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The Politics of Sustainable Development:
Natural Forest Policy in Chile, Venezuela,
Costa Rica and Mexico

Eduardo Silva

**THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL FOREST POLICY
IN CHILE, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA AND MEXICO**

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL FOREST POLICY IN CHILE, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, AND MEXICO

This paper argues that two opposing views of sustainable development--market-friendly and grassroots development--lie at the heart of political disputes over this issue. Because it has been a lightning rod for conflict over the use of natural renewable resources, forest policy offers an excellent window into the comparative politics of sustainable development. Explaining whether a country has exclusively market-oriented forest policy or whether it also includes significant elements of the grassroots approach requires an examination of when and how four broad factors affect outcomes: ideas, state institutions, social groups, and international conditions. Paired comparisons show that cohesive teams of experts in lead ministries may define the executive's approach, but whether they succeed or fail depends on other factors; specifically, the capacity of social groups to forge larger socio-political alliances, and the presence or absence of direct external intervention in the policy process.

THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL FOREST POLICY IN CHILE, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, AND MEXICO

The concept of sustainable development, which seeks to bridge incompatibilities between environmental integrity and economic development, has become a topic of growing concern in North-South relations. Yet the issue has also erupted onto the national policy agendas of many developing countries. Consequently, it poses interesting questions for comparative politics as well as for international relations and development studies. Natural forest policy in particular offers a useful window into the comparative politics of sustainable development because it has been a lightning rod for political conflict over the use of natural renewable resources. Yet most of the burgeoning literature on sustainable development and forests has avoided the problem of politics.¹ Studies generally focus on the diagnosis of factors responsible for unsustainable development and policy prescriptions to halt the destruction. However, beyond an invocation of the need for political will analysts usually do not address the conditions that induce governments to adopt the policies they prescribe.²

To get to the heart of the politics of sustainable development, this paper argues that there are two ideal typical views of that concept; each with its own assumptions, diagnoses, and policy prescriptions. One of them emphasizes market solutions and large-scale industry while the other favors policies that are more grassroots development oriented and participatory. The natural forest policies of Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico tend to cluster on the market-friendly/grassroots axis. Without excluding industrial interests, Costa Rica and Venezuela have included significant elements of the grassroots development approach to the sustainable development of natural forests. By contrast, Chile and Mexico only emphasize the market-friendly alternative.

In addition to these differences, politicization of natural forest policy was high in Chile and Costa Rica, low in Mexico and Venezuela.

These outcomes and the general lack of political analyses in the existing literature raise two basic questions. What factors influenced a government's basic orientation with respect to the sustainable development of their natural forests? When can we expect policy formulation in this issue area to be highly politicized? To answer these questions the paper examines when and how ideas, state institutions, social groups, and international factors affected those results. The comparison of the four cases shows that ideas--in the form of cohesive networks of experts--and state institutions must be complemented with factors drawn from a political economy framework. Ideologues and state institutions may define the initial impetus of policy, but their relationship to social groups and external actors must also be considered.

The paper develops this argument over four sections. The first section examines the policy implications of contending interpretations of sustainable development. The next part briefly outlines a framework for understanding the differences among the cases with respect to policy orientation and the degree of conflict over natural forest policy. The third section applies the interpretative framework to the country cases. Having presented some data, the conclusion returns to the relationship between ideas, state institutions, social groups, and international factors in explaining the outcomes among the cases.

COMPETING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The literature on environment and development posits a strong relationship between economic development, poverty, and environmental quality. Bad economic performance increases poverty which accelerates environmental degradation.³ Given these findings, the Brundtland

Commission first popularized the concept of sustainable development in 1987.⁴ It called for a development model capable of meeting the basic needs of a developing country's population without depleting the stock of natural resources in ways that rob future generations of their use. For policy purposes development economists concurred that sustainable development consists of three main building blocks: a healthy economy, attention to social equity, and environmental quality.⁵ And here agreement largely ends, for differing views exist on how to define the properties of these components and the relationship between them.

For analytical purposes, this paper argues that two alternative conceptualizations of sustainable development lie at the heart of political conflict over environment and development and natural forest policy in developing countries. Each has its own diagnosis and policy prescriptions. They also loosely fit in the right to-left political spectrum.⁶

The dominant approach among top decision makers in Latin America, the United States, and in multilateral lending organizations, such as the World Bank, is a market-friendly one.⁷ Healthy economic growth lies at the heart of this approach. To achieve rapid economic growth, developing countries must engage in free-market economic restructuring. That means, building market economies with minimum state intervention, integrating them into world markets, reinforcing private property rights over cooperative efforts, and increasing foreign direct investment. The negative environmental impacts of vigorous economic expansion are considered to be unfortunate side effects. The best way to address the problem is to add technologies that moderate the environmental impact of existing industrial processes (end-of-pipe technologies), rather than finding substitutes or alternative methods.⁸

This perspective largely reduces the problem of social equity and environmental integrity to free-market based economic growth. Rapid economic expansion should improve national per capita income, and therefore standards of living. Targeted welfare programs for the extremely poor,

supported by World Bank structural adjustment loans, provide minimum safety nets for those temporarily left out of the market. As expanding economies draw people into national markets such programs can be scaled back. The rise in standards of living alone will have a beneficial effect on the environment. From the market-friendly perspective wealthier people have the leisure to be concerned about environmental quality. Desperately poor people simply degrade it. As long as open political systems prevail, an economically better off and environmentally aware population will organize special interest groups to pressure government into action, and to help implement its policies--a thoroughly pluralist conception of politics. In addition to these assumptions, the approach also tends to privilege global environmental problems: global warming, ozone depletion, acid rain, management of the ocean, and urban questions such as waste management.⁹

Translated to the forest, the market-friendly view of sustainable development offers the following policy prescriptions. The survival of natural forests depends on giving it economic value. It values trees (not forests) for their contributions to solving global environmental problems such as the reduction of gases that contribute to global warming, fixing soil to keep it from eroding, protecting watersheds. Given this perspective, the market friendly approach privileges the development of large-scale plantation industry. It contributes to global environmental goals, increases social equity by offering employment, and earns foreign exchange. Plantations also promote and deepen market relations in rural areas and undercut cooperative efforts based on an outdated romanticism. This means that projects for poor communities that do not involve large-scale plantations should mainly focus on the incorporation of individual small-scale farmers or peasants into markets. In short, the market-friendly approach endorses private property rights over cooperative ventures and communal ownership. It also recommends the elimination of government subsidies that make deforestation profitable, reducing the role of the state to minimize the impact of

bureaucratic incompetence, and then strengthening institutional capacities in sharply reduced spheres of state action.¹⁰

The grassroots development alternative to the market-friendly view differs on virtually every dimension. It strives to take each of the terms of sustainable development--economic growth, social equity, and environment--into account in their own right, and then seeks linkages between them. Healthy economic growth is certainly necessary, but it alone will not drive everything else. This view also questions whether free market oriented economic restructuring is the best path. The focus on end-of-pipe technology offers few incentives to tackle the roots of the environmental dilemma: existing industrial processes. Moreover, the history of capitalist development on the periphery suggests that market-based growth by itself will not reduce basic social inequalities or promote rapid economic growth.¹¹

The grassroots development approach draws many of its values from the ecological movement. Accepting that socio-economic systems will remain basically market-oriented, it stresses more appropriate, smaller scale, decentralized economic activity based on cleaner production processes and products to substitute for highly toxic ones. The state has an important role in the promotion of such change via regulation and incentives. Organized social groups should have ample participation in policy making processes and policy implementation, including decisions about technological packages.

Taking the concern for citizen participation a step further, this perspective links the improvement of social equity to the social, economic, and cultural self-determination of subordinate class and ethnic-based groups. Policy prescriptions emphasize grassroots development projects that promote local self reliance and control over resources in order achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth. In rural areas, there is an added emphasis on technologies that mimic natural processes.

In urban areas, the approach encourages self-help groups for environmental health, clean-up, and improvement (green belts).¹²

The grassroots development approach to sustainable development is more holistic than the market-friendly one. According to this view, the ecological impact of human activities cuts across economic, as well as social, economic, and political boundaries. Consequently, sector-specific environmental policy must take into account how policies in other sectors affect the proposed project. This requires coordinated action among state agencies and the organizations of civil society.

When it comes to natural forests, the grassroots development view emphasizes the basic needs of impoverished rural populations--peasants and small-scale farmers. Their livelihoods will improve to the degree to which organized communities build small scale cooperative enterprises to manage forest harvests, industrialize the timber, and link up with local, regional, national, and world markets. The approach favors projects that cultivate the multiple use of the forest, both for timber and nontimber products including social forestry and reforestation practices, extraction of nontimber products, and the combination of forestry with agriculture (agroforestry) or ranching. These measures provide peasants with a basket of economically important goods while conserving natural forests. In short, the focus is on organized communities as a vehicle for the selfdetermination of subordinate social groups as opposed to the extension of market relations at the community level.

Although the argument presents market-friendly and grassroots development conceptualizations of sustainable development as opposites, in reality they are not mutually exclusive. There can be many combinations of the two. Yet the distinction performs a useful analytical function. It nicely reveals the core of the political conflict over the issue of sustainable development. Since Latin American economies are essentially market-based, grassroots development policies cannot totally supplant the market-friendly view. This means that the policy

struggle turns more on the issue of consistently including significant elements of grassroots development-oriented concerns in an overall policy package along with improvement of sustainable industrial harvesting of natural forests. In short, it is more a question of balance than an either-or proposition.

EXPLAINING THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

The recent forest policy of Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Mexico allow for paired comparisons along two dimensions with respect to outcomes. The first dimension focuses on whether forest policy drew exclusively from the market-friendly approach, or whether it also incorporated significant elements of the grassroots development approach. The second dimension considers the degree of politicization over the issue. The matrix exhibited below shows how the cases fit along those dimensions. Costa Rica and Venezuela incorporated grassroots development concerns while those of Chile and Mexico did not. Politicization of the native forest policy was high in Chile and Costa Rica, low in Mexico and Venezuela.

		Sustainable Development	
		Market-Friendly	Grassroots Development
Conflict	High	Chile	Costa Rica
	Low	Mexico	Venezuela

What, then, accounts for the similarities and differences in the environmentally conscious forest policy of these cases and their degree of politicization? This paper examines when and how four broad factors influence the differences among the cases: ideas, political institutions, social groups, and external conditions. This methodology builds on recent work about political and

economic change that has called attention to the relative futility of seeking to determine which one of these factors has more overall explanatory power.¹³ In short, instead of offering a general causal model, this paper establishes which of those factors carry more weight than the others under carefully specified circumstances. This allows for the construction of predictive propositions with rigorous attention to context.¹⁴ Within similar contexts the same combination of variables should produce similar results. The value of the four cases is that they cover a range of differences in country characteristics that typify most situations in Latin America.

This approach seeks to build on the shortcomings of two separate strands of theorizing in the emerging literature over the determinants of environmental politics, where each sought to explain outcomes based on only a pair of the four conditions. One explanation focused on the role of ideas and the institutional capacity of the state. In this view, networks of experts in government agencies bound together by shared values, knowledge, and policy recommendations shape the state's response to environmental problems. Differences in policy cohesiveness and extensiveness depend on the relative autonomy of the institution that developed the policy.¹⁵

This approach suffers on at least two accounts. First, it shares the weaknesses of statist approaches in general. It only looks at the relationship of specific interest groups to the state and ignores the effect of broader social coalitions that may support or oppose proposed policy. Secondly, this approach has not taken into account the politicization of environmental issues. There is no one technocratic solution to a problem, which leaves the door open for alliance building between conflicting groups, including social groups and external actors. Moreover, these groups and actors may seek allies within state institutions that do not support the objectives of the ministry in charge of forest policy.

A second approach examined the role that social groups and international factors played in forcing recalcitrant governments to adopt policies that promote the sustainable development of

native forests. These studies mostly focused on the struggle to establish extractive reserves in Brazil. The main problem with this approach was that the state remained a black box. Because they concentrated on the sources of resistance to destructive policies and the imposition of more benevolent policy upon the state, these studies said little if anything about the role of state actors in the design of environmentally conscious native forest policy.¹⁶

Given the shortcomings of these alternative explanations, which show that each of those factors is a necessary but not sufficient condition, it seems appropriate to consider when and how all four conditions affect both the policies designed to achieve the sustainable development of natural forests in Latin America and the degree of conflict over the issue. An examination of the role played by ideas in the form of policy making teams within the relevant sectoral ministry is a good place to start. Beginning with "statist" factors makes sense because Latin American political systems are usually dominated by the executive branch. Thus, one might expect that the ideas of the policy making teams charged with initiating the policy formulation stage of the policy process within the lead ministry will heavily influence the framing of the policy debate.

But this is not a sufficient condition. In all of the cases cohesive policy making teams with solid state institutional backing initiated forest policy reforms. Yet final outcomes often differed from initial efforts due to conflicts that appeared at different stages of the policy process. Because neoliberal economic restructuring dominates the political agenda in Latin America, as a general rule conflict erupted when the policy making team in the lead ministry sought to incorporate elements of the grassroots development approach. Yet exceptions and other twists pose an interesting challenge for explanation. For example, proponents of the grassroots development approach dominated forest policy making within the state in three of the four cases: Chile, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. As expected, forest policy was highly politicized in the first two, but, contrary to expectation, not in Venezuela. Moreover, conflict over grassroots development oriented policy did not always result in

complete defeat for its advocates. In Chile they lost, in Costa Rica they struck a compromise, and in Venezuela they largely had a free hand. By the same token, Mexico changed from a grassroots oriented forest policy in the 1970s and 1980s to a market-friendly line in the 1990s with little conflict.

Understanding these outcomes requires an examination of social forces that opposed or supported the lead ministry's policy making team, their power resources, and the presence or absence of strong, direct international influences. When external factors are only background conditions, social groups, their coalitions, and their relative capabilities will be the deciding factor.¹⁷ Chile suggests that efforts to incorporate grassroots development ideas in natural forest policy are likely to be highly politicized and fail in cases where private timber interests are powerful, own the forests that provide their timber, and generate substantial economic benefits for the nations' accounts. Their economic power allows them to forge alliances with broader socio-political forces, such as political parties and the rest of the business community. Their combined weight can overwhelm the efforts of environmentalists no matter how strong the backing from the executive branch. By contrast, Venezuela shows that if private timber groups do not contribute much to the economy and if they hold the forests in concessions from the state, grassroots development efforts may have a greater chance to succeed. That is because the timber interests will probably not be able to forge larger defensive coalitions.

The influence of international factors varies with the strength of the ties to the regional hegemon--in this case the United States. Where the regional hegemon has a strong presence it can tip the balance of internal power in favor of the domestic groups it supports.¹⁸ The United States essentially supports the market-oriented approach to sustainable development and it habitually seeks to strengthen the private sector. Thus, Costa Rica suggests that in cases where the United States has a strong presence, where forest policy seeks to incorporate grassroots development ideals, and where

the private timber interests are weak, U.S. intervention in the policy debate may extract significant concessions from the proponents of a grassroots development approach, or defeat them entirely. Free-trade treaties are also an international factor. Mexico shows that treaty conditionality enhances the capabilities of market-friendly socio-political groups.¹⁹ They compel legislative changes that favor market forces.

THE CASES: CHILE, VENEZUELA, COSTA RICA, AND MEXICO

The cases are presented as paired comparisons with respect to both outcomes and explanatory factors. In the first pair, Chile retained a market-oriented policy after fierce struggle, while Venezuela incorporated some grassroots elements. Differences in domestic conditions--the economic power of timber interests--largely determined these outcomes. In the second pair, Costa Rica and Mexico, again, one included grassroots policies--although much attenuated from the original position, while the other adopted a market-oriented approach. External conditions blunted the grassroots components of policy in Costa Rica and facilitated the triumph of market-friendly forest policy in Mexico.

Chile: The Persistence Of Market-Oriented Natural Forest Policy

Chile's current forest policy has a strong market-orientation and suffered high levels of politicization with the return to democracy in 1990. The military government (1973-1989) deepened the market-oriented aspects of forest policy begun in the 1960s. Since 1974, Decree Law 701 and its modifications have provided abundant financial incentives for the development of a timber industry based on plantations of exotic species (not native to the country), basically radiata pine and

some eucalyptus. The incentive system's structure, however, only made it accessible to large-scale national and international timber companies, where the national firms were part of Chile's most important conglomerates. By the late 1980s, the timber industry contributed close to a billion dollars in foreign exchange earnings.²⁰ In Southern Chile, widespread substitution of natural forests for plantations, and to turn short fiber natural species into wood chips for export, were the principal ecological problems of this incentive system. A lack of sustained economic returns from the natural forest for small and medium scale land owners--many of them peasants--was the main socio-economic drawback.²¹

With the arrival of democracy in 1990 environmental issues burst on the policy agenda. A legislative bill to sustainably develop natural forests was high on the list of priorities in this issue area, along with the formulation of a general environmental law. The bill that the administration of Patricio Aylwin sent to the legislature incorporated some important, albeit mild, elements of the grassroots approach to sustainable development. First, it sought to establish a fiscal incentive program to cover most of the costs of natural forest management modeled on that provided for plantations. Yet, the incentives were to be highly accessible to small and medium land owners, the category which had possession of much of the remaining natural forests not owned by corporations. It is worth pointing out that in Chile, as well as throughout Latin America, this social group is among the most impoverished rural sectors, for forests tend to stand on the most marginal lands. The second grassroots development-oriented feature of the bill defended natural forests against clear cutting by industrial interests. It carefully defined the extent to and place where companies could do so. This bill generated turbulent political conflict and never became the law of the land, despite the best efforts of the Aylwin administration over four years. As a result, the market-oriented policy of the military dictatorship still prevails.²²

How to account for this outcome? In keeping with our interpretative framework, the ideological background of the policy making team, and strong backing by the lead government agency--the Ministry of Agriculture--offer the best starting point. The core of the policy making team had long advocated the sustainable development of natural forests from a grassroots development point of view. During the transition to democracy, they formed part of the technical team that put together the opposition to the dictatorship's campaign program for environmental problems.²³ With the victory of the center-left opposition coalition (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, or simply Concertación) they obtained important positions for forest policy making under the wing of the Ministry of Agriculture. From the beginning, their policy proposals suffered from sharp attacks by timber interests that attempted to gut the relatively soft grassroots-oriented approach of the core policy making team. Those efforts included splitting the policy making team itself and turning more powerful ministries against agriculture.²⁴ Unwavering support from the Minister of Agriculture, and ultimately the favorable intervention of the president of the republic himself, assured that the central points of the proposed bill made it into the version that the executive sent to the congress.²⁵ Yet they failed to pass the bill. Their defeat despite the presence of strong "statist" variables underscores the necessity of combining this approach with factors drawn from a political economy perspective.

Because international factors were essentially background conditions, domestic factors proved much more significant in the explanation of the failure to reform forest policy in Chile. The most important of those domestic factors were class-based social groups and their economic and institutional power resources. Given Chile's economic and political history, the aforementioned large-scale industrialists in timber were very powerful. The free-market economic model of the military government had privileged agro-extractive exports. As seen above, timber had become one of Chile's leading exports and the companies themselves were part of the nation's largest multi-

sectoral conglomerates. Their economic power secured them the support of other business sectors, as represented by the industrialists' peak association.²⁶

The central role of timber in Chile's economic model, and solid general private sector support, rallied conservative political parties in Congress to the defense of the timber interests. Conservatives argued that they were preserving Chile's successful economic model against the corrosive attacks of leftists, now disguised as environmentalists. Had timber industrialists not played such a key role in the symbolism of free-market economics in Chile, it is unlikely that the conservative political parties would have protected them.

Conservative political parties played this key role as a result of the structure of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of government. The military government wanted an institutional arrangement that would protect its free-market economic model from the kinds of efforts that the natural forest policy bill represented. To that end, through gerrymandering and other means, the dictatorship arranged the over representation of conservative parties in the Congress. Moreover, they had an assured majority in the Senate which had veto power over all legislation.²⁷ The ministry of Agriculture's natural forest policy bill passed the House of Deputies, but has been terminally blocked in the Senate.

Venezuela: Forests Come Of Age

Venezuela has had an active concern for environmental issues since the mid-1970s with the creation of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Renewable Resources (MARNR). However, it only began to seriously address forestry issues as of the late 1980s.²⁸ Its policies attempted to balance industrial management of the natural forest with conservation and some peasant and native American grassroots development in forestry. The forests are public lands, and the forest service

extends concessions to timber interests. The forest service, first created as a government agency in its own right (Dirección General) in 1990, significantly increased regulation and oversight of sustainable harvest methods for timber. The forests in Eastern Venezuela have very little population and are essentially given over to sustainable industrial harvesting of the natural forest. In the more populated areas of Western Venezuela, the forest service began an extensive program in community agroforestry to reduce encroachment on the natural forest reserves in concession to industry.²⁹ In the new state of Amazonas, SADA-Amazonas (the oversight agency for that region) began a program to organize native American communities for the extraction and commercialization of non-timber forest products. A branch of the German development agency strongly supported this project.³⁰

Like in Chile, the grassroots development features of natural forest policy were relatively modest policies that antagonized timber industry interests. How was it that Venezuelan policy makers managed to carry out these policies while Chileans could not? Why was there no great political conflict over these measures, as had been the case in Chile? Differences in the economic orientation of their administrations cannot explain the divergence of outcomes. The Venezuelan presidency's main policy goals also centered on neoliberal economic restructuring.³¹

In Venezuela, external conditions were mainly background factors. This meant that, like Chile, differences in domestic conditions largely accounted for the variance. Also similar to Chile, the incorporation of mild grassroots development objectives in Venezuela's natural forest policy originated with a relatively cohesive group of experts that had the full backing of the lead ministry--the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources. The cohesiveness of their policy positions was rooted in the functional division and coordination of that ministry. Moreover, again as in Chile, the president of the republic had placed environmental issues on the administration's policy agenda.³²

The key difference lay in the capacity of industrial groups to oppose the grassroots development aspects of natural forest policy. Venezuelan timber industrialists unsuccessfully lobbied the forest service, and then proved unable to mount larger political campaigns to pressure the forest service. This outcome, in contrast to Chile, was rooted in the highly dissimilar political economy of Venezuela. Venezuela has an oil economy and the timber industry is economically insignificant; its weakness exacerbated by the fact that the firms do not own the lands they exploit. The state gives them in concession. Nor are the companies part of the largest Venezuelan consortia. As a result, the timber industry cannot command allies among other business groups or within other ministries to force the forest service to soften or change its policies.³³ In neither sectors would they find persons willing to expend political capital for such relatively insignificant business interests.

The low status of the ministry of environment in the cabinet hierarchy underscores the analytical significance of the weakness of timber industrialists and the consequences of their incapacity to form alliances. In Venezuela, higher up line ministries (such as economy, finance, development, mines and energy) and parapublic enterprises can stymie the environmental ministry's policies with relative ease.³⁴ This occurs with some frequency.

Costa Rica: The Search For Balance

Costa Rica has had a greater commitment to the incorporation of policies and projects that reflected the grassroots development approach to the sustainable development of natural forests than either Chile or Venezuela.³⁵ Since 1986, the forest service has had a specific department devoted to such efforts.³⁶ That department, and the forest service in general, has come under increasing attack since 1990 during the drawn out, highly politicized struggle over the formulation and passage of a new forestry law. Sharp conflict over the bill has delayed its passage in Congress for four

years, where it still languishes. In the final analysis, the grassroots development supporters suffered set backs, but were not entirely defeated as in Chile.

The explanatory challenge lies in the fact that, only to a slightly lesser degree than in the previous two cases, the team in charge of policy making and its institutional backing within the state essentially favored the grassroots development oriented socio-political forces. But timber interests were weak as they had been in Venezuela. How, then, could the market-friendly forces mount such a significant challenge? The crucial difference rested in the presence of a strong international factor--the United States government, which has traditionally exercised its prerogatives in Central America.

In Costa Rica, both the Ministry of Natural Renewable Resources Energy and Mines and the legislative Assembly's Agricultural Commission shared policy formulation responsibilities in the forest issue area.³⁷ In the main, from mid 1990 to mid 1992, a cohesive group of experts in the forest service and the technical team of advisors to the legislative commission drafted a forest bill with a whole section devoted to grassroots development.³⁸ It legislated fiscal incentives for small holders to sustainably extract timber from natural forests (what the Chileans wanted to do) and for reforestation with native species. Some incentives, financed by donations from Holland, already existed by decree. The novelty was that the bill established the Costa Rican state's responsibility in this area. The bill also had clauses that strengthened peasant organizations so that cooperative efforts in community forestry and reforestation might be more successful. To ensure access to markets, it mandated the integration of their timber in industrial production. It essentially provided no incentives for plantations with exotic species or for large-scale industrial timber enterprises to exploit natural forests. It also heavily regulated the exploitation and transport of timber.³⁹

Timber interests and their political and intellectual allies were outraged at this bill. What could they do to stop it? As in Venezuela, the timber interests were economically weak. By and

large, the industrialists did not own the forests. They were almost entirely in the hands of small-holders and peasants. Consequently, timber industrialists found it difficult to enlist help from other business sectors to lobby higher instances of government.⁴⁰

The Costa Rican proponents of a market-oriented approach to sustainable development found two supports. First, within the executive branch the grassroots development oriented forces were not quite as strong as they had been in Chile and Venezuela. This aided the timber interests, but as will be seen, not decisively. More progressive versions of natural forestry legislation began their life under the more social democratic Partido Liberal administration of Oscar Arias (1986-1990).⁴¹ Shortly after the following more conservative administration of the opposition party (1990-1994) took over the presidency a constitutional challenge to the law opened it up for debate once again.⁴² The new administration replaced ministers and top political appointees in the environmental agencies, but the main technical teams remained due to civil service clauses and political maneuvering. To make a long story short, the team of experts and the role of the Legislative Assembly in the policy making process led to the bill discussed above that the new minister could not override even though he opposed it.⁴³ Thus, although in formal terms the cohesiveness of executive backing for the grassroots effort was not as strong as in Chile and Venezuela, it was not the deciding factor in the outcome.

An external factor, the direct intervention of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) made the crucial difference in Costa Rica. The head of the rural development department strongly advocated market-oriented policies, and was an admirer of the Chilean timber industry. Thus, the minister of natural resources and the private sector turned to him for help against the grassroots-oriented policy making team in the ministry and the legislature. USAID provided the resources and organizational know-how to, first, contract a market-oriented environmental think tank to develop a counter bill, and second, to improve private sector

organization by pulling together the different sub-sector groups under the umbrella of a single organization--the Cámara Costaricense Forestal--to lobby bureaucrats and the Assembly.⁴⁴ The strategy worked. In highly politicized, but not public, political maneuvering they blocked the original bill, which was quite advanced in the legislative process. According to private sector representatives, without help from USAID it was unlikely that weak timber industrialists and relatively weak pro-market government actors would have had the power to resist a more grassroots-oriented bill.⁴⁵

In the ensuing compromise (as of November 1994) the new bill presented much stronger market-oriented elements than the original one. Nevertheless, grassroots-oriented forest development still retains a place, which is different from both Chile and, as will be seen, Mexico.⁴⁶ In the face of entrenched political groups that favored grassroots development in the state, the economic and political weakness of timber industrialists forced them to ally with small and medium scale farmers. Both had an interest in the liberalization of state controls over logging.⁴⁷ As a condition of their participation, the small and medium land owners and peasants negotiated favorable clauses for their development with both large-scale timber interests and their allies within the forest service.⁴⁸ In short, U.S. intervention on behalf of market-friendly forces significantly bolstered them, but those forces were still not powerful enough for complete victory.

Mexico: Forests, Peasants, and the Reimposition of the Market

During the administration of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), Mexico's forest policy shifted from one that emphasized both industrial use and grassroots efforts to a policy that privileged a market-

friendly perspective.⁴⁹ From the 1970s to the middle of the 1980s, forest policy encouraged large-scale industrial use based on sustainable harvests from natural forests. It also promoted community forestry by aiding organized peasant communities to manage, market, and industrialize their own timber from sustainably managed forests. Beginning in 1986, but especially after 1990, natural forest policy took on an exclusively market-oriented cast, modeled on the development of Chilean-style large-scale industrial plantations.⁵⁰ What influenced this shift and the relative lack of politicization over the issue in the 1990s?

Like Costa Rica, the Mexican case shows how and when international variables may play important roles in the politics of sustainable development. However, instead of direct intervention, as in Costa Rica, Mexico highlights the significance of the presence or absence of trade treaties. Before Mexico entered the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the balance of domestic factors largely determined natural forest policy. Beginning in the 1970s, a cohesive group of experts who favored grassroots development dominated policy making within the forest service of the Agriculture Secretariat.⁵¹ Given Mexico's semi-authoritarian political system, their agency had substantial--but not total--autonomy from societal forces.⁵² Because they favored grassroots development, they faced resistance from regional alliances of timber interests, state governors, and foresters. Where ever that alliance was strained, grassroots organizing among forestry ejidos--communal land grants for peasants--became possible. Those tensions allowed the cohesive team of experts in the forest agency of the Agriculture Secretariat to forge counter alliances with peasant communities, a few state governors, and international cooperation from Europe.⁵³ Most of the existing examples of social forestry in Mexico date back to this experience.⁵⁴ The effort crystallized in the forestry law of 1986.

Mexico's entry into GATT in 1986 weakened this cohesive group of experts. This was reflected in the regulations of the 1986 forest law, which gutted some the articles that sanctioned grassroots development.⁵⁵ With negotiations for NAFTA underway after 1990, the Salinas administration appointed a new, cohesive group of market-oriented experts that swept the more grassroots-oriented policy makers aside.⁵⁶ The presidency wanted them to rewrite forest law to fit the conditions placed upon Mexico by the NAFTA treaty, and the general policy of free-market economic restructuring under Salinas.⁵⁷ The market-friendly technical team wrote a new forestry bill that privileged large-scale industrial plantations over natural forest management. It also cut organized peasants off from government aid--extension work, credit, and protected markets. The bill became law without great difficulty in 1992.

Despite the market-orientation of new forest policy and its potential benefits for the private sector, the weak, overprotected timber industry was ambivalent about the policy shift. Their weakness stemmed from two sources. Technologically backward forestry firms did not contribute much to the national economy and they did not own the forests. Peasant communities owned eighty per cent of the forests. Thus, on the one hand, industrialists welcomed the opportunity to regain control of timber resources. They felt it had been wrestled away from them by past legislation which had favored peasant development.⁵⁸ On the other hand, they worried about the impact of imports and the lack of an industrial policy to help them adjust to trade liberalization. They also chafed under the Mexican government's focus on foreign direct investment. The few successful peasant cooperatives felt the same way. Yet, despite this common interest, the dispute over control of forest resources kept these two class-based social groups from allying.⁵⁹

The relative lack of importance of the forest sector in the economy largely explained the weak politicization of the issue in Mexico. This meant that neither peasants with forests nor overprotected and inefficient timber industrialists were very significant policy actors. Moreover,

while lack of control over the forests hurt the timber interests, possession of the forest failed to strengthen peasants because most lacked effective organization, capital, and know-how.⁶⁰ The point is nicely contrasted by the fact that other more important and better developed peasant agricultural sectors--basic grains and beans--received some relief in 1994. The forest sector did not. As a result of these economic and organizational weakness, social actors linked to forestry lacked allies in other ministries or among broader social groups to ameliorate their plight. This is particularly important in Mexico, because, unlike Chile or Costa Rica, Mexico's state structure has basically kept the legislature from being an arena for political struggle.

Some remnants of the grassroots development approach to sustainable development found a niche in a state institution that was lower in the cabinet hierarchy with respect to the formulation of forest policy. They edged out strict preservationists in the National Ecology Institute (INE) of the Solidarity Secretariat.⁶¹ They mounted a critique of the Agriculture Secretariat's forest policy, and peasant groups that had begun community forestry projects in the last ten years sought them out as a source of support within the government.⁶² But they were not very successful under the Salinas administration, and the issue never became highly politicized because INE had little jurisdiction over national forest policy. They were in charge of parks and nature reserves.

CONCLUSION

The cases demonstrated the utility of the distinction between market-friendly and grassroots-oriented forest policy as a tool to understand some of the fundamental political conflicts over sustainable development. Policy outcomes--legislative bills, decrees, and projects--reflected the contending approaches. Politicization of the issue also followed those lines. The Chilean policy process exhibited strong conflict, and market-friendly policies persisted in spite of the ideas of key

policy makers who tried to introduce some different elements. Mexican policy makers introduced legislation to copy the Chilean market friendly model in an effort to revert past policy that included grassroots development, and without great upheaval. With high levels of conflict Costa Rican policy still included some grassroots development ideas, while Venezuela managed to do the same without much conflict.

The question then was, what determined the environmentally conscious natural forest policy of the four cases, what made the policy debate particularly contentious in some but not in others? An examination of the ideas of cohesive teams of experts within the state agency charged with formulating forest policy proved to be a useful starting point. In all four cases, the initial impetus to make natural forest policy compatible with the concept of sustainable development originated with them. All had solid state institutional backing. But this was clearly not a sufficient condition. Whether they were able to translate their vision into policy depended on other factors. The cases highlighted the utility of examining how two additional variables impinged upon the preferences of policy makers. One focused on the impact of class and ethnic-based social groups and their sources of economic and institutional power. The second factor took into account the impact of international factors, such as the nature of the regional hegemon, formal trade treaties, and direct action in domestic politics.

The presence or absence of these factors helped to explain divergent outcomes. Chile and Venezuela underscored the significance of domestic variables when external factors are only a background variable. In both cases policy makers favored some weak grassroots measures. In Venezuela they succeeded. In Chile they failed. This clearly had to do with the relative power of the timber industry. In Chile, where timber contributes significantly to the economy, large-scale timber industrialists--who own their forests--forged alliances with other ministries and business sectors. Conservative political parties in congress also aided them. Having forged these alliances,

business interests managed to stop the natural forestry bill. Venezuela has an oil economy. Timber industrialists are economically weak, hold the land in concession from the state, and are not connected to other business groups. In this relative isolation they find themselves unable to change policy.

Costa Rica and Mexico demonstrated the potential impact of international factors when they are more than background conditions. In Costa Rica, support from USAID allowed a weak timber industry to challenge policy initiatives of the forestry service that had a substantial grassroots development component. With this external ally, the private sector gained support within the government and the congress to substantially modify the bill. Without it timber interests would have failed completely in their effort. The weakness of the timber industrialists, however, forced them into an alliance with small scale producers. As a result, legislation still incorporated some grassroots development elements. By the same token, trade treaties, in particular with the United States, largely accounted for the reversal of policy in Mexico. Although the Mexican state's semi-authoritarian character gives policy makers leeway, as a general rule they still have to balance socio-political interests. In this sense, the weakness of both business and peasant groups in the forestry sector contributed to their inability to form alliances with other sectors to soften the negative impacts of the bill. The fact that peasants in the traditional basic grains sector and industrialists in other areas secured some relief underscored the political significance of the marginality of the forest sector.

In conclusion, this paper has focused on when and how external factors, ideas, state institutions, and social groups affect the degree to which forest policy takes a market-friendly cast, or whether it also includes grassroots development oriented elements; and the degree of politicization over the issue. To begin with, throughout Latin America, international agencies have acted as background factors because their concern over environmental issues has helped to place

them on the policy agenda of Latin American governments. Beyond that, however, these four cases show that the domestic policy responses to that diffuse pressure was, in the first instance, rooted in the ideas of policy makers within the lead ministries. However, the degree to which that policy impetus translated into policy outcomes depended on other factors. When external factors exclusively functioned as background variables, domestic conditions were more important--specifically, the economic strength or weakness of the timber industry. That dictated its capacity to form larger socio-political alliances in defense against grassroots development oriented policy proposals. By the same token, the cases demonstrated that, when present, more direct external intervention by U.S. agencies or in the form of trade treaties can alter the balance of domestic forces. If grassroots development efforts confront weak timber interests, external intervention can force compromises that otherwise would not have been on the table. When policy makers favor market-friendly solutions, external factors can strengthen their position even further by rendering opposition incapable of response.

NOTES

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3. William Ascher and R. Healy, Natural Resource Policymaking: A Framework for Developing Countries (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Inter-American Development Bank, Our Own Agenda (Washington, D.C.: IDB, 1991).
4. Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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6. For a review of the left-alternative approach to ecology in European Green parties see, Matthias Kaelberer, "The Emergence of Green Parties in Western Europe," Comparative Politics, 25, 2, 1993.
7. The definitive work is still, World Bank, World Development Report, 1992: Development and the Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
8. In addition to the World Bank's, World Development Report, 1992, see, D.L. Nielsen and M.A. Stern, "Multilateral Lending Institutions and the Environment: A Discussion of the Political Dynamic Between Lenders, Donors and Recipients," in G.J. MacDonald, D.L. Nielsen, and M.A. Stern, eds., Latin American Environmental Policymaking in International Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming).
9. World Bank, World Development Report, 1991: The Challenge of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and World Bank, World Development Report, 1992.
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11. For the left-alternative approach see, Barry Commoner, Making Peace with the Planet (New York: Pantheon, 1990); Manfred Max-Neef, A Human Scale of Development: Conception, Application, and Further Reflections (New York: Apex Press, 1991); John Browder, Fragile Lands of Latin America: Strategies for Sustainable Development (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Michael Redclift and David Goodman, eds., Environment and Development in Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

12. For these views on social equity see, D. Ghai, ed., Development and Change, 25, 1, Special Issue; J. Friedmann and H. Rangan, eds., In Defense of Livelihood: Comparative Studies on Environmental Action (West Hartford: UNRISD and Kumarian Press, 1993); D. Ghai and J.M. Vivian, eds., Grassroots Environmental Action: People's Participation in Sustainable Development (London: Routledge, 1992).
13. Hector Schamis, "Reconsidering Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism," Comparative Politics, 23, 2, 1991; Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (forthcoming); Peter H. Smith, "Crisis and Democracy in Latin America," World Politics, 43, 4, 1991.
14. For the value of mid-range theorizing to explain different outcomes in similar contexts see, Carlos H. Acuña and William C. Smith, "The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Logic of Support and Opposition to Neoliberal Reform," in William C. Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds., Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform: Theoretical and Comparative perspectives for the 1990s (New Brunswick: North-South Center/Transaction Publishers, 1994).
15. The seminal work in this line of theorizing is, Peter Haas, "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, 46, 1, 1991.
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17. For a classic work in this vein see, Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Crises (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986). For a more recent treatment related to Latin America see, William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra, Latin American Political Economy in the Age of Neoliberal Reform.
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20. Robert N. Gwynne, "Non-Traditional Export Growth and Economic Development: The Chilean Forestry Sector since 1974," Bulletin of Latin American Research, 12, 2, 1993.
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24. Eduardo Silva, "Conservation, Sustainable Development, and the Politics of Native Forest Policy in Chile," in Gordon MacDonald, Daniel Nielson, and Marc Stern, eds. The Politics of Latin American Environmental Policy in International Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming.
25. For Minister Figueroa's stance see, "Presidente de CORMA: Sólo un tercio de los bosques se aprovecha económicamente," Estrategia, January 11, 1991; "Ministro de Agricultura: El bosque nativo chileno debe ser preservado," El Mercurio, April 4, 1991. With respect to President Aylwin's position, a number of interviewees in the policy making loop mentioned the importance of his intervention. All author interviews in Santiago de Chile, June-July 1992 and August 1993.
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30. Pedro García Montero, "Sada-Amazonas: La política ambiental y desarrollo sustentable en el Estado Amazonas," and "La reserva de la biósfera Alto Orinico-Casiquiare: Una opción para el desarrollo sustentable," both in Ambiente, 15, 47, 1993; and Antonio Carrillo, "Anotaciones sobre la política ambiental de la R.F. de Alemania," Encuentros, 6, 1992.
31. For neoliberal reforms see, Joseph Tulchin with Gary Blan, ed., Venezuela in the Wake of Radical Reforms (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

32. For the ideology of the leading experts I relied on author interviews with Omar Carrero, Director General of the forest service (Seforven); Diomira Barrios, Director of Planning, Seforven; Deud Dumith, president of the parks service (Inparques); José Arnoldo Gabaldón, former Minister of MARNR; Pedro García, Director General of the department with oversight for Amazonia (Sada-Amazonas). All interviews in Caracas, Venezuela, between June and July, 1993. For an overview of departments and functions in the ministry see, Ministerio de Recursos Naturales Renovables, Memoria y Cuenta Año 1991 (Caracas: República de Venezuela, 1992).

33. Data for this interpretation were drawn from author interviews with María Auxiliadora Alvarado, Executive Director of the timber industry association (Asoinbosques); Antonio Gaspard, a timber industrialist and Asoinbosque representative to the National Forestry Council (an advisory body to the MARNR); Juan Gutiérrez and Gustavo Larrazábal, each on the board of directors of large pulp and paper firms. All interviews in Caracas, Venezuela between June and July, 1993. For antipathy to the agroforestry projects see the Asoinbosques statement in the minutes of the meetings of the National Forestry Council, July 2, 1991, in MARNR, Consejo Nacional Forestal: Gestión Año 1991 (Caracas: Seforven, 1992).

34. Author interviews with high-level planning board personnel of the Ministry of Natural Renewable Resources, such as José Antonio Carvallo, Director, Office of Planning and Budget. All interviews in Caracas, Venezuela in June and July, 1993.

35. For overviews of Costa Rica see, Lori-Ann Thrupp, "Political Ecology of Sustainable Rural Development," in Patricia Allen, ed., Food for the Future: Conditions and Contradictions of Sustainability, John Wiley and Sons, 1993; Jean Carriere, "The Crisis in Costa Rica: An Ecological perspective," in Michael Redclift and D. Goodman, eds., Environment and Development in Latin America: The Politics of Sustainability (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

36. Magda Solís, Junta Nacional Forestal Campesina: Una experiencia de organización campesina (San José: Junaforca/FAO, 1993).

37. The institutional setting for legislation in Costa Rica is complex, and, for idiosyncratic reasons that cannot be developed here for lack of space; even more so in the case of natural forest policy. For the basics see, Jean Carriere, "The Crisis in Costa Rica: An Ecological perspective."

38. For the policy orientation of the legislative commission I relied on author interviews with key actors in the process, these included José Luis Salas, technical director of the commission; Gilbert Canet, director of the Forest Service's Office of Peasant Development; Gastón Vargas, chief aide to Legislative Commission. All interviews in San José, Costa Rica, November, 1994.

39. Asamblea Nacional, Comisión Especial para las Reformas a la Ley Forestal No. 7174, "Dictámen afirmativo de mayoría," Expediente no. 11,003, San José, July 9, 1992.

40. These data from author interviews with key market-friendly participants, Enrique Barráu, Agricultural Development Officer, USAID; Raúl Solórzano, Executive Director of the Centro Científico Tropical; Luis Fernando Sage, forest industrialist; Alfredo Peralta, forest industrialist. All interviews in May, 1993 and November, 1994, San José, Costa Rica.

41. República de Costa Rica, "Ley Forestal," La Gaceta, 85, May 7, 1986. Also see, República de Costa Rica, Estrategia de conservación para el desarrollo sostenible de Costa Rica (San José: Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energía y Minas, 1990).
42. Dixie Mendoza, "Sala IV anula Ley Forestal," La Nación, 25 May, 1990.
43. These data collected during author interviews with key actors on both sides of the debate. On the more grassroots-oriented side these included José Luis Salas, technical director of the commission; Gastón Vargas, chief aide to Legislative Commission. All interviews in San José, Costa Rica, November, 1994. On the more market-friendly side interviewees included, Enrique Barrau, Agricultural Development Officer, USAID; Raúl Solórzano, Executive Director of the Centro Científico Tropical; Luis Fernando Sage, forest industrialist; Alfredo Peralta, forest industrialist. All interviews in May, 1993 and November, 1994, San José, Costa Rica.
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45. Author interviews with Luis Fernando Sage, forest industrialist; Alfredo Peralta, forest industrialist, and now vice president of the Cámara Costarricense Forestal; Edgar Salazar, executive director, Comisión de Desarrollo Forestal de San Carlos. All interviews in May, 1993 and November, 1994, in San José and Ciudad Quesada, Costa Rica
46. Dirección General Forestal, "Proyecto Ley Forestal," October 31, 1994.
47. Author interviews with key large and small-scale private sector timber interests and peasant organizations, Luis Fernando Sage; Alfredo Peralta; Edgar Salazar; Magda Solís, executive director of the Junta Nacional Forestal Campesina. All interviews in May, 1993 and November, 1994, in San José and Ciudad Quesada, Costa Rica
48. Author interview with Magda Solís, Junaforca, November 1994. Junaforca carried out the negotiations on behalf of peasant organizations. Also see, Junaforca, "El nuevo sector forestal," Boletín Informativo, 5, September-October, 1994.
49. For general studies of environmental issues, including forests, in Mexico see, Enrique Leff, ed., Medio ambiente y desarrollo en México (Mexico City: Grupo Editorial Miguel Angel Porrua, 1990); Victor Toledo, et al, La producción rural en México: Alternativas ecológicas (Mexico City: Fundación Universo Veintiuno, 1989); Antonio Azuela, et al, Desarrollo sustentable: Hacia una política ambiental (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1993).
50. These data partially from author interviews with key policy makers of this period, León Jorge Castaños, former undersecretary for forestry of the Agriculture Secretariat; and his one time right hand assistant, Víctor Suárez. Both interviews in Mexico City, July 1994. Also see, Gonzalo Chapela, "Nueva Ley Forestal, nuevo interlocutor," Cuadernos Agrarios, 5-6, 1992; Luisa Paré, Las plantaciones forestales: ¿Para quién es el negocio?, Cuadernos Agrarios, 5-6, 1992; Gonzalo Chapela, "De bosques

y campesinos: La problemática forestal y el desarrollo organizativo," in Armando Bartra, et al, Los nuevos sujetos del desarrollo rural (Mexico City: Aden Editores, 1991).

51. The core of the group from the mid-1970s to the mid 1980s included former Secretary of Agriculture, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas; León Jorge Castaños, former undersecretary for forestry, and his right hand man, Víctor Suárez. All are firmly leftist in their ideology. They established a program for forestry development called socio-production. Mr. Cárdenas on went to become two time leftist presidential challenger to the ruling party (1988 and 1994).

52. For the semi-authoritarian Mexican political system see, Wayne Cornelius and Ann Craig, The Mexican Political System in Transition (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies, 1991).

53. Author interview with Víctor Suárez and León Jorge Castaños, Mexico City, July 1994.

54. Key leaders of peasant cooperatives that I visited in states of Jalisco and Quintana Roo in July, August, and October 1994 all made spontaneous reference to the period of socio-producción as key to the genesis of their community forestry enterprises.

55. Gonzalo Chapela, "Nueva Ley Forestal, nuevo interlocutor." This checks out when one compares the actual documents as well.

56. Luis Tellez, a strong supporter of neoliberal economic restructuring, was appointed by president Salinas to head the technical team that would design forest policy. He appointed another neoliberal, Claudio González as his right hand man. Together they hand-picked the rest of the technical team, largely from universities on a consultancy basis.

57. Author interview with Gerardo Segura, a member of the technical team that worked on the bill, Mexico City, June 1994. The same position is clearly reflected in various drafts that the technical group put forth, as well as in the preamble of the bill itself, see Presidencia de la República, "Nueva Ley Forestal," Doc. LV/o36/92 P.O. (II), 1992.

58. These points came across clearly in legislative hearings on the forestry bill, see declarations by private sector representatives for the hearings of June 10, 14, and 17, 1992 in Cámara de Diputados, Consultas: Iniciativa Ley de Bosques, 1992 (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Capacitación del Sector Agropecuario, n.d.).

59. This was evident in the congressional hearings cited above. Discontent over loss of protection also came out strongly in a two day conference that I attended on sustainable forestry organized by the Instituto Nacional de Ecología--a government agency--on June 16-17, 1994. The clash between business and peasants over control of forest resources was also sharp.

60. For the structure of the forest sector and the different actors, see El Cotidiano: Revista de la realidad mexicana actual, 8, June 1992. This is a special issue dedicated to forests.

61. Julia Carabias and Enrique Provencio headed the group. They had long been involved in the production of grassroots development-oriented ideas from various academic institutions.

62. Author interview with Enrique Provencio, Director General of the Instituto Nacional de Ecología, Mexico City, July 1994. Author interviews with peasant leaders at the INE-organized "Taller sobre desarrollo forestal sostenible," Mexico City, June 16-17, 1994.