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Carol Skalnik Leff

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Defining Slovakia: Slovaks, Hungarians,  
and Identity-Security Politics in  
International Context

Carol Skalnik Leff

**DEFINING SLOVAKIA: SLOVAKS, HUNGARIANS, AND IDENTITY-SECURITY  
POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT**

**CAROL SKALNIK LEFF**

**Assistant Professor**

**Department of Political Science**

**University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign**

**Urbana, IL 61801**

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## Introduction

Broadly speaking, the individual transformative processes in post-communist Europe are embedded in a dramatic shift in the terms--and the institutional framework-- in which identity and security are defined. During the Cold War, these states had been part of a coherent international subsystem; that is, the communist framework of domestic politics was reinforced by a broader socialist international context, producing a rough congruence between international alignment and domestic political systems. Indeed, as defined by Soviet power, the bloc alliance was designed precisely to reinforce and maintain the socialist order *within* states. Socialist internationalism was presented as a guarantor system for the identity and security of its constituent states; the possibility of conflicting identity claims within the bloc, in the form of ethnonational tensions, for example, was rejected in favor of a formula that proclaimed fraternal coincidence of interests. 1989 demonstrated, if any demonstration were necessary, that the logic of this framework was far from consensual. The question of an alternative logic for the preservation of security and identity, however, remained open.

Most of the post-communist European governments looked to the West for incorporation into a framework that seemed equally coherent: a democratic capitalist order whose domestic logic was reflected in the international setting by a network of multilateral institutions that were themselves underpinned by the norms of what I have elsewhere called the democratic capitalist peace. NATO expects its membership to be democratic and capitalist, as does the European Union. Thus, here too, the gross logic of affiliation was that similar domestic systems would be coordinated and reinforced by transnational institutions.

There were considerable incentives for eastern states to seek affiliation with Western multilateral institutions. NATO and the European Union in particular appeared to offer a highly favorable context for

safeguarding economic and security interests. The consensus on the desirability of “joining Europe” by way of these primary institutions was thus very widespread among the leaderships of the transitional states, all of whom (with the exception of the Bulgarian leadership’s often problematic outlook on NATO) persistently and explicitly set NATO and EU affiliation as a central foreign policy goal. The important point to emphasize here is that from the outset, the democratization projects of postcommunist central Europe were nested within the larger strategy of “joining Europe.” Superficially, the demands of affiliation and the dictates of domestic transformation were complementary, for at the most general level the expectations of democratized capitalism would be best realized through association with the EU, and NATO membership would rescue East Central Europe from the “grey zone” in which states were reliant on *ad hoc* guarantees and self-protection. In practice, however, the embeddedness of the domestic agenda in the broader framework of the attempt to join Europe was considerably more problematic.

In this analysis, I will be concerned with the structure of the European environment at the level of the state and of multilateral actors, and the ways in which this structure frames domestic politics of transitional Eastern European regimes. How are such international influences internalized, and with what consequences? The most direct and obvious effect is on the political agenda. In the European post-communist cases, the international context not only generates new items on policy agenda but also transforms or penetrates it, particularly insofar as aspirations to join Europe entail a detailed and sustained accommodation with the existing requirements and norms of multilateral organizations on a broad range of domestic policy issues. Indeed on the most fundamental issues there are: type of political regime, the economic system, and the ethnonational bargain. The scope of this effect means that the impact of the international environment can extend beyond and through the question of what individual issues politicians may argue about, beyond the agenda as such, to the organization, dynamics and stability of the political process.

It is impossible to explore the full dimensions of the problematic interaction between domestic and international forces in a chapter. Rather, I will explore certain aspects of the Slovak case from this perspective. Slovakia's troubled transition is an excellent case study in the dynamics of the internationalization of domestic politics, because it occupies a theoretically useful middle ground between those transitional regimes that are clearly responsive to the expectations of external actors, and those, particularly in the Balkans, that are profoundly problematic. On what Slovak leaders like to call the "objective indicators"--economic performance--Slovakia had earned a place in the first tier of eligibles for European integration. By 1995, measure by measure, Slovakia stood up well even by comparison with the Czech Republic, the acknowledged "bloc champ," in everything but employment levels, boasting a high growth rate in GDP and industry, and greater budgetary restraint than its Czech neighbor.

[insert Table 1 about here]

Yet in that same year, Slovakia, initially included in the first tier of eligibles for Euro-membership, increasingly began to be omitted from the A-list. The problem lay in its tortured domestic politics and its troubled ethnonational situation. Slovakia now must confront the fact that the course of its postcommunist transformation has bred increasing tension over the way in which its search for identity and security fits into the larger framework of European politics. In this analysis, I will first define a theoretical context for the analysis, before turning to the Slovak case, which I will treat first in its domestic setting before looking at Slovak politics of transformation through the prism of its interaction with external actors.

#### STATE OF THE FIELD

Any attempt to analyze identity and security questions in the postcommunist states of central

Europe cannot as yet find a secure footing in the explosion of democratization scholarship that has attended the so-called "third wave" of global democratization. Scholars of transitions from authoritarian rule came rather belatedly to the acknowledgment of the importance of both identity politics and international context to the transition process. The seminal study by O'Donnell and Schmitter of the early phases of the "third wave," for example, explicitly discounted the central relevance of the international environment to the dynamics of regime transition and was mute on the subject of ethnic conflict.<sup>1</sup> The wave of postcommunist transitions, in fact, were pivotal in rethinking both issues, a process that is still in the early stages of conceptualization. The case study of Slovakia in this paper is therefore both a specific attempt to address the dynamics of identity and security in a new state, and a broader effort to engage the democratization literature on issues that warrant further theoretical development.

Scholars of democratization who have begun to explore international influences on domestic transitions from authoritarian rule--most notably Laurence Whitehead and Philippe Schmitter--have sought to catalogue differential forms of external impact, both purposive attempts to influence the course of democratic transition and consolidation, and the more diffuse effects of the structure of the international system and prevailing norms. The debate is provisional and fairly general; it focuses largely on the development of topologies designed to capture different forms of international effects. To the alliterative categories of contagion, consent, and coercion proposed by Whitehead, Schmitter adds a fourth: conditionality.<sup>2</sup> Coercion, defined to refer to regime impositions such as the democratization of post-war Japan and Germany, is not relevant to the post-communist transitions.

The other three warrant closer attention. Contagion effects center on the transmission of resonant information: the attractiveness of foreign models of governance, or the demonstration or snowballing effects of neighboring regime transitions. Conditionality is borrowed from the lexicon of

multilateral lending organizations to embrace the efforts of all multilateral institutions to condition the provision of benefits on appropriate democratic behavior. The category of consent is not strictly parallel to the previous three, since it is the sole category designed to encompass both international impact and internal response; indeed, it suffers from some ambiguity on this count. Its clearest international referent is the grant of recognition to an emergent regime within its claimed territory, a particularly salient issue for multinational or secessionist states. It should be evident that Whitehead and Schmitter make their primary contribution in the domain of purposive actor behavior designed to encourage democratization in the target state; they are far less concerned with the impact of broad structural features of the international context. Indeed, it is this concentration of focus that makes their analysis useful in the Slovak case. For Slovakia is a transitional state that does not face clear international enemies who would benefit from domestic instability, and a state targeted by the ongoing interventions of external actors who seek to provide incentives for domestic democratic consolidation.

The Schmitter-Whitehead categorization thus has the virtue of capturing some of the central kinds of directed international impact on domestic regime change. Because such analysis is in a preliminary stage, however, it is not sufficiently elaborated. Not only do the central concepts need further unpacking, but above all they are deficient, or rather underdeveloped, in a most important respect. International influences of this sort are not, after all, a hypodermic injection into a body politic. The exercise of international influence is an interactive process, the outcome of which depends not only on the content and strategies of external actors, but also the character of the domestic response, which quite evidently is not, and could not be expected to be, uniform across cases. International attempts at influence must operate on its targets through distinctive perceptual filters and through the existing structure of domestic politics, considerations that point to the need for a more dynamic conception of the impact of external factors on the democratization project.<sup>3</sup>



In this analysis of the troubled Slovak search for identity and security, I will try to address the dynamics of “conditionality” in particular, by tracing the interactions between important Slovak political actors and the attentive community of multilateral institutions, states, and NGOs that have tried to affect the direction of postcommunist consolidation.<sup>4</sup> In this undertaking, the identity question is not an extraneous independent variable; the presence or absence of ethnonational contestation of the stateness question is a central factor in determining the responsiveness of domestic politics to international interventions, and the contested identity of the Slovak state is not only a focus of external concern, but also a central determinant of Slovak official willingness to play the game of good Euro-citizenship.

The democratization literature itself is in some respects even more provisional in its treatment of ethnicity and democratization than is true of the international dimension.<sup>5</sup> The clear exception is the attention devoted to the issue by Linz and Stepan in their ambitious and comprehensive treatment of democratization and consolidation in the third wave, in which they addressed the “undertheorized” stateness question, albeit from a largely domestic perspective.<sup>6</sup> The rudimentary treatment of that issue in the democratization literature is echoed in turn by the relative novelty of attention to ethnonational identity issues in European foreign policy. The least developed component of the framework for international cooperation through western multilateral institutions before 1989 was that of safeguards to ethnonational identity. By and large, the member states of Western multilateral organizations, while formally acceding to norms of mutual tolerance embodied in the charter of the Council of Europe, showed considerable deference in their scrutiny of each other’s internal policies. On the rare occasions when internal identity conflict erupted onto the multilateral agenda, the issues were framed in terms of individual, rather than group rights. A case in point is the conflict in Northern Ireland, which external actors treated largely in terms of the human rights of dissidents to fair and timely legal proceedings. In Western Europe, the most important conflicts over ethnonational identity did in fact occur *within* states;

crossboundary ties were a secondary problem, and the primary manifestation of concern about external identity threats centered on migration from outside the core area. It was the collapse of the European communist state system that spurred greater attention to the problem of ethnonational conflict, and the first serious elaboration and codification of norms regarding the preservation of ethnonational identity. The scholarly need to come to terms with identity problems in post-communist states thus coincides with the diplomatic security need to cope with these same problems.

Elsewhere, I have developed a more elaborated argument about the variables that condition responsiveness of postcommunist governments to external expectations and attempts to impose conditionality.<sup>7</sup> There I suggest that responsiveness is shaped by 1) policymaking capabilities of the state, that is, its *capacity* to respond; 2) the incentives and disincentives for responsiveness to external cues in the strategic political environment with respect to government coalition maintenance and electoral strategies and 3) more specifically, the embeddedness of identity politics in that strategic political environment. In the following sections, I will discuss the domestic political environment in Slovakia in such a way as to shed light on these factors, before turning to Slovakia's interactions with external actors.

### Domestic Context

Slovakia emerged from the shadow of the Czech Republic with the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state in 1992. There was a widespread hope that statehood would also contribute to the routinization of Slovak politics by freeing it from the focus on battles with Prague over jurisdiction and constitutional questions. Nonetheless, Slovakia remains plagued by a stateness question, and by the attendant metapolitical controversies that attend it, as well as by the intensely personalized and controversial politics that swirl around the person of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar.<sup>8</sup> I will sketch the main features of this political context in order to analyze more intensively the extent to which

it constrains or facilitates a response to external expectations.

Slovakia's distinctive pattern of post-communist leadership contestation is a clue to its political travails. The governments of three-time Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar have twice fallen between elections, in April 1991 and March 1994, after mounting internecine quarrels with his leadership and organized defections from his government. Initially designated Prime Minister while he was still part of the Public Against Violence (PAV) movement that had emerged to challenge communist rule in tandem with the Czech Civic Forum in November 1989, Mečiar withdrew from PAV in the wake of the fall of his first government in the spring of 1991 to form his own vehicle, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS). The electoral success of the MDS in 1992 swept him back into office, initiating a second and somewhat more prolonged tenure that nonetheless was marked by personal antagonisms and defections from his party that eroded his parliamentary majority; this minority government fell in March 1994, giving way to a miscellaneous coalition of the previous opposition parties under Prime Minister Josef Moravčík that served until Mečiar's MDS bested them yet again in the fall 1994 elections.

Returned to power a third time, Mečiar now set his sights on the consolidation of his own party's position and the discrediting of his rivals, who by then included the MDS-selected Slovak President Michal Kováč, who had cooperated in the second Mečiar ouster. Post-independence politics in Slovakia has thus been most distinctive in its highly personalized polarization into two camps, pro-Mečiar and anti-Mečiar. In itself, this polarization has taxed the adjustment to democratic politics, putting heavy strain on the accountability linkages of the system. Mečiar's two ousters have meant that he has never faced an electoral accounting for his stewardship, but rather has contested each subsequent election as a renewed challenger. In turn, the anti-Mečiar governments of 1991-1992 and 1994 have been unable to win an electoral mandate. The political elites that can win elections cannot govern harmoniously, and the elites capable of cooperating in power cannot win elections. As we will see, this unfortunate

dichotomy has serious implications for Slovak governmental response to international conditionality initiatives, since the unelectable governments have proven far more responsive to external expectations than have the Mečiar governments.

The ensuing confrontation between Mečiar and his opposition has permeated all aspects of the transformational politics. In consolidating power, Mečiar has taken actions that raise serious doubts about democratic consolidation in Slovakia. His government has maintained a firm grip on Slovak television, subsidized supportive newspapers and undercut critical ones, freezing them out of the journalistic access channels and questioning their loyalty to the state. After the 1994 election, his third government challenged the continued parliamentary representation of the opposition Democratic Union (whose core leadership is comprised of former MDS officials whose defection toppled the second Mečiar government) by opening police and parliamentary investigations of the party's electoral eligibility.

Most dramatically, the MDS has been locked in a protracted and thus far inconclusive conflict with institutions beyond his direct control, notably the constitutional courts (a problem he has proposed to "solve" with a restrictive constitutional amendment on the power of the courts) and the presidency. President Kováč is regarded within the MDS as having brokered the fall of the second Mečiar government. Since the 1994 elections, the Mečiar government has used all available legal channels to constrict presidential prerogatives, repeatedly slashing Kováč's official budget and transferring his appointment powers to the government or parliament. Lacking the necessary three-fifths majority to change the constitution or impeach Kováč, the MDS has nonetheless passed symbolic votes of no-confidence in him, called for his resignation and toyed with the utilization of a referendum to remove him. In August 1995, the president's son was abducted from Slovakia by persons unknown, and deposited in Austria, which in effect exposed him to questioning in a German investigation of corporate fraud. This bizarre incident suggested an escalation of the stakes of the systemic conflict--an effort to

discredit the president through extra-legal channels. Evidence pointed to the complicity of the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), whose director was one of the appointive positions removed from presidential jurisdiction the previous spring and vested in the parliament. The pursuit of this trail, however, was blocked by the removal of regular police investigators who announced they were pursuing the SIS link. The expiration of Kováč's presidential term in 1998 raises the specter of a parliamentary deadlock on selecting his successor, which would allow Mečiar to exercise presidential functions until the next parliamentary elections in 1999. The opposition, unable to gain legislative approval for the direct presidential elections that would forestall this outcome, have resorted to gathering signatures for a popular referendum on the question. The battle over the presidential office continues, and Mečiar's conflict with his opposition has continued to impede the mechanisms of democratic accountability in the fledgling state.

Above all, Slovak politics has clearly far to go before the concept of a loyal opposition becomes an operational reality. In 1996, the parliament twice approved, and the president twice vetoed, a law on the "protection of the republic," an amendment to the penal code that levied penalties of up to seven years in prison for public rallies "aimed at the subverting of the constitutional system, territorial integrity or defense capability of the republic, or at destroying its independence." A particularly controversial clause providing that those "who damage the interests of the republic" by disseminating "false information" be liable to two year jail sentences was deleted in the second version. Media and opposition alike viewed this initiative as a sword of Damocles suspended above them, for Mečiar's party has tended to interpret criticism of the coalition government as disloyalty to the state. Pursuant to the second presidential veto of this legislation in early January 1997, the parliament failed to pass a third, revised version. However, draft "state of emergency" legislation is currently under consideration that provides for suspending civil liberties in periods of crisis.

The economic transition has proceeded within this highly charged political environment. Although there is little doubt that Slovakia has made considerable economic progress, there is criticism both at home and abroad of the lack of "transparency" of the economic transition. Privatization in particular, has been a major battlefield, in which Mečiar's opposition has charged him with dispensing the state's economic holdings to cronies and party loyalists in a process that raises considerable questions about the openness and regularity of the transfer of state-owned property to the private sector. The cancellation of the second wave of so-called coupon privatization in midstream (a process launched by the 1994 Moravčík government) in favor of the compensation of coupon-holders with state bonds redeemable after the next parliamentary elections was both unpopular and controversial in raising questions as to the identity of the beneficiaries of this policy reorientation. To many, Mečiar's economic policy seems a base for clientilism and an extension of his colonization of the political space.

Finally, successive Mečiar governments have pursued policies that fueled continued controversy over the Slovak relations with the substantial Hungarian minority, some 11 percent of the population concentrated along Slovakia's southern border with Hungary. This issue will be discussed in the next section. First, I will conclude the current section by emphasizing a feature of the internal domestic context that is critical to understanding the impact of external efforts to influence domestic developments: i.e., the polarization of politics into pro- and anti-Mečiar camps, with profound implications for parliamentary governance. Because Mečiar's opposition is loath to enter an MDS government on his terms and the Hungarian minority parties are politically risky coalition partners, a parliamentary majority for the MDS is currently possible only with the support of two smaller parties. Of the two, the Slovak National Party (SNP) is the most strategically important and has had the most pronounced impact on the political agenda. Although it would be too much to say that the SNP holds the government hostage to its own conception of identity politics, its program and orientation has certainly

constrained the government's flexibility in responding to domestic and foreign criticism on minority issues. The government's dependence on the SNP, however, should be understood in the context of MDS policies that discourage the formation of alternative coalitions. In turn, an alternate government coalition that excludes the MDS is numerically impossible without the Hungarian minority parties, and electorally impossible with them. This is particularly important because the opposition, when in power, did in fact pursue policies that won international approval, on minority policies and other issues. Thus, the electoral and parliamentary coalition-building arenas of Slovak politics prove to be problematic for the successful exercise of external constraint on Slovak democratization policy and economic restructuring.

#### Identity Politics And The Hungarian Minority

The challenge for Slovakia, and for other new or newly transformed states, is to formulate a workable postcommunist identity in such a way as to meet international expectations; the alternative is to jeopardize the entire project of joining Europe. This challenge operates both on the symbolic level and in the concrete form of the arrangements of power, decisionmaking and policy content. And it is a challenge because external expectations may well run counter to the internal dynamics. At base, the issue is the answer to the questions: Whose state is this, and how and from what should it be protected?

For Slovakia, a central problem is the incorporation of its substantial Hungarian minority (some eleven percent of the population) into the political design of the state, and the meshing of the identity claims of that minority with those of the Slovak majority in a state recently emergent from the larger multinational context of Czechoslovakia. The fact that the Slovak state is new is not in itself a fully distinguishing factor. Existing states like Romania must also grapple with the significance of multinational diversity, as indeed must any state with an unresolved ethnonational bargain.

Under such circumstances, one can confidently expect a faultline between those in the majority

national grouping who perceive the state as the apotheosis of the ethnonational identity of the dominant national grouping, on the one hand, and those who would prefer to constitute the state as an expression of a multinational community and to invoke what theorists call a "civic" nationalism as the glue that binds together the citizenry. Both perceive the project of identity-building as a security problem, differently construed. For those championing a basically ethnonational conception of the state, enshrining the national identity in symbolic language and espousing a basically majoritarian definition of democracy is perceived as a bulwark against not only the erosion of the core identity of the dominant group, but also, at the extreme, a barricade against territorial erosion of the state. Those who accommodate to the concept of the state as a multinational project are more receptive to constraints on the majoritarian principle; they in turn perceive security risks stemming from the alternative ethnonational principle of state identity. Subjection of minorities to a definition of state identity that excludes them is likely to breed continued minority grievances. The important point is that these divergent viewpoints do not confront each other in a debating forum, but within the political process, and in fact act upon the political process itself.

Indeed, it should be noted that these alternative visions of the state correspond to two ideal typical polarities in construction of democratic institutions. On the one hand, institutional design can favor majoritarian decision rules (single-member districts with plurality voting, presidentialist systems), with rights vested in individuals and policy choice based on aggregated individual tallies. The alternative is a system design that maximizes voice and veto power of minority coalitions--a system with strong consociational features: proportional representation, multiple veto and access points (federal, bicameral, parliamentary), mandated consultation or inclusion of defined interests in government decisionmaking, and reserved domains of policymaking for protected groups.<sup>9</sup> The first--ethnonational--formulation of state identity corresponds in political logic to that of majoritarian



democracy, and the second--civic nationalism in an avowedly multinational state--corresponds in logic to the more consociational form.

Since independence, the Mečiar government has adopted a sometimes equivocal position on these core questions of identity and institutional design. The thrust of government policy and rhetoric, however, has pushed Slovakia toward an ethnonational construction of state identity. The following indicators may help summarize this thrust. The first indicators are the product of symbolic politics: the wording of the constitutional preamble, which speaks in the name of the "Slovak nation" rather than the "citizens of Slovakia," and legal constraints, passed in 1996, on the use of Hungarian emblems, anthems and other symbols.

Other initiatives impinge directly on the capacity of the Hungarian minority to maintain its identity. Cultural guarantees are one such area. Minority language rights were a controversial issue from the first, but the language law of 1990 did provide recognition of such rights in regions with a threshold percentage of ethnic Hungarian citizens. The Moravčík government of 1994 went further, passing legislation that permitted Hungarian regions to post bilingual signs, and acknowledging the right of Hungarian women to maintain their names without Slovakized endings. The educational and language-use guarantees promulgated by earlier governments eroded under Mečiar's third government, however, with a new policy of "alternative" bilingual education and a law, passed in November 1995, that enshrined Slovak as the official language and established an inspectorate (dubbed the "language police") to enforce it, throwing the previously mandated right to use minority languages into limbo. A promised corrective, a minority language law, has been repeatedly postponed. In tandem, subsidies in support of minority institutions have been slashed, and a significant amount of the minority budget for media redirected to Hungarian-language publication of official Slovak media. This latter is highly relevant in the present climate. A government that has been generally intolerant of criticism has been

especially unreceptive to Hungarian claims. The penal code amendments were widely seen as targeting the minority, for example.

Slovakia's institutional design has gravitated further toward a majoritarian model since independence. All Slovak politicians decry the idea of territorial autonomy in areas of minority population concentration. Further, the government revised the regional administrative boundaries inherited from the communist state in legislation passed in 1996 over a presidential veto. The new north-south regional boundaries distribute the Hungarian population so to water down their local majorities, and currently only one of the newly appointed 8 regional and 79 district heads is not an ethnic Slovak. Although the government initially denied any intention to parlay this administrative revision into an electoral gerrymander, it announced plans in February 1997 to debate a move from proportional representation to a plurality system with majoritarian impact. Such a move would generally favor the MDS as the largest party, but it is also especially troubling to the Hungarian minority, whose representational voice under such a system would depend heavily on the way electoral districts were drawn. Proportional representation is generally seen as a safeguard of legislative representation for minorities, and its abandonment raises the possibility of undermining the already limited Hungarian political clout, and strengthening the Slovak parties within the political system.

All of the indicators just mentioned militate in favor of an ethnic conception of the state, both in terms of symbolic politics and institutional design. Taken as a whole, they represent an unpalatable ethnonational bargain for the Hungarian minority. It is important to understand, however, how this incrementally developed understanding of the state emerged from the dynamics of party politics.

In 1989, in the wake of the Velvet Revolution, the fluidity of the nascent party system and the ambiguity of the democratization formula offered scope to alternative forms of response to existing or potential societal cleavages and in particular to the issues posed by the incorporation of the Hungarian

minority into the political process. The Public Against Violence, counterpart to the Czech Civic Forum as a holding company for broad anti-communist political forces, harbored a range of disparate tendencies, and included a Hungarian organization (the Hungarian Independent Initiative) under the big political tent. The possibility thus seemed to exist for a party politics that was not completely ethnationally segmented, notwithstanding the presence of an independent Hungarian movement, Coexistence, in the first electoral campaign. The defection of its leader, Miklos Duray, from the larger PAV movement was significant because Duray was the most prominent of the communist-era dissidents engaged in championing minority rights, and among the few Slovak-based signatories of Charter 77--a largely Czech movement-- from Slovakia. His choice, said to have been predicated on government refusal to establish a powerful minority rights office headed by Duray himself, was the harbinger of the eventual fate of Hungarian participation in Slovak politics in general. Since the following electoral cycle in 1992, Hungarian political activity has been channeled exclusively through ethnically Hungarian parties.

They thus constitute an enclave within the larger party system, highly successful in mobilizing the target minority electorate, but extremely unsuccessful in gaining voice and access to government and policymaking influence. No Hungarian politician has served in the government or in a position of parliamentary responsibility since the inauguration of the state in 1993,<sup>10</sup> and no Hungarian policy initiative has met with success since the installation of the third Mečiar government in 1994. Only the interim Moravčík government of 1994--a government that both needed tacit Hungarian support to remain in office and wanted western approbation--attended to Hungarian claims.

It is further important that since the ascension of the third Mečiar government to power in 1994, even the Slovak opposition has remained significantly aloof from its Hungarian counterparts. Although both oppositions find the incumbent government profoundly disturbing, they have substantially refrained

from coordinated critiques, and the Slovak opposition has been reluctant to dissent even from nationalist government gestures targeting the minority that breed international concern. Why?

Prominent in the political logic of the domestic situation is the perception of the Slovak opposition that cooperation with the Hungarian minority invites electoral retaliation. Parties in both non-Mečiar governments paid the electoral penalty for perceived leniency on the Hungarian question, while the MDS campaigned as the true champion of Slovak interests in 1992 and 1994. Both the earlier inclusion of the Hungarian Independent Initiative under the PAV umbrella and the Moravčík government's legislation of minority guarantees fueled MDS charges that their opponents were subservient to Hungarian interests. This despite the fact that the Moravčík government, which needed Hungarian deputies' votes for a parliamentary majority, carefully calibrated its relations with the Hungarian parties by coupling legal concessions with the exclusion of the Hungarians from cabinet posts in the formal governing coalition.

The parties that comprised the Moravčík government, now in opposition, apparently concluded after their electoral savaging at the hands of the MDS in the September 1994 that the politics of multinational accommodation had exposed them to the erosion of support from ethnic Slovaks. Such erosion cannot be compensated by Hungarian votes, since Slovak parties are in no position to outbid Hungarian parties on minority rights issues that are of central concern to the Hungarian electorate. This aloofness necessarily excludes alternative government coalitions inclusive of Hungarian parties. As the head of the Party of the Democratic Left said tersely after the 1994 election, any project that envisioned the formation of a governmental alternative to Mečiar on the basis of collaboration with the Hungarian parties was "unrealistic." In terms that Giovanni Sartori originally applied in his analysis of polarized pluralism of the left and right,<sup>11</sup> Hungarian parties are simply "uncoalitionable"--they are not currently eligible coalition partners for any viable Slovak-based government.

The same considerations appear to have discouraged opposition defense of Hungarian interests against government initiatives. When the MDS coalition presented its controversial language law in 1995, one Slovak opposition party abstained, the rest supported it, and the president signed it--all of them reluctantly, but even more reluctant to give Mečiar an effective political weapon against them. The opposition challenged, and the President unavailingly vetoed, the government's administrative redistricting not because of its disadvantages to Hungarian minorities, but on the grounds of its discrimination against Bratislava. Thus, the polarization of Slovak politics into two camps has left the Hungarian parliamentary coalition divided even from the rest of the opposition, uncoalitionable in governance and unsupported in its policy claims.

This is the strategic situation within which the question of the Hungarian place in the formulation of the identity of the Slovak state has been played out, and it is this strategic environment in which a series of Hungarian proposals have been defeated and a series of restrictions and potential restrictions on their political position enacted. This is also, of course the strategic situation in which external actors attempt to intervene, a question addressed in the final section of this essay.

#### International Context of Domestic Transformation

In reviewing the relevant external actors, the *dramatis personae* is extensive and diverse : multilateral institutions, west European governments, US government and neighboring states (in the case of Slovakia, particularly Hungary and Romania). This list is not, however, miscellaneous; an important first step is to recognize that the external environment is structured, both by the normative and utilitarian logic of interlocking multilateral institutions, and by the desire of postcommunist governments to affiliate with these institutions. Even in the absence of clear central direction, the core logic of external expectations is fairly uniform: sustained progress in democratizing, marketizing and resolving

ethnonational tensions. Underlying this expectation is the corollary assumption that such progress will breed stability in external and internal politics. This is the stuff of good Eurocitizenship that creates entitlements to membership in NATO and the EU. Although the prize may be NATO and EU membership, however, the way stations to that goal require responsiveness to the total complex of additional multilateral institutions that have gatekeeping functions.

Two multilateral organizations are worthy of specific note: the Council of Europe (CE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although Western multilateral institutions have not negotiated a formal division of labor, the CE and OSCE took early and parallel action to elaborate norms on minority rights and to devise monitoring procedures on this sensitive issue; indeed, the impulse to normative elaboration was precisely the recognition of the explosive potential of ethnic conflict in the region, and the desire to develop framework standards and "early warning systems" to cope with such conflict. By themselves, neither organization possesses sufficient clout or resources to enforce compliance with their expectations. Membership in good standing in both organizations, however, is of instrumental importance despite the price of intrusiveness in domestic politics. Membership in the Council of Europe, explicitly chartered as a organization of democracies, grants the admitted state imprimatur as democratic; membership is accompanied by an elaborate monitoring and assessment process that is intended to certify minimal democratic standards, and membership itself is accompanied by further stipulations of further action necessary to attain the requisite standards .

This process is worth enduring for postcommunist governments, all of which are aware that no state failing to obtain Council membership is likely to receive consideration for EU and NATO membership. A similar logic dictates responsiveness to OSCE initiatives. Here membership is not the issue (all postcommunist states were part of the Helsinki process that produced the OSCE, and only rump-Yugoslavia has been suspended), but responsiveness to OSCE inquiries and cooperation with

OSCE envoys is widely understood to be an important yardstick of compliance with Western expectations. The OSCE and CE norms, then, are not merely an articulation of prevailing international *desiderata*; they are backed by the force of conditionality. Thus, it is not a question of whether the convention produced by the Council of Europe, for example, is binding; rather, it is possible to evoke such standards as part of the expectations that must be met for membership in NATO and the EU. Some analysts have found this overarching framework of monitoring compliance with external expectations a highly coercive context, even to the extent of distorting optimal domestic policy in the region, but it is coercive precisely to the extent that the ultimate goals of EU and NATO membership are themselves valued in the region.<sup>12</sup> The imposition of conditionality in such circumstances, however, is highly sensitive, particularly where it touches directly on core identity questions. The recently elaborated norms on minority rights are themselves a departure in international relations, extending the scope of normatively approved areas in which the state is asked to mortgage its sovereignty by accepting external intervention in defense of such rights.

The previous analysis provides a context in which to assess the impact of the external environment on Slovakia's transformation since independence in 1993, a context in which external actors have attempted to exercise conditionality over the direction of Slovak domestic politics. Slovak governments have repeatedly reaffirmed the goals of EU and NATO membership as the core features of foreign policy, a commitment that would seem to dictate maximal responsiveness to external *desiderata*. Further, anxious to stabilize and defuse tensions, key international actors have repeatedly voiced concern with a range of Slovak government policies and initiatives, particularly since Mečiar returned to power in 1994. Slovak governments could be in little doubt as to the character of external concerns. The record of intervention, however, has been mixed and ambiguous. I will briefly review some key features of this record, and then return to the internal dynamics of Slovak politics to account for the limitations on

external influence, concentrating on the dimension of this international concern that impinges on the identity question.

From the promulgation of Slovak independence, Western governments and multilateral institutions conveyed the strong message that an accommodation with the minority and with the neighboring Hungarian government were essential to the establishment of Slovakia's eligibility for early membership in NATO and the EU. The Hungarian question had figured prominently in the negotiation of Slovakia's re-admission to the Council of Europe in 1993.<sup>13</sup> Slovakia's membership, in fact, went forward only after a period of uncertainty as to whether Hungary would attempt to block it on the grounds of the unsatisfactory minority policy of the second Mečiar government, and was predicated on the Slovak government's agreement to make specific concessions to the minority in language use within six months. It was the next year however, under the Moravčík government, before action was taken, and these gains proved subject to subsequent erosion under the third Mečiar government, as we have seen.

A second, and more complex instance of intervention was the explicit western expectation that Hungary and Slovakia achieve a formal resolution of their relationship and its outstanding problems; primary among these disagreements was a dispute over the adequacy of Slovakia's commitment to the recognition of the rights of its Hungarian minority. Accordingly, external pressure for the enactment of a Hungarian-Slovak treaty of cooperation and friendship was very pronounced. Both governments understood, and repeatedly acknowledged, that the stakes of such an agreement centered not only on the directly favorable consequences defusing of mutual tensions, but also on the larger gains to be accrued on the road to Europe. In March 1995, the two governments approved such a treaty, in which Hungary recognized Slovakia's borders and Slovakia incorporated Council of Europe guidelines on the treatment of minorities.

It would appear that international intervention had thereby scored a success. The subsequent



course of events however, presents a more problematic picture, for the price of the agreement was stiff. The Mečiar government faced a revolt of the junior coalition partner Slovak National Party, which had publicly decried the treaty, and the prospect of being forced to rely on opposition votes for ratification and even of the dissolution of the government's parliamentary majority. The Hungarian parliament ratified the accord in June 1995, while repeated postponements of the Slovak ratification debate punctuated a period of protracted intra-dissension within the MDS-led coalition. Ultimately, the government achieved coalitional consensus in support of the treaty, but only after the enactment of a series of additional measures demanded by the SNP, or designed more generally to avoid the perception that the government was soft on the minority question. These included the passage of legislation according official status to the Slovak language in November 1995; the enactment of a Law for the Protection of the Republic--an explicit SNP *quid pro quo* for treaty ratification; and the reorganization of Slovakia's regional boundaries that Hungarian politicians charged with gerrymandering Hungarian population concentrations. Further, the treaty itself was ratified only after the abandonment of plans to incorporate an appendix that circumscribed treaty-mandated commitments to the CE charter on minorities. It is unclear that the Hungarian minority is more secure after the treaty proceedings than it was before.

This course of events did not pass without notice in the West, where concern was already mounting over the expanding scope of presidential-prime ministerial conflict. A series of *démarches* by the EU and western governments punctuated the progress of the domestic imbroglios, sharply worded warnings that even threatened economic consequences for nonresponsiveness. "The EU members cannot accept nations that are at odds with democratic ethics," said the French Minister for European Affairs pointedly in a July 1996 meeting with President Kováč.<sup>14</sup> The Slovak government's posture on these initiatives adds a further dimension to the problem of marshaling international pressure on the course of

post-communist transitions, for there are clear indications that it has been seeking alternatives to dependence on the good will of the West. Even as the government continues to express commitment to eventual European integration, Mečiar warned in April 1996 that the prospect of early membership was receding. In tandem with that signal, a forecast that he attributed to the detrimental effects on the Slovak image of opposition criticism, there has been a continuing, partially improvised search for partners in exclusion from the west. The past year has seen, for example, warming relations with Serbia, the recourse to Russian assistance in the retooling of the Mochovce nuclear power plant (a project sufficiently controversial in the West to jeopardize EBRD funding), and overtures to other postcommunist states that cannot expect early admission to "Europe." The Slovak government shows signs of a search for an alternative means of safeguarding national interests while insulating Slovak politics from the effective pressure of Western expectations. Analysts have noted Mečiar's flirtation with the development of Slovakia as a bridge to the East, and with the concept of marshaling a Russian counterweight to economic ties with the West. Such analysts have been duly skeptical of the realism of this alternative, and certainly it offers no prospect of a stable institutionalized network of relationships such as that of Western multilateral institutions.<sup>15</sup>

The limitations of Slovak responsiveness to western expectations and incentives become fully intelligible only when viewed in the context of the earlier analysis of the dynamics of domestic politics. Mečiar's personality and political tactics have constrained his options in government formation. To maintain a parliamentary majority, his only choice since independence has been to rule with the Slovak National Party, a partner whose own nationalist agenda embraces a clear conception of an ethnically Slovak state. Indeed, international actors, in their concern with Mečiar's general record, have discouraged coalitional alternatives that would pair Mečiar with parties in the current opposition.<sup>16</sup> However opportunistic Mečiar's own Slovak nationalism may be, his government is, by dint of its

composition, ill-positioned to demonstrate unambiguous compliance with external expectations on guarantees for the Hungarian minority and on a broader and more inclusive understanding of the identity of the Slovak state. Further, responsiveness to external expectations runs athwart Mečiar's own personalist strategy of power maintenance, marked by a clientelist politics and a populist rhetoric that undercuts Western *desiderata* on transparency, tolerance and inclusiveness in governance.

If one can argue that domestic forces are not aligned in such a way as to be readily responsive to external pressure, the external environment is also important to domestic politics in a less straightforward sense. Foreign actors and the monitoring process itself have become ancillary arenas for the propagation of domestic political conflict. Mečiar himself has complained of the transference of domestic political struggle to the arena of international relations, and the way in which it impedes a valid evaluation of Slovakia's democracy,<sup>17</sup> and it is true that virtually every trip abroad by Slovak politicians to western capitals, and every foreign visit to Bratislava, breeds a tug of war over just what was said, by whom, in praise or blame of Slovakia's transformation progress; opposition forces seek to increase pressure on the government in sensitive legislative battles through the lever of foreign criticism, and the government in turn seeks to exercise spin control over that criticism by accentuating any positive signals from abroad.

A case in point, in which the ongoing monitoring process itself became the subject of spin control, was the November 1996 visit to Slovakia of OSCE High Commissioner for Minorities Max van der Stoel. Van der Stoel found himself the center of a brief uproar when Mečiar claimed that he had urged that Hungarians show "more loyalty" to the Slovak state. Van der Stoel, whose report on the minority situation had in fact urged greater government responsiveness to minority needs (with the proviso that of course Hungarians in Slovakia should be loyal to the state), was forced to maneuver diplomatically around this selective and misleading characterization of his views.

The awkward positioning of the Slovak government--a government that continues to hope for EU and NATO admission--has thus put the state's international image at center stage in domestic politics. Mečiar has repeatedly charged that his opposition is to blame for tarnishing that image, for politically-motivated criticism of his government that misleads foreign opinion. In fact, the government's hypersensitivity to criticism, a response that placed Mečiar number ten on the international Committee for the Protection of Journalist's list of ten "worst enemies of the press" in 1996, is in no small part a function of the recognition that such criticism is disseminated internationally and may have consequential effects on the task of joining Europe. The opposition, in turn, claims that he is blaming the messenger for the bad news.

When international criticism cannot be deflected or reinterpreted, the government takes a different approach. International expectations are linked to domestic political actors in ways explicitly designed to delegitimize rival stances. MDS spokesmen charged their critics in the penal code amendment controversy with brazenly cooperating with "international political structures, which they effectively use for fighting against the government coalition."<sup>18</sup> Mečiar's 1994 election campaign trumpeted MDS independence of foreign interests.

It should be emphasized that this continued political maneuvering over the relevance of foreign initiatives and commentary is a function of the domestic configuration of Slovak politics, and a battle for custody of Slovak identity and interests. The opposition, both Slovak and Hungarian, play the international card to bolster their own power in confrontation with a majority government, while the government counters by reinterpreting or decrying international influence. The result is that no domestic policy conflict develops without recourse to international opinion, and international initiatives designed to signal desirable policy outcomes play into an environment so structured as to preclude any straightforward connection between foreign pressure--efforts to exercise conditionality--and policy

response.

Of course, Hungarian minority politicians are particularly sensitive players in this dynamic. Since 1989, Hungarian frustration with limited domestic influence has triggered the search for compensational leverage by recourse both to multilateral organizations and to the Hungarian government in search of external allies to support minority rights. Petitions to multilateral organizations documenting areas of concern have been a staple feature of the response to each new government initiative that threatens the status of minorities, among the most recent of which was an open letter to NATO and EU on threats to democracy in Slovakia in October 1996. This is a delicate strategy, since the expression of grievances derives its power from the impact such unresolved issues have on Slovakia's acceptance in Europe, and can be construed domestically as a form of political blackmail. The government thus has a ready response in the battle over image. Since Mečiar first publicly warned Hungarian politicians against making trouble over Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe, there have been continued charges of "defaming" Slovakia abroad.

The resort to Budapest to exert pressure on Bratislava is particularly sensitive. Although a neighboring state is clearly in a position to champion the interests of conationals (and indeed Hungarian governments since the mid-1980s have done so, mindful of domestic opinion), there are two limits to this strategy. First, such cross-border alliances open politically exploitable questions; Mečiar's spokesmen have repeatedly suggested that Hungarians in Slovakia who turn to Budapest are compromising their loyalty to the Slovak state, a message that has had particular resonance in domestic politics. Second, the interests of the Hungarian government and their conationals in Slovakia do not march in lockstep. Hungary, too, is positioning itself for NATO and EU membership, and sustained shrillness on the national question must be tempered in cognizance of the clear interest of Western actors in harmonious relations between postcommunist states. Support for Hungarian Slovaks in their battles with the Mečiar

government predictably brings official Slovak charges of Hungarian irredentism in the service of recreating a Greater Hungary, and pulls Hungary into the contentious politics that have impeded Slovakia's acceptance in the new European design. Where identity politics are at issue, then, the extension of domestic battles into the international arena is hardly a risk-free strategy for any of the parties involved.

### Conclusion

This analysis represents a first attempt to examine more precisely the way in which external efforts to shape the course of regime change interact with domestic politics, and in particular, the limitations on such efforts. The embeddedness of Slovakia's postcommunist transformation in a broader international context is not merely a sporadic interpolation into a domestic process of reconfiguring the communist legacy; rather, western monitoring and conditionality efforts have become an integral part of that process. This is true not only because domestic politics is the primary focus of western attempts to exercise conditionality, but also because domestic actors play that international card. The international context thus becomes an important adjunct arena for the playing out of domestic conflict. In this setting, efforts to exercise conditionality can feed into and fuel domestic conflict. Such efforts carry a considerable burden: they confront an internal strategic context in which there are powerful limitations, some of them self-induced, on the capacity to respond to external expectations, since Mečiar's rivals fear electoral consequences of responsiveness to concerns about minority rights, and Mečiar's coalitional constraints bind him to an ethnonational conception of state identity that breeds external disquiet. If theorizing on the international dimensions of democratization is to advance, more work is needed to compare and schematize such problematic interactions.

The Slovak case is distinctive in several respects, most of all in the polarization of politics in the

face of the Mečiar phenomenon. Where the stakes are as high and as comprehensive in their import as they are in the quest for NATO and EU membership, however, several of the effects noted here replicate themselves in other cases. A pervasive external impact on domestic politics obtains throughout the region, and in each case interacts with the strategic context of domestic politics in ways that pose politically volatile challenges to sovereignty and state autonomy. The temptation of domestic actors to play the international card in support of preferred policies can create backlash effects, and, more directly, the overt exercise of conditionality to prove domestically unpopular policies can have similar effects. Where identity politics is a significant factor in the domestic political arena of multinational stakes, the penetration of the domestic agenda by the politics of EU and NATO accession is especially delicate.

At the same time, it should be remembered that the basis of external leverage on states like Slovakia is the realistic hope of membership in these core institutions. In 1997 and 1998, that hope will be dashed or fulfilled when the first cluster of NATO and EU members from Eastern Europe is identified as the result of the NATO meeting, in the summer of 1997, and the launching of EU accession talks, slated for early 1998. If there have been difficulties in exercising conditionality while the expectation of membership remains alive and immediate, these difficulties will be compounded in the cases where hope is indefinitely deferred by failure to be included in the first round. If Slovakia is snubbed in this initial selection process, the need to affix blame may further exacerbate internal tensions. The delays and ambiguities in Western commitment since 1989 have frustrated many prospective members, but those delays have had their benefits. Dispelling the ambiguity of who is in, and who is out of Europe in the immediate future will create a different environment for the exercise of conditionality and for the dynamics of domestic politics in the states that are left behind in the gray zone.

**TABLE 1**  
**ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS,**  
**1990-1996, ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE**

| <b>Czech Republic</b> | 1991  | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996  |
|-----------------------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Inflation             | 56.6  | 12.7 | 20.0 | 10.7 | 9.0  | 8.6*  |
| Unemployment          | 4.4   | 2.6  | 3.5  | 3.5  | 2.9  | 3.3*  |
| GDP Growth            | -14.5 | -7.1 | -0.5 | 2.5  | 5.2  | 4.4*  |
| <b>Slovakia</b>       | 1991  | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996  |
| Inflation             | 61.2  | 10.0 | 23.2 | 11.7 | 6.7  | 6.0*  |
| Unemployment          | 11.8  | 10.4 | 14.0 | 14.3 | 13.1 | 12.3* |
| GDP Growth            | -15.8 | -7.0 | -4.6 | 4.2  | 6.8  | 6.0*  |

\*Estimates

**Sources:** Jan Winiiecki, "East Central Europe: A Regional Survey"; Deutsche Bank, OMRI Daily Digest, FBIS *Daily Report on Eastern Europe*; *World Tables 1994*, World Bank (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 580-583; OECD, *OECD Economic Surveys: The Czech and Slovak Republics* (Paris: OECD, Center for Co-operation with the Economies in Transition, 1994); Federal Statistics Office report, reprinted in *Smena*, 19 August 1992; *PlanEcon Reports*.



1. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 18.

2. "Three International Dimensions of Democratization," in Laurence Whitehead (ed.) The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. 3-27; and Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," in The International Dimensions of Democratization, pp. 26-54. Schmitter's attempt to tidy these four forms of influence into a 2X2 matrix, according to the number of actors (unilateral or multilateral) and the basis for action (coercive, backed by states, and voluntary, supported by private actors) has other limitations as well. In so encoding the types of influence, purposive behavior supersedes a broader accounting of international dimensions of democratization to the exclusion of systemic or structural factors such as the economic or geostrategic, as well as to the exclusion of diffuse and unintended contagion effects. Further, coercion is designated the sole province of the unilateral state actor, to the exclusion of multilateral interventions.

3. A valuable study in furthering this agenda is Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1996).

4. This issue is considered in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, Building Democracy?: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 7-31.

5. However, here there is a wider field of inquiry addressed by other scholars. Theorists concerned with institutional design have devoted considerable attention to the most suitable forms of democratic governance for multinational states, a concern most prominently reflected in Lijphart's continuing engagement with the problem of consociational solutions for the mediation of competing national interests within a state and Horowitz's classic study of ethnic conflict, which deals extensively with the institutional dynamics of ethnonational diversity. There is, in addition, a large body of scholarship devoted to the examination of ethnonational conflict in the emerging post-communist states. Most of this literature, however, does not frame the analysis in a way that is directly relevant to a broader theoretical understanding of the interaction between democratization and identity questions.

6. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 16-37.

7. "The International Dimensions of Democratic Transitions in Postcommunist Europe," book manuscript in progress.

8. For a more focused analysis of these questions, see Carol Skalnik Leff, "Dysfunctional Democratization? Institutional Conflict in Post-Communist Slovakia," Problems of Post-Communism 43:5 (September-October 1996): 36-51.

9. See Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1984).

10. After the 1992 elections, the initial practice of awarding one of the vice chairmanships in the Slovak legislature to an ethnic Hungarian was suspended. Hungarians were not included in the drafting of the constitution in 1992, and indeed abstained from the constitutional vote in protest over the disregard of their proposed modifications to that document. RFE/RL Daily Digest, 25 June 1992, #119.

11. Sartori, Giovanni, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph Palombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 137-176.

12. See especially Attila Agh, "The Paradoxes of Transition: The External and Internal Overload of the Transition Process," in Terry Cox and Andy Furlong, eds., Hungary: the Politics of Transition (London: Frank Cass, 1995).