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J. Martin Rochester
rochester@umsl.edu

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The United Nations and
World Order: Reviving the Theory
and Practice of International
Organization

J. Martin Rochester

THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: REVIVING THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION*

J. Martin Rochester
Department of Political Science, and
Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri 63121-4499
U.S.A.

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THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: REVIVING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

As Mark Twain put it, "faith is believin' in what you know ain't true." One would seemingly have to rely upon faith today to believe that international organizations -- particularly those at the global level -- deserve to be taken seriously by either practitioners or scholars. It is commonly observed that the United Nations system has been in decline for some time and has become enfeebled during the past decade, especially in the peace and security area where the UN has been conspicuous by its absence or futility in numerous ongoing conflicts around the globe. Despite some signs of revival lately, the impression that the UN has reached a nadir is confirmed by empirical research. A recent study finds that only 32% of "all disputes involving military operations and fighting" have been referred to the UN in the 1980s -- "the lowest share in the history of the organization."¹ This is in contrast to the UN's relatively successful record between 1945 and 1975, when the organization became involved in more than half of all "international crises" and was effective at "crisis abatement" in one-third of those cases, with effectiveness increasing as the situation became more serious and more violent.² In the economic arena, the Bretton Woods postwar economic order, the foundation of which has been the International Monetary Fund and related UN agencies, is widely recognized as having become unravelled and threatened with collapse.³ In the environmental and other more technical issue-areas, the problems are mounting at the same time that institutional capabilities seem to be diminishing, with the UN attempting to survive a financial crisis that finds the membership some \$500 million in arrears. In the words of a former UN Secretary-General:

The fact is plain. The United Nations has fallen upon hard days. It goes through its paces in a workaday routine that is increasingly

ignored or condemned and that threatens to become increasingly irrelevant in the real world. . . . To some, its future is at best obscure.⁴

The future of international organization as a field of study would appear "obscure" as well, if one defines *international organization* in conventional terms as referring generally to "a formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social, or related fields."⁵ The malaise surrounding the "world of actual international organizations"⁶ has been accompanied by the increased disengagement of international organization scholars from the study of those organizations.⁷ As two authors characterize the current relationship between theory and practice in the international organization field, "the leading doctors have become biochemists and have stopped treating and in most cases even seeing patients."⁸ Instead of studying multilateral institutions, scholars are studying the institution of multilateralism (as John Ruggie has put it, "institutionalized collective behavior").⁹ In other words, the emphasis is on the analysis of "recognized patterns . . . around which expectations converge," which "may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements,"¹⁰ i.e. *regimes*. Regimes constitute widely accepted norms, rules, procedures, or other forms of cooperation -- "governing arrangements"¹¹ -- that permit the international community to function and cope with various concerns in the absence of a world government. While this new focus of international organization scholarship is generally felt to represent a healthy maturation of the field away from earlier sterile preoccupation with legal-formal aspects of international affairs toward consideration of broader phenomena, it has rendered the field almost indistinguishable from the rest of the international relations discipline.¹² Moreover, largely unnoticed or unsaid, the deprecation of international organizations that is a signature trait of the regime literature

reflects a pervasive pessimism toward the prospects of international institution-building that is perhaps unprecedented in this century.

Such skepticism would not seem totally justified. If it is obvious that international organizations are currently experiencing serious problems, it is also obvious that it is hard to envision a future for humanity without international organization of some sort. Pollyanish as this statement sounds, it is grounded in what is plainly evident. When one looks beyond present epiphenomena and takes a longer-term, historical perspective, the following simple observations can be made: (1) the trend is unmistakably in the direction of international organizational growth, with one recent study documenting the proliferation of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and counting over 1000 such entities in the contemporary global political system;¹³ (2) the "expectation of international organization, the habit of organizing, the taking-for-granted of international bodies . . . are permanent results of the movement" that began almost from scratch a century or so ago;¹⁴ and (3) the United Nations - primitive, flawed, and fragile as it is-- represents the latest, most ambitious stage in the historic process of global institution-building.

There are two still simpler observations about the global condition that cannot escape attention today. A few may dispute these facts of international life, but the supporting evidence is overwhelming and does not require lengthy recitation here. On the one hand, notwithstanding a rising tide of transnational activity, elites and attentive publics almost universally remain wedded to the Westphalian state system culture, with its emphasis on nationalism, national interests, and sovereignty; and it strains human mental capacities to imagine the international organization "movement" or any other development undermining this condition anytime soon.¹⁵ On the other hand, given technological imperatives that are inexorably producing reduced travel, communications, and other distances

between states and concomitantly increased interdependence in terms of "sensitivity" and "vulnerability,"¹⁶ it is equally mindboggling to imagine these same elites and publics --save for the most isolationist-oriented-- experiencing in the foreseeable future any diminution in their felt need for improved, more elaborate ways to manage interstate relations. Between these two fundamental realities of the nuclear age lies the potential for unparalleled conflict as well as unparalleled cooperation.

These thoughts, of course, are not new or profound. They have been uttered so often in one manner or another as to border on cliché, which is perhaps why their implications have been so blithely ignored of late and, hence, deserve more careful scrutiny. One can find as many integrative forces at work in the contemporary international system as disintegrative ones.¹⁷ To the extent that the disintegrative forces currently operating in the international system contribute to a growing sense of chaos and crisis in the international community, they may provide the very impetus needed for forging a consensus among national governments and their constituencies behind the search for new means of international governance. While it is true that "necessities [in themselves] do not create possibilities,"¹⁸ one should also avoid another form of wishful thinking, namely rationalizing that because some change is thought impossible, it is thereby not needed. Determination of what is both necessary and possible with regard to international governance involves complicated empirical and normative judgments that often get blurred.

My objective here is to make a case for a return to the study of international organization generally and the United Nations in particular as an important component of the quest for world order in the late twentieth century, based on an empirical argument rather than merely normative belief or "faith", and to suggest new directions this line of inquiry might take. As such, the author

adopts an *institutionalist* and *globalist* approach to international order, positing that (1) the development of formal intergovernmental organizations is at least as relevant to concerns about order (and, by implication, peaceful change) as the development of less formal modes of interstate cooperation, even though not all organizational arrangements are equally benign in this regard, and (2) any efforts at international institution-building must focus to some extent on the global level and the creation of "central guidance" mechanisms, even though many problems can be treated as regional or bilateral in scope and might be usefully addressed through international organizations operating at those levels or requiring only "limited membership" participation. These ideas, once part of the orthodoxy of the international organization field, now sound almost heretical, although we may be on the brink of another round of revisionism.

Interestingly, just as political scientists recently have rediscovered institutions as phenomena worth studying and have shown a renewed appreciation of their role in shaping political life at the national level,¹⁹ international relations specialists have begun calling for "a new theory of institutions"²⁰ in the international realm. However, where the former define institutions in a way that accords prominent treatment to "organizational factors," the latter as already noted tend to conceptualize the term more loosely, in the context of regimes, consciously downplaying such factors. To be sure, the new institutionalists in the international relations field call for including international organizations in their formulations. Young, for example, acknowledges that "relations between the regimes themselves and various explicit organizations are of obvious importance" in pursuing "the promise of institutionalism."²¹ Likewise, Ruggie recognizes that as "international institutions of a formal kind have been left behind" in the wake of the regime literature, there is "the ever-present danger of theory getting out of touch with

practice," and hence "it is necessary to link up regimes in some fashion with the formal mechanisms through which real-world actors operate."²² Regarding the UN's predicament in particular, Ruggie has attempted recently "to begin to rectify the abdication of responsible comment by the academic community," noting that "the academic community can help engender realistic expectations and offer proposals for institutional reform"²³ and adding that, if the "crisis of multilateralism" is to be resolved, "professional students of international organization . . . will have to play their part -- which is to rejuvenate the systematic study of the structure and functioning of institutions in the contemporary world system."²⁴ Still, as critics of the UN have been known to say, there remains much more talk than action on this front, given the token amount of attention international organizations continue to receive in the scholarly literature.

What follows, then, is an exploration of how the study of the United Nations might fit into a research program on the "new institutionalism" in international relations and, in a broader vein, how the theory and practice of international organization might be revived after years of neglect. The article will first examine a variety of theoretical perspectives on the nature of world order, elaborating upon what I have described as unprecedented pessimism that marks the current generation of students of international governance, and will then take up the task of reinstating the UN within this scholarly tradition.

Approaches to World Order: From Maximalism to Minimalism

The major problematique of the international relations field over the years has been how to minimize conflict and maximize cooperation, thereby maintaining a semblance of order, in a decentralized system of sovereign states. A variety of "approaches to world order" have been suggested at one time or another -- the enlightened management of power (hegemony, balance, or concert), the development

of formal rules (international law), the development of formal machinery (international organization), and others. Although the three approaches just mentioned are not mutually exclusive, they generally have been considered distinct in nature. As noted above, there is some question today whether international organizations are any longer relevant enough to the world order problematique to merit inclusion in the panoply of approaches worthy of scholarly research. It can be argued, though, that this skepticism goes beyond international organization, extending to international law and, indeed, to the very concept of world order.

Three observers of the contemporary scene have commented:

Perhaps not since the birth of the modern state system, usually associated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, has the image of international law in the political life of the world seemed so tarnished. This is not . . . because there is "less" law or "more" sovereignty, but because the inability of law to satisfy steadily increasing minimal expectations about the requirements of global order . . . create[s] an impression of "failure", deterioration, and disillusionment. Indeed, given the inability of international law to evolve at a pace comparable to that of increasing interdependence, *doing more can still seem like achieving less.*²⁵

International organization could easily be substituted for international law in the previous sentence. Even if these authors are overstating the case in suggesting that the current cynicism is unparalleled in the roughly 300 years since Westphalia, it would seem unsurpassed at least in this century, since international relations first emerged as an identifiable academic discipline in the period between the two world wars. As David Fromkin states: "The leaders of civilized opinion in every generation since 1914 . . . have believed that there is an urgent need for world politics to be transformed in such a fundamental way that warfare will be abolished and mankind will never have to go back into the trenches and bomb shelters again."²⁶ Although Fromkin himself exaggerates the degree of consensus that developed after World War I regarding the necessity for radical system transformation -- the League and UN were bold experiments, but hardly aimed

at altering the status quo -- he properly calls attention to what has been a twentieth century penchant for thinking in larger, world order terms. That is, until now.

If the interwar period -- in which the "idealist" school dominated international relations thinking, and international organization enjoyed the status of not so much a subfield as the core of the discipline -- could be characterized as *maximalist* in its view of world order possibilities,²⁷ the present era -- after a passage through "realism" to "neorealism" in the post-World War II years, during which time international organization as a distinct subfield was gradually consigned to the periphery and then to virtual oblivion except in name only²⁸ -- can only be labeled *minimalist*. Many will object to this portrayal of the intellectual odyssey of international relations scholars in the postwar period. The more common view is that the current state of the field reflects a long overdue convergence of the idealist and realist paradigms, as the intellectual heirs of the realist tradition have generally come to recognize how non-security issues can compete for attention with security issues and that order can coexist with anarchy in the international realm, while the descendants of the idealist tradition have generally come to understand how power and interests underlie order and that order can consist in something less than law and organization.²⁹ It is said that international politics scholars and international organization scholars have met each other halfway, with a single theoretical framework able to accommodate the investigation of a whole range of phenomena from military-strategic concerns of a "high politics" nature to economic and other concerns of a "low politics" nature, all of which can feature elements of both conflict and cooperation.³⁰ Writings combining threads of realist and idealist thought into the twin themes of "anarchy and order" abound.³¹

Why the observation that order can prevail amidst (and cooperation can occur under) anarchy should be treated seemingly as a profound discovery by the current generation of international relations scholars is puzzling, since such assumptions have informed the problematique of the field from the start and were elaborated upon long ago by the likes of Wolfers, Aron, Kaplan and Katzenbach, Claude, and others.³² What is even more puzzling, however, is how the present synthesis of realism and idealism can be seen as a rather even-handed exchange of concessions made by those representing the two traditions, when in fact realism has gotten much the better of it. There is, after all, no neoidealism to match neorealism.³³ At most, one can speak of neoliberals³⁴ and those accused of being neorealists (structural realists) but who refuse to be branded as such or to be labeled in any way.³⁵ Although the international relations field has become far too large and diverse to be captured completely by any one school of thought, neorealism seems increasingly to be setting the terms of much scholarly debate despite its many "critics."³⁶ As the authors of a book that led the way in reconciling realist and idealist ideas have recently admitted, "less has been done with the liberal than the realist half of our attempted synthesis."³⁷ The contemporary study of international relations can rightly be considered "minimalist" in terms of world order perspectives, inasmuch as those scholars widely viewed as "forward thinkers" on the leading edge of knowledge production -- neorealists and neoliberals alike -- tend to harbor more modest expectations about the prospects for progressive change in human affairs than their classical realist and idealist counterparts of yesteryear.³⁸

How else can one interpret the disarmingly understated, underwhelming, cautiously worded conclusion reached at the end of a much-celebrated recent symposium on "Cooperation Under Anarchy", acknowledging that "[despite anarchy] as the articles in this symposium have shown, cooperation is sometimes attained"³⁹?

Even with the rise of realism in the late 1940s and 1950s, "serious" scholarship could still be found in those days frequently asking questions about the feasibility of developing supranational institutions; in the 1960s, asking questions about the dynamics of political integration at the regional and other levels; and as recently as the late 1970s, asking questions about the implications of transnational and transgovernmental coalition-building within international organizations.⁴⁰ Such studies did not necessarily start with rosy premises or yield optimistic conclusions about the prospects for a new world order, but they at least considered it worth the effort to examine relatively elaborate and advanced forms of collaboration across national boundaries. In the 1980s, in contrast, the world order problematique commonly found in the major journals and scholarly literature has been reduced to the most elemental, primitive, and truly cynical of all questions, i.e. how is *any* inter-state cooperation possible?

In Robert Jervis' words, "the basic question posed by the recent work is how self-interested actors can cooperate in the face of anarchy and important conflicting interests."⁴¹ Similarly, Robert Axelrod ponders how "cooperation [can] occur in a world of egoists without central authority."⁴² Great pain is taken and great satisfaction apparently derived in demonstrating that cooperation can occur in international affairs. Reviewing Robert Keohane's impressive effort in *After Hegemony* to establish why "it would be a mistake to infer . . . that cooperation is impossible without hegemony,"⁴³ James Rosenau comments: "Genuinely puzzled, Keohane relentlessly pursues this question in chapter after chapter, through the thickets of rational-choice models, along the path of functional explanations, down the road of bounded rationality, and in and around many dead-ends until the diverse pieces of the puzzle fit together."⁴⁴

No doubt Keohane and others would contend that it is not a matter of being more cynical but rather more scholarly in the pursuit of knowledge relevant to

world order concerns. The classic problematique continues to preoccupy scholars but the focus has shifted somewhat from controlling violence to the more mundane and yet more positive matter of managing interdependence. New, more sophisticated perspectives and tools are being utilized; as Jervis notes, "recent analyses have formalized these problems and analyzed them by means of modern social science techniques."⁴⁵ The latest approaches -- notably game theory, public goods theory, and microeconomic theory comparing the behavior of states with that of profit-maximizing firms in a free market -- bring us back to basics, subjecting such terms as "cooperation" to much tighter conceptualization and employing more rigorous analysis in seeking to uncover the conditions associated with international cooperation. The general view that informs this enterprise is that the grander theorizing which produced a spate of writings on the UN, regional integration, and transnationalism in successive decades earlier in the postwar period made for a series of false starts that could not withstand reality-testing. In short, it is felt that the newer approaches promise to provide more reliable knowledge and, ultimately, more useful advice for policymakers regarding the promotion of cooperation in international affairs.⁴⁶

Still, one is left with a nagging question whether the recent literature takes us much beyond the insights gained from previous work on the dynamics of "why nations collaborate"⁴⁷ and, in particular, whether it is capable of providing insights about how states can move from *ad hoc* cooperation and the striking of bargains to longer-term *institution-building*, i.e. whether it truly has anything to say about *world order*. The latter requires not merely theorizing about interstate interactions a la Schelling and other pioneering strategic thinkers (micro-systemic phenomena)⁴⁸ but theorizing about international system change and development (macro-systemic or system-wide phenomena), a focus currently receiving scant attention.

For example, the latest game-theoretic approaches treat "the evolution of cooperation" in the context of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy rather than in the context of system development. Although such studies note that the "shadow of the future" (the anticipation of having to play repeated rounds of a game or several different games with the same actor or actors over time) is an important variable that is subject to "willful modification" -- states can foster cooperation through strategies which "lengthen" the shadow-- few attempts are made to explore the implications for international institution-building at the system-wide (or, for that matter, subsystem) level.⁴⁹ One reason is that a key theoretical argument made in this literature --involving another manipulable variable, the number of players-- is that cooperation is best achieved through "decomposition" whereby only the barest number of relevant actors are brought into the bargaining process from issue to issue.⁵⁰ In game-theoretic terms, global institution-building is dismissed from the start as a game of Deadlock as opposed to Prisoners' Dilemma or some other mixed-motive game. Another, more fundamental reason behind the reluctance to think in larger systemic terms is the tendency to equate global institution-building with the structural transformation of the international system from anarchy to world government. Since it is assumed that "any ultimate escape from international anarchy is unlikely,"⁵¹ it appears whimsical to think beyond "cooperation under anarchy" to international system development. However, the development of the international system could conceivably take a number of different paths somewhere between anarchy and world government, possibilities which could be reasonably discussed without any teleological assumptions necessarily embedded in them.

There would appear to be one major exception to the indictment just presented, one qualifier that the reader might yell cries out for special mention -- the heavy attention that neorealists, neoliberals, and others give to the study

of regimes. It is not an exaggeration to say that "indeed, 'regimes' seem now to be everywhere!"⁵² As noted at the outset, regime analysts are interested in phenomena which go beyond ad hoc inter-state bargaining and involve patterned collective behavior. It is said that regimes help to institutionalize what otherwise would be merely "atomistic reciprocity."⁵³ Regime studies discuss the learning of consensual knowledge, the use of issue-linkage strategies, and other integrative or aggregative processes. However, other than the theory of hegemonic stability, which is relatively weak in its treatment of institutions, it is hard to find discussions in the regime literature that tend toward a system-wide perspective in dealing with problems of world order.⁵⁴

Robert Keohane, following upon his study of the dynamics of regime-making in the absence of hegemony, perhaps as much as anyone has called for increased attention to international institutions. However, his "functional" approach "does not distinguish clearly between institutions and organizations, nor indicate the conditions that lead to the international development of the latter."⁵⁵ Moreover, even though he, with Joseph Nye, has urged the adoption of "a systemic conception of international relations" that combines the neorealist focus on "structure" with the liberal focus on "process,"⁵⁶ the institution-building implied here is as limited as the authors' conception of institutions is broad. In arguing elsewhere against "global unilateralism," Keohane and Nye seem to advocate instead non-global multilateralism, appearing at best ambivalent about system-wide approaches to institution-building in general and organization-building in particular. On the one hand, echoing game-theoretic notions, they note that although "a crazy quilt of international regimes is likely to arise" without universal approaches, "better some roughness around the edges of international regimes than a vacuum at the center. Poorly coordinated coalitions, working effectively on various issues, are in general preferable to universalistic negotiations permanently deadlocked by

a diverse membership."⁵⁷ They add "only rarely are universal international organizations likely to provide the world with instruments for collective action."⁵⁸ On the other hand, "every effort should be made . . . to allow for the eventual universalization of the regimes."⁵⁹

One has to wonder whether the regime literature is yet another "fad" that will go the way of earlier bodies of international organization theory which had focused heavily on regional integration, transnationalism, and other concerns of passing interest.⁶⁰ There is reason to believe that regimes may have more staying power since, unlike previous turns taken in the international organization field over the course of the postwar era which now seem in retrospect to have been knee-jerk responses to specific events of the day -- the establishment of the UN, the creation of the European Economic Community, the oil embargo episode and ensuing energy crisis following on the heels of Vietnam -- the interest in regimes is the culmination of the accumulated experiences and reflections of a half-century of shattered expectations. Regimes have captured the attention of international organization specialists and much of the international relations discipline not necessarily because of any superior theoretical potency or clarity but perhaps because, after being burned so often in the past, scholars can count on the regime framework as "a fairly safe one to bet one's scholarly credentials on insofar as it is sufficiently amorphous to apprehend any number of eventualities within the parameters of the state system."⁶¹

Unfortunately, the concept of regime is in danger of becoming an "ambiguous symbol"⁶² both for scholars seeking to explain international phenomena and for practitioners seeking to prescribe policies. It has become a victim of its popularity. As Keohane himself has warned, "whenever a concept in international relations becomes popular, particularly as a remedy for conflict, we should be cautious."⁶³ Noting the problems that befell "balance of power" thinking, he

cites Claude's jest that " 'balance of power' is to writers on international relations as 'a pinch of salt' is to cooks, 'stellar southpaw' to baseball writers, and 'dialectical materialism' to Marxist theoreticians."⁶⁴ Although unintended by Keohane, the point could apply to regimes today.

If the concept of regime is to become more useful, analysts must deal more explicitly with empirical and normative questions raised by regime analysis. One needs to be more specific about such matters as regime content (what is meant by institutionalization) and regime scope (what part of the international system is covered by it). What degree of acceptance of rules, norms, procedures, and/or organizational machinery, involving how many actors, is the bottom line for a regime to be said to exist in a given issue-area? What are the relationships between the informal and formal elements of a regime, and is there any natural evolution that is observable or preferable? How does one distinguish between regimes as independent variables (devices or "settings" that bring about the institutionalization of world politics) and as dependent variables (the institutions themselves)? If the number of regimes is increasing, but the average number of actors associated with regimes is decreasing, does this mean we are seeing more, or less, international institution-building? It is questionable whether regimes have enough empirical and normative meaning that we can make such determinations. If it is hard to do so in the realm of theory, what does that say about the utility of regime analysis in the realm of practice?

To summarize the argument presented thusfar, a large segment of the international relations field has lost the capacity to think in world order terms except in the most minimal sense (as piecemeal cooperation), and with it the capacity to think more clearly about what are meant by international institutions and institution-building. The question is whether it is possible to overcome the limitations of current international organization perspectives without repeating

the mistakes and suffering the shattered expectations associated with earlier approaches. What is needed is a world order model that can help us "to understand peaceful change by combining multi-dimensional scholarly analysis with more visionary ways of seeing the future"⁶⁵ than we have been accustomed to recently. Such a model should specify what an achievable and desirable world order would look like in relation to the present, the criteria used, and how it might come about. If it is to merit broad and serious attention, it must be inspired by a careful sense of what Herz called "realistic idealism."⁶⁶ In the next section I will try to draw the outlines of such a model, showing how our conceiving of international institutions in a more traditional mold (as organizations) and in a systemic (global) context -- along the lines of the United Nations -- is relevant to problems of international governance.

World Order Revisited: Institution-Building and the Political Development of the International System

World order in the simplest terms refers to the basis upon which humanity has been, or could be, organized politically to govern its affairs.⁶⁷ There is general agreement that the primary structure which currently exists-- a decentralized, i.e. anarchic, system of sovereign nation-states-- has remained unchanged in its essential character since it came into being roughly around the time of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Within the anarchic state system structure, there is also common recognition that system transformation has occurred. This is where agreement begins to unravel. Using differing criteria, some observers have found system transformation occurring only rarely (Waltz, for example, finds only one change, the shift from multipolarity to bipolarity in 1945)⁶⁸ while others have cited frequent changes (Rosecrance, for example, identifies nine distinct systems between the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-twentieth century).⁶⁹ Some have found the degree of transformation relatively

modest (for example, from tight or loose bipolarity to "bimultipolarity" in the postwar period)⁷⁰ while others have noted potentially revolutionary changes (for example, the rise of nonstate actors competing with nation-states in a "polyarchic" setting in the contemporary era).⁷¹ There is disagreement particularly over whether the present system can best be described in power distribution or other terms as bipolar, multipolar, bimultipolar, hegemonic, polyarchic, or something else.

In addition to describing historical international systems, scholars have also described theoretically conceivable systems that do not yet have empirical referents (such as Kaplan's "unit veto," "universal," or "hierarchical" systems).⁷² The various real or hypothetical systems constitute alternative world order "models." Rather than thinking of world order in dichotomous (anarchy/nonanarchy) terms, we can plot alternative world order models along an axis containing space between anarchy (decentralization) and nonanarchy (centralization), based on roughly intuitive notions of how much the models tend toward one endpoint or the other. The axis would pass through variants of a unit veto system, multipolarity and bipolarity, hegemony, a system of specialized IGOs with varying degrees of supranationalism, confederation, and other systems along the way toward nonanarchy in the form of unitary (world) government. Perhaps we need a two-dimensional axis, distinguishing between centralization of power and centralization of authority. It could be argued that hegemony is the functional equivalent of world government (although no hegemon has been able to establish such supremacy unless one counts the empires of Rome and Alexander). The contemporary nation-state system would seem nowhere near nonanarchy, but it is also far from the kind of anarchy posed by a unit veto system or -- if nation-states themselves were to disintegrate into smaller, more fragmented entities -- by a pre-Westphalian system of feudal relationships.⁷³ Barry Buzan, contemplating

a "spectrum of anarchies," argues that the current international system is midway between high ("immature") and low ("mature") anarchy.⁷⁴ Utilizing our axis, one could go one step further and contemplate a spectrum of nonanarchies.

Different world order models incorporate different approaches to world order as alluded to earlier. (For example, bipolarity and multipolarity, as opposed to hegemony, can involve balance of power or concert of power mechanisms.) To speak of "approaches" is to imply that there is an element of human control and purposefulness over what kind of world order materializes. There has been much debate over the implications of various world order models for various world order values.⁷⁵ The world order problematique has traditionally focused on the maximization of peace. There remains a divergence of views regarding whether a bipolar or a multipolar system is more prone to major violence.⁷⁶ There is also controversy over whether greater centralization generally is likely to lead to increased or reduced tensions in the international system; as previously discussed, underlying much of the latest scholarship on interstate cooperation is the notion that the creation of overarching global superstructures is not only unlikely but perhaps undesirable as well, in that such arrangements may preclude chances for at least partial agreements and thereby for tension reduction.

In addition to the maximization of peace, other world order values have been added to the debate over the years, such as justice and ecological quality. As the state increasingly has come to assume responsibility not only for the physical safety of its citizens but also for their general well-being, world politics has become an arena for pursuing welfare objectives no less than security objectives. Hence, world order models with varying degrees of decentralization or centralization can be scrutinized as to their likely implications for not only peace but, say, renewable and non-renewable resource management. Some models, such as bipolarity and multipolarity, have been so closely identified with war and

peace concerns that they have little meaning when applied to other concerns. As we continue to witness "the move from a world dominated by a single chessboard ... to a world dispersed into a variety of chessboards,"⁷⁷ the most analytically useful world order models will be those that take into account the multiple "games" actors play in the system.

It should be clear from this excursion into the domain of comparative international systems/alternative world order models that constructing a new science of international cooperation (or a "new theory of institutions") around the axiom that "nations dwell in perpetual anarchy"⁷⁸ gives us an incomplete picture of world order possibilities, one that can tell us much about "cooperation under anarchy" but can tell us little about larger international governance concerns and how international society might evolve from its present condition to a "mature anarchy" or, perhaps, even to a higher political order.⁷⁹ For that, we need to think of international relations in a more holistic and dynamic fashion.

The Logic of a Global Perspective

One need not have grand designs for world order, just designs. In considering what sort of world order is achievable and desirable for the future, I propose thinking of the contemporary international system as a global political system and thinking of system transformation as political development. By *political system*, I mean we can conceptualize international politics in generic political science terms as having to do with "who gets what, when and how" in the international arena, with the "how" referring to some sort of governance process that has shape and form to it in an Eastonian sense.⁸⁰ This should not raise eyebrows or hackles. It is commonly noted that international governance occurs without international government. "Demands" (related to anything from arms control to zinc mining) get articulated, processed, and disposed of -- values get allocated -- but through an anarchic rather than central authoritative set of

structures, which distinguishes international politics from national politics.⁸¹ Affect, power, salience, and other elements of politics infuse international political processes no less than national political processes, but in the former case they work their effects through a chain of subnational, transnational, transgovernmental, and other relationships mediated mostly by the instrumentality of the nation-state. The outputs of the international political system are not as easily definable as those produced by national political systems; if one does not want to use the term "international public policies," one can speak of regimes, which have to do with the collective functioning of international society but which operate at different levels in the system.⁸² All of this is ongoing, complete with feedback loops. There are winners and losers along the way, satisfied or dissatisfied with certain outputs that have or have not resulted. And of course, in international politics, the resort to violence by the dissatisfied is considered a more endemic and acceptable if not frequent aspect of political life; the threat of violence -- and the resultant "security dilemma" -- continues to be a constant shadow hovering over the system, although is arguably less a part of the political culture than in the past.⁸³

Treating the contemporary international system as a *global* political system should also not be a source of contention. One does not have to carry all the baggage of the "Spaceship Earth" metaphor to accept the modest assertion that "we live in an era of interdependence"⁸⁴ and that the world as a whole has never been more strategically, economically, and ecologically interrelated, in terms of any corner of the globe being readily susceptible to important impacts stemming from decisions taken elsewhere (ranging from annihilation of the species to lesser impacts).⁸⁵ This does not deny the fact that interdependence tends to be asymmetrical, that there are distinctive subsystems preoccupied with local concerns more directly than system-wide concerns, that regionalism may be

outpacing globalism in IGO growth and other respects and that most actors are more regional than global in the normal reach of their activities, that intranational interactions dwarf international transactions, or that discontinuities in power, alignment, and other dimensions of system structure can be found across issues. The contemporary international system is certainly complicated, but it is nonetheless global.

Indeed, in a sense the phrase "world order" could be considered something of a misnomer as applied to international systems prior to the post-World War II era insofar as those systems were not "truly global."⁸⁶ This obviously did not stop earlier generations from thinking globally even if it was within the admittedly parochial context of a predominantly European-centered world. It seems ironic that there has been a retrenchment in world order thinking today precisely at a time when the international system is more clearly global in nature than at any point in history. There is a certain logic operating here, though, since one can be forgiven for believing that, if comprehensive approaches to world order have never worked very well previously, they are even less likely to succeed in the present environment in which there are more national actors representing greater diversity of cultural and other viewpoints than ever. Still, ignoring problems of international governance at the global level will not make them go away. It is questionable whether technology will ever allow us to revert to a less globalized existence short of some nuclear or other catastrophe. More than ever, realism would seem to dictate that we attempt to frame the world order problematique in global terms. In other words, calling the international system today a global system seems an empirically accurate statement rather than "globaloney"; arguing that we are better off decomposing problems and treating them in a sub-global fashion may make sense to the extent possible, but one should not confuse prescription with description.

This leads us, then to think of international system transformation as *political development* of the global system, a notion that might arouse substantial protest on several grounds -- that it invites misplaced analogies between domestic and international politics, substitutes a value-laden term (development) for a more straightforward analytical one (transformation), and poses problems for a discipline which has trouble enough agreeing on the criteria for assessing whether any system change has occurred of any magnitude, without also having to assess the direction of change. However, it would not seem to require much of an inferential leap from the assumption that the international system can be treated as a political system to the assumption that such a system is capable of political development. The relevant question is not whether one can contemplate the political development of the international system, but what political development (as opposed to retrogression) means in the context of international politics.

Definitions of "political development" borrowed from the comparative politics field can provide some help if judiciously applied, at least as a starting point.⁸⁷ Alfred Diamant has defined political development as "a process by which a political system acquires an increased capacity to sustain successfully and continuously new types of goals and demands and the creation of new types of organizations."⁸⁸ Lucian Pye, commenting on the diverse meanings of the concept, notes three common elements: the development of (1) "a general spirit or attitude of equality"; (2) increased "capacity" of the political system in terms of "sheer magnitude" and "effectiveness and efficiency in the execution of public policy"; and (3) increased "differentiation and specialization of structures" along with their "integration."⁸⁹ Pye and others have discussed a number of "developmental crises" political systems may encounter -- institution-building, community-building, participation, and distribution -- either in sequential, gradual fashion (as happened favorably in the West) or simultaneously (as happened

unfavorably throughout much of the Third World following decolonialization).⁹⁰ In one way or another, political development has to do with a system's capacity to cultivate a political order which combines stability with responsiveness to new demands and, hence, avenues for peaceful change.⁹¹

The latter definition of political development would seem broadly applicable to all political systems, including the contemporary global system. The connections between stability and responsiveness, or peace and justice (and related values), are just as problematical in international affairs as in national affairs, and probably moreso.⁹² Not unlike students of comparative politics, Stanley Hoffmann argues that as a general rule "in world affairs, order has to be achieved first" even if it is "established at the cost of justice."⁹³ However, recognizing that it may not be possible to separate out these concerns today, he adds that "it is difficult to conceive of a future international system remaining moderate if the inequality among its members . . . incites recurrent violence"⁹⁴; acknowledging that "there shall be no world order unless some progress is made toward worldwide equity," Hoffmann sees "a growing need for shared powers, joint policies and effective institutions in all the new realms of international politics."⁹⁵

We can carry this generic treatment of politics and political development only so far. There remains the problem of specifying what form institution-building and other aspects of political development might take in a political system that has the special characteristics of the contemporary global polity, which is not a state but a system of states. Political development dilemmas experienced by so many national political systems, difficult as they have been to resolve, seem to pale next to the "nightmare of world order"⁹⁶ that is conjured up when one ponders political development in the sphere of international politics. While the uneven level of political development among the states constituting

international society is a factor which complicates the political development of the international system,⁹⁷ the fundamental constraint is the cult of sovereignty they all uniformly share. Although the sovereignty of developed and underdeveloped states alike has been undermined by the growing complexity of human interactions within and across national boundaries, the nation-state remains at the center of the international anarchy.⁹⁸

It has been said in regard to the development of nation-states that in the eighteenth century the state preceded the nation, whereas in the nineteenth century the nation preceded the state. Since the rise of nationalism, we have seen how hard it is to create and sustain a state where there is no nation. But this problem is not really relevant to the political development of the contemporary international system. To the extent one can envision the political development of the global polity, one assumes institution-building that falls far short of a world state and community-building that falls far short of a world nation. Although it is debatable how much centralization of the international system is ultimately desirable, few would question that it is premature to try to create world government and that in any case there are strict limits on what is possible for the foreseeable future.⁹⁹

The political development of the contemporary international system, defined as the cultivation of a world order which combines stability with adaptability, may be best conceptualized as the progression toward a single pluralistic security-community. As introduced by Karl Deutsch and his associates, the "security-community" concept refers to "a group of people which has become 'integrated' . . . [in that it has achieved] the attainment . . . of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population."¹⁰⁰ In a "pluralistic" security-community, as opposed to the "amalgamated" variety, the

latter characteristics develop among political units which retain their formal sovereign independence and separate governments as in the case of the United States and Canada and, some would say, the Western industrialized democracies generally. Pluralistic security-communities are less ambitious political creations than amalgamated ones but may be more durable.

In the Deutsch study, three conditions were found to be important to the successful functioning of pluralistic security-communities: the compatibility of political values held by the members, the capacity of the member governments to respond quickly to each other's needs and actions, and the mutual predictability of behavior.¹⁰¹ While these conditions are clearly lacking presently at the global level, the same study added that "the outstanding issue leading to the emergence of a pluralistic security-community" in the cases examined "seems to have been the increasing unattractiveness . . . of war among the political units concerned" as war "promised to be both devastating and indecisive."¹⁰² It seems reasonable to argue that constraints on the use of armed force in international relations are likely to increase rather than decrease in the future, certainly among the major actors vis-a-vis each other, and that war -- "limited" or otherwise -- will become less rather than more attractive system-wide as the nuclear age proceeds into the next century. Although it is true that historically there has been only a loose correlation between the increasingly destructive potential of war and the commensurate decline in its use, we may be reaching a new threshold of unattractiveness.¹⁰³ Whether or not the growing unattractiveness of inter-state violence in cost-benefit terms will provide the stimulus for a general contraction in war as well as war preparation, eventuating in a functioning global security-community, will depend heavily upon inter-state interactions acquiring and maintaining the character of mutual responsiveness and predictability alluded to above.

The development of a sense of greater predictability of behavior among states entails in turn the increased routinization of international governance processes whereby inputs (demands) enter the international political system, outputs (regimes) emerge, and goods ultimately get allocated. The development of a perception of growing responsiveness of the system entails that such routinization include opportunities for broader participation in the creation and alteration of regimes along with broader sharing of the benefits relative to the costs associated with international cooperation, at least in those issue-areas most salient to members of the system. Broadened access to the decision points in the system and to the goods produced must occur in a manner which stops short of generating inflated participation/distribution expectations and pressures which cannot be realistically handled by the system.

The question remains whether a pluralistic security-community based on predictability and responsiveness can be established in the absence of common political values among the members. Although shared values tend to promote positive affect and make cooperation easier in a given situation, a convergence of interests should be able to overcome a divergence of values if states are the "rational egoists" which game theoretic analyses of international cooperation assume. Conflicting values are unlikely in themselves to prevent cooperation where conflicting interests can be reconciled and the need for collaboration is compelling; where conflicting interests cannot be reconciled, cooperation will fail to occur regardless of compatible or incompatible values. The pluralistic quality of the security-community contemplated here allows for the development of a new international political culture without necessarily threatening the established political culture of any individual state.

The regime literature deals precisely with the problem of achieving greater institutionalization of international politics and provides ample evidence that

states with vastly different political values can commit themselves to patterned collective behavior characterized by elements of predictability and responsiveness. However, as noted earlier, the kind of institutionalization typically examined is disjointed in nature, covering only parts of the international system; that is, to the extent regimes enhance predictability and responsiveness in the system, establishing rules of the game, they are presumed to do so for only a specified set of states (as few as two players) and in the context of a specified issue-area or "nested" set of issues (a single game). The logic of regime-making, as it is increasingly articulated by scholars and practitioners alike, calls for including in the process only those actors which are "relevant" to the issue in question and/or are "like-minded."¹⁰⁴ Although these same observers in the same breath speak of eventually universalizing the process as much as possible, it is not clear how decomposition is to evolve into recomposition so that institutionalization of international politics can occur across sets of actors and issues leading to an expanding security-community.

The notion of decomposition has great theoretical and practical appeal. However, if it is not applied in a larger context, "world order" will become an oxymoron rather than a meaningful concept. To argue that one can have world order without a globalist worldview amounts to trying to square a circle. It requires one to pretend that the parts of the international system bear no relation to the whole. When one talks of "cooperation under anarchy," it must be remembered that anarchy is, after all, a system property. We cannot have it both ways; either there is such a thing as "international society," or there isn't. While Ernst Haas rightly cautions against attributing to "the system" a "mystical wholeness,"¹⁰⁵ is it not just as mystical to believe that diffusion processes related to nuclear proliferation, technology transfer, and the like will render goods such as peace and air quality more divisible in the future? Even where

policy concerns exist which are not global in scope and do not require global responses, ascertaining relevance and like-mindedness among actors in the contemporary international system would seem to suggest that, in Robert Cox's words, we "look at the problem of world order in the whole" while at the same time we "beware of reifying a world system."¹⁰⁶

Some sort of central guidance mechanisms are needed to perform the task of "preserving and extending the limited consensus that presently exist in global society [*italics mine*]."¹⁰⁷ This is not a caveat for making the global polity more hierarchical or for "universal bargaining, issue by issue, deal by deal,"¹⁰⁸ but rather finding ways to cast "the shadow of the future" as wide as possible, providing an established setting within which various groupings of states -- ranging from, say, the London Group of nuclear suppliers to the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the Group of 7 to the Group of 77 -- can relate to each other under an umbrella framework. Such a framework would help to routinize and broaden international governance processes by facilitating decisions by the international community as to what type of institutionalization is possible and desirable in any given policy area (in terms of norms, practices, laws, organizations, or other modes of cooperation) as well as what the scope of institutionalization might be (global or sub-global).

The Logic of an Organizational Perspective

Samuel Huntington has noted that "the level of political community a society achieves reflects the relationship between its political institutions and the social forces which comprise it. . . . The more heterogeneous and complex the society, . . . the more the achievement and maintenance of political community become dependent upon the workings of political institutions."¹⁰⁹ As institutionalists argue, institutions are at once a product of their environment,

reflecting underlying political-social forces, and also can impact on the environment, providing the boundaries that shape political and social life. There is no reason to believe that institutions are less important to international society than to national societies. According to the functional theory of regimes, institutions in international politics -- whether they be formal organizations or the array of other structures which together fall under the rubric of regimes -- serve to reduce transaction costs; improve the sharing of reliable information, and generally lower the sense of risk and uncertainty in the international system. At the global or any other level, these functions theoretically could be performed with or without organizations, with current scholarship suggesting the less organization the better.

However, in considering what if any role international organizations might play as institutions in global society, we need to look more closely not at the functions regimes perform in the abstract but the functions which certain regime structures, such as organizations, perform compared to other structures. It may be that organizations are capable of producing peculiar institutional impacts distinct from other regime elements, or may produce similar impacts but more effectively, or may simply be reinforcing mechanisms. For example, international law is said to perform some rather specific functions: the allocation of legal competences among states, the regulation of international conflict (by furnishing a common bargaining medium for communicating the nature and extent of disagreements), and the internalization of international political culture, in addition to placing constraints on state behavior.¹¹⁰ Little has been said about the "functions of international organization."¹¹¹

The intellectual shift away from an organizational approach to world order seems grounded essentially in two somewhat contradictory propositions which can be culled from the international relations literature. One is that international

organizations in themselves are of little or no consequence, that overhauling or tinkering with organizational machinery will have no noticeable effects in the absence of changed attitudes on the part of the membership; this is the familiar critique against a preoccupation with formalistic concerns, symbolized by Lord Caradon's oft-invoked dismissal of UN reform efforts: "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the United Nations -- except its members."¹¹² International organizations, in other words, are thought to be irrelevant or superfluous. Another proposition upon which the case against international organizations rests, though, is that they may be dysfunctional for the international system; this is the argument about the inefficiencies and negative impacts associated with bureaucratization and other features inherent in an "organizational culture." International organizations, in other words, tend not so much to be inconsequential but bad. Guided by either or both of these tenets, students of international regimes have chosen to focus attention largely on institutional structures which are non-organizational in nature.

In heeding Keohane's call to avoid "the Mt. Everest syndrome" -- that is, studying international organizations for their own sake, "because they are there" -- scholars may be overlooking a significant point. The fact that "they are there" in a physical, concrete sense -- in a way that norms, rules, practices, and other regime elements are not -- makes organizations "live collectivities interacting with their environments"¹¹³ and endows them with particular properties. Any community of any size requires some manner of formal apparatus. As Deutsch and his colleagues acknowledged, "both types of integration [amalgamated and pluralistic] require, at the international level, some kind of organization, even though it may be very loose."¹¹⁴ As a society becomes more complex and diverse, there are pressures toward increased formalization of the institutions upon which its viability depends. Informal modes of cooperation suffice less and

less. It is not an accident that as the volume of international interactions has expanded in the twentieth century along with the number and heterogeneity of the actors in the international system, we have witnessed the increased codification of what were previously predominantly customary rules of international law.¹¹⁵ The proliferation of international organizations in this century can be understood in the same terms. Although IGO growth has been uneven, concentrated particularly among open, technologically advanced states, there is evidence that the web is gradually expanding.¹¹⁶ The growing formalization of the international system is far easier to trace empirically than the growth in shared "norms," "practices" and other informal dimensions. International organizations command attention, however, not because they can be easily counted but because they appear to be part of an evolutionary process at work in world politics. Rather than being viewed as experimental, failed responses to war and welfare problems, they may more cogently be seen as structures which are deeply embedded in historical forces.

Harold Jacobson gives the functionalist account of IGO growth:

Functionalism argues that mass participation in political life will inexorably increase, that general populations everywhere are primarily interested in increasing their own standard of living, and that mass participation will make economic welfare the dominant concern of governments. Functionalism also argues that technology offers immense possibilities for improving living standards, but that international cooperation is essential to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by technology; states are simply too small.¹¹⁷

This may be a compelling explanation of the forces promoting international cooperation, but it fails to explain adequately why international cooperation should necessarily take *organizational* form as opposed to occurring merely through international agreements or periodic conferences or other non-organizational vehicles. For a fuller understanding of IGO growth, we need to look more carefully at the functional logic of organizations.

International law and international organization have had a synergistic relationship, with international law helping to create IGOs (although IGOs are

increasingly being established as offshoots of existing IGOs rather than owing their existence to treaties) and IGOs helping in turn to create international law (although IGOs are still not the primary producers of international "legislation"). Most treaties are bilateral (e.g. the web of inter-state treaties dealing with extradition or use of air space); these "contractual" agreements do not require organizations as vehicles for sponsoring or conducting negotiations, and rarely are concluded through organizations as such. Multilateral treaties are something else. As long as there is a continuing movement toward general "law-making" treaties of a broad multilateral character (e.g. the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea or the proposed "law of the air" treaty dealing with pollution), driven partly by the recognized inefficiency of each state attempting to negotiate separate bilateral pacts with over 150 other states on a myriad of issues, it is predictable that international organizations will take on added rather than declining responsibilities as either indirect facilitators or direct venues in the international bargaining process; it is almost inconceivable that the international political system could produce such outputs in the absence of organizations. In areas where "global bargaining" is eschewed and agreements are forged among only a limited group of states on a regional or other basis, in keeping with a decomposition strategy, it is still hard to see how even "minilateral" cooperation can occur in an organizational vacuum. While it is true that international organizations, "because they are there," tend to look for problems to solve and manufacture the need for agreements -- where there is international organization, international law is likely to follow -- the existence of problems and the need for agreements give rise to organizations in the first place.

IGOs are a long way from becoming the key loci for making the major "decisions that have consequences for the distribution of values in the global

political system,"¹¹⁸ whether these are decisions about the formal rules or about other arrangements governing various areas of international activity. To the extent that IGOs are involved in international governance processes, though, they can perform several useful functions which relate to the requirements of a security-community. Some organizations will perform these functions more effectively than others. First, aside from facilitating the handling of more demands, organizations permit decisions to be made more openly, in a participatory fashion, with greater opportunities for interest articulation and aggregation, thereby increasing the possibility that the process will be perceived as responsive and the decisions accepted as legitimate regardless of who gets what. Second, organizations permit decisions to be made in a regularized, timely, and prescribed manner rather than intermittently, thereby contributing to a greater sense of routinization. Third, they allow for constant communication and information streams and are explicit devices for *lengthening* the "shadow of the future," with continuous game-playing among the membership a built-in feature, therefore enhancing prospects for the learning of cooperation. Although these attributes make organizations relevant to governance concerns at every level of the international system, they would seem especially important at the global level and may in fact provide a partial rationale for the existence of global IGOs.

Rule-making can occur without organizations more readily than can rule-implementation. Although the bulk of international agreements entered into are not accompanied by the creation of international organizations, the wider the geographical scope of an agreement the more likely that some organizational apparatus will be associated with it, whatever the issue-area in question. Implementing an acid rain agreement between the United States and Canada is unlikely to require the establishment of an organization; implementing such an

agreement on a broad multilateral, global scale is likely to if an available body does not already exist.

International cooperation through organizations generally entails greater tangible resource expenditures than other modes of cooperation. With greater investment in an institution may come greater commitment. Treaties are somehow easier to abandon than the buildings and infrastructure which have been developed around organizations; while relatively few treaties are broken as a percentage of all treaties, even fewer IGOs disappear once they are born. The durability of IGOs may owe not only to the material investment they represent, or to the survival instincts of all bureaucracies, but also to their symbolic importance to their memberships and the psychic investment the latter have at stake in the organizations. It is not just a case of few IGOs dying; a sampling of individual IGO histories would also show in all probability few members leaving over time (notwithstanding UNESCO and other cases that can be found). Coercion cannot account for this phenomenon, since hardly any IGOs are based simply on coerced membership. Utilitarian motives cannot fully explain it either. If IGOs had to depend for their continued existence upon their performance ratings as instruments for international rule-making and implementation, most might not be still around. International organizations may satisfy certain subtle needs, such as the need for a larger sense of community and a feeling that there is at least a modicum of order rather than total chaos "out there." Particularly at the global level, a latent function which international organization perhaps performs is that -- in the guise of the UN system -- it is the most visible sign of humanity groping for world order, offering a faint glimmer of the stirrings of a single security-community in the making.¹¹⁹

Globalism, Institutionalism, and the United Nations

It is, of course, problematical whether such a public order will ever materialize. The problem confronting the future development of the international system may not be a lack of organizations but a lack of organization. The "dizzying pace" of IGO proliferation, which already poses enormous obstacles to rational control and coordination by states,¹²⁰ is likely to continue even as scholars ignore the existence of organizations and inveigh against their necessity. How these organizations will relate to each other and to the larger regimes they are encapsulated in will determine whatever progress occurs in the quest toward world order. Many regimes will operate without organizations, although the larger their "membership" the more likely some organizational component will be present. There is much to be said for pragmatism, flexibility, and pluralism in governing arrangements; the decentralized nature of the international system insures that these qualities will never be lacking. However, it is questionable whether the willy-nilly manner in which international governance processes are evolving (characterized by some as "functional eclecticism")¹²¹ can be expected to promote the kind of predictability and responsiveness associated with a security-community. If world politics is to become more institutionalized -- if the world is to be made safe for parochialism in all its permutations, including unilateralism, bilateralism, minilateralism, and multilateralism -- then we will need to think more self-consciously about concepts of international governance and institution-building and consider how some degree of central guidance might be injected into the global political system.

Unless one is prepared to make an argument for U.S. hegemony or an American-Soviet condominium, the United Nations is the one available mechanism which is even remotely in a position to impart a measure of central guidance to the

international system. If it is to do so, however, it will have to become more proactive and less reactive in its organizational behavior. Conceived primarily as a conflict manager, the UN over the years has been viewed mainly in terms of how well or poorly it has succeeded at collective security, peacekeeping, and peaceful settlement. The UN Charter, as well as practicality, has dictated that the conflict management mission be carried out with the UN as the forum of last (or late) resort, to be utilized after local or regional efforts have failed. There has been relatively little attention given to the UN as a manager of cooperation, a mission which, if developed more fully beyond the modest rule-making and implementation role it has played to date, would render the UN the forum of first (or early) resort in many instances.

As a cooperation manager, the UN could serve as a conduit through which regime-making efforts pass and international waters are tested to determine those issue-areas in which a basis for international cooperation exists, what organizational or non-organizational form it might take, and the maximum number of states to be included. In its capacity as a "regime processing center," the UN would be a place, in other words, where emerging problems (e.g. ozone layer deterioration, debt relief, drug trafficking) could be identified, monitored, and proposed for consideration on the global agenda; where bargaining could occur which would indicate the degree of consensus ("consensual knowledge") mobilizable in support of international action; and where signals ultimately would be provided as to whether global solutions are possible or whether regime-making should be pursued at some lower level in the system. Decomposition strategies would not be precluded, but would not drive the process. Periodic review of regimes could be built into the process to determine how they are working, what improvements might be made, and whether participation can be expanded without diluting the

"robustness" of existing cooperation. Regimes would be something more than theoretical constructs invented by academics.

In some ways the UN already engages in these activities through its various organs and Specialized Agencies, although not in any systematic fashion. The UN cannot be the lone gatekeeper for international cooperation -- such a responsibility would totally overload the institution-- but it can play a more active and pivotal part in expanding the capacity of the international system to respond to new demands and in helping to define the outer limits of collaboration for the international community. Depending on how a cooperation management role is operationalized (for example, relying on non-voting, relatively non-confrontational decisionmaking procedures), the UN's reach need not exceed its grasp, with expectations, frustrations, and disillusionment held in check.

The future of the UN can be captured in three possible scenarios. One scenario is that the organization will continue to decline and maybe disappear as the League did. A second is that it will be supported enough by the membership to at least muddle through. The third is that it will experience organizational growth and be an engine for the political development of the international system. The second scenario seems more realistic than the first. Short of a system-wide war, the UN is not likely to suffer the fate of the League; there is evidence (based on the latest public statements and sudden infusions of cash) that the major actors in the system, including the United States, the Soviet Union, the Western Europeans, and Japan, have concluded that the decline of the organization has gone far enough. As for the third scenario, it will depend upon whether the major actors are willing and able to have the UN do more than muddle through, and whether other aspects of the international environment are conducive to institution-building. All of this suggests a research agenda which students of international organization might fruitfully pursue.

The Theory and Practice of International Organization:
A Suggested Research Agenda

International organizations are at the intersection between anarchy and nonanarchy in world politics. They are not the handiwork of theoreticians, idealistic or otherwise, but of practitioners having to cope with a common reality that drives them to seek more elaborate means to manage interstate relations while preserving as much autonomy as possible for themselves and their states. Each state wants international institution-building, albeit on its own terms. Few are satisfied with the way existing institutions are working inside or outside the UN system, and few would deny the need for some improvements. There is, then, a certain bias in the direction of change -- in the direction of development of the international political system -- notwithstanding the existence of countervailing forces, including those of habit and inertia which infect any large-scale change process (especially one as cosmic and glacial as discussed here). These thoughts may be nothing more than assertions, but assertions which at the very least are "empirically based prejudices"¹²² and which could provide grist for testable propositions yielding practical insights about the parameters of institution-building in international relations. Where international organizations fit into the overall equation is a question that, rather than being skirted, needs to be explored further as one cornerstone of any "new theory of institutions."

It is no doubt true in an immediate sense that, to paraphrase one observer, the UN depends upon peace for its well-being more than peace depends upon the UN.¹²³ For the foreseeable future, it seems axiomatic that the world figures to have a much greater impact on the UN than vice-versa, and that this can be said of not just the UN but international organizations in general. Even more than the "weak states" studied by institutionalists, international organizations are subsystem dominant, i.e. as institutions they will tend to mirror their

environment more than they will affect it. However, as institutions they also have some capacity to shape behavior and to influence the larger system they are a part of. This points to two broad paths research might follow in the international organization field: (1) investigation of the role of systemic and other factors as determinants of organizational behavior and growth and (2) investigation of the role of organizations as determinants of system maintenance and change. Treating organizational characteristics as both dependent and independent variables, how might we approach the study of the UN and other IGOs?

Organizations as Dependent Variables

International organizations are clearly creatures of their environment. An obvious example of how an international organization is shaped by its environment is the UN itself, which was born out of the ashes of world war, was designed in a manner which mirrored the power realities of the time, whose success at conflict management has correlated strongly with the ebb and flow of American-Soviet tensions, and whose evolution generally has reflected changing developments in the international system. Contrary to the claim that the UN is less a microcosm than a distortion of the world outside its walls, that it is untouched by reality, it has been very much buffeted by external conditions. Whenever politics within the UN has been out of synch with politics outside the body, the organization has been reminded that it cannot move too far ahead of the system.

There is a need for more extensive and rigorous analysis of the relationship between systemic conditions and international institution-building, identifying those factors which tend to inhibit institution-building and those which facilitate it at various levels and in various forms. How, for instance, do crises pose opportunities (contributing to the growth of organizations) as well as constraints (contributing to their decay)? As the power distribution among states becomes more diffuse -- as hegemony or bipolarity weakens -- does this make

institution-building harder or easier? As power within states becomes more diffuse -- as mass participation pressures weaken the control of elites -- does this tend to promote or retard institution-building? How are technological developments a help or a hindrance? What broad systemic changes during the postwar era account for the recent malaise of the UN and multilateralism generally, what are emerging trends, and what does this diagnosis suggest about workable multilateral arrangements in the future? In particular, under what circumstances are organizations likely to be more effective as institutions than non-organizational arrangements? At which level -- global or sub-global? In what issue-areas -- international security, economic, environmental, or other relations?

In order to understand fully the dynamics of international institution-building, we need to link systemic variables to interaction processes and state behavior. Although systemic forces structure the foreign policy behavior of states, including their involvement in international institutions, those forces do not mechanistically determine behavior. Relatively little research has been done on how states arrive at decisions having to do with international problem-solving, for example whether to rely on bilateral and regional means rather than on the UN to deal with drug trafficking concerns, whether to support funding for a new environmental agency or to propose a new environmental convention at the global level, and whether to shift from fixed to floating exchange rates in managing monetary affairs. Yet these and other such decisions taken by states, especially those states in a position to influence the agendas and outcomes of international bargaining processes the most, are the stuff of which regimes are made, ultimately determining the scope and form of international cooperation.

Much of the regime literature has focused on the dynamics of international bargaining, treating states as unitary, rational actors engaged in making what

amounts to "international public policy" aimed at mutual problem-solving. To what extent, however, is problem-solving as rational and purposive an activity as implied when one speaks impressively of "the non-proliferation regime" or "the textile regime" or other regimes? Do informal elements of regimes, such as norms and practices, develop in any goal-directed fashion connected to the problems they are purported to be a response to? What about the formal elements? How do problems get defined as "regional" or "global," and as requiring or not requiring organizational machinery?

It is true that international organizations along with treaties are the products of discrete, conscious acts of creation which do not happen unless states make explicit decisions to become parties to them. However, it is open to question whether these decisions can be understood by using a rational actor model alone or whether one needs to employ also a bureaucratic politics model and other models focusing on subnational, transnational, and transgovernmental actors. Are the routes taken to reach national issue-positions and bargaining strategies on such matters as acid rain reduction different from those traversed in deciding about such subjects as chemical and biological weapons bans, and do patterns vary much from one country to another? The more some concern impinges on broad national interests, the more salient attention it is likely to receive at the highest levels of a country's foreign policy establishment and, hence, the more applicable will be a rational actor model. Many issues on international agendas never achieve that kind of salience.

Even in regard to a matter one would think is salient to most governments, such as the future financial survival of the United Nations, a state's behavior may only partially reflect goal-directed "decisions" as such; for example, recent U.S. "policy" toward the UN and its financial crisis might be explained less by a rational actor model than by a bureaucratic politics model, i.e. as a function of

not only the Reagan administration's view of whether UN reform has gone far enough to satisfy American demands but also the vagaries of budgetary politics in the U.S. Congress that are far removed from the UN.¹²⁴

More case studies, incorporating both systemic and foreign policy perspectives, are needed to trace how regimes are created, maintained, and changed. Is there enough rationality surrounding international problem-solving that the UN could aspire to the kind of "regime processing" role alluded to earlier?

Organizations as Independent Variables

In a 1970 issue of *International Organization*, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace announced that one of the questions which merited special attention and funding as a research focus in the field was: "What difference do international organizations make?"¹²⁵ Today this question no longer occupies a significant place on the overall research agenda of the field, although one can rightly ask whether we know enough yet about the difference international organizations make, or could make, to justify writing them off as unworthy of extensive scholarly study.

At issue here is not whether IGOs do good works -- whether any of the world's estimated 10 million refugees have had their lives touched by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, whether over 700 billion passenger-miles could be flown by scheduled airlines worldwide or 8 billion pieces of mail sent across national boundaries each year without the International Civil Aviation Organization or the Universal Postal Union, whether smallpox would have been eradicated in the absence of the World Health Organization, and the like -- but whether they work well, particularly in areas of more than peripheral importance to world politics. As instruments of international action and subjects of scholarly analysis, can international organizations be viewed as anything other

than the sum of their parts? That is, in addition to being creatures of their environment, are they also prisoners of their environment? Alternatively, for better or worse, are they at times either autonomous actors competing with states in producing outcomes in the international arena (through the "withinputs" of IGO officials and other institutional elements) or structures which are part of a feedback process reshaping the international political system?

A number of observers have suggested how international organizations in general and the UN in particular can have various sorts of "effects" aside from providing information and services. For example, Jacobson and his colleagues studied "IGO memberships and the performance and behavior of states" and found partial support for functionalist assumptions "that joining IGOs . . . enable[s] states to improve their economic welfare, and that entanglement in a web of IGOs . . . tend[s] to make states less bellicose"; Jeane Kirkpatrick, as U.S. Ambassador to the UN, claimed the U.S. had to pay more attention to the UN because the organization could have important "political impacts"; Frank Hoole pointed to "policy impacts" produced by WHO and other IGOs which needed evaluation; others have noted the "legal effects of UN resolutions," "non-resolution consequences," and "socialization" effects.¹²⁶

The effects of international organizations should be scrutinized more closely, including both the intended and unintended functions they perform. How are they agents of the status quo, and of change? Do IGOs through their secretariats and commissions contribute to the merging of scientific and consensual knowledge and the learning of new behaviors by producing and disseminating data viewed as more credible than would otherwise be the case? How do IGOs influence the framing and disposition of issues, such as decolonialization and the New International Economic Order? How do formal decisionmaking arrangements (e.g. consensus procedures as opposed to weighted voting or one

state-one vote majoritarianism) affect compliance patterns? There is a need to examine the impacts global and sub-global IGOs have on each other. To what extent do regional and limited membership IGOs relieve demand pressures on global IGOs and reduce international tensions, or instead complicate global problem-solving and aggravate tensions?

In addition to asking whether international organizations make a difference, we need to ask how the academic study of international organization can make a difference. The main rationale of the international organization field over the years has been to provide a base of scholarship which can help inform and guide the practice of international collaboration. No greater challenge exists for students of international organization than that posed by the search for world order through global institution-building, which finds its most concrete expression today in the form of the United Nations. A science of international cooperation that includes the study of organizations should be able to suggest how specific parts of the UN system might be improved -- through more effective connections with regimes in such problem areas as arms control, trade, and the management of the oceans and other commons -- and how the UN as a whole might be improved. Such a science might tell us not only which institutional reforms (the "binding triad" proposal and other designs) are realistically adoptable in terms of what the UN's environment will permit, but also which reforms are likely to prove meaningful in terms of having implications for increasing the UN's efficiency, credibility, and legitimacy as well as achieving various world order values.

The dilemma posed by UN reform in general and any attempt to develop a "comprehensive system of international security"¹²⁷ is that those proposals which appear feasible also seem trivial, while those which might truly matter seem the least doable. If one chooses a strategy of merely tinkering with the present

institutional machinery -- focusing on reforms mainly of a managerial and administrative nature, such as achieving better coordination among the Specialized Agencies, streamlining debate and other procedures in the General Assembly, developing more sophisticated program budgeting, planning and evaluation techniques along with more stringent requirements for personnel recruitment and retention in the Secretariat, and upgrading the Security Council's capabilities through the creation of standing panels of mediators and fact-finders -- then one stands accused of engaging in a wasteful expenditure of time, money, and intellectual effort given the benefits that are likely to accrue from these seemingly innocuous changes (even though some proposals relating to matters like the professionalization of the international civil service and reorganization of the Specialized Agencies can be quite controversial). If one takes the position that only a major rethinking and overhauling of the organization's structure is a worthwhile exercise -- focusing on reform of the basic political arrangements, including the decisionmaking formulas in the General Assembly and other organs, or starting over from scratch -- then one, too, is charged with irrelevancy but for different reasons. Somewhere between tinkering and rethinking there may be opportunities for engineering change in a manner that is realistic and meaningful, with international organization scholarship possibly supplying the clues.

Serious scholarship is normally defined by the degree of intellectual ferment and hard-nosed sobriety one brings to a subject. The subject of the UN in recent times has inspired widespread indifference and ridicule, with scholars tending to steer clear lest they be branded guilty of indulging in "institutionalist approaches of yesteryear"¹²⁸ or utopian futurism and risk pariah status in the international relations fraternity akin to some states in the international community. It may be that the UN and global international organization has become too large and unwieldy a matter to be subjected to either

serious scientific inquiry or social engineering. It is true that the world does not revolve around governments making "great global choices among grand alternatives."¹²⁹ Still, large-scale changes occur. Nobody planned the national welfare state which has been the dominant political structure of the twentieth century. It was the resultant of historical forces pushed along by a myriad of individual decisions and accumulated learning. If a global security community comes to pass, it will not be planned but will also emerge as a product of historical forces which likewise can be nudged along in small ways if we have the will and the knowledge to do so.

NOTES

1. Ernst B. Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945-1984, Policy Papers in International Affairs, No. 26 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1986), p.20.
2. Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, "International Crises 1945-1975: The UN Dimension," International Studies Quarterly 28 (March 1984).
3. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Towards A New Bretton Woods: Challenges for the World Financial and Trading System (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1983); and Miriam Camps and William Diebold, Jr., The New Multilateralism: Can the World Trading System Be Saved? (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986).
4. Kurt Waldheim, "The United Nations: The Tarnished Image," Foreign Affairs 63 (Fall 1984), p.106. It is nothing new to depict the UN as moribund or in crisis. Witness, for example, Carlos Romulo's statement that "the UN is in a state of coma, and there isn't much time left to revive it," in "The UN Is Dying," Colliers (July 23, 1954), p.32; and "United Nations in Crisis," a report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US House of Representatives by congressional members of the US delegation to the UN (January 28, 1964). The difference is that today there seems much greater resignation to failure, a condition which will be examined below.

5. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Kalamazoo: New Issues, 1979), p.288.
6. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art or an Art of the State," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), p.753.
7. One survey of articles published in International Organization, the preeminent journal in the field, found that "the formal institutional focus has declined steadily from the very beginning and now accounts for fewer than 5 percent of the total." Ibid, p.760. For a more general review of trends in the international organization field since World War II, see J. Martin Rochester, "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986).
8. Kratochwil and Ruggie, op.cit., p.753. These authors see the trend away from the study of formal institutions as potentially having salutary effects on the practice of international organization.
9. John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975). See also Kratochwil and Ruggie, op.cit., p.754.
10. Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics 32 (April 1980), pp. 332-333.
11. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p.5. See also Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). As the concept is sometimes used in the literature, a regime can be just bilateral in scope and can involve a relatively narrow concern. See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987).

12. Clearly, there are many scholars who still focus their research on the UN and other international organizations, examining either the structures themselves or their performance. See, for example, Harold K. Jacobson and David A. Kay, Environmental Protection: The International Dimension (Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun, 1983) and Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1984); Haas, op.cit. and "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981," International Organization 37 (Spring 1983); and Mark W. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77 (New York: Praeger, 1979). The point is that there has been a distinct decline in this brand of scholarship in favor of investigating more general phenomena that are relatively tangential to international organization.
13. Harold K. Jacobson, William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," American Political Science Review 80 (March 1986), p.141. The authors note that regional IGO growth has exceeded global IGO growth since World War II, although "the absolute number [of IGOs with potentially universal membership] for the post-World War II era is impressively high" (p.145). Even those scholars who could be labeled skeptics acknowledge that "quantitatively, . . . IGOs are still an expanding force in international affairs" despite the fact that "qualitatively . . . the world of IGOs is not in good shape." See John Gerard Ruggie, "The United States and the United Nations: Toward A New Realism," International Organization 39 (Spring 1985), p.343.
14. Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Record of International Organizations in the Twentieth Century," Tamkang Chair Lecture Series, No.64, Tamkang University, Taiwan, January 1986 (mimeo), p.25. Claude adds that "we cannot ignore the successful implantation of the idea of international organization.

International organization may not have taken over the system, but it has certainly taken hold in the system. The twentieth century has seen the establishment of the prescription that multilateral agencies are essential to the conduct of international affairs."

15. On this point, see David Fromkin, The Independence of Nations (New York: Praeger, 1981), especially chapters 7-9.
16. These concepts were introduced by Keohane and Nye in Power and Interdependence, op.cit., pp.12-22. For more recent reflection on the concepts and ideas developed in the latter work, see Keohane and Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987).
17. One of the better discussions of this theme is provided by K.J. Holsti in "Change in the International System: Interdependence, Integration, and Fragmentation," in Ole R. Holsti et al., eds., Change in the International System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 23-53. For a less conventional treatment, see Richard Falk, "A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals," in Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 651-702.
18. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p.109.
19. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (September 1984).
20. Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward A New Theory of Institutions," World Politics 39 (October 1986). For an application of the "institutional" approach to the analysis of U.S. foreign economic policy, see the symposium on "The State and American Foreign Economic Policy," International

- Organization 42 (Winter 1988), especially the concluding article by John Ikenberry.
21. Ibid., pp.121-122.
 22. Kratochwil and Ruggie, op.cit., pp.771-772. Among the few recent attempts to pursue this linkage are Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations," International Organization 42 (Spring 1988); and Christer Jonsson, "Interorganization Theory and International Organization," International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986).
 23. Ruggie, "The United States and the United Nations," op.cit., p.345.
 24. Ibid., p.356.
 25. Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p.1.
 26. Fromkin, op.cit., p.6. Few writers are more cynical than Fromkin, who deplores what he sees as a continuing tendency toward idealistic thinking on the part of students of international relations. I am referring to cynicism and pessimism as it relates to the prospects for international institution-building and not human affairs generally. Clearly, one can find gloomy prognoses of the human condition throughout the twentieth century, including the work of Spengler and Toynbee in the early decades and of limits to growth thinkers in the 1970s.
 27. The classic statement and critique of this is E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939), which launched the "idealist-realist" debate that was to color much postwar thinking about the role of international organization in world politics. For a discussion of this debate, see F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought (London: Sage, 1977), chapter 10; John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago

- Press, 1951); and the series of essays in International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981), pp.179-241.
28. On the evolution of the international relations field since World War II, including turns taken toward behavioralism and globalism along the way to neorealism, see William C. Olson, "The Growth of A Discipline," in B.Porter, ed., The Aberysthwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.3-29; K.J.Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985); and Rochester, op.cit.
 29. Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987).
 30. See Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theory of International Politics," World Politics 38 (October 1985), p.25; Robert Axelrod and Robert O.Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," World Politics 38 (October 1985), pp.226-227 and 231-232; and other articles in the same volume. Snidal (p.57) states that "the metaphors of 'Hobbesian anarchy' and 'international organization' . . . have divided and obscured our understanding of international politics."
 31. For example, Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York: John Wiley, 1976); Kenneth A.Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), originally published as a symposium in World Politics 38 (October 1985); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also the call for papers for the 1989 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, featuring the convention theme of "Cooperation, Discord and the Conditions for Peace in International Society," International Studies Newsletter 14 (December 1987), pp.1 and 3.

32. The criticism that previous writers in the realist tradition gave little attention to the dynamics of cooperation while those in the idealist tradition ignored conflict seems somewhat overdone, although it is true that the earlier literature gave relatively little coverage to the welfare objectives of states, focusing overwhelmingly on security concerns. See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Raymond Aron, Peace and War, trans. by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966); Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley, 1961); and Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1956).
33. "Neorealism," a term first coined by Robert Cox and sometimes referred to as "structural realism," has been defined as a body of thought which attempts to "systematize political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics." Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.15. It is most closely associated with the work of Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin. See Waltz, op.cit. and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
34. The term refers to those writers whose work springs generally from a concern about the dynamics of interdependence, following up the "globalist" thinking of the 1970s. See Joseph S. Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics 40 (January 1988); Nye gives as an example of neoliberalism Richard Rosecrance's The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
35. Richard Ashley, in "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), includes Robert Keohane in the neorealist camp, even though Keohane has denied the label, advocating a "research program [that] would pay much more attention to the roles of institutions and rules than does

- Structural Realism." Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, DC: APSA, 1983), p.530. Also see Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, op.cit., p.25. One should add here that there are some well-known scholars, such as Richard Falk and others associated with the World Order Models Project, who continue to harbor expansive, "maximalist" views of world order and remain close to the classical idealist tradition, although they tend to be quite removed from mainstream thought in the international relations field as a whole as they no doubt would be the first to admit and to lament.
36. Ruggie, for example, in his much-cited critique of Waltz, calls for a "neorealist synthesis." See "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward A Neorealist Synthesis," World Politics 35 (January 1983), reprinted in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, op.cit., pp.131-157.
37. Keohane and Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," op.cit., p.752. The "modernist" (or "globalist") paradigm that they developed, based on the notion of "complex interdependence," was presented not as an alternative but as a complement to the realist paradigm. Although it challenged some realist assumptions -- deemphasizing the state-as-actor and relaxing the distinction between domestic and international politics -- its treatment of international organizations as "clusters of intergovernmental and transgovernmental networks" was far divorced from the legal-formal roots of the idealist tradition. If anything, Keohane and Nye have further distanced themselves from this tradition in the 1980s, qualifying some of their earlier suggestions about the importance of nonstate actors and particularly rejecting what, fairly or unfairly, was widely seen as an endorsement of a "cobweb" as opposed to a "billiard ball" conception of international politics. A few others, however, have reaffirmed the globalist paradigm in

- the 1980s and have attempted to expand upon it, such as Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988); and Marvin S. Soroos, Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global Policy (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986).
38. Although neorealists contend that their emphasis on the "essentially conflictual nature of international affairs" and "the primacy in all political life of power and security in human motivation" makes them true to the realist tradition, critics argue that neorealism is far more fatalistic and resigned to the status quo than is classical realism. See Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), p.20; and Ashley, op.cit. Such classical realists as Morgenthau and Herz did alter their views about reality as time went on. See Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," Encounter 43 (August 1974), p.57; and John H. Herz, "Political Realism Revisited," International Studies Quarterly 25 (June 1981), pp.202-203. As for neoliberals, see the previous footnote.
39. Axelrod and Keohane, op.cit., p.226. Cooperation is defined in the symposium as "conscious policy coordination" among states having "conflicting policy preferences."
40. Among the more prominent examples are Claude, Swords into Plowshares, op.cit.; Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," International Organization 15 (Autumn 1961); Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold,

- Europe's Would-Be Polity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, op.cit.
41. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April 1988), p.318. Jervis is specifically referring here to the latest applications of game theory to the study of cooperation, but many non-game theoretic works tend to frame the question similarly.
 42. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p.3.
 43. Keohane, After Hegemony, op.cit., p.183.
 44. James N. Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp.870-871.
 45. Jervis, op.cit., p.317.
 46. On policy implications, see Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, op.cit., pp.136-139 and 190-191.
 47. See, for example, Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of International Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (March 1957) or John Gerard Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration," American Political Science Review 66 (September 1972). Students of international law have long noted the utilitarian basis for cooperative acceptance of rules in international affairs, and how actors will subject themselves to binding agreements even in the absence of a central constraint system in the Austinian sense. William D. Coplin, The Functions of International Law (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1966).
 48. Compare the "tit-for-tat" reciprocity strategies recommended by Axelrod in The Evolution of Cooperation, op.cit., with the strategies found in Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

- 1960) and Charles E. Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).
49. Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," World Politics 38 (October 1985), pp. 2 and 12-18. As Joanne Gowa points out, many of the "strategies" suggested by game theorists may have questionable practical relevance not only for institution-building but also for ad hoc cooperation, given the state-centric rationality and other assumptions governing this mode of analysis. See Gowa, "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: *The Evolution of Cooperation and International Regimes*," International Organization 40 (Winter 1986).
 50. Ibid., pp. 4 and 18-22. The view that global institution-building is not only unlikely but undesirable in many cases is forcefully presented in John Conybeare, "International Organization and the Theory of Property Rights," International Organization 34 (Summer 1980).
 51. Oye, op.cit., p. 1.
 52. Keohane and Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," op.cit., p. 740.
 53. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," op.cit., p. 24; and Axelrod and Keohane, op.cit., pp. 248-254. Kratochwil and Ruggie, op.cit., p. 767, state that "what distinguishes international regimes from other international phenomena -- from strategic interaction, let us say -- is a specifically normative element."
 54. Even hegemony theory has been criticized for not fully treating international relations in a systemic context, for example ignoring non-capitalist states and glossing over bipolar features of the international system in analyzing the postwar economic order; the theory has been criticized on other grounds as well, including the fact that it deals as much with instability as stability, that it confuses cooperation with coercion, that it excludes other possibly superior bases for cooperation,

- and that it offers little advice to policymakers concerned about the requirements of world order other than to allow a single state to become and remain a hegemon. See Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985); and Haggard and Simmons, op.cit., pp.500-504.
55. Haggard and Simmons, op.cit., p.508. These authors distinguish between the functional, structural, game-theoretic, and cognitive strains of the regime literature.
 56. Keohane and Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," op.cit., p.747.
 57. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Two Cheers for Multilateralism," Foreign Policy (Fall 1985), p.159. Of course, one does not have to rely on game theory to observe that the greater the number of actors, the more likely there is to be diversity and, hence, difficulty in reconciling differences.
 58. Ibid., p.155. They equate institution-building through the UN with an ill-advised "grand design" approach to world order.
 59. Ibid., pp.158-159.
 60. At least one critic dismisses the study of regimes as "a fad, one of those shifts of fashion not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events in the real world." Susan Strange, "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), p.479.
 61. Rochester, op.cit., p.803.
 62. The term is Arnold Wolfers', referring to the overuse and misuse of the concept of "national security." "National Security As An Ambiguous Symbol," in Wolfers, op.cit., p.147.
 63. Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), p.2.

64. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p.12; cited in ibid.
65. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," op.cit., p.533.
66. Herz, "Political Realism Revisited," op.cit., p.202.
67. A more expansive definition is provided by the Consortium on World Order Studies, which defines world order as the "study and appraisal of efforts of creating a more dependable international environment which would lead to a significant reduction of violence and the improvement of the quality of life throughout the globe." Consortium on World Order Studies (mimeo), p.1; cited in Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Law and Human Action: A Jurisprudential Plea for a World Order Perspective in International Legal Studies," in Falk et al., op.cit., p.646.
68. Waltz, op.cit., p.162.
69. Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). Among others, K.J. Holsti identifies distinct international systems in the periods from the early eighteenth century until 1789, 1789 to 1939, and 1945 to the present. Evan Luard cites 1789 and 1914 as watershed dates. Seyom Brown speaks of five historical systems since 1648. See K.J.Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983); Evan Luard, Types of International Society (New York: Free Press, 1976); and Brown, op.cit., p.14.
70. The term "bimultipolarity" was coined by Richard Rosecrance in 1966 to describe a hypothetical system that he felt might exist in the future but did not yet exist at the time. Others, like Stanley Hoffmann, have since suggested that such a system has materialized. See Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 (September

- 1966); and Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp.21-46.
71. Brown, op.cit., chapter 12.
 72. Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957).
 73. Some observers have suggested that recent disintegrative trends in the form of the breakup of colonial empires and increased subnational conflict in both established and young states, combined with the erosion of state sovereignty associated with multinational corporations and transnationalism, threaten to move the international system toward a "new feudalism" or "new medievalism." See, for example, Bull, op.cit., pp.254-256 and 291-294, and James A. Nathan, "The New Feudalism," Foreign Policy (Spring 1981), as well as the discussion of "polyarchy" in Brown, op.cit.
 74. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p.97.
 75. World order values have been most extensively discussed in the World Order Models Project literature, such as Richard Falk, A Study of Future Worlds (New York: Free Press, 1975). Also, see Robert C. Johansen, The National Interest and the Human Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
 76. For a concise review of the Waltz, Singer, and related controversies on this question, see Buzan, op.cit., chapter 4.
 77. Stanley Hoffmann, "Choices," Foreign Policy (Fall 1973), p.5.
 78. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy," op.cit., p.1.
 79. In their article on "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," op.cit., pp.226-228, Axelrod and Keohane stress that except for the fact that "anarchy remains a constant," the "context" in which games occur in international relations is "malleable." They might have taken this

point further and examined cooperation in a larger context. Interestingly, in an article focusing on institutions, they manage never to use the term "international organization" once.

80. Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1958); David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965).
81. Mansbach and Vasquez, op.cit., develop a "global politics" paradigm which includes a discussion of "allocation mechanisms." Although they rely on Easton's definition of politics ("the authoritative allocation of valued things") as the starting point for their paradigm, it is questionable whether such a definition is appropriate to international politics even if his systems framework seems quite applicable. Among the numerous articles comparing the international political system with national political systems, see Fred W. Riggs, "International Relations as a Prismatic System," World Politics 14 (October 1961).
82. Sounding somewhat like regimes, a "policy" has been defined in a national context as *"a general principle concerning the pattern of activity, or a general commitment to the pattern of activity, developed or adopted for use in making particular decisions about programs or actions."* David V. Edwards, The American Political Experience, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p.481.
83. Commenting on the proscription against armed aggression written into the UN Charter, Louis Henkin contends that "the norm against the unilateral national use of force has survived. Indeed, . . . the norm has been largely observed . . . and the kinds of international wars which it sought to prevent have been infrequent." Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p.146. However, while the incidence of traditional interstate wars seems to have decreased, there has been

growing internationalization of civil wars along with growing security anxiety and war preparation as manifested by enormously increased global military expenditures in recent years. Trends are reported in World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington, DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1988), p.1; and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Conflict in the International System, 1816-1977: Historical Trends and Policy Futures," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan, eds., Challenges to America: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), pp.89-115.

84. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, op.cit., p.3.
85. On some dimensions of interdependence, some parts of the world may be less interdependent today than in the past. This does not contradict my statement, which refers to the overall condition of the international system. Even Waltz's well-known caveat about the "myth" of interdependence does not deny that empirically one can demonstrate growing interdependence. As he says, his quarrel is a "conceptual" one, in that he confines interdependence to a "relationship among equals" and focuses on interdependence between certain parts of the system, namely the "great powers." Waltz, op.cit., pp.144-145. Also, see Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26 (October 1973); and Alex Inkeles, "The Emerging Social Structure of the World," World Politics 27 (July 1975).
86. Robert Cox makes this point, arguing that "previous historical systems referred to more limited areas, more or less sealed off from external influences, which were the relevant 'worlds' for the people in them." See "On Thinking About Future World Order," World Politics 28 (January 1976), p.195.

87. An overview of the development of "political development" as a field of study, including some of the biases surrounding the concept, can be found in Gabriel A. Almond, "The Development of Political Development," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp.437-478.
88. Alfred Diamant, "The Nature of Political Development," in Jason L.Finkle and Richard W. Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p.92.
89. Lucian W.Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," in Finkle and Gable, op.cit., p.90.
90. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); and Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
91. For a good discussion of the relationship between political stability, or peace, on the one hand and political democracy and economic equality, or justice, on the other, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Weiner and Huntington, op.cit., pp.3-32. Huntington (p.7) states that although the "assumption that 'all good things go together' is generally wrong and easy to criticize," "it would be wrong to dismiss it entirely." He (p.19) notes that, following the predominance of the "conflict" literature in the political development field in the 1970s, which suggested that such values as stability and equality or democracy might be incompatible in developing societies, the "reconciliation" literature in the 1980s attempted to explore how they might all be increasingly realized over time, with political scientists generally urging "the temporal priority of order over democracy."
92. In addition to Huntington's article cited in the previous note, writings which examine the empirical link between political violence and inequality

- in a comparative politics context are Manus I. Midlarsky, "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence," American Political Science Review 82 (June 1988); Edward N. Muller, "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence," American Sociological Review 50 (June 1985); Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," World Politics 16 (April 1964); Jack H. Nagel, "Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis," World Politics 26 (July 1974) and "Erratum," World Politics 28 (January 1976); and Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Theoretical foundations are supplied by John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) as well as the classic writings of Plato, Aristotle, and de Tocqueville. The general view is that increased political and economic equality in the long run tends to lessen violence but in the short run may aggravate instability and lead to greater violence insofar as it produces a "revolution of rising expectations" that cannot be fulfilled. In an international politics context, an article which looks at whether peace and prosperity "go together" is Bruce Russett's "Prosperity and Peace," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983).
93. Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978), p.108.
 94. Ibid., p.184.
 95. Ibid., pp.185-186. Hoffmann calls for "gradual economic and social progress," as opposed to "the utopia of global welfare-and-justice." For another view that questions whether the distribution of wealth is something that can or ought to be placed on the global agenda, see Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
 96. Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, op.cit., p.101.

97. Buzan maintains that "only when the weaker members [of the international system] have become more firmly established as states" and "can project a basic solidity into the system" will "the system as a whole be able to advance in maturity." Buzan, op.cit., p.118.
98. For an argument that international institution-building must be centered around not only states but nonstate actors, given the "polyarchical" structure of world politics, see Brown, op.cit., chapters 12 and 13.
99. It is hard to quarrel with Hedley Bull's caution that "[although] the system of a plurality of sovereign states gives rise to classic dangers, . . . these have to be reckoned against the dangers inherent in the attempt to contain disparate communities within the framework of a single government" and his conclusion that "world order at the present time . . . [may be] best served by living with the former dangers rather than by attempting to face the latter." Bull, op.cit., p.287.
100. Karl W.Deutsch et al., "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area," in International Political Communities (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), p.2. Mansbach and Vasquez, op.cit., p.292, associate "political development" of the international system with "increasing institutionalization, legitimacy, and hierarchy in games among actors," which in their scheme of things can include acceptance of war as an allocation mechanism.
101. Deutsch et al., "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area," op.cit., p.45.
102. Ibid., p.89.
103. See note 83. For evidence that the international system over time has been moving in the direction of war avoidance, edging toward the foundations of a global security-community, and that the reduction in interstate violence is correlated with IGO growth, see Jacobson et al., "National Entanglements in

- International Governmental Organizations," op.cit., p.156; and Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, op.cit., pp.190-192 and 198-199.
104. The strategy of building international cooperation through "decomposition," as game theorists have argued, has also been reflected in recent practitioner thinking. See, for example, the Atlantic Council Working Group on the United Nations, The Future of the UN: A Strategy for Like-Minded Nations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977); and the United Nations Association of the USA, A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow (New York: UNA-USA, 1987).
 105. Ernst B. Haas, "On Systems and International Regimes," World Politics 27 (January 1975), p.148.
 106. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, op.cit., p.206.
 107. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, op.cit., p.391.
 108. Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, op.cit., p.189. I use the term "central guidance" more loosely than Richard Falk. See his A Study of Future Worlds, op.cit., chapter 4.
 109. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.8-9.
 110. See Coplin, op.cit.; and Richard Falk, "The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International Law: An Intermediate View," in Karl W. Deutsch and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The Relevance of International Law (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1968).
 111. I am referring to functions here in a broader sense than, say, Jacobson in Networks of Interdependence, op.cit., chapter 5.
 112. Cited in Richard Gardner, "To Make the World Safe for Interdependence," UN 30 (New York: UNA-USA, 1975), p.16.
 113. Ness and Brechin, op.cit., p.247.

114. Deutsch et al., "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area," op.cit., p.3.
115. One writer notes that the "official published version of treaties entered into by the United Kingdom in 1892 . . . filled 190 pages; the treaties entered into by the United Kingdom in 1960 filled 2500 pages in the same series." Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 5th ed. (London: Unwin and Allen, 1984), p.25.
116. Jacobson et al., "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," op.cit.
117. Ibid., p.142.
118. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, op.cit., p.81.
119. Based on the work of Abraham Maslow, Gerald and Patricia Miche in Toward A Human World Order (New York: Paulist Press, 1977), p.28, infer a "natural human genetic propensity for bonding and unification" which contends with more parochial, centrifugal tendencies. As simplistic as this notion appears in light of the Westphalian state system, the evolution of "the state" itself may lend some credence to it, since as Roger Masters points out "contemporary nation-states are so much larger than the groups observed in other mammals." See "The Biological Nature of the State," World Politics 35 (January 1983), p.161. Also see Miriam Steiner, "Human Nature and Truth as World Order Issues," International Organization 34 (Summer 1980). The UN remains a powerful symbol. Even in the United States, where anti-UN sentiment in recent years has been as high as anywhere in the world, Gallup and other public opinion polls consistently have shown overwhelming support for remaining in the organization despite widespread dissatisfaction with UN performance.
120. Jacobson et al., "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," op.cit., p.157.

121. Seyom Brown and Larry Fabian, "Toward Mutual Accountability in the Nonterrestrial Realms," International Organization 29 (Summer 1975).
122. The phrase is borrowed from March and Olsen, op.cit., p.747.
123. U.S. Senator Henry Jackson's exact comments were: "The best hope for peace with justice does not lie in the United Nations. . . . The best hope for the United Nations lies in the maintenance of peace." New York Times Magazine (April 1, 1962), p.108.
124. This point is made very cogently by Robert Gregg in "The Politics of Financing the United Nations," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, March 30, 1988.
125. International Organization, 24 (Winter 1970), p.160.
126. Jacobson et al., "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," op.cit., p.152; Jeane Kirkpatrick's introductory statement in US Department of State, Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations (February 24, 1985); Francis W. Hoole, "Evaluating the Impact of International Organizations," International Organization 31 (Summer 1977); Jorge Castaneda, Legal Effects of UN Resolutions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Chadwick F. Alger, "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and Their Effect on International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 5 (June 1961); Robert E. Riggs, "One Small Step for Functionalism: UN Participation and Congressional Attitude Change," International Organization 31 (Summer 1977); and Peter Wolf, "International Organization and Attitude Change: A Re-Examination of the Functionalist Approach," International Organization 27 (Summer 1973).
127. In an article entitled "The Reality and Guarantees of A Secure World," published in the September 17, 1987 issue of Pravda, Mikhail Gorbachev articulated his vision of a "comprehensive system of international security"

which encompassed military, economic, social, and ecological concerns to be addressed through the UN.

128. Kratochwil and Ruggie, op.cit., p.772.

129. Robert A. Dahl, Research Frontiers in Politics and Government (Washington,DC: Brookings, 1955), p.46.