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Is There Too Little, or
Too Much, Systemic Crisis?

J. Martin Rochester

**THE PROSPECTS FOR UNITED NATIONS REFORM:
IS THERE TOO LITTLE, OR
TOO MUCH, SYSTEMIC CRISIS?**

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Introduction

In an article that appeared in a 1986 issue of *International Organization*, published shortly after the observance of the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, I lamented what I argued was the passing of international organization as a distinct field of study in the international relations discipline.¹ I took as my definition of international organization the traditional notion of "a formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social, or related fields."² As Kratochwil and Ruggie also noted in the same volume, although with more approval than lament, the theory and practice of international organization were becoming increasingly divorced from each other: "The leading doctors have become biochemists and have stopped treating and in most cases even seeing patients."³ Instead of studying multilateral institutions, scholars were studying the institution of multilateralism (as Ruggie put it, "institutionalized collective behavior").⁴ In other words, to the extent the IO field could still be said to exist, it was focused on the analysis of "recognized patterns . . . around which expectations converge," which "may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements,"⁵ i.e., regimes.

Kratochwil, Ruggie, and others could be forgiven for their skepticism about the worthiness of formal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as a subject of scholarly inquiry, particularly those operating at the global level. After all, the history of the UN system could be read as the steady erosion of the initial euphoria that accompanied its creation out of the ashes of World War II, with periods of decline punctuated by short-term revival and bursts of renewed hope only to be succeeded by another round of failure and ever-compounding cynicism.⁶ In the mid-1980s especially--at a time when another

grayish-looking Soviet apparatchik (Mikhail Gorbachev) had just come to power in the "evil empire" and when a US Secretary of Defense (Caspar Weinberger) found it reasonable to declare that "we are no longer in the postwar era but a prewar era"--it was easy to dismiss world order, whether pursued through international organization or any other vehicle, as a rather hollow concept. Nonetheless, I ended my 1986 piece with the following words:

There is every reason to believe that eventually, at some point in the future, international organization as traditionally conceived will be among the dominant subjects of political inquiry on the planet. One can only hope that we make it through the interim.

Were these words prophetic, or hopelessly naive? Have we made it through "the interim," at least partially through, sooner than anyone expected? Is a UN-centered "new world order" ready to dawn in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union, the Cold War, and the bipolar era, as was suggested in a *New York Times* editorial trumpeting the UN's comeback?

In a wondrous sea-change, the United Nations has silenced most of its detractors. A body once scorned as a dithering talk-shop has now mobilized impressively to punish Iraq's aggressions in the Persian Gulf. Elsewhere, from Afghanistan to Namibia, from Cambodia to Central America, the UN has also offered a glimpse of . . . hopes for a new world order to resolve conflicts by multilateral diplomacy and collective security.⁸

Or, as suggested by the UN's subsequent failure in Afghanistan and more recent stumbling in the Balkans and elsewhere, is this merely yet another and perhaps potentially even more dangerous turn in the rollercoaster life of the world body, that is, is the emergent new world order--to paraphrase Voltaire's remark about the Holy Roman Empire--likely to be neither terribly new nor worldly nor orderly?³ Whether the UN will be able to move beyond the past cycle of ups and downs and chart a more steady course in the future is a question answerable not by looking for empirical indicators of unusual UN revival (for example, the authorization of more peacekeeping operations between 1988 and 1992 than in the previous 43 years, with a fivefold increase in UN-mandated troops dispatched worldwide over the past year alone) or by following the latest news headlines

reporting UN slippage, but by inquiring into much deeper phenomena having to do with the fundamental requirements for effective global organization.

This paper stems from a larger study which explores the systemic constraints as well as opportunities surrounding global institution-building in contemporary world politics. I focus here particularly on the role of crisis as a variable in promoting major change in human affairs. The change that is the subject of my inquiry is significant UN reform. The question I wish to consider is whether there is presently too little, or too much, systemic crisis to support global institution-building in the form of UN reform.

In choosing to examine the prospects for UN reform, I am rejecting the familiar critique of formal-legal analyses, symbolized by Lord Caradon's oft-invoked dismissal of UN reform efforts: "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the United Nations--except its members."¹⁰ I am also rejecting the equally fashionable critique of systemwide approaches to international governance as being inferior to subglobal multilateralism and minilateralism.¹¹ I start with *institutionalist* and *globalist* assumptions that (1) the development of formal intergovernmental organizations is at least as relevant to concerns about international order (and justice) as the development of less formal modes of interstate cooperation, even though not all organizational arrangements are equally benign in this regard, and (2) any efforts at international institution-building must focus to some extent on the global level, even though many problems can be treated as regional or bilateral in scope and might be usefully addressed through international organizations operating at those levels or having only limited membership participation. These ideas, once part of the orthodoxy of the international organization field, have sounded almost heretical in recent times.

From "Bad Idealism" to "Bad Realism"

Even as the practitioners in the 1990s have returned to the "world of actual international organizations"¹² (they, of course, never entirely left), the theoreticians for

the most part remain disengaged from the study of those organizations. The clarion call for a new world order reverberating at the outset of the decade masked a deep-seated incredulity that had taken hold in the scholarly community towards IGOs in general and global IGOs in particular.¹³ Despite some recent stirrings of renewed interest in IGOs such as the UN,¹⁴ liberal institutionalists (neoliberals) tend to share common ground with realists and neorealists in their deprecation of formal, universal international organization. To cite just a few examples:

- o As recently as 1989, Oran Young was writing: "I have . . . found it hard to become unduly alarmed by the apparent decline of the United Nations and certain other international organizations in recent years. . . . If one looks at institutions rather than at international organizations, I believe, there is less cause for alarm regarding the pursuit of international order and justice."¹⁵
- o Duncan Snidal has equated the term "international organization" with an extreme idealist view of the world, stating that "the metaphors of 'Hobbesian anarchy' and 'international organization' have divided and obscured our understanding of international politics."¹⁶
- o In an article focusing on the role of "institutions" in achieving cooperation under anarchy, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane manage never once to use the term "international organization."¹⁷
- o To the extent Keohane associates himself with formal organizations, it is not notably of the global variety. In arguing against global unilateralism, Keohane and Joseph Nye have advocated subglobal multilateralism, noting that although "a crazy quilt of international regimes is likely to arise" without universal approaches, "better some roughness around the edges of international regimes than a vacuum at the center. Poorly coordinated coalitions, working effectively on various issues, are in general preferable to universalistic negotiations permanently deadlocked by diverse membership. . . . Only

rarely are universal international organizations likely to provide the world with instruments for collective action."¹⁸

- o Joseph Grieco has characterized liberal institutionalists such as Keohane and Nye as unduly optimistic about human and national behavior despite their heavily guarded analyses of the prospects for global institution-building.¹⁹

- o In a 1992 symposium on "Multilateralism," John Ruggie still hedges on the subject of global organization. Although he speaks of "generalized organizing principles," he states that "the generic institutional form of multilateralism must not be confused with formal multilateral organizations, a relatively recent arrival, and still of only relatively modest importance." Of the "move to institutions" (i.e., IGO growth in the twentieth century), Ruggie expresses bewilderment: "I know of no good explanation in the literature of why states should have wanted to complicate their lives in this manner."²⁰

One can discern a highly guarded, almost anti-globalist and anti-institutionalist posture even on the part of scholars who focus their research on the UN, reflected in a 1989 Academic Council on the UN System study which concluded that "the fact [is] that globalist approaches to world order may have run their course, at least for the present" and that there are "limits to both globalism and intergovernmentalism."²¹ No less an old IO hand than Inis Claude has entered the ranks of the cynics, with his recent revisiting of balance of power theory which suggested that universal approaches to problem-solving have seen their day come and gone and that they no longer can be given the credence they enjoyed earlier in this century.²²

From Bad Realism to Neoidealism: Can Wilsonianism Be Resurrected?

If a previous generation of international relationists could be accused of "bad idealism," the current generation might be guilty of "bad realism."²³ There is no neoidealism to match neorealism.²⁴ Such skepticism does not seem entirely justified. When one looks beyond present epiphenomena and takes a longer-term perspective, the

following simple observations can be made: (1) the trend is unmistakably in the direction of international organizational growth, with one study documenting the proliferation of IGOs and counting over 1000 such entities in the contemporary global system;²⁵ (2) the "expectation of international organization, the habit of organizing, the taking-for-granted of international bodies . . . are permanent results of the movement" that began almost from scratch a century or so ago;²⁶ and (3) the United Nations--primitive, flawed, and fragile as it is--represents the latest, most ambitious stage in the historic process of global institution-building. While this process is not completely linear--setbacks occur--there does seem to be a process at work.

If one is not impressed with these trendlines and is more inclined to look at current conditions and their ripeness for global institution-building, consider the following:

The constant presence of change that is pervasive but somewhat indeterminate with respect to overall pattern or direction constitutes a fundamental aspect of the international milieu in which the United Nations operates at the present time. The resultant fluidity of the international system shapes the activities of the Organization in a number of significant ways. Under these circumstances the problems of regulating relationships of power, for example, are highly complex. . . . The role of the United Nations as a creator of norms and a source of collective legitimization tends to be sharply emphasized in a rapidly changing system in contrast to one that is more stable and slowly changing. And the opportunities thrown up by the pervasiveness of change constitute an invitation to various actors in the system to make an effort to harness the influence of the organization as an instrument for the accomplishment of political change.²⁷

These observations were made in an article appearing in *International Organization* in 1968, when such theorizing about the UN in scholarly journals was more commonplace than today, even though they would seem far more germane to the 1990s. As revolutionary as the international environment might have appeared in the 1960s, few would equate that decade with the present one as a period of ferment in international relations.

While there is a possibility that we will overreact to the upheavals from Moscow to Maastricht which have ushered in the post-postwar era and attribute larger importance to

them than they deserve, especially coming as they have at a time when cosmic visions are being stirred by the impending arrival of a new century and millennium, there is also a chance we will underestimate them and fail to grasp their significance as evidences of a watershed period in the life of the international system. If it is much too premature to declare the epoch we are passing through in the late twentieth century as marking "the end of history"²⁸ or to equate it historically with the Reformation,²⁹ it may be just as wrong to dismiss it as merely a *deja vu* return to world politics as it looked prior to 1945 or 1914.

In some respects the convulsions in world politics since the late 1980s can be viewed in retrospect as the culmination of a process of ongoing erosion of the bipolar postwar international order traceable back to its beginnings. Long observable trends in the direction of a more complex international system are becoming more pronounced and accelerated. This complexity has four main aspects: (1) *the growing diffusion and ambiguity of power*, including the decline of the US as a hegemon, the internal and external problems of the other one-time superpower, the continued rise of Japan, the challenge presented by a reunited German state acting in combination with others within the European Community, the proliferation of ministates capable at times of frustrating the will of major actors, as well as shifting relationships generally between military, economic, and technological bases of power; (2) *the growing fluidity of alignments*, including the depolarization of the East-West conflict as former East bloc states move ideologically toward the West while West-West economic competition heats up as an axis of conflict, the North-South conflict losing its defining character also as increasing diversity among NICs, OPEC states, Fourth World countries and other LDCs makes Southern solidarity harder to sustain, and greater localization of politics related to ethnicity and other issues beneath the global level; (3) *ever more intricate patterns of interdependence*, associated with an expanding agenda of concerns and a broadening conception of national security beyond traditional military considerations; and (4) *the growing role of nonstate*

actors along with increasing linkages between subnational, transnational, and intergovernmental levels of activity even as the size of national governmental budgets and state apparatuses resist shrinkage.

The question remains whether we are witnessing merely the end of the postwar era and the transformation of the international system back to the more normal historical pattern of full-blown multipolarity, in which case we can continue to rely on the state-centric paradigm and its focus on national interests, sovereignty, and international anarchy, or whether we are on the brink of a more fundamental and epic transformation, namely the unraveling of the very fabric of the Westphalian state system itself that has been the primary basis of human political organization for the past several centuries. Some seize upon the first two systemic characteristics cited above (the fragmentation of the postwar power and alignment structure) and suggest the *deja vu* scenario is the correct one.³⁰ Others seize upon the other two systemic characteristics (relating to interdependence, transnationalism and intergovernmentalism) and suggest differently, i.e., the international system is experiencing unprecedented "turbulence"--a "bifurcated global politics" torn between state-centrism and multicentrism, calling for a wholly new "post-international politics" paradigm.³¹

Every generation is tempted to see itself as living at a (perhaps *the*) pivotal juncture in human history. Temporocentrism in the late twentieth century is especially understandable. Statism and nationalism seem more vibrant than ever, at the same time that they have never seemed more at risk; as Governor Lamm put it, commenting on the perils of the nuclear age: "It has historically been one thing to die for your country. It is a different thing [today] to die *with* your country."³² That there is a particularly schizophrenic quality to contemporary world politics is clear, although it is hard to say how the various tensions will be resolved. Whether this is one of those special moments in time must be left for future historians to judge. It took over 200 years for historians to recognize the significance of 1648 and for the international relations discipline to be

born. Might historians a century or two from now look back on this era as the beginning of the end of the Westphalian state system, even if we are no more sure of what we have wrought than our seventeenth-century ancestors? Although any response to this query would be pure, idle speculation, the thought alone should at least give pause to those incapable of entertaining visions of any other world order than the present one.

As stated at the outset, the metamorphosis I am interested in investigating is not a change *of* the Westphalian system (toward world government or some more hierarchical order) but a change *in* the Westphalian system. Within the state system, I am interested in conscious, deliberate international institution-building (what Oran Young has called "negotiated orders" as opposed to unplanned "spontaneous orders"),³⁴ and within the category of negotiated orders, I am interested in what Young calls "framework agreements encompassing the basic order or ordering principles of an entire social system."³⁵ He cites "San Francisco in 1945" as belonging to "this class of comprehensive or framework agreements," which he recognizes to be a rare development. To inquire into the present prospects for UN reform is to ask whether the occasion now exists for forging the next framework agreement in the life of the interstate system, or at least reworking if not rethinking the one entered into in San Francisco.

The dilemma posed by UN reform is that those proposals which appear feasible also seem trivial, while those which might truly matter in making a difference seem the least doable. If one chooses a strategy of merely tinkering with the present institutional machinery--focusing on reforms mainly of a managerial and administrative nature, such as achieving better coordination among the specialized agencies, streamlining debate and other procedures in the General Assembly, developing more sophisticated PPBE techniques along with more stringent requirements for personnel recruitment and promotion in the Secretariat, and upgrading the Security Council's capabilities through the creation of standing panels of mediators and fact-finders--then one stands accused of engaging in a wasteful expenditure of time, money, and intellectual effort given the benefits that are

likely to accrue from these seemingly innocuous changes; although some proposals relating to matters like the professionalization of the international civil service and reorganization of the specialized agencies can be quite controversial, any UN reform exercise which is limited largely to nuts-and-bolts changes will be perceived as such, merely confirming Caradon's view of the irrelevance of formal-legal explanations of and solutions to organizational malfunctioning. On the other hand, if one takes the position that only a total rethinking and overhauling of the UN's structure is a worthwhile exercise--focusing on substantial revision of the basic political arrangements embodied in the Charter, or starting over from scratch--then one, too, can be charged with irrelevance but for overreaching rather than underreaching. Somewhere between tinkering and rethinking there may be opportunities for engineering change in a manner that is both realistic and meaningful.

The United Nations can be understood as the resultant of large-scale, long-term technological and other forces contributing to the establishment of the "habit of international organization" in the nineteenth century and the creation of global organization in the twentieth century. Whether this historical pattern of growing formalization and universalization of international politics continues, and at what pace, will depend upon several factors. Granted the small number of cases to base conclusions upon, the past dynamics of international institution-building suggests that major innovation in the political development of the international system--in terms of new macro-level governance arrangements ("framework agreements") resulting from human design--tends to be associated with a *system-wide crisis* (systemic war) combined with the existence of *an actor or set of actors disposed toward and capable of moving the system*. In other words, significant institutional development in the international system may well materialize as part of a gradual, unfolding process, but acceleration requires a push from specific actors responding to a specific crisis. Assuming we are now living in a post-hegemonic world in the nuclear age,³⁶ it follows that any attempt to promote the

development of the contemporary international system toward a more "mature" anarchy³⁷ or still higher political order, through UN reform, will require the imprimatur of a critical mass of states that have sufficiently compatible issue-positions, shared salience levels, and joint power capabilities (including hard and soft power) as to constitute a dominant coalition willing and able to lead the other members to act in accordance with the new principles. I will comment later on whether there are currently on the scene a set of actors with the requisite power and will to move the system. Let us now turn to an examination of the crisis variable, which bears on the degree of power and will to guide system change.

Crisis as a Source of Change

As treated by foreign policy analysts, crisis by definition is occasioned by some change or disturbance in a state's environment. Just as significant change may feed crisis, crisis may itself be a source of significant change. The ecopolitics school argues that technological changes ultimately shape human socio-political structures and values, and that today growing technology-based interdependence and the problems associated with it are creating pressures putting humanity on the threshold of reconceptualizing how governments and peoples relate to each other. In Dennis Pirages's words: "The forces of ecological and technological change . . . are driving potentially revolutionary shifts in the structure of relations among nations and in the values that guide human behavior."³⁸ Similarly, George Ball, who as a US Undersecretary of State in the 1960s had called the nation-state "a very old-fashioned idea," has recently reiterated the point that, aside from its inadequacies as a guarantor of physical security, "on the economic side, we have to take account of the fact that our political structure is totally inadequate for a world where technology has assured that capital flows move around without regard to national boundaries. Sooner or later we're going to have to face restructuring our institutions so that they're not confined merely to the nation-states."³⁹ However, even if there is a

compelling logic dictating a reformation in international governance arrangements, the question must be asked, as Stanley Hoffmann has phrased it, "will the need forge a way?"⁴⁰ And will it be sooner, or later?

The biggest puzzle of our time is how it is that the need for coordinated problem-solving on a global scale--in matters of security, economics, and ecology--is arguably greater than ever before, at the same moment when central guidance mechanisms seem less feasible in some respects than in previous historical periods due to the fourfold trends cited above. One might well argue that, if comprehensive approaches to world order such as the League of Nations and its successor have failed or worked only marginally in the past, they are even less likely to succeed in the present environment. Compared with 1945, when in Truman's words "there were many who doubted that agreement could ever be reached by these 50 countries differing so much in race and religion, in language and culture,"⁴¹ the challenge of global institution-building appears all the more formidable today in a world body politic consisting of over three times as many state members representing considerably greater diversity who are clamoring to be at the global bargaining table, not to mention the complications posed by nonstate actors. While it is true that "necessities [in themselves] do not create possibilities,"⁴² one should also avoid another form of wishful thinking, namely rationalizing that because some change is thought to be impossible, it is thereby not needed. Whether individuals and societies in the contemporary international system are prepared to find their way toward a new world order, and how distant they are willing to go, will be in no small measure contingent on just how urgent the need for change is perceived, whether problems are approaching crisis proportions and are being experienced at the systemic level.

Crisis provides the best opportunity for the inertia of existing arrangements to be overcome and for the learning of new behaviors to occur. Kenneth Boulding once remarked in this regard that "man is a strange creature who is incapable of seeing the handwriting on the wall until his back is up against it." As Kant had expressed it earlier,

"the very evils which thus arise compel men to find out means against them."⁴³ The relationship between adversity and innovation is a complicated one:

Adversity does . . . produce innovation, but most often it is grudging innovation. . . . The response to adversity tends to move along the continuum of intellectual adjustment from the specific to the general, from incremental adjustments that occur at the edge of consciousness to systematic reassessments of principles. . . . Reappraisal of general principles occurs only in the face of great pressure. Discontinuity is minimized thus: operational tactics change before strategy; specific programs before policy postulates; postulates before beliefs about the environment in general; and beliefs about today's international situation before the underlying images of the nature of world politics itself.⁴⁴

How far along this path of adversity and adjustment have we come? Does the current situation truly qualify as a systemic crisis? Is the end of the Cold War an occasion for relief and complacency or a source of newfound, heightened concern about a potential worldwide cataclysm? Even if this is not a time of sufficient adversity as to constitute a "Grotian moment"⁴⁵ capable of provoking a change in the "underlying images" upon which the state system is based, is there not adequate impetus for a next stage of global institution-building?

Assessing Crisis

A "world in crisis" is not a new theme, and in fact has been part of our vernacular for so long in the postwar period that it is easy to dismiss it as a tired and empty notion. The implications of nuclear weapons and the unprecedented "interdependence of doom" they created had been cogently analyzed by John Herz and others in the 1950s.⁴⁶ As for the potentially doomsdayish implications of non-military aspects of interdependence, the first wave of apocalyptic, neo-Malthusian warnings was touched off by the formation of the Club of Rome in 1968 and the publication of *The Limits to Growth*, guided by an "overriding conviction that the major problems facing mankind are of such complexity and are so interrelated that traditional institutions and policies are no longer able to cope with them."⁴⁷ The Club of Rome caveat, warning of a destructive linkage between population and economic growth on the one hand and renewable and nonrenewable

resource management on the other, was echoed in the late 1970s in the US by the Carter administration; *The Global 2000 Report to the President* opened with the observation that "the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now" unless "the nations of the world act decisively to alter current trends."⁴⁸ In 1980 the report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (the Brandt Commission), focusing on Third World economic conditions, argued the crisis was already here: "The crisis through which international relations and the world economy are now passing presents great dangers, and they appear to be growing more serious."⁴⁹ More recently, the UN-sponsored Brundtland Commission issued a study with a similar ring, although emphasizing the environmental context of economic decisions and calling for a worldwide movement in support of "sustainable development."⁵⁰

The litany of sermons sounding the alarm about Armageddon has desensitized many to the existence of any crisis, especially since there has been no concrete, palpable manifestation--no single event or series of events to galvanize concern equivalent to the Great Depression sandwiched between two World Wars experienced in successive decades by an older generation. Instead, what appear to be geographically and temporally isolated disasters have occurred, such as Chernobyl, the Sahel famine, the oil embargo and subsequent gas lines, the savings and loan debacle in the US, and other episodes which produced at most some rumblings of discontent and anxiety and an ill-defined malaise.

Whether the world is in crisis is partly a question of fact and partly a question of perception. Regarding the subjective dimension, measuring "happiness" or "satisfaction" and the converse--"adversity"--is a tricky enough proposition when the objects of one's analysis are simply individuals or a single nation-state and its national mood.⁵¹ It is all the more difficult to attempt such an analysis on a global scale. The general improvement in living conditions in the industrialized nations since the industrial revolution, along with the subsequent communications revolution which brought the imagery if not the

benefits of the good life to the rest of the world, have created a widespread revolution of rising expectations among mass publics that elites everywhere are struggling to meet. Herman Kahn, Julian Simon, and other critics of limits-to-growth thinking have argued that, if one looks at the big picture, humanity is doing better even if it may be feeling worse.⁵² Simon points out, for example, that female life expectancy in France increased from under 30 years in the 1740s to 75 years by the 1960s, that the infant mortality rate was still 200 per thousand in much of Europe as late as 1900 compared with the present norm of 10-15 per thousand, and that similar progress is gradually being repeated elsewhere in the world today.⁵³ Kahn and his associates see the current era as a transitional one from a world where "200 years ago almost everywhere human beings were comparatively few, poor, and at the mercy of the forces of nature to one 200 years ahead where, barring bad luck and/or bad management, almost everywhere they will be numerous, rich and in control of the forces of nature."⁵⁴

Of course, planetary *management* is precisely what is at issue here. There is empirical evidence of poor management lately, of humanity not only feeling worse but doing worse as well, and of problems becoming less isolated or episodic and more structural in nature:

The last two decades have been filled with anomalies . . . indicative of an international system under stress. Economically, this period has seen two energy crisis cycles . . . a major world food shortage that many thought would lead to global starvation, two very deep global recessions, a protracted global debt problem, and a collapse of world stock markets. In the decade prior to 1973, the annual real growth rate of the industrial economies was about 5 percent. Since then it has been in the vicinity of 2 percent. The less developed countries saw their vigorous growth rate of 6 percent of the previous decade drop to less than 2 percent in the . . . 1980s.⁵⁵

These data covering recent experience in the last two decades would seem more relevant to our inquiry than the data gleaned from a longitudinal analysis of over two centuries. Although cumulative historical experience shapes individual and national consciousness, the time frame which typically informs reflection and action is not so much one's sense of the sweep of history or long-term future as one's sense of the

immediate past, the present, and the impending near-term.⁵⁶ Compared with the early postwar period, the international system today seems to be stalling as an engine of progress across various regions and cultures.

As attested to by the revolution of rising expectations phenomenon, social indicators used as objective measures of well-being, such as income levels and infant mortality rates, do not always correlate strongly with subjective data based on opinion surveys. Still, there tends to be a fit between the objective and subjective data. As Ronald Inglehart concludes from the available evidence, "the overall pattern is clear; wealthier nations [and presumably healthier and more generously endowed nations generally] tend to show higher levels of life satisfaction than poorer [and otherwise disadvantaged] ones."⁵⁷ Likewise, within a given country, as living conditions improve or deteriorate, such fluctuations can be expected in time to be reflected in public moods, in either increased attachment to or alienation from the existing order.

At the core of the "turbulence" James Rosenau sees in contemporary world politics is the growing dysfunctionality of the national security-welfare state. He comments at length on the "declining effectiveness" of governments, defined as "a progressive inability of governments to provide their clients (elites, citizens, allies) with the conditions and services that reflect the goals they have set for themselves and that their clients expect of them. . . . It involves the solving of problems and the resolving of issues, or at least preventing the worsening of problems and the intensifying of issues. It pertains to policy outputs, to tangible services such as highways and employment checks"⁵⁸

Rosenau confesses that the declining governmental effectiveness he refers to is largely an "assertion" in need of verification "with systematic data."⁵⁹ Such data are being gathered in many quarters.⁶⁰ Elsewhere, I have conducted an extensive analysis of worldwide trends in three broad issue-areas since the late 1960s--economic well-being (examining data on GNP and GNP per capita growth rates), quality of life (examining data on life expectancy, infant mortality rates, daily calorie supply per capita, and other

such indicators), and ecological balance (examining air quality levels and other environmental characteristics).⁶¹ The conditions I surveyed represented to me broad domains of human experience which bear on basic human hopes and expectations. Although not all actors have identical stakes in all problem-areas (e.g., some in the upper reaches of the Northern hemisphere may benefit from greenhouse warming), I felt it was safe to assume that higher wages, improved health, cleaner air, and the like were values most generally wish for themselves even if not necessarily for others. Within each issue-area, I looked at both global and subglobal cuts of reality. Globally, a determination was made of what percentage of states in the international system were experiencing an improvement or decline in conditions over time and whether system-wide averages indicated positive or negative developments overall. Subglobally, similar determinations were made for various subsystems, separating out the OECD industrial market economies, the erstwhile East bloc centrally planned economies, and the Third World countries (further analyzed by income level and geographical region). I found that matters have on balance been getting worse systemwide across all major groupings of states despite some rays of progress found in some places on some specific dimensions.⁶²

As adversity arises, people and societies become increasingly disposed toward change. Today there would seem to be a general bias in the direction of change in the international system at large, given the fact that all categories of states are witnessing evidence of growing malfunctioning of their economic-social-ecological systems. Small changes are ordinarily preferred to big changes, so that one's first inclination is to look for correctives closest to home, internally within one's borders rather than externally in the international realm, and regionally rather than globally. Even if the international system is primed for change, as seems to be the case, states will have to be convinced that the failings of international governance structures are at the root of current problems--or that, whatever the explanation, the overhauling of these structures offers a way out--before the kind of innovative macro-level institution-building I have alluded to can

materialize. Assuming one values international institution-building, things may have to get still worse before they can get better. Considering the nature of the high-case and base-case scenarios presented by the World Bank and other bodies in projecting trends in the 1990s, the future prognosis for most countries is at best guarded.⁶³

As matters worsen, the paradox is that there is the opportunity not only for increased international institution-building but also massive conflagration. If it is true that "history does not move forward without catastrophe,"⁶⁴ a point can be reached at which crisis becomes immobilizing and destructive rather than releasing creative energies. As one writer comments, "when the risks become too many or unbearable our ability to assess and cope often breaks down."⁶⁵ To quote Niebuhr, "Undoubtedly, fear may be a creative force But the creative power of fear does not increase in proportion to its intensity."⁶⁶ Whether the institution-building path is followed will depend not merely on the degree of stimulation furnished by crisis but on other variables as well.

Large-scale social change, unless glacial and unconscious as with the agricultural and industrial revolutions, requires an agent or set of agents. In the international political system, historically certain national leaderships have taken the initiative in socializing the other members of the system to accept new concepts and norms along with new institutional forms. Although some have suggested that such modernizing elites today are to be found in the guise of nongovernmental and transnational social movements,⁶⁷ the latter are still no match for governments presiding, however, tenuously, over nation-states. We need to add power and will as additional elements in the equation of system change.

The contemporary international system that forms the organizational environment of the UN is like a great double-edged sword having various properties which pose constraints as well as opportunities for enhanced institution-building at the global level. The very problems which recently have afflicted the US and other states and which ostensibly have created in the system a stronger inclination to countenance change have at

the same time sapped the power of many actors which might be candidates for a custodial role. Still, despite the end of the superpower era and a trend toward diffusion of power, there has hardly been a leveling of capabilities in the system; just eight states constitute a virtual proprietorship over the "policing" instruments in the world body politic (as measured by their share of global arms expenditures and manpower levels), while also accounting for 70 percent of the planetary economic product and--relevant to legitimacy considerations and the use of soft power--well over a majority of the world's population.⁶⁸ What has been lost in power concentration has been more than offset by the reduced rigidity of alignments allowing more creative possibilities for an enlightened concert of power approach to international governance.⁶⁹ While "loss of control" has thrown into question the continued capacity of sovereign governments to engage in purposive, goal-directed behavior--to steer the ship of state successfully toward various ends, including international institution-building--it has also raised the salience of governance issues and perhaps the willingness of national governments to reexamine existing arrangements. One could argue based on a realist analysis that, insofar as IGOs represent not so much precursors to world government but rather adaptations of the Westphalian state system designed to make world government unnecessary, as international organizations go so goes the state system in which the major states have the largest stake; as Lynn Miller notes, "it is *their* system" for the most part.⁷⁰ Even though the stakes have become diffused, and no one actor may have a singularly vested interest in promoting global order as much as in the past, there would appear to be enough at stake for some subset of states to invest the necessary resources and provide the collective good represented by international institution-building.⁷¹

Implications for UN Reform

In the United Nations itself, the impetus for change provided by the collapse of the postwar order along with the familiar categories and assumptions that colored world

politics for the past half-century contends with "restructuring fatigue"⁷² fostered by years of reform failure. One must add as a countervailing factor the attention deficit problem, i.e., the tendency for the press of concrete, immediate events (foreign policy "crises")--such as the Gulf War and the Gorbachev coup and counter-coup, two August surprises on the eve of the 1990 and 1991 opening of the UN General Assembly--to divert the energies of the international community from larger matters.

While there are persuasive arguments to be made against Charter revision of any kind, particularly given the historical record of aversion to constitutional change in the UN and the cumbersome nature of the amendment process, it seems rather dogmatic to assume that the Charter is completely off the bargaining table. If anything, the prospect of close to 200 states (including numerous "ministates" or "statelets") crowding the global bargaining table has created growing pressures against the kind of rigid state-centric egalitarianism embodied in one state-one vote formulas as in the General Assembly, so that associate or consultative membership status, weighted voting formulas, and other such devices are likely to be the wave of the future as long as states continue to feel a need for global IGOs.

George Bush in his address to the 46th General Assembly called for a "Pax Universalis" in place of a Pax Americana or any other such narrowly grounded peace, that is a new order "built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations."⁷³ While attempts to promote world order through collective security may be a "quixotic crusade,"⁷⁴ the prospects for peace and peaceful change can be enhanced greatly by the collective leadership provided by a dominant coalition of states able and willing to steer the system in a manner that offers incentives for others to follow. The coalition must be broad enough to possess sufficient material resources to support the demand load and, at the symbolic level, to make a reasonable claim to the aura of legitimacy, but not so broad as to be incapable of action and susceptible to breaking down.⁷⁵

Economic resource transfers will be especially critical. Coalition members will not only have to pay their full assessments as currently calculated but must be prepared to accept a bigger burden, both to provide necessary side-payments to the bulk of the UN membership (in the form of debt relief or some other *quid pro quo*) to attract initial support for reforms as well as to maintain a reformed system once it is in place. Given the magnitude of the financial requirements and the weakened state of many economies, notably the American and Russian, only a conglomerate of several states can hope to do the job. Major donor states might be willing to overcome the pattern of delinquency in paying their assessed dues--the US, which is over \$1 billion in arrears, remains the largest culprit responsible for the UN's current financial crisis--and might be willing to convert more voluntary funding into assessed funding, thereby putting UN budgets on much more solid footing, if they could be assured of greater control over the budget process. Such assurances are close to being realized through the recent budget reforms produced by the Group of 18 exercise. The UN financial crisis remains at bottom a political crisis. While the sums of money consumed by the UN system appear staggering, they are still miniscule as a percentage of the gross national product of any one lead donor much less the aggregate GNPs of the ten largest benefactors, so that it is hardly the case that the international system has reached its limit in terms of its capacity to generate additional resources to support global organization.

Some states are better positioned than others as candidates to participate in a dominant coalition in support of UN reform, owing not just to economic clout but other attributes. It is unthinkable not to make every effort to include China, for example, in such a coalition, even if China currently pays less than 1 percent of the UN budget. Different states will bring different assets and different responsibilities to a leadership coalition. There may also be different expectations. Some will settle for a role in power steering by virtue of being accorded proper standing on the Committee for Program and Coordination and/or a truncated ECOSOC, while others may insist on the ultimate

leadership trophy, i.e., permanent membership on the Security Council. I hesitate to bring Security Council reform into the discussion since mere mention of it puts one immediately on the most treacherous constitutional terrain. However, the postwar order has now been so thoroughly changed that the concert of five permanent Council members has an inherent impermanence about it. It seems a foregone conclusion that an institutional arrangement which was increasingly a glaring anomaly in world politics as the postwar era progressed and has become even moreso in the post-postwar era cannot survive much longer into the future. It may or may not be worth at this time inviting the kind of wrenching Charter debate that would ensue over Security Council reform. One can at least think out loud what the Security Council of the future might look like.

The conventional wisdom presumes that any attempt to make additions to the roster of permanent members on the Security Council is doomed to defeat, or if successful could tear the organization apart in the process, owing to two basic facts of life. One is the difficulty of getting the present Big Five to forego their use of the veto and permit the admission of new entrants into the permanent membership club when the effect is to diminish the elite status of the charter members. The second is the difficulty of formally including certain specified countries in an expanded Council permanent membership club without alienating those who are excluded.

As regards the first point, given their own strained global organizational support capabilities, the US and other members of the Big Five might well welcome others into the fold who would be willing to share the leadership burden, as long as they could screen potential applicants. From the perspective of the Big Five, Security Council enlargement might have to be the price paid not only in order to coopt some wealthy states to assume a bigger donor role but also to coopt into partnership some Third World states whose collaboration is critical to dealing with environmental or other issues. (For example, Brazil and India would be attractive candidates not only because of their demographic weight but also because of their strategic relevance to the forging of workable global

regimes to combat greenhouse warming and to regulate arms exports.) As regards the second point, the cost of membership in the club can be expected to be high enough that not every state would beckon to join. There have been greater acts of self-abnegation performed by states than passing up opportunities for membership on the Security Council, notably the willingness--at least up to now--on the part of over 100 non-nuclear countries (including several with nuclear weapons potential) to do without what is seemingly an unmatched badge of security and status. The same cost-benefit calculations that have led many states to avoid joining the nuclear club also figure to shape their interest or disinterest in joining other elite clubs.

An expansion of the Security Council to accommodate new permanent members will have to provide for balanced representation of nonpermanent members as well. No matter the size or composition of the Council, it is unlikely the UN membership at large will consent to grant the body any more competence than it already has to involve the organization in peace and security matters. An enlarged Council might in fact serve as a brake against excessive sovereignty-threatening intervention by the UN, while providing enhanced legitimacy where action is approved. In the immediate term there might be a transition period allowing for different categories of Security Council membership, perhaps along the lines of the Japanese proposal to add six new permanent seats without veto power.

Even if the world is not quite ready for Security Council reform, what about ECOSOC and other parts of the UN system? There have been shifting views in recent years as to whether the organization should be (and can be) primarily looked to and relied on to address "war-peace" concerns as opposed to "other" concerns.⁷⁶ Although, as Jacobson notes, "historically, the first goal of early IGOs was to promote economic growth,"⁷⁷ Claude has noted that "the organizing movement of the twentieth century can be interpreted as a reaction to the increasingly terrible consequences of armed conflict."⁷⁸ How high-politics, peace and security concerns relate to low-politics, functional, welfare

concerns, and what might be the proper place of the UN in these respective areas, has become somewhat muddled as the conceptual distinctions themselves have become blurred.

Lip service continues to be paid to the need for international organizations such as the UN to address both sets of issues, based on the link between physical and structural violence (alternatively phrased as "collective security" and "cooperative security,"⁷⁹ or "peacekeeping" and "peace-building,"⁸⁰ and the like). However, where once it was a given that the second set of issues offered the greater growth potential for the UN--based on the assumption shared by functionalists and nonfunctionalists alike that an international organizations's ease and effectiveness in forging collaboration was likely to be inversely related to its degree of involvement in matters touching the core interests of states--this bit of conventional wisdom has now been turned on its head. In a stunning role reversal at odds with both the theory of international organization and the practice of the UN historically (especially throughout much of the 1980s), the tractability of problems, the utility of the UN, and the prospects for institutional reform in the 1990s are being deemed greater in the war-peace area than in other areas, notably in the field of economic development. Two observers have summed up this situation in commenting that "the UN has become a Janus-like system of two faces--the UN of peace and security, relatively purposeful and effective, to which influential governments pay active and growing attention; and the UN of economic and social affairs, halting, hortatory, and often ignored by powers great and small."⁸¹

Again, one must be mindful of the pitfalls of overreacting to the latest developments, either exaggerating the promise of the UN in the war-peace area or dismissing it in the economic, social, and technical realm. If it was premature to write off the UN in the former domain at the start of the 1980s, it seems premature as well to do so in the latter domain at the start of the 1990s.⁸² One might envision the UN as a regime-processing center or, more ambitiously, as a fulcrum for "global policy."⁸³ As realists and neorealists are quick to point out, not all concerns are global in scope or

require organizational solutions. One might reason that it is precisely the task of global policy to sort these matters out. The UN proper, as distinct from the specialized agencies, is uniquely situated to furnish the necessary filtering apparatus for engaging the international system in policy-relevant political-intellectual routines at the system-wide level, permitting a determination of how much globalism and institutionalism is optimal for the system. In other words, rather than starting with *a priori* anti-institutionalist and anti-globalist presumptions regarding the parameters of international problem-solving, the UN might be viewed as a general facilitator of decisions by the international community as to what type of regime instrument is possible and desirable in a given problem-area (in terms of norms, rules, organizations, programs, or other outputs) as well as what the regime scope might be (global or subglobal). Present references to the "nuclear proliferation regime" or "the monetary regime" have the air of impressive accomplishments engineered by the international system in response to common problems. They would be all the more impressive if they could more rightly claim to be the fruits of policy-conscious, deliberate acts of creation and remaking that stretch the bounds of intelligent collaboration to the fullest extent imaginable. Such an image of the UN is consistent with current calls for "practical internationalism,"⁸⁴ yet at the same time offers a more expansive vision as a basis for framing the debate over institutional reform. In this way the UN might furnish an element of central guidance compatible with the systemic environment in which it is likely to operate into the next century, providing a single framework whereby parochialism--ranging from unilateralism to subglobal multilateralism--and pragmatism--including informal as well as formal modes of cooperation--can safely flourish.

Conclusion

The future of the UN can be captured in three possible scenarios. One scenario is that the organization will miss the current window of opportunity, will decline further,

and maybe disappear as the League of Nations did. A second is that it will be supported enough by the membership to at least muddle through. The third is that it will experience organizational growth and be an engine for the political development of the international system, contributing to "the development of long-term viability for the states . . . in the system."⁸⁵ The second scenario seems more realistic than the first. Short of a systemwide, great-power war, which in the nuclear age would almost surely be "the last crisis," the UN is not likely to suffer the fate of the League. As for the third scenario, it will depend upon whether the "crisis of multilateralism" becomes perceived and felt more deeply--sufficiently to energize the major actors' willingness to have the UN do more than muddle through, but not so much as to render them incapable of action.⁸⁶

International organization scholars may even be able to play at least a modest role here. The main *raison d'être* of the international organization field over the years has been to provide a base of scholarship that can help inform and guide the practice of international collaboration. The problem with much contemporary "IO" scholarship is that as the field has sought to distance itself from its idealist past and to become more firmly grounded in science and reality-testing, it has become further removed from the real-world institutions in which practitioners operate. The gap between international organizational phenomena studied by academics and those experienced by policymakers continues to widen as few explicit connections are made between theory and practice.

No greater challenge exists for students of international organization than that posed by the search for world order through global institution-building, which finds its most concrete expression today in the form of the United Nations. Serious scholarship is normally defined by the degree of intellectual ferment and hard-nosed sobriety one brings to a subject. The subject of the UN in recent times has inspired widespread indifference and ridicule, with scholars tending to steer clear lest they be branded guilty of indulging in "institutionalist approaches of yesteryear"⁸⁷ or utopian futurism and risk pariah status in the international relations fraternity akin to some states in the international

community. Excessive use of the terms "earth" and "planet" can damage one's credibility. There is the caveat that global international organization has become too large and unwieldy to be subjected to either serious scientific inquiry or social engineering. It is true that the world does not revolve around governments making "great global choices among grand alternatives."⁸⁸ Policymakers, John Ruggie notes, "do not get to choose on the future of the state system; they confront choices on exchange rates, . . . terrorist attacks on airport lobbies and embassy compounds, and garbage that floats down a river or is transported through the air. If change comes it will be the product of micro practices. Hence, if we want to understand change or help to shape it, it is to these micro practices that we should look."⁸⁹ Was the creation of the UN in 1945 a "micro practice"? If so, are there other such practices we should look to?

Nobody planned the national welfare state which has been the dominant political structure of the twentieth century. It was the resultant of historical forces pushed along by a myriad of individual decisions and accumulated learning. If a global security-community comes to pass, it will not be planned but will also emerge as a product of historical forces which likewise can be nudged along in small ways if we have the knowledge and will to do so. There will always be an element of faith in our quest, although as John Herz said in his requiem for the territorial-state, "it is not wishful thinking that leads us on, but an ever so faint ray of hope that that which is not entirely impossible will emerge as real."⁹⁰ One can take heart in the old saw that most revolutions on their eve seem unimaginable, and on the morning after seem to have been inevitable.⁹¹ Just three years after the Red Army Band and Chorus was heard belting out "God Bless America" in Washington, D.C., the light is still flickering however faintly.

Notes

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1. J. Martin Rochester, "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study," *International Organization*, 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 777-813.
2. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (Kalamazoo: New Issues, 1979), p. 288.
3. Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on An Art of the State," *International Organization*, 40 (Autumn 1986), p. 753. These authors saw the trend away from the study of formal institutions as potentially having salutary effects on the practice of international organization.
4. John G. Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," *International Organization*, 29 (Summer 1975). See also Kratochwil and Ruggie, *op. cit.*, p. 754.
5. Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," *World Politics*, 32 (April 1980), pp. 332-333. Kratochwil and Ruggie's 1986 survey of articles published in *International Organization*, the preeminent journal in the field, found that "the formal institutional focus has declined steadily from the very beginning and now accounts for fewer than 5% of the total." Kratochwil and Ruggie, *op. cit.*, p. 760.
6. For example, compare President Truman's bombastic statement opening the San Francisco Conference expressing the expectation that the delegates were about to create "machinery which will make future peace not only possible, but certain" with Carlos Romulo's statement less than a decade later that "the UN is in a state of coma, and there isn't much time left to revive it." *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 12 (April 29, 1945), p. 789; and Carlos Romulo, "The UN is Dying," *Colliers* (July 23, 1954), p. 32. Compare realist Henry Kissinger's lavish praise of the UN following the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict ("I must say that the United Nations played a more effective role in this crisis than could have been deduced from my theoretical statements as a professor") with the despair evidenced a decade later by a UN Secretary-General ("The UN goes through its paces in a workaday routine that is increasingly ignored or condemned and that threatens to become increasingly irrelevant in the real world"). *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 69 (December 10, 1973), p. 708; and Kurt Waldheim, "The United Nations: The Tarnished Image," *Foreign Affairs*, 63 (Fall 1984), p. 106.
7. Rochester, *op. cit.*, p. 813.
8. *New York Times* (September 24, 1990), p. 23. Likewise, a *Wall Street Journal* headline on August 30, 1990, p. 1, read "Coming of Age: UN Long Stymied by Cold War Begins to Fulfill Its Promise As World's Peacekeeper."
9. This is the view advanced by John Mearsheimer in "Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War," *The Atlantic* (August 1990).

10. Cited in Richard Gardner, "To Make The World Safe for Interdependence," *UN 30* (New York: UNA-USA, 1975), p. 16.

11. The argument that the larger a group is, the less likely are its members to cooperate voluntarily in providing collective goods (due to "free rider" and other problems) originated with Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action*. On the problem of achieving cooperation among large numbers of actors in the international arena, see Kenneth A. Oye, ed. *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). On the possibilities for cooperation even among large numbers, see Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers," *International Organization*, 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 681-708.

12. The phrase is from Kratochwil and Ruggie, *op. cit.* p. 753.

13. As a follow-up to the Kratochwil and Ruggie survey, an analysis I conducted of *International Organization* articles published between 1985 and 1991 showed that 17% of the total focused on formal institutions, and only 3% on the UN, even though by the late 1980s there was evidence of a "breaking out of peace" in the world.

14. Clearly, there are many scholars who have had a sustained research focus on the UN and other international organizations, examining either the structures themselves or their performance. See, for example, Harold K. Jacobson *Networks of Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1984), with a third edition forthcoming. Other scholars have rediscovered the UN of late, exemplified by Bruce M. Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The UN in A New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, 70 (Spring 1991), pp. 69-83. There is a newly created Academic Council on the United Nations System, which has issued a report on "Strengthening the Study of International Organizations" (Hanover, NH: ACUNS, 1987) and publishes annual reviews of the UN, such as Donald J. Puchala and Roger A. Coate *The Challenge of Relevance: The United Nations in A Changing World Environment* (Hanover, NH: ACUNS, 1989). One can also note a new Ford Foundation program on International Organizations and Law, as well as Harvard's pre- and post-doctoral fellowship program in the area of international institutions including the UN. The point is that there has been a distinct overall decline in this brand of scholarship in the "IO field" in favor of investigating more general phenomena that are relatively indistinguishable from the rest of the international relations academic enterprise.

15. Oran R. Young, "Odysseus Twenty-Five Years On: Reflections on the Study of International Relations," in Joseph R. Kruzel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Journeys Through World Politics* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 76.

16. Duncan Snidal, "The Game Theory of International Politics," *World Politics*, 38 (October 1985), p. 25.

17. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Oye, *op. cit.*

18. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Two Cheers for Multilateralism," *Foreign Policy*, 60 (Fall 1985), pp. 155-159. Keohane's ideas are more fully developed in *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). In the revised edition of *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1989), Keohane and Nye continue to be somewhat defensive about being labeled as "liberals;" see p. xi.

19. Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," *International Organization*, 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 486-507. Likewise, see Guillo Gallorotti, "The Limits of International Organization: Systematic Failure in the Management of International Relations," *International Organization*, 45 (Spring 1991), pp. 183-220.
20. John G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of An Institution," *International Organization*, 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 567-584.
21. Puchala and Coate, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-108.
22. Inis L. Claude, "The Balance of Power Revisited," *Review of International Studies*, 15 (April 1989), pp. 77-86. It must be said that Claude, as far back as *Swords Into Plowshares*, has always defied labeling as a realist or idealist.
23. These terms are borrowed from Giovanni Sartori, even though they were not used by him in connection with international relations. See *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 51.
24. The term neoidealism, as opposed to neoliberalism, has been studiously avoided up to now for the most part, although the 1993 International Studies Association presidential address by Charles Kegley is entitled "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and New International Realities." Also see Stanley Kober, "Idealpolitik," *Foreign Policy*, 79 (Summer 1990), pp. 3-24.
25. Harold K. Jacobson, William M. Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, "National Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations," *American Political Science Review*, 80 (March 1986), p. 141. The authors note that regional IGO growth has exceeded global IGO growth since World War II, although "the absolute number [of IGOs with potentially universal membership] for the post-World War II era is impressively high" (p. 145). Even skeptics acknowledge that "quantitatively, . . . IGOs are still an expanding force in international affairs" despite the fact that "qualitatively . . . the world of IGOs is not in good shape." See John Ruggie, "The United States and the United Nations: Toward A New Realism," *International Organization*, 39 (Spring 1985), p. 343. Statistics on IGO growth are reported in Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations 1988/89*, 25th ed. (1988), vol. 1, Appendix 7, and subsequent editions.
26. Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Record of International Organizations in the Twentieth Century," Tamkang Chair Lecture Series, No. 64, Tamkang University, Taiwan, January 1986 (mimeo), p. 25. Claude adds that "we cannot ignore the successful implantation of the ideal of international organization. International organization may not have taken over the system, but it has certainly taken hold in the system. The twentieth century has seen the establishment of the prescription that multilateral agencies are essential to the conduct of international affairs." As cited in note 22, Claude lately has had second thoughts about universal IGOs.
27. Oran R. Young, "The United Nations and the International System," *International Organization*, 20 (Autumn 1968), p. 906. These thoughts are in obvious contrast to those expressed by the same author under the guise of "the new institutionalism"; see note 15.
28. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989).
29. George F. Will, "Europe's Second Reformation," essay in *Newsweek* (November 20, 1989), p. 90.

30. See note 9.
31. James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Rosenau's analysis is in the tradition of earlier writings in the 1970s and 1980s that posed a "cobweb" paradigm as an alternative to the standard billiard ball paradigm, such as John W. Burton, *et al.*, *The Study of World Society* (Pittsburgh: ISA, 1974), Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), and Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974). Also, see Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance," paper presented at International Studies Association annual meeting, Vancouver, March 22, 1991, although Zacher does not see the state as much under siege as Rosenau. John Ruggie, whose writings have been clearly state-centric oriented, examines ala John Herz the changing nature of the territorial state in "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization*, 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-174; Ruggie (p. 144) urges "addressing the question of whether the modern system of states may be yielding in some instances to postmodern forms of configuring political space."
32. Remark by Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado, cited in *Christian Science Monitor* (April 24, 1985), p. 5.
33. One is reminded of Hegel's dictum that "the owl of Minerva always rises at night"--scholars are good at predicting the past, at uncovering truths associated with the tail-end of some phenomenon--and of Parkinson's law about a phenomenon always peaking immediately prior to its collapse.
34. Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," *International Organization*, 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 282-285. Young also speaks of "imposed orders."
35. Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization*, 45 (Summer 1991), p. 282.
36. See Keohane, *After Hegemony*, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
37. Barry Buzan argues that the interntional system as of the 1980s was midway between high ("immature") and low ("mature") anarchy. *People, States, and Fear* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 97.
38. Dennis Pirages, *Global Technopolitics* (Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole, 1989), p. 202. Also representative of this view are Harry Clay Blaney III, *Global Challenges: A World at Risk* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1979) and, to some extent, Robert North, *War, Peace, Survival* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).
39. The 1960s quote is from "The Promise of the Multinational Corporation," *Fortune* (June 1, 1967), p. 80. The more recent quote is from the *New York Times* (January 24, 1988).
40. Stanley Hoffman, *Primacy or World Order* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978), p. 193.

41. President Truman's address to the UN Conference on International Organization, cited in *US Department of State Bulletin*, 13 (July 1, 1945), p. 4, acknowledging the fact that the original UN membership consisted of 51 countries.
42. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 109.
43. Cited in Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 56. Clark also quotes, on p. 59, Robert Hutchins' musings in the 1940s about world government: "The slogan of our faith today must be, world government is necessary and therefore possible." Clark is highly critical of what he calls "the twentieth-century neo-Kantians."
44. Michael Brenner, "The Problem of Innovation and the Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, 17 (September 1993), pp. 267-268. On the role of crisis in promoting a change in institutionalized relationships, also see Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
45. Richard Falk and his associates speak of the "Grotian moment" as "a time of transition between world order systems," akin to the time of Hugo Grotius and the creation of the Westphalian state system at the end of the Thirty Years' War. See Falk, *et al.*, eds., *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective* (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. 7.
46. John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 304. Herz pondered the "demise of the territorial state" due to its growing permeability, notably its incapacity any longer to perform the defense function, although he later recanted this prediction as premature.
47. Donella Meadows, *et al.*, *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe Books, 1972), pp. 9-10. Two more recent reports of the Club of Rome are Meadows, *et al.*, *Beyond the Limits* (Post Mills, VT.: Chelsea Green, 1992) and Bertrand Schneider, *The First Global Revolution* (New York: Pantheon, 1991).
48. *The Global 2000 Report to The President* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 1.
49. Brandt Commission, *North-South: A Programme For Survival* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980), p. 3.
50. Brundtland Commission, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). The report was presented to the UN General Assembly in October 1987 and was the catalyst for the 1992 "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro.
51. The operationalization problems surrounding such concepts are discussed in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, and Willard L. Rogers, *The Quality of American Life* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976).
52. In the US there has been a decline in "happiness" among the general public over the course of the post-World War II era and an increasing tendency for individuals to view the nation and its institutions as in a state of deterioration even if they are hopeful about their personal lives. See *ibid.*, pp. 26-30 and 269-275; Campbell, *The Sense of Well-Being in America* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 164-174; and *Gallup Report*, no. 266 (November 1987), p. 25. Although comparative data are hard to find, similar trends in

public mood can be discerned in other nations. See *Index to International Public Opinion*. Ronald Inglehart, examining Euro-Barometer surveys since 1973, found relatively stable public attitudes in regards to "personal life satisfaction" in nine European Community countries, although in only one, Denmark, did a majority of the population indicate they were "very satisfied." Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review*, 82 (December 1988), pp. 1205-1206.

53. Julian Simon, "Life on Earth is Getting Better, Not Worse," *The Futurist* (August 1983), p. 7. Also, see *The Ultimate Resource* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

54. Herman Kahn, William Brown, and Leon Martel, *The Next 200 Years* (New York: Morrow, 1976), p. 1. Also see Herman Kahn and Ernest Schneider, "Globaloney 2000," *Policy Review*, 16 (Spring 1981), pp. 129-147; and Simon and Kahn, eds., *The Resourceful Earth* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). A more bullish statement cannot be found than that recently authored by Allen Goodman in "A Brief History of the Future," paper prepared for the Georgetown Leadership Seminar, Berlin, June 23-26, 1991, p. 1: "The 21st century will encompass the longest period of peace, democracy, and economic development in history." This is to be contrasted with Robert Heilbroner's "Is there hope for man?," in *An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), p. 13; he reexamines this question in a second edition in 1991.

55. Pirages, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

56. Kenneth Boulding has explained how "national images" deeply rooted in historical experience, however durable, persist intact only as long as they are not jarred by strong stimuli--"reorganizing events"--which call them into question. "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3 (June 1959), pp. 120-131.

57. Inglehart, *op. cit.*, p. 1209. Also, see Inglehart and Jacques-Rene Rabier, "Aspirations Adapt to Situations--But why Are the Belgians So Much Happier Than the French?," unpublished mimeo (1989), p. 42; and Hadley Centril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

58. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

59. *Ibid.*

60. See Richard C. Snyder, Charles F. Hermann, and Harold D. Lasswell, "A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the Effects of Government on Human Dignity," *International Studies Quarterly*, 20 (June 1976), p. 221; Morris Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) and the work of the Overseas Development Council; Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence*, *op. cit.* (3rd ed. forthcoming); and Michael J. Sullivan III, *Measuring Global Values: The Ranking of 162 Countries* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991). At another level Eugene Meehan and Hans Michelman are currently at work on a research project entitled "Government and the Human Condition: Four Cases from Contemporary Industrial Society."

61. J. Martin Rochester, "The Contemporary International System: Is There a Growing Crisis?" Center for International Studies Occasional Paper Series, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 1992.

62. Obvious exceptions on some indicators can be cited. For example, China's real GNP in 1992 grew 7 percent and industrial output 14 percent. At the same time, as one

intelligence analysis indicated, "these positive trends masked some fundamental weaknesses," such as a state budget deficit "which increased at a 22 percent average annual rate since 1987 to reach a record \$12.2 billion (in 1992)." US Central Intelligence Agency, *The Chinese Economy in 1991 and 1992: Pressure to Revisit Reform Mounts* (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), pp. iii-iv. According to the UN World Economic Survey (1992), the global economy's growth rate in 1991 fell to zero from 1 percent in 1990, 3 percent in 1989, and 4.3 percent in 1988. 1992 saw no improvement, with neither the US nor EC nor Japan exceeding 2 percent growth, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union seeing output drop by 10 percent, and most Third World economies remaining stagnant.

63. See World Bank, *World Development Report, 1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 20-21; UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, *World Economic Survey, 1992* (New York: UN, 1992); and International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1991). A somewhat more upbeat projection can be found in Shahrokh Fardost and Ashok Dhareshwar, *A Long-Term Outlook for the World Economy: Issues and Projections for the 1990s* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1990).
64. S. Pollard, *The Idea of Progress* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 81.
65. Blaney, *op. cit.*, p. viii.
66. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government," *The Nation* (March 16, 1949).
67. Richard Falk, "The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations at the Edge of Time," *Alternatives*, 12 (1987), pp. 173-196.
68. An analysis of current military, economic, and demographic power is undertaken by the author in *Waiting for The Millennium: The United Nations and The Future of World Order* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, forthcoming). Among recent writings which have cautioned against exaggerating the extent to which power has become diffused in the international system, particularly the loss of American power, see Joseph Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Bruce M. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; Or is Mark Twain Really Dead?," *International Organization*, 39 (Spring 1985), p. 211. Nye discusses the notion of "soft power" as does Kenneth Boulding in *The Three Faces of Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1989).
69. The GLOBUS project, which created a "political world model" out of 25 states "representing examples of industrialized and developing countries, western and non-western, noncommunist and communist-ruled" and accounting for "75 percent of the world's population, 80 percent of its income, and 85 percent of its armaments" is suggestive of the kind of critical mass of power that might be mobilizable. Karl W. Deutsch, "A Path Among the Social Sciences," in Kruzel and Roenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23. Also see Stuart A. Bremer, ed., *The GLOBUS Model* (Boulder: Westview, 1987).
70. Lynn Miller, *Global Order*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 29.
71. For an analysis of "will," see Rochester, *Waiting for the Millennium, op. cit.* On American will in particular, Hedley Bull once wrote: "The problem America presents for us is not, as so many Americans appear to think, the relative decline of its power, but the decline of its capacity for sound judgement and leadership." Cited in Susan Strange, "Protectionism and World Politics," *International Organization*, 39 (Spring 1985), p. 256.

Henry Kissinger has pointed out that American willingness to lead will be severely tested in a wholly strange environment in which for the first time the US today finds itself in a world that it can neither dominate nor withdraw from; comments made on PBS, January 17, 1993.

72. The term is taken from Johan Kaufmann and Nico Shrijver, *Changing Global Needs: Expanding Roles for The United Nations System* (Hanover, NH: Academic Council on UN System, 1990), p. 55.

73. *New York Times* (September 23, 1991), p. A6.

74. The wording is from Ted Galen Carpenter, "The New World Disorder," *Foreign Policy*, no. 84 (Fall 1991), p. 39.

75. Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson noted in *The Anatomy of Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 435-436, that although "any significant future growth or task expansion of international organization is likely to be through" an "oligarchic model," in time "there is no reason to believe that the oligarchic model cannot be transformed in new ways toward a broader diffusion of influence."

76. The reference to the "other UN" is found in Robert W. Gregg, "UN Economic, Social, and Technical Activities," in James Barros, ed., *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 221.

77. Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence*, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

78. Claude, "The Record of International Organizations in the Twentieth Century," *op. cit.*, p. 2.

79. *Collective Security and the United Nations: An Old Promise in A New Era* (Muscatine, Iowa: Stanley Foundation, 1991), p. 35.

80. Rober A. Coate and Donald J. Puchala, "Global Policies and the United Nations System: A Current Assessment," *Journal of Peace Research*, 27 (May 1990), p. 127; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace," report of the Secretary-General submitted to UN Security Council on June 17, 1992 (S/24111); and Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering The United Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, 71 (Winter, 1992/93), p. 89-102.

81. C. Whitehead and Jeffrey Laurenti, "The Hydra-Headed UN," *Christian Science Monitor* (May 29, 1991), p. 18. Puchala and Coate in their interviews have found that "the [recent] enthusiasm and optimism of the peacekeepers differs markedly from the frustration and pessimism of the international developers." *Challenge of Relevance*, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

82. Consider the unfortunate timing of the major UN study project undertaken by the United Nations Association-USA in the mid-1980s, at a time when the UN was experiencing a nadir in terms of its performance in the war-peace area. The UNA study *Successor Vision* that was published in 1987, just prior to the end of the Cold War, assumed that "where UN peace and security mechanisms are concerned, major structural changes will not yield the sort of results anticipated in the realm of social, economic, and humanitarian affairs." UNA-USA, *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow* (New York: UNA-USA, 1987: 94).

83. I discuss the notion of a regime-processing center in "Global Policy and The Future of the UN," *Journal of Peace Research*, 27 (May 1990), pp. 141-154. In the same article I critique the concept of "global policy" as discussed in Marvin Soroos, *Beyond Sovereignty: The Challenge of Global Policy* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986).
84. See Richard Gardner, "Practical Internationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, 66 (Spring 1988), pp. 830-831.
85. Young, "The United Nations and the International System," *op. cit.*, p. 903.
86. Rosenau, in an offshoot of his *Turbulence* book that examines the implications of present trends for the UN, sees relatively few changes in store for the UN. The few UN reform proposals he offers do not touch the basic political arrangements. For example, he suggests that it may be possible in the future to establish a UN mission (an embassy of sorts) in every nation-state, although it is hard to see how this differs much from the already extant reality of a UN resident representative present in virtually every country. He also suggests the possibility of UN ambassadors-at-large. See James N. Rosenau, *The United Nations in A Turbulent World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
87. Kratochwil and Ruggie, *op. cit.*, p. 772.
88. Robert A. Dahl, *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1955), p. 46.
89. John J. Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time and Method," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 32.
90. Herz, *op. cit.*, p. 305
91. One is also reminded of Winston Churchill's 1936 comments regarding the "spacious conception" of the League of Nations: "You must not underrate the force which these ideas exert One does not know how these seeds are planted by the winds of the centuries in the hearts of the working people." Cited in Shirley Hazzard, "Breaking Faith," *The New Yorker* (September 25, 1989), p. 76.