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Who Decides? A Study of the Effects on Decision Unit Dynamics in Crisis and Crisis Transition

Janet Leigh Drake

University of Missouri-St. Louis

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Who Decides? A Study of the Effects on Decision Unit Dynamics in Crisis and Crisis Transition

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A Dissertation submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri – St. Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

December 2014

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Abstract

Foreign policy decision-making is often an obscured process, particularly when it involves threats to national security or national interests. Despite the lack of transparency, though sometimes necessary, foreign policy decisions can have far-reaching consequences. Policymakers establish and affect relationships with other governments, and can commit state resources for cooperation or for conflict.

The purpose of this study is to determine what types of decision units make foreign policy decisions and what factors influence the dynamics of the unit. I employ the decision units (DU) framework developed by Margaret Hermann to decisions made by the United States and Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War until the signing of the Sinai II Agreement. I identify and classify the units, which constitute both a crisis and crisis transition period. In addition, this study tests the effects of shocks or feedback on decision unit dynamics.

The results of the study reveal that more decisions were made more often by one individual during the crisis than during the crisis transition period. External shocks did not appear to have a significant effect on the type of decision unit, except for the initial shock of the war. Internal political shocks occurred in both the United States and Israel during the transition period, affecting regime change and thus a change in key actors involved in the decision-making process.
Pertaining to the effects of feedback, negative feedback influenced decision unit dynamics in the U.S. during the crisis. For Israel, negative feedback as a result of a crisis decision affected the nature of the decision unit, but in the transition period. In other words, there was no change in decision unit dynamics until after the conclusion of hostilities. Positive feedback did not appear to influence the nature of the decision unit.

Overall, the study demonstrates that as the crisis subsided and transitioned to a less stressful, non-crisis situation, single group decision-making became more prevalent. The study also shows that decision unit dynamics helped determine policy outcomes.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COGS</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Defense Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DU</td>
<td>Decision Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Israeli State Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israel Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>Poliheuristic Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSAG</td>
<td>Washington Special Action Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Chapter One

Introduction

“The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself...There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process – mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.”

John F. Kennedy

The Research Puzzle

Foreign policy decisions: Who decides?

Nations engage in foreign policy making in different ways, dependent upon a number of factors, including government structure (e.g., democratic or autocratic, parliamentary or presidential), a state’s position in the international system, and societal or cultural features. Foreign policy and foreign affairs are often economic or military in nature. Policies and agendas tend to be common knowledge, with information reaching the public via speeches or the media. Specific decisions become public knowledge when governments announce they are pursuing a particular course of action. However, the process by which policymakers recognize an issue or problem and then reach a conclusion or solution to the problem is far from public and sometimes entirely secretive. Because of the often elusive nature of
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the foreign policy process, it is sometimes difficult to understand why a government pursues a certain policy or action. In other words, how do policymakers come to this particular decision or reach that specific solution? Specifically pertaining to my study is how specific individual actors involved in decision-making affect the process and eventual outcome.

In trying to understand the "why" of foreign policy decisions, an important first step is identifying “who” exactly makes the decision. Which actor or actors form the decisional unit, and what is their role within that unit? The purpose of this study is to help explain the decision process and eventual outcomes through an examination of the decision unit or units involved. The study seeks to uncover how certain endogenous and exogenous factors might affect the configuration of the decision unit and if this in turn affects the outcome. Simply put, I attempt to determine why, or if, decision unit dynamics might vary throughout the course of a crisis and subsequent crisis transition period. The key independent variables in the study are feedback (positive and negative) and shocks (domestic and international).

A multitude of scholars has endeavored to get inside the “black box” of government in order to better understand the role of individual actors in the foreign policy decision-making process. Some of the discourse has focused on whether states should be considered unitary actors, or whether we must examine individuals and their preferences when studying foreign policy decisions. Kenneth Waltz (1979, 100) asserts that foreign policy behavior need not be examined at the individual level at all but rather behavior and outcomes can be explained by looking at the
international-political system. The structure of the system “affects both the interactions of states and their attributes.” The organization of units and the distribution of capabilities define the system.

J. David Singer (1961, 80) argues that system level analysis may “exaggerate the impact of the system upon the national actors… and discount the impact of the actors on the system.” As the primary actor in international relations, examination at the nation-state level allows for differentiation of states and, thus, a comparative approach toward state behavior. However, as Singer points out, comparison at the state level has several disadvantages as well. For instance, researchers may have a tendency to overemphasize differences between states, which could potentially involve value bias on the part of the researcher – i.e., ethnocentrism (Singer 1967; Waltz 1959). Also at issue is whether the behavior of a particular state is purposive and goal seeking, and, if so, how and why they pursue such goals. Although Singer does not elaborate on alternative models or units of analysis, he implies that the study of decision-making at the national level could be enriched by examining the individuals “operating within the institutional framework” of the state (Singer 1961, 88).

Each of these levels of analysis has its merits. Indeed, each has demonstrated validity in explaining international relations and foreign policy behavior – although Waltz would argue that it is not his intent nor inclination to explain specific foreign policy decisions. However, since specific decisions are made at the individual level,
Introduction

whether by one actor or a group of actors, decision processes (structured or ad hoc), rules and norms, and decision unit structure matter in foreign policy outcomes.

At the individual level, many studies seek to explain one specific decision. These case studies tend to focus on a significant or historic decision. While these cases may explain how a decisional unit arrived at a particular decision, they often provide just a snapshot or a single frame in an episode or series of decisions (Hermann 2001). An examination of a sequence of decisions may better explain a government’s strategy or its means of coping with a particular issue.

Of particular interest to scholars has been foreign policy decisions made in crisis situations. The time constraints and high stress levels which crises evoke tend to be publicly dramatic, newsworthy, and atypical. Because crisis situations are atypical, one aspect of my research will be to examine possible changes in the decision unit dynamics during the transitional period from crisis to non-crisis. While much has been written on crisis as well as routine decision-making, few scholars have examined the post-crisis or the transitional period immediately following a crisis (Brecher 1980). In addition, few researchers have specifically addressed or identified possible influences that may affect the subsequent structure or dynamics of a particular decisional unit. (I have found no studies that apply the DU framework to sequential decision-making.)

For this study, I apply the decision unit (DU) framework developed by Margaret Hermann (2001) to explore how or why the dynamics of decisional units might change through a series of decisions involving one foreign policy issue or
problem. The DU framework specifies three types of authoritative decision units – predominant leader, single group, and coalition – that are designed to subsume the various decision-making entities that can be found within different types of governments. My study will attempt to elaborate on the relationship between the occasion for decision (the point at which policymakers recognize that a problem exists) and the authoritative decision unit. In order to explore this relationship, I identify and classify different types of occasions of decision, such as related feedback from a previous decision or new information relating to the problem at hand that might affect the structure of the decision unit.

The study examines how policy feedback, as a result of one or more decisions made during the crisis, influences and/or mingle with information from the environment to shape the nature of subsequent decisions and, hence, the nature or type of subsequent decisional unit (Beasley et al. 2001). Examining the American and Israeli actors involved in decision-making during the Yom Kippur War, I also consider internal and external shocks in order to determine if the decision unit is influenced by other significant events. In other words, I evaluate whether or not other crises occurred during the time period of the study, and if those events had an impact on the nature of the decision unit.

This study will also test the overall applicability of the DU framework to sequential decisions. Most studies that have applied the DU framework focus on one particular decision rather than on a series of related decisions. Scholars recognize that policymaking is an ongoing process consisting of a series of decisions. Each of
these builds upon previous decisions, reacts to previous decisions, and/or creates new opportunities for choice (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954; Lindblom 1959; Brecher 1979; Steinbruner 2002; Hermann 2001). Occasionally, policymakers will recognize that a problem exists, but the actors involved in the decision process will choose to forego a decision or to search for more information. Although Hermann refers to this occurrence as a “non-decision,” I view this choice as a decision to do nothing. In the scope of foreign policy decision-making, doing nothing has been shown to have significant consequences.

Applying the DU framework developed by Hermann (2001), this study compares the decision units of the Israeli and American governments as they pertain to key decisions made during the period extending from the onset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War to the signing of the Sinai II Agreement in 1975. I examine the sequential decision-making processes of these two governments in order to test the effects of certain factors on decision unit dynamics. The selection of the time frame allows me to examine changes in the type of decision unit or changes occurring within the decision unit as the international environment transitions from a crisis situation to non-crisis conditions. I argue that upon the conclusion of hostilities, the decision unit dynamic likely became less cohesive, allowing dissenting viewpoints to surface, despite the potential for a return to military engagement. Specifically, pertaining to the DU framework, the structure of the decision unit likely grew to include additional members or was replaced with a new type of unit upon the conclusion of hostilities. As the environment became less
contentious and more stable, additional policymakers perhaps were included in the decision-making process.

I also compare the decision-making processes taking place within each country to identify any changes in process outcomes associated with changes in the decision unit or changes in leadership. For example, did Henry Kissinger’s role in the decision-making process change following the resignation of Richard Nixon and the ascension of Gerald Ford to the presidency? If so, did this result in any changes to process outcomes?

Examining the possible impact of feedback and new information on foreign policy decision-making, this study will incorporate elements of the cybernetics approach (Steinbruner 2002) into the DU framework. The cybernetics approach focuses on the potential influence that policy feedback and prior decisions have on future decisions (Billings and Hermann 1998; Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Ozkececi-Taner 2006; Steinbruner 2002). Cybernetics involves information processing, specifically, policymakers’ recognition of negative feedback and select information from the environment that may indicate that the policy needs to be readdressed.

John Steinbruner (2002) refers to this process as control through feedback. Because many decision-making processes tend to be complex, governments establish structured channels in order to facilitate the flow of potential feedback or new information. As such, policymakers become sensitive to particular information only if it comes in through the established channels. Monitoring policy feedback and select information from the environment prevents decision-makers from having to
recalculate the array of possible policy outcomes and allows for incremental changes to the previous policy decision (Steinbruner 2002; Hermann 1990; Billings and Hermann; 1998; Ozkececi-Taner 2006). As Charles Hermann (1990, 9) summarizes, “an essential feature of [the cybernetic approach] is that an agent, attempting to pursue some standard or goal, continuously monitors a select stream of information from the environment that indicates where he is in relation to that goal and how the relation has altered across intervals of time.”

To summarize, I will apply the DU framework to sequential decision-making, employing specific elements of the cybernetics approach. The research will focus on changes in the type or nature of the decision unit and whether those changes were influenced by feedback from previous decisions, new information, or shocks to the environment. Assessing such changes can help identify who makes foreign policy decisions and whether the introduction of new actors, the withdrawal (or removal) of existing actors, or a shift in the specific type of decision unit results in a change in policy outcomes.

**Conceptual Framework**

The DU framework is a contingency model that incorporates an assortment of previously developed foreign policy decision-making models, allowing for the utilization of case-appropriate theories and models under one framework umbrella. The framework suggests in what political structures, kinds of problems, and situations each type is expected to prevail (Hermann 2001, 49). Table 1.1 summarizes the decision unit dynamics and the theories on which the DU
framework is based. The nature of the decision unit and the key contingencies suggest particular process outcome characteristics.

The specification of the decisional unit and the proposed key contingencies that inform the decision process allow for various models and theories to be considered within the framework. For example, a predominant leader who is insensitive to the contextual information provided by the environment will tend to demonstrate a principled approach to the decision process. Personal goals, beliefs, and principles of the predominant leader likely will drive the decision process. Theories that exemplify this particular aspect of the DU and decision process include personality theories such as those based on social learning, biological, and/or psychoanalytical factors. Although many of these theories are the underpinnings of the DU framework, my research focuses primarily on the types of decision units and how they might change over the course of a series of decisions in a crisis situation.

Because crisis events are often fluid and unpredictable, I argue that there usually is the possibility that change will occur regarding the problem or issue, resulting in a potential for change in the nature or structure of the decision unit. Of course, a change in the problem does not imply or necessitate a change in the decision unit, only that the opportunity or potential exists for the decision unit to undergo a change in structure or dynamic. Moreover, a change in the decision unit does not necessarily result in a change in goals or objectives. Likewise, a new occasion for decision, i.e. feedback, external or internal shocks, might not result in a
### TABLE 1.1 Decision Unit Dynamics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Unit Process</th>
<th>Key Contingency</th>
<th>Theories Exemplify</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Leader</td>
<td>Sensitivity to Contextual Information:</td>
<td>Personality Theory</td>
<td>Principled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Relatively Insensitive (Goals and Means Well-Defined)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Moderately Sensitive (Goals Well-Defined, Means Flexible; Political Timing Important)</td>
<td>Theories Based on the Person/Situation Interaction</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Highly Sensitive</td>
<td>Theories Focused on the Situation Alone</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Group</td>
<td>Techniques Used to Manage Conflict in Group:</td>
<td>Group Dynamics</td>
<td>Deny Conflict and Seek Concurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Members Act to Minimize Conflict (Members Loyal to Group)</td>
<td>(“Groupthink”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Members Acknowledge Conflict Is Unavoidable; Group Must Deal With It (Members’ Loyalty Outside Group; Unanimity Decision Rule)</td>
<td>Bureaucratic Politics</td>
<td>Resolve Conflict Through Debate and Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Members Recognize Conflict May Have No Resolution (Members’ Loyalty Outside Group)</td>
<td>Minority/Majority Influence and Jury Decision Making</td>
<td>Accept Conflict and Allow for Winning Majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>Nature of Rules/Norms Guiding Interaction</td>
<td>Theories of Political Instability</td>
<td>Anarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) No Established Rules for Decision Making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Established Norms Favor Majority Rule</td>
<td>Theories of Coalition Formation</td>
<td>Minimum Connected Winning Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Established Norms Favor Unanimity Rule</td>
<td>Theories Regarding DevelopmentUnit Veto of Under- and Over-Sized Coalitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

different type of decision unit, but it may alter the dynamics of the unit. For example, during the time period in this study, Gerald Ford assumed the presidency upon the resignation of Richard Nixon; and, when Golda Meir of Israel relinquished her post as Prime Minister, she was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin. Should this study classify Richard Nixon or Golda Meir as “predominant leaders” at some point during the decision-making process, I then evaluate what types of changes, if any, occurred upon their exit from office. Also, I evaluate what type of unit subsequently emerged to address the ongoing crisis.

During crisis periods, multiple decisions are made, or considered, in order to address the immediate threats of the situation. Some of these decisions are technical and military in nature, while others are decidedly political. Other decisions span both the military and political spectrums. I intend to examine the decisions that are primarily political in nature. While military decisions can, and often do, generate occasions for decisions for policymakers (see Graham Allison’s organizational process model),¹ they are not themselves political decisions. However, decisions that involve military components must necessarily be included in the study. For example, I consider Golda Meir’s initial decision not to launch a preemptive military strike, as well as her request for military aid from the United States. The request itself was for military purposes, but it was political insofar as it would force the U.S. into taking a public, political, and pro-Israel stance, setting the United States in direct opposition to the Soviet Union and her clients, Egypt and Syria. Though military decisions may affect political considerations, this study will not include the array of military decisions made on the battlefield.

¹ Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
**Introduction**

The aim in identifying feedback from a particular decision is not to evaluate the effectiveness of that decision (except to identify the feedback as positive or negative), but rather to determine whether a specific decision and subsequent action of a decision unit resulted in a specific response. Although there may be no observable response or identifiable feedback, the possibility exists that decision-makers could *perceive* that feedback has occurred as a result of their decision. No response, for example, can generate multiple signals, depending upon the policy action. It can indicate to decision-makers that the policy choice was acceptable, leading the decision-makers to proceed as planned. Or it can indicate a rejection of the policy. Much depends on the attitudes, perceptions, and goals of the policymakers themselves. The evidence of which might be found in the debates that arise subsequent to the initial onset of the crisis.

Although other state actors were involved in the crisis and non-crisis periods, I chose these two governments based on several requirements. Israel is an obvious choice, as she was the recipient or target of hostilities. It could be argued that Egypt and Syria, the perpetrators of the war, should be included in the study. Although Syria no doubt played a significant role in the prosecution of the war and helped Egypt gain an early military advantage, Syria was not involved in the final disengagement agreement in 1975 (Sinai II). Syrian President Hafez Assad refused to attend the summit conference in Geneva in December 1973. Syria’s sole motivation in the conflict was to recover the Golan Heights lost in the 1967 Six Day War. There were no indications that Assad wished to engage in any sort of diplomatic relationship with Israel; and, to this day, Syria does not recognize Israel’s
right to exist. Moreover, there is no accessibility to any primary source documentation and secondary sources recounting the decision-making process at that time is severely limited.

Egypt, on the other hand, was the primary actor and orchestrated the coordination of the war. As in the case of Syria, acquiring relevant data for Egypt is also problematic. Most, if not all, of the primary documents pertaining to Egyptian decisions are not readily available. Although the Egyptian government recently announced plans to release 600 pages of official documents pertaining to the 1973 war, the government claims that the documents, which cover the period from 5 June 1967 (the beginning of the Six Day War) through the end of the Yom Kippur War, would not contain any military papers. It remains unclear if any of the official documents to be released would include minutes of high-level meetings. It would be necessary, therefore, to rely solely upon the personal accounts of the actors involved in government meetings or upon second-hand reporting. A survey of these accounts could possibly enable the identification of the decision unit structures. Indeed, Hermann (2001) maintains that primary sources are not an absolute necessity. However, the results of the research could be skewed, owing to the overwhelming discrepancies in the amount of data available for each of the governments in the case study.

The Soviet Union was also drawn into the crisis, and could be considered for this study. Soviet involvement affected decisions across all of the governmental decision units. In addition, both Egypt and Syria were client states of Moscow, which
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presented a counterweight to the U.S. role. Given its adversarial superpower role in what was then a bipolar international system, a thorough assessment of the decisional units at the Kremlin would add an additional dimension to the study. I opted to exclude them based on two factors: 1) military advisers and their families had been expelled from Egypt prior to the onset of war; thus, Soviet influence in Egypt had dissipated, and Sadat had little use for Moscow but for equipment and leverage against the U.S. in negotiations (Sadat 1978); and 2) except for Moscow’s participation in the Geneva Conference, the Soviets were effectively excluded from the negotiating process. As in the cases of Syria and Egypt, documentation regarding the Soviet decision process is not readily available.

The decision to include the U.S. in the study stems from America’s pivotal role in negotiating a ceasefire accord, a military disengagement agreement, and, eventually, a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The role of the United States in this particular series of events was arguably one of mediator and facilitator, which could point a researcher toward using theories and models that deal with negotiations, the role of intermediaries, or conflict resolution. While it could be argued that theories and models that explain state behavior under these conditions would be better suited for examining U.S. involvement, there are several obstacles to this approach. First, one could argue that the United States was not simply a neutral party to the conflict, nor were there benign repercussions for the U.S. in the resulting negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Although the U.S. was actively engaged in a diplomatic solution to the crisis, America also provided substantial military aid to Israel both during and after the war. Politically, the U.S. at the very
least considered Israel a client state, as Israel was the only democratic state in the Middle East.

Second, the United States had a vested interest in returning stability, i.e., economic stability, to the Middle East. During the war, the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced an oil embargo against the United States and other countries that supported Israel, including the Netherlands, South Africa, and Portugal. The embargo prohibited the exportation of oil to targeted countries, as well as calling for cuts in production. By the onset of the war, America had become increasingly dependent on foreign oil, and the embargo naturally strained the U.S. economy.

Third, the bipolar structure of the international system at the time of the conflict and the competitive nature of the foreign policy environment was a motivating factor for the United States to take a leadership role in the crisis and to simultaneously marginalize Soviet influence. Becoming involved in negotiating a ceasefire or peace settlement was an opportunity for America to establish a relationship with Egypt, which had been one of Moscow’s client states in the Middle East. Additionally, any scenario that drew the U.S. and Soviet Union into an international crisis – particularly when their respective clients were facing a military confrontation – would naturally elevate America’s role, as well as that of the Soviet’s, from intermediary to potential participant. Once again, this is evidenced by the fact that both governments put their militaries on full nuclear alert status during the war.
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Ultimately, the inclusion of the United States in this study presents the opportunity to more accurately test the validity of the DU framework, due to the amount, ease, and availability of data. Unlike Egypt, Syria, or the Soviet Union, the United States has released classified documents, reports, and telephone conversations that took place during the time frame. Although not all information is available, enough should be obtainable to make the determinations necessary for this study.

Definitions of Terms

One of the primary concepts at issue in this investigation is the definition of an international crisis. Clarifying what constitutes a crisis will help to delineate the conditions and time frame of the observed episode. According to Charles Hermann (1972), an event may be deemed an international crisis if: (1) it threatens high-priority goals of decision-makers; (2) both the response time and policy actions or decisions are restricted; and (3) the event comes as a surprise to members of the decision-making unit. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing (1978) suggest that an international crisis comprises a “sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war” (6). Michael Brecher (1979, 447) maintains that an international crisis consists of (1) a change in the internal or external environment that (2) generates a threat to basic values, which (3) creates a “high probability of involvement in military hostilities,” and (4) the
“awareness of a finite time for their response to the external value threat.” Each of these definitions emerges from a decision-making perspective; thus, a situation can be classified as a crisis if decision-makers perceive that threats to high-priority goals or national security exist (Hermann 1972; Brecher 1979).

A key feature of international crises is a state’s uncertainty of “each other’s willingness to impose a settlement” (Powell 1999, 86). Powell’s model pertains to what Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992) refer to as “neorealist version” of interaction games, in which the “players are states rather than individual leaders [whose] preferences are entirely determined by the realpolitik national interests, and domestic politics is considered largely irrelevant” (Ye 2007, 323). However, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) are not concerned with national interests, per se, but rather the interests of the decision-makers.

The systemic perspective views an international crisis as a significant change in the normal interaction pattern between nation-states (Young 1967; McClelland 1968; McCormick 1978), which are considered to be the primary actors in international relations. This definition is not particularly concerned with perceptions but rather with the decisions of states and changes in state behavior. As James McCormick (1978) maintains, utilizing the definition of an international crisis solely from a decision-making perspective or a systemic perspective can be problematic because one group of researchers may not recognize the alternate definition. Additionally, “both approaches rely on arbitrary specifications of crisis
thresholds” (356). McCormick suggests applying both criteria when determining whether a crisis situation exists and, if so, when the crisis begins and when it ends.

When examining individual actors and groups in the decision-making process, the definition of international crisis must be considered from the perspective of those actors. Clearly, evidence of an immediate threat or impending military hostilities constitutes a crisis; however, policymakers react or respond to perceived threats, whether or not an actual crisis exists. Stemming from McCormick’s (1978) treatment of international crises, this study utilizes the definition from a systemic perspective as well as a decision-making perspective. An international crisis, therefore, consists of (1) a significant change in the normal interactions between states, which (2) generates a high-level threat to values, and (3) a high probability of military conflict. The definition also consists of decision-makers understanding or recognizing a finite amount of time to respond to the threat. However, unlike the systemic perspective, this study views domestic politics as highly relevant.

Analysis of governmental decision units requires a working definition of decision. Essentially, a decision is a choice made by an individual actor or a group of actors for a course of action in pursuit of a particular goal or purpose (Steinbruner 2002; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann 1990; Hermann 2001; Hudson et. al. 2002; Mintz 2004b). The goal or purpose can be viewed as a value or objective. Regarding foreign policy decisions, some argue that it matters whether the decision
unit is one individual or a group of individuals (Steinbruner 2002; Hagan 2001; Hermann 2001; Ozkececi-Taner 2006; Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006).

The occasion for decision is a key element in the DU framework and the primary independent variable in this study. An elaboration on this component, therefore, seems warranted. Essentially, occasions for decision represent the points in time when policymakers acknowledge a specific problem and are faced with making a choice in order to cope with the problem (Hermann 2001). Individuals involved in the decision-making process must feel the need to take action even if the action is the decision to do nothing at all or to search for additional information. Thus, one problem can, and often does, include a number of occasions for decision that need to be addressed across time. Hermann (2001) maintains that these occasions for decision might be addressed by the same type of decision unit or by all three types of decision units. The occasion for decision, triggered by a foreign policy problem, is the initial step in the decision-making process in the DU framework.

Specific variables in this study include internal shocks, external shocks, and outcome feedback. When analyzing and comparing governmental entities, regime type would be a significant variable. However, as the United States and Israel are both rated as totally free democracies, regime type will not be a variable in this study but rather will be considered an assumption.

Internal shocks are visible and dramatic events that occur within the domestic context. As noted earlier, one such event in my study entails the resignation of President Richard Nixon in 1974. Although not directly related to the
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Yom Kippur War, the scandal and subsequent removal and replacement of a sitting president directly affects the state’s ability to conduct foreign policy. While Kissinger remained the Secretary of State, it is the President of the U.S. who wields the ultimate authority to commit the state resources in many foreign policy matters. Of particular interest is the effect the event may have had on the decision unit managing the crisis. For example, did the decision unit undergo a categorical change; or, conversely, did the decision unit remain constant, with only the participants changing seats?

External shocks, by comparison, are visible and dramatic events that occur outside of the control of any of the governments in this study. India’s first nuclear test in 1974 caught the United States by surprise, for instance, about the same time that Lebanon began to experience a civil war that would last more than 15 years. Although external shocks are not likely to directly affect a change in the types of decision units of the governments being studied, I argue that these events might present a distraction, with the result that the authority to commit resources may have been transferred to another actor, possibly resulting in a change in the nature of the decision unit.

Feedback is another variable that could affect a change in the decision unit. In relation to this study, feedback is essentially responses or reactions to key decisions that signal policymakers whether the action requires modification. I argue that negative feedback is more likely to become a factor in changing the type or the dynamics of a decision unit during a crisis event. Positive feedback reinforces
policy behavior and institutions, while negative feedback calls into question the effectiveness of the policy. Both positive and negative feedback can be assessed through the debates and discussions of decision-makers.

Summary of Methodology

My research is a “comparative-historical” case study, employing a temporal component to across- and within-unit variations (Gerring 2004). That is, the study will examine the decision units across the selected governments as well as the decision units within each government over a two-year time frame. I consider the Yom Kippur War and its immediate aftermath as a single or continuous event. Using the occasion for decision as the unit of analysis, I will be able to assess and compare any changes in the decision unit dynamics between and within the governments of Israel and the United States.

Applying the DU framework involves identifying key decisions for each government and then isolating the occasions for decision that initiated the decision-making process. As Hermann (2001) maintains, the DU framework requires the researcher to isolate the occasions for decision that “lead to authoritative actions on the part of the government in dealing with a perceived foreign policy problem” (55; author’s emphasis), as opposed to those occasions for decision that seek additional information about a problem, implement a previous decision, or ratify a decision. Hermann directs the researcher to examine only those occasions that result in an “authoritative decision on what the government is going to do or not do with regard
to the problem at hand” (55). Perhaps an examination of one decision warrants adhering to the criteria mentioned above. Because this study involves sequential decision-making, the criteria limit the scope of key decision selection. Indeed, several decisions that impacted the decision process were not actionable decisions. By including these types of decisions in the study, I demonstrate the relevance of “non-decisions” in the decision-making process.

I classify each occasion for decision (discussed below) in order to assess, first, whether there is a relationship between the type of occasion for decision and the decision unit that emerged, and, secondly, whether the emergence of a certain type of occasion for decision may affect a change in the type of decision unit involved in the process. In essence, I will examine foreign policy feedback loops and inputs from the environment in order to assess structural changes or the nature and extent of changes in decision unit dynamics.

Once the types of decision units for each occasion for decision have been identified, I will assess whether changes occurred in each unit and what factors may have precipitated the change. Some might be more obvious than others (the resignation of President Nixon, for example), while others might be more ambiguous. I will focus on three potential factors in affecting change in the decision unit: feedback regarding a previous decision made during the crisis, internal shocks, and external shocks. Moreover, these factors will be considered only if the member or members of the decision unit perceived them to be relevant to the issue or decision at hand. For example, negative public opinion would not be considered
negative feedback, if the decision unit did not engage in discussions or debates regarding public opinion. Such indications of individual or group perceptions might be gleaned from debates or meeting records. While shocks and feedback certainly occurred during the time period in the study, one cannot necessarily discern if those instances resulted in a change in any of the decision unit or policy outcome without a review of the debates, discussions, or reports related to those events.

Returning to the primary element I will be examining in the DU framework, the occasion for decision, or the recognition of a policy problem, will be the impetus for the emergence of a decision unit. While Hermann (2001) establishes the occasion for decision as the unit of analysis, in order to ascertain whether a new occasion for decision results in a change in the type or nature of the decision unit, I will need to treat the “occasion for decision” also as an independent variable. As such, I will classify the occasions for decision into 6 possible categories:

- **External shock**
- **Internal shock**
- **Positive feedback**
- **Negative feedback**
- **New information**
- **Other/unknown**

Hermann suggests that a change in the preferences of one or more members in a decision unit can affect the structure or dynamic of that unit. Generally, one does not arbitrarily change preferences without reason. I maintain that the categories listed above will encompass some of the reasons for a change in preferences and, hence, a potential change in the decision unit dynamic. President
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Nixon’s resignation, for example, can be classified as an internal shock. But even if the event did not trigger an “occasion for decision” for either of the two decisional units (U.S. and Israel) during the timeframe studied, it may still be considered as an independent or intervening variable.

The study also requires an examination of whether each government had the formal structures or established institutional rules and norms that governed foreign policy decision-making during the period in question. Institutional rules and norms might include bureaucratic processes such as information gathering and management; or they could involve managing group conflicts and decision procedures. For example, the rules governing a particular committee decision might require a unanimous vote. Established rules or norms affect the decision process and, thus, the process outcome.

The research requires the use of both primary and secondary sources in determining the key decisions and the subsequent decision units. Primary sources of evidence for the Israeli occasions for decision are available through the Israel State Archives; however, much of the documentation is in Hebrew. While this may hinder somewhat the process of analyzing the data, translation of Israeli documents into English is possible through research assistants. Other documents available at the Israel State Archives are the records from the Bureaus of Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin (1969-1977) and the personal documents of Golda Meir (1925-1984), including declassified material. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz (1984) produced a volume of historically significant Israeli documents in
English. Chapters in the volume include the Interim Report of the Agranat Commission,\(^5\) which was the result of a formal investigation into the failures of Israeli military and intelligence analysts at the beginning of the war, as well as essays that address the onset of the October War and the protest activity following the publication of the Agranat Commission’s Report.

As not all of the relevant Israeli documents have been declassified, secondary sources will also be necessary for this study. Other sources of evidence for Israel’s decision units will include letters, cables, transcripts of conversations, and meetings, where available. In some cases, no records of meetings were kept. Also, biographies, speeches, and records of interviews and personal accounts will help reveal the actors involved in the series of decisions.

Data pertaining to decisions made by the United States can be gleaned from the National Security Archives, including the Kissinger transcripts of telephone conversations with various policymakers, including Richard Nixon, Brent Scowcroft, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, and Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. Documents and archival material can be found at the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, the Department of State, and through Congressional records. Various academic publications on American foreign policy and biographical studies will also provide insights into the U.S. decision-making process.
Limitations and Contributions of the Study

This research examines the decision units employed by two governments under two specific conditions: an international crisis period and the transition period immediately following the crisis. Although the timeframe under this study encompasses both a crisis as well as a transition period, my research essentially treats the entire timeframe as one case study (single event examined over time), comprising two units: Israel and the United States. A large-\( N \) study that includes a comprehensive examination or comparative analysis of a number of crises, narrow enough to consider only military conflicts, would provide some external validity. Given the specificity of the crisis environment, the results of this study are unlikely to be applicable to all types of foreign policy decisions. However, this study should be able to say something about the actors and decision units involved in sequential decision-making during an international crisis. In addition, the results of the study may provide insight into the decision-making dynamics of governments in transition from an international crisis to a non-crisis situation.

It is also probable that crisis decision-making is heavily influenced by the international system. Policy alternatives can differ significantly in a bipolar system than from policy choices embedded in a unipolar or multipolar system. Would Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, for example, occur under the current international system? Would Sadat have decided to attack Israel had it not been for superpower competition and the probability that each superpower would take steps to limit the scope of the conflict? This is not to suggest that systems theory might better explain
most foreign policy decisions in a crisis, only that the structure of the international system is a condition of the international environment that should be considered when examining decisions made during crises.

Along those same lines, one must consider the limitations of this study in terms of its applicability to current international crises. While the events leading up to the 1973 war, as well as the war itself, fit neatly into the frequently cited definition of international crisis, some argue that “traditional” inter-state wars are on the decline (Mueller 1989; Kaldor 2007; Richards 2010; Pinker 2011; Gat 2012; Goldstein 2012) and, according to Mary Kaldor (2007), a new type of warfare is emerging. Civil wars, ethnic conflict, and transnational terrorism create different types of crises for national governments. Snyder and Diesing’s (1978) assertion that an international crisis comprises interactions between sovereign states in severe conflict does not reflect recent patterns as described above. Some threats to national security emerge from non-state actors and by unconventional means – e.g., the attacks that occurred in the U.S. on 9/11. Also, technological advances create opportunities for a cyber attack, which has economic as well as physical consequences. Additionally, Brecher’s (1979) definition of crisis contains one element that involves the high probability of military hostilities. The events of 9/11 and cyber security represent conditions whereby a military response may not be the most effective means of addressing national security threats.

Comparing and contrasting two democratic states says nothing about the possible decision unit dynamics in nondemocratic regimes. Although it is assumed
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that authoritarian rulers possess the ultimate power to commit or withhold the resources of their government, we cannot presume that each decision unit would necessarily take the form of a predominant leader. Advisors, working alone or in cooperation with others, can influence leaders’ decisions in a variety of ways. Government elites might control or distort the flow of information. Military commanders, particularly in times of war, make technical decisions that impact the strategic goals of the ruling party and, hence, affect foreign policy decisions. Also, the presumed leader may in fact be simply a figurehead, making decisions on behalf of some other individual or groups of individuals.

Another limitation of the study is the discrepancy between Israel and the United States regarding the data available. While the U.S. has declassified most of the documents, transcripts, and reports pertaining to the conflict, the Israeli government has yet to release some of the relevant material from their archives. Some of the minutes of high-level meetings are simply unavailable to the public. In addition, original documents are more readily available in the United States than in Israel. On the other hand, there has been considerable research conducted on the available Israeli data, hence, many documents have been transcribed and/or published in English. Part of my methodology incorporates surveys of secondary sources and historical accounts of the decision process.

Despite the limitations mentioned, as well as the dearth of material already published on the subject, this study provides valuable contributions to the study of foreign policy decision-making. My research expands on the DU framework
developed by Hermann through its application to sequential decision-making. The 
study attempts to demonstrate how, or if, decision unit dynamics change through a 
series of decisions under certain circumstances. I also expand upon the framework 
with the classification of the occasions for decision. I attempt to determine if 
domestic shocks – a change in leadership, for example – or external shocks to the 
international environment affect the decision-making process. I also assess whether 
or not feedback plays a role in the type or nature of the decision unit. To summarize, 
this study seeks to understand who makes foreign policy decisions, and to assess 
the relative stability of established decision units through a series of decisions from 
crisis conditions through the transitional period to non-crisis.

Plan of the Study

Chapter Two explores the literature and the various approaches to foreign 
policy decision-making. Chapter Three presents the research design, including 
explanations of the hypotheses and the variables used in the study. Chapter Four 
provides a brief history of Israel, focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as 
Israel’s relationship with the United States. The chapter is not intended to be 
comprehensive, but rather is meant to provide the reader with some contextual 
information and situational awareness. Chapters Five and Six provide an account of 
the sequence of decisions used in the study. Chapter Five focuses on decisions made 
during the crisis, while Chapter Six is dedicated to the crisis transition period. I also 
provide a brief analysis of the decision units related to the decisions for each
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government at the end of Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Seven presents the results relating to the hypotheses. This chapter also compares and assesses decision unit dynamics between and within each government. Chapter Eight explores the overall utility and applicability of the DU framework and provides suggestions for future research.
Notes: Chapter One

4 Scholars differ on an exact definition of feedback; however, for an in depth explanation of positive and negative feedback as related to political science and public policy, see Baumgartner and Jones, 2002, "Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics," in *Policy Dynamics*, Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp 9-19.
5 It is important to note that the Agranat Commission was concluded and the final report published on 30 January 1975, eight months before the signing of the Sinai II Agreement (the conclusion of my study). Although the Report is 1,500 pages in length, the majority of the report deals with Military Intelligence and the army, as the Commission restricted its investigation to the military level. Notwithstanding the nature of the investigation, the Interim Report, published in April 1974, cleared Prime Minister Golda Meir and her cabinet of any incompetent action. This initial report, however, caused a public outcry and forced the Prime Minister to resign her post.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

Systems, States, and Individuals

Do Individual Actors Matter?

When it comes to explaining foreign policy behavior and decision-making, there are three primary schools of thought as to what level of analysis is of consequence or relevance: the systemic level, the state level, and the individual actor level. Each of these levels of analysis has dominated the international relations literature at one time or another. Early works focused on systems-level analysis (Carr 1939; Hobson 1902; Kaplan 1961; Mahan 1912; Marx 1859; Waltz 1959), where researchers maintain that state behavior can best be explained by looking at the international system.

A systemic analysis to international politics is considered a “top-down” approach and focuses on the characteristics or structure of the international system and the relationships between the various actors in the system (Gilpin 1981; Waltz 1979; Wendt 1987). Characteristics of the international system can be thought of in political, economic, social, or geographic terms, and these characteristics help determine relationships and interactions of global actors. Nation-states have been viewed traditionally as the dominant actors in international relations; however, other global actors have emerged in the past several decades as significant political
players, including but not limited to multinational corporations (MNC), international non-governmental organizations (INGO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), inter-governmental organizations (IGO), and even transnational terrorist organizations. At the root of the systemic approach is that interactions between states or other international actors can be explained by the political, economic, and/or societal characteristics of the global system and how those actors fit into that system.

In 1954 Richard Snyder and his colleagues (1954) introduced the notion that individuals are involved in making decisions on behalf of the state and, thus, individuals matter in international relations. By the 1970's an abundance of theoretical approaches and models focusing on foreign policy decision-making at the individual (or group) level had been published (Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein 1969; Janis 1972; Jervis 1976; Shapiro and Bonham 1973). Approaches to individual-level analysis include examining the roles of leaders, their perceptions, beliefs and experiences, and leadership style (Astorino-Courtois 1998; Avner 2001; Brecher 1979; Brecher 1980; Chiozza and Choi 2003; Goeman, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009; Hermann 1993; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Keller and Yang 2008; Mintz 2004; Schein 2010; Shapiro and Bonham 1973; Steinberg 2008; Stoessinger 1979).

System-level analysis saw resurgence in the 1980's with seminal works by Waltz (1979), Robert Gilpin (1981), and Robert Keohane (1984), espousing the virtues of hegemonic stability theory and neorealism. Since the mid-1980's,
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however, research and theoretical development at the individual level has once again dominated the literature on foreign policy decision-making (Anderson 1987; Astorino-Courtois 1995; Beasley et al. 2001; Crichlow 2005; Dacey and Carlson 2004; DeRouen Jr. and Sprecher 2004; George 1980; George and Romme 2004; Goertz 2004; Hermann 1990; Hermann 1993, 2001; Hermann and Hermann 1987; Holsti 2006; Hudson, Chollet, and Goldgeier 2002; Kaarbo 1996; Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006; Levy 1997; Mintz 2004; Putnam 1988; Vertzberger 1986). Throughout the micro versus macro debate in international relations, the foreign policy literature has been rich with studies at the nation-state level (Bueno de Mesquita; Lebow 2005; Morgenthau 1948; Singer 1979; Wendt 1992). A nation-state level of analysis involves the examination of structures, such as legislatures, bureaucracies, and interest groups. Regime type, societal dynamics (e.g., ethnic homogeneity), and economic factors are all relevant variables at the nation-state level.

In addition to the three primary levels of analysis, Graham Allison (1971 [1999]) introduced two models that allow for the examination of organizational decision-making in governments: the organizational process model and the bureaucratic politics model. The concept of examining individuals within an “organizational context” was first proposed by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin in 1954. Allison’s (1999) Essence of Decision is one of the most often cited works on foreign policy decision-making during an international crisis. His review of the decision process during the Cuban missile crisis involves employing the two organizational models noted above, as well as the rational actor model. His novel approach to the
study of foreign policy decisions allowed for the comparison of different models that could help explain the outcome of the crisis. I will elaborate on these models subsequently.

Each of these levels of analysis has its merits. Indeed, each has demonstrated validity in explaining international relations and foreign policy. However, since specific decisions are made at the individual level, whether by one actor or a group of actors, decision processes (structured or ad hoc), rules and norms, and decision unit structure matter in foreign policy outcomes.

**Foreign Policy and Decision-making Paradigms**

**Foreign Policy Analysis**

The study of foreign policy decision-making began with the seminal work of Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (2002). Their 1954 work, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*, offered a more comprehensive perspective to the international relations literature and directly addressed the issue of multi-level analysis. What the authors identified as foreign policy analysis (FPA), Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin proposed that the “most effective way” to understand international politics is to “pitch the analysis” at the state level. Since the study of international relations involves the behavior of international actors, one of the work’s primary assumptions was that the nation-state would be the “significant unit of political action for many years to come” (Snyder, Bruck, and
Sapin 2002, 58). To this notion or assumption, the authors added that the state is an actor in a situation [author's emphasis]. That is, a study may treat the state as part of a collectivity and still acknowledge that there are certain perspectives associated with the situation in which a state may be bound.

Furthermore, the authors contend that political behavior or action is based on decisions by actual human beings with varying degrees of perceptions and perspectives (see also Rosenau 1980). Understanding the political behavior of states, therefore, requires consideration of the views of the identifiable actors involved in the decision-making process. As such, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (2002) suggest analyzing actors in terms of: (1) “their discrimination and relating of objects, conditions, and other actors”; (2) “the existence, establishment, or definition of goals”; (3) “attachment of significance to various courses of action suggested by the situation according to some criteria of estimation”; and (4) “application of ‘standards of acceptability’” which narrow the range of perceptions, the range of objects wanted, and the number of alternatives (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 59).

These authors also incorporate multi-level analysis into their decision-making framework. Variables they suggest include the internal setting (society, culture), social structure and behavior (value orientations, role differentiation, and social processes), and external setting (other cultures, other societies). Also important to the approach are the perceptions, choices, and expectations of the state – or rather the individual, group, or coalition making decisions on behalf of the state. The authors argue that these features are extremely relevant if one is to understand
the decisions or actions taken by the actors. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s work has provided the foundation for other scholars to develop and expound upon the study of foreign policy decision-making. Additionally, although the dynamics of international relations have changed considerably since 1954, such as the increasing influence of non-state actors as well as the structure of the international system, the nation-state is still viewed as a significant unit of political action.

Rational Choice and Prospect Theory

The rational actor model, based on rational choice theory, has been a dominant theme in the international relations literature. Indeed, rational choice theory has been applied or assumed at each level of analysis. Basically, the theory assumes that states make decisions in considerations of costs and benefits, goals and agendas, and national interests. Valerie Hudson (2002, 1) notes that the study of international relations is grounded in “human decision-makers, acting singly or in groups.” However, many theories in IR treat the decision making body as a unitary rational actor, whether the level of analysis is at the state or individual level. For example, the rational actor model assumes that foreign policy decision-making processes are alike in essential ways across states, and that the international system determines state actions (Allison and Zelikow 1999). According to Min Ye (2007), the standard solution in the rational choice approach is to collapse all issues “to a single policy dimension having to do with the overall contribution of the policy” (Ye 2007, 319; see also Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).
According to Bueno de Mesquita (2009, 2), the rational actor model “assumes that actors (such as decision makers) make choices that the actors believe will lead to the best feasible outcomes for them as defined by their personal values or preferences” (2). The actors’ preferences may or may not reflect the interest of the nation-state. Although the rational actor model assumes that policy choices will reflect the preferences of the decision makers, the decision makers themselves are often constrained (March 1994; Bueno de Mesquita 2009). Constraints can result from the structure of the system, the structure of the government, or domestic pressures. They can also come from the inability of decision makers to obtain complete information or know all possible outcomes (Simon 1957; March 1994). These constraints limit the choices available to policy makers, and so, theoretically, policymakers will select the option that will most likely achieve particular goals.

Bueno de Mesquita (2009) claims that uncertainty, impatience, indivisibility, and commitment problems are generally the conditions whereby a decision-maker’s preferences do not align with those of the state or citizenry. He examines the rational actor model along two dimensions: 1) game theoretic studies that regard states as the rational actor, and 2) studies that “look within states at rational choices against the backdrop of domestic politics” from a political economy perspective (Bueno de Mesquita 2009, 4). He also suggests that scholars should examine “institutions, endowments, and ease with which citizens opposed to government policies can coordinate so as to understand how domestic conditions shape the incentives of political leaders to pursue war and impose misery on their subjects or to pursue peace and advance prosperity” (Bueno de Mesquita 2009, 22).
According to Allison and Zelikow (1999, 13), a trademark of the rational actor model is “the attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments.” The rational actor model assumes the state or national government to be the unitary actor. In addition, the rational choice model assumes that the action selected is based on a calculated assessment of the problem and its potential solutions. Essentially, the researcher can identify specific goals the government is pursuing and how the choice was a reasonable one.

An alternative approach to rational choice in the decision literature is prospect theory. Prospect theory posits that individuals tend to value what they already have over what they could have. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) assert that expected utility theory, dominant in analyses of decision-making under risk, is not an adequate “descriptive model” and that people weigh gains and losses from a reference point rather than from levels of wealth and welfare (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1997).

**Poliheuristic Theory and Crisis Decision-Making**

The poliheuristic theory (PH) combines the cognitive – mental shortcuts – and rational approaches to decision-making that consists of a two-stage process (Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Stern 2004). The first stage is the cognitive phase, which simplifies and reduces the alternatives based on the decision makers’ experiences and knowledge of the issue. Limited to bounded rationality and satisficing behavior, policymakers are able to eliminate options that do not meet
a certain threshold (Mintz 2004; Simon 1957). The second stage uses the rational approach to select from the remaining alternatives.

The PH model assumes that people “process information differently depending on time constraints, prior beliefs and experiences, limited searches for information, and a dominant goal or value heavily influencing the decision process” (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004, 57). Additionally, the model assumes that a dominant goal for national leaders is to avoid political loss. DeRouen and Sprecher find that the avoidance of domestic political loss is a significant influence in the initial behavior of decision-makers during a crisis.

Proponents of the theory claim that PH is an integrative approach that bridges the gap between cognitive and rationalist theories (Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Stern 2004). Limitations of PH include its inability to illuminate “how problems are detected, how decision makers are activated, and how decision units are formed” (Stern 2004, 110; see also Hermann 2001).

Sequencing, Feedback, and Environmental Shocks

Sequential Decision Making

A common formulation applied to foreign policy analysis involves cases in which policymakers regard each decision as an ad hoc event despite the reliance on previous experiences (Brecher 1980; Kuperman 2006; Maoz and Astorino 1992). In this formulation, decision-makers may even recognize the need for future rounds of
decisions. My study is conducive to this particular approach due to the nature of crisis conditions (e.g., high levels of stress, time constraints).

Ranan Kuperman (2006) attempts to differentiate the processes of decision-making, categorizing events as ad hoc, sequential, or dynamic. He posits that an “ideal” ad hoc event should mean that the problem is entirely new and appears suddenly. In the ad hoc decision-making event, previous experience is irrelevant. Sequential decision-making, according to Kuperman, involves policymakers readdressing a particular problem. This can occur due to a change in the significance of the problem or a reevaluation of previously held assumptions. In dynamic decision-making, the problem has no solution, continually exists, and prior experience in constantly being incorporated into the process (Kuperman 2006).

One method of analyzing sequential decision-making is to examine what Christian List (2004, 499) refers to as the “decision path”; that is, the “order in which the options are considered in a sequential decision process”. He offers one model of a decision path in order to determine if such decisions are path-dependent. List’s model is based on the concept that prior propositions and decisions constrain future decisions. His priority-to-the-past rule does not allow the acceptance of propositions that conflict with propositions accepted earlier. The decision path is stable or consistent in that previous propositions are not overturned.

List (2004, 510) maintains that individual decision-makers may attempt to avoid path-dependence through a “self-imposed discipline of rationality.” However, this implies that rational individuals have complete information and are cognitive of
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the various options available. List acknowledges the implication and notes that a “perfectly rational individual can avoid path-dependence, [whereas] a boundedly rational [individual] may be susceptible to it” (List 2004, 510). Consequently, path-dependence can be particularly significant at the collective level, where several – sometimes many – individuals are involved in the decision-making. List maintains that the aggregate beliefs and attitudes of group members run the risk of violating rationality and make the collective decision process susceptible to path-dependence. In addition, the group decision process is vulnerable to manipulation both by agenda setting and from misleading or ambiguous information.

List does not address decisions made under crisis conditions. His priority-to-the-past rule dictates that the order of options and decisions is temporal in nature, rather than occurring in order of importance or priority. In this regard, his model may not be conducive to crisis decision-making as multiple propositions and multiple decisions are made under severe time constraints. List also does not incorporate feedback into his model, a crucial element of path-dependence (Pierson 2004). Although the findings in List’s study indicate that certain violations of rationality by relevant agents are “necessary and sufficient” for path-dependence, he does not investigate why or how sequential decisions can avoid or deviate from path-dependence.

A particular issue with examining decisions made over time is that most research does not account for possible changes in individual agency within a decision-making body. Although not explicit in much of the literature, a key
assumption of sequential decision-making implies that the decisional unit or
decision body remains relatively static (Beasley et al. 2001). That is, in the course of
addressing a particular problem or issue, Beasley et al. imply that decisions will be
considered by the same type of decision unit, if not by the same actual group of
decision-makers. Research that does address administrative changes tends to focus
on one or two key positions (e.g., a president or prime minister), with primary
importance focused on potential changes in leadership style or agenda and how this
might affect decision processes.

Although a change in individual actors within a decision unit can affect the
decision process and eventual policy outcome, I argue that there does not
necessarily have to be such a change in order for a problem to be reconsidered.
Some scholars maintain that decision-makers may reconsider their position or
strategy in light of new information or unintended consequences (Beasley et al.
2001; C. Hermann 1990; Hermann 2001; Rasler 2000). As discussed in Chapter One,
I argue that there are associated problems embedded in sequential decision-making
that affect the decision process in general and the decision unit specifically.

Feedback, Decision-making, and Crises

One of the premises of this study is that positive feedback reinforces
organizational or institutional structures. Thus, research suggests that positive
feedback encourages path dependence in government institutions (North 1990;
Pierson 2004; Skocpol 1979). As the foreign policy decision process in most
governments tends to be guided by certain rules and norms, both formal and informal, I argue that positive feedback can create path dependence for decision units involved in international affairs. Specifically, when decision-makers are presented with positive feedback, there will be no reason to deviate from the current decision-making process. Paul Pierson (2004, 44) asserts that “once the self-reinforcing process has been established, positive feedback will generally lead to a single equilibrium,” which tends to be resistant to change.

This single equilibrium, however resistant to change, establishes an environment or condition that will inevitably become unstable; that is, positive feedback, without an incursion of negative feedback, will lead to the destruction of the system (Baumgartner and Jones 2002; de Rosnay 1997; Wiener 1948). Following the cybernetics approach, scholars in fields such as mathematics, biology, and the social sciences maintain that it is negative feedback that creates stability and equilibrium in many different types of systems (Ashby 1956; Baumgartner and Jones 2002; de Rosnay 1997; McCulloch 1969; Wiener 1948). While Pierson (2004) and North (1990) seek to explain how policies and institutions expand and become entrenched, they do not suggest that negative feedback is not a factor in political development; simply, they maintain that consistent positive feedback results in increasing returns and sunk costs, establishing a basis, or perhaps establishing legitimacy, for the continuation or expansion of policies, bureaucracies, and administrators.
Steinbruner’s (2002) cybernetic theory of decision, first published in 1974, draws from the field of mathematics and employs a concept first introduced by Norbert Wiener in 1948. Wiener (1954) developed a theory of control and communication, what he termed “cybernetics,” where information is processed in such a way as to control the surrounding environment. Underlying Wiener’s theory is the idea of feedback. Although his theory refers primarily to machines, he maintains that machines – or animals or humans – can sense feedback from the environment and then adapt accordingly so as to function within its system (Wiener 1954, 21). Thus, machines, animals, and humans respond to negative feedback and make adjustments. In Wiener’s theory, negative feedback leads to stability and equilibrium in the system, whereas positive feedback leads to destruction (de Rosnay 1997; Wiener 1948).

“An important next step in making the [DU] framework more comprehensive in detailing the decision-making process involves constructing a more dynamic model by examining a sequence of occasions for decision” (Beasley et al. 2001, 234). “[F]eedback from the environment can lead to reconsideration and possible change in the prior response to the problem” and “[F]eedback can cause the decision unit to alter its definition of the problem and, as a result, to make different assumptions than those they followed in the previous decision(s)” (Beasley et al. 2001, 236).

The vast research on the effect of policy feedback is generally referred to as an “historical institutionalist” approach to comparative politics (Pierson 1993; Pierson 2004). “Historical institutionalist analysis is based on a few key claims: that..."
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political processes can best be understood if they are studied over time; that structural constraints on individual actions, especially those emanating from government, are important sources of political behavior; and that the detailed investigation of carefully chosen, comparatively informed case studies is a powerful tool for uncovering the sources of political change.” North (1990), Pierson (2004), and Skocpol’s (1979) works emphasize institutional path dependence, or persistence and equilibrium in bureaucracies and organizations. Pertaining the effects of positive feedback, the research in political science generally applies to the public policies and public good (Pierson 2004; Skocpol 1979). Although limited, studies that examine the effects of feedback under crisis conditions generally apply cognitive theories (Astorino-Courtois 1998; Bonham, Shapiro and Trumble 1979; DeRouen and Sprecher 2004; Geva and Mintz 1997; Mintz 2004a), such as PH theory, or focus on crisis negotiations (Wagner 2000; Wilkenfeld et al 2003; Ye 2007).

Peter Trumbore and Mark Boyer (2000) examine the impact of domestic factors on decision-making across regime types and how those factors relate to the use and extent of violence in international crisis. Their study draws 895 foreign policy crises from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset. Trumbore and Boyer employ three categories of regime type: democratic, civil/authoritarian, and military. Cross-tabulation and regression analysis reveals that democracies and non-democracies exhibit similar behaviors in crisis situations, particularly in the initial stages of the crisis. They find differences across regime types begin to emerge when considering the entire crisis time period. [author's emphasis] This suggests
that, in order to better understand the decision-making process under crisis conditions, it would be beneficial to examine sequential decisions across the crisis episode.

Trumbore and Boyer’s (2000) findings that relate to the size and structure of the decisional unit reveal some differences between the regime types. For example, in civil/authoritarian and military regimes the size of the decisional unit tended to consist of less than four members (56.9% and 55.8%, respectively). Democratic regimes, however, displayed a slight, although not dramatic, tendency for wider participation in the decision-making process. Eighty of the cases (32%) resulted in a small unit (1-4 members), 94 (37.6%) cases were medium-sized units (5-10), and 76 cases (30.4%) resulted in a decisional unit of 10 or more members. While the results do not say anything about the dynamics of the decision unit, this research suggests non-democratic states demonstrate a higher restriction of the members of the authoritative decision unit and perhaps will be more likely to tend toward a “predominant leader” unit than would democratic regimes. Trumbore and Boyer do not differentiate between a single “predominant leader” and a small group; whereas, the DU framework makes that distinction.

Trumbore and Boyer (2000) also examine what they deem to be the structure of the decisional unit – i.e. institutional, ad hoc, combined, and other. Interestingly, they find that an overwhelming number of the decisional units during international crises are institutional (90.9%) rather than ad hoc (4.5%), regardless of regime type. That is, Ranan Kuperman and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner (2006; see also
Integration of Elements

Anderson (1987) maintain, however, that the onset of a crisis may encourage the establishment of ad hoc decision units, owing to the high level of stress or unusual circumstances (see also Maoz 1990). Astorino-Courtois (1995) also finds that states tend toward ad hoc policy-making during crisis situations. She asserts that the uncertainty of crisis conditions and the opponent’s previous level of cooperativeness – i.e. the Prisoner’s Dilemma – influence the decision environment and affect subsequent behavior.

Environmental Shocks and Decision Making Constraints

Beliefs, values, and ideas are embedded within most institutions. Thus, institutions are inherently resistant to change. “To the extent that an institution is successful in institutionalizing one set of ideas and values, it will encounter difficult in change; and [either] leadership (Brunsson and Olsen 1993) or significant external shocks (Baumgartner and Jones 2009) will be required to generate change. In reality both of these factors may be necessary, as an agent is still required to mediate between the dynamic external environment and the internal inertia of the institution” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1288).

Research pertaining to institutional changes resulting from environmental shocks largely focus on the effects of exogenous shocks (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Gilpin 1981; Hermann 1990; Ikenberry 1986; Legro 2000; Luong and Weinthal 2004; North 1990; Rasler 2000; Thelen 2004; Wendt 1987) Much of the literature tends to be found in conflict studies.
There are numerous studies that examine the effects of endogenous shocks; however, rather than “shocks,” these studies usually refer to domestic political changes with a turnover in leadership as the dominant focus (Brunsson and Olsen 1993; Colaresi 2004; McGillivray and Smith 2004; Schein 2010; Skowronek 1997). Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1983) helps to clarify and define both endogenous and exogenous shocks as crises or galvanizing events (domestic or international). In short, shocks are crises. Some are short in duration, such as the election of a new leader, while others can span months and years (e.g., financial crises). Of interest in my study is how a shock affects previously established institutional structures, specifically decisional units.

One theory of how change can develop in organizations includes Kurt Lewin’s (1947) three-stage model of change. The process consists of (1) unfreezing the present level, (2) moving to the new level, (3) and freezing group life on the new level (Donahue and O’Leary 2012). “[A] change toward a higher level of group performance is frequently short lived: after a ‘shot in the arm,’ group life soon returns to the previous level” (Lewin 1947, 344). According to Lewin, in order for organizational change to occur, present group behavior must be “unfrozen” (there must be a motivation to change). Then a change needs to “occur in the form of moving to the new level. The group as a whole must acknowledge a new set of ideas or values. The new behavior then needs to be ‘frozen,’ or reinforced, at the new level (Donahue and O’Leary 2012, 401).
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Edgar Schein (2010), recognized for his research on organizational culture, extends Lewin’s model of change by looking deeper into each of the stages and to include the context of organization change and culture (underlying sets of values, beliefs, understandings, and norms shared by ‘employees’). Schein asserts that once an organization is sufficiently motivated to change behavior, reframing or “cognitive redefinition” is needed. The new information – the source of the motivation – will be adopted and the result creates “new standards of judgment or evaluation, which must be congruent with the rest of the organization culture” (Donahue and O’Leary 2012, 402). For the change to be permanent (“refreezing”), the new standards, including norms and behaviors, must be embedded throughout the organization and reinforced through positive feedback (Schein 2010).

Kanter’s (1983) work includes the role of crises in organizational change. In her assessment, five forces must converge:

- “grassroots innovations” – new ways of thinking emerge within the organization;
- “crisis or galvanizing event” – the crisis may be exogenous or precipitated by organization’s own behavior (the first two forces set the stage for change);
- “change strategists and strategic decisions” – a leadership emerges (whether from within or from outside the group), and a new definition of the situation (plans, reconceptualization) is expressed;
• “individual prime movers” – these are the people who push the new organizational reality, support advocates for change, and themselves actively push for change;

• “action vehicles” – “transform abstract notions of change into reality” – procedures, structures, processes; essentially, working out the details of how to implement the change (Donahue and O’Leary 2012).

Although the logic and explanation of the five forces are compelling, Kanter’s work pertains to organizational change in American corporations. That is not to say, however, that these concepts do not apply to political institutions, or even decisional units.

Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal (2004) suggest that exogenous shocks can provide the stimulus for institutional change. These scholars examine decisions by the Russian government and Russian oil companies to alter economic policy through the negotiation of a new tax code. The authors argue that the impetus for the change was the August 1998 economic shock, which revealed to both actors the financial vulnerabilities of the government as well as the oil companies. Shared perceptions of vulnerability were key in stimulating the change; however, these perceptions were “contingent upon both sets of actors feeling equally vulnerable to the effects of the crisis and recognizing that they depended on one another to recover from the crisis” (Luong and Weinthal 2004, 145). Although this example of exogenous shocks and their effects on institutional change focuses solely on an economic crisis and economic policy, it nevertheless demonstrates how established
institutions and structures can be altered by changes in the external environment. Also, shared perceptions alone were insufficient to bring about the change in policy, strengthening Kanter's requirement of “action vehicles.”

Donahue and O'Leary (2012) attempt to determine whether the presence of shocks can affect organizational change. They examine three devastating accidents of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), each of which resulted in the death of the crewmembers, and review subsequent changes within the organization. Although many technical and procedural changes occurred following the tragedies, they discovered that certain obstacles were embedded within the organization that made change difficult. NASA operates within a complex environment (external authorities, the media, demands by interest groups) that affect what the agency can and cannot do. This research may suggest that change in an organization – even one as small as a decision unit (group) – may not be sustained. Things may go back to the way they were prior to the introduction of the impetus for the change. Donahue and O'Leary posit that “change imposed from the outside after a shock is likely to be opposed on the inside of an organization” – i.e., pressure exerted by those outside of the organization to change will likely be resisted by the organization itself. Moreover, Donahue and O'Leary argue that internal acceptance is critical in establishing permanent change. “The greater the acceptance of the need to change by members at all levels of an organization...the greater the likelihood of sustained change after a shock. Sustainable change cannot be driven solely from the top (Donahue and O'Leary 2012, 423). The authors suggest that future research should examine how the environment of an
organization affects or does not affect change within those organizations after a shock.

Karen Rasler (2000) examines the effects of internal and external political shocks in the case of Palestinian-Israeli de-escalation of protracted conflict. She asserts that while political shocks alone do not always affect change in the expectations or strategies of Palestinian and Israeli leadership, they can combine with other key variables to improve the frequency of agreements in the long term. Moreover, she finds that shocks, combined with entrepreneurship, “reduced major institutional constraints” and helped lead to the initial settlement in the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Rasler (2000, 702) maintains that shocks “are transitional situations that can instigate a major period of change in adversarial relations by altering key expectancies.” She goes on to say that “[s]ince shocks are not always certain to alter expectancies, the extent to which they do so ultimately depends on how actors perceive them” (702). Thus, Rasler views changes in leadership as internal or endogenous shocks. “Critical events (or potentially significant transforming events) can be policy windows that allow proponents of change to assert their political leadership by advancing new alternatives to old problems” (Rasler 2000, 703). It is perhaps under these types of conditions that individuals within a decision unit would be most likely to alter their positions and affect group dynamics.

Allison Astorino-Courtois’ (1998, 733) study of the effects of situation versus personality on foreign policy decision-making reveals that the relevant importance
of each of these factors is a “function of the structural constraints imposed by the policy decision environment.” Examining the 1970 Jordanian Civil War decision process, Astorino-Courtois applies an analytic framework first used by Zeev Maoz (1990) that considers the focal actor (initiator or target of the action), whether the nature of the decision situation is conflictual or cooperative, the severity of the consequences of the decision, and the time available for action (Astorino-Courtois 1998). The author holds personalities and perceptions constant under varied decision types and structures. The study consisted of ten key political decisions involving four governments or actors: Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel, and Syria. The results of Astorino-Courtois’ research demonstrates that decision-makers’ preferences seem to be more relevant in a fluid decision environment, where there are less constraints on the decision structure. In general terms, the personalities, perceptions, preferences, and leadership styles of decision-makers become more relevant in explaining decision outcomes in fluid settings. The study suggests, then, that the decisional unit, including the number of members involved as well as their personal preferences, matters in the decision-making process during crisis situations, where the environment is fluid, less constrained, and uncertain.

Decisional Units and the Decision Units Framework

The basic premise of my study is that foreign policy decisions are significantly influenced by the dynamics and structure of those involved in the
decision-making process. Whether the decisional unit includes one individual or many, how the unit is configured, the positions of the actors within the unit, and the perceptions of those actors affect foreign policy outcomes. The DU framework provides a vehicle by which to examine and assess the decision-making process. Ryan Beasley et al. (2001) assert that DU framework is not intended to be a general explanation of foreign policy but an explanation of foreign policy decision-making at the point of choice. Essentially, the framework is “intended to aid in understanding how foreign policy decisions are made by those with the authority to commit the government to a particular action or set of actions when faced with an occasion for decision” (Beasley et al. 2001, 232). To reiterate, the three types of authoritative decision units in the framework are the predominant leader, single group, and coalition.

Patrick Haney (1994) notes that research on crisis management “has demonstrated that as a crisis emerges and builds, the size of the ‘ultimate decision unit’ tends to shrink in size and grow in importance” (941). This might seem to imply that many of the decision units involved in my study would take the form of predominant leader. Since decisions – including the actions and policies that are derived thereof – often become path dependent and help determine subsequent decisions, identifying each decision unit can facilitate our understanding of the foreign policy-making process. Simply stated, each decision made and action taken along the policy path has consequences and implications for the outcome. The process outcome will either achieve the desired result or the desired goals, or it will cause decision-makers to reassess the policy.
Theoretical approaches to leadership – when it involves a single predominant actor – tend to lend themselves to dichotomous categorizations. For instance, are certain leaders “born to lead” or do circumstances offer opportunities and leaders rise to the challenges? John Stoessinger (1979, xvi-xvii) suggests that leaders are “movers” rather than mere players and can be categorized according to their personalities: crusaders and pragmatists. “Crusaders” are the leaders whose foreign policy decisions are guided by a preconceived worldview. “Pragmatists,” on the other hand, are leaders who make foreign policy decisions based on evidence and practicality. Other dichotomous classifications include “ideologue vs. opportunist, directive vs. consultative, task-oriented vs. relations-oriented, and transformational vs. transactional” (M. Hermann et al. 2001, 86). M Hermann et al. further maintain that each of these classifications can be grouped into two general categories. Crusaders, ideologues, those who are directive, task-oriented, or transformational are classified as “goal-driven leaders.” That is, the foreign policy of these leaders is shaped by previously held beliefs, attitudes, motives, and passions. Goal-driven leaders often surround themselves with like-minded individuals, attempt to shape institutional norms, and are less open to alternative views (M. Hermann et al. 2001, 87). M. Hermann et al. classify pragmatists, opportunists, and those who are consultative, relations-oriented, or transactional as “contextually responsive” and who seem to be constrained by the domestic environment. These leaders are more risk averse and interested in “consensus-building and multilateral approaches to foreign policy” (M. Hermann et al. 2001, 88).
The literature on group decision-making suggests that there is generally a formal set of procedures for the processing of information, the management of options, and resolving disagreements within the group (C. Hermann et al 2001; Janis 1972; Kuperman 2006; Maoz and Astorino 1992; Vertzberger 1990). The DU framework developed by Hermann (2001) focuses on the management of options within group decision-making and, in particular, the role that conflict among the members of the group plays in the process (Hermann 2001; C. Hermann et al 2001).

As noted previously, Allison and Zelikow (1999) develop two organizational decision-making models. In the organizational process model, they explain the decision-making process of government leaders by analyzing the behavior and communications of the actors involved in the Cuban missile crisis. Their analysis challenges previously held assumptions regarding foreign policy decisions and the process from which those decisions are derived. Allison and Zelikow employ a multiperspectivist approach (Stern 2004), which consists of identifying several alternative decision-making (or policy-making) models from the literature and then consider how well each “illuminates and accounts for a given empirical case” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 106). Government leaders must also be able to assess other governments’ motives, intentions, and possible responses to any actions taken. It is not enough simply to detect potential threatening situations; policymakers must make determinations as to the possible or probable intentions of adversaries.

The bureaucratic politics model, also referred to as the governmental
politics model of decision-making, is “concerned with features of internal politics of a government that might produce decision” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 183). Simply stated, multiple agencies or officials inside the government engage in bargaining and compromise in order to reach a policy decision. Allison and Zelikow maintain, for example, that executive decision-making is constrained by the amalgamation of competing organizations that seek to advance interests of their own. The information each unit provides is presented in such a way as to maximize that agency’s particular interests. Problem representation – whose voices are heard and who defines the problem – facilitates the decision process where alternatives are presented, goals are defined, and solutions are considered (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 2011). During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay argued that a military strike was essential for eliminating the problem. His suggested alternative would have given his organization – the military – a prominent position in the decision-making process, rendering it a key actor in the implementation of the policy during the crisis (Allison and Zelikow 1999).

A seminal approach pertaining to single group interaction is Irving Janis’ (1972) work on groupthink. Based on social psychology theories, ”[g]roupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures”(Janis 1972, 9). In Victims of Groupthink, Janis explains that cohesive groups engage in concurrence-seeking behavior, which may result in inappropriate decisions or responses to crisis situations. Concurrence-seeking behavior may also result in ”incredibly gross miscalculations about both the practical and moral consequences of their decisions” (Janis 1972, iv). Janis claims,
however, that this may not necessarily be the case. Groupthink can produce successful results (although the case studies Janis uses in his study, as well as the title of his work, suggests that groupthink in and of itself is negatively connotated). Cohesive groups – particularly, small groups – may be like-minded or have a “hidden agenda” that may influence decision-making alternatives. As with his caveat of the occasional success resulting from groupthink, Janis admits that other causes are likely to effect “bad” policy decisions. Janis simply seeks to determine the conditions under which bad policy decisions are likely to be made by small group decision-making units.

In *Groupthink in Government*, Paul ‘t Hart (1990, 282) expands on Janis’ concept of groupthink and attempts to "move groupthink from its present unwarranted popularity resulting in vulgarized applications and quick-and-easy analyses, to the status it deserves, namely to a conceptually and empirically well-founded, contextually sound, and cautiously used explanatory framework." ‘t Hart suggests three paths that lead to excessive concurrence-seeking: cohesiveness, de-individuation, and anticipatory compliance. He further adds to Janis’ concept by identifying two outcome scenarios of groupthink: collective avoidance and collective over-optimism. Unlike Janis, ‘t Hart maintains that conflict is a natural condition that precedes analysis of alternatives by the group. One of his case studies – Reagan and the arms-for-hostages deal – examines contextual factors and preconditions, process dynamics, and decision outcomes.
Grounded in the groupthink literature, Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow (2002) examine the influence of three types of process factors on outcomes resulting from group decision-making. They investigate situational factors, such as time constraint or stress level, factors relating to the structure of the group, and factors pertaining to information processing. Their findings suggest that situation variables have little influence in terms of affecting outcomes and quality of information processing. However, the results of their quantitative analysis indicate that both group structure and information processing have a significant effect on outcomes relating to national interest and level of international conflict.

One example of group decision-making is illustrated in Patrick Haney’s (1994) work on advisory groups. He examines the construct of advisory groups in three separate crises during the Nixon administration. “Previous research has shown that Nixon utilized a formalistic approach to structure both domestic and foreign policymaking (George 1980; Hess 1988; Johnson 1974). Furthermore, George (1980) notes that the Nixon model included a broad strategy for overcoming the potentially distorting effects of a hierarchically organized foreign policymaking bureaucracy: a “formal options” system. The purpose of this system was to center decision making at the top, and yet to insure that policy options got to the top (George 1980, 177). A variety of interdepartmental committees was created in the National Security Council and chaired by Henry Kissinger. One of these groups was the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), whose responsibilities included crisis management” (Haney 1994, 942-943). “We know little about how the onset of a crisis may have conditioned or affected the Nixon advisory structure and strategy”
Haney employs a case survey methodology. He examines previous case studies as data and extracts information using a schedule of questions for each case. Through one set of questions, he examines the nature of the advisory structure established by the president: formalistic competitive, collegial, or a hybrid of these types. These advisory structures are distinctly different from the decision unit structure developed by Hermann (2001). Another set of questions addresses the nature of the decision-making process: how the advisory group, including the president, performed the task of decision-making.

Haney maintains that the evidence from the crises indicates that the group size reduced as the crises unfolded and eventually centered on Nixon and Kissinger. Haney does not differentiate between Nixon and Kissinger as individuals per se, except to note that Kissinger was “‘filling-in’ where presidential leadership would normally have been expected” (Haney 1994, 953). As to possible dynamics within the advisory group that may have affected decisions made during the crisis, Haney (1994, 953) only mentions conceptual “baggage” with which the group had to contend that “clouded its ability to assimilate new and discrepant information.”

While Haney makes general assessments on group decision-making, the DU framework will allow me to compartmentalize the key decisions made during the 1973 crisis and specify the decisional unit. In addition, I will be able to determine whether there were changes in that unit and perhaps discover why those changes occurred.
Foreign policy decision-making by coalition is the third category in the DU framework. A decision unit is considered a coalition if the setting is fragmented and centers on the “willingness and ability of multiple, politically autonomous actors to achieve agreement to enact policy” (Hagan et al. 2001, 169). Coalition decision-making is commonly found in parliamentary democracies with multiparty cabinets, in presidential democracies where the legislative and executive branches are in opposition, in authoritarian regimes where power is distributed among different factions or institutions, and where bureaucrats obtain authority by dealing collectively on major policy issues. In a coalition decision unit, the identities of the members rest with constituents, not the group. Essentially, while no single actor may enact a policy directive, any one member of the coalition can block or prohibit the initiatives of the other members. Such actions include the use of a presidential veto, threats of termination of the coalition, or “withholding the resources necessary for action or the approval needed for their use” (Hagan et al. 2001, 170).

Constituents can also influence members of the decision unit. Members of the coalition must not only negotiate with other members of the decision group but also are committed to representing the interests or values of those they represent. This feature of the process is known as the “two-level game” (Putnam 1988). Echoing Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s (2002) findings, the internal environment of the state necessarily affects the interests of the coalition members and, hence, foreign policy outcomes.
Generally missing from the coalition literature is a focus on the decision-making process and its influence on policy outcomes (Kaarbo 2008). Juliet Kaarbo posits that the lack of research on coalitions and foreign policy outcomes may be in part because coalitions can dissolve due to disagreements. Of the literature on coalitions and international conflict, the results have been mixed. Brandon Prins and Christopher Sprecher (1999) find that Western parliamentary democracies are rarely involved in military disputes and are rarely the aggressor. Additionally, when parliamentary democracies are the targets of aggression, they are more likely to reciprocate if a coalition government is in power rather than a single-party government. Conversely, Dan Reiter and Erik Tillman (2002) find that there is no difference between coalition cabinets and single-party governments when it comes to military reciprocation. These studies are quantitative in nature, and neither investigates beyond conflict initiation and response. However, they do suggest that further research could tease out other factors that influence coalition government behavior.

The following chapter presents the research design and hypotheses. Chapter Three also provides an explanation for the variables used in the study.
Notes: Chapter Two

1 The size of the decisional unit is a variable available in the ICB dataset. According the ICB codebook, the "decisional unit is not necessarily the formal body designated by a crisis actor's regime to make choices, but rather that body which actually formulates the major response to the crisis trigger. The term 'decision maker' refers to political leaders, not bureaucrats or military officers, or any other advisors." Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2010, "International Crisis Behavior Project," University of Maryland.

2 The category "other" is not specified, but is explained as "other variations on the normal policy process" (Trumbore and Boyer 2000, 686).
Chapter Three

Research Design and Hypotheses

Research Design

My research incorporates two main components of foreign policy behavior: (1) the decisional units involved in the decision-making process; and (2) specific conditions under which decisions are made. The first component of the research design draws from certain concepts regarding foreign policy behavior and decision-making. First is the notion that people make decisions and, therefore, individual leaders matter. Second, that within most governments exist rules and norms that help determine the decision process, including which actor or group of actors has the authority to commit the state’s resources. The DU framework provides a set of guidelines that helps analysts identify the type of unit involved in particular decisions. In addition to directing the analyst to the type of decision unit, the framework stipulates that consideration should be given as to the nature of the unit; that is, whether the decision unit is formally or informally structured. Formal structures are guided by established rules and are assumed to be more rigid. Informal structures are guided by culture, norms, and traditions. Drawing on theories of institutional change, a formal or institutionalized decision unit structure might be more difficult to change (North 1990; Pierson 2004; Skocpol 1979). Given the nature of the structure, therefore, the research design takes into consideration specific variables that might affect changes in such units.
Research Design and Hypotheses

The second component of the study involves foreign policy decisions that are made under specific conditions: crisis and crisis transition. The selection of crisis decision-making is two-fold. First, since the literature suggests that the number of actors involved in the foreign policy decision process tends to shrink as the level of threat or as the interest of decision-makers increases (Haney 1994; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann 2001), the ability to assess decision unit dynamics becomes more feasible. Given the atypical nature of crises, there is likely to be a large amount of information available, both primary and secondary material (e.g., biographical accounts, minutes of meetings and telephone conversations, correspondence, press conferences/briefings, and Congressional records). Second, crisis decision-making is made at the highest levels of government, making it easier to identify individual unit members and goals. The disadvantage is that the process tends to take place in secret. As such, much of the necessary documents are classified and inaccessible. Although some of the primary sources have yet to be released, particularly in the Israeli case, a considerable amount of historical and biographical accounts have been published.

The transition from hostilities to non-crisis conditions is the second phase of the study. As history has shown, cease-fire agreements do not always signify an end to the conflict, but rather provide an immediate reduction in tensions with a perhaps cautious transition to a more stable, yet still threatening, environment (Fortna 2004). This was certainly the case following the Yom Kippur War. Each side in the conflict accused the other of violating the cease-fire, after an agreement had
supposedly been reached. Even after the participants stopped firing and tensions eased, there was still the issue of military disengagement.

Tensions also persisted in other areas of the region. The Nixon administration continued to negotiate for an end to the oil embargo, which was a result of U.S. assistance to Israel during the war and critical to the U.S. economy. Additionally, the administration was concerned about the increasing possibility of renewed hostilities (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). This does not by itself indicate that the crisis persisted; however, it speaks to the perceptions of the leadership that a termination of negotiations or some other setback could result in renewed fighting. The point here is that while the intensity of the crisis may have subsided, decision-makers recognized the implications of failing to reach some sort of settlement that would appease those concerned and limit the possibility of another war. From an analytical perspective, I argue that the crisis (or at least the “problem”) was not sufficiently resolved to prevent a recurrence and, therefore, warrants an examination of the decision units involved in the continued negotiations.

In my study, the time period following the end of the war until the conclusion of the Sinai II Agreement (military disengagement) is referred to as the transition phase. In comparing a sequence of decisions, the DU framework provides a fairly systematic way to identify and categorize decisional units and policy outcomes. Hermann (2001) asserts that the type of decision unit and its key contingencies affect the type of decision process in which policymakers engage (see Table 1.1) and
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this, in turn, shapes the outcome. The framework itself was designed to examine one process outcome based on one occasion for decision, although the structure is such that presumably one could apply the framework to a series of occasions and decisions. Beasley et al. (2001) suggest that an elaboration of the DU framework is possible by examining the circumstances under which prior decisions are reconsidered or continued.

Reconsideration consists of the reexamination of a prior decision or of the problem itself, while continuation involves the decision unit’s recognition that the problem is ongoing and will require a series of decisions. The authors’ definition of a reconsideration of a problem implies that there is a time lapse between decisions and, perhaps, the emergence of a different set of actors. Alternatively, the continuation of a problem implies that once the decision unit has been established, it will remain constant for the duration of the decision process. Given the fluid nature of crises and the multiple decisions that must be undertaken, I argue that it is possible for different types of decision units to emerge from separate occasions for decision, even if each occasion relates to the same problem. Simply stated, not all members of the unit or the actors involved in the initial decision process need participate in subsequent decision-making.

The framework indicates that one occasion for decision initiates a series of decisions and culminates in a policy outcome. While this is true in a very practical sense, issues emerge when there is a decided change in the actors involved in the process before the problem is resolved. In addition, the definition of “problem” itself
can be problematic. In the case of the 1973 war, the basic problem was the threat of force mobilization at the Israeli border. After hostilities began, the problem facing Israel was no longer what Israeli decision-makers should do about the impending attack. Not surprisingly, additional problems emerged within the overarching crisis. Should Israel use nuclear weapons? Should Israel go on the counter-offensive? Should Israel call for a Security Council meeting? Will they give up territory if they lose the war? Should they give up territory for peace?

Similarly, the United States faced multiple decisions and reformulated short-term goals as the crisis developed. An immediate goal for the U.S. was to get the fighting stopped. Although U.S. decision-makers had long-term strategic goals regarding the Middle East, Kissinger recognized that it was necessary to deal with one “problem” at a time. Therefore, identifying the “problem” as can be derived from one occasion for decision does not always reflect the numerous decisions that are made throughout the crisis.

According to the steps in the framework, a “problem” arises, the decision unit emerges, and a process outcome (policy or action) results. This works ideally when applied to one significant or finite decision and the decision process is not complicated by extraneous issues. One assumption emanating from this ideal would seem to be that the structure or type of decision unit does not change for the duration of the immediate problem. The question then becomes, how does a government address and respond to a series of associated problems inherently embedded within a bigger problem? Do the same types of decision units (or the
same decision-makers, for that matter) address all problems during a crisis situation? In short, problem identification, problem definition and short-term goals become critical factors in determining how the decision process unfolds.

Problem identification can be viewed as the *occasion for decision* noted in the framework. Through government or intelligence reports, meetings, and correspondence, policymakers recognize that a problem needs to be addressed. Once policymakers recognize (or perceive) that a problem exists, the type of decision unit emerges. As the dynamics of the decision unit begin to be revealed, the analyst learns whose positions are considered and who is framing the issue. Thus, problem definition is an underlying part of the step in the framework where the decision unit emerges. Also discernible in this step are the short-term goals of the individual member(s) of the unit.

From a practical perspective, it is not feasible to identify all problems, decisions, and decision-makers involved in a crisis (and, in my study, the crisis transition). However, identifying *key* decisions made by high-level policymakers is more than possible and is of particular interest to foreign policy analysis. These decisions are those that, once implemented, are difficult or unlikely to be reversed. The implementation process of such decisions is not considered in this study.

In addition to the notion of *associated* problems, there is the reality that policymakers must deal with multiple *unrelated* problems or crises. This was certainly the case for the United States during the time of the Yom Kippur War. President Nixon was embroiled in the Watergate scandal, concerned about the
developing relations with China, and was distracted by ongoing problems in Southeast Asia and Latin America. These or other unrelated problems are considered in this study as shocks to the environment.

**Identifying Shocks and Feedback**

The inclusion of the effects of endogenous or exogenous shocks speaks to the fact that multiple crises (domestic and international) can and do occur simultaneously (Kanter 1983). This study does not intend to thoroughly examine multiple crises or the decision units that emerged from each, but rather the purpose of their inclusion is to ascertain whether other parallel events (i.e., shocks) might affect the dynamics of the actor or actors involved in the decisions made pertaining to my case study: the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath. Although the inclusion of external and internal shocks in the study might contribute in part to the understanding of how multiple crises are managed, any effects noted pertain primarily to the structure of decision units.

Borrowing from Rasler’s design, (2000, 704) one can identify shocks as: (1) “the emergence of external threats from a new actor(s) that downgrade the threats posed by old adversaries; (2) changes in domestic political leaderships and/or institutions that either increase the perception of value and goal compatibility or alter preference structures that emphasize the management of domestic problems; (3) significant decreases in the availability of economic resources that are perceived as current or impending; and (4) catalytic events that cause adversaries to reconsider their assumptions about their rivals or changes their ability to compete.
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with them.” The advantage of using shocks as a variable in this study is that they tend to be high profile, public events and, thus, fairly easy to recognize. A potential difficulty in assessing shocks pertains specifically to decision-makers’ perceptions. Unless the events are included in the debates and discussions of the relevant decision unit(s), the effects of such events on the unit would have to be assumed rather than substantiated. In other words, there would be inconclusive evidence to support or reject my hypotheses regarding shocks and decision unit dynamics.

While shocks might be easier to identify, it can be more difficult to recognize feedback. As noted in Chapter One, feedback, in verbal or physical (military) form, can be positive or negative, real or perceived, and is monitored through various channels. For policymakers, the decision process can be particularly challenging in an environment where multiple decisions must be made under time constraints and conditions of uncertainty, and feedback might not always reach policymakers before the next decision is made. The inclusion of feedback as a variable in this study is based on the literature that suggests that institutional structures can be reinforced or altered by particular kinds of feedback (North 1990; Peters, Pierre, and King 2005; Pierson 2004; Thelen 2004).

Hypotheses

The hypotheses in this study pertain to the potential changes in the type or nature of the decision unit under a specific set of conditions in a sequential decision-making process. Specifically, they relate to how new occasions for decisions that
result from feedback (perceived or actual), internal shocks, or external shocks affect the decision units in a series or sequence of decisions made during a crisis and its immediate aftermath: the transition period. As stated previously, the three types of decision units, derived from the DU framework, are the predominant leader, single group, and coalition.

Conditions favoring a predominant leader, where the leader is likely to take charge and exercise authority, include instances of high-level diplomacy, instances in which the leader has a high personal interest, and crisis situations (Hermann 2001). The international crisis literature indicates that there is a contraction of authority during situations that are critical to regime stability or survival or during international crisis events. This suggests that the decision units that emerge during crises would most likely fall under the ‘predominant leader’ or ‘single group’ category.¹ Hermann (2001) asserts that the authoritative decision-maker will exercise his or her authority and become involved in crisis decision-making, even if he or she is not generally involved in foreign policy issues.² I argue that during crisis events, the decision unit will likely take the form of predominant leader or single group and will maintain the same structure throughout the crisis period. Hypotheses #1 and #2 are based on the propositions stated above.

\[H_1: \text{During sequential crisis decision-making, the nature and type of decision unit will remain constant throughout the duration of the crisis.}\]
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$H_2$: During sequential crisis decision-making, the decision unit will likely take the form of predominant leader or single group.

Hypotheses #3 through #5 pertain to the effects of policy feedback and shocks to the environment, respectively. The hypotheses illustrate that negative feedback is more likely to affect change. Hypothesis #3 reflects the notion that positive feedback tends to generate path dependence. As noted in the literature review, research on policy feedback suggests that positive feedback reinforces organizational or institutional structures and policy choices, maintaining previously established entities and ensuring the persistence of a particular course of action (North 1990; Pierson 2004). Paul Pierson explains that path dependence can also be a result of certain actors in positions of authority imposing self-reinforcing rules on others. Such an actor can effectively “change the rules of the game” (Pierson 2004, 36), for both formal institutions as well as informal public policies, in order to shift the rules in his or her favor or to increase the capacity for political action while diminishing that of his or her rivals.

Hypotheses #4 and #5 address the potential effects of negative feedback. Given the concepts of positive feedback and path dependence, I hypothesize, on the one hand, that affirmation of a policy action in the form of positive feedback received during a crisis period, whether actual or perceived, will reinforce the decision unit dynamic; while negative feedback has the potential to alter decision unit dynamics. It does not necessarily challenge the existing order or policy. Under
time constraints and uncertainty, however, negative feedback could have a greater influence on the decision process. In addition, based on the assertion that crises tend to minimize disagreements within a unit or group, I argue that changes in the decision unit will more likely occur due to negative feedback only after the cessation of hostilities or during the transition period.

\textit{H3:} Positive feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy action will not likely alter the nature or type of decision unit of a given government.

\textit{H4:} Negative feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy action will not likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a government under crisis conditions.

\textit{H5:} Negative feedback from a foreign policy decision or policy action will likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a government during the transition period from a crisis to non-crisis.

Hypotheses #6 and #7 are meant to test the effects of internal and external shocks to the decision-making environment. Internal shocks can include but are not
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limited to national elections, a change in leadership (whether or not the change was the result of elections or some other event), a constitutional crisis, economic shocks, natural disasters, or civil conflict. For my purposes, external shocks may include but are not limited to, imposing embargoes, the ceasing of diplomatic ties, a sudden change in the international market (perhaps resulting from droughts, floods, or pestilence) or a significant natural disaster. These shocks, external and internal, may be associated with the crisis at hand, such as the Soviet and U.S decisions in October 1973 to place their militaries on heightened alert, or can fall completely outside the scope of the crisis (i.e., the Watergate scandal and President Nixon’s subsequent resignation).

\( H_6: \) Internal (domestic) shocks likely will alter the nature or type of decision unit under both crisis conditions and during the transition period from crisis to non-crisis.

\( H_7: \) External shocks likely will alter the nature or type of decision unit under crisis conditions and during the transition period from crisis to non-crisis.

An alternative hypothesis might test whether the initial structure and/or dynamics of a particular decision unit might affect the structure of subsequent units.
in sequential decision-making. According to the DU framework, different models of
group dynamics result in different policy outcomes. (See Table 3.1) For example, a
single group unit can consist of a concurrence model or a unanimity model. In a
cconcurrency model the members of the group find their primary identity within that
group and, therefore, will be more likely to choose a dominant solution. In a
unanimity model, members of the group have their primary identity elsewhere and,
thus, deadlocks or integrative solutions tend to be the result. A single group unit
whose members identify strongly with that group may inhibit the decision-making
process insofar as members will tend to avoid disagreement and to encourage
cconcurrence on decisions: groupthink (Janis 1972). In this scenario, the resulting
decision might be less than optimal, or alternative options may be dismissed or not
cconsidered.

The framework does not concern itself with the relationship between the
unit that emerges from the initial occasion for decision with subsequent decision
units addressing the same problem or issue. Each occasion for decision is treated as
a separate (or new) event, creating a new unit. This might be due to the fact the
framework assumes that some period of time will lapse before the problem recurs
or reemerges. These concerns and the potential for the decision unit to affect
subsequent units, however, can be potentially addressed under Hypothesis #1. If
Hypothesis #1 is true, and the decision unit remains unchanged, then the implied
assumption of the framework – that one decision unit will emerge and remain as
such until the problem is resolved – would appear to be valid. If it proves to be false,
### TABLE 3.1 Characteristics and Implications of Process Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range of Preferences Represented in Decision</th>
<th>Distribution of Payoffs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Party's Concurrence</td>
<td>One Party’s Position Prevails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(All own decision; see decision as final; move to other problems)</td>
<td>(Only one party owns decision; others monitor resulting action; push for reconsideration if feedback is negative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Parties' Mutual Compromise/Consensus</td>
<td>Lopsided Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Members know got all possible at moment; monitor for change in political context; seek to return to decision if think can change outcome in their favor)</td>
<td>(Some members own position, others do not; latter monitor resulting action and political context, agitating for reconsideration of decision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party's Deadlock</td>
<td>Fragmented Symbolic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Members know no one did better than others; seek to redefine the problem so solution or trade-offs are feasible)</td>
<td>(No members own decision; seek to change the political context in order to reconstitute decision unit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


then Hypotheses #3 through #7 could indicate why there was a change in the decision unit.

At issue, however, is whether the variables included in this study act independent of or in coordination with one another. Do the dynamics of the decision
unit, which potentially inhibit the decision process, determine the structure of subsequent decision units? Or does negative feedback influence successive units, to the extent that it creates friction or fragmentation within the decision unit?

Institutional structure, rules, and norms must also play a role in the construction of the decision unit. But, given crisis conditions, those rules and norms might be treated as flexible or fluid in order to deal with an untenable situation (Astorino-Courtois 1998). It is quite possible, and even likely, that two or more of these variables work together to act upon subsequent unit structures.

**Summary**

My research design is intended to isolate decisions made under crisis conditions and during the crisis transitional period, enabling me to identify the actor or actors that make up the decision units involved in the decision process. The transitional period is identified as the time between the traditionally recognized end of the crisis (cease-fire agreement) and the conclusion of a military disengagement agreement. The disengagement agreement is viewed as an indicator that the immediate crisis is indeed over and the potential for future hostilities is minimized.

A considerable amount of research has been published on the subject matter chosen for my study, including military analyses, intelligence studies, and decision-making in both the United States and Israel. It is important, therefore, to differentiate between what those studies provide and what this research attempts to do. Some of the studies focus on individuals and their leadership style or
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personality (Ambrose 1991; Benedikt 2005; Braun 1992; Dallek 2007; Haney 1994; Inbar 1999; Isaacson 1992; Kohl 1975; Martin 1988; Steinberg 2008; Thornton 2001), while others assess the war, its aftermath and effects (Allen 1982; Dunston 2007; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2004; Zeira 1993). Like my study, some of the research delves into the decision-making process conducted during the war (Astorino-Courtois 1995; Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008; Brecher 1980; Brownstein 1977; Dowty 1984; Haney 1984; Maghroori 1981; Maoz and Astorino 1992; Quandt 1977). Most of the research on decision-making concludes their analysis with the end of the war. Brecher’s (1980) study extends beyond the war to the post-crisis period, but ends with the signing of the first disengagement agreement on January 18, 1974. My study goes beyond the cessation of hostilities, the presumed end of the crisis, and concludes with the signing of the second disengagement settlement, the Sinai II Agreement. Furthermore, Brecher’s study compares the perceptions and attitudes of Israeli decision-makers in the 1967 Six Day War with those in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. While his study looks at particular decisions, my research applies a specific framework by which to compare decision units not only within governments but also between governments.

Of the studies mentioned above regarding decision-making, only one was published later than 1995. Therefore, in addition to the extended examination of the crisis and transition period, my study includes recently declassified documents of meetings, conversations, and correspondence. And, as Graham Allison (1969, 689) maintains, “[i]mproved understanding of...[crises] depends in part on more information and more probing analyses of available evidence.” The inclusion of
additional information on the decision processes, bridging the time period between crisis and non-crisis, and examining how the authoritative decision unit(s) might change during that time are what distinguish my study from previous research.

Chapter Four presents a brief background regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship between the United States and Israel. It is not intended to be a comprehensive historical account, but rather strives to put the Yom Kippur War in its historical context and provide the reader with some foundational knowledge of U.S.-Israeli relations.
Notes: Chapter Three

1 Although Israel’s parliamentary system encourages cooperation and compromise between political adversaries and tends to require coalitions to make policy decisions, foreign policy decisions are generally made within the Office of the Prime Minister and, under crisis conditions, are likely to be made by a small, elite group of actors. The decision unit may be classified as a coalition, however, if any one of the members of the decision group may withhold the resources of the state – essentially, veto any decision made.

2 For example, Franco of Spain was qualified to act as a ‘predominant leader’ yet had little interest in foreign affairs and left much of Spain’s foreign policymaking to his foreign and economic ministers (M. Hermann et al 2001).
Chapter Four

Contemporary Israel – A Brief History

A note on historical sourcing: For the general chronology of events, I utilized Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. The Archives strives to provide accurate and objective articles on a variety of world events. I consulted other sources as well, which are cited where appropriate.

The War of Independence and Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1948

The birth of the modern state of Israel in the mid-twentieth century came after nearly three decades of British occupation in the land of Palestine. In 1922 the League of Nations agreed to grant Great Britain administrative control over the territory, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire. According to the mandate, the League of Nations favored the establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for the Jewish people1 with the stipulation that “nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities” currently residing in the territory (League of Nations). During the mandate period, the British forces endured an Arab revolt by Palestinian Arabs, a Jewish insurgency conducted by Jewish underground groups, and, in the last two years of its administration, a civil war between the Arabs and the Jews. The British mandate lasted from 1920 until Jewish leaders proclaimed Israel’s independence in May 1948 (Keesing’s 1922, 1948).
Although formally holding an administrative position over Palestine until 1948, Great Britain transferred its responsibilities for Palestine to the United Nations in February 1947. In November 1947 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181(II), approving the implementation of a partition of Palestine into two separate states, one Arab and one Jewish. As illustrated in the map in Figure 4.1, the proposed plan would create two disjointed states whose borders were not contiguous. While Zionist leaders were resolute in their determination to have an independent state, Arab leaders were adamantly opposed to a Jewish state in Palestine (Sachar 2009). In response, the Arab League – members of which included Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen – met in Cairo the following month and formally rejected the partition plan. In addition, the members decided to “enter battle against” the plan and take “decisive measures” to prevent such a partition (Keesing’s 1948).

By April 1948 the internal situation in Palestine had deteriorated markedly. Palestinians conducted numerous attacks on Jewish settlements and offices (Sachar 2010). The Jewish paramilitary organization, Haganah, led multiple attacks on Arab-run hotels, while other Jewish groups attacked Arab villages, buses, and markets. Palestine’s Arab neighbors sent a coalition of troops, the Arab Liberation Army, to assist the Palestinians against the Jewish community. However, disputes surrounding the Arab leadership fractured the coalition army. In addition, most of the Palestinians residing in the combat zones had fled or were driven out. The result was a crushing Palestinian defeat (Morris 2008; Sachar 2010).
On May 14, 1948, following the successes of the Haganah, Israel proclaimed its independence in Tel Aviv. The proclamation officially marked the end of the British Mandate. Later the same day the United States issued a public statement that recognized the provisional Jewish government as the *de facto* authority of the state of

**Figure 4.1 United Nations Proposed Partition Plan, 1947**

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Israel: A Brief History

Israel. Howard Sachar (2009) and Nadav Safran (1963) maintain Truman was reluctant to recognize the new state. However, over the objections of some members of his administration, he originally instructed the Department of State to support the partition plan (Davidson 2001; Karp 2004; Weir 2014). The following day, May 15, the armed forces of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the newly established state of Israel (Keesing’s 1947, 1948; Sachar 2010; Safran 1978; Smith 2009).³

During what would be known as the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab armies bombed Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem witnessed heavy fighting. After an Arab assault on Jerusalem, the Old City was taken on May 28. After two weeks of hostilities, the Arab League and the Government of Israel accepted a temporary truce, which went into effect on June 11 (Keesing’s 1948; Sachar 2009). During the month-long truce, the Israeli military was reinforced with heavy equipment provided by the Europeans and Americans. With an improved defense system, Israel was able to repel renewed Egyptian and Syrian assaults. In addition, the Jewish air force went into action for the first time during the 1948 conflict.

Fighting continued until January 1949, when Israel withdrew its troops from the border town of Rafa (Sachar 2010). Despite armistice agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbors, a state of war continued to exist (Smith 2009). From 1948 up until 1956, heightened border tensions resulted in frequent clashes, particularly with Jordan.

The relationship between the governments of the United States and Israel during the War of Independence and the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict was one of cautious alliance. Elements within the Truman administration were adamantly against U.S.
support of the partition plan and establishment of a Zionist state, whereas the president favored a homeland for the Jews (Carp 2004; Christison 1998; Weir 2014). Numerous members of Truman’s cabinet were outraged when, hours after Israel proclaimed its independence, the president officially recognized the new state (Sachar 2009; Spiegel 1985; Weir 2014). Premised on the strategy of containment, America’s policy toward the Middle East following the 1948 war through the remainder of Truman’s time in office focused on stabilizing the region while aligning Israeli and Arab interests with those of the U.S. (Hahn 2004).

The 1956 Suez Crisis and Sinai Campaign

Between the summers of 1955 and 1956, the already tenuous relationship between Israel and Egypt steadily deteriorated. Palestinian fedayeen (militant groups later reorganized into the Palestine Liberation Organization), supported by the government of Egypt, were conducting raids on Israel, and Israeli forces retaliated by launching attacks on Gaza (Keesing’s 1955, 1956). Concerned about Egyptian military weakness, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser entered into an arms deal with the Soviet Union. Israel likewise sought to increase its military strength with supplies from France.

In September 1955 Nasser ordered the blockade of the Port of Eilat, effectively barring Israeli ships from passing (Keesing’s 1955; Sachar 2010; Smith 2009). Then, in July 1956, after the United States withdrew its financial support on the construction of the Aswan Dam project, Nasser announced Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal.
France and Great Britain had owned and operated the canal since 1869, and Nasser reassured them that they would be compensated. Although Nasser claimed that commercial traffic would not be affected, both countries were outraged and concerned over Egypt’s actions (Sachar 2009; Smith 2010). Great Britain filed a formal note of protest to Egypt and subsequently froze Egyptian Sterling accounts, both private and government-owned (Keesing’s 1956). The French government, as well as the American government, likewise took financial measures against Egypt, freezing assets of the Egyptian government and the Suez Canal Company.

Despite a Six-Point Agreement reached several weeks later by Britain, France, and Egypt, which stated, “there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination,” Israeli ships were still not permitted to pass (Keesing’s 1956). On October 29 Israel launched an all-out attack on Egypt. At the end of five days of fighting, Israel advanced to within ten miles of the Canal and controlled virtually the entire peninsula.

The Israeli government claimed that the objective of the raid, deemed Operation Kadesh, was political rather than tactical in nature, a strategy seemingly devised to force Great Britain and the United States to take measures. However, the United States accused Britain and France of colluding with Israel, helping to plan the invasion of the peninsula. As a result, the U.S. sided with the U.N. rather than with its NATO allies (Sachar 2010; Smith 2009) and called for an immediate cease-fire. The General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the United States proposed resolution (Resolution 997), which not only called for an immediate cessation of hostilities but also demanded
the withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Sinai. Additionally, the General Assembly passed Resolution 1000, establishing a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to secure and supervise the cease-fire, as well as to provide a buffer between the belligerent nations.

On the pretext of securing the canal, British and French paratroopers landed just outside Port Said on November 5 (Sachar 2010). After the introduction of British and French troops into the Sinai, the U.S. pressured its allies to accept the U.N. cease-fire resolution. The United Nations sent troops to the region on November 20, and, by the end of December, the last of the British and French troops left Port Said (Sachar 2010).

The introduction of the UNEF into the Sinai, however, required the consent of the Egyptian government. Before conveying his consent, Nasser wanted clear and precise terms as to the function of the UNEF, including where troops would be allowed to go and how long the force would stay. Nasser was assured that the United Nations would not infringe upon Egypt’s sovereignty, “detract from Egypt’s power freely to negotiate a settlement on the Suez Canal or submit Egypt to any control from the outside.” Moreover, the Secretary-General of the U.N. informed Nasser that the UNEF could not stay in Egypt if consent were withdrawn. A decade later, Egypt would formally withdraw her consent on the eve of the Six-Day War.

President Dwight Eisenhower’s policy toward Israel differed significantly from Truman. Unlike Truman’s “special relationship” with the newly established country (Alteras 1993), Eisenhower exerted heavy pressure on Israel during his administration. In 1953, for example, he employed economic pressure to compel Israel to stop the
diversion of water from the Jordan River. In regards to the Suez crisis and the Sinai campaign, he effectively forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula (Alteras 1993; Christison 1998; Hahn 2006; Saunders 2011). In essence, Eisenhower was determined to practice impartiality in regards to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Eisenhower’s balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict was intended to diminish America’s role as Israel’s ally and protector and to mitigate Soviet influence with the Arab states (Alteras 1993; Hahn 2006). While some Arab states favored the Eisenhower Doctrine, Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser demonstrated little gratitude for Eisenhower’s policies and frequently undermined U.S. interests. The president eventually came to appreciate Israel’s stability and military strength, and increased economic aid to that country (Alteras 1993; Hahn 2006; Saunders 2011).

The Six-Day War

In the months leading up the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt found itself faced with serious financial problems. America stopped sending wheat shipments, and loans from Western commercial banks and the International Monetary Fund dried up in response to Nasser’s refusal to abandon his quest for long-range missiles and reduce Egypt’s armed forces (Keesing’s 1967; Sachar 2009). Food shortages and rising unemployment threatened to weaken the Nasser regime. When the Soviet ambassador to Egypt erroneously informed Cairo on May 12 that the Israelis were amassing troops on the northern border for a surprise attack on Syria, Nasser was presented with an
opportunity. On May 15 the Egyptian president announced a state of military emergency, sending two armored divisions to the Sinai (Sachar 2009).

By May 17 Egypt and Syria were in a state of “combat readiness” with a strong military build-up along the Israeli borders with both countries. Jordan announced that its forces were mobilized and ready if the situation warranted. On May 19 the United Nations withdrew its UNEF from the Sinai and Gaza at the behest of Egypt’s President Nasser. Meanwhile, Israel began taking what it considered to “appropriate measures” in response to the Arab build-up (Keesing’s 1967, 22063).

May 22 saw the closure of the Straits of Tiran, sealing off the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. The closure effectively blocked the Israeli port of Eilat, Israel’s only outlet to the Red Sea and gateway to Africa and Asia (Keesing’s 1967; Sachar 2009). Eilat was also Israel’s primary oil port. The government of Israel stated that it would not wait indefinitely for an end to the blockade and responded with a complete mobilization of its forces (Sachar 2009). Washington’s reaction was a firm message that the U.S. would “regard any impingement of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran, whether under the Israeli flag or another, as an act of aggression, against which Israel, in the opinion of the United States, is justified in taking defensive measures” (Sachar 2009, 626).

In a speech given on May 26, Nasser claimed that if war came, “it will be total and the objective will be to destroy Israel.” Nasser went on to say that the Egyptian military was ready for war and that he was confident Egypt could win such a war against Israel. Israel responded with an official protest and appeals to France, the U.S., and the U.K. Nasser warned that if the West took any measures against Egypt, he would close the
Suez Canal. Because of the increasing probability that Egypt would be going to war, on May 29 the National Assembly conferred full powers on Nasser, enabling him to make decisions without their consultation (Keesing’s 1967).

Another significant regional development occurred prior to the onset of the 1967 war. On May 30 Jordan and Egypt signed a defense treaty whereby an attack on either nation would be an attack on both. On June 4 Iraq joined the Egypt-Jordan defense pact. The following day, June 5, Israel conducted a pre-emptive assault on Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, crippling the Egyptian air force in fewer than three hours. The air forces of Syria and Jordan fared no better against Israeli pilots. By the second day of the war, the entire Jordan air force was destroyed, Syria lost two-thirds of its combat air force, and Iraq lost nine fighter aircraft. Moreover, every Arab fighter that entered Israeli air space was shot down (Sachar 2009). In addition, the Israeli air force was able to eliminate enemy ground forces in the Sinai and played a major role in the defeat of Syrian and Jordanian armored divisions. It was one of the most rapid and dramatic military campaigns in modern history (Keesing’s 1967). After repeated calls by the U.N. for a cease-fire, hostilities came to an end on June 10. By the end of war, Israel had gained significant territorial ground.

The maps depicted in Figure 4.2 illustrate the extent of Israeli acquisition of enemy land. As a result of the superiority of the Israeli air force, Israel was able to capture all of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, gain possession of the entire city of Jerusalem (Old and New) from Jordan, and wrest control of the Golan Heights from Syria. Israel also captured the West Bank cities of Bethlehem, Hebron, Jericho, Nablus,
Ramallah, and Jenin. In all, the Jewish state was in possession of an area four times greater than the area of Israel before the war broke out (Keesing’s 1967).

The conclusion of the Six-Day War did not bring any peace agreements in the Middle East. Instead, for the three years following the war, Egypt engaged in a war of attrition with Israel. Moreover, in late August 1967 an Arab League Summit took place in Khartoum, Sudan. By the end of the Summit, eight Arab heads of state declared that there would be no peace with Israel.

Figure 4.2 Maps of Territory Held by Israel before and after the Six-Day War

United States policy toward the Middle East during the 1967 crisis was considerably different than the crisis that occurred during the Eisenhower
administration. Lyndon Johnson elevated America’s relationship with Israel long before the onset of the Six-Day War (Christison 1998). During the Suez Crisis under Eisenhower’s watch, Johnson persuaded the Democratic Policy Committee to voice its unanimous opposition to the threat of sanctions against Israel (Sachar 2009). As president, he accepted Israel’s program of diverting water from the Jordan River. He agreed to sell tanks and fighter aircraft to Israel and adamantly supported the Israeli position in the 1967 conflict. His support for Israel seemed so virtually unconditional that, according to Kathleen Christison (1998), Johnson did not appear overly concerned even after Israel attacked an American communications intercept ship, killing thirty-four American naval personnel. So amiable was the president’s attitude toward Israel that during Johnson’s administration, a number of Israelis and Israel supporters had easy access to the White House, including during the 1967 crisis (Christison 1998).

Howard Sachar (2009, 630) argues, however, that although Johnson’s stance was pro-Israel, his support was not unconditional. After Egypt implemented a blockade of the Straits of Tiran, for example, the president warned Foreign Minister Abba Eban that Israel must not take preemptive military action or it would have to “go it alone.” Johnson remained publicly silent on his support for Israel during the war, and instead tried to present a united front along with the Soviets on calling for an immediate ceasefire. In reality, the war was brief enough and the Israeli military so successful that the president did not find it necessary to openly voice his support for Israel. Despite Johnson’s warning to the foreign minister against preemption, there were few political repercussions for Israel when she fired the first shot of the war, at least not from the U.S. (Christison 1993; Sachar 2009; Spiegel 1985).
Johnson’s Middle East policy at the conclusion of the war appeared to be more balanced than prior to the conflict. For example, the Johnson administration prohibited all arms shipments to the region in an attempt to “encourage Moscow to reciprocate” (Spiegel 1985, 158). When Moscow did not return the gesture, the administration publicly announced that the U.S. would deliver military equipment, which was ordered before the war began, to five pro-Western Arab states.

It was the role in the negotiations regarding Resolution 242, however, that was the Johnson administration’s most significant achievement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy (Spiegel 1985). The resolution not only provided the framework for future negotiations, but it was an indication of the increasing involvement of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War or the Ramadan War, began on the holiest day of the year in the Jewish calendar, which is traditionally observed with intensive prayer and about twenty-five hours of fasting beginning at sundown the night before. Because it was the holiest day of the year, many military personnel had been granted leave to spend the holiday with their families. This left the IDF forces significantly depleted at the Egyptian and Syrian borders.

Israeli decision-makers recognized several days before the war broke out that Egypt and Syria were positioned for a potential attack. However, previous experience
and certain underlying assumptions precluded the Israeli Cabinet from taking steps to stave off military confrontation. The general assumption was that Israel was militarily superior to both Egypt and Syria, and neither would independently attack the Jewish state. A second assumption was that Egypt had threatened war earlier that year, yet nothing had transpired. Certain elements in the Israeli government believed that Sadat was “all talk” and would not start a war that he could not win (Bar-Joseph 2006; Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Derfler 2014; Meir 1975; Rabinovich 2004; Sachar 2010). Most intelligence and military analysts did not believe that Egypt or Syria would engage in a military confrontation with Israel. In essence, although policymakers recognized the potential problem on their borders, they did not perceive the threat to be imminent.

The war would last for nearly three weeks and bring the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of a nuclear confrontation. Egypt and Syria had mobilized forces at the border weeks in advance, but Israeli intelligence analysts reported that it was most likely a military exercise. Even the expulsion of Soviet military advisors in Egypt, along with the evacuation of their families on 5 October, though worrisome, did not change the perception of some of those in the Cabinet that Israel would get “adequate warning of any real trouble” (Meir 1975). Most in the government still did not believe that Egypt or Syria would actually go to war with Israel.

The Prime Minister was reassured the day before the attack began that “sufficient reinforcements were being sent to the fronts to carry out any holding operation” that might be necessary. Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had already decided early on October 5 to place the regular IDF forces on
the highest state of alert and the Air Force on full alert. Based on intelligence evaluations and reassurances from military advisers, Meir decided not to call up the reserves.

New intelligence received on the morning of October 6 claimed that Egyptian and Syrian forces were planning to begin an assault on Israel at 6:00 p.m. that evening. The hostilities actually began four hours earlier at 2:00 p.m. That Egypt or Syria would even consider war with Israel came as a surprise to the Israeli government. Just hours before the attack, when the Israeli government became convinced of the impending hostilities, Prime Minister Golda Meir and her advisers decided against the option of a preemptive strike. Israel possessed superior air power over Egypt and Syria, and a preemptive strike, as occurred in 1967, could have substantially reduced the damage incurred by the ground assault. That initial decision to forego preemptive action would be both politically and militarily significant. By letting the Egyptian and Syrian armies make the first move, Israel’s military would come closer than ever before to a devastating defeat. Additionally, the Israeli government would raise questions about its own ability to maintain its security in the region. However, because Israel did not initiate the war, Meir and members of her cabinet were able to remind the United States and the international community again and again of Israel’s role as the victim or target in the conflict, and thus help solidify much needed U.S. military and political support.

In the early days of the war, Egypt and Syria inflicted severe damage to the deficient and unprepared Israeli army and made significant territorial gains. Syria was able to move into the Golan area, and Egypt managed to cross the Suez Canal and enter...
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the Sinai. Following three days of intense fighting, Israel was able to launch a counter-offensive, pushing Syria back across the pre-war lines and stopping Egypt's advance. Within a week of the outbreak of the war, Israeli artillery was reaching the outskirts of the Syrian capital of Damascus. On the Egyptian front, the Israeli army slowly advanced and was eventually able to cross the Canal and enter Egypt. Although it became possible for the IDF to march on both Cairo and Damascus, the Israeli government elected not to do so.

On October 22 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 338, calling for an immediate ceasefire-in-place and the implementation of SC Resolution 242.\textsuperscript{14} The UN would go on to pass two more resolutions before the fighting ceased. Despite the UN call for a ceasefire, the fighting continued, with both sides claiming the other had violated the agreement. It was during this time that Israel was able to surround the Egyptian Third Army and effectively prohibit their ability to withdraw or receive supplies, including food and water. Angered by Israel's actions and asserting that it was Israel that had violated the ceasefire, Moscow insisted that both the United States and Soviet Union send troops to the region immediately to impose the UN resolution. And, if the United States was unwilling to do so, the Soviet Union would act unilaterally, sending its own troops. The U.S. government was adamantly opposed to any American or Soviet military involvement in the current conflict and believed it could only escalate to a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. Despite the concern over such a confrontation, the U.S. response to the Soviet proposal was to put its military worldwide on a heightened state of alert. Secretary of State Kissinger had
just returned from Moscow following what seemed to have been successful negotiations regarding the crisis. Fortunately, the elevated alert status lasted less than a day.

Tensions between the Americans and the Soviets de-escalated and the ceasefire took hold only after persistent communications between the two governments and an increase of U.S. pressure on Israel to comply with the second and third UN resolutions. The U.S. also convinced Israel to allow nonmilitary aid to reach the surrounded Egyptian army. On October 26, Israel accepted UN calls for a ceasefire. The war itself was over, but negotiations for a military disengagement were just beginning. It is important to note that near the end of the war and throughout the negotiation process, Syria and Egypt acted independently of one another. What began as a collaborative effort to regain lost territory ended with divided interests and different strategies for obtaining long-term objectives.

U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East under the Nixon administration was heavily influenced by the policy of détente with the Soviet Union (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Maghroori 1981; Quandt 1977; Siniver 2008; Spiegel 1985). Before the October war broke out, President Richard Nixon did not consider Arab-Israeli relations to be a top priority on his agenda (Dowty 1984; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Maghroori 1981; Perlmutter 1975; Quandt 1977; Sachar 2009; Siniver 2008; Spiegel 1985). While he fundamentally supported Israel and defensible borders, he was less involved with the region in general, instead focusing on Cambodia, China, and Vietnam (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977; Spiegel 1985). When Nixon did become involved in the Middle East, his policy choices were often inconsistent or at odds with one another. Steven
Spiegel (1985) explains Nixon’s conflicting and confusing approach to his Mideast policy:

The administration that more than any of its predecessors cooperated with the Soviets in the Mideast through the Big Two and Big Four talks, by the end of its first term threatened the U.S.S.R. in Egypt, the country of most significant influence in the area...An administration that openly withheld arms to Israel in spring 1970, even after increased Russian involvement in Egypt, was by early 1972 concluding the first long-term arms arrangement with Jerusalem. An administration that openly issued a comprehensive plan for reaching an Arab-Israeli settlement (the Rogers Plan) found itself by the end of the term secretly discussing negotiations to initiate a mere interim settlement on the Suez Canal (217).

According to Spiegel, it was Nixon’s ambivalence toward the Middle East, coupled with domestic problems that allowed various members of his cabinet to heavily influence foreign policy in the region. For example, by the time hostilities began in October 1973, Nixon was already beleaguered by the Watergate Scandal, which presented a more immediate threat to the administration.

It would take nearly two years, several rounds of negotiations, and significant commitments from the U.S. before the Sinai II Agreement was signed. During the negotiation phase (crisis transition period), several domestic and international events occurred that affected the decision process in both the U.S. and Israel.
Conclusion

The events surrounding the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 created a fundamental consensus on the nature of the threats facing its society. The Arab League had immediately rejected the UN partition plan, and, just one day after declaring independence, several of Israel’s neighbors attacked the new nation. The attack signaled to the Jewish people that the creation of a new and enduring state in the region, particularly a Jewish one, would not be easy. Moreover, America’s official recognition of Israel suggested to Jewish leaders that they could count the United States as a political ally. At the same time the announcement marginalized the Palestinian issue, which further heightened concerns of Arab leaders. Israel’s victory in the 1948 conflict did little to persuade Arab leaders’ acceptance of the new country.

The successes of the Six Day War demonstrated the considerable capabilities of the Israeli military over those of her Arab neighbors and fostered the notion of an Israeli unchallenged superiority. In addition, the strategic advantage of capturing the Sinai was the acquisition of the Giddi and Mitla Passes and the oil fields at Abu Rudeis. The mountain passes formed a bottleneck, which could allow a small contingent of Israeli troops to defend a large force. Indeed, the passes are considered the best places from which to defend Israel (Rabinovich 2004; Sacher 2010; Safran 1978; Siniver 2013). These same passes would play a key role in the negotiations of the disengagement agreements following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

The military superiority displayed during the 1967 war also created in the minds of the Israelis, along with many in the international community, an assumption
that no Arab nation would again engage Israel militarily until they had the capacity to match or defeat her air power. In the Israeli government this assumption, coupled with the idea that Syria would never act alone, became known as the “concept” (Brecher 1980; Rabinovich 2004; Safran 1978; Siniver 2013; Zeira 1993). The Agranat Commission, established following the failures that occurred during the Yom Kippur War, determined that the “concept” was a crucial factor in interpreting and evaluating the intelligence that was gathered leading up to the conflict. The “conception,” according to the Commission Report, was deemed outdated, and evidence and intelligence to the contrary were not enough to displace the significant influence of the conception (Bar-Joseph 2006). However, some scholars argue that there were multiple contributing factors responsible for the intelligence failure, including groupthink on the part of the Israeli decision-makers (Stein 1982). Despite the crushing defeat in the 1967 Six Day War, Arab leaders professed that there would be “no peace...no recognition...no negotiations with Israel.”¹⁵

A further assumption within the government was that Israel would have at least forty-eight hours’ notice of an impending attack. And, if such an attack were to occur, there was no doubt that Israel maintained military superiority and could quickly dispatch with the enemy. The view that Israel could easily defeat her Arab neighbors was present in the U.S. as well and had a significant influence on decisions taken during the crisis. In addition to the assumptions resulting from the 1967 war, other effects included the emergence of a regional environment of superpower competition by proxy. Essentially, the United States supported the pro-Western countries of Israel and
some Arab countries such as Jordan, and the Soviet Union backed the Egyptian and Syrian regimes (Siniver 2013).

United States policy concerning Israel from the War of Independence in 1948 up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War was in general one of cautious support. Truman and Johnson were often swayed by the Jewish voting bloc in the U.S. when it came to decisions regarding Israel, whereas Eisenhower tried to implement a more balanced approach to U.S.-Israeli relations (Christison 1998; Hahn 2006; Sachar 2009; Spiegel 1985). The containment of Soviet expansion in the Middle East was a primary driver of U.S. foreign policy from Truman to Johnson (Hahn 2006; Sachar; 2009; Spiegel 1985). Nixon sought a different approach in regards to its relationship with the Soviet Union: détente. Nixon’s concerns, however, focused on events and conditions in Southeast Asia rather than the Middle East (Haney 1994; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Kohl 1975; Quandt 1977; Sachar 2009; Siniver 2008; Spiegel 1985). Nevertheless, a competitive international environment continued to exist during the Nixon and Ford administrations, which helped to shape decision processes throughout both the 1973 crisis and crisis transition period.

Chapter Five is intended to provide some contextual information and brief descriptions of each of the key decisions undertaken during the crisis, which covers the period from October 5 to October 26, 1973. Included in each description are assessments and classifications of the types of decision units and occasions for decision. The decisions taken by both the U.S. and Israel are presented chronologically. This chapter also provides a brief analysis of the decisions taken during this time. As some of
the hypotheses in this study seek to test the effects of environmental shocks, I include these events within the chronology of decisions. These events are noted in italicized text. Chapters Five and Six do not provide detailed, minute-by-minute accounts of all decisions considered, but are intended to inform the reader of the basis for the classifications used in this study. Chapter Seven provides comparisons of the findings and an assessment of the DU framework.
Notes: Chapter Four

1 This was a reference to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which was a letter written by British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild that publicized Great Britain’s support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
2 The Haganah (defense) organization would later become the core of the Israeli Defense Forces (Sachar 2009).
4 Allison Weir argues that the State Department opposed supporting partition based on electoral politics, as well as on the principle of self-determination. Secretary of State George Marshall accused Truman of favoring partition as a “transparent dodge to win a few votes,” p. 49. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and State Department’s Director of Policy Planning George Kennan warned that supporting the establishment of an Israeli state would endanger national interests and advantage the Soviet Union.
6 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
11 The Eisenhower Doctrine addressed the potential for Soviet influence or intervention in the region. The Doctrine stated that the U.S. would provide aid to any country in the Middle East that felt threatened by armed aggression from another country. Through the Doctrine, Eisenhower authorized the commitment of U.S. forces “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism,” [history.state.gov].
13 Ibid.
14 Adopted following the 1967 Six-Day War, UNSC Resolution 242 was intended to be a measure that would lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. The main principles of the resolution stipulated (1) the withdrawal of Israeli forces from “territories occupied in the recent conflict,” and (2) the “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force” (UN Resolution 242).
Chapter Five

Crisis Decisions

Introduction

In the early hours of October 6, 1973, an Israeli intelligence source confirmed what the Israeli government did not want to acknowledge: that a war would be launched against the Jewish state that day. For several days leading up to the war, military intelligence reported a build-up of Syrian and Egyptian forces along the border. Though disconcerting, analysts concluded that the Egyptian activity was most likely a military exercise and, in the case of Syria, the deployment was probably defensive maneuvering in response to an unexpected air battle with Israel that had occurred on September 13. Despite evidence to the contrary, the intelligence assessments went largely unquestioned (Bar-Joseph 2006; Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Dunstan 2007; Eban 1977; Erikkson 2013; Meir 1975; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010). The day before the war began, the Egyptian army made a move toward the Suez Canal. The Syrian military transitioned from a defensive to an offensive posture. Israel reacted by putting its military on high alert. For many in the Israeli government, war appeared to be inevitable, but not all were convinced (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Eban 1977; Meir 1975).

At the time the crisis began, Henry Kissinger was in New York and President Nixon was in Key Biscayne, Florida. According to telephone transcripts, they spoke only once the first day of the war. The conversation included a brief description on the status
of the fighting, the possibility that the Soviets knew about the impending attack, and the likelihood of a UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting being called that day. Nixon suggested that Kissinger “take the initiative” and call for a UNSC meeting himself, or perhaps get the Russians to do it. Kissinger relayed his strategy to the President about getting the Soviets involved and the possibility of a comprehensive settlement. Bringing the Soviets in, Kissinger explained, entailed asking them to take a neutral position with the United States. Kissinger also told the President that the long-term strategy should be to actively seek a diplomatic settlement to the bigger problem, the Palestinians. The President reminded Kissinger not to take sides and asked to be kept informed of the developments. Though not explicit, Nixon’s responses in the telephone conversation suggested that Kissinger had the authority to decide how to handle the immediate situation. In that regard, Kissinger did not call for a UNSC meeting.

The international shock of an impending conflict initiated a series of sixty-two discernible key decisions by both Israel and the United States during the crisis and crisis transition periods, including two decisions made the day before the war broke out. During the crisis period, a total of thirty-two decisions were made, fifteen by the United States and seventeen by Israel.

**Sequence of Decisions**

Note: The dates of each decision correspond to the local date and time of each of the official documents issued by the respective government. Discrepancies in the sequence of decisions are the result of time zone differences. Additionally, assessments
of the Israeli decisions taken between October 5 and 9 are supported by official
documentation from the Israeli State Archives. Analysis of the decisions made after
October 9 was derived from secondary sources. Most of the assessments of U.S.
decisions were based on primary sources, augmented with secondary source
information.

October 5, 1973

On October 5, 1973, Israeli military intelligence reported that Egyptian and
Syrian militaries were mobilized along the Israeli border. Defense Minister Moshe
Dayan authorized Chief of General Staff (COGS) David Elazar to place the IDF and air
force on high alert. In an emergency meeting, the Cabinet, acting as a single group
decision unit, approved the alert status and the decision was made to give authority to
the prime minister and Dayan to mobilize all reserves if necessary (Bartov 1981; Ben-
Meir 1986; Brecher 1980; Dayan; 1976; Meir 1975). The authorization for mobilization
is denoted as Israel Decision #1 (hereafter, IS1) in the decision table. The occasion for
decision in IS1, Egyptian and Syrian military activity, is classified as an external shock.

In consultation with Elazar, Meir and Dayan voiced their concern about the
Egyptian and Syrian military postures, but agreed that mobilization of Israeli forces
may not be necessary (IS2). Elazar maintained that Israel would have an advanced
warning before an attack, but still believed war was unlikely. Meir accepted this
assessment and decided not to mobilize reserves at that time. The timing of the crisis
(Yom Kippur) played no small role in Meir’s decision not to mobilize reserve forces
(Meir 1975). Most were at home with their families preparing for the holiday.
According to the official transcript of the meeting, Meir was the ultimate authority and made the decision regarding mobilization (IS2). The decision unit for IS2 is classified as predominant leader, and the occasion for decision is the same as in IS1: external shock.

October 6-7, 1973

By the morning of October 6, Meir and her Cabinet learned that a coordinated Egyptian and Syrian attack was imminent and reportedly would commence at 6:00 p.m. (The outbreak of the war would actually begin at 2:00 p.m.) Archival transcripts dated October 6, which were declassified and released in 2010, revealed that the discussions regarding the mobilization of the reserves and the option of a preemptive strike occurred during the same meeting. Regarding the mobilization, Elazar recommended a full-scale mobilization of reserves, while Dayan supported only limited mobilization. Meir, acting on the chance that war was imminent, decided to adopt Elazar's recommendation and ordered full mobilization (IS3).

On the subject of a preemptive strike, Elazar strongly argued in favor of such action, but Dayan was adamantly opposed. Elazar later explained his support for preemption was based on the assumption that war was a certainty and it was the only way to “neutralize...the initial advantage enjoyed by the battle-ready Syrians and Egyptians” (Bartov 1981). Conversely, Dayan was not convinced of the certainty of an attack and was concerned about the consequences of initiating hostilities (ISA/RG130/143 2013; Bartov 1981; Ben-Meir 1986; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Safran 1978). The transcripts suggest that the prime minister was the individual...
responsible for deciding against a preemptive strike (IS4). Meir (1975) explained to Elazar:

“Dado, I know all the arguments in favor of a preemptive strike, but I am against it. We don’t know now...what the future will hold, but there is always the possibility that we will need help, and if we strike first, we get nothing from anyone...with a heavy heart I am going to say no” (p. 357).4

Although Meir was concerned with the political implications of preemptions, she was also reassured by the military leadership that, with Israel’s superior capabilities, they would be able to overcome an initial assault and eventually take the advantage. The transcripts indicate that Meir acted as predominant leader in both decisions (IS3 and IS4). The occasions for decision were twofold: external shock and new information. The external shock was the immediate threat of an attack, and Israeli intelligence provided new information that confirmed an attack was to begin at a specific time.

The United States was well aware of the situation growing in the Middle East. A series of telephone transcripts indicate that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger communicated regularly with the Israeli Ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, and the ambassador kept Kissinger informed of developments in the days leading up to the war. Additionally, Meir informed Washington through Embassy channels that Israel had no aggressive intentions, but would respond forcefully if attacked. Kissinger urged Israel not to initiate hostilities.5
During an Israeli Cabinet meeting on the afternoon of October 6, reports came in that war had broken out on both fronts (Brecher 1981).

Throughout the first day of fighting, reports coming in from the military commands on both fronts indicated that the situation was under control. In actuality, Israeli forces were taking heavy losses and, by the second day (October 7), battle updates were no longer optimistic. The information raised concerns about Israel’s ability to defend her borders in a protracted conflict (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2004; Sachar 2010; Safran 1978). Prime Minister Meir and her Cabinet made two key decisions on the second day of fighting: [1] to request emergency assistance and military supplies from the United States (IS5); and [2] a decision regarding a counter-attack (IS6).

The decision to request aid from the U.S. had been discussed at several Cabinet meetings since before the start of hostilities (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). All of the participants in these meetings, who included the prime minister, defense minister, the chief of staff, and several military advisers, agreed that Israel should make the request for supplies (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). Although the military leaders recommended the request and there was consensus on the decision (Brecher 1980), the transcripts of the meeting suggest that Meir maintained the ultimate authority to order the request (Ben-Meir 1986; Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). According to Henry Kissinger’s telephone transcripts, U.S. decision-making during the first day of the war centered on getting the fighting stopped. However,
varying accounts indicate that Sadat was not interested in a cease-fire, and Israel was concerned about the timing – Israel did not want to lose any territory if a cease-fire-in-place was imposed too early (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Nixon 1978; Quandt 1977). In regards to steps toward a cease-fire, the administration’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union weighed heavily on the decision to ask the Soviets to take a neutral stand alongside the U.S. – US Decision #1, hereafter US1 (Dallek 2007; Horne 2009; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Nixon 1978; Perlmutter 1975; Siniver 2008). Kissinger suggested the idea of bringing the Soviets in and Nixon agreed. This seems to indicate that the decision unit consisted of a single group. The clear impetus, or occasion for decision, was the commencement of the war, which can be classified as an external shock.

In a telephone conversation with Kissinger later that day, the Minister of the Israeli Embassy, Mordechai Shalev, assured Kissinger that Israel did not initiate hostilities and that reports coming out of Cairo of an Israeli naval engagement were false. Shalev also informed Kissinger that Israel’s military commander had submitted a list of “urgent items” for U.S. consideration. Kissinger told Shalev that they could meet later to discuss the items.

Kissinger and Nixon agreed to provide the missiles and ammunition (US2), but delayed approving the request for planes. According to telephone transcripts, the issue delaying the supply of planes was based on the assumption that Israeli forces would be able to reverse Arab advances and take the advantage within a few days. In addition, Kissinger warned that the delivery of the supplies from the U.S. should be kept low-key so as to “preserve the American position in the Arab world” (Kissinger 2003, 159).
Nixon was not opposed to this strategy; indeed early on he voiced his concerns to Kissinger that he did not want the U.S. to appear too pro-Israel. Therefore, in order to maintain a low profile, it was decided that Israel would pick up the supplies in unmarked planes (US2).

Although it is not clear from official transcripts, Kissinger alone likely decided to have the Israelis pick up the aid. Kissinger and Nixon did not discuss logistics during their telephone conversation. Also, there are no indications of a face-to-face meeting between Kissinger and Nixon during this time, where such a decision might have been addressed. The assessment of the decision unit is also based on telephone transcripts between Kissinger and General Brent Scowcroft, as well as secondary sources (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 2001; Siniver 2008). While the decision to provide military supplies to Israel was key, and one that had to be approved by the president, I argue that the primary significance of the decision lay in the U.S. insistence that Israel was required to come and get them. The decision unit is therefore classified as predominant leader. The occasion for decision is assessed to be other (strategic).

Unfortunately for the Israeli government, there was an issue with Israeli planes not being allowed to land at any of the airbases for supply transfer (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1975; Eban 1977). During a telephone conversation on October 7 between the Secretary of State and the Israeli Ambassador, Dinitz told Kissinger that he would work on securing charter planes to pick up the supplies. At this time Kissinger left the Israeli Ambassador to work out the delivery logistics of the resupply effort. Later, it would become known that personnel in the Defense Department deliberately delayed

Also on October 7, the Israeli government authorized COGS Elazar to make the decision on a counter attack (IS6). This is considered to be a key political decision because the significant territorial encroachments into Syria and Egypt would affect the political negotiations upon the conclusion of hostilities. The decision for granting the authorization was based partly on the fact that Elazar was an experienced military officer and understood the battlefield better than members of the Cabinet (Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Rabinovich 2004) and partly on the previous practices that granted military leadership considerable leeway in decision-making regarding national security (Bar-Joseph 2000; Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Eban 1977; Elizur and Salpeter 1973; Maoz 1990; Rabinovich 2004; Safran 1978). Chief of Staff Elazar recommended an immediate counter attack on Syria, but recommended they hold off in the Sinai until the situation improved (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Rabinovich 2004). Elazar was confident that additional tanks in the north along with the superior capabilities of the air force could prove successful against Syria. Additionally, if Israeli forces could hold the Egyptians at the Suez Canal, the air force could complete its mission in the north and return to assist in the south (Bartov 1981). The decision unit for the authorization of the counter-attack option is assessed to be a single group. The occasion for decision is classified as other, deferring to expertise in military matters.

In addition to the decisions noted above, it has been reported that on or around the second day of the war the prime minister was presented with the option of
preparing Israel’s arsenal for a “nuclear demonstration” (Cohen 2008). According to an interview with Arnan Azaryahu, a trusted aide and confidante to key adviser and Minister Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili, a meeting took place involving the Prime Minister Meir, Defense Minister Dayan, COGS Elazar, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Alon, and Galili. At the end of the meeting, after Elazar left, Dayan proposed to the prime minister that Israel should prepare a nuclear demonstration. Those remaining in Meir’s office immediately warned against such an action, that the situation was not yet that desperate. According to Azaryahu, the prime minister unequivocally denied Dayan’s suggestion. In no uncertain terms, Meir told Dayan, “Forget it” (Cohen 2008, 3).

Azaryahu maintains that Dayan’s failure to adequately assess the strength of the enemy, combined with the bleak situation on both fronts, had transformed him into a “Prophet of Doom” with few options for Israel.

Although some have suggested that Israel seriously considered implementing a nuclear “demonstration” (Aronson 1992; Evron 1994; Hersch 1991; Kumaraswamy 2000), primary documentation cannot confirm such an exchange took place. Moreover, Azaryahu admits that he did not personally attend the meeting, but only reports what was relayed to him by Galili. Neither Meir (1975) nor Dayan (1976) make any mention of such a meeting in their autobiographies, and Dayan called the suggestion “absurd” (Raz 2014, 104). While the decision to reject a nuclear option would have certainly been a key decision to include in this study, the absence of first-hand accounts or primary sources would render an analysis of such a decision conjecture.

October 9, 1973
The next set of key decisions made by the Israeli government came two days later on October 9. The first involved the authorization of air strikes on military targets in the heart of the Syrian capital of Damascus (IS7). On the previous day, October 8, the IDF experienced serious setbacks and failures on both the northern and southern fronts. In light of these developments, Dayan and Elazar agreed that the Israeli Air Force should begin conducting strikes in Damascus. Meir was reluctant to authorize such a campaign on the capital (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). She eventually relented, but instructed Elazar to target only military installations. The occasion for decision can be classified as new information, but also other and strategic in nature. Based on the transcript of the meeting on this issue, I assess the decision unit to be predominant leader.

The second decision was in response to the delay in military supplies Kissinger had promised Israel. Prime Minister Meir was growing concerned and frustrated with the delay in receiving much needed military supplies from the U.S (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1975; Meir 1976). In consultation with Dayan, Meir suggested that perhaps she should make a trip to Washington (IS8) to convince President Nixon of the critical nature of the situation (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1976). Dayan was in agreement. The trip became unnecessary, however, because, when Nixon and Kissinger learned of the plan, Kissinger informed the prime minister that no such journey was warranted. According to Kissinger, all requests coming through Ambassador Dinitz or Minister Shalev were considered requests by the prime minister and would be treated as such. In other words, the U.S. had already decided they were
going to send supplies and a visit from Meir would not have any effect on that decision, one way or the other.

According to Kissinger (2003), the primary issue was one of logistics rather than intent. The U.S. diplomatic strategy included trying not to anger the Arabs with an overt airlift for Israel. Arranging the delivery of supplies was, therefore, hindered by the secrecy of the mission. Meir’s proposed trip, though not terribly significant in the overall sequence of events, nonetheless can be considered a key decision based on several factors. First, it indicated to the U.S. that the Israeli military was faring far worse than previously believed, which Kissinger later confirmed caused the U.S. to reconsider certain assumptions about Israel’s capabilities (Kissinger 2003). It was becoming more apparent that Israel really did need the equipment for which they were asking. Additionally, the United States had been prepared to delay long enough and veto any resolution calling for a cease-fire in place, as the American government expected Israel to eventually reverse the course of the war. However, given the setback experienced thus far, Kissinger realized that the U.S. position would not be sustainable indefinitely (Kissinger 2003).

According to the characteristics in the DU framework, Meir’s (aborted) decision (IS8) to fly to Washington was made by a predominant leader. The occasion for decision is classified as new information, in light of the military setbacks on both fronts and the continued delay of supplies from the United States.

**October 10, 1973**
Crisis Decisions

On October 10, the Israeli Cabinet approved a plan to launch a general attack on Syria (IS10). The Israeli army had been able to push Syrian forces back beyond the October 5 lines, and a push toward Damascus would put pressure on Syria to agree to a cease-fire. Although the plan indicated the attack would move in the direction of Damascus, Meir insisted she did not wish to occupy Syria's capital (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). The attack eventually allowed Israel to recapture the Golan Heights and gave Israel bargaining leverage with Syria. The recommendation was probably made by Elazar and/or Dayan (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Rabinovich 2004), who then requested the endorsement of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. It is not clear whether the Cabinet approved the plan on a strict majority vote, or whether it was actually Meir’s decision and the Cabinet went along. It is unclear, therefore, whether the decision unit was predominant leader or single group. Based on similar types of decisions made earlier in the conflict, I assess that the decision unit was likely a single group. The type of occasion for decision is classified as new information, based on battle reports, and also other because it was strategic in nature.

As to the strategy for the southern front, the Cabinet decided that the southern command would hold the Egyptian army for now, but should prepare its forces for an attack (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Rabinovich 2004). Dayan reported that there was “now powerful pressure...for an unconditional cease-fire...This would mean victory for the Arabs...I felt we should do whatever we could to prevent an immediate cease-fire decision” until Israel could push the Egyptian army back across the Canal (Dayan 1976, 426; see also Brecher 1980, 212, and Quandt 1977, 177).
The U.S. decisions on October 10 were in relation to military supplies and the delivery of those supplies. According to Walter Isaacson (1992), Nixon received information regarding a Soviet airlift to Syria and was worried about how the war was developing for the Israelis. Nixon reportedly agreed to replace all aircraft lost by Israel (US4) as well as to send new F-4 Phantom fighters (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977, 2001). In this scenario, the decision unit is *predominant leader*. However, in a telephone conversation, Kissinger asks James Schlesinger that, if he [Kissinger] wanted to “sweeten the pot” with the Israelis, what planes could they [Defense Department] “scrape together.” Schlesinger responded with “only Phantoms.” This interaction implies that it was Kissinger who acted as *predominant leader* in the decision to supply Israel with additional aircraft. Although I am unable to identify the specific decision-maker in this instance, it is apparent that the decision unit was one of *predominant leader*. Because of the news of the Soviet airlift and the state of the Israeli military, the occasion for decision is classified as *new information*.

Despite the U.S. decision to provide aid to Israel, problems continued to persist regarding its delivery. According to Quandt (1977), the intensity of the fighting was such that the supplies could not be delivered solely by El Al flights. Kissinger decided that the U.S. would try and hire civilian charter planes to deliver the supplies (US3). This would help expedite the delivery while maintaining the illusion of official American involvement (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). The decision unit is classified as *predominant leader*. The occasion for decision is *negative feedback*. Meanwhile, Kissinger continued to press Israel for an immediate cease-fire.
Throughout 1973, the Nixon administration had been experiencing political difficulties on the domestic front. In addition to the Watergate burglary plaguing Nixon, his vice-president, Spiro Agnew, became entangled in a bribery scandal in April 1973. Allegations against Agnew grew more serious over the summer, with threats of impeachment and indictment. Finally, on October 10 the vice-president resigned from office.

October 12-13, 1973

By October 12, none of the planes promised by the White House had yet to arrive (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977). On that same day, Elazar presented his assessment of the IDF’s ability to cross the Canal and hold the Egyptian line. He was confident that ground forces could successfully capture a portion of the west bank of the Canal, but could not hold that position for an extended period of time (Bartov 1981, 438). In other words, if a cease-fire was likely to occur in the next few days, he would recommend the attempted crossing. Later in the day, news arrived that the Egyptians were planning to implement “Phase Two” of their war plan, suggesting that Sadat was not considering a cease-fire in the immediate future (Bartov 1981). Indeed, reports from the southern front indicated that Egyptian forces on the west bank had begun crossing the Canal (Brecher 1980).

The Cabinet decided to postpone a decision on attempting to cross the Suez Canal (IS10) until Israeli forces could break the Egyptian armor (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976). This was a key decision in several respects. A crossing of the Canal could potentially send a signal to Egypt that Israel might try to advance on Cairo, a clear
move with threatening political overtones (Brecher 1980). Additionally, the decision
turned out to be key because the two Israeli divisions determined to cross would be
doing so just as two full-strength Egyptian divisions were approaching the Canal to
cross to the east (Bartov 1981). The decision was similar in nature to IS9 – the decision
to launch a general attack on Syria - therefore, the Cabinet probably acted as a *single
group*. According to Elazar, it became clear that “only the Cabinet [would] decide on the
crossing” (Bartov 1981, 438]. The occasion for decision is tactical in nature and thus
classified as *other*.

Before October 12 came to an end, the Israelis received a report that the
Russians were preparing to send three divisions to the Middle East (Bartov 1981). In a
midnight meeting, the Cabinet discussed the probability of a cease-fire proposal in the
Security Council (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976). Meir and the Cabinet
decided to accept a U.S. suggestion for a cease-fire in place (IS11) if such a proposal was
raised. The much-needed supplies promised by the U.S. had yet to be delivered, and
Elazar reported that Egyptian activity suggested a possible full-scale armor attack
(Bartov 1981, 444). Based on biographical accounts, the decision unit is classified as a
*single group*. Although Brecher (1980) suggests that Meir made the decision in
consultation with Dayan and Elazar, other reports indicate that Meir and her War
Cabinet (consisting of Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and adviser and Minister
Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili) decided to accept a cease-fire, if one should be
proposed. The occasion for decision is considered strategic in nature and classified as
*other*.
In regards to the crossing of the Canal, Elazar laid out his plan to members of the Cabinet. The ensuing meeting went on until after midnight. The differences of opinion within the Cabinet generally centered on “how and when” to implement the plan, rather than whether or not it should be undertaken (Bartov 1981, 471; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). Even Dayan threw his support behind the plan (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). Finally, the Cabinet approved the proposal to cross the Canal (IS12). This is classified as a tactical decision (other) based on new information. Based on personal accounts of the meeting, the vote was unanimous, indicating that the decision unit was a single group (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975).

In the United States, President Nixon learned that Israel had yet to receive the military aid promised. He then directed Kissinger and Haig to have American military planes deliver supplies to Israel (US5), something Kissinger was trying to avoid (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 1977, 2001). In fact, in a telephone conversation early on October 13, Kissinger explicitly told James Schlesinger that he did not want American planes flying into Israel. Although Nixon was concerned early about America looking pro-Israel, no one in the administration wanted to see Israel lose the war (Dallek 2007; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Nixon 1978; Quandt 2001; Siniver 2008). The precipitous occasion for this decision is classified as negative feedback, the direct result of Kissinger’s insistence on a covert military equipment delivery. New information also qualifies as the occasion for decision. The new information was not only that Israel could lose the war, but also that supplies previously promised had not been delivered. The decision unit, Nixon, is classified as predominant leader.
October 19, 1973

Several developments occurred between October 14 and 19. Israel was able to cross to the west side of Canal, surprising the Egyptian army (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2003; Tzabag 2001). Meanwhile, the Israeli government received word that Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was travelling to Cairo. The Israeli government was somewhat buoyed by this development (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Safran 1978). Based on the recent Israeli military successes, including pushing back and fracturing a massive Egyptian assault as well as the crossing of the Canal, they were hopeful that the Soviets could convince Sadat to accept a cease-fire (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Safran 1978).

Despite daily communications between the United States and the Soviet Union, they remained deadlocked on the specifics of the joint proposal for a cease-fire. In an attempt to break the deadlock, Premier Brezhnev invited Kissinger to Moscow for face-to-face meetings. Nixon instructed Kissinger to make the trip and granted him full authority to negotiate a cease-fire (US6). The decision unit is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is strategic in nature and therefore classified as other. Possibly because of Kissinger’s previous successes in foreign policy – i.e. winning the Nobel Peace Prize – the occasion for decision could also be classified as positive feedback.

In response to the public acknowledgement of American supplies to Israel, coupled with Nixon’s formal request of $2.2 billion in aid for Israel, the Arab states announced on October 19 an oil embargo. Although some argue that the embargo did not affect the
outcome of the war (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977), it would influence negotiations following the cessation of hostilities.

October 20, 1973

Nixon became increasingly preoccupied with his domestic troubles, namely the Watergate affair (Isaacson 1992). The situation was exacerbated when Nixon ordered the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Conversations between Nixon and Kissinger at this time reflected this growing concern and included some references to negative press reporting. According to Kissinger, Nixon needed a significant political achievement that portrayed the administration in a favorable light (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 2003). On the eve of Kissinger's trip to Moscow, Nixon instructed him to reach a joint comprehensive peace plan, propose it to the U.N. and impose it on both the Israelis and the Arabs (US7). As early as October 14, Nixon advocated a peace conference to negotiate a comprehensive agreement between Israel and her Arab neighbors. However, Kissinger preferred a step-by-step approach to a settlement and demonstrated this approach often in communications with both the Israelis and the Soviets. The decision unit is classified as predominant leader. The occasion for decision is strategic in nature and classified as other.

While Kissinger was en route to Moscow, he learned that Nixon had sent a cable to Brezhnev indicating that the Secretary of State was granted the authorization to make decisions on behalf of the United States in any negotiations with the Soviets (US8). Kissinger was furious because he preferred to have the option of deferring all decisions to the White House if he wished to delay (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982;
Quandt 1977). Nixon’s decision to send the letter to Moscow was most likely precipitated by his desire to achieve some kind of political accomplishment in the way of peace in the Middle East. The decision unit is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is classified as other (tactical).

October 21-22, 1973

Kissinger's trip to Moscow and subsequent negotiations proved fruitful; however, acting as predominant leader, Kissinger essentially ignored Nixon’s orders on trying to reach a comprehensive peace agreement (US9). Both parties agreed to a simple cease-fire-in-place, a call for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and to negotiations between the Arab and Israelis under “appropriate auspices” – i.e. a peace conference co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union (Quandt 1977). The occasion for decision in this case is classified as other (tactical).

On October 21 the Israeli government learned that Kissinger had reached a tentative cease-fire agreement with the Soviet Union (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Isaacson; Kissinger; Sachar 2010; Safran 1978).19 Although Israel was aware of Kissinger’s trip, the prime minister was under the impression that Kissinger’s trip was a delay tactic so Israel could complete military operations (Quandt 1977). At the very least, she would be informed of any developments prior to an actual agreement. Brecher (1980) maintains that Israel was not informed of Kissinger’s “secret” trip to Moscow; however, telephone transcripts indicate that the Israeli ambassador in Washington was fully aware of Kissinger’s travel plans.
Crisis Decisions

The irritation felt by the prime minister was not simply that Kissinger would draft a joint cease-fire resolution – indeed, the Israelis anticipated that such a proposal was imminent based on conversations between Washington and Tel Aviv (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Kissinger 2003; Meir 1975). The primary issue was that the U.S. was now insisting that Israel accept the proposal without consulting her government in advance (Meir 1975). Meir requested Kissinger to come to Israel before returning to the United States. He complied with the request, although telephone transcripts reveal that Kissinger told Ambassador Dinitz that he might go on to Israel following the talks with the Soviets. Kissinger did not arrive in Israel until after the Cabinet decided to accept the cease-fire resolution October 22 (IS14).

In his meeting with Meir and Dayan, Kissinger reiterated that hostilities should cease at 5:00 p.m. on October 22. However, he also indicated to the Israeli prime minister that there could be some “slippage” in the deadline (US10). Kissinger would later admit that it was mistake, stating that he had thoughts of “hours” rather than “days” when he issued the statement (Bartov 1981; Kissinger 2003). The decision unit for the US10 is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is other.

Given the time frame before the cease-fire would take effect (approximately nineteen hours) and Kissinger’s indication of some flexibility in the timetable, discussions within the Israeli Cabinet focused on better positioning themselves for negotiations, as well as the possibility that Egypt would not abide by the cease-fire (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977). Elazar and Dayan believed that the IDF could accomplish several missions already begun. Success of these
objectives could put Israel in a better position when negotiations began. Although the Cabinet voted to accept the impending cease-fire agreement, several members of the prime minister’s inner circle were concerned that Egypt would not acquiesce. Subsequently, the Cabinet decided the IDF would continue operations if Egypt or Syria did not obey the cease-fire (IS14). This was basically a pre-approval for the prime minister to authorize a continuation of the fighting based on the actions of either the Egyptian or Syrian armies. The decision unit was a single group. Because the decision was strategic in nature and based on the potential actions of Egypt or Syria, the type of occasion for decision is classified as other. The occasion for decision is also classified as new information, derived from Kissinger, with the unexpected imposition of the cease-fire.

According to accounts of some of those on the battlefield, there was a temporary cessation of hostilities around the time dictated by the resolution, although random attacks continued to occur (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977; Rabinovich 2003). Syria, however, did not accept the resolution, and so the battle continued on the northern front.

**October 23-24, 1973**

On the morning of October 23, Elazar phoned Defense Minister Dayan and informed him that the Egyptians were violating the cease-fire agreement in the Third Army’s sector (Bartov 1981). He requested permission to reengage the Third Army. Dayan granted Elazar permission to do so, although Meir subsequently gave her “approval” (IS15), and the advances of the IDF on the west bank of the canal continued.
The decision unit for this decision is *predominant leader* because Meir had preauthorization from the Cabinet. The occasion for decision is more difficult to classify. It could be considered a tactical decision (*other*), but also *new information*, as reports flowed in that Egypt continued firing on Israeli positions (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Rabinovich 2004).

In contrast, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat received reports of IDF assaults in the Third Army sector (Brecher 1980; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 1977; Sadat 1978). In light of ongoing hostilities along the Egyptian front, Sadat filed a formal complaint to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim citing Israel’s violation of the cease-fire agreement. Although Meir insisted that Israel did not initiate actions on the Egyptian front, Kissinger was not convinced (Kissinger 2003). This could have been in part to Kissinger’s earlier reference to some “slippage” in the timetable. By the afternoon of the 24th, Sadat had requested the introduction of American and Soviet troops, or observers at the very least, into the region in order to enforce the cease-fire (Kissinger 2003; Quandt 1977, 2001; Sadat 1978). Kissinger dismissed the idea of sending troops and insisted that Sadat withdraw his request (US11 and US12). Alarmingly, the Soviet Union informed Washington that it would support Sadat’s appeal for troops. Kissinger then issued a reply to Moscow, adamantly rejecting the introduction of either country’s troops in the region (US13). The reply was in the form of a letter from President Nixon to Brezhnev. It is difficult to determine the decision-maker on the issue of the letter; however, based on Kissinger telephone transcripts, Kissinger most likely structured the president’s letter to the Soviet leader. In each of the three decisions, Kissinger acted as *predominant leader*. The occasions for decision were a result of the same event, Sadat’s
request for troops in the region. The occasions for decision, therefore, can be classified as new information.

October 25-26, 1973

The Soviet response to Nixon’s letter indicated that, although they preferred a joint approach, they were willing to take unilateral military action in the Middle East in order to stop the fighting. American forces and troops worldwide were put on a heightened state of alert, Defense Condition Three – DefCon III (US14), which is in practice the highest state of alert during peace time (Kissinger 2003). The increased readiness of the American military not only created a crisis within a crisis for the United States, but it also represented an exogenous shock for Israeli decision-makers. Official U.S. documents indicate that Nixon was not involved in the decision to raise the alert status. In telephone conversations between Kissinger and Nixon and Kissinger and Haig on the afternoon of October 25, the secretary received an apology and congratulations from the president. Nixon said he was “sorry” that he “didn’t get to hear it”, and Haig told Kissinger he was superb. “And you and I were the only ones for it,” was Kissinger’s reply. Although some argue that Nixon participated in the decision process regarding the alert status (Isaacson 1992; Quandt 1977), the conversation with Haig suggests otherwise.

That Kissinger and Haig were the only ones who advocated the move to DefCon III is an indication that Kissinger acted as predominant leader in this instance. The occasion for decision, which was the alarming letter from Brezhnev, is classified as an external shock. A review of previous U.S. decisions suggests that Kissinger’s indication

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of a flexible timeline on the cease-fire (US10) may have been perceived as permission for Israel to complete its military objectives on the west bank of the Canal (IS15). The Brezhnev letter and subsequent U.S. decision to put its military worldwide on alert could have been an indirect result of Kissinger’s ambiguous timeline as indicated to the Israelis. In this instance, the occasion for decision is also classified as *negative feedback.*

Kissinger, acting as *predominant leader* in response to an *external shock* (the Brezhnev letter threatening unilateral military action), pressured Israel to release the Third Army or, at the very least, to allow nonmilitary supplies through to the surrounded Egyptian forces (US15). He gave the prime minister until October 27, 8:00 a.m. Washington time, to reply. Instead of agreeing to Kissinger’s ultimatum, Meir suggested the two parties (Egypt and Israel) meet face-to-face. Kissinger passed the message on to Egypt’s foreign minister. Meir’s suggestion eventually prompted direct talks at Kilometer 101.

After a five hour meeting, the Cabinet decided to accept the call for a cease-fire (IS16). Meir later reported that the decision was based on pressure from the U.S., threatening to end delivery of supplies (Brecher 1980; Eban 1977; Meir 1975). The decision unit was a *single group.* The occasion for decision was primarily an *external shock* (superpower confrontation and the possibility of an end to supplies). Secondary to *external shock,* the occasion for decision is also classified as *other.* Israel had gained sufficient territory – even more than they possessed at the beginning of the war – to be willing to accept an end to hostilities (Rabinovich 2003).
The Cabinet also authorized supplies to be allowed to reach Egypt’s encircled Third Army (IS17). Considerable U.S. pressure and the potential of Soviet troops being introduced into the conflict persuaded Israel to comply with the request. The decision unit was most likely a *single group*. The type of occasion for decision was two-fold. The first was the *exogenous shock* of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The second reason can be classified as *other*, which was the opportunity for Israel to achieve a primary goal: ending the war.

**Summary and Discussion of Crisis Decisions**

The findings of the study revealed thirty-one key decisions during the crisis period, fourteen of which belonged to the United States and seventeen belonging to Israel. For the U.S. the type of decision unit that emerged in thirteen of the fourteen cases was *predominant leader*. In Israel, the type of decision unit was divided between *predominant leader* (seven) and *single group* (ten). The results of the Israeli case do not seem to support Hypothesis #1, which suggests that the decision unit will likely remain constant throughout the crisis period. However, in the case of the United States the decision unit did indeed remain constant after the first *single group* decision and throughout the period. If one considers all of the decisions taken during the time period, it appears that the type of decision unit is just as likely to change throughout the course of a crisis event as it is to stay constant. In other words, a summary of the decision units does not indicate whether the same type of decision structure (unit) will make all decisions regarding the same foreign policy problem.
The classification of some of the decision units may be confusing or contradictory and thus warrants some clarification, specifically the decisions that pertain to granting governmental authority to another actor. The Israeli Cabinet twice gave authorization on decision-making: one to the prime minister and defense minister regarding the mobilization of the IDF, and the other to the chief of staff regarding a counter-attack. The decisions eventually taken by the prime minister regarding mobilization (IS2 and IS3) were included in my analysis, whereas Elazar's decision involving a counter-offensive was not. While all three decisions were of consequence to the prosecution of the war, evidence suggests that Elazar did not actually make a decision on his own, but rather continued to consult with the prime minister and brief the Cabinet for approval on every major military strategy (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976). The decisions of the Cabinet to launch offensives against both Egypt and Syria are included (IS9, IS10, and IS12), with the decision units classified as a *single group* as Elazar did not exercise his authority to make decisions on a counter-attack.

In a U.S. decision of a similar nature, President Nixon explicitly granted authorization to Kissinger to negotiate a cease-fire with the Soviets (US8). Like Meir, Kissinger did not hesitate to exercise this authority and acted as *predominant leader* on at least one occasion – i.e. Kissinger refused to discuss a comprehensive peace plan at this stage of negotiations (US10).

*United States*
# TABLE 5.1. U.S. Crisis Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Decision Unit</th>
<th>Type of Occasion for Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to ask Soviets to take a neutral stand with the US to get fighting stopped</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>External shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to provide missiles and ammunition to Israel; must be in unmarked Israeli planes</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>New information; External shock; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to have American civilian planes chartered by the DoD deliver supplies</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>Negative feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10 October 1973</td>
<td>Approval to replace all aircraft lost by Israel and sending 5 new F-4 Phantom fighters</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>New information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>13 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to have American military planes expedite delivery of supplies</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>Negative feedback; New information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>19 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to grant Kissinger full authority to negotiate cease-fire</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Predominant Leader</td>
<td>Other</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>20 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision for Kissinger to propose a Washington-Moscow joint comprehensive peace plan &amp; impose it on Israel &amp; the Arabs</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>20 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to send presidential letter to Brezhnev informing him that Kissinger acts on behalf of the US</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>21 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to discuss with Soviets a simple cease-fire rather than comprehensive agreement</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>21 October 1973</td>
<td>Kissinger indicates to Israel that there could be some &quot;slippage&quot; in the cease-fire deadline</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>24 October 1973</td>
<td>Refusal of Sadat's invitation for US &amp; Soviet troops to enforce cease-fire</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>New information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>24 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to ask Sadat to withdraw request for Soviet &amp; US troops</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>New information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>24 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to reject the introduction of Soviet or US troops in region</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>New information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>25 October 1973</td>
<td>American forces and troops worldwide are put on higher state of alert - DefCon III</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>External shock</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A total of fourteen decisions were made by the United States during the crisis period, thirteen consisting of a predominant leader decision unit, with one decision (US1) made by a single group.

During the crisis period, Nixon and Kissinger were the dominant actors in U.S. decision-making, with Nixon having considerable institutional authority over U.S. foreign policy. The evidence suggests, however, that Kissinger imposed his preferences in the decision-making process as much as, if not more often than, the president (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 1977; Safran 1978). In this regard, Kissinger emerges as the predominant leader more often than does Nixon.

Nixon occasionally made decisions as the predominant leader that was contrary to Kissinger’s strategy. For example, Kissinger was scheduled to fly to Moscow (October 20) to negotiate a cease-fire agreement. While Kissinger was en route, Nixon sent a letter to Brezhnev (US8) indicating that Kissinger was acting on the president’s full authority. The president would support any decisions Kissinger made while in Moscow. Kissinger was furious about the letter. If certain aspects of the negotiations were not satisfactory, Kissinger wanted to be able to tell the Soviets that he would have to get “presidential approval” before he could agree to anything. Nixon effectively constrained Kissinger’s maneuverability. In addition, Nixon’s directive to Kissinger to propose a Washington-Moscow joint comprehensive peace plan and impose it on Israel (US7) was essentially ignored. Although it was well within Nixon’s authority to make such decisions, Kissinger actively sought to mitigate or even reverse decisions.
The normal constraints of Congressional approval did not appear to be of significant concern for President Nixon or Kissinger. This is exemplified in a telephone conversation with White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, where Ziegler iterated that Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield had issued a statement regarding the position of Congress. “[A]s far as the Congress is concerned, we support completely the course of action being undertaken by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.” This was significant for the Nixon administration since the Democrats held a majority in both houses.

There was little evidence that on October 6 or 7 Kissinger and Nixon discussed at length what equipment the US would provide to Israel. Discussions between Kissinger and Nixon focused heavily on the knowledge and reaction of the Soviet Union and whether or not the Soviets would request a meeting of the Security Council alongside the United States. Kissinger’s conversations regarding military aid to Israel were primarily with Alexander Haig and Arthur Schlesinger. The general consensus in Washington was that, based on prior conflicts between Israel and other Arab states, Israel should have no problem turning the tide of the war. There was overall no great concern about Israel’s military capabilities.
## TABLE 5.2. Israel Crisis Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Decision Unit</th>
<th>Type of Occasion for Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 October 1973</td>
<td>Prime Minister &amp; Defense Minister receive authorization to mobilize reserves</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>External shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision not to mobilize reserves</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Meir</td>
<td>External shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision for large-scale mobilization</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Meir</td>
<td>External shock; New information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision not to conduct a pre-emptive strike</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Meir</td>
<td>External shock; New information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to request emergency assistance and military supplies from US</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Meir</td>
<td>External shock; Negative feedback (IS4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7 October 1973</td>
<td>Cabinet authorized Chief of General Staff to decide about a counter-attack</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to conduct air strikes on military targets in the Syrian capital</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Meir</td>
<td>New information; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>9 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision for Meir to fly to Washington to plead Israel’s case for supplies</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Meir</td>
<td>Negative feedback (IS4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10 October 1973</td>
<td>Approval of plan to launch general attack on Syria</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>New information; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Crisis Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Decision Unit</th>
<th>Other Reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12 October 1973</td>
<td>Vote to postpone a decision to cross the Canal</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>12 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to accept a US suggestion for a cease-fire-in-place</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>14 October 1973</td>
<td>Approval of the proposal to cross the Canal</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>New information; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>21-22 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to accept US-Soviet call for a cease-fire</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>22 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to continue IDF operations if Egypt does not obey cease-fire</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>New information; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>23 October 1973</td>
<td>Approval for continued IDF advances on the west bank of Canal</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Meir</td>
<td>New information; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>26 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to accept a 2nd &amp; 3rd call for cease-fire</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>External shock; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>26 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to allow supplies to reach Egypt's encircled 3rd Army</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>External shock; Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were a total of seventeen key decisions during the crisis period, the first five resulting from *external shocks*. In seven decisions, the decision unit was identified as a *predominant leader*, while the *single group* was identified as the decision unit the other ten decisions.
The occasion for decision for IS1 and IS2 was the recognition that Egyptian and Syrian forces appeared to be mobilizing on the northern and southern Israeli fronts. This occasion could be classified as both new information and external shock. However, based on the decision-makers’ perceptions of an unlikely war, the occasion is coded as new information (although it did raise grave concerns with some leaders, particularly Prime Minister Golda Meir). The decision units that emerged as a result of the possible mobilization of forces were single group and predominant leader, respectively. Decision #1 was coded as single group due to the fact that Cabinet acted to authorize the prime minister to make the decision.

Defense Minister Dayan and Chief of Staff Elazar differed in opinion on more than one issue during the crisis period. As there was not always consensus within the Cabinet, Meir was often faced with having to decide herself among the options. As one Cabinet member described, “Golda had great authority. Once she decided and gave her reasons, the others would accept her decision” (Brecher 1980, 201; see also Ben-Meir 1986 and Brownstein 1977).

The following chapter provides the sequence of events for the crisis transition period (October 27, 1973 to September 1, 1975).
Notes: Chapter Five

1 According to Ahron Bregman (2013), the source of the intelligence was Gamal Abdel Nasser’s son-in-law, Ashraf Marwan.
4 The quote was taken from Golda Meir’s autobiography. However, transcripts of the Cabinet meeting at 8:00 on the morning of October 6 reflect the same sentiment.
10 According to Kissinger, the agreement was for the U.S. to fly the supplies into Germany and have Israeli planes pick them up.
12 Avner Cohen’s interview with Arnan Azaryahu occurred in 2008 shortly before Azaryahu’s death at the age of 91. Cohen admits an “epistemic gap between the testimony’s core and periphery.” For example, while Cohen states that the core was in focus (the context of what transpired was clear), some of the details of Azaryahu’s account could not have occurred on the date that he claims. However, Cohen maintains that the testimony provides not simply the essence of what was discussed at the meeting, but how Moshe Dayan’s frame of mind at the time explains why he would have made the proposal in the first place. No reference to a nuclear option appears in any of the sources used for this study. Moreover, there are no records, minutes, or official testimonies that corroborate Azaryahu’s account.
14 Ibid.
15 See National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 ARAB-IS; also, Transcript of telephone conversation between Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22, October 9, 1973.
17 For a detailed account of Elazar’s plan, see Hanoch Bartov’s (1981) Dado, 48 Years and 20 Twenty Days, pp. 470-471.
19 The joint U.S.-Soviet cease-fire agreement would become known as Resolution 338.
According to Kissinger (2003, 350), most of U.S. forces were at DefCon IV or V at that time, except for those in the Pacific, where forces were at a permanent DefCon III – a legacy of the Vietnam War. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, forces worldwide were elevated to DefCon III, while strategic forces were placed on a higher alert status, DefCon II (Allison and Zelikow 1999). DefCon II indicates the highest alert level short of war.


Victor Israelyan (1995) maintains that the U.S. overreacted to the letter. He reports that Brezhnev was surprised that the U.S. government would interpret the letter as anything but a Soviet plea to resolve the immediate issue of a cease-fire.

Chapter Six

Crisis Transition Decisions

Introduction

Near the conclusion of the Yom Kippur War the Syrian army had been pushed back beyond the 1967 borders and the IDF was positioned on the west bank of the Canal. The negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Sinai II Agreement were a slow and often frustrating process. While the Israeli prime minister and Cabinet remained the authoritative decision-makers during the negotiation phase, there was also the addition of a negotiating team as a decision-making group (Ben-Meir 1986; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976). The negotiating team consisted of Meir, Dayan, Foreign Minister Eban, and Deputy Prime Minister Allon. The team, therefore, was essentially an ad hoc committee composed of a limited number of Cabinet members. According to the stipulations of the DU framework, whether a decision is attributed to the Cabinet or the negotiating team, the decision unit would still be classified as a single group.

In addition to the changes mentioned above, both the Israeli and U.S. governments experienced regime change during the crisis transition period. In Israel Yitzhak Rabin succeeded Prime Minister Meir following her resignation in April 1974. Rabin had played no part in the decision-making during the war (Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). In the U.S., President Nixon resigned in August 1974 as a result of the Watergate scandal, with Gerald Ford ascending to the presidency. Neither Rabin nor Ford initially altered the foreign policy strategy of their respective predecessor, although Ford’s
approach was significantly different than that of Nixon (Quandt 1977). However, the internal shocks that occurred in each country would affect decision-making processes in both governments.

In his first address to the Knesset as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin issued his agenda regarding Israel’s relationships with her Arab neighbors. Rabin reiterated that Israel would continue to strive for true peace, but realized that an eventual peace agreement could only be obtained in stages “through partial arrangements, which will ensure pacification on the battlefield by means of a cease-fire and thinning-out of forces, reducing the dangers of a flare-up or surprise attack.”¹ He cautioned that continued negotiations and a “dialogue toward peace” could only be accomplished if Egypt and Syria fulfill the requirements set out in the disengagement agreement signed during Meir’s government. Rabin stated that although his government endorsed peace negotiations with Egypt (as well as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon), he was adamantly opposed to returning to 1967 borders, “even within the context of a peace treaty.”²

Gerald Ford entered the White House on August 9, 1974, having served eight months as vice-president. He was a fiscal conservative, promoted a balanced budget, and was knowledgeable on the intricacies of governmental policies and programs. He spent two decades on the House defense appropriations committee and was, therefore, familiar with Nixon’s foreign policy agenda. However, Ford’s foreign policy approach was decidedly different from Nixon’s. Indeed, Yanek Mieczkowski (2005) observes that Ford was hardly the foreign policy mogul that Nixon had been. His strength lay in domestic politics. A strong proponent of containment, Ford was “openly hostile” and
“highly negative” toward the Soviet Union while a congressman, but seemed to favor détente once he became president (Mieczkowski 2005, 282).

**Sequence of Decisions**

The cease-fire agreement reached on October 26 was highly precarious and woefully inadequate. The cease-fire was simply the first step in an arduous journey to a more stable settlement (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977). Major issues in the negotiations included Israeli insistence on an exchange of prisoners and concerns over force dispositions in the Sinai and Golan Heights.

**October 30, 1973**

Prime Minister Meir had expressed the need to go to the United States and personally clarify Israel’s position on negotiations and explain the country’s immediate needs (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977). Meir also sought to garner Nixon’s direct support during the negotiation phase. The Cabinet authorized Meir to do so (IS18), and she left for the U.S. on October 31. As William Quandt (1977, 215) describes it, the meetings between Meir and Nixon and Kissinger were “chilly, if not hostile.” Rather than expressing her gratitude for U.S. aid, the prime minister voiced her disappointment at being deprived of victory by “friends.” Meir’s animosity seemed to be directed primarily toward Kissinger (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977; Siniver 2008). In spite of the uneasy environment, it was during these meetings that Kissinger and Meir hammered out a draft of the six-point agreement between Egypt and Israel (Brecher 1980).³ The
Cabinet’s decision to authorize Meir’s visit was made by a *single group*. The occasion for decision was strategic initiative and, therefore, classified as *other*.

**November 8, 1973**

On November 6 and 7 Kissinger met with Sadat in Cairo with the draft of the six-point agreement. Kissinger was able to persuade Sadat to accept the agreement as it was written, even convincing him to drop the issue of the October 22 lines (Quandt 1977). Following the secretary’s meeting with Sadat, two of Kissinger’s aides went to Israel to hammer out the details. With little modification, the Cabinet approved the six-point agreement – IS19 (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977). The accord was signed on November 11 by Israeli and Egyptian military representatives at Kilometer 101, a point along the Cairo to Suez road (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977; Rabinovich 2004). The decision unit for IS19 is classified as *single group*, while the occasion for decision is *other* (strategic).

**November 25-28, 1973**

On November 25, the Israeli Cabinet decided to participate in the opening session of the Geneva Peace Conference (IS20), under specific conditions (Brecher 1980). According to Minister Abba Eban (1977), who dictated the terms to Kissinger, Israel did not wish to enter into substantive discussions at the conference before the general elections on December 31. In addition, Israel would not discuss the Palestinian issue nor approve the presence of a separate Palestinian delegation at the conference (see also, Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Quandt 1977).
Based on a survey of several secondary sources (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Eban 1977; Quandt 1977), the Israeli decision to participate, at least conditionally, in the Geneva Conference was likely taken by the Cabinet, acting as a single group. Since the assessment is that Kissinger pressured Israel to suspend the military talks and continue negotiations under U.S. auspices, the occasion for decision can be classified as other. The decision to participate in the conference was strategic in nature, as Kissinger asserted that arriving at a broader peace plan would have a better chance of success if the U.S. were involved in the negotiations (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2001; Stein 2013).

Kilometer 101 had been the site for negotiations between Israel and Egypt prior to the signing of the six-point agreement. The talks, headed by Israeli General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian General Mohammed el-Gamasy, began on October 28 and ended on November 29. As far as the negotiations and decision-making were concerned, General Yariv had only the authority to propose or concede points which had been previously approved by the Cabinet – reference Israeli Decision #19 (Ben-Meir 1986; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). The primary task was to establish the basis of a military disengagement agreement and then to hammer out the logistics of implementing that agreement (Brecher 1980; Eban 1977; Quandt 1977). The details were regularly presented to the Israeli and Egyptian governments for approval (Stein 2013).

The negotiations between Yariv and el-Gamasy on finalizing the disengagement seemed to be progressing (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977; Stein 2013). Some scholars argue that Kissinger strove to convince Israel of the importance of Geneva in the
process of negotiations and to make sure the U.S. was a central figure in any progress (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977, 2001; Siniver 2008; Stein 2013). In a conversation with Ambassador Dinitz earlier in November, Kissinger voiced his displeasure with the type of forum in which the negotiations were taking place. Dayan did not support these talks because he too believed that the U.S. should be involved in such negotiations (Dayan 1976). At the behest of Kissinger, General Yariv was ordered to suspend talks with Egypt at Kilometer 101 (Fischer 2014; Isaacson 1992; Parker 2001; Quandt 2001; Sachar 2010; Stein 2013). Although Sadat publicly claimed that he was suspending the military talks because they were “not to his liking” (Stein 2013, 226; see also Brecher 1980), most accounts maintain that it was Israel who officially ended the negotiations (Dayan 1976; Eban 1977; Fischer 2014; Parker 2001; Sachar 2010; Stein 2013). According to General Yariv, the talks at Kilometer 101 ended because Israel wanted to put a “political stamp on what were talks between officers on a military agreement” (Brecher 1980, 307). Yariv also claims that it was Kissinger’s interest in making the Kilometer 101 talks part of the overall negotiations on disengagement that prompted Israel to withdraw from the direct talks with Egypt (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Eban 1977; Quandt 1977). The decision to recall Yariv from Kilometer 101 and suspend the military talks (IS21) was most likely made by the Israeli Cabinet, acting as a single group. The occasion for decision, Kissinger’s insistence on moving the talks to Geneva, is the same as for IS20 and classified as other.

There were also elements of negative feedback in prompting the decision to recall Yariv. Kissinger’s instance on conducting negotiations in Geneva could be considered negative feedback to the direct talks at Kilometer 101. In addition, Dayan’s
initial disapproval of the forum under which the negotiations were conducted intensified as the talks progressed. He felt Israel was on the verge of making “vital concessions...without a suitable settlement” (Dayan 1976, 451; see also Brecher 1980, 307). While the decision to send military officers to negotiate a disengagement of forces was not unprecedented (a decision which was not included as a key decision in this study), the progression of the talks at Kilometer 101 raised concerns among some decision-makers in the United States and Israel, which could be considered negative feedback from a previous Israeli decision.

December 16-17, 1973

Once the six-point agreement was reached on November 11, Kissinger felt there was sufficient momentum to begin planning for a Geneva Peace Conference (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). On December 6 and 7, Dayan met with Kissinger in Washington. The purpose of the trip was to discuss problems regarding some equipment Israel had previously requested, but also to present his personal view, for which he had the approval of the prime minister, of a disengagement agreement (Brecher 1980). Kissinger had received tentative consent of Israel's participation (IS20) in late November, but the conditions set out in that approval had still not been met. The Cabinet decided to accept the U.S.-Soviet request to start negotiations at Geneva before Knesset elections. The approval of its participation in the Geneva Conference stipulated that Israel would not sit in the same room with Syria's delegation unless Syria released the list of POWs (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977). His talks with Syrian President Hafez Assad, however, were not as productive.
On December 6, Kissinger announced that a conference on Arab-Israeli negotiations would likely convene in Geneva on December 18. Although Kissinger was successful in convening the Geneva conference, the effort resulted only in formal remarks that laid out Kissinger’s step-by-step strategy, beginning with the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as an essential first step (Quandt 1977). To complicate the ensuing negotiations, Syrian forces were placed on a high alert status in late December, the oil embargo continued, and OPEC doubled oil prices.

_Elections for the Knesset were held on December 31. The opposition gained some seats, but not to where it would necessitate selecting a new prime minister or cabinet. The elections did not seem to fundamentally affect the Meir government’s stance on negotiations or the configuration of foreign policy decision-makers._

**January 2, 1974**

The Geneva Conference lasted just one day, consisting of primarily formal remarks from the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. Kissinger then presented his step-by-step strategy, after which the conference was adjourned (Quandt 1977 and 2001). While the meeting at Geneva did not result in any substantive progress regarding negotiations, it presaged the first disengagement agreement (Sinai I) between Israel and Egypt in January 1974. The Cabinet authorized Dayan to place before Kissinger Israel’s conditions for disengagement agreement with Egypt (IS24). The Defense Minister flew to Washington and met with Kissinger on January 4 and 5. The positive tone of the meetings prompted the suggestion that Kissinger visit Egypt.
and Israel to continue the negotiations. The decision unit is classified as single group. The occasion for decision is other.

January 9, 1974

Following his meetings with Dayan, Kissinger decided to go to Egypt with a revised Israeli plan for disengagement agreement (US17). The trip required the consent of Sadat, which Kissinger received around January 9 or 10. The trip was the start of Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy. The decision unit is predominant leader. The occasion for decision was new information (Dayan’s visit) and positive feedback (the suspension of talks at Kilometer 101).

January 15, 1974

The Cabinet decided, on Meir’s initiative, to abandon Israel’s demand for clear-cut Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency. As any agreement would require the approval of the Cabinet, it is most likely that the decision to drop the verbiage on non-belligerency was probably made by a single group. Opinions within the Cabinet differed on whether Israel should accept anything less than an Egyptian promise of nonaggression (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Eban 1977), but Kissinger convinced Meir to concede and accept the less offensive phrase, “maintenance of the cease-fire” (Brecher 1980, 319; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982). The occasion for decision can be classified as either other – a strategic initiative to move the talks forward – or negative feedback – Egypt’s refusal to acquiesce to the original demand.

January 17, 1974
The Cabinet decided to accept the Disengagement Agreement (Sinai I Agreement) with Egypt. The Cabinet acted as a single group, and the occasion for decision was strategic in nature and classified as other.

Israel and the United States signed a detailed 10-point memorandum of understanding. In letters exchanged between Nixon and both Sadat and Meir, force limitations were agreed upon. The role of the United States would be to perform reconnaissance flights at regular intervals in order to monitor the agreement. The results were to be made available to both sides (Quandt 2001). The decision unit is a single group. The occasion for decision is classified as other as the commitment of resources reflect the overall strategy of establishing influence in the Middle East.

On February 6, the House of Representatives authorized an investigation to determine whether grounds existed for an impeachment of President Nixon. The announcement of the investigation did not seem to have a significant impact on negotiations. On February 9, Syria agreed to the exchange of POWs with Israel (Quandt 2001).

Although the exchange of POWs was a positive step in the Israel-Syria negotiations, Arab leaders felt more progress could be made and decided to delay lifting the oil embargo until such time.

While President Nixon continued to deal with political difficulties at home, the Israeli government would face troubles of their own in the spring of 1974. On April 1, the Agranat Commission published the interim report on the failures of the Yom Kippur War. The report blamed COGS Elazar, Intelligence Chief Eli Zeira, and Gonen for failing to
prepare the army for war and for the operations intelligence failures. The report essentially exonerated the prime minister and the defense minister. Meir, disturbed by the findings, resigned from office on April 11. On the day Meir resigned, a terror attack occurred in Kiryat Shmona, when the PFLP-GC entered an apartment building and killed all eighteen residents, half of them children. Many viewed the attack as an attempt to disrupt the Kissinger shuttle negotiations (Sachar 2010).

May 15, 1974

After more than thirty days of shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Syria, Kissinger was able to settle most of their differences. The only major issue remaining was a narrow strip of land around the town of Kuneitra, the most important urban center in the Golan (Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010). When neither Israel nor Syria was willing to move on this issue, Nixon ordered Brent Scowcroft to cut off all aid to Israel unless they immediately complied on the Syria disengagement agreement – US20 (Kissinger 1982, 1078). In a memo to the president, Kissinger strongly urged Nixon not to cut off aid. He argued that it would be a “grotesque error” to put all the blame on Israel, and to cut off aid would be “disastrous.” It seems Nixon clearly acted as the predominant leader in this decision. Some argue that the threat of the impending impeachment was largely responsible for Nixon’s response (Rabil 2006). The occasion for decision is thus classified as other.

Israel experienced another terror attack on May 15 when Palestinian militants crossed the border from Lebanon and killed two Israeli-Arab women, a couple and four-
year-old son. The militants held 105 students and ten teachers hostage. Twenty-five hostages were killed, twenty-two of them children.

May 29, 1974

On May 29, the Israeli Cabinet decided to accept the Israel-Syria disengagement agreement (IS29). Unlike the outcome of the war for the Egyptians, Syria suffered an “unqualified defeat” (Brecher 1980, 321-22; see also Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010). The primary issues in the negotiations were Israel’s insistence on a list of prisoners of war (POWs) – which was resolved in February earlier that year, the size of a United Nations Buffer zone, and Syria’s demand for the immediate return of part of the Golan (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977; Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010). Israel eventually conceded and agreed to divide Kuneitra. On May 18, Syria accepted the conditions.5 The Cabinet approved the agreement (IS29), and it was signed in Geneva on June 5, 1975. The decision unit is classified as single group. The occasion for decision is classified as positive feedback – the Israeli concessions produced a positive response – and other (strategic).

On June 3, Rabin informed the Knesset that future negotiations with Egypt would not include a return to the 1967 borders. Additionally, he reiterated that any agreement must require Egypt to forgo “maintenance of the state of belligerence.”6

June 14-17, 1974

During a trip to the Middle East in June 1974, Nixon made two key promises (decisions) that alarmed some in his administration (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982;
Crisis Transition Decisions

Quandt 1977). The first decision was Nixon’s promise of American technology for Egypt and implied that the U.S. would help Egypt build a nuclear power plant as a reward to accepting the agreement. Then two days later on June 17, Nixon promised Israel assistance with nuclear energy (US21). The promises seemed to stem from his own strategic initiative, which would classify the occasion for decision as other. Therefore, in both instances, Nixon acted as predominant leader.

Yigal Allon, who became Foreign Minister under the Rabin government, publicly downplayed the risk of Nixon’s proposed sale of an American nuclear reactor to Egypt. In protest to Allon’s statements, on June 19, the Knesset took a vote of “no confidence” on a motion by the Likud and National Religious Party. The vote was defeated 60-50.

On August 8, 1974, President Nixon announced his resignation. The entire Watergate affair took a personal toll on Nixon and was politically devastating. The impeachment proceedings and Nixon’s subsequent resignation created a constitutional crisis for the United States. For the first several months and with the guidance of his cabinet, Ford concentrated on regaining some political respect for the office of the presidency (minutes of cabinet meeting – 10 August 1974; 10:07 a.m.). His time was consumed with finding a new Vice President, setting up his organizational structure (i.e., communications between the White House and the Cabinet and other aspects of intergovernmental relations). Ford wanted to be able to focus on domestic problems, which had been put on the back burner since the Watergate scandal (Quandt 2001). Ford was kept informed of developments regarding Middle East negotiations, but did not personally involve himself in the process. It was not simply that the new president was
occupied with other, more pressing obligations. According to William Quandt, foreign policy was not Ford’s area of expertise.

Domestic troubles continued for Israel during the summer months of 1974. On June 24 Palestinian militants again launched an attack. They infiltrated Nahariya by sea from Lebanon and killed three civilians and one soldier. A little more than two months later, September 8, a TWA jet from Tel Aviv to Athens crashed, killing all eighty-eight passengers aboard. The cause of the crash was a bomb detonated by PFLP militants.

Between the decisions of June 17 and October 17, the international community witnessed a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the U.S. president being charged with obstruction of justice.

Throughout this period communications continued between the United States and both Egypt and Israel.

October 17, 1974

Ford and Kissinger discussed on several occasions the aid packages that the U.S. might offer Egypt as incentive to accept the second disengagement agreement. Despite potential constraints from Congress, President Ford promised in a letter to Sadat that he would push for $250 million in assistance for Egypt (US$22). The decision unit is classified as single group, based on several memoranda of conversation between Ford and Kissinger. The occasion for decision is classified other (tactical).
On November 19 Palestinian militants attacked the city of Beit She’an, killing four civilians. The following March, the Savot Hotel was attacked by Fatah, where eight of thirteen hostages and three Israeli soldiers were killed.

March 3, 1975

Based on what Ford and Kissinger believed to be movement toward Israeli territorial concessions, Ford authorized Kissinger to go to the Middle East and negotiate on behalf of the United States (US23) (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). The decision unit is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is classified as other.

March 19, 1975

A statement issued by the Israeli government on March 20 explained the recent impasse in the Israel-Egypt negotiations. After another round of shuttle diplomacy failed to produce any movement toward an interim agreement. In a terse letter from the U.S. president, Ford urged Israel to accept Egypt’s latest offer or the United States may have to reassess its policy. Despite the deadlock on the second interim agreement, and perhaps in light of Ford’s letter, the Israeli Cabinet decided to authorize its negotiating team to continue negotiations (IS28). The decision unit is single group, and the occasion for decision is classified as other, as Israel hoped to stave off a U.S. decision of reassessment (Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014).

March 24, 1975

Following Kissinger’s return to the United States, President Ford, on Kissinger’s recommendation, publicly ordered a reassessment of America’s Middle East policy and
relationship with Israel (US25). The decision unit is classified as single group, and the occasion for decision is both negative feedback – not as a result of one specific decision but rather the failure of shuttle diplomacy and the general inability to move negotiations forward – and other – a strategic decision intended to influence the negotiating process. This development is also considered as an exogenous shock for Israel, given the historic relationship between the two countries.

The Cabinet responded to Ford’s announcement of the reassessment and decided to suspend talks on the second disengagement agreement (IS29). The decision came less than a month after Rabin was authorized to continue negotiations. The decision unit for IS29 is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is classified as external shock, as well as negative feedback.

During a one-month period of time in 1975, the United States experienced two external shocks that proved to be both morally and politically distressing. On April 30, Saigon finally fell to the Communist North Vietnam. South Vietnam surrendered unconditionally (Kissinger 2003). Then less than two weeks later on May 12, Khmer Rouge forces in Cambodia seized the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. The ship and its occupants were rescued by U.S. Navy and Marines on May 15, but forty-one Americans lost their lives in the incident. Following a trail of failed foreign policies – i.e. setbacks in the Middle East negotiations and the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists – the rescue of the Mayaguez, as costly and sloppy as it was, had a decidedly positive affect on Ford’s public opinion. The rescue showed that the United States was still willing and able to apply
the use of force. Ford recalled later that the incident was a much-needed “shot in the arm...when we really needed it” (Isaacson 1992, 651).

On March 30, less than a week after Ford ordered a reassessment of Middle East policy, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announced that he would authorize the reopening of the Suez Canal, which had been closed since the 1967 Six-Day War (Associated Press 1975). An article that appeared the following day clarified that Israeli ships would be barred from passing through the Canal. While the announcement of the opening was a positive step on the part of Sadat, the U.S. and Israeli governments were skeptical about Sadat’s motives or whether Israeli ships would have access to the Canal (Associated Press 1975; Kissinger; Rabin 1996;

A review of Memoranda of Conversation revealed that, between Ford’s announcement of a reassessment on Middle East policy and the decision to resume the Sinai II negotiations, Kissinger, Scowcroft, and the president regularly discussed developments in the region and America’s strategic options. By the end of April, these discussions centered on the increasing possibility of another war between the Arabs and Israelis. On 21 May, Ford received a letter signed by 76 senators, which urged him to be “responsive to Israel’s economic and military needs” (Quandt 1977, 270).

Preventing another war seemed to be the greater priority, and, despite the recent strain on the U.S.-Israel relationship, both Ford and Kissinger agreed that the U.S. would need to reestablish negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Ford decided he would also participate in talks with Rabin and Sadat.
On June 4, the Suez Canal reopened. That same day in a statement to the Knesset, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon announced the reduction of Israeli troops near the Canal.

June 1975

By early June 1975, Ford and Kissinger decided to resume formal negotiations with Israel and Egypt – US26 (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2001). Kissinger was concerned about the increasing tensions in the region and the possibility of renewed hostilities, concerns which were compounded by the letter signed by 76 senators urging the U.S. to be “responsive to Israel’s economic and military needs” (Quandt 1977, 270). Additionally, domestic pressure seemed to help propel Ford and Kissinger’s decision to resume negotiations. Kissinger’s confidence in being able to conclude an agreement, though, had been eroded by the stagnation of talks earlier that year. During his last visit with the Israeli government, prior to the decision to reassess Middle East policy, Kissinger told Rabin that the U.S. was losing control over events and that, in essence, the effort to reach any agreement had failed (Isaacson 1992).

However, according to several conversations that took place between May 24 and June 5, 1975, Kissinger and Ford regularly discussed various contingencies and ways in which an agreement might be reached. In none of the conversations was the possibility of not being able to bring both parties to the negotiating table discussed. The timing of the decision coincided with, or perhaps was prompted by, Rabin’s trip to Washington scheduled for the second week in June. As Ford and Kissinger both agreed that an agreement was necessary, the decision unit in this case (US25) is classified as
Crisis Transition Decisions

*single group.* The occasion for decision is *new information* – indications from Israel that it would be willing to make some concessions – as well as *other.*

**June 8, 1975**

On June 8, the Cabinet adopted a resolution dealing with possible avenues to peace, and authorized Rabin to negotiate on Israel’s behalf (IS30). The resolution attempted to constrain Rabin’s ability to deviate from the government’s strategy in negotiations (Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). Rabin had intimated on several occasions that Israel may be willing to concede additional territory, including the passes and the oil fields, in return for Egypt’s declaration of non-belligerency (Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). The decision unit is classified as *single group.* The occasion for decision is strategic in nature and therefore classified as *other.* The occasion for decision can also be classified as *new information,* as Sadat had reopened the Suez Canal just days before the decision.

On June 11, Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador, the Minister of the Israeli Embassy, and the Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office met with Kissinger and Ford to discuss the different avenues toward an agreement. The consensus of all parties was that an interim agreement was preferable, and more likely to be reached, than an overall comprehensive agreement (Geneva Conference) at that time.

*On June 15, Palestinian militants entered a Jewish settlement and held a family hostage. Two civilians and one soldier were killed in the incident. A few weeks later, a terrorist detonated a booby-trapped refrigerator laden with explosives at Zion Square in*
downtown Jerusalem, killing fifteen people and wounding sixty-two others (Israel Security Agency 2010). The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility.

**August 16, 1975**

During June and July, Ford and Kissinger discussed on multiple occasions the progress of negotiations and the cost that U.S. might have to incur in order to reach an agreement. While the specifics of military force withdrawal were a primary issue in the negotiations, Israel was also asking for a significant aid package from the United States. The original request amounted to a little more than $2.5 billion in military and economic assistance. After several months of stagnation, Kissinger and Ford agreed to push for a $2.1 billion aid package for Israel (US27). The occasion for decision is classified as *other*, and the decision unit is *single group*.

The negotiating team agreed to withdraw from the Mitla and Gidi passes in exchange for Egypt’s renouncing the use of force and an unprecedented amount of U.S. aid. In addition, the United States agreed to man three warning stations in the Sinai. On August 31, the Cabinet approved Sinai II Agreement (IS31).8 The decision to accept the agreement was in part a result of positive feedback from the decision to give up some of its territory. Louise Fischer (2014) argues, however, that the territory Israel was willing to concede in August 1975 was little more than it had agreed to in October 1974. The primary incentives for Israel was the $2 billion aid package from the United States, a guaranteed oil supply, and the positive steps taken by Sadat (Fischer 2014).

*On September 1, 1975, Henry Kissinger signed a Memorandum of Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding with Israel for future military and financial aid and*
Crisis Transition Decisions

monitoring of the early warning system in the Sinai. The memoranda demonstrated to Israel America’s long-term commitment to its security. The points laid out in the Sinai II Agreement provided the foundation for the negotiations at Camp David. In addition, the signing of the agreement signaled to both Israel and Egypt that each side was willing to give up the use of force in order to resolve disputes (Fischer 2014).

Summary and Discussion of Crisis Transition Decisions

United States

The United States made fourteen decisions during the crisis transition period, six taken by a predominant leader and eight by a single group decision unit. While Kissinger acted as predominant leader in the first two of six such decisions during the crisis transition period, Presidents Nixon and Ford were responsible for the other four. Ford made only one decision as predominant leader when he authorized Kissinger to go to the Middle East and negotiate on behalf of the United States (US23). The three decisions Nixon took during the transition phase were extreme attempts to reach a settlement and, like his decisions in the crisis period, were contrary to Kissinger’s recommendations. Nixon and Kissinger made one decision as a single group: agreeing to and signing a Memorandum of Understanding promising a U.S. commitment in the Middle East (US16).
### Table 6.1. U.S. Crisis Transition Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Decision Unit</th>
<th>Type of Occasion for Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>28 November 1974</td>
<td>Kissinger convinces Israel and Egypt to suspend talks at KM 101 in favor of a Geneva Conference</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>Other - strategic initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>9 January 1974</td>
<td>Decision for Kissinger to go to Egypt with a revised Israeli plan for disengagement agreement</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Kissinger</td>
<td>New information; Positive feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>17 January 1974</td>
<td>U.S. signs a Memorandum of Understanding promising US commitment in Middle East</td>
<td>Single group - Nixon &amp; Kissinger</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>15 May 1974</td>
<td>Decision to cut off all aid to Israel unless they immediately comply on the Syria disengagement</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>14 June 1974</td>
<td>US promises Egypt American Technology &amp; implied a nuclear power plant as reward to agreement</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>17 June 1974</td>
<td>US promises Israel assistance with nuclear energy</td>
<td>Predominant leader - Nixon</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>17 October 1974</td>
<td>Promise to Sadat that US will push for $250m in assistance for Egypt</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Decision Summary</td>
<td>Leader Type</td>
<td>Other - Strategic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1975</td>
<td>Authorization for Kissinger to go to Middle East and negotiate on behalf of the US</td>
<td>Predominant</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 March 1975</td>
<td>Decision to reassessment America's Middle East policy &amp; relationship with Israel</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Negative feedback; Other - tactical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1975</td>
<td>Decision to resume formal negotiations</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>New information; Other - strategic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1975</td>
<td>Decision to push for $2.1b aid package for Israel</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1975</td>
<td>Decision to resume shuttle diplomacy</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Positive feedback; New information; Other - strategic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 1975</td>
<td>Kissinger signs a MoA &amp; MoU with Israel for future military &amp; financial aid &amp; monitoring early warning system</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Half of the U.S. decisions during the crisis transition period were made under the Ford administration and, as noted previously, all but one decision unit was classified as *single group*. 
Israel

All but two of the decision units associated with Israeli decisions during the transition period can be classified as *single group*. Twelve of the eighteen decisions were made when Meir served as prime minister; the others were taken under the Rabin government. The types of occasion for decision included three instances of *negative feedback* and one instance of *new information*. Fourteen decisions were based on the classification *other*, which were generally of a strategic or tactical nature. Two decisions were based on multiple types of occasions.

### TABLE 6.2. Israel Crisis Transition Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dec. No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Decision Unit</th>
<th>Type of Occasion for Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>30 October 1973</td>
<td>Decision to authorize Meir's visit to US to enlist Nixon's direct support</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>8 November 1973</td>
<td>Approval of amended version of the Six-Point Agreement</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Positive feedback; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>25 November 1973</td>
<td>Decision to participate in opening session of Geneva Peace Conference</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>28 November 1973</td>
<td>Decision to end talks with Egypt at Kilometer 101 regarding the separation of forces</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Transition Decisions</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td>16-17 December 1973</td>
<td>Decision to accept US-Soviet request to start negotiations at Geneva before Knesset elections</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td>17 December 1973</td>
<td>Decision to participate in Geneva Conf but not to sit in same room with Syria's delegation unless Syria releases list of POWs</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - tactical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td>2 January 1974</td>
<td>Decision to authorize Dayan to present to Kissinger Israel's conditions for disengagement agreement with Egypt</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td>15 January 1974</td>
<td>Decision to abandon Israel's demand for clear-cut Egyptian declaration of nonbelligerency</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Negative feedback; Other - strategic initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td>17 January 1974</td>
<td>Decision to accept the Disengagement Agreement with Egypt</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Positive feedback; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td>~29 May 1974</td>
<td>Approval of Israel-Syria disengagement agreement</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Positive feedback; Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td>19 March 1975</td>
<td>Decision to support continued negotiations despite deadlock on second agreement</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>Other - strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
<td>24 March 1975</td>
<td>Decision to suspend talks</td>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>External shock; Negative feedback</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30 June 1975
Adoption of resolution dealing with possible avenues to peace, Rabin authorized to negotiate on Israel's behalf
Single group
New information; Other - strategic

31 August 1975
Approval of Sinai II Agreement
Single group
Positive feedback; Other - strategic

In the crisis transition period challenges facing Israel were primarily of the domestic nature. Numerous terror incidents fueled the concerns for national security and occupied much of the government’s attention. Only two primary exogenous shocks occurred during the transition period that affected Israeli foreign policy: the reopening of the Suez Canal in June 1975 and the U.S. decision to reassess its foreign policy toward Israel. Both events likely influenced the decision to resume negotiations between Israel and Egypt.

In March 1975, the sticking points to an interim agreement were: (1) how far Israel would have to withdraw and the extent of the Egyptian advance; (2) the Israeli early warning system at Um Hashiva; and (3) the duration of the agreement. Gerald Ford sent a letter to Rabin stating that “failure of the negotiations will have a far-reaching impact on the region and on our relations. I have given instructions for a reassessment of United States’ policy in the region, including our relations with Israel, with the aim of ensuring that overall American interests...are protected. You will be notified of our decision” (Rabin 1979, 200). Whatever the effect Ford intended, the
letter made even the “most hesitant members of the Cabinet” resolve that the negotiating team remain adamant on its policy.

According to several accounts, the U.S. decision to reassess policy in the region did not induce Rabin to reconsider his position on restarting negotiations (Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014; Rabin 1996). Even a suspension of military contracts between the U.S. and Israel did not resolve the impasse. Rabin stated that his “desire to achieve an interim agreement with Egypt rested upon my perception of Israel’s needs, rather than on any wish to placate the United States” (Rabin 1996, 261). It was Sadat’s expressed interest in restarting negotiations that prompted Rabin to accept an invitation to go to Washington in June 1975 (Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014; Rabin 1996).

The reopening of the canal in June 1975, while a seemingly positive development, also did not appear to influence Israeli decision-makers (Derfler 2014; Rabin 1996). In a speech addressed to the Knesset on June 4, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon noted that the opening of the canal was an important and constructive act that could aid in the easing of tension in the region, of which Israel had a great interest. However, Allon also recognized that the opening of the canal would have the greatest benefit to Egypt.9

Chapter Seven discusses the results of the hypotheses and compares the decision unit dynamics between the United States and Israel. The next chapter also explores the differences in decision unit dynamics between the crisis and crisis transition periods.
Notes: Chapter Six


2 Ibid.

3 According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the six-point agreement stipulated that (1) Egypt and Israel observe the cease-fire called for by the UN Security Council; (2) discussions between them would begin immediately regarding the return to the October 22 positions; (3) the town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water, and medicines; (4) there would be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank of the Canal; (5) Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would be replaced by UN checkpoints; and (6) there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war following the establishment of the UN checkpoints.

4 Kissinger’s claim that Nixon ordered aid to Israel to be cut off is substantiated in a May 15, 1974, Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to President Nixon. Scowcroft relays Kissinger’s assessment that doing so would be “disastrous in terms of the immediate negotiation, the long-term evolution and the U.S. position in the Middle East.” National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 45, HAK Trip Files, Middle East Memos and Security, April 28-May 31, 1974.

5 The Israeli demand for a cessation of terror activity in the Golan was refused by President Assad. It was only after the U.S. agreed to a memorandum of understanding that the United States would not consider any actions taken by Israel in defense against “raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation line” as violations of the cease-fire agreement, and that the United States would support Israel politically (Brecher 1980, 323-24).


7 National Security Adviser’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Box 1, Folder “Egypt – President Sadat (1).”

8 At the time the agreement was signed, Israeli law did not require treaties and agreements to be approved by the Knesset, only that the Knesset needed to be notified of such agreements within thirty days.


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Chapter Seven

Results and Comparisons

Summary of Decisions, Units, and Occasions for Decision

Table 7.1 illustrates the number and type of decision units associated with the decisions. The *predominant leader* decision unit emerged in twenty-six decisions (twenty during the crisis and six in the transition period), while the *single group* type occurred in thirty-three of the decisions. The *coalition* decision unit did not appear as the authoritative body in any of the sixty-two decisions.

TABLE 7.1. Decision Unit by Type and Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis decisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant leader</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transition decisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant leader</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single group</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results of Hypotheses

Decision Units

The first two hypotheses relate to the types of decision unit that emerged during the decision process.

\( H_1: \) During sequential crisis decision-making, the nature and type of decision unit will remain constant throughout the duration of the crisis.

\( H_2: \) During sequential crisis decision-making, the decision unit will likely take the form of predominant leader or single group.

The results of the study regarding the consistency of the decision unit is mixed. During the crisis period, the decision units for the U.S. fell overwhelmingly into the predominant leader category (13 of 14), but they were evenly split, seven predominant leader and seven single group, during the crisis transition period. Conversely, Israeli decision units were divided during the crisis period (seven predominant leaders and ten single group decisions); and all of the decision units in the transition period were single group. Overall, the trend in the type of decision unit from crisis to crisis transition was a dramatic decrease in predominant leader decisions (20 during the crisis, six during the transition).

There could be several reasons for this discrepancy. One reason could be the institutional structures involved in foreign policy decision-making, as well as the often times ambiguous nature of leadership roles. In Israel’s parliamentary system, foreign
Results and Comparisons

Policy decisions and matters of national security are the responsibilities of the prime minister and his or her Cabinet.¹ And, according to Yehuda Ben-Meir (1986, 99), the final governmental authority – in the absence of an explicit Cabinet decision to the contrary – is the prime minister (see also Brownstein 1977). Foreign policy decisions, therefore, seem to depend on the leadership style of the prime minister, as well as the coalition of the Cabinet (Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). Meir, prime minister during the crisis period, enjoyed a significant majority in her coalition government, holding 72 of 120 seats in the Knesset, as opposed to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (transition period), who had only a one-vote margin in the Knesset when he won his party’s leadership election in 1974. Meir generally had the support of her Cabinet, whereas Rabin had to contend with two adversarial Cabinet members with whom he disagreed on many issues (Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014). In other words, Meir may have had some flexibility in exercising her authority, while Rabin did not.

As for the United States, foreign policy decision-making is generally conducted within the Executive Branch, which consists of the President and his subordinates (i.e., members of his Cabinet and various advisers). The Constitution signifies the President as the primary actor in matters of foreign policy, if he so chooses. However, because of the political problems that plagued the Nixon administration – i.e., Vice-President Agnew’s resignation and the Watergate scandal – Secretary of State Kissinger was the primary actor involved in managing the October crisis (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977, 2001). Where Nixon was distracted with domestic issues, his successor, Gerald Ford, seemed to be engaged in the foreign policy decision-making process.
(Quandt 1977). During the crisis period under the Nixon administration, Kissinger was able to take some liberties with decisions. This did not seem to be the case under Ford.

A second reason why the decision units may not be consistent across governments could be the position of the players in the course of events. Israel was directly involved in the conflict, whereas the United States was primarily involved in conflict resolution. The environment in which Israel had to make decisions was decidedly more stressful than that in the United States. The literature suggests that decision-makers under stress may seek support from a group of trusted associates who have a first-hand understanding of the immediate crisis (Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008; ‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997). In addition, Brecher’s (1980) study on crisis decision-making in Israel finds that as stress increases, so does the number of persons consulted. That is not to say that an increase in consultations implies group decision-making. Indeed, the evidence shows, and both Meir (1975) and Dayan (1976) admit, that it was the prime minister who was responsible for, and ultimately made, many of the decisions during the October crisis.

Brecher (1980) concludes that when stress is reduced in the environment, Israeli decision-makers return to routine procedures for choice – i.e., institutional versus ad hoc decision-making. Whether Meir merely consulted with the Cabinet or requested approval on a decision, Israeli leadership was confronted with an immediate physical threat to its security during the crisis period. With the possible exception of the nuclear alert, I would argue that the United States and Israel were operating under
Results and Comparisons

different fundamental threats and stress levels, which may have had an effect on the
type of decision unit that emerged during the crisis.

As for the crisis transition period, the evidence seems to support Brecher’s
(1980) assertion of a return to institutional decision-making. In fact, while a
comparison of the U.S. and Israeli decision units suggests that there may be slightly
different processes for policymaking, both governments moved toward an increase in
group decision-making during the crisis transition period.

As to Hypothesis #2, the findings seem to support the proposition that the
decision unit will likely take the form of predominant leader or single group during the
crisis and crisis transition periods. All of the decision units across both time periods and
both governments were either predominant leader (26 of 59 cases) or single group (33
of 59 cases). This is perhaps consistent with the literature that suggests that the
number of actors involved in crisis decision-making tends to contract (George 1980;
Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann 2001; ’t Hart 1990; Trumbore and Boyer
2000). However, because the DU framework indicates that a single group need only
consist of two members, it tells us nothing about the dynamic nature of the decision
unit – only that no one member alone can commit or withhold the resources of the
government.

In the Israeli instances where the predominant leader emerged (all during the
crisis period), it was Golda Meir who was identified as such. In the United States, the
predominant leader was not always the same individual. During the crisis period,
Kissinger emerged as the *predominant leader* in seven decisions, while Nixon was identified as such in six decisions.

During numerous telephone conversations, Nixon repeatedly told Kissinger that whatever he thought would be fine with him. He issued this remark regarding strategy and the oil embargo, military aid to Israel, and handling of détente with the Soviets. The instances where Nixon intervened on any of Kissinger’s decisions seemed to be when there was negative feedback from the press, when new information reached the President, or when decisions were not being implemented. William Quandt (1977, 130) asserts that, because of Nixon’s preoccupation with his “crumbling domestic base of support,” Kissinger was given considerable latitude in American diplomacy, particularly in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Quandt claims that Kissinger occasionally called on Nixon to invoke his presidential authority and kept Nixon informed at each stage. Kissinger also ignored presidential directives on occasion.

Gerald Ford also gave Kissinger some negotiating room with Israel and Egypt, but, unlike Nixon, Ford took a genuine interest in Middle East policy (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). And, although Kissinger heavily influenced foreign policy in the new administration, Ford chose to participate in the decision-making process. But because Kissinger did hold sway with Ford, the majority of decisions were made as a *single group*.

Since Meir resigned in April 1974 but stayed on in a caretaker capacity until the new government was formed in June, she was involved in ten of the fourteen decisions during the transition period. A comparison of the decision units alone from the Meir
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regime to Rabin’s government does not say anything about the nature of the decision-making process.

Occasions for Decision

The occasions for decisions are classified into six types: (1) external shock, (2) internal (domestic) shock, (3) positive feedback, (4) negative feedback, (5) new information, and (6) other. All of the types except for other are designed to address Hypotheses #3 through #7. The classification other incorporates all types of occasions for decision not otherwise specified. Where possible, I elaborate on the other category by providing some context as to the nature of the occasion for decision. For the purposes of the study, there is no differentiation between the various contexts, and the effects of the other category are not considered.

As might be expected, one decision is often the result of more than one type of occasion for decision. Indeed, the findings indicate that out of the sixty-two decisions taken, twenty were initiated by two or more types of occasions. Likewise, one occasion for decision can spawn multiple decisions and thus multiple decision units. Table 7.2 provides a data summary of the different types of occasions for decision associated with the conditions of the decision environment (i.e., crisis versus crisis transition).

The type of occasion for decision most often found in this study is other (forty-one out of ninety-one), forty-five percent of the total. New information category accounts for the second highest number of occasions with seventeen; external shocks was observed in twelve cases; negative feedback was identified in eleven instances; and positive feedback makes up only four of the ninety-one different occasions for decision.
The category *internal shocks* did not appear as the occasion in any of the identified decisions.

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**TABLE 7.2. Occasions for Decision by Type and Period**

| Type of Occasion for Decision | United States | | Israel | | Total |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------|---------|
|                              | Crisis        | Transition      | Crisis  | Transition |       |
| External shock               | 2             | 0               | 7       | 1         | 10     |
| Internal shock               | 0             | 0               | 0       | 0         | 0      |
| Positive Feedback            | 0             | 2               | 0       | 4         | 6      |
| Negative Feedback            | 2             | 1               | 2       | 2         | 7      |
| New information              | 6             | 3               | 7       | 2         | 18     |
| Other                        | 6             | 13              | 11      | 14        | 44     |
| Total                        | 16            | 19              | 27      | 23        | 85     |

It should not be surprising that the classification of *new information* appears overwhelmingly as the occasion for decision during the crisis period. In times of crises, particularly conflicts, events tend to develop quickly and new intelligence or new information is passed along to policymakers. Sometimes that information can be erroneous, and decision-makers must reevaluate or reconsider a previous decision. For example, on several occasions during the war, Israeli military advisers described a more optimistic picture of events on the front than what was actually taking place. Misleading or wrong information, although considered *new* by my typology, might also lead to
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decisions that produce negative feedback. Therefore, some occasions for decision identified as negative feedback could have been the result of incorrect information involved in an earlier decision.

This seemed to be the case in two instances for Israel. The Israeli decision not to preempt (IS4) was based in part on the assumption that the IDF could quickly recover and take the advantage. When Meir learned that military intelligence analysts significantly underestimated the enemy’s capabilities and intent, the prime minister expressed an increased sense of urgency in obtaining additional planes and tanks (IS5). Several days later, after there had been no movement on the supplies, Meir felt she needed to go Washington personally to plead Israel’s case (IS8).

Several of the hypotheses presented in this study seek to test whether certain factors affect change in the structure or nature of the decision unit, given a series of decisions regarding one problem or issue. These factors, while incorporated into the classification system representing different types of occasions for decision, can occur outside the purview of the occasion for decision variable. Put simply, the study does not rely solely on the type of occasion for decision to determine the effects of shocks or feedback on the decision unit. Classifying the occasion for decision attempts to facilitate the understanding of the relationship between an occasion for decision and the decision unit.

Feedback

Hypotheses #3, #4, and #5 pertain to the effects of feedback on the decision unit.
$H_3$: Positive feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy action will not likely alter the nature or type of decision unit of a given government.

$H_4$: Negative feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy action will not likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a government under crisis conditions.

$H_5$: Negative feedback from a foreign policy decision or policy action will likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a government during the transition period from a crisis to non-crisis.

Feedback prompted a decision to be taken or was instrumental in initiating a decision in thirteen instances. Seven decisions were the result of negative feedback, while six were classified as positive. Occasions for decision that are categorized as feedback (positive and negative) occurred about equally in the crisis and transition periods. As to the effects of feedback on the decision unit, in four instances negative feedback was the result of a previous key decision (two related to U.S. decisions; two related to Israel), none of which produced a structural change in the decision unit. Positive feedback occurred as the occasion for decision in two U.S. cases and four Israeli decisions, none of which resulted in a change in the type of decision unit.
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Positive feedback by itself did not seem to affect the type of decision unit in this study. Four of the six occasions of positive feedback pertain to the Israeli acceptance of various agreements throughout the crisis transition position (IS19, IS26, IS27, and IS31), and represent the culmination of demands and concessions from several rounds of negotiations. In none of the cases was positive feedback the result of a previous key decision used in this study.

The two instances of positive feedback in U.S. decisions also occurred in the crisis transition period, one of which can be linked to a previous key decision. The decision for Kissinger to resume his shuttle diplomacy in August 1975 (US27) seemed to be a result, at least in part, of the responsiveness to an earlier decision in June to resume formal negotiations (US25). Ford and Kissinger had separate talks with both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat in June 1975, and felt that the parties were receptive to the idea of moving forward (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). According to conversations between Kissinger and Ford, however, positive feedback was not the predominant reason to resume shuttle diplomacy. Both were concerned about the possibility of renewed hostilities if an agreement could not be reached. While this concern most likely played a large part in the decision to resume the shuttle, Kissinger would not have agreed to this decision had there not been progress in the June talks with Israel and Egypt.

Despite the absence of positive feedback as an occasion for decision, there obviously were positive developments throughout the crisis and transition periods. The talks at Kilometer 101 represented the first direct negotiations between Israel and
Egypt. Although the talks initially were a little tense, the two military leaders eventually relaxed and the negotiations progressed for a time (Brecher 1980; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977). The reopening of the Suez Canal was also a positive development. Sadat announced it in March 1975 and opened the Canal to ship traffic on June 4. The primary developments, and I would argue most significant, were the signing of Sinai I and II Disengagement Agreements.

While negative feedback generally did not cause a change in the types of decision units, there was one change in the configuration of the decision unit, which involved specific individual identified as the predominant leader. In U.S. Decision #5, Nixon emerged as the predominant leader as a result of the failed execution of Kissinger’s decisions (US2 and US3) to have aid delivered to Israel. Kissinger’s condition that equipment was to be picked up in unmarked Israeli planes (US2) and the subsequent decision to charter civilian planes (US3) were both problematic. It should be noted, however, that Kissinger did not anticipate the problems associated with the conditions. With each point of failure, Israel increased its pressure on the United States, specifically on the president. According to Quandt (1977), it was the Soviet airlift to Egypt and Sadat’s refusal to accept a cease-fire that prompted the decision to use American military aircraft to transport the equipment. In this regard, the occasion for decision could be classified as new information. However, if not for the failures in implementing Kissinger’s conditional decisions, Nixon’s ruling would not have been necessary.

By not conducting a pre-emptive strike, Israel was forced to take the full brunt of the Egyptian and Syrian attacks. The decision resulted in a greater loss than anticipated
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of military equipment (not to mention soldiers). It was the rapid depletion of equipment that caused Israel considerable concern of a protracted war, and thus placed greater emphasis and reliance on U.S. supplies. The decision not to pre-empt, therefore, resulted in negative feedback, which prompted two subsequent decisions: (1) the decision to request emergency assistance (IS5); and (2) Meir’s decision to fly to Washington (IS9). The decision unit classification (predominant leader) remained the same for each of the decisions, which would support Hypothesis #4.

Environmental Shocks

A total of twenty-six shocks occurred from the onset of the war until the signing of the Sinai II Agreement. According to the results displayed in Table 7.3, the United States witnessed seven external shocks (four during the crisis and three during the transition period), as well as six internal shocks (two in the crisis period and three in the transition phase). Israel faced the same number of exogenous shocks during the crisis, as did the United States and only one during the crisis transition period. Israel experienced no internal shocks during the crisis phase. All eleven endogenous events in Israel occurred during the transition period.

Hypotheses #6 and #7 propose that both internal and external shocks will affect change in the decision unit.

H6: Internal (domestic) shocks likely will alter the nature or type of decision unit under both crisis conditions and during the transition period from crisis to non-crisis.
Who Decides?

H7: External shocks likely will alter the nature or type of decision unit under crisis conditions and during the transition period from crisis to non-crisis.

Of the five internal shocks that occurred in the United States throughout both periods, four were related to the Watergate affair and Nixon's subsequent resignation. While none of the shocks appeared as occasions for decision in the study, all influenced the decision-making process and the decision units that appeared as a result. As stated previously, Nixon's domestic problems allowed for Kissinger's emergence as the predominant leader in many of the decisions. And his resignation during the transition period initiated a regime change where a new actor (Ford) emerged as one member, if not the member, of the authoritative decision unit.

Israel experienced eleven endogenous shocks during the time period studied, all occurring during the crisis transition period. Of the eleven shocks, nine incidents were militant attacks and two were related directly to the October war. Terror attacks were not uncommon events in Israel; however, there had not been a fatality on Israeli soil since June 1972 (Johnstonarchives.com). And, although more than forty Israeli citizens were killed as a result of the nine attacks during that time and the incidents were addressed in prime minister speeches to the Knesset, the events themselves did not appear to affect fundamental or dynamic changes in the decision units.

Conversely, the two internal shocks related to the crisis had a significant effect on the decision unit dynamic. The first was the release of the interim report, published by the Agranat Commission to determine the failures of the intelligence and military
establishments. The report exonerated Meir and Dayan of the responsibilities of the failures; however, Chief of General Staff David Elazar, head of military intelligence Major-General Eliz Zeira, and the Chief of Southern Command Major-General Shmuel Gonen were identified as the primary parties responsible for the operational intelligence failures and failing to prepare the army for war (Bar-Joseph 2006; Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010). Although the interim report absolved Meir and Dayan of direct, both submitted their resignations.

The publication of the interim report and the resignation of the prime minister are treated as two distinct internal shocks. The report prompted the resignation, and the resignation brought about the election of a new government. As in the case of the United States, the internal shocks themselves did not appear in the study as occasions for decision. Instead, they created a fundamental change in the decision-making body.

Although it did not appear as an occasion for decision in this study, internal shocks nonetheless had an effect on the dynamic of the decision unit. Indeed, there was a change in the actor vested with the authority to commit the state’s resources. New leadership in both countries brought with it new cabinet configurations, new ideas and new approaches to the problem. Rabin faced opposition within his Cabinet, while Meir less so, which created a more hostile decision-making environment. Ford was far more interested in the foreign affairs of the Middle East than was Nixon, and actively (and constructively) participated in the decision-making process. The results, therefore, seem to support Hypotheses #6. However, the type of decision unit did not change in response to regime change, only key members of the group.
A total of ten external shocks appeared as the occasion for decision during the crisis and crisis transition periods, three of which affected both the United States and Israel. The mobilization of the Egyptian and Syrian forces along the Israeli border, the initiation of hostilities, and the Soviet warning of unilateral military action threatened to destabilize security in the Middle East and disrupt the balance of power in the region. The three shocks shared by both governments initiated a series of ten decisions. The United States took three, and Israel took seven.

The mobilization of the Egyptian and Syrian forces prompted the decision of the Cabinet to authorize the prime minister to mobilize reserves (IS1), which Meir did not do (IS2). After receiving new intelligence that war was imminent, Meir made the decision for large-scale mobilization (IS3), but decided against pre-emption (IS4). In light of reports emanating from the front and in anticipation of a possible prolonged engagement, Meir decided to request military supplies from the U.S. (IS5). Of these first five decisions, Meir acted as predominant leader in four, with the authorization stemming from the first decision taken by the Cabinet (single group). Although the decision unit changed from single group to predominant leader after the first decision, the change was not a result of a new shock, but a consequent of the first decision itself. This suggests that, under normal conditions the Cabinet, acting as a single group, is the authoritative decision unit. When the external shock was recognized, the single group decision unit granted authority to a predominant leader. In this particular case, the evidence supports Hypothesis #7.
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For the United States, the mobilization of forces did not initiate a decision, but the commencement of hostilities did (US1) when the Nixon administration asked the Soviet Union to take a neutral stand alongside the U.S. The decision unit for the first decision was a single group. The second decision, to provide supplies to Israel in unmarked planes (US2), resulted in a change from a single group to predominant leader decision unit. Unlike the process in Israel, there was no decision-making body that officially granted Kissinger this authority. Although Nixon agreed to provide the supplies, he was not part of the unit that decided to stipulate the conditions of the delivery. As Kissinger took it upon himself to create the condition, the change in the type of decision unit for the United States was not a result of the external shock. As to whether the external shocks affected a change in the decision unit for the U.S., the results indicate that with the recognition of a crisis event, the size of the decision unit did contract, but only after an overall strategy was established.

It could be argued that all of the decisions made during the crisis period should be considered because all stemmed from the initial shock of the war. Indeed, none would have been necessary if not for the outbreak of hostilities. I argue, however, that there are additional variables and conditions that arise during the decision-making process that influence decision unit dynamics. Thus, while the entire crisis period, and the decisions which occurred therein, is a result of one external shock, it is important to determine which intervening variables might influence that dynamic. That said, a cursory review of the decision units that emerged during the crisis period in the United States reveal that, after the first decision (taken by a single group), all subsequent
decisions were made by a predominant leader. In this case, the findings support Hypothesis #7.

The third external shock shared by Israel and the United States involved the Soviet threat of unilateral military action. The United States made one key decision in response: Kissinger authorized the alert status to be raised to Defense Condition III. Although Kissinger consulted with multiple advisers and Cabinet members, there was no change in the type of decision unit for this decision. For the Israelis, the two decisions associated with the alert, acceptance of the cease-fire and allowing supplies to reach the Third Army, effectively ended the war. The decisions were taken by the Cabinet and thus constitute single group decision units. While there was a change from the type of decision unit found in the decision immediately preceding it, this was not likely the introduction of a new external shock, as the Cabinet made more than half of the decisions during the crisis period. As to the effects of external shocks on the decision unit, the findings of the Israeli case are inconclusive.

The only other external shock that seemed to be relevant to the decision-making process in this study occurred during the crisis transition period, when Ford announced the reassessment of U.S. policy toward the Middle East and its relationship with Israel. This event did not seem to change the decision unit type or alter the dynamics of the decision-making process – the Israeli Cabinet took all of the decisions during the crisis transition period – but it did cause the Cabinet to announce the suspension of negotiations (IS29). (See Appendix for Environmental Shocks Tables 7.3 and 7.4)
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As to whether the evidence from this case study supports Hypothesis #7, the findings are mixed. In the crisis period, the shock of the war prompted an initial change in the authoritative decision unit, but it did not persist throughout the crisis. In the United States, once the decision unit changed to predominant leader, it did not change again until the crisis transition period. This suggests that perhaps the decision-making processes in each country are fundamentally different or that decisions are more heavily influenced by the personalities of the leadership. These considerations are addressed more fully in concluding remarks.

Process Outcomes and Key Contingencies

With the fundamental structural changes of the decision-making body that occur as a result of regime change, one might expect to see more fluctuations in the structure of the decision units as a result. That there was little change in the type of decision units over the course of the period studied suggests that an examination of the decision unit alone is not sufficient to determine dynamic changes. Such changes are a little more evident, however, in a review of the process outcomes and key contingencies as described in the DU framework.

The framework suggests that process outcomes tend to fall into one of six categories dependent upon preferences within the decision unit (see Table 3.1). The specified outcomes include one party's position prevails, concurrence, mutual compromise/consensus, lopsided compromise, deadlock, and fragmented symbolic action. The categories are further divided between symmetrical and asymmetrical payoff.
distributions. Concurrence, mutual compromise, and deadlock are symmetrical payoffs, while one party's position prevails, lopsided compromise, and fragmented symbolic action are asymmetrical payoffs. In short, the process outcomes reflect whose positions counted in the final decision and how reconsideration of the decision might develop (Hermann 2001).

One additional aspect of the decision unit framework that should be addressed relates to the key contingencies described in Table 1.1. Hermann (2001) maintains that certain information about the nature of the key contingencies can provide some insight into the operation of the decision units. The contingencies indicate which theories and models of decision-making are relevant and suggest the nature of the decision process. For example, when acting as predominant leader, Kissinger's goals were well defined (détente with the Soviets and an increased U.S. influence in the Middle East); the means of achieving those goals were flexible (employed joint cooperation with the Soviets and engaged in shuttle diplomacy); and political timing was important (convincing Israel and Egypt to suspend talks at Kilometer 101). This assessment of Kissinger indicates that he displayed moderate sensitivity to the political context, where theories based on the actor/situation interaction are most relevant and the decision process tends to be strategic.

The alternating positions of Kissinger and Nixon as the predominant leader reflect the process outcomes described in the framework. U.S. decisions #7, #8, and #9 reflect the lopsided compromise that became the struggle for both Nixon and Kissinger to exercise what each perceived to be their designated authority. Arguably, the outcome
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for Decisions #7 through #10 could be considered as one party's position prevailing over all others. However, a primary characteristic of this outcome is that other parties will push for reconsideration if there is negative feedback. Kissinger did not wait for negative feedback. Instead, he deliberately ignored or defied Nixon's instructions. He clearly acted as the predominant leader in these instances, effectively assuming the authority to do so. Moreover, his decisions were not reversed, reinforcing his perception that he acted with full authority.

The findings of this study indicate that many of the process outcomes during the Nixon-Kissinger dyad resulted in lopsided compromise, fragmented symbolic action, or one party's position prevailing. The payoff distribution for decision preferences was often asymmetrical. The results demonstrate the asymmetrical payoffs in decisions #5, #6, #7, #8, #18, #19, #20, and #21. Nixon, more so than Kissinger, made decisions that complicated, impeded, or otherwise undermined the strategy of negotiations. That is not to suggest that Nixon and Kissinger never agreed on a decision, just that the key decisions chosen for this study tend to reflect conflicting goals and the means of addressing those goals.

The process outcomes under the Ford-Kissinger partnership, on the other hand, tended toward concurrence or mutual compromise – symmetrical distribution of payoffs. According to the characteristics and implications of process outcomes in the DU framework, the findings indicate that Kissinger and Ford worked to minimize conflict within the group and accepted ownership of most of the decisions. Unlike Nixon, Ford
As described in the case of the U.S., a clearer picture of any differences can be found in examining the process outcomes of the Israel decisions. The outcomes of the Israeli decisions are relatively consistent throughout the crisis and transition periods. The findings reveal that most decisions resulted in outcomes of concurrence, consensus, or mutual compromise, with possibly only one outcome resulting in a lopsided compromise. The decision where it is unclear whether there was a mutual compromise or a lopsided compromise was the agreement to abandon the demand for language on non-belligerence (IS25). The argument that could support a lopsided compromise is based on reports that Israel was insistent upon the inclusion of such verbiage in the first disengagement agreement (Brecher 1980; Safran 1978), indicating strong feelings on the subject in at least some of the members of the Cabinet. In addition, Safran (1978, 544) contends that Kissinger was surprised during negotiations in March 1975 on Sinai II when Israel “firmly insisted on a non-belligerency declaration” in return for Israeli withdrawal from the Mitla and Gidi passes and the oil fields, since Israel had dropped the language in the first disengagement agreement. That the issue of non-belligerence was again raised in the second phase of negotiations (Sinai II) indicates one of two possibilities.

First, there was a mutual compromise whereby the members of the first decision unit understood that this specific concession was necessary, and they had obtained all they could at that time. In this instance, members seek to return to the decision if they
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think the outcome will be in their favor (Hermann 2001). The second possibility is that some members took ownership of the previous decision and others did not. The members that did not would then monitor the action or the political context and agitate for a reconsideration of the decision. The second scenario would have been a lopsided compromise, or an asymmetrical distribution of payoffs. It is difficult to determine which scenario actually applies to the decision. However, Brecher (1980) and Safran (1978) maintain that the decision in January 1974 to drop the demand for non-belligerency was a considerable concession on the part of the Cabinet, and it was only agreed to at the behest of Meir. It is likely, though not certain, that the decision was a mutual compromise with the intent to revisit the issue in the second phase of negotiations.

Nixon’s actions as predominant leader seem to move from moderately sensitive to the political context to highly sensitive. The first two decisions taken by Nixon – to replace all aircraft lost by Israel (US4) and instructing American military planes to expedite delivery (US5) – demonstrate his strategy to maintain balance in the Middle East and yet willingness to employ tactics not otherwise preferred, tactics that could challenge detente. His decisions also reflected consideration for his political base, many of whom held strong support for Israel (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Nixon 1978; Quandt 1977; Siniver 2008). All of the other decisions that Nixon made as predominant leader illustrate a high sensitivity to the political context. The continued investigation into the Watergate affair, along with a persistent decrease in public opinion, prompted Nixon to put domestic politics above the immediate crisis and make spontaneous, sometimes erratic, decisions. The decisions instructing Kissinger to negotiate and
impose a comprehensive peace plan on Israel and Egypt (US7) and the letter to Brezhnev authorizing Kissinger to act on behalf of the U.S. (US8) demonstrate this, as well as the promises of nuclear energy to Israel and American technology to Egypt. Nixon took initiative in most of these decisions without consulting his key adviser, Kissinger. These observations support Hermann’s proposal from the key contingency table, indicating that Nixon’s decision process straddled the strategic/pragmatic line, exemplified by theories that focus primarily on the situation.

Although only one individual was identified as predominant leader for the Israeli decisions, an application of the key contingencies for Prime Minister Golda Meir reveal that she was moderately sensitive to the political context, particularly in regards to Israel’s relationship with the United States. While she was concerned about U.S. support and mindful of the consequences of her decisions, she was not willing to sacrifice Israel’s security in order to appease the United States. On the domestic side, Meir enjoyed a significant majority in her coalition government, holding 72 of 120 seats in the Knesset, and so did not feel the political pressure that Nixon experienced. However, given that Israel was at war when she made most of her decisions as a predominant leader, her first concern was always with Israel’s security not domestic or international politics.

**Conclusion**

A summary of the results indicates that the decision units stayed relatively stable during the crisis and crisis transition periods. For the United States, decisions
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during the crisis period were made primarily by a predominant leader, although not always the same individual actor. While decisions in Israel during the crisis period were divided between predominant leader and single group, Meir was the only individual identified as the predominant leader. The decision unit dynamics, however, illustrated key differences between Israel and the United States during the crisis period. The decision-making process in Israel focused on consensus, despite any differences within the Cabinet. In the U.S., the process tended more toward asymmetric payoff distributions in the form of a lopsided compromise or one party’s position prevailing, at least until Nixon resigned from office when the decision-making process became more stable.

The effects of regime change on decision unit dynamics are clearer in the U.S. case than they are for Israel. As noted above, the Ford-Kissinger decision-making process focused more on consensus building than did the Nixon-Kissinger partnership. In the early part of Ford’s tenure, he gave Kissinger a considerable amount of leeway in conducting foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. He asked a lot of questions but tended to demure to Kissinger’s position and supported him in all aspects. As Ford became more informed on the details of ongoing negotiations and met or corresponded with various political figures and heads of state, he developed his own opinions and ideas about what could move negotiations forward. Ford gained more and more confidence in his abilities the longer he was in office.

Ford’s leadership style also differed significantly from that of Nixon. Where Nixon challenged institutional constraints, Ford respected them. Unlike Nixon, Ford was
open to information and worked toward building consensus in his Cabinet. If any similarities in leadership style existed between the two presidents, it lay in their confidence of Kissinger’s abilities.

In Israel, there were only four key decisions taken after Rabin became prime minister, and all of the process outcomes resulted in consensus or concurrence, despite opposition within Rabin’s government. The outcomes of the key decisions, however, do not suggest that there were no disagreements within the Cabinet regarding other related decisions made during this time. Indeed, Defense Minister Shimon Peres at one time threatened to resign rather than to withdraw any further than previously agreed. In general, Kissinger recognized that the negotiating team headed by Rabin was undoubtedly different from that led by Meir. In a memorandum to President Ford dated August 23, 1975, Kissinger relates how conflicts within the Cabinet and the mood of negotiations reflected domestic political considerations, which was not the case under Meir. An agreement was reached shortly after the memorandum was written; however, it came at a considerable cost to the United States.

The findings of the Agranat Commission highlighted the problems with foreign policy decision-making in the Israeli government and prompted Meir to resign her post. Several members in the new government expected Rabin to advocate for change in the decision-making process, particularly involving negotiations with the United States (Ben-Meir 1986; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). Yariv attests to the fact that Rabin felt that the process was not as it should be. Rabin admitted that the “procedure by which the prime minister would convene the Cabinet or the MDC on Fridays to deliberate and
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take decisions that had to be presented to Kissinger the following day was a faulty one” (Ben-Meir 1986, 109). Despite this, Rabin was neither able nor willing to change it (Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). As Gazit maintains, Rabin “openly opposed a national security council system, claiming that it was inappropriate to the realities of Israeli government” (Ben-Meir 1986, 109).

There is little doubt that the process was affected by the failure of Israeli intelligence to foresee the attack by the Egyptian or Syrian army (Brownstein 1977). As Lewis Brownstein (260) notes, “The authority of the prime minister has been challenged in [a] way that is unprecedented.” Golda Meir enjoyed wide flexibility in exercising her authority, maintaining the support and confidence of her Cabinet and receiving little in the way of challenges from the Knesset (at least during the crisis period).

For Rabin, in addition to the opposition within his Cabinet, he faced considerable criticism and challenges from opposition groups in the Knesset, primarily from Menachem Begin and the newly formed, right wing Likud party. Despite openly hostile opposition, Rabin continued in the tradition of previous prime ministers and asserted his unspecified authority. On the matter of negotiating a second disengagement agreement and dealing the Arabs, Rabin had his own approach to foreign policy and acted accordingly (Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014).

Hermann (2001) maintains that the DU framework can accommodate varying theories and models on decision-making. By designating the decision unit as the level of analysis, the framework provides the analyst with a way to compare foreign policy
decisions across different types of governments and decision-makers. An examination of the decision units by themselves, however, is not sufficient for comparison. Only when one delves into the dynamics of those units do comparisons become useful. The key contingencies and process outcomes are, therefore, a necessary component of the framework. Leadership style and conflict management within a group can help explain many of the decisions taken during the time period in this study. However, as the case of Nixon demonstrates, domestic environmental conditions can have a significant impact on decision unit dynamics and foreign policy decisions.

The concluding chapter provides an assessment of the DU framework for sequential decision analysis, as well as the utility in the classification systems proposed in this study. Chapter Eight also explores the prospects for future research.
According to Lewis Brownstein (1977), the role of the Knesset (Israel’s legislative body) in foreign policy matters is decidedly weak (see also Mahler 1981). Knesset control or supervision over public administration, security affairs, and the conduct of foreign policy is virtually non-existent.

A comprehensive agreement, rather than step-by-step interim agreements, would have required negotiations on the Palestinian issue. Before the Arab summit in 1974, Jordan was the de facto authority to speak for the Palestinians. However, an Arab reassessment of the conditions in the region resulted in a vote to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the ultimate Palestinian authority.

This was based on a memorandum of conversation on June 20, 1975, where Kissinger attempted to demonstrate to Ford the attitude of the Israeli Cabinet and the improbability of imposing an interim agreement. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, June 20, 1975.

Despite the promise of more than $2 billion in aid, not all of materialized (Fischer 2014).
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

Assessment of the Decision Unit Framework

In this study, I have applied the DU framework to the decisions made by Israel and the United States from the day before the Yom Kippur War began (October 5, 1973) to the conclusion of the Sinai II Agreement (September 1, 1975). The DU framework stipulates the occasion for decision as the level of analysis by which foreign policy decisions can be compared. I have attempted to classify the occasions with the intent of expanding upon the framework. The hypotheses considered in this study were developed in order to test the effects of the occasions for decisions on the decision unit and to provide a way to potentially identify when or why decision unit dynamics might be altered during the decision-making process.

By applying the DU framework to sequential decisions I have been able to identify the key actors in the decision process within a government and establish patterns of behavior or choice indicative of that government. These patterns can help identify decision units where the evidence is not quite clear. While I applied behavior patterns to several decisions in this study, there is a danger in making assumptions about a decision unit if one is trying to determine what factors might precipitate a change in that unit. This could present a limitation in the confidence level of the analysis, particularly where primary sources are scarce. However, limitations can be
Conclusion

minimized by examining how the decision in question reflects or contradicts the decision-makers’ goals and preferences.

An overall view of the study shows that, as the environment moved from a crisis to a transition period, single group decision-making became more prevalent. Indeed, the single group decision unit was present in eleven of thirty-one decisions during the crisis and twenty-three of twenty-nine in the transition period. This may suggest that as the level of stress decreases or as the immediate threat associated with the crisis begins to subside, the decision unit may return to more routine decision-making.

In general, applying the DU framework to one key decision was not especially difficult. However, attempting to identify specific key decisions in a sequential decision process may at times seem arbitrary. For example, decisions that did not result in actionable consequences – i.e., Meir’s decision to fly to Washington during the crisis, and Nixon’s promises of American technologies to Israel and Egypt – might seem irrelevant in the overall study. However, these decisions offer indications into the personalities and confidence of the individuals’ abilities to affect events. Meir believed a personal visit from her could convince the U.S. of the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need for supplies. Nixon’s bold promises of American technologies demonstrated his desire to interject himself into the successes in the Middle East, where previously he had been inattentive.

In addition, the fluid nature of war presents some challenges in discriminating between political and military decisions. For the United States, the determination was more apparent. America was not engaged militarily; therefore, all of its decisions were
decidedly political. Even the decision to provide military equipment to Israel was political. There was no immediate threat to U.S. security or territorial integrity. There were no American military forces deployed. America’s primary concern focused on U.S. interests in the region – i.e., maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East and addressing the concerns of the Jewish voting community at home. That the U.S. sought to marginalize Soviet influence in the region, while establishing a closer relationship to Egypt, was political opportunism. Simply put, the Israel strategy was to end or prevent hostilities with consideration for political and territorial consequences. The U.S. strategy was to protect its foreign interests and expand its influence in the Middle East.

With respect to classifying the occasion for decision, several problems quickly became apparent. First, in some instances it was difficult to discern all of the factors that led decision-makers to consider one specific decision – let alone a sequence of decisions – especially in cases where official documentation is not available. In such cases, I used biographical accounts of those individuals involved in the decision-making process. Although not a perfect solution, the use of personal accounts enabled me to piece together the events leading up to a particular decision.

Another issue pertaining to the classification of the occasions for decision was that some decisions were a result of multiple occasions, confounding possible effects. Determining if one occasion had a greater influence than the other or if there was an interaction effect became potentially problematic. And, of course, there is always the possibility that a key variable was omitted.
Conclusion

The most difficult occasion to assess was new information. Decisions are generally not reached arbitrarily, and most can be associated with the presentation of new or additional information. For example, when the Israeli government learned that Egyptian and Syrian forces had mobilized along the border, the information signified a threat to the country, easily identifiable as an external shock. However, the intelligence is obviously new information. Indeed, external shock may be viewed simply as a subcategory of new information. It could be recommended, therefore, that new information be further clarified, defined, and classified into subcategories that identify what type of new information is being introduced to decision-makers.

Although it would not affect the hypotheses in this study, the category other could also be further defined. For example, additional conditions that might precipitate or influence decision-making include domestic factors such as economic cycles, interest group or lobbying activities, or considerations of an upcoming election. For example, the Jewish lobby in the United States put considerable pressure on Presidents Nixon and Ford to ensure Israel’s security, as evidenced in meeting minutes. Jewish leaders routinely met with or telephoned Kissinger in efforts to influence or increase U.S. support for Israel. How much of an effect this activity had on the decision units in this study is difficult to determine. Perhaps an alternative approach would be to ask: without the pressure applied by the pro-Israel lobby, not only to the administration but also to Congress, would the United States have agreed to the substantial aid packages to Israel? Domestic pressures may have affected the outcome of certain decisions, but it is uncertain whether they influenced the dynamics of the decision units involved.
Who Decides?

This research cannot say whether shocks or feedback affected a persistent change in decision unit dynamics or decision processes, as the study did not consider Israeli or U.S. decision-making after the signing of the second interim agreement. Overall, though, Israeli decision-making seemed to have been more affected than the U.S. For Israel, the initiation of the war, the external shock that precipitated the crisis, revealed serious vulnerabilities regarding information processing and intelligence analysis, as highlighted in the Agranat Commission report.

As to the overall effects of feedback, consider Wiener (1954) and de Rosnay's (1997) assessment that negative feedback induces stability while positive feedback will eventually destroy a system as it applies to one particular decision. Through established Israeli information channels, decision-makers learned of a possible, perhaps imminent, attack by the Egyptian and Syrian armies. Prior experience and preconceived beliefs led many of these analysts to conclude that, although evidence and intelligence suggested such a possibility, war with either Egypt or Syria was highly unlikely; thus, Meir made the decision not to call up reserves or put the military on full alert. The consequences of this decision were decidedly negative. The Israeli army sustained heavy losses, including the loss of soldiers and, at least initially, territorial ground. Israeli military experts and analysts were exposed as naïve or short-minded at best and incompetent at worst. Political and military careers were compromised. The question then becomes: did the negative consequences (or feedback) of this policy action reinforce stability in the existing system, as Wiener would propose, or rather did it proceed along the path Pierson might suggest and create systemic changes or challenges to the processing of information as well as to the decision-making process?
Conclusion

In the short term, specifically during the crisis period, this particular negative consequence appeared to have little or no impact on the dynamics of the decision unit. In fact, Prime Minister Meir acted as predominant leader in several subsequent decisions. However, the negative consequences of multiple Israeli decisions publicly called into question the informal nature of the decision-making process (Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). As for long-term effects, the results in this study are inconclusive. The dynamics of Rabin’s government may have differed from that of Meir; however, the four decisions taken under Rabin indicate no significant differences in process outcomes.

In the conduct of the study, I found some deficiencies in the framework. The primary focus of this study was to determine the decision unit for each key decision. Although I attempt to identify other elements, such as the type of occasion for decision, simply recognizing the DU says nothing about the process leading up to the occasion for decision. For instance, the DU framework does not consider the flow of information or how intelligence reaches the upper levels of government, a significant factor in what options are available and how they are presented to decision-makers.

The identification of the decision unit as single group also highlights some deficiencies in terms of decision analysis. While Hermann (2001) maintains that the key contingencies – the techniques used to manage conflict within the group – help determine the decision process and outcomes, the size and configuration of the group can potentially influence sequential decisions. For instance, in the Israeli case during the crisis period, sometimes the group consisted of select members of the Cabinet –
Meir’s Kitchen Cabinet – and sometimes it consisted of the entire Cabinet. If Meir chose to include or exclude particular members, as Brecher (1980) and others maintain, then she consciously affected group dynamics, potentially limiting dissention or disagreements within the Cabinet. This raises some question of whether Meir acted more as a predominant leader by influencing group structure rather than a strong group leader.

Finally, Hermann (2001, 55) suggests that researchers should focus on those occasions for decision that lead to authoritative actions rather than those occasions that seek information, implement a previous decision, or ratify a decision. In examining sequential decision-making, I deliberately deviated from the framework’s intent. Decisions such as Cabinet approval of the disengagement agreements and Cabinet authorizations demonstrate an underlying premise of the Israeli decision process: while the prime minister might wield considerable influence with his or her government, it is the Cabinet that is presumed to possess the authority to commit the resources of the state.

In her memoirs, Golda Meir (1976, 369) posed the following: “In the final analysis...the fate of small countries always rests with the superpowers, and they always have their own interest to guard.” Many of the decisions in the study seem to reflect this assessment. The involvement of the United States, as well as the Soviet Union, no doubt played a key role in the decision-making process for Israel. Great consideration was given to the possible consequences of U.S. support prior to several key Israeli decisions. The escalation toward a superpower confrontation forced Israel...
(and Egypt) to accept an immediate cease-fire and make certain concessions. On the part of the United States, the government took decisions that obviously reflected their own interests, including taking the negotiations to Geneva, the reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy, and, in particular, providing military aid with the stipulation that it be transported via unmarked Israeli airplanes. One could argue that Meir’s assessment supports a systemic approach to foreign policy-making, perhaps rendering assessments at the individual level unnecessary. However, this study demonstrates that individual leadership and group dynamics can influence not only the outcomes of decisions but also the decision process itself.

This raises an important point regarding the potential relevance of the DU framework. Those intent on influencing foreign policy must be aware of the individuals or groups of individuals with the authority to make policy decisions. Understanding the decision-making process in a particular government can help individuals, organizations, and other governments focus efforts toward the appropriate policymakers.

**Future Research**

Despite some limitations of the framework, several possible avenues for future research emerge. An examination of Israeli and U.S. decisional units during the Camp David Accords might reveal any differences in the decision-making process when compared to the results of my study. Additionally, a comparison of the decision units of the other governments involved in the 1973 crisis, such as Egypt, Syria, and the Soviet Union, could provide more depth and richness to this study, particularly when
compared to the decisions made during the crisis period. A study of sequential decision-making after the fall of Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union could test the possible systemic effects on U.S. and Israeli decisions and decision units. The framework might also be used to examine U.S. or Israeli decisions made under routine conditions – e.g., treaties or trade agreements.

As suggested previously, the classification system for the occasions for decision could be further clarified and refined. This would present the opportunity to not only test the effects of other types of occasions but it would also allow for the isolation of “like” occasions for decision. Researchers could then provide more quantitative analysis using multiple foreign policy decisions across multiple types of governments.

Beasley et al. (2001) suggests that the nature of the decision unit is important in determining how a series of actions is going to play out. My research helps to confirm this assertion. It illustrates how dominant individual leadership, whether in the form of a predominant leader or a powerful leader in a single group, can influence the foreign policy decision-making process as well as the ultimate decision. Henry Kissinger demonstrated this, as did Golda Meir. Kissinger achieved his overall strategic goal of marginalizing Soviet influence. Meir was able to convince her Cabinet to make certain concessions, which were previously unacceptable, in order to secure long-term commitments from the United States. Moreover, the process outcomes generally reflected the dynamics of the decision unit. Going beyond explaining historical decisions, however, researchers applying the DU framework to sequential decision-making in other cases might be able to identify broader, more general patterns of choice.
Conclusion

and behavior that could perhaps help move the framework into a more predictive realm.
### TABLE 7.3. Environmental Shocks - Crisis Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Endogenous Shock</th>
<th>Exogenous Shock</th>
<th>Endogenous Shock</th>
<th>Exogenous Shock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 October 1973</td>
<td>Mobilization of Egyptian and Syrian forces along the Israeli border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilization of Egyptian and Syrian forces along the Israeli border</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 October 1973</td>
<td>Egypt and Syria attack Israel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Egypt and Syria attack Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 October 1973</td>
<td>VP Spiro Agnew resigns</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 October 1973</td>
<td>Arab oil embargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 October 1973</td>
<td>Nixon orders firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 October 1973</td>
<td>Soviets threaten unilateral military action in the Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 October 1973</td>
<td>Soviets threaten unilateral military action in the Middle East</td>
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<td></td>
<td>US increases military readiness to DefCon III</td>
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</table>
### TABLE 7.4. Environmental Shocks - Crisis Transition Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Endogenous Shock</th>
<th>Exogenous Shock</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Endogenous Shock</th>
<th>Exogenous Shock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>Prime Minister Meir resigns</td>
<td>Kiryat Shmona massacre</td>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>Ma'a lot massacre</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 June</td>
<td>Knesset narrowly fails to pass a vote of no-confidence against Rabin government</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24-25 June</td>
<td>Nahariya attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>House Judiciary Committee adopts articles of impeachment charging</td>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 July 1974</td>
<td>Turkey invades Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 August 1974</td>
<td>Nixon announces resignation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 September 1974</td>
<td>TWA jet from Tel Aviv to Athens crashed - terror attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 November 1974</td>
<td>Beit She'an attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 March 1975</td>
<td>Savoy Hotel attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 March 1975</td>
<td>Ford announces reassessment of US policy on Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 April 1975</td>
<td>Saigon falls to Communist North Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 May 1975</td>
<td>Jerusalem struck by missiles, 500 meters from Knesset</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-15 May 1975</td>
<td>Mayaguez incident</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 June 1975</td>
<td>Suez Canal reopens</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 June 1975</td>
<td>Kfar Yuval hostage crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 July 1975</td>
<td>Zion Square refrigerator bombing</td>
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