of the summer of '89 may have nonetheless given birth to new prerequisites for the further normalization of relations within the divided nation.

For the Honecker regime, the primary issue in ideological terms entails the formal recognition of its right to accord exclusive citizenship and to regulate GDR domestic affairs free from West German interference, be it of the direct or indirect sort. East Berlin's hard-line response to would-be exiters' occupation of FRG embassies, as well as its application of force against indigenous demonstrations, is moreover entangled in a web of secondary (but no less critical) real-political concerns. The list includes mounting problems of economic and demographic stagnation, the "squeeze" effects of simultaneous pressures from Bonn and Moscow deriving from the SED's reluctance to embrace the new religions of glasnost and perestroika, along with new

to filter out the "national" components of the GDR's identity as a separate state, and to determine the extent to which these components have contributed to or worked against the leadership's efforts to legitimize the GDR's existence in the eyes of its own citizens.

I. State-political and Psycho-social Dimensions of Identity

There exists no perfect equivalence between the "identity of interests" as defined at the state (collective) level and at the (individual) level of citizen-consciousness, respectively, no matter what the prevailing ideological order reflected in a given society. The need to reconcile inevitable conflicts between the two is openly recognized in pluralist society, with outcomes usually assuming the form of political compromise. In contrast, Marxist-Leninist ideology anticipates that an organic convergence of those interests will occur subsequent to the socialist-revolution stage of development, resulting in a universally internalized consensus. Maintaining the stability of any modern political system requires, at a minimum, an increasing degree of congruence between the values of the dominant political culture, the allocation of political roles and rewards, and access to the institutional framework/political structures which are intended to regulate normative and behavioral aspects of citizenship.⁵

In light of the developments of the last two months, there are no doubt many (e.g., David Childs) who have found

for those wont to explore the processes of national identity formation.

The links between individual and collective identity-formation are more than tenuous or coincidental in character, as difficult as it may be to establish a direct causal nexus. At a minimum, there appear to be four axes along which identities are likely to develop, whether the focus rests with the creation of self-identity, or whether the emphasis falls on the construction of national identity per se. "Identity," in either case, represents a composite of cognitive, affective, contextual and interactive elements. It is at once subjective and objective in nature.

The acquisition of cognitive and affective orientations towards self has long occupied the attentions of developmental psychologists and psychoanalysts, ranging from Piaget to Freud. Theories regarding the contextual and interactional components of self-identity may be less well-developed, but they are potentially all the more interesting because of their inherently dynamic character. The latter dimensions permit, or perhaps even require, a broader interdisciplinary perspective, serving as a bridge between individual and collective identification processes.

Richard Logan has determined that an "individual's sense of self inevitably and necessarily reflects the general world views prevailing in a given era."⁶ Moreover, "the prevailing sense of self of members of that culture and that era... may be a 'cause'

playing a particular role, and having a particular identity [my emphasis]."¹¹ Context yields a unique configuration of "particulars" which establishes the parameters of identity at any specific point in time. One need not presume, however, that both the direction and the intensity of commitment to significant others must remain constant relative to one's self-identification. Nor is the historical progression of identities depicted by Logan necessarily a linear one (e.g., moving from collective to individual, never to return to an earlier state of affairs).¹² George McCall even suggests that identity-formation evinces its own life-cycle process, moving through the stages of acquisition, development, transformation and eventual phasing out.¹³ The important point is not that identities per se change (as individuals advance through the life cycle, for example), but that the functions of and the relationships between identities thus committed also change. Combining elements of the actual and the ideal, viz., linking past, present and future states of consciousness or being, identities "must be negotiated," according to McCall; furthermore, as Stryker maintains, identities must be validated.¹⁴ I submit, however, that somewhere in between the phases of "negotiation" and "validation," identity must also seek self-affirmation.

Intuitively speaking, individuals who have experienced serious, deep-seated identity problems in the past will be more inclined to persist in a problemistic search for "self" than those persons for whom identity implies a steady state. One can

integration. In short, the substitution of role for identity may serve to defer or deflect questions of identity but only temporarily. Ultimately, "it does not follow... that there is some peculiar and unique way in which Germans [either individually or collectively] can define their identity by not having one."¹⁸

Stryker's assertion that mental and behavioral patterns emerge from social process raises the possibility of generational asymmetries, especially where "it has been a component of the political culture that younger people should define themselves at a distance from the nation."¹⁹ This lack of personal identification with one's country, I submit, does hold empirically observable consequences for the stability of the system; I contend that it is precisely a measure of internalized, sentimental attachment to the polity which ensures a reservoir of legitimacy, and hence stability, during those periods when the system finds itself incapable of meeting the citizenry's instrumental-material expectations, specifically, in times of major socio-economic crisis. The question of asymmetry becomes all the more pressing should younger generations not only fail to internalize a new concept of national identity as officially defined but also reject the form and the substance of specific roles which have entrenched themselves as identity's substitute.

Hence, how an individual relates to her/his country at the socio-psychological level may or may not converge with the

alienating, depersonalized mass society. A revived interest in the preservation of local dialects, the surprising popularity of the early 1980's TV-series bearing the same name, as well as the instant best-seller status accorded recent biographies of regional heroes of yesteryear (e.g., the Swabian Duke, Karl Eugen) are but a few developments testifying to the rehabilitation of Heimat as a component of postwar West German identity. In contrast, the German Democratic Republic is intensifying its efforts to re-wed the notion of Heimat to an increasing emphasis on sozialistische Vaterlandsliebe, explored in greater detail below.

The instrumentalization of Heimat as a stepping stone to a larger collective identity, evinced in both cases, is far from coincidental. One must bear in mind the extent to which postwar cohorts in the two states -- especially those under the age of 40 -- may possess an insufficient grasp of what it means to be a nation in the conventional sense; "blessed by late birth" and having been spared its historically militant manifestations, they may fail to develop an active interest in the topic. On the other hand, younger citizens may still find it difficult to abandon "nationalism" as a component of their own identities as long as they are uncertain as to what they may be giving up. In this they differ significantly from the elderly Gründer- or Aufbaugeneration for whom "the avoidance of any approach to our real identity as Germans, the virtual tabooing of the subject and its absence from public discussion and personal conversation

community of the whole. Instrumental attachment, on the other hand, tends to emerge as a function of one's commitment to a particular set of socio-economic institutions. Secondly, it may result from a commitment to the institutionalization and effective performance of specific social roles. Finally, instrumental involvement with the system can be grounded in a commitment to law and order as desirable ends an und für sich.²²

The stability of the modern nation-state is presumably secured through a balanced mixture of different types of commitment, which are more or less randomly distributed throughout the population. Personal attachment becomes a source of political legitimacy and political continuity to the extent that it stimulates further involvement with the system; involvement, in turn, may generate a greater sense of collective consciousness, opening the door to an eventual identification with the state in which it is housed.

As conventionally understood, the bonds of collective qua national consciousness are woven from the fibers of common language, ethnicity, religion and customs, usually within the framework of a shared history. For Karl Deutsch, the essence of nationhood rests in shared systems of social communication and economic interchange, linked to a center which has the power to compel cohesiveness and effective control among citizen-members.²³ Boyd Shafer's 10-fold criteria are more rigorous, and therefore also more difficult to apply in the case of newly created states. They include: 1) territorial unity; 2) shared

political legitimacy, one can begin to posit a symbiotic relationship between the processes of identity-formation and legitimation, as experienced by two Germanys during the first forty years of their existence:

the perception of the state as representative of national unity can compensate for failures to meet people's needs and interests. On the other hand, the perception of the state as meeting the people's needs and interests can compensate for a lacking sense of national identity, and can in fact help to create such an identity.²⁶

The nation-state (under normal circumstances) functions as the institutional embodiment of a common national consciousness. National consciousness, however, is short-hand for many types of collective consciousness prevailing within a given territory. The German language is, in fact, replete with terms whose purpose is to draw a number of very fine but significant lines between the various types of collective consciousness, on the one hand, and to blur any ultimate distinctions among those types, on the other -- or so it would seem to the non-native speaker. Leaders of both postwar states have, at various points in their separate histories, been heard to apply the terms Kulturnation, Staatsnation, Nationalbewusstsein, Staatsbewusstsein, and Bewusstseinsnation, in an effort to highlight, refute or even to reestablish the ties that divide and bind them. To the bearers of "normal" national identities,

writes Sternberger, "is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right."²⁹ The problem with this and many other such broad definitions is that the notion of "right" precludes neither a Weberian (that is, legal-rational) nor a Marxian (class-struggle) interpretation. The history of Germany itself bears witness to the diversity of conditions and values under which people are prepared to recognize and embrace the state as their own. Since 1945, Western analysts have inevitably tended to judge the legitimacy of Eastern regimes according to liberal-democratic standards -- rendering all self-proclaimed socialist states, almost by definition, inherently illegitimate. The converse holds true for Eastern states, equally intent on demonstrating the ultimately illegitimate character of bourgeois-capitalist governments.

In fact, there do appear to be a number of overarching dimensions with respect to the foundations of legitimacy in capitalist and socialist states -- the critical difference seems to lie in the question of the rank-ordering and weighting of these dimensions.³⁰ These dimensions must also be considered interactive in character, implying the possibility of their compensatory effects as objective conditions or subjective perceptions change over time.

Among the more/less universally applicable bases for

5) material/performance-based factors [here the emphasis falls on the "unity of economic and social policy," counterbalancing expectations against the actual delivery of goods and services under "real-existing" socialism]; the significance of this dimension has been dramatically demonstrated by the summations of DDR-Aussiedler -- Dialectical materialism as redefined aus dem Volksmund reads: "Kontinuität besteht in der Fortsetzung der wirtschaftlichen Mangelerscheinungen, Veränderung hängt von der Art der Mängel ab!"

6) constitutional-procedural consensus, along the lines of Weber, N. Luhmann, and J. Habermas [the exercise of state power is indeed constitutionally defined, based on the principle of democratic centralism, as is the catalogue of citizen rights and responsibilities; as in many of the above categories, the problem lies in the gap between theory and praxis];

7) instrumental-participatory factors [the system does provide for a wide range of participatory organs and mechanisms in accordance with the dictum, "Plane mit, arbeite mit, regiere mit"-- the goal of participation, however, is not to promote individual self-determination but collective integration; the revised version

--1952-1961 the institutionalization and stabilization of power, concentration on the integration of social forces

--1961-1967 the (re)structuring of power (through economic decentralization) and national "demarcation" (operationalized through construction of the Berlin Wall)

--1967-1977 the (begrudging) internalization of legitimacy (prompted by material improvements within and diplomatic recognition from without), ideological refinement of the self-identity concept under the auspices of the VIII. Party Congress

--1977-1987 the externalization of legitimacy, including widespread international recognition of GDR-sovereignty, increasing involvement in international affairs (homage to détente and Helsinki, support for nuclear and chemical weapons-free zones), and assertions of autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (propagation of the Verantwortungsgemeinschaft, Honecker's 1987 visit to BRD).³¹

Unfortunately, the promotion of an irreversibly separate, self-defined "identity" occurred rather late in the GDR's history, commencing in 1955 but not assuming its "final" form until almost two-thirds of the way through its existence to date. Likewise problematic is the fact that the

excluding the prospects for a re/unified national consciousness -- although logic would dictate that FRG citizens would have to identify both sentimentally and instrumentally with their own state, as a stepping stone to an eventual identification with the other German state and, hence, with the nation-reunified.³² The GDR has sought to escape the horns of this "Nation vs. State Identity" dilemma by cultivating a more positive orientation towards its own status as a new nation-state, having largely disassociated or otherwise exonerated itself from the legacy of the Third Reich. In an effort to achieve this standing, the SED has had to subject the very concept of "nation" to a number of important theoretical transmutations, none of which find direct support in the tomes of orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

A. Fine distinctions with major consequences

Proletarian internationalism was born of the early socialists' attempts to unfetter themselves from their cursed status as vaterlandslose Gesellen; as articulated in the Communist Manifesto of 1848, "working men have no country" [working women, of course, had even less!]. For Marx, the most fundamental cleavages besetting society were not the vertical divisions of ethnicity/nationality, but rather the horizontal cleavages of class struggle. Marx attributed the rise of the modern (read: bourgeois) nation-state to the demise of feudalism and new economic relations compelling structured markets. Thus the nation-state itself was the

soon recognize the economic advantages afforded by the socialization of mass production and integration into the increasingly internationalist whole. Resting on the formula "national in form, socialist in content," Leninist policy towards the nationalities (its perverted manifestations under Stalin notwithstanding) was subject to one critical qualification: above all, the vanguard itself was obliged to keep the party centralized and to eschew any national proclivities of its own.³⁴

Thus, in terms of socialist orthodoxy, the German Democratic Republic was precluded at the time of its inception from establishing itself as a new "anti-fascist, democratic" nation, to the extent that new nations could only arise in conjunction with the capitalist phase of development.

B. State vs. Nation as the Framework for Identity

Indeed, during the three years preceding the promulgation of the first East German constitution, the emergent socialist leadership was entirely consistent in its appeals for the restitution of the deutsche Einheitsstaat, albeit one completely purged of all capitalist-imperialist (and thus still inherently fascist) elements and structures. Among the vehicles for promotion of German unity were the People's Congresses, convened in December, 1947 and March, 1948, respectively, along with efforts to build a united front among reestablished parties and mass organizations in support of the plebiscite of spring 1948 (outlawed in the Western occupation zones). The first acts

constitution identified the GDR as "the socialist state of the German nation" -- a designation which suddenly lost favor once Willy Brandt embraced the existence of "two states in one nation" as the official policy of the Bundesregierung in 1969. The SED shifted its rhetorical emphasis to "the socialist German nation-state," proclaiming at the VIII. Party Congress in 1971 that "the national question has disappeared from German soil."³⁸ The dramatic change in course was further reflected in the constitutional revision of October, 1974, which expunged all remaining references to a gradual "growing-closer" between the two parts (Art. 8, Abs. 2) and established the GDR as "the state of workers and farmers." To some degree sensitive to the confusion and insecurity that this manifestation of intensified Abgrenzung was likely to create in the popular mind, Honecker opted to confront the issue head-on with his December, 1974 formula, "citizenship: GDR, nationality: German. The next five years witnessed a conscious campaign on the part of the SED to "de-Germanize" the country still further by replacing the adjective deutsch with the label DDR-national (or "of the GDR") in the names of various official organizations and publications (notable exceptions being the Deutsche Reichsbahn, Neues Deutschland and the name of the Party itself).

To a large degree, the SED's move away from its self-conception as a socialist-state of the German nation to an identity based on socialist-nationhood was a reaction to the dramatic shift in FRG policy towards the GDR (the details of

between classes and relations of production; the course of its development follows the objective Gesetzmässigkeiten of history; represents the "change" portion of the dialectical equation of what it means to be German.

-- Nationality: the subjective component of identity, grounded in a shared past, common language, and other ethnic factors should not be underestimated, but it does not represent the essence of what it means to be a nation; psychological relation to cultural factors deserves respect, spirit of equal treatment, non-discrimination (e.g., the special status enjoyed by the Sorbian population); psychological remnants will persist for several generations, representing the "continuity" component of the dialectic.³⁹

A second set of distinctions grows increasingly problematic in terms of the SED's perception of itself as perhaps the most orthodox of all the European Marxist-Leninist parties (why it is problematic will be explained in Part IV). The literature is replete with references to GDR-state consciousness, socialist consciousness, socialist patriotism, love for the socialist fatherland, and proletarian internationalism, all of which are very vaguely defined but nonetheless ascertained to stand in dialectical unity with one another. The most important line can be drawn between the constructs:

--- Sozialistische Vaterlandsliebe: ostensibly the missing link between the cultivation of Heimatliebe (and the observable proclivity on the part of average GDR citizens to withdraw into

internationalism has become the ultimate defense of its national existence, having repudiated the principle of reunification; hence, the state is hoping for "continuity." 40

The East German leadership has yet to pose the types of painfully self-critical, ideologically soul-searching questions that have become one of the hallmarks of glasnost in the Soviet Union since 1986. On the other hand, the GDR intelligentsia has been engaged in an historical re-evaluation process for well over a decade, leading to a much more positive emphasis on the history it once shared with its western counterpart. The result has been a wash of historical "rehabilitations" (accompanied by expensive mega-celebrations in conjunction with their respective anniversaries), an opening to formerly taboo topics, a greater attention to detail and Alltagsgeschichte, as well as the adoption of new social-scientific methodologies.

It is clear that das deutsche Volk needs to know where it has come from in order to determine where it is going/ought to go. But the return to a common historical foundation provides no guarantee that a people-divided will either interpret this history in the same light or derive from the same lessons for the future. Enter the distinctions:

-- Erbe: represents the sum total of a nation's history, from which no one can consciously divorce her-/himself; requires the recognition of the good, the bad, and the ugly that has contributed to a nation's character; embodies the continuity inherent to the dialectic.

to view even these protests as a source of legitimacy and support for its official "peace policies" -- which did, in fact, allow Honecker to experience a short-lived legitimacy boom 1983-1987. A second apparent contradiction deriving from the GDR's external efforts to secure its legitimacy is that it can no longer uphold the other Germany as the ultimate enemy, since both would be equally victimized in case of war; this renders political Abgrenzung somewhat superfluous, at a minimum, but reinforces a sense of Schicksalsgemeinschaft at the grass-roots level. The emphasis on "human rights" à la Helsinki has been especially fraught with contradictions, to the extent that the Party emphasizes a category of socio-economic rights which younger GDR citizens have come to take for granted, while denying the need for such political rights as are emphasized in the West; embodies a search for continuity in and through change.

Exkurs: Time permitting, this section of the paper would have explored potential parallels with regard to processes of "historicization" as "normalization" in the FRG and the GDR (are there East German analogies to the West German Historikerstreit? Compare S. Friedlander and J. Hoffmann)? Whatever happened to the 1946 imperative -- "Von der Sowjetunion lernen, heisst siegen lernen"?

IV. Thesis - Antithesis: In Search of an Identity Synthesis

to explain its continuing status as a separate state by emphasizing the first (or as Clay Clemens would phrase it, "we're all Genscherists now"), while the GDR justifies its existence as a sovereign (read: "anti-fascist-democratic") state based on the second.

If the events of the last two months offer us some kind of barometric reading on the depth and scope of citizen-identification with the East German state, it appears that the SED leadership will soon be forced to reduce, replace or transcend its forty-year emphasis on the GDR's anti-fascist/socialist reason-for-being. The same catalogue of factors compelling that change may also be used to speculate about potentially new bases for citizen re/identification with the GDR; for the sake of provoking discussion, I will even dare to argue that the second DDR-identity about to be born of the dialectic, might even prove inherently more stable than the first, all things considered.

First, there is the fact that some two-thirds of those currently/still residing in the GDR (as well as in the FRG) must now be characterized as members of the postwar, or even post-postwar, generations; they therefore have no personal recollection of the war, and thus, no direct identification with the anti-fascist "tradition;" nor do they have the individual memories of Wiederaufbau to give them a sense of personal pride in the GDR's achievements to date; they moreover were not directly involved in creating the system as it now stands, and

citizens (including some 45,000 border-hoppers and embassy-occupiers to date) that they can enjoy higher standards of living elsewhere and still be "good Germans." Perhaps more than FRG politicians realize, the citizens of the German Democratic Republic have internalized the prescription of Wandel durch Annäherung. It is precisely because of the dramatic improvements in inter-German relations throughout the seventies and eighties than they have experienced a measure of liberalization and material satisfaction within their own borders, which has made them desirous of even more Annäherung.

In other words, the identity-formation strategy that was expected to produce positive, legitimizing results with regard to the eventual evolution of a DDR-Nationalbewusstsein may now be seen to hold negative consequences for the internalization of a real-existing DDR-Staatsbewusstsein. One of the greatest challenges to GDR-legitimacy thus remains the existence of a prosperous-democratic (and also constitutionally anti-fascistic) "German alternative" next door; but an equally great challenge can be seen to lie in the increasing tendency among GDR citizens to judge their state according to the criteria it has publicly propagated as its own over the last 40 years.

What options might the GDR leadership pursue in an effort to cultivate a new state-identity that is more consistent with the identity needs perceived to exist at the level of citizen-consciousness? Like everyone else in attendance, I can only speculate with regard to the possible frameworks for that

cultural, scientific, literary and travel liberalizations of the past eight years, but they are also well-informed with respect to the negative trade-offs of life in the FRG. The youngest generation has also internalized many of the "rights" of GDR, including the benefits of a free education. Higher levels of education and their status as the GDR's first TV-generation--West-Fernsehen, that is -- reinforces their desire to become critical, self-determining citizens. Through Western TV they have learned not only about the down-side of life under capitalism; they have also acquired knowledge about their own system, e.g., through such programs as "Kennzeichen D," whetting their appetites for more! GDR youth reject the standard Bevormündung implicit in the concept of the "socialist personality," the contents of which are inevitably defined from above. They are perhaps more cynical about the SED's constant affirmations regarding the "identity of interests" to be found in the "state of workers and farmers" -- if the overlap between state and citizen interests were already so perfect, there would be no need to enshrine the "leading role of the Party" in the GDR constitution, and the party could dare to face the competition of open elections.

On the other hand, the second and third generations are not as "hung-up" on the problems of nationalism and the prestige value of one's own status as a "nation-state," provided the system is capable of delivering the goods. They will be first-hand observers of efforts to establish a "common European

Menschheitsideale: soziale Gerechtigkeit, Solidarität, Freiheit für die Unterdrückten, Hilfe für die Schwächen, ist er unvergänglich.... Jeden Tag werden in Amerika etwa 600 Babys von Müttern geboren, die kokainsüchtig sind.... Arbeitslosigkeit, Alkohol- und Drogenmissbrauch, Prostitution, Kürzungen des Sozialprogramms, Steuersenkungen und Budgetdefizit. Sollte dies wirklich die perfekte Gesellschaft sein, die für alle Zeiten über den Sozialismus triumphiert?⁴³

As the sudden proliferation of opposition groups (New Forum, Democracy Now, the Böhlener Platform, Initiative for a Social Democratic Party, Democratic Renewal) indicate, there is a tremendous reservoir of Reformbereitschaft waiting to be mobilized and channeled from within; many Möchte-gern activists have collected organizational experience based on their involvement in non-official "new social movement groups," which could now provide the foundation for a new "loyal" opposition outside the walls of the Evangelical Church.

Last but not least, I must return to the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist injunctions regarding the role of nations and nationalism in advancing the socialist revolution. As one who enjoined the party vanguard to employ the power of national identity in establishing and enhancing the legitimacy of the socialist system, Lenin upheld the position:

Democratic Republic's own notorische Hierbleiber to forge a new synthesis between the thesis and anti-thesis of state and national identity. The dialectic lives, as redefined aus dem Volksmund: "Was gestern wahr gewesen ist, darf heute nicht mehr wahr sein."

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20. Herbert C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: Free Press, 1969, p. 284.
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22. Kelman, loc. cit.
23. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966, 2nd ed.
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25. Kelman, loc. cit., p. 285.
26. Ibid.
27. Reinhard Kuhn, Nation, Nationalismus, Nationale Frage, Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1986.
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29. D. Sternberger, "Legitimacy," in: International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Bd. 9, London, 1968, p. 244.

40. Gerhart Neuner, "Sozialistische Patrioten und proletarische Internationalisten erziehen," Einheit, 32. Jg., Heft 5 (1977), pp. 548-556; "Unser sozialistisches Vaterland -- Werk und Stolz des Volkes," Einheit, 32. Jg., Heft 9 (1977), pp. 1103-1110; Johannes Zelt, "Sozialistischer Patriotismus und proletarischer Internationalismus in unserer Gesellschaft," Einheit, 38. Jg., Heft 12 (1983), pp. 1132-1137; Harald Schliwa, "Vom Stellenwert der Persönlichkeitsentwicklung und der Individualität in der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 36. Jg., Heft 8 (1988), pp. 704-712.
41. See the recent volume edited by Helmut Meier and Walter Schmidt, Erbe und Tradition in der DDR. Die Diskussion der Historiker, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1988.
42. Autorenkollektiv unter Leitung von Max Schmidt, Sicherheit und friedliche Koexistenz -- Umfassende internationale Sicherheit -- Umsetzung friedlicher Koexistenzbeziehungen heute. Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989.
43. Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, "Am Ende aller Geschichte?", Die Zeit, 29. September 1989, p. 1.
44. The wording is Walker Connor's, op. cit., p. 38.