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Hometown Influence: The Impact of Geography on Statewide Candidate Emergence and Success

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by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to explore whether statewide geography influences a candidate's electoral position. More specifically, what role does geography play in candidate emergence and success on the statewide level? Conventional wisdom holds that geography does matter in candidate emergence and success. Beyond the anecdotal, however, there has been little research in this area. I theorize that general attitudes about rural identity and, conversely, urbanity affect electoral outcomes based upon the population composition of the state. To explore these questions, I created a typology characterizing states as rural or urban, based upon an index capturing rural cultural and physical attributes of each state, and as concentrated or dispersed, a measure of the proximity of urban areas within a state. I coded the hometowns of candidates from 1948-2008, including a classification as to whether their home county was rural or urban on a relative scale. Using this data, I implemented a negative binomial regression to consider the likelihood of candidate emergence. In this model, I found that rurality is not a negative predictor of candidate emergence in most state types, with urban states being the exception. I then implemented a logit model to estimate the likelihood of winning with the traditional predictors of candidate success and within my theoretical framework. Relative to senate races, if candidates can get into the race, the negative effects of hometown lose significance. In gubernatorial races, coming from a rural area actually increases the likelihood of getting elected in rural, concentrated, and dispersed classified states. In sum, political geography matters and has implications on both candidate emergence and success.

These findings and the use of this typology add an important component for future research. Simply put, geography should not be ignored in politics.

Keywords: rural, urban, candidate emergence, candidate success, political geography, senate elections, gubernatorial elections, localism, hometown

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CHAPTER 1

Upon meeting someone, inevitably, the conversation turns to the question, "Where are you from?" This is one of the essential gauges of "getting to know someone." It is an indication of one's personal traits and character; one makes assumptions about a person, in a general sense, based upon where he or she is from. There are certain qualities attributed to a person based upon his or her geographic identity, defined as the place that one spent most of his or her childhood. For example, if a woman claims Piedmont, Missouri (a small, Midwestern town), as her hometown, then presumptions are made about her. Why is this? It is because we all draw upon geographic stereotypes. Further, does it matter to whom she is giving this information? If she is telling someone born and raised in Chicago, he may draw different conclusions than if she was telling someone from Paducah, Kentucky. The Chicago native may perceive her as backward and unsophisticated, while the Kentuckian assumes she is hardworking and trustworthy. Everything is relative, but it is clear that geography does matter because of the attributes that it inevitably attaches to an individual, simply by virtue of being from a place. How, though, does geographic identity impact one's electoral position?

Consider the case of Claire McCaskill, currently the senior U.S. Senator from Missouri, who clearly understands the implications, and attached connotations, of the question, "Where are you from?" Senator McCaskill spent much of her childhood in the small Missouri towns of Houston and Lebanon; eventually, her family moved to Columbia, a mid-sized college community during her high school years. While a product of outstate Missouri, McCaskill's adult life has been spent in Jackson (home of Kansas City) and St. Louis

Counties, both urbanized counties within the state. This, though, is not something that is apparent upon meeting Senator McCaskill. She knows that politically it is not advantageous to promote her Kirkwood residence, a rich suburb of St. Louis, or her marriage to a wealthy real-estate developer. Catering to rural interests in Missouri was an early political lesson for McCaskill. During her gubernatorial race against Republican Matt Blunt in 2004, McCaskill acknowledged that she lost the race "because she ignored rural voters to focus on more liberal Kansas City, her political base, and St. Louis" (Stone 2006). In Missouri, one cannot attach herself to the urban centers of Kansas City or St. Louis if she wants to be successful because, in this Midwestern state, St. Louis and Kansas City are pitted against each other electorally leaving candidates dependent upon rural interests of the state. Is the impact of geography in this locale an anomaly, or could geography have some sort of systematic effect on the electoral landscape? Would McCaskill's 2004 strategy have been successful if the state's geography was more like Illinois, where there is one major concentrated urban area (Chicago)? This is something that has not been fully considered by those studying electoral behavior.

Thus, I argue that there is a missing piece within the candidate success literature: the impact of geography.[1] It is something that few scholars explicitly consider when discussing why candidates win or lose; however, in many cases, there is more to candidate success than simply money, resources and incumbency. I argue that one needs to consider the effect of geographic context, namely the composition of urbanity within a state and the

[1] Geography is essentially the interpretation of place and the relationship between various places; "human beings still locate themselves in places, fixed, contiguous, distinctive. Places mold actors, structuring their life chances, providing them with identities and traditions of social and political action…Places are strategic sites of action…" (Therborn 2006).

overall impact it has on the culture of the state. In statewide elections, the candidate's geographic identity matters (Black and Black 1973, Tatalovich 1975, Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983, Rice and Macht 1987, Holbrook 1991, Gimpel and Schuknecht 2004, Key 2006 [Sixth Printing]: 37, Gimpel, et al. 2011). For some, it is a character flaw if you were born and raised in a city.[2] For others, the impact of an urban geographic identity is unimportant. It is something that most candidates understand, causing them to underemphasize or, depending upon the state's geography, exaggerate their roots. Furthermore, I argue that geographic distribution of urban contexts throughout the states influence candidates' success. I hope to provide some evidence that one's geographic identity affects the likelihood that he or she will, or will not, be elected.

In my view, the distribution of urban areas is a determining factor in candidate success; in concentrated urban states (where there is one urban center), it is predicted that the negative perceptions coming out of this urban-rural divide are less severe. Thus, the likelihood of urban candidate success will increase. Conversely, in a state where there are several dispersed urban areas, it is electorally damaging to have an urban geographic identity. Take, for example, a comparison of Missouri and Illinois. Missouri has two major metropolitan areas, St. Louis and Kansas City. They are located on opposite sides of the state, on the eastern and western border respectively. Illinois, on the other hand, has one major urban area, Chicago, in the northern part of the state. In both states, there are common stereotypes of the statewide electoral landscape. Both are also very good counterexamples because of Missouri's affinity to rurality and Illinois' association with

[2] The reader may notice that there is an anti-urban bias; this is also noted in urban politics literature (Frank 2004a, 2005a, Judd and Swanstrom 2005, Bartels 2006b). The merits of this perspective will be discussed later.

urbanity, due to Chicago's undeniable influence. In Missouri, for instance, most urban candidates understand that there is little advantage to claiming St. Louis or Kansas City because rural interests rule, or are at least prominent within the electoral arena. This is based out of a statewide culture that perceives rurality to be more honest and more representative of the population. Urbanity is associated with corruption and deceit. One would think, given any knowledge of Illinois history with political corruption, namely in Chicago, that the state would repel any statewide electoral candidate from the metropolitan region. On the contrary, though, the state seems to more often than not rely upon this region for electoral candidates. Chicago candidates typically overshadow any efforts of those outstate.

With that said, when one looks at the electoral outcomes for governor races since 1948 to the present, there is some indication that geography needs to be considered in statewide candidate success. The last successful urban gubernatorial candidate from Missouri was Joseph Teasdale from Jackson County (Kansas City) in 1976. The last successful urban gubernatorial candidate from Illinois was its current governor Bruce Rauner, raised in a suburb of Chicago. This is a state that could, arguably, be called Chicago and outlying regions. What distinguishes statewide electoral success from state to state? I argue it is more than simply party identification or resources; electoral success is also a byproduct of geography. In Missouri, it is a disadvantage to be an urban candidate, while in Illinois it is nearly a necessity to be classified as such.

The Central Question

The central question of this dissertation is: What role does geography play in candidate emergence and success on the statewide level? Can, and do, some candidates use geography (inevitably tied to cultural perceptions) to gain some sort of electoral advantage? Conventional wisdom holds that geography does matter in candidate emergence and success. For example, political parties will consider hometown origin before courting candidates to run for office and such candidates do make conscious decisions about where to tell voters they are from to garner a personal connection and drive up vote totals. In short, it seems logical that geography matters. Beyond the anecdotal, however, there has been little research in this area. Thus, I will examine the actual relationship between geography and electoral actions and outcomes.

Expectations: Theoretical Underpinnings

Defining political geography[3] is a very complex question that is considered from a multitude of vantages and fields, as seen in geography's intersection in fields from economics to engineering. For my purposes, though, I will focus upon the aspects of geography that could affect candidate emergence and success on the state-level, those driving my theory: geographic placed-based voting—later referred to as concentrated versus dispersed—and rural versus urban constructs.

[3] What is political geography? From a strictly definitional perspective, it is "…having a particular political or cultural (for instance, religious) history… central or peripheral, large or small in social space; or on a continuum of social density, of rurality and urbanity, or of communication, from centrality to isolation" (Therborn 2006: 512). Clear as mud, right? Political geography is moves beyond just the general term geography by including cultural and electoral considerations into the discussion. It is more than topography; it is an examination of politics and place.

Geographic place-based voting is a very simple theory where electoral decision-making is purely a matter of distance/location: the closer one lives to a candidate, the more likely he or she will be to support that person. In this line of thinking, a candidate would simply want to come from the most populous area, the place with the most votes, because that location would garner the most votes. I argue that there is more than simple distance calculations related to electoral success because it is crucial to consider the geographic makeup of the state, the urban concentration or dispersion, because this consideration can impact the electoral viability of the candidate. Do not forget the example of Missouri, as previously discussed, where urban identity is not necessarily used for electoral advantage, but, rather, seems to be a clear disadvantage. In Missouri, and arguably states like it, urban candidates cannot be trusted and therefore are not elected. Thus, the relationship between geography and candidate success moves beyond simple place-based voting models. Context must be considered.

The next geographical considerations relate to the conception that there are cultural and political differences in rural and urban areas. Generally speaking, notions surrounding the concepts of "rurality" and "urbanism" are quite confusing, and even at times contradictory. Rural areas are perceived to be highly conservative and traditional, especially in relation to moral values, while, at the same time, backwards and close-minded. Urban areas, on the other hand, are noted as rarely concerned with traditional values and preoccupied with progressive trends. These perceptions, whether based in reality or not, drive the urban-rural divide that is often alluded to in the American political landscape. Thus, the relative influence of these two cultures on each other is unclear. I argue that

candidates consider the conservative nature of rural areas, and try to use it to their advantage if a significant portion of the state's population is classified as rural or if the urban regions of the state are not geographically concentrated. The lack of urban concentration can inhibit urban collaboration, essentially giving the rural agenda more political power. I argue that these urban-rural considerations are important to the electoral strategy of statewide candidates and can, therefore, impact electoral outcomes.

Geographic Factors in Candidate Success: Why Geography Matters

The current literature on candidate emergence and success gives little attention to the notion that geography matters. If any attention is given regarding geography, it is related to the theory of localism. Localism, also known as "friends and neighbors," is the theory that a candidate will have higher electoral support in his or her home county (or respective geographic unit) when certain conditions are met: it is a one party system (no competition between two parties) and there are no factions. Basically, it is the idea of hometown advantage. V.O. Key was the first to elaborate on this theory in his work, *Southern Politics*, where he found that proximity, or distance, does impact support levels, as noted in his findings related to Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, South Carolina, Georgia and Mississippi; he argues, "…localism justifies a diagnosis of low voter-interest in public issues and a susceptibility to control by the irrelevant appeal to support the home-town boy" (2006 [Sixth Printing]: 37). In other words, people will support those who they feel like they are most closely tied to, a local candidate. Again, this is found under the presumed conditions.

The purpose of this dissertation is to move beyond the traditional understanding of localism, a theory directly tied to one's origin, where support decays as distance increases, to argue that candidates will use geography in a different way: A candidate will use, or, more accurately, sell the characteristics of his or her hometown, his or her geographic identity, to citizens of the rest of the state. If the theory of localism explains candidate behavior, then all candidates would advertise themselves as urban; they would be products of the most populated areas since that would logically produce the most local support. Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe argue that more densely populated areas produce a larger share of electoral candidates. They measure home county not as that of birth or childhood residence, but as the county a candidate lived most of his or her adult life (2011). They find that most successful candidates come from urban counties.

These findings are not surprising given their classification of the term hometown. A more insightful examination would use the county that a candidate spent most of his or her childhood and likely the county that he or she portrays as his or her hometown; again, consider Senator Claire McCaskill. Her online biography cites that McCaskill's "first home was Houston, Missouri, where her father William worked at the McCaskill feed mill. Later, the family moved to Lebanon, hometown of Claire's mother, Betty Anne, where her mother's family ran the corner drugstore in town," implying one of these small towns, Houston or Lebanon, is her hometown, not St. Louis, her current residence (McCaskill 2009). It seems that the findings would not be supportive of the urban thesis if the hometown classification were reformulated to correctly capture a candidate's true

hometown or, at the least, the hometown the candidate would like voters to perceive since voter perception is the crux of this and related studies.

The Typology

To highlight my point regarding the impact that I believe geography has on statewide candidate success, I will compare four states that fit within my four-category typology. I will expand this typology to US states over time in the forthcoming analysis, as is noted in Table 1.1.[4] My theory regarding the impact of geography has two dimensions: 1) whether the state is culturally rural or urban, and 2) the concentration, or dispersion, of metropolitan areas within each respective state.[5]

Urban versus Rural State Classifications

Urban and rural statewide classifications are largely dependent upon the overall culture of the state. To briefly summarize what will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, states were categorized urban or rural based upon an index that was created to capture the rurality of a particular state. The variables included in this index trying to capture the measure of rurality were restrictions on abortions, conservatism score for the state's House delegation, percentage mass public conservative, percentage of households with guns, public support for gay rights issues, vote for Bush in 2000, percentage of frequent churchgoers, percentage living in metropolitan area, population per square mile, and per capita energy consumed, BTU. These variables were chosen as they were highly correlated and were a proxy for the concept of ruralism. In Chapter 4, the methods for

[4] Please consider Chapter 4 for further details on the state typology.

[5] The classification of metropolitan will be a relative measure. For instance, an "urban" region in Montana will not have the same population as an "urban" region in New York. Perceptions of such regions will thus vary from state to state and, so too, must the classifications.

classification are discussed in more detail; however, please consider the Rural-Urban index correlations in Table 1.2. Table 1.3 shows the State-by-State categorizations.

Concentrated versus Dispersed State Classifications

Concentration and dispersion measures are essentially the measure as to whether or not the urban, or metropolitan, regions of the state are found within proximity of one another, concentrated, or whether they are scattered across the state, dispersed. Urban classified counties are those counties within the state that had at least five percent of the state's population. Table 1.4 highlights the urban classified counties for each state. Concentrated states were those that had a visual clustering of a majority of the urban classified counties in one region, as opposed to a dispersed classified stated where the urban classified counties were spread throughout the state. Figure 1.1 highlights concentrated and dispersed urban states, while Figure 1.2 shows concentrated and dispersed rural states. There are four categories of states: urban-concentrated, urban-dispersed, rural-concentrated, and rural-dispersed; again, reference Table 1.3, which outlines the categorization of each state and Table 1.4 indicates the urban classified counties in each state. One will note that the urban states are on the coast, whereas the rural states are in middle America. Further, most of the urban states are Democratic dominated and most rural states are Republican dominated. No rural states are Democratic dominated.

Highlighting the State Types

To highlight the different categories of my typology, I consider the hometown locations, where they spent the majority of their childhood, for gubernatorial candidates

from 1948-2008 in Illinois, Washington, Oklahoma, and Missouri;[6] this brief analysis provides a basic understanding of the categories, as well as a glimpse into the trends driving this dissertation. First, reference Figure 1.3, the state of Illinois, which is classified as an urban concentrated state. This figure shows the winner versus loser count comparison where there is a less consistent pattern of urban-based candidates, with a back and forth over time between urban and rural geographic identity for successful candidates; clearly, though, most of the state's gubernatorial candidates come from the Chicago metropolitan region (upper right hand corner of the maps). Thus, there seems to be some advantage to being from the urban metropolitan area of Illinois. Even in terms of candidate emergence, though, there are just generally more candidates coming out of the Chicago area. It seems to be the wellspring of statewide political candidates for the state.

Secondly, consider the state of Washington noted in Figure 1.4, an urban dispersed state, we see that most of the gubernatorial candidates, winning and losing, come from the western portion of the state. This seems to indicate that, in states where there is a county with a large proportion of the population, like, in this case, King 29% and Pierce 12%, even if there are other urban classified counties not in proximity to this larger urban region, voters do not feel torn between counties. This could be indicative of my urban county threshold being too low or may say something about urban states in general. There were no non-native winning candidates. It is important to note that, like Illinois, most of winning and losing candidates emerge out of urban classified counties.

[6] I chose these states because they are pointed examples of my proposed schema, as highlighted in the research design section. Again, the full analysis will examine all fifty states over time, as detailed in the research design section. This is a cross-section of things to come.

Next, consider Figure 1.5, which highlights the rural concentrated classified state of Oklahoma. In Oklahoma, a couple of things are evident upon first glance: most of the successful candidates come from either the Oklahoma City or Tulsa area, or a county in the metropolitan area. Many of the losers were from outstate Oklahoma (six) or were nonnative (five). It seems, from this example, that in concentrated rural states, there is a pattern of support for the metropolitan region. Is there something about urban concentration that generates trust in the citizenry? Is there a higher tendency to be trustful if there is not geographic separation of metropolitan areas? If so, is this simply because geographic separation causes a competition of sorts, as may be noted in the example of Missouri?

Finally, the rural dispersed classified state of Missouri, as noted in Figure 1.6, shows that there have been many losers from the St. Louis and region, but barely any winners from metropolitan areas. It should be noted that there has not been a governor from an urban county in Missouri since Joseph P. Teasdale, a Kansas City native, who was elected in 1976, by defeating Kit Bond. Kit Bond, a Mexico, MO native, subsequently defeated Teasdale in 1980. While Teasdale outspent Bond, $2.7 million to Bond's $1.7 million, Teasdale was portrayed "as a captive of the 'web of privilege'…[and] out of touch with the common man" ("Kit Bond Turns Table on Teasdale" 1980). This is a fine illustration of the possible impact that geography may be having on candidate success. Did the election of rurally based governors for the past thirty years in Missouri occur simply by chance? Or is something else driving this type of relationship? Does the tension between the two urban

regions of Missouri, Kansas City on one side of the state and St. Louis on the other, cause voters to choose outstate candidates?

The purpose of this study is to fill in the gap of what role geography plays in statewide elections, beyond that of localism, based upon the notion that different geographic contexts beget different electoral outcomes. Candidates can sell geographic origin as a positive character trait, to create a connection with the voter, and to, ultimately, increase electoral advantage. It is important to better understand whether different geographical contexts (i.e. urban concentrated versus urban dispersed) affect how successful candidates are in the electoral arena. Do political parties consider geography in their selection process? Is it possible that geography can give one candidate a significant upper hand over another? These are important questions to explore.

Reformulating Rural and Urban

Clearly, as the proceeding sections highlight, there is confusion surrounding the nature of what is or is not classified as rural, urban, or something else. The mystification of these concepts is reminiscent of the discussions surrounding obscenity; the notion of, "I know it when I see it" comes to mind (Stewart 1964). Is it as simple as "I know rurality when I see it?" Can such concepts be really operationalized? These are all important considerations for my research goals; basically, I need to consider how I will capture these elusive concepts. Can we move beyond the "I know it when I see it conceptions?" I believe so.

For me, rurality is not just proximity from an urban area, as calculated with some proxy like commuting time or urban influence, but is rather a general sentiment, a cultural

idea (Walsh 2012). For some rurality is tinged with negative conceptions, rurality is marked by a communities that uphold backward stereotypes and that are living fifteen years behind the times. They are areas lacking culture and sophistication. For others, rurality is a romanticized way of life. It is a picture of neighborly kinship, of small town festivals and a slower, more appreciated, pace of life. In these places, one can feel safe and people can be trusted. So, where, then, lies the truth?

From my vantage, rurality is defined by the general attitudes of the people in a general area. While it may be true these places are generally far from urban areas, it is not always the case (Ching and Creed 1997). Thus, the term is relative and will vary from state to state. You may have some communities that are only twenty minutes away from a state's largest city that see themselves as rural in nature. Conversely, you may have a town that is an hour from a populated area that is particularly tied to the identification of urbanity. Further, it is important to note that perceptions of rurality may vary from state to state in terms of what the general belief that rural is; so, for example, identified rural citizens in Arkansas may be completely different from identified rural citizens in California. Does this then make one group more or less rural? I believe not.

Now, back to how this confusion relates to my study. I theorize that general attitudes about rurality affect electoral outcomes based upon the population composition of the state. For example, in a state where the general sentiment about rurality is generally positive, the romanticized version, then the citizenry will be less likely to support an urban classified candidate (one that was raised in a city, an urban hometown), especially if the urban regions of the state are dispersed. If, though, the state is urban concentrated, even if

it is a rural classified state, then it is more likely that urban, or nonnative, candidates will be elected.

In terms of the relative nature of rurality, it is important to consider the overall nature of the state. Is the state classified as rural or urban overall? And, further, why does this matter? The typology of rural versus urban states is important to this discussion because it gives acknowledgement to the relative nature of rurality. In a rural classified state, the overall sentiment towards rurality, and the positive attributes of such, will outweigh urban sentiments. Thus, I expect to find more rural-based candidate support overall in these states, relative to urban classified states, due to a lower threshold of urban influence. The opposite is true for urban concentrated states. Urban dispersed states, though, are a bit more difficult to classify since the ability of candidates to pit urban areas against each other will be advantageous in getting rural support overall.

As with all academic endeavors, one always returns to the questions, "Who cares?" or "Why does this matter?" By delving into a greater understanding of the impact that state geographic variances may have on statewide elections, not only am I adding to the literature, which, to this point, hardly addresses the impact such may have, but also, from a practical vantage, gives candidates a better understanding of how they should market themselves to voters. This investigation will add to political behavior and geography literature, as well as add insight to the extensive Red versus Blue state debates that continue. Finally, since history has shown us that most presidential candidates were previously governors or senators, understanding if there are geographic influences uncovers new lessons about the United States' highest office.

Dissertation Plan

I hope to follow a logical path in my quest to better understand how exactly geography impacts candidate success. Chapter 2 will be a discussion on non-geographical indicators of candidate success; basically, the line of reasoning used by most scholars in explaining why and how candidates win. Next, Chapter 3 will focus on rural and urban definitions, as well as the impact that geography has on candidate success, including a discussion surrounding the measurement of rural culture. It would be misguided of me to present this dissertation without a close examination of the different ways scholars, journalists and pundits have tried to capture the illusive concepts of "rural" and "urban." I argue that, while illusive, we can attempt to capture the differences in these communities through a more detailed variable.

The discussion of my methods will be found in Chapter 4 where I lay out, not only the design of my study, but also the way I plan to operationalize my key variables and measure outcomes. In this discussion, I will explain why my method is an attempt at uncovering relationships that are often overlooked, or under examined, in related pieces of literature.

Chapter 5 is where the real substance of this discussion will be found, the statistical analysis. I will place my typology into the context of the Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe piece (2011). Does my typology impact the findings regarding geographical influences on candidate emergence? My results indicate that statewide geography does influence candidate emergence. Candidate emergence from rural is less likely in urban classified states than for rural and dispersed states for senatorial nominees. In gubernatorial races, in

urban classified states, candidates simply do not come from rural counties. There is no significance in the other state types. The nuances are discussed further in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 will take Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's basic formulation and consider it within the context my data on a candidate's hometown (2011). Simply put, does considering the candidate's hometown as where the candidate was born and raised instead of where he or she lived for the majority of their adult live affect the results on related to candidate emergence? I also explore the likelihood of winning based upon my theory of state typology.

My final chapter, Chapter 7, will be a discussion of the major findings uncovered in my analysis and how this relates and adds to the existing candidate emergence and success literature. At this point, suggestions for subsequent research plans will also be outlined.

Now, onto a look into the depths of the candidate success literature: What is the general consensus as to why some are elected, while others are not? Do non-geographic variables fully capture why one wins? I do not agree, but readers can judge for themselves following the discussion of non-geographic indicators related to candidate success.

CHAPTER 2

NON-GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS

What distinguishes a candidate from everyone else? What factors enable foster candidate emergence? Moreover, what distinguishes a successful versus an unsuccessful candidate? Is there something fundamentally different from these respective groups? Much of the literature in the discipline focuses upon why voters vote the way that they do, with less emphasis on what makes a candidate successful. I argue that these are two distinct discussions. While the two considerations are indisputably intertwined, the factors impacting candidate success, I believe, are much more nuanced. They are less reliant upon individualistic considerations, and more conscious of aggregated preferences.

Before I can consider the impact of geography on candidate success, I need to outline what is already known about candidates. Why do they emerge? What makes them successful? Essentially, I am embarking on a discussion focused on the non-geographic factors impacting candidate behavior and, ultimately, electoral outcomes. Central to the discussion of this dissertation is what variables impact candidate emergence and success. Accordingly, I will consider the non-geographic model, in terms of both candidate emergence and candidate success, before moving onto a more exhaustive consideration of the impact geography may have and the electoral process. In terms of candidate emergence, I consider the role of incumbency, institutional factors, party influence, demographic, and idiosyncratic factors on potential candidates. Relative to candidate success, I consider incumbency, economic conditions, partisanship levels, presidential approval (as it relates to the candidate's party), and other idiosyncratic factors, like

candidate personality. It is the hope that this discussion will give a strong foundation for the discussion focused upon geographic factors impacting candidate success that will follow in Chapter 3.

Candidate Emergence

To begin, what distinguishes a candidate from everyone else? Or, rather, what motivates one to run for public office? Incumbency, institutional factors, party influence, demographic, and ambition factors are all influences on whoever decides to enter the electoral arena.

Incumbency

The literature on candidate emergence is largely focused on the impact of incumbency. The rational model holds that candidates calculate the utility of running for office by considering the probability of winning, the benefits of the office, and the cost of running. If an incumbent is deemed 'weak,' then stronger challengers will be more likely to emerge. Studies have shown that incumbents have about an 8-percentage point advantage for high-level statewide and federal offices (Erikson 1971, Mayhew 1974b, Gelman and King 1990, Krashinsky and Milne 1993, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002, Hirano and Snyder 2009). This advantage is no secret; thus, many qualified candidates are deterred from even entering the race (Kazee 1983, Banks and Kiewiet 1989, Cox and Katz 1996, Gordon, et al. 2007). Essentially, it is not rational for one to enter a race where the likelihood of winning is so low, so, often, the parties will push a 'losing' candidate into a race that they know he or she cannot win (Krasno and Green 1988, Fowler and McClure 1989, Canon 1993). The

economic advantages of incumbency, such as is noted by large war chests, are also a deterrent to high quality challengers entry to the electoral race (Box-Steffensmeier 1996).

Hollibaugh, Rothenberg and Rulison indicate that incumbency can even overcome a fundamental difference in opinion with the voters; simply put, incumbency may overcome accountability (2013). Groseclose provides an excellent overview of the valance factors, including incumbency, that advantage candidates (2001). Thus, incumbency is quite a powerful indicator indeed, causing candidates to think twice before making the decision to run.

Institutional Factors

From an institutional perspective, scholars have considered how the type of electoral system may affect who decides to run. Candidates are more likely to run in states where there is a runoff system (Lazarus 2007). Sanbonmatsu (2006) argues that seat competition, increased legislative professionalism, and less active state and local party systems should increase recruitment levels by legislative party leadership. She finds that competition is a strong indicator of legislative party recruitment, but is less conclusive about the interaction between legislative party and state and local party leadership. Further, more professionalized states are more likely to have the institutional structures that encourage candidate recruitment.

Candidates are also, logically, more likely to emerge when there is an open seat and if the incumbent is facing a political scandal (Prinz 1993, Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994, Welch and Hibbing 1997, Wrighton and Squire 1997, Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Institutional factors are the general framework from which candidates emerge. What

cannot be uncovered are the many institutional factors throughout the citizenry that may fundamentally remove the idea that one could or should run for political office. These institutional barriers are hard to capture and quantify, but do deserve a mention. This is indirectly alluded to in studies discussions of the "politicized upbringing expectation," or rather how family may be the medium for transference of political efficacy (Fox and Lawless 2005).

Party Influence

Studies related to how political parties recruit potential candidates are somewhat limited. What has been shown, though, is that partisan attachments help to bring citizens into the political arena (Verba and Nie 1972). Political parties also work to recruit candidates and people who are approached by parties are more likely to run (Lawless and Fox 2010). Party influence is also noted in the consideration candidates make in the likelihood of making it through the primary stages of the election (Stone and Maisel 2003). Stone and Maisel also find that "…districts that are balanced in their partisan makeup may experience competitive elections because potential candidates see their prospects as relatively good, and are therefore more likely to run" (Stone and Maisel 2003: 975).

Demographic Factors

The resource model for deciding to run is normally the foundation for discussions related to the demographic factors to emerging as a candidate. Simply put, a primary consideration is does the individual have the time, money and civic skills to throw his or her hat into the race (Verba, et al. 1995). There are also demographic factors influencing the likelihood of a candidate to emerge. As was previously mentioned, family ties and name

recognition increase the likelihood for a candidate to emerge (Flanigan and Zingale 2002, Fox and Lawless 2005). You do not have to look much beyond the familial ties of our highest office to see the impact that family can have on elections. Political socialization also most certainly impacts whether or not individuals run for office (Almond and Verba 1963, Beck and Jennings 1982, Verba, et al. 1995), as does trust (Hetherington 2005). Hetherington states, "Trust can act as a simple decision rule for supporting or rejecting government activity" (2005: 51). Logically, once could assert this carries to the decision to enter the public arena. Presumably, one will not run for office if they do not feel that gaining such a position could produce change.

The literature has shown that many traditionally excluded groups, such as minorities and women, are less likely to run for office; although, efficacy in these groups does rise when living in an environment where politicians are "like them" (i.e. female, African American, etc.) (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, Burrell 1996, Burns, et al. 2001, Moncrief, et al. 2001, Lawless 2004, Fox and Lawless 2005, Lawless and Fox 2010).

Furthermore, Gaddie (2004) finds that younger candidates have more energy to enter the political arena and Fox and Lawless (2005) find that increased income levels correlated with increased interest in running for office.

Ambition

Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, and Stone (2006) show the impact that ambition has on the likelihood to run for office. They describe political ambition as a two-stage process. First, the candidate has the ambition to run and, then, he or she decides to run. They cite Schlesinger (1966), Black's (1972), and Jacobson and Kernell (1983) pieces which contend

candidates emerge when they think it is actually possible to win and add to this theory by arguing, "…opportunity alone is insufficient to create ambition. Instead ambition for higher office stems from a combination of factors, many of which are personal assessments about the costs and benefits of moving. These costs and benefits affect ambition, rather than the immediate decision to enter a particular race." They argue it is "…not about *whether* to run; it is a choice about *when* to run" (2006: 197 [emphasis in original]). Interestingly, their findings regarding ambition are tied back to institutional influences particularly that candidates are more likely to run for higher office when originating from professional legislatures, as professional legislatures have more developed campaign resources and campaign networks.

Fox and Lawless add to the discussion surrounding political ambition by finding that a variety of circumstances impact a person's decision to run for office, including nascent ambition and expressive ambition factors, and that these circumstances change over time (2005, 2011). They find that ambition goes beyond Lasswell's original notion of the "political type," a person who is a "…power seeker…devoting themselves to the capture and use of government" (1948: 20) by considering the one's "…*nascent ambition*—or the inclination to consider a candidacy" (Fox and Lawless 2005: 644). Aside from factors serving as proxies for individual feelings, like political efficacy, they find that this nascent ambition, including childhood socialization, and adult recruitment are important factors in a person's political ambition. Interestingly, they found that having a party member "suggest" that he should run increased the likelihood of considering running by 40% (Fox and Lawless 2005: 651).

Candidate Success

The non-geographic model of candidate success includes the following factors on the state level: incumbency, economic conditions, partisanship levels, presidential approval (as it relates to the candidate's party), and other idiosyncratic factors, like candidate personality (Crew, et al. 2002). Moving on from the question of why people choose to run, I will now examine the factors impacting why people win. These are two very important distinctions and, while some influences are congruent from emergence to success, there are some additional considerations for candidate success.

Incumbency

As Jacobson (2004) notes, since the 1960s, the candidate-centered electoral arena has produced an environment where it is a seemingly insurmountable feat to unseat an incumbent. Incumbents have many advantages including name recognition, party support and official resources, such as staff, travel funds, access and support by political action committees and increased communication resources via franking privileges and connections to media sources (Erikson 1971, Cover 1977, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002, Hirano and Snyder 2009). Further, already holding office allows "members to take the 'right' positions, making pleasing statements, and bring[ing] home the bacon while avoiding responsibility for the collective performance of Congress" Jacobson 2004: 32. Mayhew (1974a) describes how, at least for congressional seats, the decentralized nature of the institution allows members to specialize in areas that are most suited to their constituents' needs. Undoubtedly, these committee assignments, and related benefits, are conveyed to voters during reelection campaigns further incentivizing voting for him or her (Fiorina 1989).

Further, incumbents have the advantage where there is a decline in partisanship; as Fenno highlights, "Members of Congress run *for* Congress by running *against* Congress" (1978: 168 [emphasis in the original]. Voters are more likely to trust in a particular candidate than in the institution itself (Ferejohn 1977, Fiorina 1977). Further, the fact that in most states the incumbent may play a role in the process of redistricting allows him or her to, essentially, hand pick the voters they desire making the seat at hand less competitive (Grofman and Brunell 2010).[7]

Jacobson's most recent article chips away at the strength of incumbency by showing that incumbency advantage has decreased as congress has become more polarized (2015). Essentially, he finds that there has been a rise in straight-ticket voting, which ultimately is harmful to incumbents of the rival party.

Economic Conditions

Many scholars have considered if, and how, voter use appraisals of current conditions, namely the economy, on vote choice (Downs 1957, Key 1966, Kramer 1971, Fiorina 1981, Erickson, et al. 2002, Vavreck 2008). In relation to economic conditions, Atkeson and Partin (1995) find that voters differentiate "functional responsibility" for senators and governors; essentially, they hold that senatorial voting is based upon presidential approval, while gubernatorial voting is in response to state economic conditions. They find that neither race is contingent upon national economic trends, or individual economic circumstances.

[7] There is some debate as to whether redistricting may, in fact, hurt incumbents. For further discussion, see Desposato and Petrocik (2003), which provides a very good background discussion and analysis on incumbent advantage varying based upon context.

Partisanship Levels

Carsey and Wright respond to Atkeson and Partin's study finding support for their hypotheses that both gubernatorial and senatorial voting is responsive to presidential approval ratings (1998a). King (2001) also finds support for the relationship between presidential approval and gubernatorial support, as well as prior gubernatorial support on future open races. Further, they find that senate elections are related to evaluations of national economic trends. They concur with Atkeson and Partin in their finding that voting for governor is reliant upon state economic conditions.[8]

Moreover, scholars using a multidimensional scaling method have shown that the effect of partisanship has changed over time. This approach essentially argues that candidates are plotted on an axis, where similar candidates are close together and dissimilar candidates are further apart (Rabinowitz 1975, Weisberg 1980, Jacoby 1986, 1988, McCarty, et al. 2006, Jacoby 2010). As Jacoby summarizes, "From the 1960s on through the first presidential elections of the twenty-first century, one of the dimensions has always corresponded closely to a general liberal-conservative continuum" (2010: 270). The second dimension, though, has shifted from "specific issues" to "mass perceptions of candidate credibility or electability" (Jacoby 2010: 270). Or, put more aptly, whether to electorate likes and/or trusts the candidate enough to vote for him or her.

In a more simplistic view, though, parties enable voters to attach labels, those that can help relate to or judge candidates. Some scholars contend that voters use values and

[8] The contrary conclusions found in the studies of Atkeson and Partin (1998) and Carsey and Wright (1998a) are based upon differences in model specification, as outlined by the rejoinder provided by Carsey and Wright (1998b).

preferences, which are most like their own to choose their "best" candidate (Abramowitz 1988, Green, et al. 2002, Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). Others argue that voters will punish or reward candidates or parties by considering past performance and using this as a predictor for future success or failure (Downs 1957, Key 1966, Fiorina 1981). This view that values and/or characteristics are associated with candidates is in the same vein as much of the political polarization literature, which is tied to the geographic influences on candidate success. This perspective will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Presidential Approval

Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998) find that, independent of incumbency, coattails, term limits and macroeconomic conditions, fiscal accountability is stronger under unified party control. This is somewhat contingent upon which party is in power. For Republican controlled states, gubernatorial candidates lose votes if there were unanticipated increases in the state budget, while this effect is the opposite for Democratically controlled states. Fundamentally, they believe that this is due to the differing expectations for Democrats, bigger spenders, versus Republicans, the party of small government. So, when voters are able to identify who is to blame—which is easier in unified government—they will punish or reward respectively.

Idiosyncratic Factors

Studies deriving from *The American Voter*, consider the impact that evaluations, like candidate background and personality, have on voter identification with and, as a consequence, support for candidates (Campbell, et al. 1960, Bartels 2002, Jacoby 2010, Fridkin and Kenney 2011, Kam and Zechmeister 2013). While these studies are interesting,

it is quite difficult to untangle the linkage between whether a candidate won because of his or her specific personality trait versus whether they won because of partisan loyalties.

The Missing Piece

While there is a well-developed and continuing discussion regarding why candidates emerge and why candidates win, I believe there is still something missing from the overall framework. The majority of studies relative to political behavior and electoral success treat all elections the same or are working from the assumption that voters from different places will vote the same based solely upon their political affiliations and demographic factors. Geography is missing. Place matters and impacts voter preferences. Elections vary from state to state and outcomes cannot be evaluated solely upon these individualist factors without a consideration of where these voters come from. In the next chapter, we will explore the geographic factors related to candidate success in order to get a broader understanding of voter behavior.

CHAPTER 3

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS

The substantial value to be gained from this dissertation is the discussion and exploration of the impact that geographic factors may have on candidate emergence and success. It is a rare day—even more so on election years—when one does not hear news commentators discussing the geographic divide in the United States. There is a perceived cultural difference between rural and urban areas, as noted in the red versus blue state discussions that are prominent in media circles. This dichotomy will be discussed further shortly.

Chapter 2 outlined the non-geographic factors impacting candidate emergence and success, but there is more to the story of why candidates win. It cannot be coincidental that statewide candidates often stand in front of barns, instead of high rises, while in campaign ads. Thus, this chapter will discuss the current perspectives on the impact of geography from the theory to a more concrete discussion of effects.

Theoretical Perspectives

Defining political geography

While defining political geography, on its face, may seem simple, there is some ambiguity of what the term actually means and some questions by political geographers as to the discipline of political science's place in this subfield (Kofman 2003, Mamadouh 2003, Toal 2003). Beginning in the next section, I will discuss the various theories within the discipline, such as localism and the rural/urban divide, that are noted for their place based components, but readers should remember political geography lies within a larger

consideration of how geography impacts influence actors. Or, rather, that "…contemporary politics is best understood by identifying and considering the historical layers of political geographies and how they interact to provide constraints and opportunities for actors" (Flint 2003: 619). Through the consideration of geography's possible impact on political behavior, we are gaining a broader understanding of the context within which voters and politicians act.[9] Political geography is aptly defined by Agnew, Mitchell and Toal, in their text, *A Companion to Political Geography,*

> "…political geography is about how barriers between people and their political communities are put up and come down; how world orders based on different geographical organizing principles (such as empires, state systems, and ideological–materialist relationships) arise and collapse; and how material processes and political movements are re-making how we inhabit and imagine the 'world political map" (as cited in Toal 2003: 653).

The world is not a vacuum, certainly not the political world that is tinted with interactive biases and cultural nuances. Geographical context adds the piece missing from traditional political behavior theory. In moving onto the discussion of theories within political science addressing the impacts of geography, we see there are some competing theories regarding the factors impacting candidate emergence and success.

Geographic Place-based Voting

This theory is very simple: Candidates hope to originate from populous areas, the places with the most residents, because those locations garner the most votes. It is a

[9] For more discussion on the implications related to macro analysis and spatial structuring, please consider Darmofal (2006).

simple distance calculation in that the closer one lives to a candidate, the more likely he or she will be to support that person. Under this theory, the successful candidate would be the candidate from the most populated area because he or she would be the closest to the most people. Funds and campaign activities are also concentrated in urban areas. Geographic placed-based voting is the basic building block for localism. They are, though, not the same theory as localism, which builds upon the simple distance calculations and includes a consideration of context and a calculation of support based upon such factors. Simply put, localism is more complex than place-based voting because it includes other factors that may speed up or slow down distance decay.

Localism

Localism is the theory that a candidate will hold an electoral advantage in his or her hometown, or respective geographic unit. This is his or her hometown advantage. V.O. Key was the first to seriously examine this theory (Key 2006 [Sixth Printing]). While the literature on localism is not extensive, the examination of the topic has revealed that there is still support for the general idea that candidates do better in their home county or state, *ceteris paribus*. Again, as previously stated, this is different from geographic placed-based voting in which local ties are inconsequential, as it is a simple distance measure. In terms of the literature related to sub-state examination, Black and Black were among the first to further test Key's findings related to his theory of localism where they considered the geographical nature of Wallace's support in Alabama. This rudimentary approach simply provided a dummy variable for Wallace's home region, seven contiguous counties; not

surprisingly, support for "friends and neighbors" was found in this model (Black and Black 1973).

Tatalovich built upon the findings of Key, extrapolating eight hypotheses related to the theory "friends and neighbors" (Tatalovich 1975:809). Essentially, he contends that this phenomenon is more prevalent in low information elections where opponents are not from similar geographic regions, where there is no incumbent and in lower prestige offices. His findings are mostly supportive of the hypotheses, with the exception of office prestige. While Tatalovich hypothesized that low information elections would provide more rationale for localism, his findings are supportive of the opposite, that the Senate race provided more evidence of "friends and neighbors" than that of the lesser known office of Lieutenant Governor (Tatalovich 1975: 813).

Rice and Macht build upon these findings by considering gubernatorial and senate races in 46 states from 1976 to 1982 to determine if a candidate's home county vote totals, that county in which a candidate was born and raised, supported the notion of localism (1987).[10] They found that localism was prevalent in over two-thirds of the cases, with a hometown advantage, on average, of 3.7 percentage points, when controlling for incumbency, population and party support. They find that this advantage will increase in smaller populated counties, the advantage will be greater for Democrats than Republicans,

[10] Hometown advantage, *H,* was measured by considering "the deviation of a candidate's actual percentage of the vote in his or her home county (C_a) from the candidate's expected vote share in that county (C_e), adjusted for the candidate's statewide percentage of the vote (S_a) relative to how well candidates of his or her party normally do in contests for that office (S_e)" This formulation is noted in the following equation: $H= (C_a - C_e) – (S_a - S_e)$ (Rice and Macht 1987: 449).

and, finally, that incumbents will have less home county advantage since their name recognition will be more dispersed.

More recent examinations have also given credence to the "friends and neighbors" hypothesis. Kjar and Laband consider precinct-level data for Alabama's 1998 third district congressional election and find strong support for the localism hypothesis (2002). Gimpel et al. (2007, Gimpel, et al. 2008) implemented a GIS examination of the localism hypothesis and measured support through a continuous measure. While controlling for political competitiveness, partisanship, median income, percent born inside the state (local tenure), percent minority (black and Hispanic), population density and total population, they find that, for both Democratic and Republican candidates, support levels drop as they move away from their home counties.[11] Importantly, though, the decline stops once a certain distance is reached and Republicans seem to do better when an area is geographically isolated, or further from their candidate's home county (assuming there is not still Democratic advantage distance wise). Gimpel et al. argue that the reason Republicans do better with these isolated locations is because the Republican party pulls candidates from a "greater diversity of locations" and, thus, causing their party loyalists to be "less sensitive to place-of-origin" when voting (2007: 23). In short, Democrats are more suited to the localism hypothesis.

Localism has also been considered at the state-level through the examination of the impact of home state advantage in presidential races; findings indicate that such an advantage does exist (Lewis-Beck and Rice 1983, Garand 1988, Holbrook 1991, Mixon and

[11] They define home county as the county in which candidates has lived during their adulthood, mainly after college, not where they were born and raised.

Tyrone 2004). This concept has also been extending beyond simple voting behavior, as noted in Thielemann's piece which finds support for localism in the area of judicial campaign finance. A consideration of a judicial race is particularly informative, as such elections are notably low-information in that the voters are generally uniformed regarding the nominee's background, showing that "…home county means a great deal while neighboring counties do not" (Thielemann 1993: 476).

Geography is more than just localism. Geography's impact is more than the simple evaluation of distance from a candidate's origin. Gimpel et al. argue that, based upon the notion of localism, "Elections then become conflicts cleaved by territory, and are not expressions of political preference anchored in well-considered polity considerations" (2007: 2). While the general crux of this statement may be true, "elections … become conflicts cleaved by territory," localism may not accurately explain these considerations. The broader understanding of state geography—how rural/urban counties identify with other rural/urban counties—may have far-reaching implications to electoral emergence and success for potential candidates. It matters how a candidate sells himself to the rest of the state. If he primarily talks about his rural roots, even though he may live in an urban area, this action has meaning and indicates the he understands that such personal framing may garner an electoral advantage.

Rural-Urban Cultural/Political Divide

The juxtaposition between urban and rural values and lifestyles is often noted in political discussions. There is a general belief that these places are different; there are distinct cultural and political attributes tied to each area. For example, people see rural

places as "racially prejudiced, resistant to change, expressive of Christian zealotry, anti-Semitic, morally intolerant, backward and culturally isolated" (Gimpel and Lay 2002: 2) . On the other hand, there is a sense that such communities are "examples of civic vitality, to be held up as models for the rest of the country on how to produce a truly enlightened political community" (Gimpel and Lay 2002: 2). Thus, the political culture of the region will vary based upon the degree of rurality. Political culture defined is "the attitudes, values, and beliefs that people hold towards government" (Radin, et al. 1996: 86).

Beyond the perceived cultural differences in the two areas, there is evidence that rural voters behave differently than their urban counterparts. Recent literature has focused upon the political conservatism of rural America. Thomas Frank and Larry Bartels debate the true motivation driving Republican rural voters; essentially, whether they vote based upon morals or economics. While Frank felt rural voters voted against their personal economic interests, which would have been better suited to the Democratic Party, due to their backlash against the Democrat's socially liberal ideals, Bartels felt they were true to their personal economic interests (Frank 2004b, 2005b, Bartels 2006a).[12] Gimpel and Karnes entered this debate arguing that rural constituents are not voting based solely upon moral or economic issues, but rather relate with the Republican Party due their strong individualistic and entrepreneurial self-image. This explanation depends upon local culture

[12] Thomas Frank, a journalist, argues in *What's the Matter with Kansas* the typical theme running through rural cultural and political studies that rural American resents the influence and air of superiority of urban America, is alive and well. Due to this, working class Americans have developed a "backlash spirit" and have, therefore, voted against their economic interests in favor of the Republican Party (2004b). For Frank, these citizens, are often live in rural or small town America, cast their ballots based the premise that "values matter most," even more than economic interest. Larry M. Bartels disputes the premise put forth by Frank, using NES election data, which he argues show that working class voters do vote based upon economic interests, rather than social; For Bartels, Frank did not accurately measure such inclinations. Bartels essentially disagrees with the entire notion that "conservatives won the heart of America."

combined with an economic ideals perspective; it holds rural constituents are not dissatisfied with their economic situations enough to revolt from the party that supports their personal economic beliefs, like low taxes (2006).

Somewhat tied to the discussion of political participation in rural America, especially within the context of the Frank and Bartels debate, there has been some focus on the urban-rural divide within America. While past pieces were explicit in the differentiation being between urban and rural communities (Baker 1955, Hahn 1971), much of the current work reframes the issue into a red versus blue state culture war.[13] In *Culture War,* Fiorina et al. essentially argue that the cultural divisions, based upon geographical and partisan lines, are overstated and most Americans "are ambivalent and uncertain, and consequently reluctant to make firm commitments to parties, politicians, or policies" (Fiorina, et al. 2006: ix). From this perspective, the divisions that many journalists and politicians highlight are elite driven and are not as extreme as portrayed. As they argue, "Although there are some real differences between Red and Blue America, there is no fundamental conflict. There may be cracks, but there is no chasm" (Fiorina, et al. 2006: 56).

Conversely, Abramowitz and Saunders dispute the claim put forth by Fiorina et al. arguing that there are "deep divisions between Democrats and Republicans, between red state voters and blue state voters, and between religious voters and secular voters…they are likely to increase in the future as a result of long-term trends affecting American

[13] There has been little scholarship that has traced the movement within the discipline from the use of the term rural-urban to more contemporary references, and even the shift from placing rural first in the rural-urban conjunction to moving it behind urban, a more recent shift. The language used affects the framing of the issue and is of consequence. It should be noted, though, that many of the references made by these authors are not explicitly considering rural versus urban issues, but such is clearly implied in the substance of the material.

society" (2005: 1; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Much of the dispute between these two pieces is based upon methodological differences; basically, they measured various concepts differently and Abramowitz and Sauders contend the measures used to capture ideological polarization by Fiorina et al. is not accurate because it does not accurately capture the voter's concern regarding an issue or his or her knowledge on such. Abramowitz and Sauder's 2008 piece disputes Fiorina et al.'s five claims of moderation, partisan polarization, geographical polarization, social cleavages, and voter engagement and participation. The relevant piece for this discussion, geographic polarization, Abramowitz and Saunders show that, contrary to Fiorina et al's claim that there has been little increase in geographical polarization, the evidence shows that red state and blue state voters are quite divergent on a number of measures, including both social and political attitudes. They also highlight that fewer states over the hour decades have been classified as electoral battleground states (Fiorina and Abrams 2008: 348-9). It is evident that the topic of the urban-rural divide is becoming both a timely and relevant issue.

McKee (2007) discusses the marked shift of rural voters to the Republican Party in the 2000 and 2004 presidential contests. While he is unclear on the measurement of rural versus urban, he does find that there are significant differences in voting patterns between the two subsets of voters. Rural voters, not surprisingly, are more likely than urban voters to be "value voters" and, therefore, supportive of the Republican Party. He finds that "candidates who share the characteristics and/or values of rural voters are much better positioned to gain their support" (McKee 2007: 22). McKee finds that the "Clinton Fatigue," the dissatisfaction with President Clinton, was much more pronounced in rural America

where these voters moved more significantly to the Republican Party; essentially, candidates do have the power to identify with rural citizens and draw support. If they do not make these connections, the power of rurality may be neutralized, as was noted in Clinton's tenure.

Finally, Sauerzopf and Swanstrom (1999), using a narrower conception of urban defined as central cities, create an index of difference to compare the vote totals of cities versus the remainder of the state from 1920-1996 for twelve cities; in this index zero would indicate no difference where 200 would indicate complete difference where the Democratic vote is representative of the urban vote. They find that there is a decline in the electoral influence of cities both due to suburbanization and because of the demobilization of the urban electorate. They highlight the need for candidates, namely Democratic ones, to court suburban and rural voters to garner enough votes, although completely dismissing urban needs is not fruitful. As a caveat, Sauerzopft and Swanstrom do note that the largest metropolitan areas do still hold incredible power in the respective states. This article highlights how important it is for candidates to carefully consider their electoral strategies geographically since these contextual considerations can hold implications for success or failure.

Rural-Urban-Suburban Definitions

Much of the confusion surrounding the study of urban and rural politics lies in the uncertainty over its definition, or rather how does rurality fit into the spatial and geopolitical landscape of the United States? First of all, one must consider the unit at which past scholars have studied these communities, since rurality has been considered on various

units of analysis, from municipal to regional.[14] Studies using the state level of analysis have used the proximity to urban areas, the percentage of the state which is urban or the amount of electoral votes held by the state as the delineation between rural and urban (Bryan 1981, Okinaka, et al. 2007, Stambough, et al. 2007).[15] Regional studies have also considered rurality by looking specifically at the characteristics specific to a geographic area, like the South or the Midwest, and provide readers a broader understanding of the problems facing larger areas. Regional studies also provide a glimpse into the increasingly codependent nature of local communities and states in a globalizing world (Key 1949, Fenton 1957, Lockard 1959, Havard 1972, Sofranko 1991, Falk, et al. 2003).

Of the studies using local governments as the unit of analysis, there have been both qualitative and quantitative analyses performed. Numerous cases studies have examined specific rural communities' social structure, political organization and cultural context.[16] Of the quantitative studies, many—especially older studies—kept the definition of rural in line with the one provided by the Census, which historically defined a community as rural if it had no more than 2,500 residents. Some scholars, though, were displeased with this

[14] The lack of regular discussion related rurality among political scientist holds considerable implications for the overall understanding of the American context for these communities inhabit a large geographically area and a hold significant population size; the latter considerations are debated since there is some confusion surrounding the definition of rurality. For a more detailed understanding of the distinctions between rural-urban, which can become quite cumbersome, one should consider the briefs provided by the Rural Policy Research Institute (Miller 2006).

[15] Bryan defines rural states as those having more than 56 percent of the population not living in cities or suburban areas (1981: 47). Okinaka et al. defines states as rural if they have less six electoral votes (Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming), while Stambough et al. defines rural as a state that has fifty percent or less urbanized (Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming) (2007: 124, 2007: 229).

[16] While there are too many case studies to cite every article or book written on rural communities, see (Davidson 1996, Tilton 1998, Duncan 1999, Vidich and Bensman 2000) for a glimpse of some this work. Most of this work has been pursued by rural sociologist or rural historians.

classification, so the Census, in recent times, created a new classification of urbanized, which defines communities with over 50,000 people urban which allows scholars to make a new class of communities, small towns, those with between 2,500 and 50,000 residents (Aguiar 2007). The entire situation becomes even more confusing and cumbersome due to the differences and overlapping nature of urban versus rural counties (using the traditional above/below 2,500 residents benchmark) and metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan areas (can including one, or more, counties). Simply put, some counties are classified as rural and metropolitan and vice-versa. John Fraser Hart found that "in the United States as a whole one of every seven residents of metropolitan areas in 1990 was classified as rural, and more than two of every five rural Americans lived in a metropolitan area" (1995: 74). The Office of Management and Budget urged scholars and policy-makers to be aware of these distinctions during the development of studies (Miller 2006). Clearly, the establishment of a rural unit of analysis is not easy to sort out, and there is some disagreement among scholars about which measures capture rurality best, but using any of the previously mentioned units provide substantial size and variance for study.

There have been, though, questions raised as to the usefulness of the conception of rural in today's highly mobile and integrated society; basically, the question becomes whether rural communities are distinct from urban and suburban areas because if they are not, then there is not need for specific study of rural communities. Some question whether there are things still to learn from rural communities or if should they be viewed, as Pierce Lewis does, as extensions of urban areas forming "galactic cities?" In other words, are rural communities simply satellite extensions of urban areas? (Lewis 1995). As noted with

Lewis' commentary, the need to legitimize the study of rural politics is of concern. One way to consider the usefulness of the study of rural communities is to do a more comprehensive review of the differences between the various measures of rurality and compare such to suburban and urban areas and how these concepts have changed over time. If it is true, as Lewis suggests, that rural communities are no longer a distinct entity, then there should not be significant differences in economic, social and political characteristics. Chapter three of my dissertation will explore the definitions of urban-suburban-rural, and whether it is important to consider each in evaluating electoral behavior.

Trait Ownership

Somewhat related to the notion of rural versus urban conceptions is the idea that voter decision-making processes are affected by candidate traits. While much of the literature links issue ownership, as related through party identification (Petrocik 1996, Hayes 2005), it may be that one party takes on the representation of rural or urban causes. The theory of trait ownership finds that people "being only minimally attentive to politics [form impressions]…by using information shortcuts to make candidate assessments" (Hayes 2005: 910). If this is true, then, it could be extrapolated, that voters note certain individual traits based upon the personal representation a candidate gives, based out of his or her background. Simply put, are there certain characteristics that voters will give a candidate based upon his or her hometown? And, further, do these characterizations impact candidate success?

Now that we have considered both the non-geographic and the geographic factors related to candidate emergence and success, this knowledge will serve as the foundation

for my theory of how political geography may impact electoral outcomes. Chapter 4 will discuss the research design, while Chapter 5 will evaluate my typology relative to a related theory candidate emergence. Chapter 6 allows us to consider how a new definition of hometown may impact the initial findings, as well as a consideration of the typology on candidate success. Finally, we will consider what lessons can be gained, both in terms of the non-geographic and geographic factors, of candidate emergence and success.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, I will outline the overall research design and discuss my rationale for my measurement determinations. I will also outline the types of data collected, the sources of such, as well as an overview of this data. This will provide readers with an understanding of the basic research design prior to the quantitative analysis occurring in Chapters 5 and 6.

Overall Design

As I briefly outlined in Chapter 1, my research design centers upon the classification of each state as urban, rural, concentrated or dispersed and then a combination of those categories. Before moving onto a discussion of the models I consider, Table 1.1, which shows the basic framework for considering the impact of geography on candidate emergence and success (Table 1.3 outlines how each state fits within this typology). For the candidate emergence considerations, I will replicate the study by Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe (as I will discuss more in Chapter 5) to consider if my framework (urban, rural, concentrated or dispersed) influences the likelihood of candidate emergence (2011). For the candidate success models, I will expand upon their model and consider the likelihood of winning using the typical political behavior measures, such as incumbency and party support, within the framework of my state typology. First, though, one should consider how I determined which states should be defined as rural versus urban and how I made the determination as to the concentrated nature of each state.

Defining Rural and Urban States

As Chapter 3 highlighted, measuring rurality is a difficult exercise. Rurality goes beyond a simple place explanation where one just counts the population and calls it rural or urban. Rurality is relative, which is why I created an index to better capture the rural nature of a state, as is noted in Table 4.1. My index includes the following variables in an attempt to capture both place-based measures (i.e. being isolated) and cultural indicators (i.e. views on gun control and abortion):

1) Number of restrictions on abortion, 2000
2) Conservatism score for the state's House delegation, 2000
3) Percent of state population that is conservative, 2000
4) Percent of households with a gun, 2000
5) Metropolitan Area, %, 2000
6) Public support for gay rights issues (summary of 8 issues), 2000
7) Vote for Bush in 2000
8) Percent Frequent Church Goers, 2000
9) Population per Square Mile, 2000
10) Per Capita Energy Consumed, BTU (1991)

While there is no universal answer for the indicators of rurality, these variables were chosen after a consideration of cultural studies on rurality, including, but not limited to Frank (2004a), Florida (2008), Bishop and Cushing (2008) and Chinni and Gimpel (2010). Gun ownership and religiosity are regularly associated with Republican leaning voters, as is exemplified with books like *Deer Hunting with Jesus: Dispatches from American's Class War* by Joe Bageant (2007). Much like gun ownership and religiosity, strong negative feelings towards gay rights and abortion are noted in conservative leaning states. When considering the overall rurality of a state, one must also consider the overall geography of the state, which is captured with the percent metropolitan, population per square mile and per capita energy consumed.

Cronbach's alpha provides us with the reliability measure for the index and "…is defined as the square of the correlation between the measured scale and the underlying factor" (Weesie 2013). The alpha score is related to the factor analysis of the variables. Ideally, the factor loadings should be equal showing they are holding the same weight on the overall index. When considering Table 1.2, it is noted that the abortion, church attendance, metro area, and percent energy consumed measures have a low item-test correlation. However, because I feel that these measures are necessary to capture rurality and because the alpha measure of reliability is 0.91, I did not drop them from the index. A reliability score of 0.91 is acceptable score (Nunnally and I. H. Bernstein 1994 as cited in Weesie 2013).

Table 4.1 provides the index score for each state, based upon the above listed variables. It shows Rhode Island being the most urban state on the index with a score of -1.61, followed by Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York. Idaho is classified as the most rural with a score of 1.11, followed by Wyoming, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Michigan and Ohio are the two states in the middle of the index. Interestingly, battleground states in presidential elections are found in the middle of the index. The hope is that this index better captures the rural nature of a state and is, at a minimum, a more accurate indicator than simply using population size or distance from a metropolitan area.

Defining Concentrated and Dispersed

A key component is how to delineate the concentration, or urban counties, within states. It is important that this be a relative measure because, clearly, an "urban" county, or rather the concentrated areas, will differ from state to state. For example, urban area in

Montana would not been seen as such in New York because those living in New York have a different standard of evaluation. This, though, does not diminish the relative value of that urban region in Montana; it just means that my measure should account for state-to-state differences.

Given that this analysis will be conducted on the county level, concentrated areas will be defined as counties where least five percent of a state's population resides. This means, for example, that California's urban counties will include Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Santa Clara, San Bernardino, and Riverside, while North Dakota's urban counties include Cass, Burleigh, Grand Forks, and Ward. For a breakdown of county classifications in each state, please consider Table 1.4. Concentration and dispersion measures are essentially the measure as to whether or not the urban, or metropolitan, regions of the state are found within proximity of one another, concentrated, or whether they are scattered across the state, dispersed. These classifications were made through a visual analysis of each state type and the examination of the maps to see where concentrated populations were located in each state.

The Models

Replicating Gimpel, Thorpe and Lee's Model Related to Candidate Emergence

Replication of Gimple, Thorpe and Lee's model of candidate emergence was made easier because their data was shared with me (2011). The first model I ran was a consideration of Gimpel et al.'s model within my state typology: Urban, Rural, Concentrated and Dispersed states. This analysis was performed to see if my predictors of candidate emergence vary by state type. This model is discussed in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 6, I expand Gimpel et al.'s model by including my data. So, while Gimpel et al. only explored elections from 1996-2006, I was able to consider data from 1948-2008.

Models Capturing the Likelihood of Winning

In Chapter 6, I also explore the likelihood of winning by, first, replicating Gimpel et al.'s model, but using the counts of winning candidates as the dependent variable. Moving beyond this examination, I consider winning and losing on the individual level and am able to incorporate the impact of incumbency and party influence. In Chapter 6, I expand the state typology to include not only urban, rural, dispersed, and concentrated classified states, but also urban-concentrated, rural-concentrated, urban-dispersed, and rural-dispersed classified states.

Expectations

State Type Urban expectations: I expect most candidates will come from urban regions and there will be a higher number of non-native candidates. Urban areas hold more financial and political resources, so it is quite logical that more candidates would come from these localities. Metropolitan regions have a more transient population, so it would be logical for non-native candidates to be more successful in these locations than they would be in rural classified states. Also, non-metro rural areas are ignored more in urban and concentrated states, where political power emanates from urban areas.

State Type Rural expectations: I expect that most candidates will come from urban counties, more so than urban classified states. In rural states, the influence of urban areas (political and economic resources) are more acutely noted, thereby increasing the success of urban candidates in these rural states.

State Type Concentrated expectations: I expect that candidates will come from urban regions. In concentrated states, much of the support will be concentrated in one urban area, so separate urban regions will not need to compete over political resources. Thus, logically it would follow that urban areas would likely be more successful.

State Type Dispersed expectations: I expect that most candidates will come from urban counties; although, to a lesser degree than in concentrated states. Again, the power of political resources in urban areas is hard to negate. However, I believe the impact of urban success will be less strong in these state types since there may be some competition between urban regions in dispersed states.

State Type UD expectations: In these states, candidate emergence and success will be more sporadic, in terms of geographic origin; although, since the state is urban, urban based candidates still be highly likely. Because the overall state classification is urban, it less likely that politicians will be able to use the urban personification against the candidate, as is suggested in RD states.

State Type UC expectations: In these states, it is expected that more urban candidates will emerge and be successful. Also, it is expected that there will be a higher frequency of non-native candidates. In these states, much of the economic drive and many political resources are in one regions, which really provides the jumping board for urban candidates.

State Type RD expectations: In these states, it is expected that it would be more difficult for urban-based candidates to emerge and be successful because urban areas would compete against each other to produce statewide candidates. In these states, it is expected that

urbanism will more likely be used against the candidate because the urban regions will be competitive for resources of the state and outstate parties will use this to their advantage. *State Type RC expectations*: In these states, it is expected that most candidates will come from the concentrated urban classified region. Much like UC states, urban candidates will have an advantage over rural candidates; however, I believe this impact will be lessor than UC states due to the overall rural nature of the state itself.

The Data

Sources

Table 4.2 outlines the data sources for this research. Much of my data was derived from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research where I was able to utilize the Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-1990, which provided candidate names, parties, and vote totals for elections from 1948-1990. This was the jumping off point for the data that I personally collected, which included all candidate voting data from 1991 through 2008; there were approximately 1,040 new observations added, producing a total of 3,835 candidates. I also coded the party support variable for all candidates. The party support variable was the vote total for the candidate's party in the previous presidential race measured as a percentage of the total vote. Please see Table 4.3 for variable descriptions.

I considered the home county classification, the county in which candidate spent most of his or her childhood and likely the county that he or she portrayed as his or her hometown, for gubernatorial and U.S. senate candidates for 48 of the U.S. states, from 1948-2008. Alaska and Hawaii will not be included in this analysis due to the unique

geographic and cultural nature of these states. To code the hometown for each candidate, I first had to research the place where the candidate spent most of his or her childhood.[17] I relied heavily on *Biographical Directories of the Governors in the United States* and other online sources, such as newspapers and political biography pages for various candidates. Once I determined the location, I coded it based upon its unique FIPS, Federal Information Processing Standards code. For those candidates not born in the state where they were running, they were coded as "alien" and I associated two unique FIPS codes, one being the place where they were living when they ran (as classified in tables as ADULT) and the place where they were raised (as classified as RAISED). I also coded unknown and non-us native candidates. There were 23 unknowns and 18 non-us candidates. These candidates were coded in the ADULT category, if possible, but were will not be noted in the RAISED data. My geographic considerations will be based around my urban-rural/dispersed-concentrated state typologies; I will be looking for a pattern of success and/or failure. I will only consider those candidates who received at least ten (10) percent of the vote total. I am considering only general election candidates.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 4.3 provides a full listing of the variables utilized in this study. The independent variables for my county level models are: electoral concentration (percentage of population relative to the state), percentage high income relative to the state, percentage self-employed, non-metro counties with fewer than 10,000 people, a state capital control, number of counties per state, number of elections per election period, party

[17] Note that Gimpel, Thorpe, and Lee (2011) coded the candidate's hometown as the county they spent most of their adult life prior to running for office.

support, and percentage black. For the individual data, I added in the following independent variables: incumbency, non-native status, and my rural designation (less than 5% of the state's population). The dependent variables are the count of candidates emerging from a county or the county of winning candidates (collapsed and not collapsed) for both senate and governor races.

Note that there are two broad categories, county level data and individual level data. The county level data, with the exception of party support, was provided by Gimpel et al (2011). The party support variable was pulled and entered directly relying upon David Leip's Atlas of Elections website. Table 4.3 highlights that there is little variation in the independent variables when collapsed by ADULT versus RAISED. While there was consideration to only consider ADULT, and not RAISED, as the correlation between the two measures is .77, I felt it was instructive to consider the impacts of each. Particularly since a RAISED consideration may be relevant in the candidate emergence models. In looking at the data from a RAISED perspective, we are better able to see the counties were candidates are produced (even if they do not run for office in their home county's state). Whereas, I would argue ADULT may be a better model for capturing winning in losing, since it does not place some candidates in states where they did not actually run (it just takes the lead from Gimpel et al. and codes them as where they were living when they ran).

With a better understanding of the variables impacting emergence and success, as well as better understanding of my research design, Chapters 5 and 6 will test my predictions to discover if geography does indeed influence candidate emergence and/or success.

CHAPTER 5

GROWN-UP HOMETOWNS: AN ANALYSIS of GIMPEL, LEE, and THORPE'S MODEL

Geography has been glaringly absent from the study of electoral trends on the statewide level. There have been discussions, in broad sense, about how rural interests versus urban interests influence the overall political structure. However, there has been little consideration of the impact that interstate geography, urban versus rural in a relative sense, has on that state's political outcomes and, consequently, on the national political landscape. This chapter will examine one of the main influential studies that has broached the topic of how a candidate's geographic origins affect voter perceptions and, ultimately, electoral outcomes, Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's piece, "The wellsprings of candidate emergence: Geographic origins of statewide candidacies in the United States" (2011). I will explore the outcomes using their definition of a candidate's hometown as the place where he or she has spent most of one's adult life—grown-up hometowns, if you will—and test whether the findings are affected by running the model in differing state classifications.

In the long search for credible and noteworthy studies related to the study of the impact of political geography on statewide political success, I was most strongly drawn to Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's piece (2011). They find that "… aspirants virtually never emerge directly out of rural areas or small towns. Serious contenders may have some family ties to out-of-the-way places, but they must commonly move to more urban locations to launch successful careers" (Gimpel, et al. 2011: 26). Gimpel and associates define hometown as "… 'home counties' not necessarily as the location of birth or childhood residence…but as the county the candidate resided in and 'called home' during their adult life prior to running for

statewide office" (2011: 28). This very valuable piece provides an excellent foundation for the discussion of geographical impacts on candidate emergence.

It seemed only logical to begin my empirical quest by examining my typology through the lens of Gimpel's model.[18] In the next chapter, I will discuss the implications of how one defines hometown and explore how a new definition influences electoral outcomes. For now, though, I will consider how their results are impacted by simply breaking the data into my typology of Urban versus Rural Dominated States and Concentrated versus Dispersed states. To reiterate, rural versus urban states were chosen based upon the rural index, which is detailed in Chapter 4, but essentially aims at capturing the rurality of a state. Concentration and dispersion measures whether or not the urban, or metropolitan, regions of the state are found within proximity of one another, concentrated, or whether they are scattered across the state, dispersed. One would not expect to find much differentiation in outcomes, if their theory holds true. I believe, though, that the type of state, urban versus rural or dispersed versus concentrated, will impact the emergence of candidates for statewide office. I have outlined my expectations below:

1. Non-Metro Rural (counties with fewer than 10,000 residents): I would expect that candidate emergence from urban counties is much less likely in rural and dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. This hypothesis is based around the dispersion of power in rural and dispersed classified states. In these states, it is less advantageous to claim

[18] This would not have been possible if not for the generosity of Dr. Jim Gimpel, who provided his dataset to me, no questions asked and with no expectations of reciprocity. His words of advice and support are so appreciated.

urban associations or ties. Concentrated power would be noted in urban and concentrated classified states. Gimpel et al. found that, for Senate races, there is a very low likelihood that candidates will emerge from non-metro rural areas. This effect will be weaker in rural and dispersed states. I believe this will be parsed out more clearly when considered in the frame of state classifications.

2. Electoral Concentration (a county's population size relative to the state): I expect there will be more candidates coming from more populated counties in rural states, than for urban states, and for dispersed states than for concentrated states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections; however, I do anticipate that for all state types an increase in population will increase the likelihood of candidate emergence. I believe the impact will be more significant in rural and dispersed classified states because there county size has more of an impact in these types of states. This may be the largest finding from Gimpel et al.'s study; they found that the more electoral population increases, the more likely candidates are to emerge. More specifically, for a one percent increase in relative population size, there was an expected increase of Senate nominees of 36% and a 29% expected increase for gubernatorial candidates.
3. Percent Self-Employed in unincorporated businesses: I would expect that as the percent self-employed increases, there will be an increase in candidates emerging from rural states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections.

This expectation comes out of rural culture that supports small business ownership. I believe for urban and concentrated states, there will be a negative impact of percent self-employed. So, as percent self-employed increases in a county for urban, concentrated and dispersed states, I anticipate that there will be a reduction of candidates emerging from those counties. Gimpel et al.'s findings suggest that political candidates rarely emerge from counties controlled by small businesses. For both races, a one percent increase in the percentage of self-employed (keep in mind population is controlled here) will result in a drop of the expected count of candidates by 8%.

4. State Capital: I would expect that for all state types, being from a state capital would increase the likelihood of candidate emergence. I do believe this impact will be the largest in rural and dispersed states, as state capitals may hold more weight in rural states where there may not be many large urban areas and dispersed states where the capital may hold more relevance. Gimpel et al. found that, while the impact was higher in senatorial races at 391% than for gubernatorial races at 288%, state capitals in either race increases the likelihood of candidate emergence.
5. Percent High Income (percent earning over $150,000 relative to the state average): I would expect that more candidates would come from counties with higher income in urban and concentrated states than for rural and dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. Although, I

> think that there will be a positive impact on all state types because, as much of the political behavior literature highlights, concentrated money equates to political power. Gimpel et al. found that percent high income increases the expected count of candidates for senate and gubernatorial candidates, 27% and 16% respectively, holding all else equal.

In the next chapter, I will more fully consider the impact that various geographical impacts may have within each of these typologies by modeling on the candidate's hometown, as defined by where the candidate spent most of his or her youth, on candidate emergence and—to take that a bit further—candidate success. Let us first explore the impact that the deconstruction of my state typology has on Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's data. If Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's theory holds strong, it should not be impacted by this deconstruction because the typology of a state would not matter.

Findings

I will again briefly summarize the main findings of Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's model.[19] Not surprisingly, they find that both successful and unsuccessful candidates for statewide office disproportionately emerge from the most densely populated areas in their respective states. They find that, for all Senate nominees, a one percent increase in local population of a county increases the number of nominees from that county by 36 percent, while, for gubernatorial nominees, a one percent increase of the relative size increases the number of nominees from that county by 29 percent. As previously outlined, I do not find this

[19] The authors use a negative binomial regression where the dependent variable is the count of Senate or gubernatorial candidates emerging from each of the nation's 3140 counties. The time period considered is 1996 through 2006. The models are estimated using maximum likelihood.

outcome surprising, since it is advantageous for candidates to reside in urban areas, for both economic and political reasons. They also find that candidates emerging from wealthier counties are favored. A 27 percent increase in the count for Senate nominees is related to a one percent rise in the relative wealth of a county; this association is 16 percent for gubernatorial candidates. They find that counties with a high percentage of self-employed businesses are not conducive to increasing the expected counts for either office, suggesting that candidates are reliant on big business support rather than main street economies. Also not surprisingly, a county having the state capital increases the counts for both Senate and gubernatorial candidates. This impact is less impactful for gubernatorial candidates than for those running for Senate; however, it is quite large for both types of races.

Let us now consider the impact of running Gimpel, Lee et al.'s model on my state typology classifications. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the outcomes of running the models on urban versus rural classified states and concentrated versus dispersed states. Gimpel, Lee et al.'s model should be consistent, even if I break the data down into these typologies. To begin, consider the outcomes if we run the models on urban and rural states. For a refresher of the state classifications, please consider Table 1.3, State-by-State Categorization. There are a total of 22 urban states and 26 rural states.

In both instances, senate and gubernatorial elections, there are some noteworthy outcomes when broken down by urban and rural state classification. I think the first, and the most significant consideration, is the big variation between the outcomes of Gimpel, Lee et al. and urban/rural states models in the rural non-metro location and electoral

concentration variables. There is also some variation for percent self-employed, the state capital control, and percent high income. This holds true for both senate and gubernatorial considerations. Please note that for all of these models, we are controlling for relative population size. This control allows for a closer examination of the actual impacts that rural versus urban locations may have in this case.

To begin, let us consider the impact of rural non-metro locations on candidate emergence. For urban states, the impact of non-metro rural areas is stronger than when considering all states whereas the impact of non-metro areas is less impactful for rural states. Relative to senate nominees, Gimpel et al. found that candidate emergence is about 90 percent lower in rural locations than in urban areas, whereas this finding is 100 percent lower for urban-classified states and 88 percent lower for rural states. Simply put, for senate races, candidate emergence from rural areas is more likely in rural than urban classified states; although, it should be noted that for both urban and rural states candidate emergence is less likely to occur in rural than urban areas. For urban states, there are essentially no candidates emerging from rural areas. This is unsurprising based upon the way Gimpel and associates coded the locations of candidates; however, it is interesting that, even with this classification, we find differences between urban and rural states. While there are a handful of states, such as Connecticut, where the majority or all (as in the case of Rhode Island) of the counties are urban classified, in most states there are less urban than rural classified counties. Again, an urban classified county, for the purposes of this study, is a county with at least five percent of the state's total population. With this in mind, please reconsider Figures 1.1. and 1.2, which highlight urban and rural classified

states and the urban classified counties therein. It is noted that these urban classified areas are, for the most part, a very small part of the overall landscape of most states. Consider that, the results related to non-metro location, indicate that candidates will likely only emerge from those few urban classified counties, leaving large parts of the state where candidates seemingly have no hope of emerging.

This impact is also noted in urban-classified states relative to gubernatorial nominees. Gimpel and associates found no impact on candidate emergence relative to rural locations in their model, whereas when the model is reconsidered on urban states, the finding is that candidate emergence from rural areas is 100 percent less than for urban areas (it is predicted that no candidates would emerge from non-metro counties in urban classified states); for rural states this variable has no impact on candidate emergence. Thus, in gubernatorial races, it holds that more candidates will emerge from urban areas in urban states; this finding, though, is not noted in rural classified states.

When considering the impact of non-metro locations on senate nominees for concentrated versus dispersed classified states, an impact is noted only in dispersed states. As a reminder, concentration versus dispersion measures are essentially the measure as to whether or not the urban, or metropolitan, regions of the state are found within proximity of one another, concentrated, or whether they are scattered across the state, dispersed. In dispersed states, senate candidate emergence is 92% less in rural classified counties. This variable has no impact on gubernatorial candidate emergence.

Moving onto a consideration of the impact of electoral concentration measured as a county's percentage of the state's total population on candidate emergence, holding all else

constant. It should be noted that any impacts on urban classified states will not matter because, as was previously discussed, in these states, there is no chance for a candidate to emerge from a rural county. Thus, electoral concentration would not matter as much in those states. Electoral concentration discussions are only relevant in discussions related to rural, dispersed and concentrated states. This relationship is noted in the consideration of Figures 5.1[20] and 5.2, where the probability of zero candidates emerging is essentially a horizontal curve at 100% in both senate and gubernatorial races in urban classified states. These figures really show that increases in county population have more of an impact in rural dominated and dispersed states than in urban dominated and concentrated states.

There is some variance of the impact of electoral concentration in the other state types, though.[21] First, in rural classified states, given a one percent increase in local population as a percent of state population, the count of nominees increases 57%, for concentrated states this increase is 22% and dispersed states it is 53%, holding all else constant. For gubernatorial nominees, breaking it down by state type, the count of nominees for rural classified states the increase is 44% for a one percent increase in electoral concentration, for concentrated states it is 18% and dispersed states it is 42%, holding all else constant. For urban classified states, as the population increases from the 1st percentile to the 99th percentile, the expected probability of no candidate emerging decreases from .96 to .81 (again, a moot discussion as noted in the statement regarding the

[20] I was unable to include urban states in my graph for senatorial data because there are not enough observations; however, the expected outcomes are nearly identical to concentrated states; please refer to Table 1.3, which shows a coefficient for urban states at .21 and concentrated states at .20, both with .05 significance level.

[21] Overall, for senate nominees, Gimpel et al. found for a one percent increase in local population as a percent of state population, the count of nominees increases by 36% and 29% for gubernatorial races, holding all else constant

impact noted in the non-metro variable); for rural states this decrease is from .96 to .61; for concentrated states this decrease is from .96 to .87 and for dispersed states this .96 to .63. In rural states there are more counties (2,266) versus urban states (844).[22] When looking at the gubernatorial data, candidates in rural states come from 461 counties versus 218 counties in urban states. In the senatorial data, candidates in rural states come from 427 counties versus 224 counties in urban states. What these descriptive statistics imply is that in rural states, candidates come from a larger and more diverse set of counties than in urban states. An important take away from this discussion is that, in rural and dispersed states, electoral concentration is more important than in urban and concentrated states because urban classified counties in rural and dispersed states are not the only option for candidate emergence.

In terms of the measure of percent self-employed, a measure of local economic resources, Gimpel et al. expected that the rate of candidate emergence would be smaller in cities where small business are more pivotal to the local economy. In both senatorial and gubernatorial, a one percent increase in the percentage of self-employed businesses drops the expected count of candidates by 8% in Gimpel et al.'s model. When breaking this variable down by my topology, it is noted that, for senate nominees, in urban states, there is an 11% drop in expected count of candidates, and in concentrated states, a 17% drop. There was no impact found in rural or dispersed states. For gubernatorial nominees, there is no impact on urban states. For rural states the outcome is identical to Gimpel et al.'s finding of an 8% drop, while there is a 15% drop for concentrated states.

[22] Please note that the sum of rural and urban states does not add to 3140, the number of US counties. This is due to the exclusion of Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington DC.

Finally, for senatorial nominees under Gimpel et al.'s model, if a county is state capital, we expect there to be a 391% increase in the count of nominees over all other locations. For urban states this increase is lower at 297%, for rural states 289%, and for concentrated states 258%. The only state type that had a large impact on count due to state capital impact was dispersed states at 410%. For gubernatorial nominees under Gimpel et al.'s model, if a county is state capital, we expect there to be a 288% increase in the count of nominees over all other locations. For urban states, this increase is lower at 238%, for rural states 208%, and for concentrated states 198%. The only state type that had a large impact on count due to state capital impact were dispersed states at 357%.

Finally, there are some nuanced findings when considering the percent high income (percent earning more than $150,000 relative to state average). For Gimpel and associate's model, we see that for Senate races, a one percent rise in relative wealth is associated with a 27% increase in the count of Senate nominees, all else being equal; the increase is 16% for gubernatorial nominees. It should be noted that all of the state typologies do hold significance in the variable and most impacts are quite similar to GImpel et al.'s initial finding; however, I do see a 6% drop (21%) for Senate nominees in concentrated states and a 3% drop (13%) in gubernatorial nominees in rural states.

Discussion of Findings

To begin, overall, I did find that there are differences in outcomes when Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's data is deconstructed by my state typology. Generally, this indicates that statewide geography does influence candidate emergence. Let us consider these impacts in the framework my previously outlined expectations.

First, I expected that, for urban and concentrated states, candidate emergence from non-metro locations to be less likely than for rural and dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. My expectation that candidate emergence from rural areas would be less likely in urban classified states over rural and dispersed classified states holds true for senatorial and gubernatorial nominees. While the likelihood of candidate emergence is less likely in rural areas than metro areas for all state typologies for senatorial nominees, for urban states the impact is greater. This impact in urban states is also 10% greater in urban states than in Gimpel et al.'s model (-90%). Thus, for senatorial nominees, it is difficult for any candidate to springboard from any rural region, but is basically impossible in urban classified states. This impact is even more notable in the gubernatorial comparison, where the only impact is noted for urban classified states at -100%. So, for gubernatorial nominees, in urban classified states, you are 100% less likely to emerge from a rural area than an urban area meaning that candidates simply do not come from rural counties. There is no impact for gubernatorial nominees in my other classifications or in Gimpel et al.'s model. It is truly remarkable that we see, especially for Senate candidate emergence, very few candidates coming out of rural areas, especially in urban classified states. The impact is less for gubernatorial candidate emergence, where the impact is only noted in urban classified states.

I do not find the difference between senate and gubernatorial nominees' emergence from non-metro counties surprising. The senate position is more removed from the voters than that of the governor, so voters may not put as much emphasis on the value of rural

versus urban context, or, conversely, the internal thresholds for making it to this level of office may be more closely tied to internal partisanship rather than electoral considerations.

Moving onto the consideration of concentrated versus dispersed states, please note that all typologies relative to the non-metro location drop significance meaning there is no impact with the exception of dispersed states for senate nominees. In that case, candidate emergence is 92 percent lower in rural locations than in urban locations. It is quite interesting that emergence from a rural location has an impact in dispersed states for senatorial nominees. While rural emergence does not have an impact in concentrated states for Senate nominees, there is an impact in dispersed states. This may indicate that in large statewide races where the votes will be split across the state (think Missouri's Kansas City and St. Louis split), there is no room on the ballot to include candidates from rural areas because they need to foster the local base. It is very interesting to note rural emergence does not negatively or positively influence gubernatorial nominees, as the variable falls from significance for all, but urban states. It seems that, overall, if one was a rural based nominee, one would be better off running in a gubernatorial rather than a Senate race (with the exception of urban classified states, which in both cases it is highly disadvantageous for rural candidates).

The next consideration is electoral concentration, where I expected more candidates to come from more populated counties in rural and dispersed states than for urban or concentrated states for both election types. Relative to Gimpel et al.'s finding of 36% increase in senatorial candidate emergence, we see a drop of 13% (23% actual) for urban states and 14% (22% actual) for concentrated states and an increase of 21 points (57%

actual) for rural states and 17 point increase (53% actual) for dispersed states. The findings are as expected; electoral concentration matters more in rural and dispersed states because in those states the possibility for emergence from both rural and urban counties exists. Senatorial candidates emerge at higher levels in rural and dispersed states. This finding is less pronounced, but similar in fashion when considering the gubernatorial candidate emergence. It is evidence that electoral concentration will increase the likelihood of candidate emergence, especially so in rural and dispersed states. This may mean that candidates need to gravitate to more populous areas in rural and dispersed states, whereas it is less necessary in urban and concentrated states. Alternatively, it could just be a function of the way the authors characterized the candidates' hometown classification.

The next consideration is the percent self-employed, where I expected that as the percent self-employee increases, there will be an increase in candidates emerging from rural and dispersed states for both types of elections. For senate emergence, the only state types where this variable had an impact were urban states and concentrated states, where we see that as the percent self-employee increases the likelihood for candidate emergences decreases, by 11% and 17% respectively. For gubernatorial races, we see that the impact is only found in rural and concentrated states, a drop of 8% and 15% respectively. This seems to indicate that in the cases where self-employed does have an impact, it depresses the number of candidates emerging. This seems to highlight the impact that large business may have over candidate selection and grooming, especially in senate nominees. This is not indicative of good things for small business political clout. Is this because in places where

small businesses are the majority are not able to unify behind candidates or such places are not concerned with statewide or national politics? Or something else?

I expected that for all state types being from a state capital would increase the likelihood of candidate emergence. This seemed like no brainer, especially considering the way the hometowns of these candidates were classified. I though this impact would be greatest in rural and dispersed states, as state capitals may hold more weight where there may not be large urban areas and in dispersed states where the state capital may hold more relevance. Interestingly, the impact of the state capital is most pronounced in dispersed states for both election types. This may indicate that in places were the population is dispersed, voters more heavily rely upon the political capital gained through resources in the state capital.

Finally, I expected that more nominees would come from counties with higher income in urban and concentrated states for both election types. While the impact overall is greater for senatorial than gubernatorial elections, in that increased income has a greater impact in the former than the latter, there is little variation between the state types other than a slight drop in nominees for concentrated senate (6% drop from Gimpel et al.'s finding of 27%) rural gubernatorial (3% drop from Gimpel et al.'s finding of 16%). We see that relative wealth impacts all senate races more so than gubernatorial. Wealth has the least impact on rural state gubernatorial races.

I would like to add one comment regarding my expectations versus the actual outcomes. Again, I would like to emphasize that the way the candidate's hometown was coded may matter. As we will see in the next chapter, outcomes differ when the hometown

of the candidate is driven by where he or she spent most of his or her childhood, rather than where he or she spent most of their adult life prior to running for office. The outcomes discussed in this chapter may not fully account for and measure public perceptions of the candidate's origin. Let us move onto Chapter 6, where I will evaluate the impact of classifying candidates on their hometown, as defined as where they spent most of their childhood on candidate success. Once we have these findings, it would be fruitful to make a comparison to this chapter's findings on candidate emergence. Does it truly hold that definitions do matter?

CHAPTER 6

CHILDHOOD HOMETOWNS: DOES THE DEFINITON OF HOMETOWN MATTER?

Accurately measuring the impact of a candidate's background, in terms of geography, may depend upon how one defines this variable. This chapter will explore if the construction of a candidate's origin matters. I will explore if my definition of hometown, the county where the candidate spent most of his or her childhood, modifies initial findings about the predictions if candidate origins influence electoral success or failure. Simply put, can a candidate's hometown increase his or her likelihood of being elected? If so, is it affected by the geographical context of the state the candidate is running in?

Often it is difficult to define where a candidate is from, or rather the place she identifies as her hometown. To my knowledge, there is no national study asking candidates the place they consider as their hometown, so there is no consensus on the "correct" way to define hometown. In Chapter 5, I explored the impact that breaking down Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's model by my state typology of urban versus rural dominated states and concentrated versus dispersed states has on candidate emergence. Again, please note the distinction between my data and Gimpel et al. (2011) is that they defined hometown as the county the candidate lived for most of his or her adult life. Some interesting findings resulted. First, candidate emergence is less likely in rural areas for all state types in senatorial races, especially for urban classified states. This impact was also noted for gubernatorial nominees in urban classified states. In sum, if one was a rural based nominee, one would be more likely to run running in a gubernatorial rather than a Senate race (with the exception of urban classified states, which in both cases it is highly

disadvantageous for rural candidates). With regard to electoral concentration, more candidates emerged from populated counties in rural and dispersed states than in urban and concentrated states; although, it should be noted that electoral concentration will increase the likelihood for candidate emergence in all state types. Generally speaking, the percent self-employed (when significant) depresses the number of candidates that emerge. Coming from a state capital does increase candidate emergence, especially in dispersed states, and wealthier counties produce more candidates in all state types.

While Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's treatment of the candidate's hometown is different than mine, their definition does not diminish the advantages of place that they discuss (2011: 27); in many ways our models are similar. I agree that campaign donors are highly concentrated within wealthy, urban areas and that it does help if you can get to know these donors by, say, living amongst them. I concur that much of the local media is centralized in city locations and that much of the coverage targets those in close proximity. With all of these premises, I find no fault. In fact, I find no error in the argument that many—no, most—candidates live in urban areas. Gimpel et al. did indeed highlight this in their article (2011). What I do find fault with is their notion that 1) candidates rarely come from rural areas and 2) that the voters are more likely to trust those living close to them, in urban areas, leading to an ill-informed conclusion that they do not trust rural-born candidates.

Further, I find Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's explanation of the "favorite-son" effect to be disingenuous and not the intent of the actual creators of the term (see also Gimpel, et al. 2008). They seem to tie electoral support strictly based upon the proximity of where the candidates currently reside, with no consideration to the background of the candidate. I

find that the creators "favorite-son," also known as the "hometown boy," definition tied the bump in electoral outcomes to the actual distance they are from where the candidate was from, not where the candidate currently lives.

The creator of the localism, as known as, friends-and-neighbors, V.O. Key, Jr., in his groundbreaking piece, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, at times defines the home county as where the candidate was raised and where the candidate currently lives. In some discussions, he only considers were the candidate's home county, without a clear explanation if that means where the candidate was raised or where he currently lives or both (2006 [Sixth Printing]). This concept was later expanded upon by Black and Black (1973), Kjar and Laband (2002), Rice and Macht (1987), and Tatalovich (1975).

Black and Black (1973) found support in the candidate's home and surrounding counties is beyond what would be expected just considering race and occupation, supporting the notion that the candidate's shared locality did impact voter preference. In this study, Black and Black were considering the friends and neighbors impact of George Wallace's origin from Barbour County, Alabama. I would like to clarify that this measure captured where Wallace was born and raised, not a county where Wallace may have later lived (Black and Black 1973). Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe do not clarify that their definition is not in line with the original definition because they classify locality as the county where they lived longest as adults.

Further, another of the studies cited by Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe is that of Kjar and Laband (2002). In Kjar and Laband, the candidates used to highlight the friends and neighbor effect include Bob Riley of Clay County, Alabama and Joe Turnham of Lee County,

Alabama (2002). Please note that both candidates were born and raised in these respective counties. Also, in Rice and Macht hometown considerations were defined as, "the county that the candidate was born and raised in, or otherwise calls 'home" (1987: 449). Tatalovich defines the candidate's local county as where he or she lives; however, he does not touch upon whether or not this is the candidate's actual hometown county, as in where the candidate grew up. The time period analyzed is 1943-1973 and the author is considering the implications of Black and Black's discussion of Wallace, so there may have been an assumption that the hometown is the same as the current county in which the candidate resides (Black and Black 1973; Tatalovich 1975). It cannot be confirmed, though, since the author never clarified his reasoning. Based upon these considerations, using the term "favorite son," as link to where the candidate may currently reside, not taking into account his hometown roots, does not accurately capture the historical development of the term and, I would argue, is a misrepresentation of the term itself.[23] In order to conceive of a new conceptualization of what the context of friends and neighbors, an explanation of why the old definitions are no longer relevant is needed.

I do concur with Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe that hometown advantage is a "personal vote" for many; however, I see it differently than they do (2011: 27). For example, it is personal insofar as the voters' values make it personal. It is personal to the voter that the candidate was raised in a farming community, where trust and honesty are the

[23] Gimpel, Karnes et al. also modify the term "Friends and Neighbors" in their 2008 article. In this article, they also define hometown as where the candidate spent much of his or her adult life. This, in my opinion, does not truly represent the historical development of the term. The authors do not provide foundation for the reader, as to why the shift in definitions was warranted or how it may impact the relationship to the previous "Favorite-Son" considerations (2008).

cornerstones. You rarely hear from a candidate that he or she lives in an expansive suburban home because this would not make things personal to many voters. What makes things personal is the foundation from which these candidates emerge. Many voters themselves came from outlying areas, or have ties to those idealized spaces, so they can make a connection with rural born candidates. In states with large numbers of immigrants and migrant populations, it would not be considered a fault for a candidate to be a transplant (from another state) or even fault her from emerging from the urban core. It would make sense that, in these urbanized states, there is an increased return from the long-lasting relationships built in during their youth. It would seem such networks would be strengthened by living and working in the urban centers for longer periods of time. I do agree with Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's statement, "Barriers to political ammunition are rooted in the geographic and social milieu of rural areas." However, I disagree with the proceeding sentence that "Given the relative disadvantages they face, we should expect disproportionately few nominees for major statewide offices to originate straightaway from the more remote reaches of the state" (2011: 27). Yes, I could understand that a candidate living and working outside of a state's urban core would make things more difficult, in terms of garnering political capital. I do not, though, associate this disadvantage with the individual being raised outside the city, namely in states were rural values are cherished. In states where "ruralness" is not valued, it may actually harm a candidate to be from a rural area. I would argue, though, that devaluation is not due to the lack of resources, but, rather, a conflict of values.

Gimpel et al. discuss the negative stereotyping of rural populations that work against candidates. They discuss the literature, which highlights rural citizens as being "…not only viewed as unsophisticated and provincial, but unintelligent" (2011: 27). The authors agree with the idea that a "pro-urban bias has become the objective norm, an invisible preference, which relegates rural dwellers to a second-class status" (Gimpel, et al. 2011: 28). I disagree with their assessment, in part. Yes, I concur that there are a great many voters holding pro-urban biases, but I argue there are many voters who have a pro-rural bias believing rural people are humble, reverent, loyal, and hardworking (Frank 2004a: 20-7).

Katherine Cramer Walsh puts a new spin on the source of seeming biases in voters by considering the impact of group consciousness (2012). She ties the set of ideas held by the type of geographic place one is from (in this case rural areas) to their shared beliefs and the biases against political elites in urban areas. To summarize, she found that "…identification as a rural resident was more than a geographic reference for many…It was imbued with perceptions of inequalities of power, differences in values and also inequalities of resources" (Walsh 2012: 522). This study attempts to uncover how Walsh's "rural consciousness" may impact electoral outcomes. In my view, rurality will not someday be extinct because rural identification matters. As Walsh highlights, those places that are less urban and now considered rural from a relative standpoint, create a collective identification that has political implications. Rurality, or at least the perception of such, is here to stay, as are the collective biases resulting from this rural consciousness.

I argue these underlying biases ultimately influence the way candidates sell themselves and the way that voters cast votes. This is an important distinction from Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe (2011) because they do not take into account the impact that hometown roots may have on electoral outcomes, nor do they try to capture rural identity in any other fashion. The way they frame their study automatically dismisses any causation that one's hometown may have on his or her electoral success.

While I do agree that it seems logical for candidates to move to urban centers, as do many Americans (Jacobs 1969, 1984, Bishop and Cushing 2008, Florida 2008, Lambert March 26, 2012, Toppo March 27, 2014), because that is where jobs and opportunities may lie, it does not mean that these candidates are "from" those urban areas. For those who have watched a campaign commercial in Missouri recently, it is clear candidates, at least from a state like Missouri, do not campaign on their "urbanism." Actually, it is quite the opposite. Most commercials are filmed in front of barns, with picturesque scans of cattle grazing in rolling fields in the background; these shots clearly identify the candidate's rural roots. On initial review, it would seem that Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's perceptions related to candidate success and statewide political geography are polar opposite to my theory; such a conclusion is unfair on its premise (2011). Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe simply choose to define their model in a different manner. As previously discussed, they categorized the candidates based upon where they were currently living versus where they grew up. This may be a small distinction for many; however, I argue this is an undeniable facet of the urban-rural divide. I would further suggest that viewpoint is not lost upon political consultants across the country.

My purpose here is to test their presumptions and provide (or attempt to do so) empirical evidence that geographically tied roots matter. Roots, whether urban or rural, provide the basis for many campaign slogans and networking connections. Electoral success is not random, but has been fine-tuned by political parties and machines over time. In my view, academics have yet to fully appreciate the impact that rural versus urban politics may have on statewide electoral success. Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's presumptions in their article highlight the misconstruction of the rural-urban divide that is often portrayed within the discipline. I argue that definitions do matter. It does matter where you were raised and the geographical context of the state does matter; grown-up hometowns are an oxymoron. For most Americans, hometowns are the place from which they associate their childhood, not their adulthood. These foundations are the framework by which candidates connect with voters.

In this chapter, I will examine Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's (2011) findings by evaluating whether their conclusions hold when placed in my framework, urban versus rural and concentrated versus dispersed, and when modifying the data on a candidate's hometown. I will consider the outcomes of candidate emergence when hometown is defined as where the candidate spent most of his or her childhood, rather than where one spent most of his or her adult life (Gimpel et al.'s definition). Quickly, to recap, rural and urban states were coded based upon the rurality index, as is outlined in Table 4.1, an attempt at capturing the overall culture of the state, that I created (please reference Chapter 4). Concentrated states were those states where counties with over 5% of the population, urban counties, cluster together, where in dispersed states these urban counties were scattered across the state

(again, please consider Figures 1.1 and 1.2). I will also consider whether the candidate's hometown affects his or likelihood of winning, within the context of my framework and how this may be influenced by the coding of hometown.

Testing the New Definition of Hometown on Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's Model

After examining the impact of emergence using Gimpel et al.'s general framework, I will consider the likelihood of winning or losing within the context of my typology of states, as is noted in Table 1.1. Simply, what impact does breaking the data down by state type, urban concentrated, urban dispersed, rural concentrated or rural dispersed have on the predictors of success?

ADULT versus RAISED

Before moving onto a discussion of the findings using Gimpel et al.'s model with my data where hometown is where the candidate live the majority of his or her childhood, I must first clarify a couple of issues pertaining to the coding of the candidate's hometown. As you will note when you begin to consider the findings, there are two classifications for the candidate's hometown, ADULT[24] and RAISED. The central reasoning behind the need for two separate classifications is the "alien" candidate, more specifically those candidates who were not raised in the state in which they are running for election. The models labeled ADULT classifies these candidates' hometown as where they were living when they ran; one should note this is the way that Gimpel et al. coded all of their candidates. All other "non-

[24] Both ADULT and RAISED classifications are based upon the candidate's FIPS code. FIPS is the accepted abbreviation for Federal Information Processing Standards, which provides a unique code for states and counties. For example the FIPS code for Cook County, IL is 17031, the state FIPS being 17 and the county FIPS being 031.

alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood.

The RAISED classification somewhat spins the ADULT classification on its head. It codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification. Coding RAISED in this manner will really capture from which counties candidates emerge. For example, in New York County (Manhattan borough only), we see that there are 62 candidates, of which 39 are "aliens." Keep in mind that this does include incumbents, meaning there will be duplications, but it does highlight that New York City is a hotbed for candidate emergence and just for the state of New York. In the forthcoming discussion, I will be comparing outcomes based upon both ADULT and RAISED. Please note that the correlation between the coding of home county, ADULT and RAISED, is .77, enough of a difference to justify a closer examination.

Tables 6.1a and 6.1b provide an overview of the number of "alien" candidates, those candidates that are non-native to the state, by state type, by ADULT and RAISED, and by senatorial and gubernatorial elections. The tables also include winning percentage of alien candidates for each state type. To begin, for both election types and for both classification scheme for home county, the lowest number of total candidates emerge from rural concentrated states, while the highest numbers come from urban concentrated states. In general terms, there are more "alien" candidates emerging from urban than rural states and from concentrated than dispersed states. Tables 6.2a and 6.2b also show the breakdown of

the number of alien candidates as a percentage of all candidates. In rural concentrated states, only two percent of all candidates are "aliens" for both types of elections, indicating that it is very unlikely that non-native candidates state will run in that state type.

These tables make it quite clear that, in both senatorial and gubernatorial elections, "alien" candidates are more likely in urban than rural states and in concentrated than dispersed states. It is notable that in both of the races, nearly 30% of candidates in urban states are "alien" candidates, whereas the average is closer to 14% for rural classified states. Overall, though, when you consider "alien" candidates in the context of all candidates, the highest percentage is urban states at 14%. Simply put, we see more non-native candidates in urban classified states than in the other state types. In terms of the state types where "alien" candidates are more likely to win, we see that, generally speaking, RAISED candidates are more likely to win in senate elections and ADULT candidates are more likely to win in gubernatorial elections. When comparing apples to apples, or rather, ADULT to ADULT models, we see that non-native candidates are more likely to win in gubernatorial races than senate races (Tables 6.1a and 6.1b). A comparison of RAISED models, we see that "alien" candidates are more likely to win urban dispersed gubernatorial races and rural concentrated senatorial races. It would be instructive for future studies to consider the context, which allow for and/or develop "alien" or, rather, non-state native candidates.

Candidate Emergence Findings using ADULT and RAISED on Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe's Model, 1948-2008

Non-metro rural. Consider Tables 6.3-6.6 to explore the differences in outcomes overall between Gimpel et al.'s model and my two models, using ADULT and RAISED to code

hometowns. First, let us consider the impact of candidate emergence from non-metro locations from 1948-2008. I hypothesized that candidate emergence from rural counties would be much less likely in urban and concentrated states than for rural and dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. For gubernatorial emergence, the only state type holding any significance is urban states using the RAISED coding. In urban states, using the location where all candidates were raised, we expect that, if the county is rural, holding all else constant, there will be a 64% drop in candidate emergence. Compare this to Gimpel et al.'s overall model, which predicted a 90% drop and his model for urban states a 100% drop in emergence if the county is rural. It is interesting to note that using a new definition of hometown causes this variable to drop in significance for all other state types in gubernatorial races. This would make sense, as more of the candidates would be coded outside major metropolitan areas whereas in Gimpel et al.'s model where they were currently living and running for office. A consideration of the data shows that there is a larger distribution of the data in the RAISED model versus the ADULT model. For gubernatorial races, there are 681 counties producing candidates in the RAISED model versus 630 in the ADULT, and 654 and 610 respectively for the senatorial races. Using this new definition of hometown seems to indicate that rurality is less of a detriment to emergence than originally predicted by Gimpel et al.

The story is a bit more complex when one considers the variances in models related to candidates emerging from rural counties in senatorial races. Be reminded that when Gimpel et al.'s model is not deconstructed by my state typology, the non-metro rural variable is not significant. When I broke his model down by my typology, emergence was

expected to decrease 100% for urban classified states, 88% for rural classified states, and 92% for dispersed states if the county was rural (Tables 6.3 and 6.5). There was no significance on this variable for concentrated classified states. Considering Table 6.3, please note that the overall model for RAISED, there is no significance in this variable and we only see significance in urban states were we expect candidate emergence to drop 56% from rural counties in urban classified states. For the ADULT model overall, we do see significance; there is a 35% decrease in the likelihood of candidate emergence from rural counties for all states. For urban states, it is a 57% expected decrease; for rural states a 31% decrease; and for dispersed, a 36% decrease using the ADULT data for senatorial candidate emergence. Again, as with Gimpel's data, there is no significance on this variable for concentrated classified states.

To reiterate, I hypothesized that candidate emergence from rural counties would be much less likely in urban and concentrated states than for rural and dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. For gubernatorial elections, as is noted in Table 6.4, the only significant state type is urban classified using ADULT coding. Otherwise, coming from a rural county holds no significance one way or the other. In senatorial races, it is noted that coming from a rural county does negatively impact emergence for urban, rural, and dispersed state types using ADULT coding. The impact is more notable for urban states than for rural or dispersed states. For the senatorial RAISED coding, like the gubernatorial candidate emergence, only urban states hold significance. This is quite instructive when one considers that, when you consider where all candidates were actually raised, which would remove some of the skew that is inevitable with the ADULT coding due

to candidates living in state capitals or urban areas, for three of the state types non-metro locations now do not hold significance. Thus, a major take away is that, growing up in a rural area (RAISED coding) is not a negative predictor for candidate emergence in most state types, urban states being the exception.

Electoral concentration. Moving onto the consideration of electoral concentration, there are not any huge differences when comparing the results of Gimpel et al.'s models and my ADULT and RAISED models. The results do indicate a slightly larger impact on candidate emergence from populous counties in both the overall ADULT and RAISED models at 48% and 46% respectively, when compared to Gimpel et al.'s overall model's result of 29%. It is worth noting that for all categories there is significance in a positive direction. So, simply put, no matter how you slice it, the more populous the county, the more candidates one would expect to emerge.

Further, we see that the alpha coefficient is higher in my models versus Gimpel's models, indicating that there is more overdispersion in my models. This makes sense given that I have more data points than Gimpel et al. and given that I coded the hometown of individuals, whereas Gimpel et al. coded where they were currently living. This means there is more variance in my models than in their models; so, in other words, there are more counties considered (less zeros) in my models than theirs. In Gimpel et al.'s senate model, there were only 203 counties were candidates emerged. In my senate models, there were 654 (RAISED) and 610 (ADULT). In Gimpel et al.'s gubernatorial model, there were only 187 counties were candidates emerged, as compared to 681 counties total in my RAISED model and 630 in my ADULT model. Please note that the time period, 1948-2008, for my data is

much more extensive than theirs, 1996-2006, which would explain some of the variance between the alpha coefficients; however, I think much of the difference is due to coding.

Percent self-employed. For the next variable, percent employed in unincorporated business, I expect that as the percent self-employed increases, there will be an increase in candidates emerging from rural states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. Gimpel et al.'s data showed that as this variable increased by one percent, we could expect a drop in candidate emergence, for both senatorial and gubernatorial races, of 8%. For senate races, the overall models for both ADULT and RAISED, lost significance; although, there was significance for urban and concentrated states for both ADULT and RAISED models. There was no significance for rural or dispersed states of any senatorial model. While the impact is negative for these models, it is less impactful for the ADULT data than for Gimpel et al.'s or for the RAISED model. It is interesting that rural and dispersed hold no significance in the senatorial race, which may indicate small businesses hold more political influence in these state types, or at a minimum are not a determent to candidate emergence. Alternatively, it may imply that strong senatorial candidates can be developed in places where small businesses thrive in rural and dispersed state types.

Percent high-income. In considering impact of percent high income (relative to the state average), I would expect that more candidates would come from counties with higher income in urban and concentrated states than for rural and dispersed states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. Although, I think that there will be a positive impact on all state types because, as much of the political behavior literature highlights, concentrated money equates to political power. There are some interesting findings,

especially with regard to gubernatorial candidate emergence, here. In the overall models, those not broken down by typology, we see that Gimpel et al.'s model predicts a one percent rise in relative wealth is associated with a 27% increase in the count of Senate nominees, holding all else equal, while the RAISED model predicts a 9% increase and the ADULT model a 6% increase. This is quite a significant drop from Gimpel et al.'s estimate. Further, when I broke Gimpel et al.'s data down into my state typology for gubernatorial elections all state types were significant. As we would expect, as it has certainly been shown repeatedly, money equals political power. When using the ADULT and RAISED data, though, significance drops for rural states in both cases and concentrated states for RAISED and dispersed states ADULT. This seems to indicate that, in those state types, money may not equal political power, at least in terms of grooming and producing candidates.

In considering the senatorial emergence and percent high income, Gimpel et al.'s estimate is less divergent from the ADULT and RAISED estimates (16%, 10% and 11% respectively). Unlike the gubernatorial models where nearly half lacked significance, we see that all but one (Concentrated-ADULT) are positively significant. There is quite a range on the predicted impact of percent high income on the expected count of emerging candidates, holding all else constant. On one extreme, you have concentrated states using RAISED at 7% expected increase and at the other extreme, there is Gimpel et al.'s rural states at 28% expected increase. Overall, though, the ADULT and RAISED estimates are lower than Gimpel et al. This again highlights that the measure of hometown used by Gimpel et al. may be exaggerating the influence of wealthy areas on the courting and grooming of homegrown candidates.

State capital. In the last chapter, it was quite clear that being from a state capital greatly supports candidate emergence, which is what I expected. While this trend continued with both the ADULT and RAISED models, the impact was to a lesser degree, especially for senatorial races. Overall, in both races using the RAISED data, the impact of being from a state capital was less impactful. This does seem quite logical since both the ADULT data and Gimpel's data would likely have larger numbers of candidates residing in state capitals, whereas the RAISED data is indicative where the candidate was raised (less likely to be a state capital).

Lessons on Candidate Emergence

Before moving onto my discussion of how one's hometown may impact the likelihood of winning or losing in the context of my typology, what are the main lessons learned regarding candidate emergence using Gimpel et al.'s model on my definition of hometown?

- "Alien," non-native to the state candidates, are more likely to emerge in urban than rural states and in concentrated than dispersed states. In both senatorial and gubernatorial races, nearly 30% of urban candidates of urban states are "alien" candidates, whereas the average is closer to 14% for rural classified states. Using the RAISED model, "Alien" are more likely to win in senate elections and, in the ADULT model, candidates are more likely to win in gubernatorial elections. When comparing the ADULT models, we see that non-native candidates are more likely to win in gubernatorial races than senate races. A comparison of the RAISED models, we see that "alien" candidates are more

likely to win urban dispersed gubernatorial races and rural concentrated senatorial races.

- Coding matters because the examination of childhood hometowns reveals a wider distribution of candidate origins. While my data did cover a longer time period, the difference in the number of counties candidates emerged based upon the coding of hometown was quite notable. The suspicion that Gimpel et al.'s coding would be more concentrated was validated.
- Non-metropolitan area candidate emergence is unlikely in urban classified states where, for rural classified counties, holding all else constant, there is a significant predicted drop in candidate emergence. This was the case for all models that were tested. Generally, the negative impact of candidates from rural areas is more evident in senatorial races than in gubernatorial races.
- Electoral concentration's impact on candidate emergence is straightforward. The more populous a county, the more candidates that are expected to emerge. All models were statistically significant and the estimates from each of the state types were closely aligned. In short, this variable was consistent across the various models. Overall, electoral concentration is less impactful in urban and concentrated states for both senatorial and gubernatorial elections. It should be noted that the impact of this variable had a larger impact when using my coding for candidate hometown.
- Percent self-employed's impact on candidate emergence is more nuanced. The models indicate that for senatorial races, in rural and dispersed states, this is not

a predictor of candidate emergence. Alternatively, for both urban and concentrated states, there is a negative relationship on the expected counts of candidates. For gubernatorial races, self-employed is significant for all RAISED states, while it drops significance for rural and concentrated ADULT state models. Overall, Gimpel et al.'s original estimates were higher than those that resulted in the significant models for both ADULT and RAISED. This indicates that, while self-employed may, in some cases, depress candidate emergence, it is not to the degree initially characterized.

- Percent high income's on candidate emergence is mostly as expected. Generally, as a county's percent high income relative to the state average increases, the expected count of candidates to emerge also increases. For all state type models that were significant, which was most, there was a positive relationship. As with the percent self-employed, Gimpel et al's estimates seem to be inflated when compared to the ADULT and RAISED estimates. It should also be noted that this variable seems to hold more weight in senatorial elections, where all but one state type was significant, versus gubernatorial elections where ADULT and RAISED drops significance in rural states and drops significance in RAISED concentrated states and ADULT dispersed states.
- State capital continues to have a strong predictive value in my ADULT and RAISED models; although, it is to a lesser degree than noted in Gimpel et al.'s model. The only model in which this variable drops significance is Rural RAISED. Overall, RAISED models, while continuing to have a positive predictive value on

candidate emergence, in all cases it was lower than both ADULT and Gimpel et al.'s models. Generally, though, the take away is that being candidate emergence is more likely from counties where the state capital lies.

Does Your Hometown Origin Influence Your Likelihood of Winning?

Moving on from the consideration of the likelihood candidates will emerge from a particular county, let us now consider whether geography impacts a candidate's likelihood of winning, based upon state type. Before moving onto a consideration of individual likelihood of winning, please consider Tables 6.7 and 6.8, which replicate Gimpel et al.'s model, but use the counts of winning candidates, instead of candidate emergence, as the dependent variable by state type and by both ADULT and RAISED. Again, the time period for my data is 1948-2008.

First, in considering the likelihood of winning by county, for both ADULT and RAISED in senatorial races (Table 6.7), the results for electoral concentration, percent self-employed, state capital number of counties and number of elections are not substantively distinct from those found in Tables 6.3 and 6.5, which highlight the likelihood of candidate emergence. What is, though, of consequence is that, for most of the state types, percent high income falls from significance, as does the measure for rural counties. The income measure is only significant for urban states, ADULT and RAISED, and dispersed classified states, RAISED only, holding all else constant. The measure for rurality is only significant in rural classified states, ADULT only, holding all else constant, supportive of my initial hypothesis that rurality would be a detriment in rural and dispersed classified states. These findings indicate a couple of interesting outcomes: 1) the impact of income relative to

winning rarely is of consequence and 2) if a candidate can make it to the race (i.e. emerge), in nearly all cases, rurality is not harmful in senatorial races. Electoral concentration, though, does still have a large effect on the number of winners, which is related to rurality.

Table 6.8 shows the likelihood of winning in gubernatorial races, again, using Gimpel et al.'s model, by state type and ADULT and RAISED. Much like the senatorial comparison, there is little difference in outcomes relative to the emergence findings noted in Tables 6.4 and 6.6. In the win/loss model, the only significant state type was urban classified states by RAISED for the rural indicator, meaning that this was the only state type where rurality mattered, in terms of winning. In urban classified states, the likelihood of winning decreases by 76%, holding all else constant, in rural counties. Also, the self-employment measure was only significant in urban and concentrated (RAISED only) classified states, not in rural or dispersed states, indicating that in urban and concentrated states higher levels of self-employment reduces the likelihood of winning. This is supportive of my hypothesis that there would be a negative impact on winning for counties where small business ownership is highest.

The most important takeaway, though, for both races, is that if you can get into the race as a general election candidate, the impact of your hometown status loses significance in most cases. Moving onto a consideration of a logistic model for winning; please see Tables 6.9-6.12. Again, the time period for this examination ins 1948-2008 and I use individual level data for incumbency and non-native status, but variables are the same as those used in Gimpel et al.'s model. I also added my rural designation, which was distinct from Gimpel et al.'s because it is a relative measure; rural being defined as a county with

less than five percent of the population. The dependent variable for this model, though, is whether the candidate won or lost. So, while most of the data collected did not have individual attributes, an examination of the likelihood of winning is still instructive.

Again, the dependent variable is winning versus losing and the independent controls are: incumbency, alien or non-native to the state candidate, party support (percentage of the presidential vote of the candidate's part in the previous presidential election), percent black, percent high income relative to the state average, percent self-employment, non-metro rural, state capital, number of counties, number of elections per election period, dummy if the county is classified as rural (under the 5% threshold) or urban (over the 5% threshold). The expectations for those variables pulled from Gimpel et al.'s piece (percent high income relative to the state average, percent self-employment, non-metro rural, state capital, number of counties, number of elections per election period), the expectations are as outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. I also expect that incumbency will have a strong positive impact on winning, as will non-native status. I used race as a control, but do not believe it will have an impact on the likelihood of winning and I expect that coming from an urban county will increase your likelihood of winning in urban concentrated, urban dispersed, and rural concentrated states, while coming from a rural county will increased your likelihood of winning in rural dispersed states (please again consider the discussion highlighting the state types in Chapter 1). I will consider this model for both senatorial and gubernatorial races for rural, urban, concentrated, dispersed, urban-concentrated, rural-concentrated, urban-dispersed, and rural concentrated classified states.

Before I begin, there is little variation between ADULT and RAISED models, so I will just discuss ADULT outcomes henceforth. First, when considering the findings, for senatorial elections, the only variables influencing the model are incumbency, in all cases, and party support, in most cases. While coming from a rural county, using my 5% threshold, is significant in the overall models, it falls out when we break the model down by state type. This is quite significant because it tells us that, while hometown status may be relevant to candidate emergence, for senatorial races it is no longer relevant to winning if the candidate can make it to the general election. This is contrary to Gimpel et al.'s conclusion that "…small town boys and girls generally do not make good—unless they first resettle in a big city to launch their political bids" (2011: 30)

In the gubernatorial model, we see that incumbency is statistically significant for all state types, while party support is significant only in some of the state types. The race control is also significant in about half of the state types. Finally, the rural county, 5% measure, is significant for rural, concentrated, dispersed and rural-concentrated classified states, indicating that geography may have some influence in gubernatorial races. The effect of my rurality measure is positive, which suggests that candidates from rural counties have an advantage and are more likely to win. For gubernatorial candidates, in rural states, the probability of winning goes from .23 to .50 moving from a non-rural to a rural county, holding all else at its mean; in concentrated states, the probability of winning goes from .50 to .50 moving from a non-rural to a rural county, holding all else at its mean; in dispersed classified states, the probability of winning goes from .46 to .52 moving from a non-rural to a rural county, holding all else at its mean; and in rural-concentrated states, the probability

of winning goes from .38 to .53 moving from a non-rural to a rural county, holding all else at its mean. Thus, especially in rural classified states and rural-concentrated states, coming from a rural county can significantly increase your likelihood of winning.

Thus, the win-loss models did provide some new insights to the impact that one's hometown may have on winning. The impact of incumbency and party support are undeniable. Most other factors fall out of significance, especially when compared to the candidate emergence models. The impact of the significance of the rurality control in gubernatorial elections is particularly noteworthy, especially when one considers that variables like income and electoral concentration are not significant. In the next chapter, I will summarize the main findings and discuss the implications of such, as well as suggest avenues for future research.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS and PROPOSALS

This study has shown that the question to candidates, "Where are you from?" is not without merit. While this investigation did not directly survey voters to see why the associations drive their vote or how such may influence potential candidates, it did provide evidence that geography does matter, both the candidate emergence and success. Indeed, geography does matter. Indeed, there is a reason behind many candidates selling themselves based upon his or her hometown. It is because, in some cases, hometown matters.

This exploration began with a consideration of both the geographic and the non-geographic factors influencing candidate emergence and success and moved into my discussion of my typology of states. For anyone who has traveled the United States, it is quite clear that beyond the physical borders from state-to-state there are also cultural idiosyncrasies. The latter has been the foundation for much of the debate focusing on the differences between rural and urban states and communities and, for some, rather such even exists. There, though, has been little scholarly attention on the impact that these biases may have on our political landscape. We know that incumbency matters. We know that party influence is critical. What we do not know, though, is if there something systematically influencing those to throw their hat into the ring? The results of this study show that geography should be a factor considered. Geography should be considered beyond the framework of localism. It is not a simple calculation of distance decay and voter

preference; the forthcoming discussion of the findings show that rurality does matter and has implications on political behavior.

To begin, once I deconstructed Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's data on my state typology, there were differences in outcomes, indicating that statewide geography does influence candidate emergence (2011). I found that candidate emergence from rural areas was less likely in urban classified states than rural and dispersed classified states for senatorial nominees; this is especially true for urban classified states. It is essentially impossible for a senatorial candidate from a rural area to springboard in urban classified states. This is more notable for gubernatorial candidates in urban classified states. In urban classified states, gubernatorial candidates just do not come from rural counties. For other state types, there is no significant impact in gubernatorial races. While rural emergence does not have an impact in concentrated states for Senate nominees, there is an impact in dispersed states. The lesson from this examination is that, if you are a rural candidate, you are better off running in a gubernatorial than a senate race, assuming you do not live in an urban classified state; in which case, it is highly improbable you will be elected as a candidate with rural roots.

In Chapter 6, I expanded upon Gimpel et al.'s data by expanding the scope of the candidates from 1996-2006 (Gimpel et al's data) to 1948-2008. I replicated his model with my data. I also explored the impact that coding may have by providing two distinct coding constructs, ADULT, where the "alien," non-state native candidate lived when he or she ran, and RAISED, where the "alien" was raised. The latter would—quite obviously—be code within a different state in which the candidate was running. The findings suggest that

Gimpel et al.'s original findings regarding the impact of rurality are overinflated. For gubernatorial races, the only state type holding significance is urban states using the RAISED classification with 64% drop in rural candidate emergence as compared to the 100% drop predicted by Gimpel et al. For senate races, the RAISED model predicts a 55% drop in emergence if the candidate is rural based, as compared to Gimpel et al.'s model where this variable did not hold significance. In my ADULT model, for senate candidates, all state types were significant except for concentrated classified states. This indicates that truly looking at where the candidate was raised will eliminate some of the skew that occurs in Gimpel et al. and ADULT models. The main takeaway is that, having a rural hometown is not a negative predictor for candidate emergence in most state types, with urban states being the exception.

Finally, I explored the impact that rurality may have on winning. Relative to senate races, if candidates can get into the race, the negative effects of hometown lose significance. Interestingly, in gubernatorial races, coming from a rural area, actually increases the likelihood of getting elected rural, concentrated, dispersed, and rural-concentrated classified states. These considerations are even more impactful when one considers that the only other factors of significance are incumbency, party support and the race control (only in some cases). Clearly, geography matters and, based upon these findings, rurality can actually give candidates a boost. This makes those quintessential barn political advertisements in Missouri make some much more sense now. It seems that the positive influence of rurality has not been lost on political consultants.

So, where do we go from here? Future scholarship would be wise to consider the impact geography, specifically rurality, has on political behavior and outcomes. Keeping this in mind, the manner in which one captures this concept can be illusive. As the discussion relative to ADULT and RAISED highlights, it does indeed matter how the data is coded and, as my typology highlights, how models are constructed. Rurality influences candidate emergence and success in different ways, but, clearly, it has an impact and should not be ignored or dismissed.

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Table 1.1. Rural versus Urban State Typology, Relative to Each State's Population Concentration

Relative type of State		Distribution of Population in Urban Areas: Dispersed	Distribution of Population in Urban Areas: Concentrated
		Dispersed	**Concentrated**
	Urban	State Type UD	State Type UC
	Rural	State Type RD	State Type RC

Table 1.2. Rural-Urban Index Correlations

Variable	Number of Observations	Sign	Item-Rest Correlation	Inter-item Correlation	Correlation	Alpha
Restrictions On Abortion	50	+	0.54	0.43	0.56	0.92
US House, Conservatism Score	50	+	0.79	0.73	0.50	0.90
% Mass Public Conservative	50	+	0.86	0.81	0.49	0.90
% Households with Gun	50	+	0.90	0.86	0.48	0.89
Metro Area, %	50	-	0.67	0.58	0.53	0.91
State Opinion on Gay Rights	50	-	0.86	0.81	0.49	0.90
Vote for Bush, 2000	50	+	0.93	0.90	0.48	0.89
Frequent Church Goers, %	37	+	0.63	0.53	0.53	0.91
Population per Sq. Mile	50	-	0.73	0.65	0.52	0.91
Per Capita Energy Consumed BTU, 1991	50	+	0.58	0.48	0.55	0.92
Test Scale					0.51	0.91

*All measures are from the year 2000, unless otherwise specified.

Table 1.3. State-by-State Categorization

Relative type of State	Distribution of Population in Urban Areas: Dispersed	Concentrated
Urban	Florida Maine Michigan Nevada New Mexico Oregon Pennsylvania Washington California New York	Arizona Colorado Connecticut Illinois Maryland Massachusetts Minnesota New Hampshire New Jersey Vermont Delaware Rhode Island
Rural	Alabama Arkansas Idaho Indiana Iowa Kansas Louisiana Mississippi Missouri Montana North Carolina North Dakota Ohio South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Virginia West Virginia	Georgia Nebraska Utah Wisconsin Wyoming Kentucky Oklahoma

Table 1.4. Population Concentrations by State (Percentages in Parenthesis)

State	Urban Counties	Typology
California	Los Angeles (28), Orange (8), San Diego (8), Santa Clara (5), San Bernardino (5), Riverside (5)	UD
New York	Kings (13), Queens (12), New York (8), Bronx (7), Nassau (7), Suffolk (7), Westchester (5), Erie (5)	UD
Florida	Miami-Dade (14), Broward (10), Palm Beach (7), Orange (6), Pinellas (6), Hillsborough (6), Duval (5)	UD
Maine	Cumberland (21), York (15), Penobscot (11), Kennebec (9), Androscoggin (8), Aroostook (6)	UD
Michigan	Wayne (21), Oakland (12), Macomb (8), Kent (6)	UD
Nevada	Clark (69), Washoe (17)	UD
New Mexico	Bernalillo (31), Dona Ana (10), Santa Fe (7), San Juan (6), Sandoval (5)	UD
Oregon	Multnomah (19), Washington (13), Clackamas (10), Lane (9), Marion (8), Jackson (5)	UD
Pennsylvania	Philadelphia (12), Allegheny (10), Montgomery (6), Bucks (5)	UD
Washington	King (29), Pierce (12), Snohomish (10), Spokane (7), Clark (6)	UD
Delaware	New Castle (64), Sussex (20), Kent (16)	UC*
Rhode Island	Providence (59), Kent (16), Washington (12), Newport (8), Bristol (5)	UC*
Arizona	Maricopa (60), Pima (16)	UC
Colorado	Denver (13), Jefferson (12), El Paso (12), Arapahoe (11), Adams (8), Larimer (6), Boulder (6)	UC
Connecticut	Fairfield (26), Hartford (25), New Haven (24), New London (8), Litchfield (5), Middlesex (5)	UC
Illinois	Cook (43), DuPage (7), Lake (5)	UC
Maryland	Montgomery (16), Prince George's (15), Baltimore (14), Baltimore City (12), Anne Arundel (9), Howard (5)	UC
Massachusetts	Middlesex (23), Worcester (12), Essex (11), Suffolk (11), Norfolk (10), Bristol (8), Hampden (7), Plymouth (7)	UC
Minnesota	Hennepin (23), Ramsey (10), Dakota (7), Anoka (6)	UC
New Hampshire	Hillsborough (31), Rockingham (22), Merrimack (11), Strafford (9), Grafton (7), Cheshire (6), Belknap (5)	UC
New Jersey	Bergen (11), Middlesex (9), Essex (9), Hudson (7), Monmouth (7), Passaic (6), Morris (6), Union (6), Ocean (6), Camden (6), Burlington (5)	UC
Vermont	Chittenden (24), Washington (10), Rutland (10), Windsor (9), Franklin (7), Windham (7), Addison (6), Bennington (6), Caledonia (5), Orange (5)	UC
Alabama	Jefferson (15), Mobile (9), Madison (6), Montgomery (5)	RD
Arkansas	Pulaski (14), Benton (6), Washington (6)	RD
Idaho	Ada (23), Canyon (10), Kootenai (8), Bonneville (6), Bannock (6), Twin Falls (5)	RD
Indiana	Marion (14), Lake (8), Allen (5)	RD

Iowa	Polk (13), Linn (7), Scott (5)	RD
Kansas	Johnson (17), Sedgwick (17), Shawnee (6), Wyandotte (6)	RD
Louisiana	Orleans (11), Jefferson (10), East Baton Rouge (9), Caddo (6)	RD
Mississippi	Hinds (9), Harrison (7), Jackson (5)	RD
Missouri	St. Louis (18), Jackson (12), St. Louis City (6), St. Charles (5)	RD
Montana	Yellowstone (14), Missoula (11), Cascade (9), Flathead (8), Gallatin (8), Lewis and Clark (6)	RD
North Carolina	Mecklenburg (9), Wake (8), Guilford (5)	RD
North Dakota	Cass (19), Burleigh (11), Grand Forks (10), Ward (9)	RD
Ohio	Cuyahoga (12), Franklin (9), Hamilton (7), Montgomery (5), Summit (5)	RD
South Carolina	Greenville (9), Richland (8), Charleston (8), Spartanburg (6), Lexington (5), Horry (5)	RD
South Dakota	Minnehaha (20), Pennington (12), Brown (5)	RD
Tennessee	Shelby (16), Davidson (10), Knox (7), Hamilton (5)	RD
Texas	Harris (16), Dallas (11), Tarrant (7), Bexar (7)	RD
Virginia	Fairfax (14), Virginia Beach (6)	RD
West Virginia	Kanawha (11), Monongalia (5), Wood (5), Cabell (5)	RD
Kentucky	Jefferson (17), Fayette (6)	RC
Oklahoma	Oklahoma (19), Tulsa (16), Cleveland (6)	RC
Georgia	Fulton (10), DeKalb (8), Gwinnett (7), Cobb (7)	RC
Nebraska	Douglas (27), Lancaster (15), Sarpy (7)	RC
Utah	Salt Lake (40), Utah (17), Davis (11), Weber (9)	RC
Wisconsin	Milwaukee (18), Dane (8), Waukesha (7)	RC
Wyoming	Laramie (17), Natrona (13), Sweetwater (8), Campbell (7), Fremont (7), Albany (6), Park (5), Sheridan (5)	RC

*****All counties within state are classified as urban, meaning they meet, or go beyond, the 5% threshold.

Table 4.1. State-by-State Score on the Rurality Index

State	Index Score-Urban	State	Index Score-Rural
Rhode Island	-1.60685	Ohio	0.02363
Massachusetts	-1.55662	Wisconsin	0.032674
New Jersey	-1.40239	Virginia	0.064524
New York	-1.23432	Iowa	0.171288
Connecticut	-1.21191	Georgia	0.264046
Maryland	-1.04593	Missouri	0.277535
California	-0.90415	West Virginia	0.303566
Vermont	-0.75421	Texas	0.39857
Washington	-0.64307	North Carolina	0.408869
Delaware	-0.6281	Indiana	0.452491
Oregon	-0.60115	Tennessee	0.476579
Illinois	-0.53059	Arkansas	0.523408
Florida	-0.44188	South Carolina	0.622588
New Hampshire	-0.38418	Utah	0.625594
Colorado	-0.33278	Nebraska	0.627254
New Mexico	-0.29926	Alabama	0.641146
Pennsylvania	-0.22211	Kansas	0.701165
Maine	-0.21141	Oklahoma	0.74659
Arizona	-0.13747	Montana	0.769675
Minnesota	-0.11741	South Dakota	0.844054
Nevada	-0.10291	North Dakota	0.847899
Michigan	-0.06218	Kentucky	0.865035
		Louisiana	0.963014
		Mississippi	1.015725
		Wyoming	1.016421
		Idaho	1.11142

Table 4.2. Data Sources

Candidate Names and Vote Totals, 1948-1990	Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-1990 [Computer file]. ICPSR07757-v5. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994. doi:10.3886/ICPSR07757
Candidate Names and Vote Totals, 1990-2008	David Leip's Atlas of Elections, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/ This sources provided vote totals for both the candidates themselves, as well as the party support variable. I personally updated all candidate voting data from 1991-2008.
Home County Information	Winning candidate biographies, as noted in *Biographical Directories of the Governors in the United States,* provided much of the information. I also did online research searching for candidate biographical information. This included Political Graveyard, http://politicalgraveyard.com/, and state government websites. I attempted in all cases to cross-reference the information provided.
Population Levels and Statewide Classification Measures	The data for the state-level rurality index were obtained from Dr. Brady Baybeck and Dr. David Kimball. Their sources include Erikson, et al. 1993, Newport 2009, Pollack 2006, Rentfrow, et al. 2008, "Uniform Crime Reporting Program," , Lax and Phillips 2009, "Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government," 2009, and Wingfield and Marcus 2007.
Statewide County Measures	These measures were pulled from Gimpel, Lee and Thorpe's data, which were generously provided to me by the Dr. Gimpel (2011).

Table 4.3. Description of Variables

Variable	Collapsed By Group	# of Obs.	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
DEPENDENT VARIABLES					
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel et al.'s model (Senator)		3140	0, 8	.12	.60
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel et al.'s model (Governor)		3140	0, 6	.10	.35
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel et al.'s model replicated (Senator)*	ADULT RAISED	3140 3140	0, 32 0, 38	.65 .64	2.24 2.12
Emerging candidate count, Gimpel et al.'s model replicated (Governor)	ADULT RAISED	3140 3140	0, 45 0, 43	.56 .56	2.01 1.83
Count of winning candidates (Senator)	ADULT RAISED	3140 3140	0, 17 0, 19	.33 .32	1.32 1.26
Count winning candidates (Governor)	ADULT RAISED	3140 3140	0, 22 0, 24	.28 .28	1.09 1.02
Count of winning candidates, not collapsed	Senator Governor	2049 1781	0, 1 0, 1	.51 .49	.50 .50
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES—County Level Models					
Electoral Concentration % of population relative to the state	Senator Governor	3137 3137	0, 36 0, 36	.80 .80	2.04 2.08
% High Income relative to the state	Senator Governor	3137 3137	-5, 14 -5, 14	8.06e-09 -1.73e-08	1.56 1.57
% Self-employed population	Senator Governor	3137 3136	0, 45 0, 46	9.65 9.60	4.87 4.91
Rural Locations, all non-metro counties with fewer than 10,000 people (Gimpel et al.'s rural measure)	Senator Governor	3140 3140	0, 1 0, 1	.21 .21	.40 .40
State Capital	Senator Governor	3137 3137	0, 1 0, 1	.02 .02	.12 .12
Number of Counties per State	Senator Governor	3140 3140	3, 254 3, 254*	97 97	57 57
Number of Elections per election period	Senator Governor	3140 3140	3, 254 6, 318	97 173	57 70
Party Support, Vote Total for Candidate's Party in Previous Presidential Race[+]	Senator Governor	2016 1731	13, 87 10, 94	48 48	10 10

Percentage Black	Senator	2043	0, .73	.12	.15
	Governor	1773	0, .69	.11	.14
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES—Individual Level Models					
Incumbency, the candidate was an incumbent	Senator	2051	0, 1	.37	.48
	Governor	1784	0, 1	.28	.45
Non-Native Status, the candidate was not native to that state (he or she was not raised in the state he or she was running)	Senator	2051	0, 1	.21	.41
	Governor	1784	0, 1	.20	.40
Rural Designated County, below 5% of Population Threshold	Senator	2051	0, 1	.56	.50
	Governor	1784	0, 1	.45	.50

*FIPS is the accepted abbreviation for Federal Information Processing Standards, which provides a unique code for states and counties. ADULT codes these candidates hometown as where they were living when they ran, whereas RAISED codes "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county, keeping all others as their ADULT classification.

**There was a coding issue noted with Gimpel et al.'s data relative to the number of counties for the gubernatorial data. The variable was corrected and my models all include the corrected version. There was no coding error found in the senatorial data.

[+] Data entered directly from county data set and not provided by Gimpel et al.

Table 5.1. US Senate Comparison of the State Typology on Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe's Model

Variable Name	Gimpel's Model[25]	Gimpel's Model Replicated[26]	Urban States	Rural States	Concentrated	Dispersed
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.30*** (.04) [1.35]	.30*** (.04) [1.36] 36%	.21*** (.04) [1.23] 23%	.45*** (.06) [1.57] 57%	.20*** (.05) [1.22] 22%	.42*** (.06) [1.53] 53%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.24*** (.02) [1.27]	.24*** (.03) [1.27] 27%	.23*** (.03) [1.26] 26%	.25*** (.05) [1.28] 28%	.19*** (.04) [1.20] 21%	.24*** (.03) [1.27] 27%
Percent Self-Employment	-.08** (.03) [.92]	-.08** (.04) [.92] -8%	-.12** (.05) [.89] -11%	-.05 (.05)	-.18** (.06) [.83] -17%	-.037 (.043)
Non-Metro Rural	-2.03** (.68) [.13]	-2.33** (.77) [.10] -90%	-45.41*** (2.07) [1.90e-20] -100%	-2.10** (.81) [.12] -88%	-1.73* (1.07)	-2.48** (1.06) [.08] -92%
State Capital	1.59*** (.21) [4.9]	1.59*** (.19) [4.9] 391%	1.38*** (.39) [3.97] 297%	1.36*** (.27) [3.89] 289%	1.28*** (.33) [3.58] 258%	1.63*** (.25) [5.10] 410%
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0068** (.0025) [.9932]	-.0068** (.0026) [.9932] -0.7%	-.0169*** (.0036) [.9833] -1.7%	-.0067** (.0030) [.9933] -0.7%	-.0111*** (.0035) [.9889] -1%	-.0059** (.0028) [.9941] -.6%
Number of Elections (per election period)	.0081*** (.0787) [1.008]	.0085 (.1025)	--	-.0009 (.1086)	.0373 (.1313)	.1919 (.2489)
N	3137	3136	844	2264	939	2169
α	1.87†	1.86†	1.58†	1.53†	1.50†	1.62†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-744.27	-743.26	-285.74	-428.00	-250.75	-465.04

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test)

†α is statistically significant

[25] Gimpel used the following: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test).

[26] The category Gimpel's model represents the outcomes when I reran his model. The outcomes are nearly identical, as is noted by the comparison to the column directly to the left.

Table 5.2. Gubernatorial Comparison of the State Typology on Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe's Model

Variable Name	Gimpel's Model[27]	Gimpel's Model Replicated[28]	Urban States	Rural States	Concentrated	Dispersed
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.24*** (.04) [1.29]	.25*** (.04) [1.29] 29%	.20*** (.05) [1.27] 23%	.37*** (.06) [1.44] 44%	.16*** (.05) [1.18] 18%	.35*** (.06) [1.42] 42%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.15*** (.02) [1.16]	.15*** (.03) [1.16] 16%	.16*** (.03) [1.17] 17%	.12** (.06) [1.13] 13%	.14** (.04) [1.15] 15%	.13*** (.04) [1.14] 14%
Percent Self-Employment	-.08** (.03) [.92]	-.08** (.03) [.92] -8%	-.11 * (.07)	-.09** (.04) [.92] -8%	-.16** (.06) [.85] -15%	-.06 (.04)
Non-Metro Rural	-.57 (.43)	-.59 (.41)	-31.35*** (1.70) [2.41e-14] -100%	-.21 (.42)	.10 (.64)	-.72 (.54)
State Capital	1.36*** (.24)	1.36*** (.23) [3.88] 288%	1.22** (.42) [3.38] 238%	1.13** (.36) [3.08] 208%	1.09*** (.33) [2.98] 198%	1.52*** (.32) [4.57] 357%
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0031** (.0009) [.9969]	-.0062** (.0011) [.9938] -0.6%	-.0112** (.0043) [.9944] -0.6%	-.0065** (.0029) [.9936] -0.6%	-.0105** (.0033) [.9896] -0.5%	-.0038 (.0024)
Number of Elections (per election period)	.18*** (.04) [1.11]	.18** (.07) [1.19] 19%	.20* (.08) [1.22] 22%	.17 (.17)	.22** (.08) [1.24] 24%	.04 (.20)
N	3138	3136	844	2264	939	2169
α	1.98†	1.97†	1.53†	2.14†	1.27†	2.10†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-720.19	-720.07	-259.21	-433.18	-239.59	-452.62

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients.
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test)
†α is statistically significant

[27] Gimpel used the following: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailed test).
[28] The category Gimpel's model represents the outcomes when I reran his model. The outcomes are nearly identical, as is noted by the comparison to the column directly to the left. A data error was noted in the "Number of Counties" variable, which was corrected. This accounts for the slight variation in the outcomes in that variable; all other estimates stayed nearly identical.

Table 6.1a. Number of Alien Candidates by State Type (Senatorial), by ADULT and RAISED (1948-2008). Winning percentage in parenthesis.

Relative type of State		Dispersed	Concentrated	Totals
	Urban	124-ADULT (43%) 120-RAISED (34%)	157-ADULT (47%) 79-RAISED (72%)	281-ADULT (45%) 199-RAISED (49%)
	Rural	116-ADULT (45%) 111-RAISED (57%)	43-ADULT (49%) 32-RAISED (75%)	159-ADULT (46%) 143-RAISED (61%)
	Totals	240-ADULT (44%) 231-RAISED (45%)	200-ADULT (48%) 111-RAISED (73%)	440-ADULT (45%) 342-RAISED (54%)

Distribution of Population in Urban Areas

Note: These are winning percentages by state type, so the rows will not add up to 100%.

Table 6.1b. Number of Alien Candidates by State Type (Gubernatorial), by ADULT and RAISED (1948-2008). Winning percentage in parenthesis.

Relative type of State		Dispersed	Concentrated	Totals
	Urban	101-ADULT (50%) 108-RAISED (66%)	143-ADULT (58%) 121-RAISED (34%)	244-ADULT (55%) 229-RAISED (49%)
	Rural	82-ADULT (61%) 127-RAISED (45%)	34-ADULT (38%) 53-RAISED (34%)	116-ADULT (54%) 180-RAISED (42%)
	Totals	183-ADULT (55%) 235-RAISED (54%)	177-ADULT (54%) 174-RAISED (34%)	360-ADULT (54%) 409-RAISED (48%)

Distribution of Population in Urban Areas

Note: These are winning percentages by state type, so the rows will not add up to 100%.

Table 6.2a. Number of Alien Candidates Compared to All Candidates by State Type and Relative to all Candidates (Senatorial), 1948-2008. Percentages in parenthesis.

Relative type of State	Dispersed	Concentrated	Totals
Urban	121/409 (30%) 121/2032 (6%)	156/510 (31%) 156/2032 (8%)	277/919 (30%) 277/2032 (14%)
Rural	116/807 (14%) 116/2032 (6%)	43/306 (14%) 43/2032 (2%)	159/1113 (14%) 159/2032 (8%)
Totals	237/1216 (19%) 237/2032 (12%)	199/816 (24%) 199/2032 (10%)	436/2032 (21%)

Distribution of Population in Urban Areas

Note: These are the number of alien candidates by state type, so the rows will not add up to 100%. The first number in each cell is the number of alien candidates in that type of state. The second number in the first row each in cell is the total number of candidates in each state type. The second number in the second row in each cell is the total number of candidates in the sample. The first row within each cell is the percentage of aliens for only that state type, while the second row within each cell is the percentage of aliens relative to all candidates in the sample.

Table 6.2b. Number of Alien Candidates Compared to All Candidates by State Type and Relative to all Candidates (Gubernatorial), 1948-2008. Percentages in parenthesis.

Relative type of State	Dispersed	Concentrated	Totals
Urban	136/456 (30%) 136/2266 (6%)	180/624 (29%) 180/2266 (8%)	316/1080 (29%) 316/2266 (14%)
Rural	100/864 (12%) 100/2266 (4%)	49/322 (15%) 49/2266 (2%)	149/1186 (13%) 149/2266 (7%)
Totals	236/1320 (18%) 236/2266 (10%)	229/946 (24%) 229/2266 (10%)	465/2266 (21%)

Distribution of Population in Urban Areas

Note: These are the number of alien candidates by state type, so the rows will not add up to 100%. The first number in each cell is the number of alien candidates in that type of state. The second number in the first row each in cell is the total number of candidates in each state type. The second number in the second row in each cell is the total number of candidates in the sample. The first row within each cell is the percentage of aliens for only that state type, while the second row within each cell is the percentage of aliens relative to all candidates in the sample.

Table 6.3. Candidate Emergence Senatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED, Urban and Rural State Comparison (1948-2008)

Variable Name	Gimpel's Model Replicated	By ADULT	By RAISED	Urban States-Gimpel	Urban States-ADULT	Urban States-RAISED	Rural States-Gimpel	Rural States-ADULT	Rural States-RAISED
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.25** (.04) [1.29] 29%	.40*** (.04) [1.48] 48%	.37*** (.04) [1.45] 46%	.21** (.04) [1.23] 23%	.29*** (.05) [1.33] 33%	.24*** (.04) [1.27] 27%	.45** (.06) [1.57] 57%	.52*** (.53) [1.68] 68%	.51*** (.06) [1.67] 67%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.15** (.03) [1.16] 16%	.10*** (.03) [1.10] 10%	.11*** (.02) [1.11] 11%	.23** (.03) [1.26] 26%	.11*** (.03) [1.12] 12%	.14*** (.03) [1.14] 15%	.25** (.05) [1.28] 28%	.07*** (.04) [1.08] 8%	.08* (.04) [1.08] 8%
Percent Self-Employment	-.08* (.03) [.92] -8%	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.12* (.05) [.89] -11%	-.06** (.03) [.93] -6%	-.11*** (.03) [.89] -11%	-.05 (.05)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
Non-Metro Rural	-.59 (.41)	-.43** (.19) [.65] -35%	-.20 (.18)	-45.41** (2.07) [1.90e-20] -100%	-.84* (.48) [.446] -57%	-.81* (.46) [.45] -56%	-2.10* (.81) [.12] -88%	-.37* (.21) [.69] -31%	-.14 (.20)
State Capital	1.36** (.23) [3.88] 288%	.80*** (.17) [2.23] 123%	.69*** (.20) [1.99] 99%	1.38** (.39) [3.97] 297%	.88*** (.23) [2.40] 142%	.54** (.23) [1.71] 71%	1.36** (.27) [3.89] 289%	.58* (.28) [1.78] 78%	.49 (.31)
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0031* (.0011) [.9969] -0.3%	-.0055*** (.0012) [.995] -0.5%	-.0052*** (.0011) [.9948] -0.5%	-.0169** (.0036) [.9833] -1.7%	-.0168*** (.0034) [.9834] -2%	-.0158*** (.0032) [.9844] -2%	-.0067* (.0030) [.9933] -0.7%	-.0058*** (.0014) [.9941] -0.6%	-.0055*** (.0013) [.9945] -0.6%
Number of Elections (per election period)	.18* (.07) [1.19] 19%	.09 (.08)	-.08 (.08)	--	--	--	-.0009 (.1086)	-.1076 (.0875)	-.0883 (.0796)
N	3136	3136	3136	844	844	844	2264	2264	2264
α	1.97†	3.53†	3.46†	1.58†	2.27†	2.16†	1.53†	3.80†	3.83†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-720.07	-2436	-2547	-285.74	-792.03	-824.07	-428.00	-1607	-1681

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.

†α is statistically significant

Table 6.4. Candidate Emergence Gubernatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED, Urban and Rural State Comparison (1948-2008)

Variable Name	Gimpel's Model Replicated	By ADULT	By RAISED	Urban States-Gimpel	Urban States-ADULT	Urban States-RAISED	Rural States-Gimpel	Rural States-ADULT	Rural States-RAISED
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.25*** (.04) [1.29] 29%	.31*** (.03) [1.37] 37%	.29*** (.03) [1.33] 33%	.20*** (.05) [1.27] 23%	.26*** (.04) [1.30] 30%	.21*** (.04) [1.24] 24%	.37*** (.06) [1.44] 44%	.40*** (.05) [1.49] 49%	.39*** (.05) [1.48] 48%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.15*** (.03) [1.16] 16%	.06** (.03) [1.06] 6%	.09*** (.03) [1.06] 9%	.16*** (.03) [1.17] 17%	.11*** (.03) [1.12] 12%	.14*** (.03) [1.15] 15%	.12** (.06) [1.13] 13%	-.01 (.04)	.00 (.04)
Percent Self-Employment	-.08** (.03) [.92] -8%	-.03** (.01) [0.97] -3%	-.04** (.01) [0.96] -4%	-.11 * (.07)	-.1*** (.03) [.91] -9%	-.11*** (.03) [0.90] -10%	-.09** (.04) [.92] -8%	-.03 (.02)	-.03** (.02) [0.97] -3%
Non-Metro Rural	-.59 (.41)	-.19 (.18)	-.25 (.18)	-31.35*** (1.70) [2.41e-14] -100%	-.52 (.40)	-1.01** (.49) [0.36] -64%	-.21 (.42)	-.17 (.21)	-.14 (.20)
State Capital	1.36*** (.23) [3.88] 288%	1.1*** (.15) [3.01] 201%	.85*** (.16) [2.33] 133%	1.22** (.42) [3.38] 238%	1.05*** (.24) [2.86] 186%	.68** (.25) [1.97] 97%	1.13** (.36) [3.08] 208%	1.04*** (.22) [2.83] 183%	.86*** (.23) [2.37] 137%
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0062** (.0011) [.9938] -0.6%	-.0049*** (.0011) [.9951] -0.5%	-.0040*** (.0010) [.9960] -0.4%	-.0112** (.0043) [.9944] -0.6%	-.0152*** (.0030) [.9849] -1.5%	-.0130*** (.0030) [.9871] -1.3%	-.0065** (.0029) [.9936] -0.6%	-.0053*** (.0012) [.9947] -0.5%	-.0038*** (.0012) [.9962] -0.4%
Number of Elections (per election period)	.18** (.07) [1.19] 19%	.10** (.04) [1.11] 11%	.05 (.04)	.20* (.08) [1.22] 22%	.16** (.05) [1.17] 17%	.08* (.05) [1.08] 8%	.17 (.17)	.01 (.07)	.02 (.07)
N	3136	3136	3136	844	844	844	2264	2264	2264
α	1.97†	2.63†	2.61†	1.53†	1.91†	2.10†	2.14†	2.69†	2.56†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-720.07	-2372	-2503	-259.21	-741.66	-800.73	-433.18	-1594	-1670

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.

†α is statistically significant

Table 6.5. Candidate Emergence Senatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED, Concentrated and Dispersed State Comparison (1948-2008)

Variable Name	Gimpel's Model Replicated	By ADULT	By RAISED	Concentrated - Gimpel	Concentrated- ADULT	Concentrated- RAISED	Dispersed-Gimpel	Dispersed-ADULT	Dispersed-RAISED
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.25** (.04) [1.29] 29%	.40*** (.04) [1.48] 48%	.37*** (.04) [1.45] 46%	.20** (.05) [1.22] 22%	.27*** (.04) [1.31] 31%	.23*** (.04) [1.26] 26%	.42** (.06) [1.53] 53%	.51*** (.05) [1.66] 66%	.50*** (.06) [1.64] 65%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.15** (.03) [1.16] 16%	.10*** (.03) [1.10] 10%	.11*** (.02) [1.11] 11%	.19** (.04) [1.20] 21%	.06 (.04)	.07** (.03) [1.07] 7%	.24** (.03) [1.27] 27%	.11*** (.03) [1.11] 11%	.12*** (.03) [1.13] 13%
Percent Self-Employment	-.08* (.03) [.92] -8%	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.18* (.06) [.83] -17%	-.04* (.02) [.96] -4%	-.09*** (.02) [.91] -9%	-.037 (.043)	-.00 (.02)	-.001 (.017)
Non-Metro Rural	-.59 (.41)	-.43** (.19) [.65] -35%	-.20 (.18)	-1.73 (1.07)	-.24 (.34)	.02 (.33)	-2.48* (1.06) [.08] -92%	-.45** (.23) [.63] -36%	-.20 (.22)
State Capital	1.36** (.23) [3.88] 288%	.80*** (.17) [2.23] 123%	.69*** (.20) [1.99] 99%	1.28** (.33) [3.58] 258%	.86*** (.27) [2.36] 136%	.68** (.28) [1.98] 98%	1.63** (.25) [5.10] 410%	.82*** (.22) [2.27] 128%	.67** (.25) [1.94] 95%
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0031* (.0011) [.9969] -0.3%	-.0055*** (.0012) [.995] -0.5%	-.0052*** (.0011) [.9948] -0.5%	-.0111** (.0035) [.9889] -1%	-.0112*** (.0025) [.9889] -1%	-.0103*** (.0023) [.9897] -1%	-.0059* (.0028) [.9941] -.6%	-.0047*** (.0013) [.9953] -.5%	-.0044*** (.0012) [.9956] -.4%
Number of Elections (per election period)	.18* (.07) [1.19] 19%	.09 (.08)	-.08 (.08)	.0373 (.1313)	.0312 (.1024)	.0591 (.0981)	.1919 (.2489)	-.2475 (.1536)	.0133 (.1456)
N	3136	3136	3136	939	939	939	2169	2169	2169
α	1.97†	3.53†	3.46†	1.50†	2.75†	2.54†	1.62†	3.43†	3.49†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-720.07	-2436	-2547	-250.75	-808.11	-835.62	-465.04	-1600	-1678

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.

†α is statistically significant

Table 6.6. Candidate Emergence Gubernatorial Comparison of Gimpel, ADULT and RAISED, Concentrated and Dispersed State Comparison (1948-2008)

Variable Name	Gimpel's Model Replicated	By ADULT	By RAISED	Concentrated-Gimpel	Concentrated-ADULT	Concentrated-RAISED	Dispersed-Gimpel	Dispersed-ADULT	Dispersed-RAISED
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.25*** (.04) [1.29] 29%	.31*** (.03) [1.37] 37%	.29*** (.03) [1.33] 33%	.16*** (.05) [1.18] 18%	.21*** (.03) [1.23] 23%	.17*** (.03) [1.18] 18%	.35*** (.06) [1.42] 42%	.41*** (.05) [1.51] 51%	.40*** (.05) [1.49] 49%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.15*** (.03) [1.16] 16%	.06** (.03) [1.06] 6%	.09*** (.03) [1.06] 9%	.14** (.04) [1.15] 15%	.06* (.03) [1.06] 6%	.06 (.04)	.13*** (.04) [1.14] 14%	.06 (.04)	.10** (.04) [1.11] 11%
Percent Self-Employment	-.08** (.03) [.92] -8%	-.03** (.01) [0.97] -3%	-.04** (.01) [0.96] -4%	-.16** (.06) [.85] -15%	-.04 (.02)	-.06** (.02) [0.94] -6%	-.06 (.04)	-.04** (.02) [.96] -4%	-.04** (.02) [.96] -4%
Non-Metro Rural	-.59 (.41)	-.19 (.18)	-.25 (.18)	.10 (.64)	-.39 (.26)	-.35 (.25)	-.72 (.54)	.03 (.23)	-.06 (.23)
State Capital	1.36*** (.23) [3.88] 288%	1.1*** (.15) [3.01] 201%	.85*** (.16) [2.33] 133%	1.09*** (.33) [2.98] 198%	1.1*** (.25) [3.01] 201%	.86*** (.27) [2.37] 138%	1.52*** (.32) [4.57] 357%	1.15*** (.19) [3.17] 217%	.88*** (.18) [2.41] 141%
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0062** (.0011) [.9938] -0.6%	-.0049*** (.0011) [.9951] -0.5%	-.0040*** (.0010) [.9960] -0.4%	-.0105** (.0033) [.9896] -0.5%	-.0106*** (.0018) [.9895] -1.1%	-.0119*** (.0017) [.9882] -1.2%	-.0038 (.0024)	-.0036** (.0011) [.10] -0.4%	-.0023** (.0011) [.10] -0.2%
Number of Elections (per election period)	.18** (.07) [1.19] 19%	.10** (.04) [1.11] 11%	.05 (.04)	.22** (.08) [1.24] 24%	.11** (.05) [1.12] 12%	.04 (.04)	.04 (.20)	-.04 (.09)	-.06 (.09)
N	3136	3136	3136	939	939	939	2169	2169	2169
α	1.97†	2.63†	2.61†	1.27†	1.74†	1.48†	2.10†	2.65†	2.75†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-720.07	-2372	-2503	-239.59	-762.58	-783.51	-452.62	-1578	-1678

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.

†α is statistically significant

Table 6.7. Win/Loss Counts Senatorial Comparison ADULT and RAISED, by State Type (1948-2008)

Variable Name	By ADULT	By RAISED	Urban States-ADULT	Urban States-RAISED	Rural States-ADULT	Rural States-RAISED	Concentrated-ADULT	Concentrated-RAISED	Dispersed-ADULT	Dispersed-RAISED
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.39*** (.05) [1.47] 47%	.36*** (.05) [1.43] 43%	.29*** (.05) [1.33] 34%	.24*** (.06) [1.27] 27%	.52*** (.08) [1.68] 68%	.48*** (.09) [1.62] 62%	.27*** (.05) [1.22] 22%	.21*** (.05) [1.23] 23%	.50*** (.07) [1.65] 65%	.47*** (.08) [1.61] 61%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.06* (.03) [1.06] 6%	.10*** (.03) [1.11] 11%	.11** (.04) [1.11] 11%	.13** (.04) [1.14] 14%	-.03 (.07)	.08 (.06)	-.02 (.05)	.05 (.05)	.09** (.04)	.14** (.04) [1.15] 15%
Percent Self-Employment	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.07* (.04) [.93] -7%	-.10** (.05) [0.90] -10%	.00 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-.05 (.03)	-.09** (.03) [0.91] -9%	.01 (.03)	.02 (.03)
Non-Metro Rural	-.49* (.28) [.61] 39%	-.26 (.27)	-.52 (.71)	-.57 (.61)	-.58* (.32) [.56] -44%	-.32 (.31)	-.12 (.44)	.12 (.43)	-.59 (.37)	-.33 (.36)
State Capital	.84*** (.26) [2.32] 132%	.70** (.26) [2.01] 101%	.74** (.29) [2.09] 109%	.68 (.30)** [1.97] 97%	.77* (.42) [2.16] 116%	.33 (.44)	1.02*** (.31) [2.39] 140%	.72** (.30) [2.06] 106%	.81** (.37) [2.26] 126%	.58 (.37)
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0050** (.0018) [.995] -0.5%	-.0056** (.0018) [.9944] -0.6%	-.0016*** (.0049) [.9833] -1.7%	-.0162*** (.0048) [.9839] -1.6%	-.0053** (.0020) [.9947] -0.5%	-.0061** (.0021) [.9940] -0.6%	-.0123*** (.0033) [.9950] -0.5%	-.0116*** (.0032) [.9885] -1.1%	-.0039** (.0019) [.9960] -0.4%	-.0047* (.0020) [.10] -0.5%
Number of Elections (per election period)	-.02 (.11)	.03 (.10)	--	--	-.04 (.11)	.02 (.10)	.12 (.14)	.05 (.13)	-.30 (.27)	.12 (.20)
N	3136	3136	844	844	2264	2264	939	939	2169	2169
α	10.20†	10.71†	5.20†	5.08†	13.08†	14.25†	6.29†	7.15†	11.90†	12.09†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1525	-1579	-522.90	-541.22	-977.95	-1007	-541.97	-548.75	-964.99	-1011

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.

†α is statistically significant

Table 6.8. Win/Loss Counts Gubernatorial Comparison ADULT and RAISED, by State Type (1948-2008)

Variable Name	By ADULT	By RAISED	Urban States-ADULT	Urban States-RAISED	Rural States-ADULT	Rural States-RAISED	Concentrated-ADULT	Concentrated-RAISED	Dispersed-ADULT	Dispersed-RAISED
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.28*** (.03) [1.32] 32%	.25*** (.03) [1.29] 29%	.24*** (.04) [1.27] 27%	.18*** (.03) [1.20] 20%	.31*** (.05) [1.37] 37%	.33*** (.06) [1.39] 39%	.20*** (.04) [1.22] 22%	.16*** (.03) [1.17] 17%	.36*** (.05) [1.43] 44%	.35*** (.05) [1.42] 42%
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.05* (.03) [1.05] 5%	.08** (.03) [1.08] 8%	.10** (.04) [1.11] 11%	.14** (.04) [1.14] 14%	-.02 (.05)	-.02 (.05)	.03 (.04)	.04 (.04)	.05 (.04)	.09** (.04) [1.10] 10%
Percent Self-Employment	-.03* (.02) [0.97] -3%	-.04** (.02) [0.96] -4%	-.14*** (.04) [.87] -13%	-.14** (.04) [0.87] -13%	-.02 (.02)	-.03 (.02)	-.05 (.04)	-.08** (.03) [0.92] -8%	-.03 (.03)	-.03 (.03)
Non-Metro Rural	-.22 (.24)	-.32 (.24)	-1.05 (.71)	-1.42** (.69) [0.24] -76%	-.22 (.27)	-.24 (.27)	-.41 (.35)	-.55 (.37)	-.01 (.31)	-.10 (.30)
State Capital	1.11*** (.19) [3.05] 205%	.81*** (.20) [2.26] 126%	.92** (.35) [2.51] 151%	.38 (.31)	1.24*** (.25) [3.46] 247%	1.00*** (.27) [2.71] 171%	.87** (.33) [2.39] 140%	.62** (.30) [1.86] 86%	1.29*** (.24) [3.63] 263%	.97*** (.25) [2.64] 164%
Number of Counties (per state)	-.0049** (.0016) [.9951] -0.5%	-.0043** (.0014) [.998] -0.2%	-.0174*** (.0036) [.9828] -1.7%	-.0161*** (.0036) [.9840] -1.6%	-.0054** (.0018) [.9946] -0.5%	-.0039** (.0016) [.9961] -0.4%	-.0100*** (.0025) [.9900] -1%	-.0118*** (.0023) [.9883] -1.2%	-.0034** (.0017) [.9967] -0.3%	-.0026* (.0015) [.9974] -0.3%
Number of Elections (per election period)	.11** (.06) [1.11] 11%	.04 (.06)	.17** (.07) [1.18] 18%	.01 (.08)	.06 (.10)	.07 (.10)	.13** (.06) [1.13] 13%	.00 (.06)	-.07 (.14)	-.04 (.13)
N	3136	3136	844	844	2264	2264	939	939	2169	2169
α	4.61†	4.89†	2.61†	3.20†	5.57†	5.60†	2.28†	2.33†	5.62†	5.84†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1554	-1632	-493.97	-542	-1030	-1065	-520.45	-519.87	-1011	-1085

Note: All entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Incident rate ratios are in square brackets for statistically significant coefficients. ***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test). The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.

†α is statistically significant

Table 6.9. Win/Loss Model, Senatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by ADULT

Variable Name	All State Types	Urban	Rural	Concentrated	Dispersed	UC	RC	UD	RD
Incumbent	2.42*** (.12)	2.12*** (.16)	2.72*** (.18)	2.31*** (.19)	2.47*** (.15)	2.17*** (.23)	2.63*** (.35)	2.02*** (.24)	2.73*** (.20)
Non-Native Candidate	-.14 (.14)	-.21 (.17)	-.04 (.23)	-.03 (.21)	-.22 (.18)	-.06 (.23)	-.19 (.46)	-.34 (.26)	-.00 (.26)
Party Support	.03*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)	.02** (.01)	.04*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)	.01 (.02)	.02** (.01)
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.02 (.03)	.00 (.01)	.01 (.02)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.05)	.00 (.02)	-.01 (.06)
Percentage Black	.41 (.39)	.73 (.71)	.19 (.51)	.46 (.81)	.39 (.46)	1.09 (.94)	2.53 (2.10)	.65 (1.3)	.36 (.54)
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.00 (.02)	.03 (.03)	-.05 (.07)	-.01 (.04)	.02 (.03)	.00 (.04)	-.09 (.15)	.07* (.04)	-.06 (.09)
Percent Self-Employment	.01 (.02)	-.01 (.04)	.02 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.02)	.02 (.06)	.01 (.06)	-.05 (.06)	.02 (.03)
Non-Metro Rural	.09 (.29)	1.07 (.76)	-.17 (.35)	.22 (.49)	.03 (.36)	1.30 (1.30)	-.05 (.60)	.70 (.81)	-.27 (.45)
State Capital	.25 (.15)	.30 (.22)	.34 (.23)	.38 (.24)	.16 (.21)	.40 (.28)	.62 (.54)	.07 (.46)	.24 (.26)
Number of Counties (per state)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)
Number of Elections (per election period)	.03 (.09)	--	.07 (.10)	.06 (.13)	-.03 (.20)	--	.26 (.18)	--	.05 (.22)
Rural County	.29** (.15)	.21 (.22)	.21 (.25)	.42* (.25)	.26 (.20)	.33 .33	.19 (.53)	.20 (.31)	.14 (.34)
N	1999	908	1091	811	1188	505	306	403	785
Pseudo R^2	.2227†	.1843†	.2630†	.2373†	.2174†	.2085†	.3016†	.1684†	.2540†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1076	-513.35	-556.54	-428.68	-643.95	-277.06	-148.05	-232.28	-405.13

Note: All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the candidate lost. The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood.
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test)
†Chi-2 is statistically significant

Table 6.10. Win/Loss Model, Senatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by RAISED

Variable Name	All State Types	Urban	Rural	Concentrated	Dispersed	UC	RC	UD	RD
Incumbent	2.42*** (.12)	2.12*** (.17)	2.63*** (.17)	2.19*** (.19)	2.51*** (.16)	2.03*** (.23)	2.45*** (.32)	2.20*** (.26)	2.68*** (.20)
Non-Native Candidate	-.14 (.14)	-.22 (.19)	-.13 (.22)	-.08 (.23)	-.17 (.19)	-.04 (.28)	-.45 (.47)	-.43 (.30)	-.02 (.26)
Party Support	.03*** (.01)	.03** (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)	.02** (.01)	.03** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.01 (.02)	.02** (.01)
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.06* (.03)	.00 (.02)	.02 (.03)
Percentage Black	.41 (.39)	.22 (.69)	.47 (.52)	.31 (.77)	.14 (.48)	.86 (.04)	-3.13 (2.02)	-1.22 (1.24)	.41 (.57)
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	.00 (.02)	.03 (.03)	-.06 (.06)	.00 (.04)	-.00 (.03)	.03 (.04)	-.14 (.15)	.02 (.04)	-.06 (.08)
Percent Self-Employment	.01 (.02)	.00 (.04)	.02 (.03)	.02 (.04)	.00 (.03)	.00 (.05)	.07 (.06)	.01 (.06)	.00 (.03)
Non-Metro Rural	.09 (.29)	1.15 (.78)	-.16 (.36)	.39 (.48)	-.13 (.21)	1.82 (1.41)	-.20 (.64)	.74 (.93)	-.27 (.47)
State Capital	.25 (.15)	.39* (.22)	.00 (.00)	.27 (.23)	.15 (.21)	.55* (.29)	.04 (.49)	.25 (.39)	.15 (.26)
Number of Counties (per state)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)
Number of Elections (per election period)	.03 (.09)	.03 (.25)	.06 (.11)	.19 (.13)	-.12 (.15)	.79 (.56)	.40** (.18)	--	-.08 (.17)
Rural County	.29** (.15)	-.13 (.22)	.28 (.23)	.36 (.25)	.18 (.20)	.47 (.33)	.16 (.44)	-.20 (.32)	.26 (.27)
N	1999	857	1079	784	1152	469	315	386	764
Pseudo R^2	.2227†	.1845†	.2530†	.2365†	.2212†	.1938†	.3157†	.1874†	.2437†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1076	-484.43	-557.60	-420.29	-621.45	-262.03	-149.38	-217.26	-399.30

Note: All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the candidate lost. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test)
†Chi-2 is statistically significant

Table 6.11. Win/Loss Model, Gubernatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by ADULT

Variable Name	All State Types	Urban	Rural	Concentrated	Dispersed	UC	RC	UD	RD
Incumbent	1.44*** (.12)	1.47*** (.17)	1.41*** (.17)	1.52*** (.19)	1.40*** (.15)	1.58*** (.22)	1.34*** (.36)	1.35*** (.26)	1.46*** (.20)
Non-Native Candidate	.31** (.14)	.34** (.17)	.29 (.23)	.35* (.20)	.26 (.19)	.52** (.23)	-.40 (.44)	.05 (.27)	.51* (.28)
Party Support	.01** (.00)	-.00 (.01)	.02** (.01)	.00 (.01)	.01** (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.04** (.01)	.03*** (.01)
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.03)	.00 (.01)	.02 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	.00 (.04)	.00 (.02)	-.00 (.07)
Percentage Black	1.12** (.42)	1.40* (.75)	.89 (.55)	1.29* (.76)	1.18** (.55)	1.60 (1.00)	-.06 (1.7)	1.77 (1.46)	1.24* (.67)
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	-.03 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	-.03 (.07)	-.04 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.13 (.11)	-.02 (.05)	.01 (.09)
Percent Self-Employment	.01 (.02)	-.02 (.04)	.01 (.03)	-.00 (.04)	.01 (.03)	-.03 (.06)	.02 (.06)	-.03 (.07)	.01 (.03)
Non-Metro Rural	-.17 (.29)	-1.23 (.92)	-.15 (.32)	.01 (.54)	-.21 (.33)	-.42 (1.42)	-.62 (.71)	-1.60 (1.07)	-.11 (.37)
State Capital	-.02 (.00)	.16 (.21)	.30 (.24)	-.10 (.22)	.14 (.23)	-.09 (.27)	.31 (.48)	-.42 (.44)	.34 (.30)
Number of Counties (per state)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)
Number of Elections (per election period)	.02 (.03)	.05 (.04)	.08 (.13)	.01 (.04)	.07 (.14)	.01 (.05)	.28 (.29)	-.10 (.30)	.14 (.17)
Rural County[29]	.41** (.16)	.19 (.25)	.63** (.26)	.51* (.29)	.48** (.21)	-.05 (.39)	1.08** (.53)	.44 (.33)	.60 (.38)
N	1715	821	894	720	996	489	231	332	663
Pseudo R^2	.0805†	.0880†	.0834†	.0866†	.0779†	.1072†	.1163†	.0906†	.0964†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1093	-518.96	-567.63	-454.83	-635.83	-302.61	-141.45	-209.23	-414.94

Note: All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the candidate lost. The model labeled ADULT classifies "alien" candidates' hometowns as where they were living when they ran; all other "non-alien" candidates in the ADULT model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood.
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test)
†Chi-2 is statistically significant

[29] The Non-Metro Rural county measure was used by Gimpel et al. and is all non-metro counties with fewer than 10, 000; whereas, my Rural county variable is a relative measure for state type. It was coded 1 if the county had less than 5% of the state's population. The two measures had a VIF score of 1.08.

Table 6.12. Win/Loss Model, Gubernatorial Elections—By State Type (1948-2008), by RAISED

Variable Name	All State Types	Urban	Rural	Concentrated	Dispersed	UC	RC	UD	RD
Incumbent	1.44*** (.12)	1.58*** (.17)	1.37*** (.17)	1.56*** (.20)	1.41*** (.15)	1.71*** (.24)	1.31*** (.35)	1.42*** (.26)	1.41*** (.20)
Non-Native Candidate	.31** (.14)	.40** (.19)	.21 (.23)	.25 (.23)	.20 (.18)	.26 (.28)	.40 (.52)	.36 (.28)	.11 (.28)
Party Support	.01** (.00)	.00 (.01)	.01* (.01)	.00 (.01)	.01** (.01)	.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	.02** (.01)
Electoral Concentration (% of state)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.00 (.02)	.00 (.01)	.02 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.02)	-.00 (.03)
Percentage Black	1.12** (.42)	1.18 (.74)	1.12** (.54)	1.30* (.78)	1.24** (.52)	1.49 (.10)	1.28 (1.76)	1.38 (1.17)	1.41** (.65)
Percent High Income (Relative to State Average)	-.03 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.04 (.07)	.01* (.04)	.01 (.04)	-.06 (.05)	-.16 (.10)	.02 (.05)	.03 (.08)
Percent Self-Employment	.01 (.02)	-.04 (.05)	.02 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.01 (.03)	-.03 (.07)	.02 (.06)	-.07 (.07)	.01 (.03)
Non-Metro Rural	-.17 (.29)	-.33 (.94)	-.20 (.33)	-.13 (.56)	-.04 (.35)	.04 (1.4)	-.84 (.68)	-.65 (1.23)	-.07 (.38)
State Capital	-.02 (.00)	.17 (.22)	.33 (.23)	-.25 (.23)	.21 (.21)	-.33 (.30)	.28 (.46)	-.01 (.36)	.43 (.28)
Number of Counties (per state)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.00 (.00)
Number of Elections (per election period)	.02 (.03)	-.01 (.04)	.18 (.11)	-.03 (.05)	.15** (.08)	-.02 (.06)	.33 (.27)	.09 (.10)	.23* (.13)
Rural County	.41** (.16)	.23 (.25)	.68** (.23)	.10 (.30)	.68*** (.20)	.58 (.42)	1.02** (.52)	.81** (.35)	.68** (.28)
N	1715	784	886	656	1014	428	228	356	658
Pseudo R^2	.0805†	.0992†	.0806†	.0937†	.0856†	.1191†	.1089†	.1013†	.0904†
Log pseudo-likelihood	-1093	-489.52	-564.35	-412.06	-642.46	-260.62	-140.19	-221.25	-414.85

Note: All entries are logistic regression estimates with robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable, winning, is scored 1 if the candidate won and 0 if the candidate lost. The RAISED model codes the "alien" born candidates to their birth state and county. All other "non-alien" candidates in the RAISED model were coded based upon the county where they spent the majority of their childhood, as with the ADULT classification.
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.1 (two tailed test)
†Chi-2 is statistically significant

Figure 1.1. Urban States and Counties of Concentration



This map includes both concentrated and dispersed urban states.
It is hypothesized that urban-based candidates will do better overall, relative to rural states.

Figure 1.2. Rural States and Counties of Concentration



This map includes both concentrated and dispersed rural states.
It is hypothesized that urban-based candidates will be unsucessful, generally speaking for rural dispersed states.
For rural concentrated states, urban-based candidates are expected to be successful;
although, at lower rates than for urban concentrated states.

Figure 1.3. Illinois Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Urban Concentrated State





Figure 1.4. Washington Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Urban Dispersed State

Washington Winner Count, by County (1948-2008)



Washington Loser Count, by County (1948-2008)*



*Three Non-Native Losing Candidates

Figure 1.5. Oklahoma Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Rural Concentrated State

Oklahoma Winner Count, by County (1948-2008)*





*Four Non-Native
Winning Candidates

Oklahoma Loser Count, by County (1948-2008)**





**Five Non-Native
Losing Candidates

Figure 1.6. Missouri Winner versus Loser Count Comparison, Rural Dispersed State





Figure 5.1. Probability of zero candidates based upon electoral concentration, for Rural, Concentrated and Dispersed Classified states (Senate Elections)



Figure 5.2. Probability of zero candidates based upon electoral concentration, for Urban, Rural, Concentrated and Dispersed Classified states (Gubernatorial Elections)