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Vision 2020: An analysis of policy implementation and agrarian change in rural Rwanda

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UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI - ST. LOUIS

Vision 2020: An analysis of policy implementation and agrarian change in rural Rwanda

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Missouri-St. Louis In Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science
July 1, 2014

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Abstract

In 2000, President Paul Kagame introduced a plan to alleviate poverty as well as to maintain political control over the policy process through a decentralized bureaucracy. Since adoption of Vision 2020 in 2000, Rwanda has been reforming its rural sector to commercialize agriculture, reduce pressures on land, and move the country into middle income status by the year 2020. In order to achieve the goals outlined in Vision 2020, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) adopted a policy of administrative decentralization in 2001 to facilitate the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture. I am addressing two related questions: 1) How has Vision 2020 been implemented in rural Rwanda? 2) Is administrative decentralization inhibiting or facilitating implementation? I am studying the challenges of implementing Vision 2020 among a population that has a shared memory of civil war and genocide as well as a history of conflict over land rights and use. Included in the analyses are discussions of the evolution of land laws, changes in the agricultural economy, and administrative structures established to facilitate development. The dissertation will focus on the policies of villagization and agricultural commercialization to illustrate how 21st century agrarian policy is being implemented in Rwanda.

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Abbreviations

AMS	Agricultural Mechanization Strategy
BNR	National Bank of Rwanda
BRD	Bank for Rwandan Development
CDCs	Community Development Councils
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DFiD	Department for International Development
DDP	District Development Plans
EICV	Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoR	Government of Rwanda
INATEK	Institute of Agriculture, Technology, and Education in Kibungo
IWMS	Integrated Watershed Management System Project
LTR	Land Tenure Regularization
LDC	Less Developed Country
MFI	Microfinance Institutions
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government
NAP	National Agricultural Policy
NIS	National Institute of Statistics
PPA	Participatory Poverty Assessment
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PAP	Project Affected Persons
RADA	Rwandan Agricultural Development Authority
RAP	Resettlement Action Plans
REMA	Rwanda Environment Management Authority
RISD	Rwandan Initiative for Sustainable Development
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative
SPAT	Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VUP	Vision 2020: Umurenge
WFP	World Food Program

Chapter One: Introduction

“Rwanda’s *Vision 2020* document.....describes the basic development objectives of the country over the long term. It is the key socio-economic policy document on which all national and sectoral policies and strategies are based and on the basis of which the allocation of resources between the various sectors is made” (Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture in Rwanda, 2009)

Land scarcity and food insecurity have been persistent problems in Rwanda, and were exacerbated after the 1994 genocide that claimed the lives of one million people in one hundred days. These historical and contemporary conditions have provided the foundation of policy development and implementation with a focused goal to alleviate poverty and increase the incomes of the majority of people who live in extreme poverty. Vision 2020 is a twenty year plan that outlines specific development goals aimed at reducing poverty and guiding Rwanda’s economic development between 2000 and 2020. While the program itself has been recognized as a model for national development, the implementation of key policies has thus far not led to the type of growth that will ensure middle income status by 2020. I investigate the implementation of two key policies, villagization and agricultural commercialization, to evaluate whether or not administrative and political institutions are hindering the ambitious goals of Vision 2020.

I frame the analysis using the work of Michel Foucault and James Scott as the government of Rwanda (GoR) is applying the principles of biopower and is making its

population legible by developing public policy based on two factors: 1) the GoR views society through a lens of post-genocide development and as one divided between victims and killers and 2) the GoR is using a combination of administrative and political institutions to control the biological necessities of life, including the control of where people may live and what they may plant. All of this is steeped in the language of global poverty reduction, with specific references to the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), making policies such as forced resettlement more amenable to international goals of rural development while, domestically, depriving the rural poor of basic rights such as where they may live and what they may plant on their land.

I am shifting the focus away from ethnicity to a more policy-oriented analysis of politics and development in twenty-first century Rwanda. While ethnicity played a significant role in the 1994 genocide, current policy development and implementation allows for a deeper understanding of what is driving and hindering development today. Rwanda is often identified as an example of a rare success story in African development due to Vision 2020 and the commitment to development by the ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) regime led by President Paul Kagame. Recent economic successes, such as attracting foreign investment and having transparent financial institutions, have led many such as the World Bank and western governments to laud Rwanda as a case to be replicated by other post-conflict governments. However, as will be argued, recent achievements overshadow the political conditions that define the country under Kagame and the RPF. The political institutions in Rwanda do not allow for criticism of policies, making the implementation of Vision 2020 more of a compulsory process rather than a participatory one, counter to what has been argued by the RPF in justifying resettlement and commercialization.

Framing the Issue of Land Reform in Rwanda

Many of the world's least developed countries (LDCs) have large rural populations, influencing the ways in which governments frame development strategies. The governments in these countries have pursued a variety of means in implementing economic and political reforms designed to alleviate poverty while maintaining political authority among rural populations. These reforms are often guided by the rationale of politically repressive regimes concerned primarily with retaining their control of government and citizenry alike. Oftentimes the goals of the state differ from those of the rural poor leading to a discrepancy in how the rural poor perceive the reforms when compared to the *raison d'état*. This difference in understanding of rural development may affect determinations of success and failure of these reforms between the rural population and the urban political elites. These issues become especially pertinent when present within the context of an ethnically divided, post-conflict country such as Rwanda.

In recent years governments have adopted strategies in line with free-market approaches to modernization. The commercialization of agriculture, resettlement of significant portions of the rural poor, and decentralization of political authority are policies that have been promoted in many African countries during periods of economic development. Historically such reforms have led to political conflict and crises due to underdeveloped administrative institutions and inefficient planning (Bunker 1987; Rondinelli 1979).

Intensive agricultural commercialization and formal land tenure based on legal definitions of ownership and use were first introduced in Africa by the colonial powers as means to extract resources from the people and the environment, to implement taxation, and maintain social control over the indigenous populations (Berry 1992: 327). Through the colonial practice of commercializing agriculture and natural resources, the foreign powers were able to subdue

and control the indigenous populations due to the fact that livelihoods were directly tied to access to land. This general trend has extended beyond the colonial era. Post-colonial leaders have consistently focused their efforts on land reform in an attempt either to favor or marginalize certain groups of people. In other words, the colonial powers, as well as numerous African leaders, have understood that control of land translates into political authority (Magagna 1991: 33 – 35).

Another impact of colonialism on issues of agricultural production and land ownership involved cultural misunderstanding between the colonial administrators and indigenous people during implementation. One telling example centers on the manner in which the British colonizers dealt with land disputes under indirect rule in West Africa. Prior to the British arrival, West African land tenure had been based on ties to a specific ethnic, regional, or linguistic group, not formal agreements that supported capital accumulation. Furthermore, the rights afforded to outsiders differed from those applied to people from within a specific group. This discrepancy made it difficult to establish a formalized set of laws that could be applied to every individual under British control (Berry 1992: 336). This point illustrates the complexities of reconciling modern policies of land use with traditional practices and beliefs of ownership. Essentially, land ownership and production “depended on the history of relations between the persons involved, and the way [the relationships] were interpreted at the time of the land acquisition” (Berry 1992: 337), a very complex practice for the British colonizers to comprehend and formalize. The colonial policies of European powers have shaped the way in which post-colonial regimes have allocated and controlled land, often in ways that intensify and polarize ethnic and religious identities.

What is evident throughout Africa is that the state has tried to reconcile history with the ambitions of national leaders through policy. When governments introduce land reform there are often references to historical precedent when justifying policies to the affected population. On the other hand, African leaders adopt ambitious plans for economic reform designed to reduce poverty and conflict while using the mechanisms of the modern state to implement these reforms. Scott (1998) refers to this as “high modernism” because the state sees the past as a hindrance to development and the present “is the platform for launching plans for a better future” (Scott 1998: 95). The state will justify short term hardships such as resettlement and changes in the types of crops cultivated by promising improved livelihoods at some undetermined future date. In the case of Rwanda, however, the GoR has set a very specific date for when these hardships will end, 2020. Furthermore, the GoR has not felt the need to justify the hardships as much as it has encouraged the local leadership and people to work harder to achieve the goals of Vision 2020.

Since the early 1960s, numerous African governments have experimented with a variety of agrarian reforms but few have been able to sustain such policies due to underdeveloped domestic institutions (Rondinelli 1979: 403). Land has remained at the center of protracted political and social conflict throughout Africa because the issue is rarely decisively resolved. This brief introduction leads to a number of pertinent questions related to Vision 2020 and policy implementation in Rwanda. Has the GoR been able to implement comparable reforms that have failed in other places in the past? Why should we expect agrarian reform in Rwanda to be successful and equitable? Most importantly, what concrete impact are the reforms having on the rural poor in Rwanda?

Rwanda has a long history of political development within the geographical context of dispersed rural communities. Land distribution and use in Rwanda has traditionally been a collective process and the idea of private or personal property rights were virtually non-existent before the era of colonialism (Pottier 1993: 8). The way in which land was distributed by the late 19th century was determined through a combination of both patron-client relations and a form of feudalism under which inhabitants traded their labor for rights and access to land (Shinichi and Marara 2007: 124). During the colonial era, especially under Belgian rule, land use and distribution in Rwanda became the responsibility of a centralized, bureaucratic system based on western ideas of property rights (Crook 2006: 1493). The Belgians supported the minority Tutsi (14%) and put them in positions of power using land laws and institutions favoring the ruling elite while excluding the majority of the population, the Hutu (85%). Because the people of Rwanda have always relied on agriculture for their individual subsistence and incomes, any restrictions on land will provide a foundation for tension and conflict between those being excluded and those promoting the exclusion. The approach taken by the Belgians in regards to land was really an extension of their overall policy of favoring the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority through a system of land tenure that encouraged Tutsi to control large tracts of land. Land, in effect, was used to further consolidate the power of the Tutsi and to ensure their continued allegiance to Belgian colonial policy.

When Rwanda was mandated to the Belgians in 1919, the social hierarchy of Tutsi kings, chiefs, and sub chiefs was directly tied to land distribution whereby local Chiefs and sub-chiefs, in turn, allocated land to rural peasants (Chretien 2003: 267 – 275). The colonial policy of land titling and land use disrupted these social relations, increasing tensions between Hutu and Tutsi. The Belgians effectively deprived the majority of the population of their livelihood, creating

animosity between the two groups as early as the 1920s due to the discriminatory way in which land use was indirectly controlled (Pottier 2006: 513).

In 1959 the Hutu Revolution brought about a shift in power relations in Rwanda. The new Hutu government immediately set about reorganizing the political, social, and economic institutions which had disadvantaged them for so long during Belgian colonial rule. Emphasizing the importance of Hutu identity, the new elites ensured that the land laws which had favored Tutsi under the Belgians would now benefit the oppressed Hutu (Maquet 1961; Chretien 2003; Pottier 2006). The socio-economic divisions that had been institutionalized through land policy under the Belgians continued to exist into the 1970s when Hutu leaders passed a land law based on the system established by the Belgians but designed to favor Hutu, effectively blocking the Tutsi from acquiring land rights (Pottier 2006: 514). The development of land policy under Belgian rule provides one example of how land has been used for political and economic influence throughout Rwanda's history. By depriving one group of access to valuable land, colonial administrators all but guaranteed the Tutsi would have access to the natural resources needed to generate wealth. This same legal standard was adopted by the ruling Hutu in the 1970s as a method to exclude Tutsi from economic and political institutions, reversing the ethnic discrimination put in place by the Belgians by subordinating Tutsi to institutions which favored Hutu.

This brief history is noted because political and economic development typically take on unique characteristics in rural societies, due to the limited reach of central authority and the difficulty in establishing authority beyond urban centers (Boone 2003). Agrarian societies are more likely to be dependent on local authorities for their well-being than on a centralized government. Furthermore, in such societies, land plays an important role in the lives of the rural

citizens as well as in the consolidation of power for the local leadership. Since 2000, local administrators in Rwanda, particularly at the District level, have been tasked with the responsibility of implementing Vision 2020. As policy is introduced to the cell and *umudugudu* administrative units, the rural poor will be implementing rural policies by doing what local administrators tell them to do. This “decentralized” approach is designed to facilitate efficient implementation, based on the assumption that the rural poor will be more likely to trust local administrators whom they may know personally, rather than urban bureaucrats sent to remote areas to oversee the implementation. There is pressure on the leadership of each administrative unit to ensure prescribed agricultural goals are being met.

It is within this historical context that the government of Rwanda has been pursuing ambitious reforms aimed at transforming both the rural economy and the rural poor. There are, however, numerous opportunities for failure, given the nature of Rwandan social and political relationships. The GoR must overcome institutional obstacles such as illiteracy, gender inequalities, and land disputes as well as the inherent difficulties in changing the way of life of the majority of the country. There are many incentives for the GoR to pursue these reforms by any means necessary.¹ Rwanda continues to struggle with reconstruction and stability after the conflicts of the late 1990s and early 21st century, thus leading to persistent food insecurity and land scarcity. Vision 2020 is an attempt to correct these factors of underdevelopment. Food insecurity, poverty, and land scarcity continue to affect the majority of the population at the halfway point of Vision 2020; suggesting implementation problems may be hindering the rapid development as envisioned by the GoR.

¹ The GoR has been criticized for using force and coercive means to resettle significant portions of the population. See The World Bank Operational Manual OP.412, December 2001 and *Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda* by Human Rights Watch for different perspectives on the issue of resettlement in Rwanda.

The GoR has argued that it is determined to learn from past experiences of land reform while adapting to changing circumstances as the policies are implemented (Republic of Rwanda 2007c). The GoR is placing the responsibility for implementation on local administrators and the rural citizens themselves. This approach encourages a sense of local ownership during the decision-making and implementation stages of Vision 2020. By promoting a sense of policy control through decentralization, the GoR is encouraging development through familiar, well-established local relationships. The GoR is addressing political and economic development simultaneously, in order to ensure popular participation and trust among the rural poor. Nonetheless, the *development* of policy is anything but decentralized. Policies such as resettlement and commercialization are designed by the urban elite, personified by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and then, by way of a hierarchical administrative structure, policies are implemented throughout the country. This political structure ensures the rural officials and administrators are “on the same page” as the urban elites, which often leads to excessive pressure upon the rural poor from local administrators to enact the policies, as well as miscommunication and competition among administrators.

The origins of Vision 2020 can be traced to the immediate post-genocide period. On December 13, 1996 the government of Rwanda adopted the National Habitat Policy which required rural Rwandans to relocate to government sanctioned villages (*imidugudu*, singular; *umudugudu*, plural) (McClintock 2001). The government provided several justifications for this program that alluded to a concerted effort to rebuild and stabilize post-genocide Rwanda: It would 1) Create non-agricultural employment in order to reduce pressure on land; 2) regroup citizens in order to effectively control any dissent that would result from forced relocation; 3) solve the land scarcity problem by redistributing land and creating terracing; 4) protect the

environment; and 5) improve the transportation and distribution networks (McClintock 2001). Taken together, the goals of *imidugudu* were a normative justification for security and resettlement in the post-conflict years that followed 1994. As an official government policy, the *imidugudu* program was designed to stabilize and reconstruct a failed state while supporting economic development in the rural sector.

Between 1996 and 2000, the initial plans for resettlement and reconstruction became important factors in a larger national policy to provide security and promote modernization in the rural regions of the country. During this period, the rationale behind the policy of villagization went from one of post-conflict resettlement to extensive land and agrarian reforms. One characteristic of resettlement between 1996 and 2003 was that the government used procedural means to forcibly relocate citizens (McClintock 2001: 28). Through a hierarchical system of state and local authorities, the people of Rwanda, primarily the rural poor, were forced to destroy their homes, after which they were then relocated to government sanctioned villages. The reasoning behind this requirement was that Hutu insurgents might use the homes as bases and hideouts from which to launch future attacks, so the destruction of property was necessary in order to protect the rural poor. Regardless of the validity or truth behind the reasoning, the citizens complied and moved into *imidugudu*.

Villagization is but one aspect of a larger rural development and land reform program that was later established in 2000 under Vision 2020. Land reform, in this instance, refers to the allocation and management of land to the citizens of Rwanda so that they can feed themselves as well as enter the economy through commercialized agricultural production. This has been difficult to accomplish for several reasons. First, Rwanda is a small nation with many people who feel they are entitled to increasingly scarce productive land. Disagreements and conflicts

over land rights put pressure on natural resources and stresses already contentious social and political relations in rural areas. Second, many citizens have a specific claim to land that is based on historical events. The Tutsi who fled during 1959, 1973 and 1990, and who then returned after the genocide in 1994, argue they are entitled to the land they left behind. However, the Hutu can argue that, according 17th century customs and discriminatory post-colonial laws, they are entitled to the land if they have cleared and cultivated it since 1994. All Rwandans, in effect, have legitimate claims to land and land rights. The GoR has responded to these disagreements by implementing policies that formalize land tenure and standardize land transactions via legal reform and contractual agreements. The idea is to minimize disputes over ambiguous claims to land, thus protecting land rights while avoiding local disputes that may lead again to large-scale violence.

Adopted in 2000, Vision 2020 established goals for development to be reached by the year 2020. There are six Pillars in Vision 2020, each aimed at promoting long term economic growth and political development. Vision 2020 outlines a strategy for pro-poor growth wherein policies are developed to facilitate rural development and address issues of poverty², food security, and rural economic development. I am evaluating the ways in which agrarian policy is being implemented among the rural poor in a post-conflict society still coming to terms with civil war and genocide. The GoR has recognized that in order to reach the goals set forth in 2000, the country must address issues facing the rural poor insofar as 90% of the population was classified as poor and dependent on subsistence agriculture in 2000.

The GoR adopted Vision 2020 in 2000, and immediately began instituting a policy of villagization; it argued that grouped settlements were necessary to ensure the rural poor living in scattered settlements had access to markets and government services. Thus the resettlement of

² Poverty here refers to the United Nations definition of 'extreme poverty' of less than \$1.25 a day.

significant numbers of the rural poor continued. Related to this policy was agricultural commercialization. Once the people had been resettled, the policy states (Republic of Rwanda 2001: 18), land could be used more productively. For example, where once a house sat on a fertile plot a dwelling was now moved to a non-fertile plot, thus allowing the former site to be used for food crops.³

The policies of villagization and commercialization will be used to illustrate the Vision 2020 framework for development which provides the state the opportunity to monitor and control political activity in the countryside via the decentralized nature of the implementation process. I frame my argument in terms of the concept of “biopower,” made popular by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in the 1970s, because these policies involve the physical relocation of large numbers of rural poor, justified by promises of agricultural commercialization and development. Both villagization and commercialization are having a significant impact on all facets of society, from national economic growth and development to state-society relations between the rural poor and the national elites. Both capture the ambitious nature of Vision 2020 and provide insight into how policy is being implemented in post-genocide Rwanda.

Vision 2020: The Six Pillars

Vision 2020 consists of six pillars that reflect specific policy areas to be addressed in order to facilitate development by 2020. The six pillars are:

³ Example given during Field Research, June / July 2011

- 1) Reconstruction of the nation based on good governance and developing social capital
- 2) Transformation and commercialization of agriculture with forward linkages to other sectors
- 3) Development of an efficient private sector that operates on free market principles;
- 4) Development of human resources including education, health, and ICT skills, focusing on demographic, and gender issues as they relate to development
- 5) Infrastructure development that includes improved transportation, energy, water and ICT networks
- 6) Promotion of regional economic integration and cooperation.

In addition, Vision 2020 is designed to address simultaneously issues involving gender, inequality and the sustainable development of natural and environmental resources. These are called cross-cutting issues that are to be taken into consideration during policy development and implementation. The second Pillar is directed specifically at the commercialization of agriculture “with forward linkages to other sectors” (Republic of Rwanda 2000 / 2004). Table 1 lists the official goals that are to be achieved by the year 2020. If successful, Vision 2020 is an ambitious plan that will have significant impact on the people of Rwanda, and specifically the rural poor who make up the majority of Rwandan society.

Table 1
Goals for Vision 2020

Goal	2000 (Baseline)	2010	2020 (Target)
Population	7.7	10.1	12.7
Per Capita Income	\$220	\$400	\$900
Agricultural Population (Active)	90%	75%	50%

Poverty (%)	64%	40%	30%
Access to Safe Water	64%	64%	100%
Access to Electric Energy	2%	4.3%	35%
Financial Credit to Ag Sector	1%	1.9%	20%
Land Parcels with Secure Tenure	--	1%	60%
Avg. Growth in Ag Sector	9%	8%	6%
Avg. Growth in Industrial Sec.	2%	8%	12%
Avg. Growth in Service Sec.	11%	7.4%	11%
Use of Fertilizers (% of Households)	6%	16%	50%
Doctors / 100,000 People	1.5	3	10
Nurses / 100,000 People	16	22	20
Literacy Rate	48%	70%	100%

Republic of Rwanda 2007a

Villagization and agricultural commercialization will be explored in greater detail below; for now it is sufficient to say that the two policies are instrumental in achieving the goals set forth under the second Pillar of Vision 2020. I examine implementation of these policies between 2000 and 2011 in chapter four and chapter five. Since 2001, Vision 2020 has been implemented by way of a decentralized administrative system whereby local administrators in rural regions bear the brunt of responsibility for the successful implementation of agrarian reform. In 2006 Rwanda underwent an administrative restructuring that reduced the number of administrative units throughout the country, making it more efficient for the national regime to deliver services and support needed for development. Prior to 2006, Rwanda had been divided into 11 provinces, 106 districts (*akarere*), 1545 sectors (*umurenge*), and 9201 cells (*akagare*). The majority of the population lived in isolated and dispersed settlements (*umudugudu*) within these administrative units, making it difficult and expensive for the GoR to provide the assistance needed to ensure the well-being of its rural citizens. Since the restructuring in 2006, Rwanda has been divided into 5 provinces, 30 districts, 416 sectors, and approximately 2148 cells (Republic of Rwanda 2007b), reflecting the incorporation of administrative units into larger, more manageable units.

Grouped settlements make it easier for the GoR to ensure technologies and assistance benefits the rural poor. Agricultural commercialization is intended to support long term

economic development by transitioning the rural population away from subsistence agriculture, reducing pressure on land and, eventually, developing opportunities for off-farm and non-agricultural economic activity. Villagization supports commercialization because it relocates the most vulnerable populations closer to roads, markets, sources of clean water, health facilities and schools, making it easier for them to sell their crops, earn wages, and learn new skills. However, the administrative and policy reforms that have accompanied villagization and agricultural commercialization have at times been met with local resistance, due to factors such as insufficient administrative capacities that contribute to misunderstandings and underdeveloped bureaucratic institutions unable to properly and equitably implement key policies (USAID 2010: 31; ARD Inc 2008: 8). This is leading me to hypothesize that the rural poor will be hesitant to support official goals if policy is not clearly defined and the process and results of implementation are unclear or misunderstood.

Villagization has required the resettlement of large numbers of the rural population (Global IDP Database 2005; Republic of Rwanda 2001). Between 1995 and 2000, 265,229 *imidugudu* were constructed; by 2002, 1.2 million people were living in these villages. In Kibungo (a district in Eastern Province), 91% of the population were in *imidugudu* by 2002 (Havugimnana 2009). This is one reason why Kibungo was selected as a case study, to gauge the progress of commercialization where such intensive villagization has occurred. If commercialization has been successfully implemented as of 2010, we should find evidence that villagization does contribute to economic growth, thereby raising the living standards of the rural poor.

However, resettlement raises many other important questions, due to the prevalence of conflict over land claims in the rural areas. The GoR has been formalizing the process by which

land is used, expropriated, owned, and registered since 2005 with the adoption of the Organic Law N° 08/2005 (discussed further in chapter five). I examine the behavior of the administrators who are leading the implementation - and whose jobs depend on successful implementation - and the issues related to extensive reform among the rural population, who have distinct ideas of their role in the agricultural economy and society. In theory, the people living in *umudugudu* are to be consulted prior to and during implementation. This approach to development in Rwanda is predicated on the principle of encouraging a sense of mutual cooperation (*ubudehe*) among the rural residents in villages (*umudugudu*) and allowing the people direct input into policy implementation. Under *ubudehe*, both the government and the people have a significant role in planning and budgeting (Musoni 2005). However, my field research results from June and July 2011 suggest this is not always the case; conflicting ideas of implementation among officials at different administrative levels are coupled with the persistence of poverty in rural Rwanda.

Defining Rural Poverty and Vision 2020

I will be relying on some very specific definitions in evaluating policies in Rwanda. Because contemporary reforms are affecting the rural poor more so than any other segment of the population, we need to differentiate among the concepts of land reform, agricultural reform, and agrarian reform in order evaluate policy in its proper context. The three concepts seem to be almost interchangeable, but each category requires different inputs from both government and the population. The input, in turn, affects what we can expect from specific policies.

Land reform refers to “the redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm labourers” (Food and Agriculture Organization 2006: 9). The concept of land reform can be further divided between *land tenure reform* and *land*

redistribution, (van der Brink et al 2006: 1), each distinction requiring a specific set of policies in order for successful reform to occur. Land tenure addresses the legal requirements for ownership while policies for land redistribution focus on “the transfer of land from large to small farmers.” (van der Brink et al 2006: 1). Admittedly, these two concepts seem to be interrelated, but in order to implement land tenure and redistribution reform there must be a set of distinct legal and economic norms accompanying the reform. For example, land redistribution must occur under a system of clearly defined and elaborated land tenure policies that legally protect all interests involved in the transfer if it is to be successful.

Beginning in the 1960s countries such as Tanzania implemented both land tenure reform and land redistribution under the auspices of African socialism. These policies ultimately failed due to underdeveloped bureaucracies with inconsistent goals among the rural poor (Lofchie 1978). Nevertheless, Tanzania serves as an example of state-led land reform which addressed land ownership and distribution under the umbrella of an ambitious agrarian reform program. The policies adopted in Tanzania during the late 1960’s were similar to those being adopted in Rwanda today in that they were designed to transform the agricultural economy in order to make production more efficient and profitable. One of the key similarities between reforms in Rwanda and Tanzania was the relocation of significant numbers of the rural poor. In Tanzania this policy was known as *Ujamaa*, roughly translated to mean “familyhood.” (Pratt 1976: 71). Then president Julius Nyerere developed a scheme for development centered on three interrelated principles: equality, democracy, and socialism (Pratt 1976: 63). In order for Tanzanians to move forward they would need to develop a sense of post-colonial community and collective responsibility. This sense of community would be developed around agriculture, the primary economic activity in Tanzania. If agriculture could be reformed in a way that the goods

produced would be sufficient to provide food and livelihoods for Tanzanians then the people would see the benefits of collective production. In order to achieve these goals Nyerere began a policy of “villagization” in which the rural poor were forced to relocate to government designed villages in order to facilitate the modernization of the agricultural sector. Ultimately, this policy failed and led to one of the worst famines in Africa during the 1970’s (Lofchie 1978).

The term agricultural reform refers to agricultural *market* reforms. Agrarian reform involves the restructuring and reorganization of legal institutions, agricultural activity, systems of credit, and a general transformation of relationships among the rural poor as well as between the rural poor and the state (Lofchie 1978). Proper implementation of agrarian reform involves at least two sets of policies: 1) integrating the agricultural sector into the broader (i.e., national, regional and international) market system, and increasing incentives for the rural poor to participate at the commercial level; and 2) promoting competition and private incentives by reducing state intervention in the functioning and marketing of agriculture (Kheralah et al 2000: 5 and 14). Essentially, agricultural reform is focused more on economic reforms and typically involves market-centered structural adjustments, as opposed to the physical redistribution of land and populations.

In short, agrarian reform encompasses a more ambitious, wide-ranging set of policies designed to transform both the economy and society during periods of development and agricultural modernization. I focus on two specific policies, villagization and agricultural commercialization reforms which go beyond the redistribution of land to include a dramatic reorganization of the agrarian sector. Villagization involves the relocation of the rural poor in order to accomplish national goals for development that require the commercialization of agriculture as a key priority for Vision 2020.

I concentrate on the implementation of resettlement, evaluating how such an ambitious and controversial policy supports commercialization and long-term growth. I conceive of the implementation of public policy as a tactic used by an authoritarian regime for political and economic control of the rural poor. Relying on administrative decentralization for both the implementation and management of the *imidugudu*, the GoR is able to exercise authority over individual households under the auspices of Vision 2020. I argue that in practice the way in which policy is implemented is more akin to deconcentration than decentralization, contradictory to what official policy claims.

Commercialization is the process, as opposed to the outcome, of establishing competition for commodities and then exchanging those goods in a free market system where each participant has equal opportunity for profit and loss. The privatization of agricultural activity will be included in the definition of commercialization. The commercialization of agriculture should allow individual farmers to determine how they will use the land and what crops they will produce. If the process of commercialization gives rise to independent producers who have access to a competitive, profit centered market system, then we can say that Rwanda is achieving the goals set forth under Vision 2020, without making claims to the ultimate success or failure of a commercialized agricultural sector. In addition, commercialization suggests that some rural residents will begin to benefit from wage labor. If there is an increase among those participating in wage labor, we can assume that commercialization is beginning to create a rural middle class that is able to provide wages, yet another indicator of agrarian development.

Variables included in this definition of commercialization include the type and extent of the mechanization of agriculture, access to lines of formal credit, trends in wage labor since 2000, and methods by which commodities enter the market system. In other words, if significant

commercialization is occurring we would expect that the responsibility for investing in technology and land to be markedly dependent upon private owners rather than on the state after ten years of implementation.

Land tenancy, another critical issue, is defined as the “lending and borrowing of land” (Shinichi and Marara 2007: 111) for productive purposes. The issue facing Rwanda is that many of these land transactions have traditionally taken place outside the realm of a formal legal framework, thereby reducing the extent to which the state can capture the benefits of such transactions. According to government reports, (Republic of Rwanda 2001: 23) this imposes an additional restraint on realizing the marketing of agricultural goods. This is where agrarian reform, as opposed to land reform, becomes integral to realizing the goals of Vision 2020. These ambitious reforms are requiring the state to address issues of customary and formal land tenure in order to minimize local conflicts when it comes to land claims. Customary tenure is based on pre-colonial understandings of land use, while formalizing the tenure process establishes legal definitions and statutes which explicitly outline an individual’s rights and responsibility to plots of land.

Customary tenure was suited to communal claims to land when land was distributed among groups, not between individuals. Formal land tenure emphasizes the productive capabilities of the individual while minimizing group ownership. Redefining legal access and control of land has required extensive administrative and bureaucratic restructuring, processes which are still evolving today. Due to a lack of administrative capabilities and inefficient bureaucracies, the rights and obligations of the rural poor have not been communicated very well in the *imidugudu* situated throughout Rwanda.

Implicit in agrarian reform during periods of pro-poor development is the focus on moving rural populations, and the national economy, away from reliance on agriculture in an attempt to diversify the economic base of a country. Agrarian reform is often designed to redirect agricultural wealth to support industrialization (Bates 1981: 119). Such policies are usually developed by urban political elites and implemented with little to no consultation among the rural populations who are most affected by such changes. This approach to development has been a staple of African governments since independence, even though evidence and experience tell us that forced relocation and forced commercialization are often misguided on the part of the state and / or misinterpreted among the rural poor.

I also distinguish between the role of national and local authorities. Local authorities represent the social, political, and economic relations between the rural poor and are tasked with the implementation of national policy. The role and importance of local authorities are defined by close interactions among the rural peasants who rely on local power structures for their day-to-day political well-being and depend on family and neighbors for their economic well-being. The functions of district, sector, and cell officials differ because the center of power may be in the capitol city or a district office where there is little to no interaction between the rural peasant and those making decisions that affect the livelihoods of the rural poor. Decentralization is designed to coordinate the efforts of district, sector, cell, and village-level authorities in implementing policies designed by national, urban elites. Furthermore, commercialization generally involves a transition from the communal social relations that define the interaction between local authorities, the rural poor, and government officials through the development of individualized economic relations such as individual lines of credit, formalized private property rights, and a decreasing reliance on group identity for ones livelihood.

Finally, I focus on agriculture activity and not activity centered on livestock in determining the impact villagization has had on commercialization. One reason for this is that the villages are ostensibly designed to increase and streamline the productivity of food crops that can then be sold and traded in regional and international markets. Second, livestock tend to be more important for the domestic economy and social relations, yet may not contribute significantly to growth as Rwanda integrates with regional and international markets. Finally, while Rwanda's agrarian reform addresses issues involving livestock, grazing rights, and animal husbandry, it will not be included in this dissertation because food production is often a more immediate issue for the rural poor. Cattle continue to be indicators of social status but there are different variables attached to livestock that may be difficult to incorporate in a study of commercialization.

While I acknowledge that Vision 2020 is a broad set of policy prescriptions which deal with economic, political, and social development, the main thesis is that *any* reform that occurs in Rwanda will be agrarian reform due to the fact that 90% of the population is classified as rural poor. Therefore, any attempt at modernization and market reform in agriculture will occur among the most marginalized populations. In a post-conflict nation like Rwanda, institutional disruptions must be considered given the existing ethnic divisions and relationships among the rural poor.

Research Design and Methodology

I have relied on a deductive approach for this topic because I want to assess whether and to what extent the official rhetoric is being translated into development. My methods include discourse analysis, e-mail based interviews and elite interviewing, in order to identify trends in

comprehension and misunderstandings of the policies being implemented. I hypothesize that miscommunication between the national government and local officials are hindering successful implementation. The secondary sources are reliable due to the fact that reports are officially sanctioned; interviewees often repeated almost verbatim what is written in official documents produced by the Government of Rwanda with little variation in terms of personal opinions regarding Vision 2020 and the approach adopted by the GoR for agrarian reform.

The majority of my field research depended on elite interviews, given my limited access to local populations due to lack of assistance in Kibungo. Policy implementation is supported by a particular discourse that both minimizes ethnicity (i.e., genocide ideology) and reminds people why the policies are necessary given the history of ethnic conflict. I selected officials from the district, sector, and cell levels of government, as well as administrators in the District Land Bureau (Kibungo), Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC), and the National Institute of Statistics (NIS), to ensure a cross-section of views from various actors with different roles and responsibilities in implementing Vision 2020. I conducted approximately 15 interviews with district, sector, and non-governmental officials in Kibungo and Kigali that generally lasted anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, depending on availability and the depth of answers given by interviewees. I generally posed the same questions to each elected official in order to determine whether or not officials in different positions had the same understanding of Vision 2020 and the accompanying policies. The questions themselves were a combination of open-ended inquiries designed to capture personal impressions as well as policy-oriented questions that informed my research into the specifics of villagization and commercialization (Appendix 1).

Many of the interviewees are elected by local residents but accountable to the GoR. This plays heavily into understanding the implementation of rural policies as local administrators are often tasked with meeting specific goals for production; if the goals are not met they are replaced at the behest of national authorities, usually through an electoral process. I discovered this creates a lack of long-term administrative knowledge needed to oversee development because there is often a high rate of turnover among officials and administrators, which puts pressure on district officials to implement policies rapidly among populations that are slow to adapt to new technologies and farming methods.

I also contacted individuals from a variety of local NGOs including the Rwandan Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD), to obtain perspectives that differed from those offered by elected and appointed officials. Further information was gathered during the course of random encounters with local residents, university employees, foreign researchers, journalists, and individuals involved in a variety of activities that included micro-finance and gender related research.

My research design was significantly influenced by the advice and recommendations of a number of scholars who have conducted similar research in recent years. Fortunately, there was a number of extremely gracious, innovative scholars and administrators who were more than happy to correspond with me as I prepared for my field research. The insights offered by those who had traveled to Rwanda multiple times in recent years were invaluable; they provided information not only regarding the logistics of research but also on the requirements for foreign researchers established by the GoR. Through this process of contacting established scholars, I was able to network with other graduate students doing similar field research at the same time and share advice and information as the research progressed.

Rwanda is classified as “not free” by Freedom House, due to its limited political competition and press freedoms. However, under the leadership of President Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the country has undergone dramatic and encouraging changes since 2000. The current regime is often compared to that of Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, as “benevolent authoritarianism”: while political freedoms are limited, the rising level of development seen throughout the country is hard to ignore. In such an environment, any information regarding official policy will be released with the tacit approval of the RPF. Prior to my arrival, I was made aware of the fragile situation in Rwanda due to ongoing tensions between the dominant ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, as well as to the political situation in which it is illegal to discuss ethnicity. I had learned that there is a difference between what people say and do when in the presence of a foreign researcher and what they really mean. I designed my questions in a way that would focus on simple answers and would avoid political or social biases as much as possible.

As of 2010, any foreign scholar is required to obtain a research permit before conducting field research in Rwanda. Initially I was told by a contact that research permits were issued by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS). Once I arrived, however, I discovered the permits were issued through the Ministry of Education, involving at least a 3-month process from the time one submits a description of research to being issued the actual permit. This was my first indication of miscommunication between bureaucratic levels of government in Rwanda, as cell and *imidugudu* authorities did not know research permits were needed to conduct interviews while district and sector officials requested a copy before the interview could begin. I was able to obtain the research permit one day before leaving for Kibungo; once I arrived in the Eastern

Province I found the permit had to be shown before anyone would begin answering my questions.

Due to the RPFs tight control over information and policy, public officials in Rwanda hold positions which depend on supporting a very specific narrative of development. The answers officials give during interviews are rarely critical of rural policy unless the government has already identified a specific issue that needs to be addressed, in which case these “criticisms” of underdevelopment have already been publicized and posted online. I initially pursued an inductive approach (Bowen 2005) to analyzing the interview responses because I wanted to see how, or if, official answers matched up with the reality in Rwanda today. I was more interested in trends and degrees of consistency in answers, as I knew many officials would only provide answers that support the overall development narrative under the RPF. As expected, government officials rarely provided any criticisms of Vision 2020, and several went so far as avoiding the question all together by pretending to search their desk for papers or taking phone calls in the middle of the interview.

There were several instances where I did not learn anything new about a specific policy, having already read the relevant documents released by the government. For example, officials would often point me specifically to the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) report and Vision 2020, which I was already well aware of due to their being posted and updated through the World Banks and Rwanda’s Ministry of Infrastructure web sites. Such official responses can be expected in countries attempting to achieve lofty goals in short periods of time, particularly when so many foreign aid agencies and actors are involved in financing development projects. Officials do not want to appear incompetent because their jobs depend on

successful implementation, and because criticism of specific policies may jeopardize the assistance coming from international actors (Humphrey and Weinstein 2009).

By interviewing elected officials I was able to obtain first hand perspectives on official rhetoric, to compare the rhetoric of Vision 2020 with the reality of rural poverty in Kibungo. For example, when asked how many meals a day people in Kibungo ate, one Sector official told me three. When asked what they ate he identified rice, Irish potatoes, vegetables, and beans as being staples of most Rwandan meals in his Sector. This did not support claims to the contrary by some researchers studying nutrition in Kibungo; their findings suggested malnutrition was a persistent problem in Kibungo, as they had seen firsthand physical indications of malnutrition among young children. This example, elaborated upon in chapter six, illustrates the purpose behind elite interviews as a way to explore whether or not the rhetoric matches the reality of Vision 2020.

Elite interviews also offer opportunities for additional, unforeseen lines of questioning not touched upon in official documents. I began my interviews in Kibungo with the District Vice Mayor and then worked my way “down” to the sector and *imidugudu* officials. My intention was to design interviews with lower officials based upon what had been said by higher officials. This allowed me to gather information from multiple sources at different levels of government and to identify trends in confirmation and contradictory answers related to certain policies. I was also able to ascertain the varying degrees of how officials at different levels of government understood both specific policies and the process of implementing those policies.

One of the challenges when preparing for field research in Rwanda was the fact that the recent history has been defined by ethnic violence, and yet one is rarely permitted to broach this subject. This was not such a major problem for my research on agrarian reform since 2000; I did

not have to ask about ethnicity and the genocide. Nonetheless, there are strong ties between the people and the land in Rwanda and oftentimes ethnicity has been used to gain access to a neighbor's land. While my topic was not explicitly concerned with ethnicity, it was a topic alluded to in any discussion of how land was distributed and acquired over the past 10 years. For example, a recent criticism of the *gaccaca* process has been that people will arbitrarily accuse neighbors of genocide in order to obtain land through the legal process. Seemingly mundane questions such as "Where did you live in 2000?" could illuminate how and why an individual ended up where they were in 2011 as a result of the legal process being used to try and convict those accused of genocide.

Another issue critical to socioeconomic relations and field research was the need to protect the identities of my interview subjects; I never named previous or future interviewees. I did this in order to keep the focus on the interview at hand, and to prevent the interviewee from shifting the line of questioning to other, non-related topics (see Sriram et al 2009 and Thompson 2010 for detailed descriptions and considerations for carrying out field research in politicized post-conflict countries).

Due to the fact I had limited interaction with individual *imidugudu* residents, and that most of my interviewees were government officials, I was more concerned with protecting the content of interviews than specific identities. Many officials' jobs depended on how they represented and promoted Vision 2020, so I was careful never to refer to past interviews, even if something was being repeated or the interviewee mentioned "a friend" to whom I had already spoken to. In Rwanda today, official jobs are treated almost as if the administrators are competing with one another, the prize is keeping their jobs. Such a system can lend itself to internal intrigues where friends turn on friends.

Rwanda is much “easier” than I had expected in terms of having to deal with corruption and intimidation from government officials, but this fact alone raised several questions. I found that things change very quickly in Rwanda. Many of the interviewees had only been in their positions from six months to one year. I highly doubt I would be talking to the same people upon a return trip. This realization is what brought me to focus on the implementation of policy, insofar as high turnover could well be contributing to a lack of coordination and communication among local officials tasked with implementation. The urban landscape is also rapidly changing. I was told many times that had I visited Rwanda in 2006, a mere five years earlier, I would not have recognized Kigali. Again, this is an indication that the GoR is pursuing policies that focus on rapid growth, especially urban growth, at the expense of political freedoms that would allow the rural poor to criticize such policies, thus leading to resistance and lack of commitment to Vision 2020 in the countryside.

One final note regarding the field research: My sample of interviewees was admittedly small because of canceled appointments, limited assistance, and a general lack of interest in speaking with me amongst elected office holders. Coupled with the information I was able to gather from the interviews I conducted, I left Rwanda with a strong sense that information is tightly controlled; a revelation that is as frustrating as it is intriguing. Frustrating because I was unable to interview as many people as I had intended, thus limiting the amount of primary data and information I could incorporate into the dissertation. Intriguing because it raises questions of why it is so difficult to gain access to even lower-level officials. Many of these individual had scheduled appointments with me and yet failed to show up. I was unable to ascertain why this was, but my feelings were that they had been told by higher officials to ignore my requests for interviews. My assistant had indicated at one point that Sector-level authorities would not make

appointments so we would need to catch them at the right time; something we were inexplicably unable to accomplish over the course of four weeks in Kibungo.

Table 2: Interview Subjects (June 6 – July 13)

Position	National	District	Sector	Cell	Non-Government
Number of Interviews	4	3	2	0	18

Outline of Dissertation

Chapter two reviews the literature relating to agrarian reform and implementation in developing countries. Agrarian and rural studies of Africa carried out in the post-independence, Cold War era have provided scholars and policy-makers with significant evidence which suggests the importance of understanding agrarian reform policies when evaluating development. However, the post-Cold War conflicts and issues of democratization during the 1990s refocused the scholarly debates on structural phenomena. My work updates the earlier studies and theories of agrarian reform by applying them to the unique situation of a post-conflict, 21st century society undergoing reforms comparable to those which failed in these earlier eras.

Chapter three discusses the demographics of Rwanda today, then explains how Vision 2020 functions as a road map for development and as a source of political control for the RPF. It is important to understand the context in which Vision 2020 has been adopted and implemented in order to connect the rhetoric with the results. Rwanda is often hailed as a post-conflict society that is on track for long-term development, rendering it a safe place for foreign investors. However, poverty and food insecurity are persistent problems which suggests the

implementation of Vision 2020 is a “work in progress” at best; an ambitious plan that can only be implemented using authoritarian methods.

Chapter four offers an analysis of decentralization and policy implementation in a system that reinforces bureaucratic discipline and conformity to national planning. It will provide a deeper understanding of villagization and commercialization since 2000. The guiding question is: Have these two core policies been successfully implemented as envisioned by the GoR in 2000? This chapter incorporates data which will indicate the location, layout, and populations of the *imidugudu*, as well as the extent to which this policy has contributed to commercialization.

Chapter five centers on how policy is being implemented, given the structure of rural Rwanda and how decentralization has been conceptualized being critical for progress since 2000. The district is the administrative unit tasked with guiding implementation, but the sector is responsible for generating reports and recommendations. In practice, the GoR is tacitly involved in the development of policy as it sends members from various ministries to monitor the activities and recommendations of Sector officials; thus why I argue the system is more deconcentrated than decentralized. Policy implementation, despite official declarations to the contrary, is not decentralized because local authorities are not fully autonomous of national influence.

Chapter six builds on the previous chapter, providing a case study of Eastern Rwanda, specifically the area in and around Ngoma District, Kibungo Sector. Kibungo was one of the first locations to experience extensive villagization immediately after the genocide, so the population there has had extensive experience with the policy for the past sixteen years. Additionally, Kibungo is a location which has not been studied as extensively as other villagization locations such as Butare in the south, or Umutara in the northeast. Therefore,

Kibungo offers the opportunity to conduct original research in an area thus far neglected by scholars and western policy analysts when it comes to agrarian reform in Rwanda.

Chapter seven concludes the dissertation by summarizing the successes and failures of agrarian reform, offering some reasons as to why policies fail to be successfully implemented. In the tradition of policy analysis, chapter seven will be a summation of agrarian reform as of 2011 and offer insight into what we can expect by 2020, given the circumstances surrounding agrarian reform at the halfway point of implementation.

Chapter Two: Post-conflict reconstruction under conditions of resource and land scarcity

If one were to define the most significant barrier to peace and development in Africa, it would be difficult to ignore the issue of land and agriculture. According to the World Bank (2008), 70% of the continent's poor live in rural areas where subsistence agriculture and underdevelopment are prominent. Conflict over land remains a prevalent concern for many governments and the rural poor of Africa, as land disputes often provide the impetus for broader civil tensions (ARD Inc 2008). Considering the relationship between food insecurity and limited access to productive land throughout Africa, it is no wonder that many governments have identified agrarian reform as one of the most sensitive, pressing issues facing their people today. The literature on African agrarian reform suggests that competition over land is often a catalyst for tensions between the state and the people, insofar as governments and peasants often have competing ideas of land use and distribution during periods of modernization and development. The relationship between long-term development, access to and distribution of land in Rwanda has been treated in a passive manner throughout much of the recent literature (Gourevitch 1998; Lemarchand 2009; Prunier 2009).

In recent years the causal relationship between natural resources and war has begun to influence public policy. Topics such as climate change and crop failure are often included in analyses of conflict and political instability. Famine, such as the recent one of 2011–2012 in the Horn of Africa, has led some to suggest that Malthus (1798) was correct in positing that population growth could far exceed food production, resulting in massive starvation for the human race. The current food crisis in Somalia is often discussed in the same articles and news stories as al-Shabaab, a radical Islamist organization using international food aid as a weapon of war against the famine refugees. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Nigeria are

two of the poorest countries in the world, despite possessing large deposits of some of the most valuable resources on the planet (e.g., coltan and oil, respectively), suggesting that an abundance of lucrative resources does not guarantee peace and prosperity. These examples illustrate the paradox of both resource scarcity and resource abundance: it is not the presence or absence of resources that determines conflict and instability but rather how the resources are managed.

In an influential article published in 1994, Thomas Homer-Dixon argued that environmental scarcity, unequal distribution of resources, and population growth would lead to violent conflicts involving sub-national actors in the world's poorest countries. He concludes that countries that experience conflict related to environmental scarcity will either fragment or become more authoritarian (Homer-Dixon 1994: 40), which would be problematic for both domestic and international security, to the extent that these regimes are more likely to launch attacks on neighboring states. In the case of Rwanda, the same government has remained in power since 2003; as recently as July 2013, this government has been implicated in supporting the M23 militia in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 2008.

In 2000, Paul Collier argued that civil wars are motivated by two factors: greed and grievance. Collier postulates that countries with deposits of natural resources, such as diamonds or oil, have a higher likelihood of experiencing civil war because natural resources provide "economic opportunities" for the leaders and participants of rebellions (Collier 2000). The "greed and grievance" (Berdal and Malone 2000) argument shifted the focus from ethnicity to access to wealth and natural resources as the motivating factor behind a number of African civil wars throughout the 1990s. This has paved the way for policies such as the Kimberley Certification Process for tracking "blood diamonds," and recent attention to coltan's contribution to instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The greed and grievance model ties

conflict to the abundance of resources, but what might explain conflict in situations of resource scarcity?

Environmental degradation can lead to competition over scarce resources such as productive land, which also contributes to civil war and instability. Homer-Dixon (1994) found that states in the post-Cold War era were more likely to fight over non-renewable resources, as opposed to political ideology, while intrastate conflicts occur among sub-national actors competing for scarce resources such as productive land and water. Indra De Soysa (2002) found less correlation between scarcity and conflict than between abundance and conflict, suggesting scarcity offers a different set of opportunities and costs, affecting the calculations of actors. However, de Soysa is concerned with mineral wealth and other non-renewable resources, in contrast to productive land. Whereas opportunities for war are greater among elites who control mineral resources, maintaining productive farm land requires more expense and less return for warring parties.

Scarcity can be understood from two perspectives. On the one hand, conflict devastates the natural environment, which further threatens already scarce resources such as productive land needed to grow food crops. On the other hand, conflict is the result of scarcity, due to competing claims over scarce land resources. Proponents of both assumptions conclude that land and conflict are intricately linked among agrarian populations throughout Africa. Determining whether scarcity is the cause or the effect of fighting is essential for developing post-conflict reconstruction and development strategies. Scarcity, greed, and grievances are related, insofar as each model shifts the causes of conflict from ethnicity and religion to more concrete and immediate concerns such as food security, access to productive farmland among agrarian

populations, and opportunities that arise due to the presence of natural resources that have a strong global demand.

Local “strong men” and sub-national actors in Sierra Leone and Liberia often controlled access to and distribution of resources during and after the wars, requiring that post-war reconstruction addressed these power relations in order to stabilize the economy. Wars eventually end, at which time the state will be able to intervene and “capture” the resources in a manner where the resources are equitably distributed and efficiently managed. The successful management of resources through formal practices such as land tenure, regulation, and taxation is often difficult to achieve, especially in divided societies with recent or ongoing ethnic conflicts. Key to resource management is equitable distribution, assuring that the state does not marginalize or favor any one group over another during periods of state and nation building after civil war.

State-society relations and post-conflict public policy

The ability of the state to manage resources is critical to reconstruction and achieving a lasting peace, especially in agrarian societies. In countries where land scarcity and poverty are widespread before, during, and after war, it is critical to include the land issue as a key policy for reconstruction. This argument is founded on classical democratic theory which argues that social and economic development supports political stability (Lipset 1959; Rustow 1970). It is no wonder that many African leaders pursue land reform as the basis for long-term economic growth. If people have food, water, and shelter, their basic needs have been met, and they will be less likely to fight over these resources. However food, water and shelter are often in scarce

supply after periods of upheaval. In such circumstances, a strong state is needed in order to manage the distribution of such public goods in the immediate post-war period.

The implementation of agrarian reform policies requires that the state understand and be able to identify an otherwise “illegible” population (Scott 1998), a population that is dispersed geographically and one that has numerous political, ethnic and religious identities that the state must identify in order to establish and maintain political authority. In order to understand how an underdeveloped bureaucracy makes a population legible, “we imagine a state that has no reliable means of enumerating and locating its population, gauging its wealth, and mapping its land, resources, and settlements” (Scott 1998: 77), allowing for miscommunication of policy goals between national and local officials, exploitation, and opportunities for corruption among those tasked with implementation. From a bureaucratic or administrative perspective, marginalized populations must be quantified in some way in order to establish the proper methods of implementation. This enables the state to provide the inputs needed for reconstruction and, eventually, development. The case study that follows focuses on the state of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the administration of President Paul Kagame. Kagame has rendered “legible” the rural population in the context of the 1994 genocide, meaning that policies are being implemented to address stability, increase agricultural production, and minimize political and social opposition to public policy. Implementation will reflect the way in which the rural poor have been identified and made legible by the state.

Tensions will likely arise between modernizers and those subjected to the negative consequences of de-agrarianization (Bryceson 1997), the process whereby agricultural livelihoods are slowly adapted to the modernizing schemes of non-rural elites. This is especially true if the implementation of policy creates or reinforces inequalities. There are at least two

ways we can understand reforms aimed at rural populations under semi-authoritarian regimes. The first is by conceptualizing policy as a way to promote pro-poor growth; this entails policies aimed at reducing reliance on subsistence agriculture, financing education, significant state and foreign investment in rural technologies such as irrigation, and extensive international assistance. In order for reforms to be successful, a strong state is seen as necessary and justified, both among the elites and the rural poor who will ostensibly benefit from the dramatic changes that take place. In the case of Rwanda, international organizations such as the World Bank tend to minimize criticism of forced resettlement and political underdevelopment; instead emphasizing Rwanda as an example to be followed given recent growth in many sectors of the economy (The World Bank 2007). Regardless of the progress being made, if there is an inefficient, poorly trained, or corrupt bureaucracy in place, policy implementation will contribute to a lack of success at the local level, no matter how heavy handed the state may be.

A second way to understand rural development is by conceptualizing reforms as the use of resources to exert authority over dispersed rural populations. Governments must make their populations “legible” during periods of development and reform (Scott 1998), which suggests a need to focus on the equality of such reforms during periods of implementation. In other words, does the entire population benefit from newly introduced rural reforms or are reforms privileging one group or region over others? This can also be thought of in terms of “bio-power” in that the state will use public policy to manage populations and reduce political dissent (Foucault 1977 and 2004). Bio-power can be understood as the manipulation of biological necessities (e.g., land, food, water, and shelter) to control large populations of people. For Michel Foucault, political power can be exercised by managing not only these biological necessities, but also by using the state to control individual bodies through policies such as resettlement by dictating

where people may and may not reside. Once the state controls land, food, water, shelter, and individual bodies, it can then exercise its authority using incentives and coercion to realize its own *raison d'état*. Benedict Anderson (2006) noted that through the construction of borders, the colonial powers were able to control their colonial subjects by physically ordering them into manageable colonial boundaries. The result was the formation of national identities through the manipulation of physical territory that has often led to both inter- and intrastate conflicts. Villagization can be seen as a micro-level example of Anderson's argument as it requires the reordering of populations for purposes of macro-level development.

A number of African countries are pursuing pro-poor policies designed to ensure food security by investing in small-scale subsistence agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization 2006; Mosely 2002; The World Bank 2007). However, this requires extensive state intervention and expenditure to reach the dispersed rural populations most in need of assistance. It is common for less developed countries to argue that large-scale, industrialized agriculture is preferable to subsistence agriculture because it attracts foreign direct investment and creates wage employment, thus reducing the population's reliance on local production susceptible to crop failure, political instability, and fluctuations in demand for commodities in the global market. Industrial agriculture places control of territory in the hands of state elites or foreign firms, further reducing access to productive land among local populations as the rural poor are moved into wage labor and denied rights to farmland.

Countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda are pursuing similar versions of the Asian Green Revolution that brought an end to famine and starvation throughout Asia during the 1960s. This involves extensive state investment in agriculture and, specifically, the food value chain, to ensure food security among impoverished rural populations. But a green

revolution has not taken off in Africa as it did in Asia and Mexico five decades ago. One reason is that the technology used to increase yields of wheat and rice has not been transferrable to East Africa where wheat and rice are not typically staple crops. The technologies used for those crops are not the same as those needed for maize, cassava, and coffee, which means African governments and farmers have had to develop new technologies while facing war, political instability, and adverse climatic conditions. A second reason why a green revolution has not occurred rests with the persistent underdevelopment of state administrative capacities. Whereas the Asian countries had the basic structures of modern bureaucracy prior to their green revolution, many African countries are still recovering from long periods of conflict. Finally, Asian countries in the 1960s had more developed infrastructure in place necessary for development of the rural economy. Rural transportation networks, for instance, are critical for commercialization and food security in order to connect the dispersed rural populations to markets. Civil wars often destroy the basic infrastructure, requiring added expenses for the state, a need absent in 1960s Asia. In order to address the infrastructure problems, African governments have adopted policies of resettlement to move populations closer to markets and to allow for more efficient delivery of government investment and services to the rural sector.

One supporting policy for agrarian reform prominent throughout East Africa has been that of forced resettlement, or villagization. Tanzania attempted to reshape its economy and society into a socialist utopia in the 1970s by moving 80% of the population into villages under President Julius Nyerere's *Ujamaa* policy. The result was mass starvation by the mid-1970s, due in part to poor planning. In Tanzania, then, forced resettlement was not conducive to achieving a socialist utopia. Ethiopia is currently resettling tens of thousands of people to make room for a variety of projects, including the construction of Africa's largest hydro-electric dam, known as

the Gibe III Dam, and a sugar plantation that will be primarily foreign owned. In recent years, members of the Omo ethnic groups have begun fighting this development using increasingly violent means to protect their land and livelihoods (Survival International February, 2014).

The history of rural reform in Africa has shown that drastic times are used to justify drastic measures, typically resulting in even more drastic times. This begs the question as to why Rwanda has opted to pursue similar strategies of resettlement under conditions of post-conflict reconstruction and development. There is a pre-colonial precedent in Rwanda as many people lived in grouped villages and worked communal land prior to the arrival of the Belgians in 1922. This communal activity ensured food security and supported important social and cultural relationships. Rwanda has been promoting food security as a rural priority since 2000, even though according to a USAID Report, approximately half of the country is facing minimal or no food security while the other half is classified as “stressed” (United States Agency for International Development 2011). Compared to other East African countries such as Ethiopia, this suggests the policies devoted to ending hunger in Rwanda are witnessing success in terms of food security. But does attaining food security indicate Vision 2020 is on track for the goals for commercialization outlined in 2000?

One reason for the emphasis on rural development in recent years has been the abundance of evidence that identifies rural poverty and food insecurity as the foremost issues facing Africa today (Sachs 2005; Thurow and Kilman 2009), not to mention reports that link famine and war with crop failure and climate change. Rwanda is an equatorial country, and I had intended to visit during the dry season in order to access the rural areas that are usually flooded during the rainy seasons. The first two weeks of my research saw record amounts of rain, and many Rwandans commented how it was supposed to be dry. If it is raining when it should be dry, and

is dry when rain is expected, farmers will be unable to properly determine planting and harvest days and lose significant yields in the process.

Rwanda: The effects of high population density and limited land on public policy

Much of the contemporary scholarship relating to Rwanda has been devoted to the genocide that took the lives of more than 800,000 people in 1994. Scholars have studied the genocides causes, execution, and aftermath (Chretien 2003; Gourevitch 1998), but few have focused on how the country has been moving forward with development since 2000. Previous research has explained Rwanda through the lens of ethnic centered conflict, minimizing the socio-economic factors that originally contributed to the violence. Since 1994, scholars have portrayed the genocide as a culmination of ethnic tensions (Chretien 2003) that originated in the era of Belgian colonialism. Rarely do scholars conceptualize the Rwandan genocide as one rooted in issues of land scarcity and rural discontent. While it is true that the country has a long history of ethnic division and obedience to authority, the importance of individual rationality (Arrighi 1968: 143) in the context of scarcity and rural livelihoods should receive greater attention, given the approach to development in Rwanda. One issue explored throughout subsequent chapters centers on conditions at the household level among Rwanda's rural poor, and how these conditions influence national priorities of development. When food insecurity is a prevalent concern, the rational choices made in rural households are not based on long-term goals but rather on immediate concerns of survival. This is one barrier to realizing Vision 2020 identified in Kibungo where the majority of my field research was carried out.

Economic Development in Rural Africa

In studying the relationship between market policies and politics in Africa, Robert Bates argues that national leaders rely on agricultural outputs to support large-scale industrialization and urbanization during periods of modernization (Bates 1981). This is not a new perspective. Karl Polanyi drew similar conclusions about the 19th century Industrial Revolution, arguing that the development of a “double movement” during periods of industrialization pitted the leaders of modernization against the working class (Polanyi 2001). In Rwanda, the working class substitute is a post-genocide, rural peasant class that is being forced to conform to the new norms of modernization, while still struggling with reconciliation. A double movement in Rwanda could result in further violence, if agrarian reform is not implemented in an equitable, consistent and transparent manner within the time frame established by Vision 2020.

Jean-Francois Bayart (1993), relying on an historical institutionalist approach to explain underdevelopment in Africa, argues that political institutions have been influenced by the unique processes of colonialism and global political dynamics of the Cold War. These institutions have developed around the control of natural resources, causing leaders not to fight over political liberalization but rather over access to power in the form of land control. Bayart (1993) refers to this as “the politics of the belly,” through which individual greed and ambition trumps meaningful political growth.

Claude Ake takes a similar approach, illustrating the importance of communal identity in relation to political development. He argues that “African democracy will need to emphasize economic rights and not abstract ideas of democracy” (Ake 1993: 241). Economic rights produce immediate benefits through distribution of resources such as land, while democracy, a slow and ambiguous process, does not put food on the table. Instead of emphasizing the long

term benefits of commercialization, leaders would better serve the people of Africa by focusing on the short-term benefits of the new socioeconomic order during modernization. Implementation marks a critical juncture, allowing short-term benefits to be seen immediately; thus implementation must be aimed not only at achieving national goals but also at providing incentives for the people to cooperate.

Goran Hyden's (1980) study of *Ujamaa* in Tanzania during the 1970s was critical for understanding how African governments address agricultural production and restructuring of rural society in ways that promote increased efficiency. He discusses the socialist political ideology that was used to justify the resettlement of millions of Tanzanians between 1967 and 1976. The newly independent government of Tanzania faced difficulties in establishing and maintaining authority over the rural peasantry due to "economies of affection"; corruption and faulty planning inhibited a successful villagization policy that would have contributed to long-term agricultural development (Hyden 1980: 271). Other scholars have noted the detrimental effects of personalistic, authoritarian rule when it comes to rural development (Sandbrook 1996; Young 1982). Pervasive corruption and favoritism diminish any potential gains to be had from increased agricultural development, particularly in states with underdeveloped bureaucratic institutions tasked with implementation. A number of scholars who studied rural reform in Tanzania in the 1970s note that resettlement was not the reason for the failure of *Ujamaa* but rather bad planning and persistent corruption (Pratt 1976; Shivji 1976; Lofchie 1978; Maro 1979).

Richard Joseph (1997) notes that newly independent governments attempted to use traditional African institutions, such as *Ujamaa*, in conjunction with institutions established under colonial rule. In addition to citizen self-rule and political competition, popular

deliberation became a necessary characteristic for democracy and public policy in Africa after the Cold War. Earlier attempts at rural transformation rarely involved citizens during policy development, and their participation during implementation was also limited. This brings us back to the failure of *Ujamaa* in Tanzania: The citizens were compelled to resettle and adopt new agricultural practices within a context of pervasive corruption and a lack of transparency when it came to the day-to-day activities of the rural poor (Pratt 1976; Shivji 1976).

Scholars also recognized the disruptive effects of modernization on traditional or divided societies, questioning the impact of development on traditional identities and relationships (Huntington 1968; Polanyi 2001). Modernization policies encourage governments to exploit the rural poor to finance and support the transition from agriculture to manufacturing and services. The wealth generated in the countryside is then diverted to urban and industrial development at the expense of the rural poor throughout Africa (Bates 1981). It is little wonder why African farmers would reject formal market institutions in favor of informal markets, because the immediate advantage of such a move makes informal activity more profitable.

Previous studies have noted that during modernization conflicts develop that include both traditional and class identities. Economic development leads to conflicts of interest in underdeveloped societies. This is when the reach of the “strong state” is tested as government competes with local authorities to express its power (Migdal 1988). This is the point at which underdeveloped political and economic institutions not only fail to alleviate poverty but actually contribute to further instability. The question then becomes whether or not a strong state is necessary and tolerable during periods of modernization. This is especially relevant when the people and government, emerging from prolonged conflict, are faced with rebuilding political and economic institutions. Extensive reconstruction will only be delayed without strong

leadership. A strong state may be necessary in order to implement ambitious reforms that will transform the rural economy, but once livelihoods improve and security is obtained, democratization should be allowed to challenge the state by shifting more political power to the rural poor.

By studying Rwanda in terms of classical theories of how the peasantry responds to modernization, I hope to expand this literature to 21st century agrarian reform in a post-conflict society. Development policy in Rwanda is ambitious in that it “promises to give” and “declares it will deliver” (Apthorpe 1986: 10) through the narrative surrounding Vision 2020. This approach represents a double-edged sword for Rwanda because the GoR is promising a better life for the rural poor by 2020, but at the expense of political reform. Implementation offers a clear declaration that resettlement and commercialization will support this development. If the Vision 2020 policies do not produce immediate results critical to the realization of long-term development, people will (and have) resisted.

The resettlement into *umudugudu* (villages) and the commercialization of agriculture involve significant changes for the rural poor, requiring a combination of incentive, coercion, and force, in cases where the people have resisted being uprooted from ancestral homes and land. Commercialization has required the rural poor to adapt to new farming techniques to meet the demands set forth by the GoR. However, both policies are important for long term, state-defined ambitions, producing clear costs and benefits to individuals for resistance and compliance, respectively. Decentralized implementation assures that the GoR has a strong presence even at the lowest administrative level, the individual *imidugudu*.

Villagization or Forced Resettlement?

Villagization is the policy of resettling people to ensure that they acquire access to services and technologies needed to support commercialization and development. The policy can be analyzed from several perspectives. The GoR argues that grouped settlements are needed because geography is one of the primary hindrances to commercialization. Rwanda's terrain varies from deep valleys and steep hills to fertile lands that bump against unproductive marshlands. The hilly terrain inhibits the use of tractors and other mechanized forms of production that would help to increase the productive capacities of the rural poor. Rural citizens who live in scattered settlements or close to the valley floors have a difficult time getting their crops from the fields to the markets. These are the types of obstacles with which the rural poor must contend in order to make a living. In a sense, villagization is a public policy designed to overcome the geographical limitations inhibiting commercialization and development.

Opponents of villagization are as varied in their criticisms as supporters regarding their justifications. One argument against the program suggests that it uses public policy to “re-engineer” society, using land policy to control and monitor the rural population (Ansoms 2009; Hillhorst 2000), a contention stemming from the strong relationship between the people and their land in Rwanda. If the state controls the development and implementation of land policy and settlement, it controls the people. These scholars typically contend that President Kagame is using rural policy to maintain political control over the country. However, the rural poor generally considered themselves better off by 2011 than they had been in 2005 (Ladipo 2012), suggesting the strong state is successfully managing rural development.

Florence Kondylis (2001) notes that villagization has not contributed to increased agricultural production, one of the intended purposes of Vision 2020. She supports the idea that

villagization is simply a way by which the state can control and monitor the rural population, using forced resettlement schemes and controlling who presides over local village leadership committees. This perspective suggests the policy should be abandoned, or at least minimized, as a key to achieving the other goals laid out in Vision 2020.

A key theme running through many recent studies of post-genocide Rwanda is that socioeconomic factors contribute to tensions and violence in the country (Uvin 1996; Fujii 2009). These studies do not reject the significance of ethnicity, but they do challenge this explanation as being too simplistic. Analyses centered on ethnicity alone tend to minimize factors such as access to land and social relations among the rural poor. In fact, one of the motivating factors used by local militias during the genocide was their promise to give land to the perpetrators, once the Tutsi were eradicated (Gourevitch 1998). Given that Rwanda is a densely populated country where the majority of people need productive land to survive, it is likely that ethnicity was but one factor out of many that led to one of the worst genocides in modern human history.

Implementation under conditions of scarcity and poverty

In Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) seminal study, policy implementation is defined as a "chain of events" where policy design and implementation are viewed as linear phenomena. Public policy requires both the definition of a problem as well as actors (bureaucrats) who are tasked with resolving the problem, based on how it has been defined. More recent research has refuted this, identifying the policy process as an interaction between policy design and those in the "street level bureaucracy" (Lipsky 1993) tasked with implementation. The interactive model identifies "interested parties [who] can exert pressure for change at many points" (Thomas and

Grindle 1991: 1166; Clay and Schaefer 1984). The interaction model distinguishes between policy development as more of a political process and implementation as an administrative process (Grindle and Thomas 1990). I argue that in the case of Rwanda, the implementation of policy has been just as political as the design process, given the decentralized structure of the bureaucracy.

Grindle and Thomas (1991) further elaborate on four factors of public resistance. The first is location: They argue that it is difficult for isolated, rural villages to form cohesive resistance to unpopular state policies. The GoR has promoted villagization as a way to ensure that the rural poor can be easily monitored by district, sector, and cell officials. While not explicitly stated in official documents, the way in which the country was administratively restructured in 2006 and the role that local officials now have in policy implementation suggest this is one aim of resettlement. The second factor of public resistance refers to the organization of groups around common interests. Vision 2020 defines the common interests of Rwanda as economic development and security. Thomas and Grindle's third factor, the capacity of the public to receive information quickly, relates to the official justifications for resettlement after 2003. Again, villagization is supposed to ensure that technology and knowledge can be distributed in a more efficient manner to grouped settlements, as opposed to providing state resources to scattered households. Finally, literacy is the fourth source of public resistance; because a literate population can decide for itself how to use the information it is provided. The GoR has a monopoly on the information and "stories" (Stone 1989) available to the rural poor living in *imidugudu*. This, again, indicates the political motive for resettlement, as the GoR is present at even the lowest administrative levels of society, such as the Cell and *imidugudu*.

As implementation occurs, the original policies will often change to some degree (Lindblom 1980). There are often instances in which perceived plans fail, due to administrative inefficiency or misunderstandings on the part of the rural poor as to how and why policy is being introduced. This has occurred in Rwanda as evidenced by the adoption of Vision 2020 *Umurenge* in 2007. After seven years of reform, *Umurenge* focused on strategies that took into account the specific problems facing implementation among the rural poor. Aside from *Umurenge*, there has been little change in policy design under President Paul Kagame. His administration has kept its focus on the original six pillars of Vision 2020.

This is where the implementation of Vision 2020 becomes germane to an understanding of rural development in a post-conflict country. The GoR views the population either as victims or killers; as policy-makers and local officials interact with the rural poor they, too, identify their constituents in this way. At the point of introducing specific policies such as resettlement, state level bureaucrats interact with the public and this interaction shapes the way in which policies are implemented. Their actions, in turn, are shaped by years of divisionism and civil war, thereby influencing the success and failure of implementation (Juma and Clarke 1985).


It is within the context of genocide, land scarcity, and extreme poverty that one must understand current rural reform in Rwanda. Just as all Rwandans were affected by the genocide, due to their close knit culture and shared history, contemporary land reforms are affecting the rural poor in a similar fashion. Rwanda's rural economy and social relations have emerged out of a variety of conditions and policies dating back well before the arrival of the Belgian colonial powers. Reforms will not contribute to long term development if the shared history and memories of the rural poor are not accounted for during implementation. The GoR emphasizes the importance of traditional relationships and institutions (i.e., *imidugudu*) as necessary to

support a modern bureaucracy tasked with implementing Vision 2020. The issues facing the rural poor are defined via the “causal stories” related to genocide; “cause, blame and responsibility” (Stone 1989: 282) for specific policy decisions are defined within the context of civil war and post-conflict development. The brutal nature of genocide and the realities of poverty are the foundation for the reasoning behind rural reform in Rwanda.

Gelase Mutahaba argues that there is a tendency for African governments to exceed their capacity to properly introduce and implement important policies (Mutahaba, et al 1993), straining the institutions of public administration and management. He notes the “scope of the state is large” because African countries were “late starters,” due to colonialism (Mutahaba et al 1993: 23 – 24). The GoR may be taking on more than it can handle, but it is not because the country is trying to “catch up” to the rest of the world. The Rwandan state is large due to the destructive nature of the 1994 genocide and subsequent reconstruction needs. Granted, Vision 2020 policies are ambitious, but they are designed to promote food security and commercialization in an impoverished 21st century country emerging from war, not colonialism.

A bureaucratic class is responsible for organizing, monitoring, and implementing the transformation from subsistence to commercial agriculture. According to organizational theory, the individual bureaucrats who make up this class are often from similar backgrounds (Wright-Mills 1956; Pareto 1968; Mosca 1960) and are socialized within the mandates and mission statements of their respective department (Montjoy and O’Toole 1979). This ensures that individual preferences are subordinated to the bureaucracy; employment is predicated on this, a basic formulation of organizational theory (Crosby 1996). In the case of Rwanda, however, the administrators charged with implementing Vision 2020 have been socialized within a culture of war and genocide which has determined their identities and their place in society. This type of

socialization occurs outside of the mandates and mission statements of their departments; they are required to subordinate their individual preferences to the state, in order to ensure their own job security and local power. Subordination is reinforced through the decentralized administrative structure which emphasizes the importance of district, sector, cell, and *umudugudu* leadership in implementing Vision 2020 in rural areas.⁴



In order to properly evaluate implementation, one needs to pinpoint where the impetus for a policy change comes from (Crosby 1979; Gordo and Gordon 2007; van de Walle 1999), as well as how policies are being funded. For Rwanda, villagization and commercialization needs are rooted in the experiences of a failed state and divided society. Between 1995 and 1998, many external organizations and donors supported villagization as a policy designed to regroup

⁴ The numbers in parentheses represent the number of units at each administrative level.

affected populations into safer locales. This initial funding and support provided the foundation for villagization after 2000 when it became key to Vision 2020. Resettlement was initially meant to facilitate stabilization and control after the genocide; our concern here is with policy execution since 2000. The impetus for villagization now lies with the need to ensure efficient delivery of government services to support commercialization.

How does one go about implementing reforms once the policies have been identified? Policies often fail because they are planned prior to determining the best approach for implementation (Elmore 1979). This “forward mapping” approach is natural in that the problem is identified as a one-size-fits-all solution and then policy prescriptions are developed. However, policy prescriptions in Rwanda since 2000 often do not take into account local conditions (Rondinelli 1979), such as knowledge of crop conditions and political relations rooted in traditional systems of authority. Another key to successful implementation rests with those directly affected by policy in both the development and implementation of policy (Ribot 2003). This may be sufficient for countries where established institutions are already in place to support consensus building and policy development, but it does not necessarily hold in countries trying to reconcile and move forward from war. Integral to successful development, building consensus among a population where both victims and their accused killers coexist requires that policies minimize inequalities in wealth and property while clearly establishing the collective benefits of rural reform.

The government of Rwanda has adopted a policy known as *ubudehe*, which recognizes the importance of traditional relationships within communities, while at the same time decentralizing administrative authority (Musoni 2005). This approach serves several purposes: First, it reinforces existing local relationships between the rural poor and administrators who are

tasked with implementation. Rwanda has a history of popular obedience to authority so the belief is that the people will be encouraged to participate if they are being guided by familiar authorities. Second, *ubudehe* is rooted in pre-colonial culture, in which the well-being of the group is dependent on the participation of all members, including the leadership. *Ubudehe* has been Rwanda's response to organizing the countryside by relying on existing relationships within and between rural communities. While the idea behind *ubudehe* is in line with the larger strategy for integrating the rural poor into the commercial economy, it is flawed in that the successful implementation of Vision 2020 depends on a decentralized administrative structure that is not autonomous or independent of the central government. Therefore, policy development is centralized and determined by national elites, while implementation is left up to local administrators who may or may not have the tacit support of their constituents.

Conclusion

Current reforms in Rwanda represent a model of development rooted in a context of war, ethnic genocide, and rural poverty. Valerie Percival emphasizes the importance of understanding the motivations of the perpetrators during the genocide, given the high population density and scarce land conditions in Rwanda (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998), which is the view I have adopted as a starting point for evaluating the implementation of contemporary agrarian reform. From here, I apply a Foucauldian perspective to understand the reasoning behind the administrative restructuring in 2006 and the way in which policies are implemented. We should expect the implementation of Rwandan policy to provide a unique case study of development in post-conflict agrarian societies. If conducted efficiently, the implementation of Vision 2020 under a semi-authoritarian regime will offer Rwanda as an example of how reconciliation and

rural modernization may be achieved in divided societies. If, on the other hand, implementation does not account for these factors, then the goals outlined in Vision 2020 will give false hope to the people and may well contribute to renewed violence as the rural poor again compete for access to land and resources. In the case of Rwanda, there seems to be chronic miscommunication between the national, district, sector, cell, and village leaders, leading to confusion during implementation. The next chapter will explore these themes in depth, and illustrate the conditions facing the rural poor and the officials implementing public policy.

Chapter Three: Rural Public Policy under Conditions of Extreme Poverty

How has the legacy of genocide driven public policy since 2000?

Much has been written about the causal relationship between poverty and conflict, but many studies overlook the importance of implementation of rural public policy. The general trend after World War II was to prescribe market-based reforms to countries struggling with underdeveloped economies and political instability; often leading countries to accrue debt that did little to alleviate poverty. By the 1990s the focus had shifted to the effect conflict had on poor countries; arguing that civil war contributed to poverty by destroying infrastructure and the natural environment, making it nearly impossible for the rural poor to earn wages and produce much needed food crops. Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) and Paul Collier (2000) emphasized that natural resource scarcity and abundance were the underlying causes of both civil war and poverty; suggesting solutions to war and poverty are found in public policies that address the management of land and mineral resources.

Land scarcity, conflict and food insecurity have been persistent issues in Rwanda for generations. The civil war that began in 1990, the 1994 genocide and the subsequent conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have exacerbated these problems, creating a humanitarian crisis that has led to further scarcity and instability. Millions of people were displaced and uprooted during the 1990s, leaving behind land but also creating a housing dilemma for the interim government of Rwanda and the international aid community. It is no coincidence that commercialization, decentralization and villagization have been interrelated since the adoption of Vision 2020 in 2000. Commercialization can be understood to promise increased food security, improved crop production and wealth for the rural poor while

villagization provides shelter and land. Decentralization is designed to facilitate these reforms by placing the responsibilities for development in the hands of local administrators and elected officials. The guiding question for this chapter reads: Who is being affected by villagization and commercialization and in what ways? The answer is the rural poor, but what are the characteristics of this segment of the population? This chapter will describe the condition of Rwanda's rural poor, in order to explain the reasoning behind policies such as villagization and decentralization within the context of Vision 2020

Theorizing rural development in divided societies

Economic liberalization in countries where political and economic power was based on ethnic or regional favoritism were more likely to struggle financially during the post-Cold War transitions once the old supporters, the Soviet Union and the United States, withdrew their financial and military resources (Widner 1994). Regimes that had formerly relied on this support found themselves vulnerable to political upheaval and calls for democratization. Rents were distributed to key interests in one last attempt to maintain leaders' political power, often at the expense of long-term development and the rural poor.

Development entails the modernization of inputs and outputs. In other words, modernization of agriculture involves a shift from subsistence agricultural to commercial agriculture, but the only way to achieve this on a large scale is to introduce new technologies and methods of farming. These changes often affect local political and social institutions as well as individual households (Haswell and Hunt 1991). Such change is significant for any society, but one such as Rwanda has the added factor of civil war and genocide to consider when implementing reforms.

Johann Pottier (2005) has studied food security at the household level through an evaluation of socioeconomic and gender dynamics in Asia and Africa. Using numerous academic disciplines to better explain food security, Pottier identifies conceptual differences between food policy experts, the international community, donor countries, and the household, emphasizing causes for food insecurity in environments of instability and inequality. His argument is that the individual farmers often have different customs, practices, and types of expertise than the state or the international community when it comes to protecting themselves from hunger.

Bleak assessments in the immediate post-Cold War era pointed to violent upheavals in countries where food was scarce or resources were abundant (Kaplan 2000). Paul Williams (2011: 38) makes the point that “Africa’s wars all have local roots” and that “local agendas and the contours of domestic politics” play a significant role in post-conflict reconstruction. This certainly rings true in the case of Rwanda, strengthening the argument that the implementation of rural policies must ensure equitable access to the inputs (financial support, access to dispute mechanisms, infrastructure, etc) and outputs (food, wages, etc) associated with commercialization.

Commercialization imposes constraints on the decisions of farmers (Berry 1993). They must decide how, what, and when to plant and harvest crops. Oftentimes these decisions are influenced by national policies aimed at increasing export-oriented commercialization of key crops. During periods of commercialization, social, political and gender relations may also be challenged, due to changing economic relations between the state and the rural poor, and within rural communities themselves. These relations can also change due to new inputs, such as improved seeds or mechanization, shifting the responsibilities of men and women when it comes



to tending crops and plots of land. Commercialization also encourages off-farm employment, as males seek wage labor in processing plants or in the informal economy, leaving women to bear the brunt of responsibility for maintaining the fields, farms, and families. All of this can lead to a reluctance among the rural poor to adopt commercialized farming methods and cash cropping, because of the disruptions to rural society and norms, and the uncertainty that accompanies these changes during the implementation of key policies (Berry 1993).

First published in 1981, Robert Bates' (2001) *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* has become an important text in the study of the political economy of agricultural commercialization. Bates argued that urban elites would use rural labor and produce to support industrialization. This led to the exploitation of the rural poor through the marketing boards that purchased their goods. The premise stands today: the rural poor are often at a disadvantage during periods of modernization as they lack sufficient political influence to affect public policy. While Rwanda is not focused on industrialization at this time, the fundamental issue of rural resistance and exploitation remains. Risk and uncertainty hindered commercialization in West Africa during the late 1970s – early 1980s when Bates (2001: 22, 39) was writing. The uncertainty and risk for the rural poor required for modernization hinders development in many areas of Africa. Farmers will minimize risk of starvation by opting to grow food crops instead of cash crops, thus limiting the ability of the state to generate significant income from agriculture. This uncertainty is present in Rwanda, but it is rooted in social divisions from the genocide, coupled with obedience to authority that can be traced back to the pre-colonial era. I am updating Bates' argument by applying it to a model of development (Vision 2020) that is being implemented in post-conflict Rwanda. The principles of risk, uncertainty, and potential for exploitation remain, while the

circumstances of civil war and genocide affect the way in which this risk and uncertainty is managed by the state.

Population issues in post-genocide Rwanda

The 1994 genocide has shaped the social, economic, and political institutions of Rwanda and has directly influenced policy-making under Vision 2020. Although the genocide largely targeted the Tutsi population, it also involved regional and political grievances that had divided southern and northern Hutu since the end of Belgian colonial rule in 1961. It is within this context that rural reform is occurring in Rwanda.



Rwanda's pre-genocide population was approximately seven million people, with the Hutu comprising 85%, Tutsi 14%, and Twa 1%. This has been the ethnic make-up of Rwanda since pre-colonial times, when Tutsi owned most of the cattle and land and were the royal patrons for Hutu, agriculturalists who were clients of the Tutsi rulers. Prior to the arrival of the Belgians, Tutsi and Hutu were socio-economic identities, meaning Hutu could become Tutsi if they acquired cattle and land. The Belgians identified Tutsi as the elites because of their social status, but the Belgians assumed this was due to a difference in ethnic identity and placed the Tutsi in positions of power in the colonial state. In 1959 the Hutu staged a coup which overthrew the Tutsi regime, and by 1962 the Belgians had left, and many Tutsi fled to

neighboring countries when the Hutu began using their power to exterminate those who had oppressed them under colonial rule.

After the Hutu Revolution of 1959 that institutionalized discrimination against the Tutsi, 150,000 Tutsi fled the country due to localized massacres in Rwanda between 1959 and 1973. Up to half of Rwanda's Tutsi population was living abroad by 1963 (Van Der Meeren 1996). Throughout the 1980s, Rwanda continued to struggle with periodic violence against Tutsi, land scarcity, and food insecurity under the regime of Juvenal Habyarimana, a northern Hutu. The 1994 genocide created a massive humanitarian crisis involving the displacement of millions of Rwandans. Immediately following there was a concerted effort by domestic, regional, and international actors to address issues of housing and the resettling of displaced persons (Reyntjens 1996). By 1996 millions of Hutu had fled Rwanda and ended up in refugee camps in neighboring Zaire and Burundi. At the same time, Tutsi who had fled between 1959 and 1994 were returning and reclaiming land they had left behind when they were forced to flee.

The 1994 genocide was primarily aimed at the minority Tutsi population and was the culmination of decades of post-colonial political and social discrimination by Hutu authorities (Pottier 2006; Prunier 2009; Gourevitch 1999; Lemarchand 2009). The ethnic motivations for the violence, however, mask additional factors such as high population density (430 people per sq. km), land scarcity, and persistent food insecurity. Recent scholarship has shifted attention to these factors, examining the socioeconomic and socio-political relations that existed prior to the genocide (Fujii 2009; Jefremovas 2002; Verwimp 2005). Land scarcity and violent conflict (Homer-Dixon and Percival 1996; Hilhorst and Van Leeuwen 2000; Van Leeuwen 2001; Bigagaza et al 2002) have become important variables in understanding the instability that has plagued Africa in recent decades, due to the reliance on land and agricultural production.

Natural resources also provide incentives for political opportunists to mobilize armies and prolong conflict for economic gains (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Given the high population density, limited productive land, and a majority who rely on farming for their livelihoods, efficient land management is critical for minimizing a recurrence of violence in a country still coming to terms with its history of racism and violence.

The GoR allows minimal political freedoms such as independent media and public criticism of government policies. In 2011, several members of the opposition party, United Democratic Forces (UDF), were arrested; its leader, Victoire Ingabire, was facing charges of promoting a genocidal ideology and colluding with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and made up of Rwandan Hutu attempting to destabilize the country. This is but a single example of Kagame's view of political opponents, but it is indicative of the motivations behind decentralizing the implementation of public policy. There is no room for meaningful opposition to either the dominant RPF party or to public policy. Much of this is related to the way the RPF has made the population "legible" (Scott 1998: 78) by defining it through the lens of genocide and civil war.

Subsequent chapters will elaborate on this topic, but for now I take the view that Vision 2020 was designed to promote development and attract foreign aid while ensuring minimal resistance from the rural poor during the implementation phase. Critical to the successful implementation are the change agents "who have well established reputations within their groups" (Coyne 2008: 63), who can act as the facilitators of implementation while representing the interests of local communities. Contemporary development in Rwanda is unique in that it protects the dominant regime while achieving key policy goals such as the commercialization of agriculture and reducing reliance on the rural economy. The GoR has achieved what many other

African countries have not: a clear and sustained effort to bring the rural poor out of extreme poverty. But Vision 2020 is being operationalized via an administrative structure that provides incentives for those who participate and punishment for those who resist; the latter is at times subtle (difficulty obtaining water), at other times more direct (forced relocation by the military or arrest). Poverty has traditionally made Rwanda's rural population reliant on the state for food, water, and shelter, which constitutes a form of bio-power that can be used to induce people to keep in line with state policy.

Villagization offers an example of biopower. Richard Apthorpe argued resettlement was “planned social change” that could lead to the political control of the population being resettled (Apthorpe 1966). An Ansoms (2009) views villagization in Rwanda as a means for re-engineering rural society. There are many overlapping identities in Rwanda, including ethnicity, regional location, and socio-economic status, and the urban elite “differs from that of the preceding period, both in terms of ethnicity and in terms of its relationship to peasants and the countryside” (Ansons 2009: 294), suggesting that the Kagame regime does not accurately represent the interests of a rural population to which it has little historical connection. Villagization promises access to land and water as a way to coerce dispersed rural citizens into grouped settlements that are governed by a hierarchy of state representatives. This again refers back to Scotts (1998) thesis of making the population legible. The GoR is using development-centered rhetoric to justify policies that allow it to monitor potential threats at every level of society.

Rural conditions and demographics

According to the 2012 Census, the population has rebounded to ten million people; 90% of the population continues to rely on agriculture for its livelihood, making attempts at reform uniquely challenging. Given the history of ethnic genocide, the government has established a set of goals to commercialize the economy and organize the population in a way that ensures equitable access to land and markets. This raises concerns with the manner in which these policies are being implemented among the rural poor, most affected by the reforms even though they have little input when it comes to policy development. It is important to identify who the rural poor are and what they do to survive.

Rwanda has the highest population density (416 people per sq. km) in Africa, despite being one of the continent's smallest nation-states. In 2005, agriculture accounted for 39% of the GDP and employed 88% of the population (Republic of Rwanda, PSAT, 2009: 1). Given the high population density, pressure on land, and the hilly terrain, the agricultural population relies on diminishing plots for its survival. The government has been promoting agrarian reform as a way to ensure equitable distribution of land, to move Rwanda towards a middle income economy through commercialization, and to reduce conflicts over land rights by formalizing and reforming the land tenure process.

Gender

Gender equality in Rwanda is another pressing issue behind development of a commercialized agricultural sector. The GoR wants to ensure equality throughout government and societal institutions by including gender as a cross-cutting cleavage that supports the benchmarks to be met by 2020. Rwandan women make up 52% of the total population of ten

million today. Women comprise 57% of the country’s working population, suggesting that they are strongly influencing growth in the agrarian sector given the nature of decentralization and the role that *imidugudu* residents play in policy implementation strategies. According to the 2003 Census, women outnumber men in every District except Kigali City, while men outnumbered women in 12 out of the 15 main urban centers (Republic of Rwanda 2003a), confirming that women constitute a significant share of the work force in non-urban regions. Furthermore, Rwanda holds the distinction of having the greatest female representation rate in its national parliament, 56%, the highest percentage in the world. However, the numbers are not so impressive at lower levels of government, such as in District posts. In fact, one of the shortcomings of Vision 2020 is the lack of emphasis on female representation in the District, Sector, and Cell committees (Field Interview with Shirley Randall and Annie Kairaba, June 2011). These are considered the most important levels of government for the implementation of agrarian policies (Field Interview, 2011: National Institute of Statistics).

Table 3

Gender (% of Female)	2005	2011
Total Population (%)	47	51
Primary School Attendance (%)	10	23
Literacy Rate (%)	60	65

Source: Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey(s): EICV3 (2012)

While women are a significant percentage of the rural population, they have traditionally lagged behind in education. However, since the adoption of the Nine-Year Basic Education policy in 2009, girls have had opportunities to earn degrees to an extent not seen under earlier administrations. Like their male counterparts, many young girls pursue degrees in services and

business, so they can learn skills needed to be competitive in the global economy, as Rwanda becomes a hub for regional and international business in Central and East Africa.

With the adoption of the Organic Law in 2004, rights to land ownership and use were formalized to incorporate rights for women. Women have been identified as a key demographic group for driving Rwanda's economic growth; they thus require equal access to property and ownership rights if agriculture is to be productive and sustainable. Since 1999 women have enjoyed equal opportunity for property ownership and inheritance, at least officially (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 20); but the Organic Land Law of 2004 further extended these rights to formal, contractual land ownership (African Development Bank 2008: 8).

An economic profile of the rural poor

Agriculture remained at constant levels, generating 41% of GDP between 2000 and 2010; between 1997 and 2007 the average annual growth in the agricultural sector stood at 5.6%. In 2006 alone, the growth rate reached 11%, although in 2007 growth fell to -3%, due to "strong seasonal disruptions and bad climatic conditions" in the previous year (Republic of Rwanda 2007a). During the same period, manufacturing showed a 13% growth rate in 2006, and 10% in 2007. The services sector saw 6% growth in 2005 and 8% in 2006 (The World Bank 2008). These economic indicators suggest that the government is developing the non-agrarian sectors of the economy while maintaining investment in rural development.

While the majority of Rwandans still live in rural areas, the 2003 Census reflected a dramatic increase in the urban population in all Provinces since 1991 (Republic of Rwanda 2003a). Over an 11-year period, the share of urban dwellers in Rwanda increased from 5% in 1991, to 17% by 2002 (Republic of Rwanda 2003a: 24). A significant number of rural poor are

moving to urban areas, such as Kigali and Butare in the south, resulting in a decreased labor pool for the agricultural economy. However, this trend was reversed between 2006 and 2011: the urban population fell from 17% to 14.8%, while the rural population rose from 83.4% to 85.2% (Republic of Rwanda 2011). One reason for this reversal may be that rural investment has created opportunities and incentives for those who had relocated to return home. Another reason could be the creation of non-farm, rural employment opportunities, such as wage labor and mechanics for farm implements such as tractors and irrigation systems, are attracting urban dwellers back to the countryside.

Rural poverty and sources of credit income

Poverty in Rwanda is defined as less than 64,000 RfW (USD \$94). Those subsisting on less than 45,000 Rfw (USD \$66) per adult per year are considered to be living in extreme poverty (Republic of Rwanda 2011: 133). Many Rwandans live in poverty due to multiple factors related to agricultural production. First, farmers concentrated in isolated settlements have traditionally been the poorest due to their limited access to roads, markets, and investment in infrastructure, new techniques such as irrigation and fertilizer usage. Second, many rural citizens are subsistence farmers, meaning they grow just enough food to consume but do not have enough to sell on the market. This point is related to the first as their physical location makes it difficult to provide the necessary inputs needed to increase yields to the point where crops could be sold for a profit. Finally, tracts of land that could be used to grow cash crops have traditionally been in the hands of elites, meaning fewer small-holders have the ability to compete with the large, more developed and profitable farms (Musahara 2008: 7). Many small-scale farmers own less than one hectare (ha) (approx. three acres) of land; much of this is distributed among a number of plots, meaning the farmers must spend a lot of time traveling from one field to another instead of

having all of their holdings in close proximity. This is a time consuming process that further reduces the productivity of land, hence the need for land consolidation.

Another 67% of small-scale farmers are living in extreme poverty, while only 18% of wage earners are found in such conditions (see Table 4). This illustrates the inefficiency of small-scale farming and the struggles that a majority of the rural poor face as long as they remain in subsistence agriculture. Commercialization is designed to reduce reliance on small-scale farming by encouraging wage employment. This reduces the vulnerability of small scale farmers to factors such as crop failure, adverse weather conditions, land degradation, and competing claims over scarce land.

Table 4: Poverty: 2006 – 2011: EICV3

	EICV2 (Poor)	EICV3 (Poor)	EICV2 (Extremely Poor)	EICV3 (Extremely Poor)
National	56.7%	45%	35.8%	24.1%
Eastern Province	52%	42%	30%	20%
Rural	62%	48.7%	39.5%	26.4%
Urban	28.5%	22%	16%	10%
Extreme pov: small scale farmers			77%	67%
Extreme Pov: Wage employment in ag			13%	18%

Source: EICV 3 (2012)

Rural living conditions and patterns of settlement

Land has been central to social, political, and economic relations since the pre-colonial era and continues to play an important role in the lives of the rural poor today. The state also has a need for productive land as Rwanda establishes itself as an emerging East African economy. Land reform has addressed the needs of the rural poor and those of the state through new laws that redefine land rights and usage. Given the historical role of land in Rwanda, it is important to understand state-society relations through the lens of property rights and distribution.

Nearly 40% of Rwanda's population resided in *imidugudu* in 2011, compared with 18 percent in 2006 (Republic of Rwanda 2011: 7). This increase in resettlement can be attributed to two key goals outlined in Vision 2020: to increase agricultural production and to expand the number of citizens with access to safe drinking water. From 2006 to 2011, marketed agricultural output increased by 5%, while those who had access to safe drinking increased by 4% during the same period (see Table 5).

Table 5: Economic Activity, Demographics and Living Conditions

Indicator	EICV2: 2005/06	EICV3: 2010/11	Eastern Province 2006	Eastern Province 2011
% living in umudugudu	18	37.5%	54.8%	80
Access to improved drinking water	70	74	57.7	66.6
Marketed Agricultural Output	21.5	26.9	24.6	30
Use of sacks	37	48	56.7	74.4
Use of fertilizer	18	38	9.2	24.9
Use of insecticides	24	31	28.7	36
Household's affected by land consolidation, pg.		22		19.2
Household's w/ addtl crop added		21		19.2
Household's protected from soil erosion		84		80.6
Two or more jobs	42%	63%		
Adults Engaged in Farm Work (wage and small scale)	80%	71.7%		
Residents in isolated dwellings	67	37	38.7	7.6
Small scale farming	71	64		70
Marketed agriculture	21	27	24	30
Land cultivation for crop production pg. 100	91	93	98	97

Source: EICV 3 (2012)

Table 5 indicates that as the number of people living in *imidugudu* has increased, other important indicators such as agricultural production and access to basic services have improved concurrently. The availability of modern farming techniques, environmental protection, and access to agricultural markets has improved for the rural poor; there has been a decrease in small-scale farming (subsistence agriculture) and the numbers living in isolated settlements where access to government support is limited. Since 2011, there is clear evidence that the GoR is meeting at least some of the main goals outlined in 2000 in Vision 2020.

Rwanda has had to contend with returnees and population movements related to the 1994 genocide, which has figured heavily into the development of rural policies. In the words of President Paul Kagame in 1999:

Resettlement of returnees has, since 1994, remained a challenge. Although the concept of organized settlements (*imidugudu*) has sometimes attracted controversy from the international community, the intentions are rational. In a society attempting to heal from the genocide the potential for exacerbating tension and conflict due to limited land resources cannot be underestimated. In many instances there was no alternative where 4 million people had to be settled. Rational utilization and distribution of resources is paramount...⁵

This line of reasoning continues to guide rural policies and the way in which the state sees the rural populations. Internal displacement and refugee populations were addressed with the Arusha Accords as part of a peace deal between the RPF and the Rwanda government in 1992. Forced resettlement also became a prominent policy between 1996 and 1999, as people continued to leave or return to Rwanda en masse. By 2000 villagization was incorporated into Vision 2020 as a way to better deliver services, to the rural poor, such as health care and security, by consolidating scattered settlements into *imidugudu*. By 2005 villagization remained a critical policy for commercialization; although still criticized by international organizations and foreign donors, it has continued ever since (Global IDP Database 2005: 21).

Land continues to be a source of local conflict. Nearly 80% of civil court cases are adjudicating disputes over contested plots of land (Havugimana 2009: 168). This is why formal land tenure and clearly defined plots of land are crucial to maintaining stability throughout the countryside. Many Rwandans feel resettlement (59%) and land titling (62%) are necessary, so there is some consensus that reform is needed (Havugimana 2009: 170).

⁵ Statement delivered at the London Donor's Conference (July 1999) from Profile of Internal Displacement: Rwanda, Global IDP Database

Villagization in Rwanda has “metropolitan origins” (Chambers 1969: 23 – 28): urban elites pursue their own interests and visions and impose these ideals on the rural population. This critique has been applied to Paul Kagame himself: some citizens see him as an outsider who grew up in the refugee camps of Uganda, with no rural roots in Rwanda (Ansoms 2009).

The Rwanda Rural Support Sector Project (RSSP) is a project funded by the World Bank but administered through various national and local agencies and actors. The Resettlement Policy Framework identified three stages of rural reform. Beginning in 2001, the first phase would focus on “building institutional, technical and human capacity” throughout the rural areas of Rwanda. Phase two, which began in 2008 and expected to be completed by 2013, involves accelerating commercialization by expanding support for commercial agricultural production (Republic of Rwanda 2008). The third phase, beginning in 2013, and scheduled for completion in 2018, will lead to a rapid growth in agricultural production and diversify agricultural crops, both to increase and to stabilize rural incomes (Republic of Rwanda 2008a). Each phase makes a direct contribution to Vision 2020, moving the rural sector towards more commercialized forms of production. By organizing the rural poor into modern villages, agricultural production will become more efficient.

Villagization was officially completed in 2008, but evidence suggests this is not entirely true. There were several road construction projects underway in Kigali in 2011 that cut through what were once neighborhoods near the downtown area. When asked in Kibungo where the people had been moved to, that was one question that received vague answers and was generally ignored when posed in Kigali. One receives conflicting answers regarding resettlement in Kibungo, suggesting that the policy was not fully operationalized in 2011. I provide evidence of this in Chapter six; villagization is still occurring, albeit at a slower pace than in previous years.

Attempts at resettlement were met with resistance immediately after the genocide (Human Rights Watch 2001: 91). In 1996 the interim government of Rwanda began a policy of forced resettlement to address issues of security and stabilization created by the genocide. However, by 2000 the policy of forced resettlement was redefined in terms of development. The period from 2000 to 2007 was, at least officially, one of encouraging the relocation of the rural poor, to ensure easier access to markets, clean water, and government services. Resettlement was necessary for economic development in that it supported the commercialization of agriculture. Redefining the goals of resettlement required a new administrative mandate, focusing attention on economic development as opposed to collective security. Once this occurred, domestic actors gained a more prominent role in the implementation of resettlement as opposed to the International Governmental Organizations (IGO's) such as the United Nations who had guided and facilitated the policy immediately after the genocide. This created a new bureaucratic class that would see to the successful implementation of policy after 2000.

The GoR recognizes that past resettlement schemes have failed (i.e. Tanzania) and are adamant about learning from past experiences and avoiding the same mistakes (Vision 2020: *Umurenge* 2007c: 17). The GoR is relying on a decentralized administrative system in which strategies are designed and implemented at the *Umurenge* administrative level (Vision 2020: *Umurenge* 2007c).

Resettlement for the purpose of increasing production was first introduced in Rwanda by the Belgians when the colonial authorities moved peasants into grouped homesteads, or *paysannats* (Republic of Rwanda 2004c: 12). This early system was used to encourage agricultural production by moving farmers to lands that had formerly been owned by cattle farmers who used the land for grazing. This policy offers early proof that allocation and land use

has long been a contentious issue among Rwandans; well-before the genocide, it created tension between herders and farmers, but not between the people and the colonial state (Republic of Rwanda 2004c: 12).

The first *imidugudu* were constructed in 1996 in the Mutara Game Reserve, the Akagera National Park and the Gishwati Mountain Forest Reserve (Liversage 2003). The Mutara Game reserve and Gishwati Mountain Reserve are located in northwestern Rwanda, one of the primary regions where Hutu *Interahamwe* used to flee into neighboring Zaire during the genocide, and from which Hutu militias continued to launch attacks into Rwanda throughout the late 1990s. By November 1998, an estimated 630,000 people had been displaced due to fighting in the northwest (Global IDP Database 2005: 28). One can argue these initial *imidugudu* were established based on strategic and security considerations, not in view of economic planning.

In eastern Rwanda, Kibungo experienced the largest influx of “old caseload” refugees, those who had left Rwanda between 1959 and 1973. They were primarily Tutsi who had followed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) at the end of the genocide in 1994. The Akagera National Park is located in eastern Rwanda along the border with Tanzania. This region saw a significant influx of Tutsi returnees, who then attempted to reclaim the land they had left behind decades earlier. *Imidugudu* was widely implemented to accommodate the large number of people flowing back into the country (Global IDP Database 2005: 60). Butare in southern Rwanda had also experienced extensive destruction during the genocide, resulting in a large number of displaced citizens in need of adequate shelter. A concentration of *imidugudu* was established there to meet the demands of refugees and internally displaced citizens as well (Global IDP Database 2005: 61).

Imidugudu were justified immediately after the genocide based on empirical evidence of refugee flows and internally displaced citizens, all of whom lacked adequate shelter. With the adoption of Vision 2020, the *imidugudu* policy shifted from one centered on stabilization and security to one of economic development and agricultural reform. Given the ambitious goals of Vision 2020, villagization can be interpreted as a mechanism by which the GoR can continue to monitor the rural populations while going forward with plans for modernization.

Villagization did contribute to an increase in land disputes which led to the formalization of land laws (discussed in chapter four). Noteworthy here is that issues related to ethnicity continued to arise in the form of complaints that the new direction in villagization and land distribution favored the returning Tutsi refugees. Hutu who remained in Rwanda after the genocide claimed their land was being illegally expropriated in order to satisfy Tutsi returnees. In a country where 90% of the population relies on land and agriculture for their livelihoods, disputes such as these could very well lead to another explosion of violence if not resolved in a formal and equitable manner.

By 2002, 19.3% of the rural population lived in *imidugudu* (Republic of Rwanda 2003a; Havugimana 2009: 28), a clear indication that the policy had evolved from one of securing the country and population to one of extensive national economic planning. By this time, the justification for villagization was framed by arguments for the need of extensive land and economic reforms. The rural poor could not necessarily relate to this shift in focus, in contrast to their acceptance of the need for security and protection in the post-genocide years. Competing claims of land ownership and use between the state and the rural poor made it difficult to move forward, although, the *imidugudu* were key to achieving the goals set forth in Vision 2020. To ensure efficient delivery of technologies, services, and knowledge to the scattered rural poor, the

GoR first needed to group people into villages in order to build roads and provide basic necessities such as water and health care (Global IDP Database 2005: 22).

Initially, the GoR planned to have 5,700 *imidugudu* completed by 2012, in addition to the 5,486 already built by 2007 (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 49). This required that 10,000 hectares of land be provided for housing, necessitating expropriation of plots of land from the rural poor. These *imidugudu* were to be located in seven districts where there is an extreme lack of adequate shelter, water, and services; as determined by the GoR (Republic of Rwanda 2007d: 49). The residents were relocated to better housing where they have access to basic services. The Ministry of Infrastructure in Rwanda projects that by 2020, 70% of the population will live in *imidugudu* (Havugimana 2009: 49).

Accessing credit

In 2007 the GoR modified Vision 2020 with the adoption of Vision 2020 Umurenge (VUP). The VUP emphasizes a pro-poor strategy at the sector administrative level. A key provision of the VUP was to increase access to credit and encourage savings among the rural poor. The VUP modernizes rural financial institutions by strengthening links between the rural credit agencies and national financial system. A significant portion of the national population works in the informal sector as subsistence farmers, making it difficult for them to save or invest their earnings in banks and savings cooperatives so the VUP provides an outline for access to rural-based savings and credit institutions. Subsistence farmers are defined as those who identify themselves as independent or unpaid farm workers (Republic of Rwanda. 2007g: Table 3.1). In 2007, the primary source of credit in the agricultural sector came from either household savings (85%) or loans from parents (10%), with only 2% of loans coming from formal financial

institutions such as national banks (Republic of Rwanda 2007g: Table 5.8). These numbers suggest the rural poor are still reliant on personal and traditional relationships for loans and credit for agricultural production, thereby inhibiting the penetration of formal credit and access to capital.

By 2010, 74% of Rwandans had taken out a loan within the previous 12 months or still had a loan (Republic of Rwanda 2011: 125), compared to 78% of the population in the Eastern Province. In 2006 the proportion had been 57% and 59%, respectively. Nationwide, approximately 8% secured loans from banks in 2010, 22% received loans from local agricultural cooperatives or lending institutions, and 70% continued to rely on relatives and friends for loans. In the Eastern Province the shares were 8%, 30%, and 68%, respectively (*Ibid*).

Overall, subsistence farmer's account for 90% of the informal farm economy while 71% of the informal and formal economies combined consists of subsistence farmers (Republic of Rwanda 2011). Compare these figures with the official number of 241,000 Rwandans who work in the formal agricultural or the fishery sector of the economy (Republic of Rwanda 2011). Not only are the majority of Rwandans working in agriculture; very few are identified as working in the formal sector, making it difficult to integrate these citizens into the formal economy. These people are part of the population that is "illegible," due to their contingent, informal employment; this informal activity poses a significant obstacle for the realization of Vision 2020. Politically speaking, this suggests the vast numbers of peasants who participate in the informal sector run the risk of not being represented when it comes to the development and implementation of rural policy.

The above data illustrate the socioeconomic status of the rural poor in Rwanda as of the 2003 Census, showing that a significant percentage of Rwandans are reliant on subsistence

agriculture and informal, familial relationships for capital. The rural poor continue to depend on traditional means of survival in the face of modernization. The majority of Rwandan citizens are straddling the informal and formal sectors of both the economy and society.

Financing public works projects under Vision 2020

Ensuring access to credit is important for financing the agricultural value chain. The Rwandan Development Bank (RDB) and the Banque Populaire are the primary sources of funding for credit agencies throughout the country (USAID 2010). There is also a push to expand access to credit through Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs). According to the 2011 Report published by the National Bank of Rwanda, 416 SACCOs have been established and financed by national banks such as the Banque Populaire since the adoption of the Umurenge SACCO in 2009. The assets for SACCOs increased 12% from 2010 to 2011, indicating moderate success in ensuring financial literacy and cooperation between Sector residents (BNR Annual Report 2011: 78).

Expanding access to credit is one of the highest priorities for the GoR. There are SACCO offices in the majority of towns in Eastern Province that provide lines of credit to local farmers. This is a result of consultations within the framework of Vision 2020: *Umurenge* (VUP), to identify and prioritize local agri-business ventures and ensure access to financial resources. This is all a result of local planning initiatives at the *umudugudu* level, for which local residents identified key outcomes and consulted on how to achieve the goals. Once the goals have been identified, the Umudugudu Committee (elected village leaders) present recommendations to elected cell officials on preferred credit packages. The Umudugudu Committee also has the final say in who will receive assistance, as determined through

community-based participatory consultations, also known as *Ubudehe* (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 85). The recommendations for the larger projects are then reviewed by the Umudugudu Council before being ultimately approved by the VUP Management Team. Depending on the nature of public works, the District Councils will ultimately allocate the necessary funds for larger projects. The final disbursement of funds will come from privately funded microfinance institutions, which will also manage the loan servicing and repayment.

The system of access to credit is predicated upon the decentralized system of administration that targets the most vulnerable populations: subsistence farmers. With the adoption of the VUP, access to savings and micro-loans allow farmers to enter into formal land leases that could be used as collateral for loans designed for rural development. These loans are for mechanization and inputs such as seeds and fertilizers among the rural poor who, otherwise, would not have the advantages of modern technologies for increasing crop production and yields.

Conclusion

The history of ethnic genocide and regional conflict continue to heavily influence the policies being implemented today. As Scott (1998) notes, the state must make society legible, and in Rwanda the state has defined the population as victims and killers. Any reforms that are instituted will be framed by an urban elite whose leaders were the victors of war. The GoR is apparently concerned with ensuring equitable access to land and shelter, but the real evidence of bio-power is better seen from the perspective of local elites who are tasked with implementation.

Those most affected by villagization and commercialization are the poorest citizens in Rwanda today. The rural poor are marginalized politically and have little say into policy development and implementation; regardless of statements by the GoR that indicate otherwise.

While there has been progress in some areas (safe water, marginally increased yields), it will be difficult to achieve the lofty goals outlined in Vision 2020, due to the pervasive poverty that continues to impact so many individual households.

The next chapter describes the decentralized structure of Rwanda's political system. Since 2006, local administrators are held personally accountable for policy failures to President Paul Kagame and evidence suggests these officials are more concerned with abiding by the demands of the RPF than representing the interests of their constituents. Chapter four will describe the origins and purpose of decentralization and how it relates to villagization and agricultural commercialization.

Chapter Four: Decentralizing Vision 2020

Accountability and Governmental Responses to Poverty

Chapter three situated Vision 2020 by describing national social, economic and political conditions as of 2011. Since 2000 Rwanda has been promoting rural development under the auspices of Vision 2020, which is being operationalized in the context of extreme poverty and post-genocide development strategies. This has led the state to view Vision 2020 both as a plan for development as well as one for political control over a dispersed, rural population. Chapter four offers an analysis of the underlying legal and political mechanisms being used to implement and operationalize Vision 2020 in the context of extreme poverty and a post-conflict development ideology.

Key supporting documents for Vision 2020 include the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS 2007a), Vision 2020: Umurenge (2007b); the National Agricultural Policy (NAP 2004c), and the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (PSAT, 2004; 2009). Taken together, these reports reflect the official reasoning behind resettlement, commercialization, and poverty reduction and outline how the GoR plans to operationalized Vision 2020. The main argument of this chapter is that the GoR is using the narrative of global development that emphasizes rural investment for long-term growth to attract foreign aid, while maintaining political control through national policies such as decentralization and forced resettlement. Despite official declarations, Vision 2020 is not being implemented in a decentralized manner; in practice the administrative structure in Rwanda today is highly centralized.

This chapter reviews the above mentioned documents and describes how each has evolved since adoption. The chapter then focuses on accountability and *imihigo* contracts,

signed agreements between District Mayors and President Paul Kagame that establish benchmarks for local projects. I will explain the nature of political influence in this process by emphasizing how these key documents, coupled with a deconcentrated administrative system, ensures that policy is implemented by holding local officials personally accountable to President Paul Kagame.

Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS)

The Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and the Vision 2020 *Umurenge* Program (VUP) aim specifically at reducing poverty through agrarian reform. Adopted in 2007, the EDPRS is the predecessor to the National Poverty Reduction Strategy and the National Investment Strategy. Under the EDPRS, district officials are tasked with identifying and developing policies that rely on local knowledge and relationships to ensure that policies and funding are in line with the needs of the rural poor (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 78). This involves determining the infrastructure and financing necessary for local projects through a coordinated effort among local residents, District officials, and national Ministries. The EDPRS (2007a) claims that decentralization will ensure efficient implementation by assigning responsibility for implementation to local officials, who are accountable to both their constituents as well as to the national government (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 115).

Vision 2020: Umurenge (VUP)

The *Umurenge* Program, adopted in 2007, decentralizes policy development and implementation to the sector, cell, and *umudugudu* levels. The VUP targets households trapped in extreme poverty through a variety of social and financial programs, such as promoting gender

equality in land ownership and supporting local savings and microfinance schemes, suited to the specific circumstances of rural poverty, encouraging the productive capabilities of its people. The VUP addresses many of the struggles associated with rural poverty by utilizing a grassroots approach to implementation; it decentralizes the political system to the point that each household has a local committee of leaders representing their needs and preferences. Success, therefore, “will be defined specifically in relation to both key achievements in the start-up pilot phase and the capacity of local governments to carry out the program components in a decentralized fashion” (Republic of Rwanda 2007b). In order for rural development, and villagization, in particular, to succeed, there must be a sustained commitment on the part of local authorities to cooperate with residents living in *imidugudu* in identifying the most pressing concerns.

The VUP is organized around three principals targeting the productive capabilities of the rural poor. First, it seeks to create off-farm employment opportunities in the trades and service sectors, and to pave the way for the transition to a more knowledge-based society. Second, it accelerates the process of commercialization by monetarizing and formalizing the economy with the establishment of rural credit and savings institutions and supporting cooperatives. Third, it provides support for the neediest people, who are landless and unable to work, by ensuring access to education under the 7-Year Education Plan and government financed universal health care.

VUP explicitly recognizes that the key to reducing poverty lies in addressing the land issue (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 10). The VUP strategy targets issues in the commodity value chain, such as poor soil quality and limited access to markets and storage facilities, by identifying land reform as a key factor to ensure food security and agricultural commercialization. The document identifies three areas in need of reform: 1) “land-credit”

addresses issues of credit access for landowners so they can purchase the inputs needed to strengthen the value chain. These inputs include seeds, fertilizers, machinery, pesticides, and investments in land improvement (terracing, soil conservation). The lack of credit and savings has been identified as one factor inhibiting rural development so these reforms will be implemented mainly through credit packages. Land credit will be financed through credit packages offered by SACCOS, rural credit unions, and banks; 2) “land-labor” focuses on hiring workers to improve and maintain land. This requires educating the rural poor in the use of new techniques and technologies such as agro-forestry, watershed management, and road construction, financing extension services and rural universities and training center, and hiring workers to construct village settlements. 3) “Labor-credit” identifies workers who can become entrepreneurs through credit and savings schemes so they may eventually invest in private businesses and, subsequently, create additional off-farm employment opportunities for local farmers.

By formally addressing land credit, land labor, and labor credit, the GoR is attempting to provide services to the most vulnerable: the youth, genocide survivors, the elderly, and some 500,000 prisoners to be released over the coming years (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 16). The VUP emphasizes that poverty reduction strategies will be implemented at the sector level, building on the input and consultation of individual residents who are most familiar with soil conditions and cropping techniques in each *imidugudu*.

VUP coordinates efforts with sector officials to provide a minimum of quality social services. For example, there has been a concerted effort to provide clean water within 500 meters of every Rwandan home,⁶ along with universal health care and primary education that emphasizes math, science, and English. Successful implementation is defined as the “capacity of

⁶ This has, in part, been contracted to foreign firms in Kibungo (Field Interview, June 2011)

local governments to carry out the program...in a decentralized fashion” (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: ii) and achieving these goals within specific time frames. The VUP seeks to revitalize the public sector while simultaneously ensuring proper planning based on participatory activities and planning (*ubudehe*) involving those directly affected by these reforms. Furthermore, the VUP contributes to the creation of off-farm employment by providing lines of credit to those who have access to plots of land large enough for development and commercialization (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 83 – 84).

Strong local governance is necessary for the efficient implementation of nationwide agrarian reform (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 86). Both the VUP and EDPRS emphasize the need for coordination of administrative capacities to ensure that national priorities are being translated accurately in order for people to see the benefits of resettlement, commercialization, and the use of new technologies such as fertilizer and mechanized methods of farming. The GoR employs incentives, such as guarantees of access to safe water and markets, to those who implement policy in order to entice others to contribute to rural policies aimed at commercialization. Several district and sector officials indicated that many people have been resistant to reform at first (i.e., new crops and cropping techniques); but they tend to adapt once they see the benefits incurred by neighbors and family members. Once it is clear how new techniques and methods increase yields, more people are likely to move beyond subsistence farming, into the commercial agricultural market.

National Agricultural Policy (NAP)

The NAP was operationalized in 2005 with the adoption of the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (SPAT). The NAP identifies market-centered reforms needed to

support the transition “from subsistence to market-oriented production.....in both economic growth and increased food security” (Republic of Rwanda 2009a: 11). It encourages private sector led growth, local participation in agricultural research and extension services, and increasing rural incomes through diversification of agricultural commodities that are grown by farmers and sold in local, regional, and international markets (*Ibid*). In addition to the economic agenda set forth under the NAP, the plan also aims to improve food security and ensure access to nutrition for the rural poor.

Key to achieving these goals is the Rwandan Rural Support Sector Project (RSSP). The RSSP is funded by the World Bank and administered through the District Land Bureaus. The Resettlement Policy Framework identified three stages of rural reform. Beginning in 2001, the first phase focused on “building institutional, technical and human capacity” throughout the rural areas of Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda. 2008a). Phase Two (2008–2013) involves accelerating the intensification and commercialization by increasing governmental financial support. The third phase (2013–2018) will lead to a rapid growth in agricultural production, to provide support for “promoting diversification of economic activities in rural areas” in order to stabilize rural incomes. Each phase is making a direct contribution to the goals of Vision 2020 by transitioning the rural sector to a more commercialized form of production. By organizing the rural poor into modern villages, agricultural production and monitoring will become more efficient in achieving Vision 2020 goals.

The RSSP implementation has conformed to the principles of the Decentralization Act. The process begins with the national policy, rooted in a very rigid, hierarchical structure of national and local officials. However, this structure operates in a nation whose socio-economic relationships are still based on informal, traditional relationships which has led to discrepancies

and inefficiency between the national leaders and local authorities. At the national level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) is ultimately responsible for implementing the RSSP, but responsibility is then passed on to District Level Bureaus, which monitor the project at that level. Resettlement and Compensation Committees, consist of representatives from the sector and cell levels, the consult with project liaison officers who then relay any concerns back to the District Bureaus. This is the basic administrative structure for the villagization process.

Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (SPAT) (Phase II)

The SPAT was adopted in 2004, and revised in 2009. The revised SPAT centers on the role of government agencies, district, sector, cell, and *imidugudu* leaders, and residents. The plan is to gradually turn the entire policy process over to district officials, with the intention of granting more responsibility to local administrators and residents, thus rendering them stakeholders of policy and practices. It calls for a coordination of efforts between local farmers, cooperatives, civil society, elected officials, along with foreign and domestic NGOs, to boost production and increase profits for poor farmers. However, the district remains the most important level for the implementation of the agricultural policies put forth under the SPAT.

Improving the value chain is considered a national priority under Vision 2020 (SPAT 2009: 6). Both the NAP and the SPAT II strengthen the links in the commodities value chain by increasing the value and productivity of agriculture. The main crops being commercialized are tea, coffee, rice, maize, beans, wheat and fruits so initial efforts were directed at improving the value chains of these particular products (Kanyarukiga and Mutijima 2006: 41). The value chain

refers to the production, processing and marketing of these key crops, hoping to give Rwanda a comparative advantage and thus key to long term development in the agricultural sector.

Table 6: Rural development indicators

	2000	2005	2011
% of Households Cultivating Staple Crops:			
Cassava		54%	52%
Maize		61%	75%
Sweet Potato		79%	76%
Rice		4%	5%
Wheat		6%	6%
Savings Account (%)	N/A	9%	20%
% Households Purchasing Chemical Fertilizer	N/A	24%	30%
Poor (% < \$95 / year)	59%	57%	45%
Literacy Rates (%)	48%	65%	70%
Secondary School Enrollment	7%	10%	21%
Tertiary School Enrollment	1%	1.2%	3%
Access to Safe Drinking Water	52%	70%	74%
Non-farm Wage Employment (%)	3%	7.3%	10.7%
% of Household Revenue Derived from Agriculture	N/A	56%	50%
Access to Electricity	2%	4%	11%

Source: The 2010/11 Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey, EICV3

Decentralization defined

The GoR has used the language of international development when targeting the commercialization of agriculture. It is pursuing pro-poor policies that not only reduce poverty, but pave the way for farmers to minimize their reliance on subsistence agriculture. The GoR has decentralized implementation, ostensibly to ensure efficiency. Decentralization also serves the political purpose of providing mechanisms by which Kagame can monitor local officials and reduce political competition via a system of checks and balances between national and local authorities.

Decentralization is defined as “the transfer of planning, decision making or management functions from the central national government to organizations at the regional or local levels” (Handoussa 2007: 17). This understanding of the policy process varies in its approach depending on whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian. Deconcentration, by comparison, entails “the dispersal of agents of higher levels of government into lower level arenas;” these agents remain accountable to a hierarchy of authorities, ensuring local loyalty to national elites (Manor 1999: 6).

William Tordoff (1994) argues that Africa experiences more instances of deconcentration: local authorities are elected but do not exercise full autonomy, due to the tight control exercised by the national government over local decision making and implementation. Deconcentration situates higher level authorities in positions of power in local communities, ensuring that the state is able to “penetrate even more effectively into those arenas without increasing the influence or of organized interests at those levels” (Manor 1999: 6). This is a more accurate understanding of how policy is developed and implemented in Rwanda today, despite official documents and policies that incorporate the term “decentralization” to describe policy implementation.

In many developing countries, public office becomes “the major institution which the dominant classes use to support their rule and influence” (Olowu 1990: 84), creating a system in which local authorities are not able to make any decisions that would threaten their own positions of power. Olowu notes that development is a political process that must account for social, political and economic factors such as ethnicity and extreme poverty (Olowu 1990: 84). This concept of decentralization provides a better theoretical understanding of policy

implementation in Rwanda; but is not an accurate framework for understanding how villagization and commercialization policies have been implemented in practice since 2000.

There are five administrative levels of governance in Rwanda today (Musoni 2005), and each unit has its own role to play in rural development. The central government remains in control of policy development, funding, monitoring and evaluation. This ensures that policy implementation is guided by a national plan, i.e., Vision 2020. The Provincial governments are “deconcentrated” institutions of power, enjoying only limited autonomy from the RPF. The district administrative level is tasked with the implementation of key policies as well as with developing plans that reflect the needs of their communities in terms of funding and proper inputs. The next administrative level is the sector, whose authority involves a deconcentrated role under the district. Sector officials and committees organize the efforts of the cells within each sector, communicating the needs of their constituents to the district. Finally, the cell serves as the lowest administrative unit in Rwanda. It bears responsibility for mobilizing residents to participate in local projects such as village beautification activities and assisting their neighbors in home repairs (Musoni 2005: 27).

Rwanda may be classified as a decentralized system because local authorities are not directly selected by the central government. Rather, each administrative level has an elected committee that ostensibly represents the interests of the voters. However, one must keep in mind that the career of these officials is predicated upon their adherence to designing and implementing policies that support the overall goals of Vision 2020.

Decentralization and accountability under Vision 2020

The Kagame government adopted the Decentralization Act (DA) in 2001 to facilitate the implementation of Vision 2020 and to provide local authorities with the power to execute extensive rural and land reforms in their districts. The policy has three goals: promotion of good governance, poverty reduction, and efficient, effective and accountable delivery of services. Each goal is aimed at reducing inefficiencies resulting from ineffective and unstable political and economic institutions. The DA establishes formal mechanisms, such as local elections and public forums for debate, designed to minimize disputes between the rural poor and the state by developing a semblance of democratic control over policy among the general population by creating an electoral process for district, sector, cell and *umudugudu* officials. The strategy for the Decentralization Act conforms to the overall Vision 2020 goals, promoting local responsibility for policy implementation. While the formal goals of the Decentralization Act suggest a move toward democracy and federalism, actual practice suggests something else.

The Rwanda Decentralization Strategic Framework (RDSF) notes that the first step in implementing the DA is “to ensure GoR’s ownership over decision making on policy, strategy, and spending” (Republic of Rwanda 2007c: 6). The Act decentralizes policy implementation but not policy development. The RDSF is designed to promote good governance, support poverty reduction, and ensure the efficient delivery of services by holding local administrators accountable to their constituents through local elections (Republic of Rwanda 2007c).

The RDSF identifies three phases of decentralization. The first phase (2000 – 2005) established local democratic structures and institutions to support community ownership and responsibility for policy. The second phase (2006 – 2010) increased the administrative capacities at the district, sector, and cell levels of government and encouraged community

engagement in the *umudugudu*. The third phase (2011 – 2015) is making “Government more effective, efficient and responsive to people’s needs and preferences” by encouraging “partnerships between public sector and non-state organizations” by reducing the role of the national government in local decision-making processes (Republic of Rwanda 2007c).

In 2008 the state initiated the Decentralization Implementation Program (DIP) to coordinate the policies of the RDSF at local levels. While responsibility for identifying and operationalizing rural policy is primarily the task of district officials, the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) oversees the national decentralization policy and monitors lower officials to ensure they are in compliance with the law. The official justification for decentralization is that making local governments accountable for delivering services will minimize corruption and wasteful spending. Furthermore, by localizing implementation, “the patterns of public spending should match citizens’ priorities” when it comes to rural development (Republic of Rwanda, 2007c: 115).

Imihigo contracts and local accountability

In 2006, the GoR instituted a practice of signing performance contracts with District Mayors in order to ensure that rural policies are being implemented in an efficient and timely manner. Known as *imihigo* contracts, this approach emphasizes a traditional practice: local leaders make promises and are held accountable for both successes and failures in keeping those promises. As of 2012 these contracts have been signed by everyone from district mayors to residents of *imidugudu* (villages). This section explains how elected officials are held accountable to *imihigo* contracts by evaluating how policies are developed and implemented in rural communities. The decentralized structure has brought about dramatic changes in the way

services are delivered to the rural poor and the way in which local officials gain and retain their positions within the administration.

With the adoption of a new constitution in 2003, the GoR established formal institutions for accountability and popular participation at the district level of government. Furthermore, the EDPRS emphasizes the necessity of establishing “an enabling environment and an efficient regulatory framework” for economic development (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 36). This has encouraged the creation of *imihigo*, or District Performance Contracts; district leaders must identify and meet specific goals of development and must present these results at a bi-annual Presidential Retreat hosted by President Kagame. District leaders are held accountable for their targets because the GoR distributes Community Development Funds (CDF) which are commitments of 10% of revenue to local development projects (Republic of Rwanda. 2007a: 36; 116 - 117). In addition to the bi-annual assessments, surveys are conducted every two years in all districts to track the performance of officials in order to ensure the CDF's are being used properly.

The policies of villagization and land reform introduced in the countryside are still determined by urban-based elites in Kigali, but the rural poor are expected to abide by these policy decisions. Although the policies themselves are designed to encourage and support a sense of individual control over capital and production, these ends will not be reached by 2020.

Administrative structure of Rwanda: 2006 – present

It is best to view decentralization in the context of accountability. The provinces and districts in Rwanda were renamed in 2006 to reflect a break with the past by changing the names of locations synonymous with the genocide. Furthermore, administrative restructuring has

introduced a system whereby officials remain dependent on supporting national policy to keep their jobs. This holds them accountable both to the national government and to the voters who elect them to office.

Prior to 2006, Rwanda was divided into eleven provinces, 106 districts (*akarere*), 1,545 sectors (*umurenge*), and 9,201 cells (*akagare*). The majority of the population lived in isolated and dispersed settlements (*umudugudu*) within these administrative units, making it difficult and expensive for the government to provide the assistance needed to ensure the well-being of rural citizens. Since the restructuring in 2006, Rwanda has been divided into five provinces, 30 districts, 416 sectors, and approximately 2,148 cells. Villagization has increased the number of people living in *umudugudu* to 40% of the population in 2010 (Havugimana 2009). The VUP does not identify what issues and concerns need to be addressed in each *imidugudu*; that is done through District Development Plans (DDPs).

A number of scholars have looked at reorganization as a way for the state to use policy and the physical location of the rural poor to minimize political opposition and dissent. Bert Ingelaere (2011) argues that decentralization actually shifted accountability from local to national authorities. Local administrators are periodically replaced by officials handpicked by the RPF, thereby making them accountable not to the local residents but to the national elites who have the authority to strip them of their positions.

An Ansoms (2009) has argued that the most important decisions affecting the rural poor are made by local authorities at the district, sector, and cell levels, all of whom are appointed, not elected. She argues that urban elites, including President Paul Kagame himself, are unable to identify with the rural poor as these new elites grew up outside of Rwanda, primarily in southern Uganda. Therefore, these elites see rural underdevelopment as a lack of peasant commitment to

reforms, ignoring the complexities of rural relations that extend back generations and are rooted in ethnicity and geography (Ansoms 2009). The Rwandan state is now firmly in control of local authorities all the way down to the household level, thus making it possible to reinforce national policy through local authorities who are ostensibly accountable to the people but, in reality, respond to the GoR demands.

Corruption and a lack of transparency have also contributed to a sense of hesitancy among the people to integrate into the new and modernized agricultural economy. Rwanda is often cited as one of the least corrupt countries in Africa by organizations such as Transparency International and the World Bank; the RPF government has made it very clear that bribery, extortion, and corruption will not be tolerated. Corruption and lack of transparency are key roadblocks to rural development and can lead to extensive financial waste, fraudulent activities, excessive fees and taxes on the rural poor, as well as mismanagement of funds among patrons and clients. Therefore, the inputs that come from the state are not efficiently utilized by the bureaucrats or by the rural poor. This creates massive waste and fraud which, in turn, leads to tensions over scarce or exploited resources such as land.

Accountability: District Mayors, Vice-Mayors, and District Secretaries

With the 2003 Constitution, the GoR adopted a series of policies that wedded traditional Rwandan culture with contemporary needs of public administration. *Imidugudu* is one example of such an approach. Collective living had been a key characteristic of pre-colonial Rwanda and was re-adopted after the genocide as a way to provide security for displaced persons. *Imidugudu* is designed to facilitate the broader goals of Vision 2020 while reflecting traditional Rwanda social and political relationships, such as local governance and strictly followed hierarchies.

The District Executive structure consists of the District Mayor, vice mayors for social welfare and economic development, and an executive secretary. This executive committee prepares the *imihigo* contract in consultation with representatives from the central government (Scher 2010: 5). For example, if the district executive committee members are setting benchmarks for the construction of cooperatives, they will meet with a representative from the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) to make sure they are setting realistic goals and to ensure funding for the project. Because tax collection is difficult for district officials, they rely heavily on funding from the central government, the reason why those representatives are involved in the planning of the *imihigo* contracts. This system ensures the District Mayors and executive committees are responsive to Vision 2020 mandates.

Candidate Eligibility

The electoral process for district officials relies on secret ballot (Article 3 and 52 of Law N 02/2006 of January 25, 2006); the elections of sector, cell and village leaders do not involve a secret ballot. District officials accountable to the national government may be hand selected by RPF leaders if they are replaced before their term of office expires. I was unable to find out more about this aside from a few passing comments, but was later advised that this is not a common occurrence and that, for the most part, officials are dismissed and elected by the residents of each district; this has become more or less institutionalized over the past several years.

The term of office for district leaders is five years (Article 5); candidates may not campaign based on their affiliation with specific political organizations, their ethnicity, their regional affiliation, or religion. Each candidate must “stand on his or her own merit” (Article 7).

Furthermore, candidates must declare their intention to run for office in writing, directly to the President of the Branch of the National Electoral Commission in each district. Each candidate must receive a letter of acknowledgement (Article 29) and the application must include: the candidate's name, date and place of birth, profession and residence, and the post for which they are competing (Article 29). The application also includes copies of the candidate's identity card (or some proof they are Rwandan), a notarized copy of a diploma, and two passport photos (Article 30).

Persons are ineligible to vote in these elections if they have been "deprived of their right to vote" or "have not been rehabilitated or granted amnesty in accordance with the law." Those who have been convicted of committing genocide, "persons who have confessed or pled guilty to the crime of genocide," and those convicted of rape, murder or manslaughter, as well as refugees, and prisoners (Article 9) are also prohibited from participating in these elections.

Many residents may be prohibited from voting given the above eligibility requirements in light of the *gacaca* process and false accusations of genocide. *Gacaca* courts are local trials in which those victimized during the genocide accuse their attackers in public forums where the entire community is present. It is common for the accuser to accept a plea from the accused with the stipulation that the guilty party relinquish land to the victim. This system was established to bring justice to those who had experienced violence and to reduce the number of cases being brought to national and international courts; these courts are reserved for perpetrators who were high ranking military or political authorities. Over the years there have been indications that the *gacaca* court system has been used to falsely accuse landed Hutu in order to acquire more property. Furthermore, "genocide ideology," a charge often leveled against political opponents of the ruling RPF party during elections, is also used at the local level to settle old scores

between rural residents. Genocide ideology refers to any rhetoric that distinguishes between Hutu and Tutsi as distinct groups in order to gain access to political power by exploiting ethnic identity. Simply using the terms Hutu and Tutsi in public in casual conversation can be enough to charge one with promoting a genocidal ideology, because it challenges the official commitment to developing a unified Rwandan identity. Accusing someone of genocide is enough to block that person from voting in local elections. Because many who are accused of genocide are Hutu, it is not difficult to see how the guidelines for electing district, sector, and cell officials might be interpreted as a method for suppressing political opposition to the Tutsi dominated government of Paul Kagame.

While there is an electoral system in place allowing citizens to decide who represents their interests, the legal system subtly discriminates against the majority Hutu. The legal requirements to vote favor the Tutsi, considered the victims of the genocide, as the law clearly indicates that those accused or convicted of genocide are excluded from the process altogether. This alone prohibits some Hutu from voting. I have no knowledge of a Tutsi being tried in a *gacaca* court, and given the incidences of false accusations and a political regime dominated by Tutsi; the electoral system is biased in favor of Tutsi, who are considered blameless for the genocide.

Accountability and Elections: Imihigo and Decentralization in Practice

Recent resettlement has required road construction, home building, establishing local hospitals and schools, providing access to water and irrigation, allocating productive farmland, etc. District mayors are tasked with setting targets for when and how these projects will be completed. A district committee may determine there is a need to build three schools to

accommodate their constituency and pledge to do this within a specified period of time in the *imihigo* contracts. District leaders compete for the President's favor by signing contracts that may set unattainable goals, hence the involvement of MINAGRI and other central offices in agreeing on goals for the performance contracts. If District Mayor's consistently fall short of meeting the goals set forth in the *imihigo* contract, they can be removed by the District Council (Scher 2010: 8).

Umudugudu places a strong emphasis on the role of decentralized, local authorities in the implementation of village level policies, such as what crops to grow and who receives assistance in maintaining their homes and livestock. There are conflicting claims as to how much influence local citizens have over the planning of key reforms. Some officials indicated the people identify issues to be addressed while others indicated employees of MINALOC carry out research and then dictate what crops will be grown and where people will be moved (Field Interviews, June and July 2011). The residents of each *imidugudu* identify the most vulnerable families, who are then given priority when it comes to the allocation of services and assistance. This is known as Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA): residents are identified as being: poorest, poorer, poor, surviving, middle, or well-off (Joseph 2006). The most vulnerable residents are identified and assisted by neighbors, *imidugudu* committees, NGOs, and district officials when maintaining and improving homes and property, thus ensuring limited resources are devoted to the poorest of each *imidugudu* residents.⁷

This structure extends to the village level as well. Each sub-unit of government (i.e. sector, cell, and village) has its own committee. Members are selected from the administrative unit below. For example, sector committees are made up of representatives from cells, while cell committees consist of members from each *imidugudu* (Scher 2010: 6). These committees report

⁷ Field Interview, June 2011

progress and problems of implementation to the next level. Each village has a committee, selected by the residents of the *imidugudu* who then report to the cell officials. Cell officials may respond in a number of ways. They may sanction the *imidugudu* leaders by removing them; by withholding funds for village projects for not meeting goals; or they may reward them by lobbying for additional funding and supplies for ongoing projects, such as repairing or updating homes. This is the case for cell officials who report to sector officials, and sector officials who report to district level officials. As of 2011, everyone must sign *imihigo* contracts with administrators from the unit above (Ingelaere 2011).

Given this approach to implementation, one could argue this represents more deconcentration of central authority than decentralization. All of the goals included in the *imihigo* contracts aim at meeting Vision 2020 benchmarks. Again, local officials are not so much developing policy as simply implementing national priorities, developed by the urban based government of Paul Kagame.

MINALOC Community Development Policy

In order for decentralization to function properly, the state has established local Community Development Councils (CDCs), designed to “ensure technical coordination of community development” (Republic of Rwanda 2008b: 6). It is from the CDCs that officials formulate the District Development Plans (DDPs) which provide the basis for the District Performance Contracts (*imihigo*) discussed earlier. Officials at the cell (*akagari*) level assist in identifying, prioritizing, and coordinating development projects in the individual *imidugudu* within the cell. The CDCs then pass their findings on to sector (*Umurenge*) officials, who design a development plan, assist local populations in identifying solutions, and present a final report to

the Executive Secretariat of the District and the Sector Council. The DDP's "reflect the prioritized needs of the population" and "provide a sound framework for resources mobilization from government and development partners," such as the World Bank and numerous NGO's (Republic of Rwanda 2008b: 6). All of this is done in accordance with Vision 2020 goals and the EDPRS. The CDCs aim to foster popular participation and transparency in the development and implementation of policy by engaging the rural poor for ongoing projects such as building schools, increasing the productive capacities of land, and linking different sectors of the economy.

These policies reflect the nature of Rwandan society in that they are strategies for pro-poor growth. The CDCs and the Ministry of Local Government's (MINALOC) Community Development Policy (CDP) are based on the idea of *Ubudehe*, a term that refers to a Rwandan culture of "mutual assistance and conviviality whereby people would come together to address problems facing them so as to work for their development" (Republic of Rwanda 2007f). *Ubudehe* is centered on the cell and sector administrative levels, encouraging mutual cooperation between those most directly affected by underdevelopment (Republic of Rwanda 2007f: 12). It puts the responsibility for identifying key problems in the hands of those closest to the problem. There is already a "culture of dependence": citizens expect authorities to provide assistance in return for loyalty and commitment to the orders of leaders, so *Ubudehe* serves as an extension of existing cultural and sociopolitical institutions.

There is an obvious contradiction between the intended purposes of the CDCs: district officials said the rural poor struggle to understand why certain policies are adopted; yet one would expect that if there was popular participation in developing the plans, there would also be an understanding of the policies themselves. According to district officials I spoke with, one of

the biggest problems was a lack of understanding and commitment to rural reform among the poor. This cleavage between official and citizen expectations indicates miscommunication, which could be responsible for hindering implementation.

Villagization and Decentralization

Decentralization is used to promote and implement policies that have already been agreed upon at the national level, e.g., the planting of “kitchen gardens” in the courtyards of individual homes. The people secure themselves against drought and famine by planting food crops such as potatoes in a mound of dirt on their own property. This guarantees food security for the rural poor when their original crop lands are being committed to cash cropping.

The government recognizes that “the environment in which decentralization is being implemented is also characterized by the culture of dependence of local communities. Although citizens mainly expect assistance from the public sector, they must become more active participants in socio-economic development and governance. Their participation is, as a matter of fact, a key factor to ensure sustainability of interventions” (Republic of Rwanda 2007c: 12). This is putting the cart before the horse in a sense as it is difficult to participate in a meaningful and informed manner when malnutrition is coupled with the physical demands of agricultural labor. In order to address this issue, the GoR has adopted several supporting policies that focus specifically on pro-poor development, food security, and increasing agricultural production.

Conclusion

With the adoption of Vision 2020 in 2000 and a new constitution in 2003, the Government of Rwanda established formal institutions for accountability and popular participation at the district level of government. Furthermore, the EDPRS established “an enabling environment and an efficient regulatory framework” for economic development (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 53 and 98). Given Rwanda’s approach to implementation, this is more deconcentration of central authority than decentralization considering the goals in *imihigo* contracts are collectively designed to reach the Vision 2020 benchmarks. From this perspective, elected officials are not so much developing policy as simply implementing local initiatives to support the national agenda. Ensuring that the rural poor are properly notified of their rights when it comes to expropriation and villagization is necessary for rural development; but is a daunting task for local leaders at the district, sector, and cell administrative units.

The main conclusion deriving from this analysis is that Rwanda’s land reform and villagization policies are a work in progress that have produced a few positive results for the rural poor thus far. Vision 2020 laid out a complex strategy for agricultural reform expected to lead to a more modern economy within a span of 20 years. Since 2000, numerous laws, decrees, acts and documents related to land reform and villagization, in particular, have modified Vision 2020. One can nonetheless draw two conclusions: First, the government of Rwanda has addressed issues of implementation as they have arisen. National authorities are not simply ignoring the rural poor, as occurred in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. But it is clear that the government is pushing economic development before political development, as seen in the lack of popular consultation - despite encouraging decentralized participation during implementation.

Secondly, significant attention is given to the rural poor during the implementation stage of villagization to reduce the marginalization of the majority of citizens.

Villagization in Rwanda requires a unique approach to development that blends the traditional relationships among the rural poor and the objectives of the national government. Many policies that have supported villagization have reduced the reliance on agriculture and focused more on developing modern industries, while tempering reform with the needs of the rural poor. However, extensive land reform will take more than 20 years to achieve as illustrated by the difficulties of villagization. The Government of Rwanda is aware of the failures of villagization in other nations and seems committed to avoiding the mistakes made elsewhere. Chapter five details the implementation of Vision 2020.

Chapter five is a study of how Vision 2020 is being operationalized. The chapter includes a description of implementation between 2000 and 2010; with a detailed analysis of the years 2005 – 2010. This period covers the early years of Vision 2020 when policies were being re-evaluated to better support pro-poor growth at the Sector level. The resettlement program ended in 2008, after which the emphasis was on increasing crop yields and encouraging savings among the rural poor. Chapter five will detail the nature of accountability and how decentralization has created a political system where ones position is dependent on successful implementation of public policies.

Chapter five: Operationalizing Vision 2020

Implementing land reform in post-conflict Rwanda

Chapter four focused on the way in which official policy is implemented since the adoption of the Decentralization Act in 2001. I argued that in practice the approach to implementation is closer to deconcentration than decentralization given the involvement of national officials in the implementation of local initiatives. District and sector officials, while ostensibly autonomous, rely on higher authorities for their jobs and funding for projects. This ensures political acquiescence to the president and the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) party. Furthermore, the development and implementation of public policies such as villagization and commercialization is not participatory as indicated in Vision 2020 and Vision 2020: Umurenge, leaving the rural poor in a precarious position where policy is not so much adopted as imposed.

Rwanda's rural poor are subsistence farmers who have traditionally survived off of small, dispersed plots of land. The majority are either wage laborers who work part of the year on the farms, or small landholders who struggle to grow crops on limited plots of land and with little or no modern irrigation. Land ownership entails several issues: 1) Valuable land is purchased by wealthier farmers and interests, diminishing access to smaller plots by those who cannot afford to buy land; 2) There is little incentive for subsistence farmers to invest in their small plots, given the limited, sometimes uncertain return on their investment; and 3) Persistent poverty induces some land owners to sell land to fill immediate needs (i.e., for food, shelter, and education), providing opportunities for wealthier farmers or foreign interests to purchase and consolidate

land in larger parcels. The GoR has prioritized land reform because so many people rely on it, yet they struggle to produce enough crops to make them commercially viable.

As of 2008, agriculture contributed 44% to the national GDP (African Development Bank 2008: 3); it has the potential to “form the basis for the transformation of the rest of the economy,” but only if commercialization is encouraged and technologies are more widely introduced in the countryside. This has often been the prescription for reducing poverty throughout Africa, but increased production and modern techniques require legal reforms and consistency when it comes to implementation. The value chain of agriculture, which includes access to inputs such as fertilizers, credit, and seeds, villagization, land consolidation, and effective marketing of crops, must also be in place to realize the full benefits of increased production. In other words, if Rwanda is to maximize its comparative advantage in agriculture, it must ensure reforms that minimize as much as possible the uncertainty and economic hardships associated with agricultural activity. Its rural development strategy must balance plans for poverty reduction and maintain civility among a population still traumatized by genocide.

This chapter focuses on the operationalization of the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (SPAT), National Agricultural Policy (NAP), Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), and Vision 2020: Umurenge (VUP). These plans have been operationalized in the context of extreme poverty under an official policy of administrative decentralization; making them susceptible to failure because people are hesitant to adopt key policies in the face of food insecurity and limited knowledge of the reasoning behind of national priorities. A number of laws have been passed since 2005 to clarify the process of land expropriation and compensation, yet miscommunication between local officials and their constituents has made these laws difficult to enact. Furthermore, this chapter argues there is

misunderstanding between local and national authorities when it comes to how policies are to be implemented. The laws discussed in this chapter illustrate the attempts made by the GoR to address these difficulties.

Population Distribution and Policy Analysis

Initial attempts at resettlement often met with resistance immediately after the genocide (Human Rights Watch 2001: 91). In 1996 the interim government implemented a policy of forced resettlement in an attempt to restore security and stability. By 2000 the goal of forced resettlement was redefined in terms of development. The period 2000 to 2007 was officially one of encouraging the relocation of the rural poor to provide easier access to markets, clean water, and government services. Redefining resettlement policy required a new administrative mandate that would focus attention on economic development, as opposed to collective security. Once this occurred, domestic actors gained a more prominent role in its implementation, in contrast to the international governmental organizations such as the United Nations that had guided and facilitated the policy immediately after 1994. A new bureaucratic class would oversee the policy implementation after 2000.

The Narrative of Implementation

The GoR has constructed a policy narrative (Sutton 1999: 11) based on past experiences of civil war and ethnic genocide to justify and guide Vision 2020. Key to supporting this narrative is what Lipsky (1980) refers to as “street-level bureaucrats,” actors such as the police, schools, and local authorities who are tasked with supporting the narrative and responsible for implementing policies. Robert Apthorpe (1986) argues that labeling certain actors (i.e., the rural

poor, *genocidaires*, vulnerable populations, etc) greatly reduce the complex set of interests these individuals have in the implementation process. This is Foucault's "ordering" of populations by classifying individuals in terms of a larger group identity; in this case group identities of victims and killers. This may explain some of the resistance to policies such as resettlement among the rural poor. The GoR has planned and implemented public policy based on its conception of a population that remains divided by genocide and war, while those being resettled have a variety of interests related to where they live and what crops they plant. Resettlement, then, is more than simply a policy for development among the rural poor.

Rondinelli (1979) discusses a key element to successful rural development: there must be a strong national commitment to accomplishing specific goals, coupled with a strong administrative commitment and capacity to realize these reforms. This includes ensuring the proper technical inputs, funding, foreign investment, and local political support (Rondinelli 1979: 395 – 402). I argue that weak administrative capacity to balance demands from national authorities and the local population is determining the progress of Vision 2020 in rural Rwanda today.

Since 2000, administrative restructuring has led to new Ministries and redefined responsibilities to operationalize Vision 2020. Ongoing administrative restructuring is hindering successful implementation, due to a lack of both administrative knowledge and commitment of new bureaucrats who are constantly being reshuffled and reassigned to different agencies and regions. I did not interview anyone who had been in their position for over six months, indicative of the high turnover rate and minimal experience contributing that is hindering progress. O'Toole (1979) argues the need for both a clear mandate and sufficient state resources to avoid intra- and inter-organizational issues such as miscommunication and competing

priorities. In fact, during times of policy development we often see the creation of new agencies tasked with implementation of new policies as has been the case in Rwanda since the adoption of Vision 2020.

Rwandan Land Law vs. Land Policy

Traditional land tenure was predicated on land clearing: Whoever cleared vacant or non-productive land had the usage rights to that property (Vansina 2004: 40). However, this activity was not an individual endeavor; only collective activity granted land rights to groups. The idea of private ownership was foreign prior to the arrival of the Belgians in 1921-22. Colonial-era land relations in Rwanda were based on the *paysannat* system. Rural peasants were resettled into villages managed by the Belgian Agricultural Service (Gravel 1968: 41 – 42), an institution that generally favored Tutsi rights over those of Hutu. Since colonialism, land tenure has been granted to heads of households, as opposed to relying on lineage and inheritance to acquire farm land (Gravel 1968: 186). This has contributed to intra-family and intra-ethnic disputes, but is still a more equitable system compared with that of the colonial era as it shifts ownership away from public officials, such as government or chiefs, to individuals.

Pauline Peters (2004) notes that the commodification of agriculture “shapes and reshapes” existing social relations; at the same time, social relations influence the commodification of agriculture via entrenched cultural and political relationships among Africa’s rural poor. Peters notes that “small acts,” such as devoting time to food crops instead of export crops, often work parallel to state policies (Peters 2004: 294) and may undermine policies, bring about a shift in strategy, or lead to increased state coercion.

As late as 1993 most land acquisitions occurred via inheritance, not by way of market transactions (Andre and Platteau 1998: 22). This type of informal land acquisition makes allocation and titling difficult for the state because there are no formal contracts or mapping procedures to indicate who owns which plot of land; thus, the need for legal restructuring defining ownership and availability. Andre and Platteau also found that a significant number of killings that occurred in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi during the genocide were against Hutu as well as Tutsi. The authors suggest that land scarcity and long standing grievances were just as strong as motivators for violence as ethnicity in Northwest Rwanda. I am arguing this was a motivating factor for the war countrywide.

Until the adoption of the Organic Land Law in 2005, land rights had been based on discriminatory Belgian colonial policies (Musahara 2006: 4). Colonialism institutionalized ethnicity by defining Hutu and Tutsi as biological identities, counter to traditional distinctions of Tutsi as landed elites and Hutu as agriculturalists. Pre-colonial identities in Rwanda were based largely on the socioeconomic status of individuals, not on racial characteristics. The Belgians developed a land policy that favored the Tutsi minority when it came to access to land and the political resources of the colonial state. Over time agreements on land ownership and transfers occurred outside of formal institutions, making it difficult for the state to register and administer land.

Land ownership was difficult to protect due to the informal nature of small-scale land transfers that had limited oversight (Pottier 2006: 514 and 520). Matters were complicated after the civil war and genocide when “old caseload refugees” (Shinichi and Marara 2007: 119) returned from exile in Uganda demanding rights to land they had abandoned after the Hutu Revolution of 1959 that brought Hutu extremists into power and subsequent mass killings in the

early 1960s and again in 1973 (Shinichi and Marara 2007). Given the informal nature of land titling, transfers and post-genocide demands, the GoR set about establishing a series of laws and policies designed to reduce land-centered conflict.

Contemporary Rwandan land policy “ensures equal right to land use for all Rwandan citizens” and addresses three areas for reform: Use of land for economic growth and poverty reduction; ensuring equal rights to land for all Rwandans; and protecting the environment and land resources. Each component of the new land laws recognizes the importance of land reform in supporting economic development and equality within agrarian institutions (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 4).

National Land Policy (2004) and the Organic Land Law (2005)

Since 2004, the GoR has been rewriting land laws to formalize land tenure and promote commercialization. In the National Land Policy (2004), the government identifies pressure on land, large numbers of “landless,” scattered settlements, outdated registration processes, and environmental degradation as areas to be addressed in order to achieve middle-income status by 2020 (Republic of Rwanda 2004c: 5). The National Land Policy outlines the legal process of reforming land tenure and allocation.

Prior to the Organic Law of 2005, land tenure was based on a “dual legal system” that included both customary and written laws. Customary law was predominant among rural populations; it encouraged the parceling of land and land transfers based on inheritance, not market exchange (Republic of Rwanda 2004c: 9). The second system was the more formal, written laws that governed non-agricultural, urban land tenure. The written land agreements

encouraged formal transfers of land and established land rights such as leases and tenancy. Since 2004, extensive changes have regulated and standardized the national land laws.

The Organic Land Law outlines the master plan for land use in Rwanda, recognizing both customary and legal claims. This was an important development because many people who lived in rural villages relied on traditional relationships and claims to land. This approach to modernization could have very well deprived the rural poor of much of their land, and livelihood, if new laws had failed to recognize traditional rights to land holding. Under Article 2, Section 6, land consolidation is defined as “a procedure of putting together small plots of land in order to manage the land and use it in an efficient uniform manner so that the land may give more productivity,” justifying the state’s villagization and resettlement policies.

Prior to 2005, all land had belonged to the state, making it illegal for many to buy or sell plots of land. Furthermore, the Organic Land Law established two categories: land use and land ownership. Each classification entailed a specific set of rights as to how individuals could use a certain plot or area of land. Article 9 distinguishes between urban or rural land uses. It sets guidelines as to how land can be used, based on whether it is classified as urban or rural and is directly related to the issue of land expropriation for *imidugudu*. Article 11 distinguishes between individually owned plots and state owned property. The Law further identifies, and formalizes, two forms of tenure: full ownership and long term leasehold. Overall, the Organic Land Law formalizes land tenure but is ambiguous enough to allow for state appropriation of land when needed.

In 2005 Presidential Order N 54/01 established “the structure, the responsibilities, the functioning and the composition of the Land Commissions” (Republic of Rwanda 2005a: 22; Republic of Rwanda 2008a). The Rwanda Natural Resource Authority (RNRA) is the

coordinating agency for the District Land Bureaus found throughout the country. The land bureaus gather agricultural data and facilitate the implementation of national policies. In 2011 the RNRA was in the process of gathering data related to land ownership and using geographic spatial (GIS) analysis to map land use throughout the country to identify the legal owners of each plot. Ministerial Order N 001/2006, an amendment to the 2004 National Land Policy, formalized the land registration process as well as the responsibilities and functions of the District Land Bureaus. Together, these orders defined the roles and duties of decentralized actors regarding the implementation of land policy.

MINALOC Community Development Policy (2008), SPAT I and SPAT II

The Ministry of Agriculture has been working with various grassroots groups as well as with international organizations, such as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), NGOs and the rural poor themselves. In 2004, the government drafted the Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (SPAT), to assist the rural poor as well as to integrate the agrarian economy into regional and world markets (Republic of Rwanda 2004b). The SPAT operates in a fairly transparent manner. The Executive Summary required that once the SPAT and the financing plans were endorsed by the government in 2004, consultations among donors and officials took place. The government is trying to set realistic goals and legitimate needed reforms for the agricultural sector. The SPAT stresses the role of farmer's cooperatives and local rural associations in alleviating tensions that have arisen during villagization and recognizes the need to have these organizations act as intermediaries between local administrators and the rural poor.

Local Community Development Councils (CDCs) are designed to “ensure technical coordination of community development” (Republic of Rwanda 2008b: 6). The CDCs relay strategies to District Officials who then formulate District Development Plans (DDPs) that provide the basis for the District Performance Contracts (*imihigo*) discussed earlier. The DDPs “reflect the prioritized needs of the population” and “provide a sound framework for resources mobilization from government and development partners” (6), such as the World Bank and numerous NGOs. All of this is done in accordance with the goals set forth in Vision 2020 and the EDPRS. The CDCs encourage rural popular participation in the development and implementation of policy, enhancing transparency, and encouraging collaboration between different sectors of the economy. Residents in each *imidugudu* identify the most vulnerable families and those to be given priority when it comes to the allocation of services and assistance. This is known as Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) as residents are identified as: poorest, poorer, poor, surviving, middle, or well-off (Joseph 2006).

Land Reform and Consolidation

Rwanda depends on coffee, tea, and sugarcane for its cash crops but the majority of the rural poor devote significant time and land to food crops such as bananas, cassava, maize, and beans (Republic of Rwanda 2004b: vi). Fruit, rice, vegetables, sorghum, maize, groundnuts, and soybeans are also valuable cash crops. The main export crops are coffee, tea, hides and skins, and a flower popular in Europe and the United States known as pyrethrum. Coffee and tea are exported internationally but the other export crops are sold primarily in regional markets, with 68% shipped to Kenya and Uganda. While cash cropping generates higher revenue, these products are susceptible to crop failure due to unpredictable climatic or economic conditions. If,

and when, this occurs the farmers are left without revenue to buy food that they had previously grown. There is a history of famine and food shortages in Rwanda, hence why farmers have been reluctant to transition entirely to cash cropping that requires using their limited plots of land for non-food production.

Table 7: Primary Crops in the Eastern Province

	Rice	Maize	Sweet Potatoes	Coffee	Tea	Cassava	Banana
EICV3: 2011							
Hh's selling more than half their crop	59%	17.6%	7.6%	97.4%	0%	8.2%	11.3%
% of HH's Cultivating:	4%	90%	74.8%	9%	0%	71.9%	77%
EICV2: 2006							
Hh's selling more than half their crop	37%	7.7%	4.4%	96.7%	100%	9.9%	4.6%
% of HH's Cultivating:	4.4%	76.5%	79.2%	6.5%	1%	62%	76.7%

Source: The Third Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV3), 2012

According to the GoR, the key to increasing production and reducing poverty is land consolidation, by combining dispersed plots of land (Musahara 2006: 12). Aruguman Kathiresan (2012: 3) evaluates the implementation and impact of land consolidation on food crop production. Given the various “layers” of implementation - and the fact that local authorities are driven more by performance contracts than long-term improvements - farmers often question the logic and purpose behind certain policies (Kathiresan 2012: 4). In addition, farmers are unsure of their rights when it comes to land ownership and consolidation due to the lack of communication and education regarding the Organic Land Law and Vision 2020 (Kathiresan 2012: 6). Couple this uncertainty with coercive methods employed by local officials seeking to meet the goals of their performance contracts, and one begins to see the social and political aspects of the implementation of key policies.

The Rwanda Rural Support Sector Project (RSSP), mentioned in Chapter four, was funded by the World Bank for the period 2001 to 2013. Phase two, begun in 2008, was to be completed by 2013; this phase aimed to increase commercial agricultural production through the use of fertilizers and modern techniques among the rural poor but relies on external funding for its success. RSSP conforms to the principles of the Decentralization Act; it begins with national policy, and the implementation relies on a very rigid, hierarchical structure of national and local officials. The responsibility is then passed on to District Level Bureaus who monitor projects at the district level.

Agricultural productivity remains low (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 19) due to limited use of fertilizers and seeds, even though these inputs have risen; 19% used fertilizer in 2000, compared to approximately 40% by 2008 (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 21). The largest increase in the use of fertilizer has been seen in the Eastern and Northern Provinces. There has also been an increase in food and cash crop production in these provinces. A report released by MINECOFIN in 2007 noted that the main reasons for poverty included lack of land (49%) and poor soil (11%) (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 21); land reform and environmental conservation became two areas of investment. By 2005, 26% of the rural labor force engaged in wage employment; poverty remained highest among households reliant on agriculture for their main source of income (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 24 - 28). As the population increases in Rwanda it will be necessary to ensure this trend continues. The land and soil cannot support eight million farmers, which would not bode well in the most densely populated country in Africa that will have a total population exceeding 12 million by 2020. Wage labor is also important for alleviating population pressures and mobilizing a skills-based workforce to move Rwanda into middle income status by 2020.

To encourage this transition, the GoR is targeting commodity chains in each district. Each chain will vary depending on the types of crops being grown, but, in general, a commodity chain includes everything from inputs such as seeds and fertilizers, to processing plants, to the marketing and transportation of crops. Relying on local knowledge to inform national policies, each of the 30 districts is encouraged to identify key links in the commodity chains where greater investment is needed (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 78); ensuring proper inputs from the national government and increased production of staple crops in each district match up to the needs of farmers.

Rwanda is a small country with a high population density and hilly terrain, thus limiting access to productive land needed to satisfy the needs of the rural poor. Geography is an important factor determining which crops will be intensified. For example, the Southwest region is considered the “bread basket” of Rwanda, producing a significant quantity of food crops, such as bananas and potatoes, while the Eastern Province is known primarily for banana production. One strategy for poverty reduction has been to reduce reliance on agriculture by creating non-farm employment opportunities. Another approach has been to rely on the people living in *umudugudu* to build their own homes. This has involved the creation of brick manufacturing at the cell level, providing masonry training to the rural poor in an attempt to teach them new skills that can be applied elsewhere as well. In addition to the logistical needs of *imidugudu*, local cottage industries employ women in making items such as baskets, bread and other homemade goods. Some women sell their goods in the global market place via foreign organizations such as Indego Africa, a social enterprise that sells and distributes fair trade goods produced by women throughout Rwanda to consumers in developed countries.

Commercializing agriculture

Commercialization is defined as the “gradual replacement of integrated farming systems by specialized enterprises for crop, livestock, poultry and aquaculture products” (Pingal and Rosegrant 1995: 171). Integrated systems refer to techniques allowing land to be used for multiple crops and farming activities. For example, cattle graze on plots of land as a way to control weeds and provide fertilizer between planting seasons. Commercialization requires that a single plot be used for specific crops, or monocropping, making it easier to apply uniform fertilizers and seeds in a more efficient manner.

Monocropping is more efficient as it allows the state to focus its technical and financial resources on specific crops instead of providing inputs for a variety of crops on a single plot of land. The GoR sends officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) to evaluate land and collaborate with district and sector officials in determining the proper crops and techniques given soil conditions and terrain. The purpose is to minimize soil degradation to preserve the health of productive plots of land, presuming that trained technocrats are better suited to making decisions of what crops to plant and where to plant them than the farmers themselves.

One controversy since 2000 has been the intensification of cash crops at the expense of food crops. In the past, there has been reluctance to transition to cash crops among the rural poor who grow food crops to survive in times of crop failure, or when there is no demand for their goods. The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) is directly involved in the transition to cash crops; the national government determines what crops grow best in certain locations and then provides the inputs for the planting, growing, and harvesting of whichever cash crop is best suited to the environmental conditions.

Commercialization is a process involving a transition away from traditional cropping and farming techniques to more modern methods designed to increase yields and production. It requires heavy investment from both the state and the international community. Between 2006 and 2013 Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (SPAT) received \$30.2 million from international organizations, including the government of Belgium (\$5.2 million), \$3.4 million from the World Food Program (WFP), and \$5.5 million from the UK's Department for International Development (DFiD) (Republic of Rwanda 2013a). The total contribution from the international community was \$30.4 million between 2006 and 2013. The government's contribution during this same period was \$1.3 million, suggesting a heavy reliance on external actors in financing rural development. The Rural Sector Support Project (RSSP 3) received \$32 million in International Development Aid from the World Bank; approximately 2% of Rwanda's national budget in 2012.

PAP and RAP

Resettlement was first introduced in 1978 but failed due to a lack of supervision and basic infrastructure (Republic of Rwanda. 2004c). However, state institutions back then were extremely centralized, granting people little influence over resettlement policies due to a lack of property and individual rights. The 2002 Rwandan Constitution recognizes the right to private property (Article 29), while subsequent executive orders have decentralized some government institutions.

The Kagame government has officially defined the rights of those who are most affected by forced relocation. Project Affected Persons (PAP) defines the "affected" persons as "persons who, for reasons of the involuntary taking of their land and other assets under the project, result

in direct economic and or social adverse impacts, regardless of whether or not said [persons] physically relocate” (Joseph 2006: 57). Individuals classified as PAPs are identified based on Resettlement Action Plans (RAP). RAPs are prepared “when subproject locations are identified” and decree that it is up to the representatives at the sector and cell levels to implement the national policies, including forced relocation (Joseph 2006: 46; Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 3). The RAPs contain specific legal requirements by which people must abide; including the proper compensation due to affected persons, based on land value or property that is being expropriated. This administrative legal structure for expropriation and resettlement takes for granted that the vast numbers being affected are able to read and understand the orders from sector and cell officials as well as their RAP rights. This particular aspect of the process lends itself to exploitation through patron-client relationships and local strongmen, two common institutions in many African nations. These are only two examples of the shortfalls of a modern policy being enacted among a largely illiterate, traditional sector of the country.

Expropriation Law (2007)

The Expropriation Law of 2007 was another important development in land and rural reform after villagization had been underway for over ten years, leading to a loss of land for many peasants. Expropriation disrupted the traditional institutions and relationships found throughout the countryside. The 2007 law outlined the rights and procedures for any expropriation affecting the public interest during villagization. The responsibility for educating rural residents about land policies fell to district land bureaus, tasked with supporting land reform policies, not with facilitating popular debate and consultation about the policies themselves. The law explicitly mandated just compensation for any expropriated land (Article

3); compensation could be monetary, alternative land or a building that was equivalent in cost to the land being expropriated (Article 22); but “just compensation” was not defined; leading to localized disputes over land values, and the compensation to be paid. The law did provide a compensation framework for land that was lost due to *imidugudization* but left it to local officials to explain the law to the illiterate rural poor which contributed to further disputes, due to lack of their legal understanding.

Valuation Law (2007)

Another important official act was the Valuation Law of 2007; while it did not resolve the problem of just compensation, it did outline the circumstances under which individuals would be compensated for lost land. It further stipulated the methods used to place values on expropriated assets. The law states, “all peoples affected by expropriation must receive fair and just compensation” as determined by independent valuers (Expropriation Law 2007; Valuation Law 2007). Two problems arose almost immediately that have yet to be resolved. First of all, “fair and just” compensation has still not been officially defined although value is determined by land valuation bureaus. Secondly, these bureaus are supposed to be located in close proximity to various districts and provinces, expecting local officials to be better qualified to place value on land with which they were familiar, in line with the Decentralization Act. As of 2007 there was only one land valuation bureau, however, located in the urban capital of Kigali, making it difficult for the government to properly value land in every district, sector, and cell in the country. In other words, it has been difficult to apply the Valuation Law due to a lack of resources and administrative capacity needed to enforce the law.

The impact of geography on implementation

Commercialization of agriculture is made more difficult due to geography. Rwanda is known as the “land of a thousand hills,” which makes it difficult to mechanize agriculture by introducing tractors and combines into the countryside. Irrigation is limited to natural rainfall in many communities; hence the resettlement of large numbers of the rural poor closer to water sources at the tops of the hills. Kibungo is the lowest altitude in Rwanda at 1469 feet and had the lowest rainfall average between 1970 and 1987, making food security and commercial production a challenge for the people and the state (1991 Census data).

The hilly terrain further reduces arable space in a country that is already land starved. On average, a rural farmer farms three hectares of land (five acres), used to produce both food crops for survival and cash crops for profit in a good year. There are multiple cropping systems throughout Rwanda, depending on the terrain and availability of water. Terracing is a common practice for planting crops on the hillsides; allowing a farmer to plant multiple crops by alternating the rows between bananas and maize, for example. Terracing ensures that rainwater will not be wasted by planting crops in positions where they already get water as it runs down the hillside. Another cropping practice is monoculture: the planting of a single crop to minimize the cost of inputs. The country is also experimenting with more eco-friendly practices, such as drip systems that utilize less water than traditional irrigation processes that stress water supplies because of over-usage.



Image 1: An isolated dwelling that is reliant on intercropping, Kibungo 2011

Challenges to Implementation: Miscommunication and Misunderstandings

Several district and sector officials stressed in interviews that illiteracy was a persistent problem and a hindrance to policy implementation. There is a lack of communication between district officials charged with implementation and the rural citizens who cannot read official documents. District and sector personnel supplied different answers regarding who decides what crops to plant and where to plant them. The District Vice Mayor of Kibungo claimed that district officials decide what crops to plant due to their immediate knowledge of the local environment: “national government policy gives direction....but leaves the details to local actors” (Interview, June 21, 2011). A sector official later mentioned that the rural poor understand the Organic Law of 2005 but not the importance of fertilizer and other technologies needed to increase yields. Many Rwandans have difficulty trusting that these new approaches to farming will work, as demonstrated by the presence of “kitchen gardens” behind many homes. These are small mounds of dirt that are located somewhere near the home. The residents plant food crops such as maize and potatoes as insurance against famine or drought. Drought was another issue the District Vice Mayor raised as he told me about the importance of irrigation in Kibungo.

Concerns over food security in Kibungo

Food insecurity is prevalent in Rwanda for a variety of reasons. First are climatic conditions such as periodic droughts and flooding that destroy entire harvests. Secondly, the infrastructure necessary for increasing crop yields, or to minimize the impact of crop failure by ensuring stockpiles of emergency food, is missing or inadequate. Then there is the land issue, already discussed at length. Given these conditions, farmers have been reluctant to change their methods to those aimed at increasing yields and incomes through cash cropping. Food insecurity has been a persistent problem throughout Rwanda's history and the rural poor reluctantly adopt new practices that force them to plant new crops or relocate. Local officials are held to promises they have made to Kagame but must also promote the needs of their constituents. When these officials run for office, they will be held accountable to two sets of competing interests: The national government demanding progress and the rural poor who have immediate concerns over land and food security.

Many rural communities are isolated from main roads, making it difficult to transport goods to market and to ensure access to state resources. District officials regularly mentioned such problems in interviews as barriers to achieving the goals outlined in *Imihigo* contracts. One young man from Kibungo, indicated that he had seen a paved road for the first time when he was 20 years old. He is now 27, having finished a Masters degree at the University of Missouri. Roads are crucial to Rwanda's rural population, as they offer opportunities for social advance as well as economic development. The state has been building new roads and improving existing routes in Kigali as well as roads leading from the city to the rest of the country. The road between Kigali and Kibungo was well-maintained and there is a new paved thoroughfare leading from Kibungo to the Tanzanian border, 90km to the east. While more roads need to be

constructed to reach those living in isolated areas, progress is being made in the region where the field research was conducted.

Just as important as infrastructure is access to clean water and health care. Diseases such as malaria and stomach illness are directly attributable to contaminated or unclean water. If children are sick, they will be unable to concentrate in school, if they can make it to the schoolhouse; when rural dwellers get sick, they often trek several hours to the nearest health facility. Once there, relatives will be responsible for providing sheets, food, and other amenities that hospitals in the developed world provide. The GoR has included water conservation and management into its plans for poverty reduction. The goal is for every Rwandan to have access to clean water no more than five km from their home. According to a report from UNICEF, 25% of Rwanda’s population did not have access to clean water in 2013, but the GoR worked closely with international donors and private firms to reduce this share (UNICEF 2013).

Table 8: Health indicators

Health Data	EICV2 (2005)	EICV3 (2011)
% Consulted Health Professional	31%	40%
Travel time to health center	95 min	60 min
Access to safe drinking water	70%	74%

Source: 2010 National Health Survey

Mechanization and new technologies

Mechanization is defined by MINAGRI (2010a) as “the use of tools, implements and machines for agricultural land development, crop production, harvesting, and preparation for storage, storage, and on-farm processing. It includes three main power sources: human, animal, and mechanical. The manufacture, distribution, repair, maintenance, management and utilization of agricultural tools, implements and machines is covered under this discipline with regard as to

how to supply mechanization inputs to the farmer in an efficient and effective manner” (Republic of Rwanda 2010a: 11). Many rural residents are unable to afford mechanized inputs for crop production, thus the need for access to formal credit and savings. The mechanization strategy is predicated on the idea that modern machinery will foster an increase in agro-processing and wage-based employment. Furthermore, mechanization leads to forward linkages in the rural economy, that is, it will generate jobs for mechanics that can repair the machines and for the hiring of workers in manufacturing and assembly. Mechanization is key to reducing the number of people dependent on subsistence agriculture and other farm-based activity (Republic of Rwanda 2010a).

Mechanization requires skilled laborers who can maintain and repair tractors and other motorized equipment. The Rwandan Agricultural Development Authority (RADA) has two such degreed specialists covering the entire country (Republic of Rwanda 2010a: 15). There is a strong push for agricultural extension services that can train additional specialists and provide local access to engineers and mechanics. The Institute of Agriculture, Technology, and Education in Kibungo (INATEK) is one such institution (described in chapter six). Another obstacle is the lack of credit needed to lease equipment. The Bank for Rwandan Development (BRD) provides leases to farmers with 20% down, at an 8.5% interest rate over two to five years. The goal is to have 25% of farming operations mechanized by 2015; providing incentives for training, encouraging rural credit markets, and increasing demand throughout the rural sector (Republic of Rwanda 2010a: 16). Getting the proper technologies and training to the rural population is made easier by concentrating efforts on *umudugudu* as opposed to promoting mechanization throughout dispersed settlements.

According to MINAGRI, 98.5% of the population still rely on hand tools for agricultural production, partly because of the hilly terrain that makes it difficult for tractors to operate safely and efficiently (Republic of Rwanda 2010a: 12). Replacement parts for tractors are scarce due to the low demand in Rwanda but may be acquired from Uganda and Kenya. Introduced in 2010, the Agricultural Mechanization Strategy (AMS) outlined how to increase and introduce mechanization in rural Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda 2010a: 11).

MINAGRI specifies two stages of agro-processing. The primary stage occurs close to the homesteads, and involves the simple harvesting of crops. The second stage marks the point at which products are processed into flour or paste, for instance. Processing occurs away from the farms insofar as large scale process requires buildings and roads to accommodate producers who bring their goods to the processing plants before selling them to buyers in regional or global markets. Several crops already have well-established agro-processing systems in place. Wheat, coffee, tea, rice, and maize currently are processed on a commercial scale. Soy beans are at an earlier stage of large scale agro-processing.

Local, nongovernmental, individuals are critical in ensuring the successful implementation of these policies, the reason why the GoR has developed the VUP and the *Ubudehe* process, relying on local knowledge and traditions to modernize the rural economy. In 2006 the GoR established *Abunzi* mediation boards in local communities. *Abunzi*, like the *Ubudehe* and the *imidugudu* concepts, is rooted in Rwanda tradition. The *Abunzi* boards are comprised of twelve members, six from the cell and six from the sector administrative unit. These boards address issues and rights at the local level and are designed to settle land disputes that occur within communities (Musoni 2005; ARD 2008; Rwanda Governance Board 2010).

Indicators of success and failure

Macro-indicators such as increases in national GDP and key crops such as bananas suggest a marked increase in agricultural output and an increase in annual GDP, but says nothing about the distribution of this income. Between 2006 and 2011, the share of marketed agricultural output increased from 22% to 27% countrywide (EICV3 2012: 98), indicating that macrolevel implementation is producing positive results. However, this macro-indicator does not say much about individual livelihoods at the household level. The EICV3 (2012) report shows a decrease in poverty countrywide as measured in consumption patterns (EICV3 2012: 134).

Accountability also seems to have been reinforced via the *imihigo* contracts and regular elections. Local officials are aware that specific issues, such as illiteracy and lack of infrastructure, are related to effective implementation; incorporating these issues in their reports and budgets. While the details of the Organic Land Law, the Valuation and Expropriation laws, and the PAP and RAP process may not be well understood initially, there are strong indications that once farmers see their neighbor's improved well-being and increasing production, they tend to adopt similar practices. Despite their initial resistance, the rural poor seem to accept resettlement once they have access to clean water, health facilities, and schools. Between EICV2 (2005) and EICV3 (2012) there was a 4% increase in those who had access to safe drinking water (EICV3 2012: 155) and an 8% increase in those seeking medical care for illness (EICV3 2012: 160), suggesting progress in some indicators of development.

Conclusion

This chapter has outlined the legal and administrative details of rural development and identified the priorities for national and local administrators essential to the operationalization of Vision 2020. The national government has defined the outcomes, but local authorities are expected to plan and implement certain policies such as land distribution and funding. Immediate outcomes such as poverty reduction, improved infrastructure, and accountability indicate Rwanda's approach to development is working, but the country is still underachieving in regards to becoming a middle-income country and a hub for trade in East Africa.

Chapter six provides a case study of Kibungo, a community in the Eastern Province that experienced the first wave of resettlement after the genocide. Known for its banana production, Kibungo lies near the Tanzanian border; it attracts traders from across the border that buys and sells their goods in a local market. Kibungo has a number of characteristics that should support development – long history of villagization, adequate revenue from agriculture and foreign trade, and well-maintained roads – it provides a strong case study for how policies are implemented and whether or not they are contributing to growth.

Chapter six: Kibungo case study

Introduction

Located in the Eastern Province, Ngoma District, Kibungo Sector was the first to absorb a major influx of returnees after the genocide; it has been the site of villagization and agricultural commercialization since 1996. These characteristics make Kibungo a unique location to study the impact of Vision 2020 during its first decade. Since 2000, Kibungo served as a test for resettlement and poverty reduction strategies under the EDPRS and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP's) (Republic of Rwanda 2007b: 16).

This chapter will analyze the progress of Vision 2020 in Kibungo Sector as of 2011. The main argument of this chapter is that authorities in Kibungo are responsible to both national authorities as well as local constituents, forcing them to balance national priorities with local demands. Chapter six will focus primarily on the political economy of Kibungo in order to explain how implementation has been carried out in a location that, seemingly, is best suited for commercialization and villagization given the sectors history of reconciliation and economic performance. Kibungo is considered one of the more economically developed regions in the country, so it is expected the local authorities and residents are better prepared for the realization of Vision 2020. The field research was carried out in the Eastern Province, Ngoma District, Kibungo Sector in June and July 2011.

Map 1: Eastern Province, Kibungo Sector



The Eastern Province is comprised of seven districts: Bugesera, Gatsibo, Kayanza, Kirehe, Ngoma, Nyagatare, and Rwamagana. It evinces the largest population of all provinces in Rwanda, 2.6 million persons, while also enjoying the lowest population density in the country at 275 persons km², compared to a national average of 379 persons km². Consisting of 95 sectors and 503 cells, the Eastern Province has a terrain comprised of hills and valleys. Its valleys are not as deep as in other provinces, which may explain the low population density; people are able to reside on hillsides, in contrast to residents in the Western Province that borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the slopes are steeper and the valleys deeper.

The Eastern Province was also one of the first locations where Tutsi returnees settled after the civil war (Shinichi and Marara 2007: 116). “Old caseload” Tutsi refugees returned to the Eastern Province, in part, because of the abundance of land. Many Hutu had fled during the genocide, but, upon their return, local administrators worked with both the Tutsi and Hutu returnees to re-allocate land. Land scarcity should have been a catalyst for renewed fighting based on models developed by Homer-Dixon (1994) and Collier (2000), but because of the early intervention by local authorities, Hutu saw land distribution as a national policy that did not favor the Tutsi but rather as a legitimate effort to address disagreements over land rights

(Shinichi and Marara 2007: 119). This is one example of why land reform and reconstruction occurred rather rapidly and efficiently in the Eastern Province compared to other regions, where local violence and retribution was the norm when it came to land issues in the years immediately following 1994. In 2011, 75 - 80% of the population lived in *imidugudu*, (IMF PRSP 2011; EICV3 2012: 56). The Northern Province had the second largest number of *imidugudu* residents at 38% (EICV3 2012: 56). One reason why more people lived in *imidugudu* in the Eastern Province is that resettlement has been occurring longer than in other districts. Local administrators are therefore more experienced at implementation, and the rural poor are familiar with the concept and process. The Northern Province, sharing a border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda, has been in a state of almost constant instability due to ongoing conflicts in those countries; nor has it experienced the level of rural development seen in Kibungo. The presence of refugees and individuals crossing the border between Rwanda and the DRC has made it difficult to manage the local population. The Eastern Province, which borders Tanzania, has addressed population related issues under more stable social, economic, and political conditions.

The Eastern Province is the least poorest in all of Rwanda after Kigali City (EICV3 2012: 5). Commercialization of agriculture (i.e. percentage of crops sold) stands at 25%, compared with a national average of 20% (EICV3 2013: 9). The Eastern Province is moreover a chief destination for migrant workers and traders from all over the country, as well as some who come from Tanzania. One draw for migrants is the region's fertile soil and "increased opportunities" such as wage labor and available land (The New Times 2012). Economic growth and land availability has enabled the districts to generate tax revenues which are then used to finance development projects, infrastructure and hospitals.

Ngoma District, Eastern Province

Prior to 2006, Kibungo was the name of the district; after administrative restructuring, the district was called Ngoma, rendering Kibungo a sector. Ngoma District is home to 323,000 people, males head households in 63% of homes and women making up 37% of heads of households (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 38). There are 453 *imidugudu* in Ngoma with an average size of 585 persons in each village (Republic of Rwanda 2010a Health and Demographic Survey: 256 and 257). As of 2010 22% of the population was classified as extremely poor, 25% as poor and 52% as non-poor (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 40). There are approximately 68,000 households in Ngoma with an average size of 4.8 persons per household (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 46).

The mean size of plots cultivated in Ngoma District is estimated at .83 hectares (ha), third highest throughout the entire country (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 25). 63% of households in Ngoma were participating in Land Tenure Regularization (LTR), the flagship reform program, which explains the higher than average land cultivation (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 27). The LTR authorizes the National Land Centre to issue titles to landholders; property can then be used as collateral by local farmers for improvement loans and fertilizer purchases and other inputs necessary for commercialization.

George Mupenzi, Vice President in Charge of Economic Affairs in Kibungo noted in 2011 that one of the shortcomings of the LTR policy was that many people were illiterate and therefore did not fully understand the purpose of registering land (Interview, June 21, 2011). This had contributed to the slow pace of commercialization because those who would benefit the most from the reform were reluctant to register land due to ignorance of its benefits. Mupenzi noted it was common for people to join together to formalize their land rights via the National

Land Centre, once they saw family or neighbors benefitting from the LTR program. When illiteracy is prevalent (53% in Kibungo) rumor tends to have more influence than regulation and public policy, another reason education is important for development and agricultural commercialization under Vision 2020.

The main crops in the district are maize, cassava, sweet potato, sorghum, bean, soybean, peanut, rice, Irish potato, taro, green peas, cabbage and eggplant (Republic of Rwanda 2007d). Rice, maize, and vegetables are cultivated in the marshlands, while maize, cassava, sorghum, soybean, and peanut are cultivated on the hillsides. Due to limited access, 19% of the population rents land during planting and harvest seasons. There has been a proliferation of farmer's cooperatives, but only 10% had joined such organizations by 2006 (Republic of Rwanda 2007d). Cooperatives are important for the commercialization of agriculture in Ngoma District, because they offer farmers a central location to sell crops and to receive fertilizer, training and financial assistance. The GoR has been intent on ensuring that more rural poor become members of cooperatives in the poorest regions.

Commercialization is measured by the share of crops sold after harvest. In Ngoma District, farmers sell 24% of their harvested crops, which is a strong indication that food insecurity is being reduced as there is a crop surplus that can be sold (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 29). The rural poor increasingly have the ability to earn wages for their farm labor, as opposed to relying on subsistence agriculture, a primary goal of Vision 2020. Furthermore, 23% of Ngoma District farmers purchase chemical fertilizer on a regular basis prior to the planting season (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 27).

Kibungo Sector

Kibungo Sector consists of five cells: Karerenge, Cyasemakamba, Mahango, Gahima, and Gatonde, with thirty-one *imidugudu* distributed throughout the five cells. Most of my field research was carried out in Cyasemakamba, which was the *imidugudu* nearest to the Institute for Technology and Education of Kibungo (INATEK) and one of the main roads, giving its residents easy access to markets, a health center, and the largest university in the district. In 1991, Tutsi made up 3% of the population in Kibungo, but it is difficult to obtain more recent census data that identifies people based on their ethnicity due to the official policy of making such identifiers a crime in Rwanda after the adoption of the new constitution in 2003 (Republic of Rwanda 1991 Census). Based on the 1991 census Tutsi are the minority in Kibungo but this was also the first place to which they returned after the genocide. It is possible that the proportion of Tutsi in Kibungo has increased since then, while remaining a minority in the sector.

Kibungo was selected for case study purposes for a number of reasons. It was the first community to experience post-genocide villagization in the Eastern Province and instituted a policy of land sharing as part of the post-genocide reconciliation process. Returnees from Tanzania and Uganda arrived in Kibungo between 1994 and 1995, establishing the first post-crisis settlements (Havugimana 2009: 42) and integrating into the existing population. The average land-holdings per household between 1988 and 1992 were 1.35 hectares, the highest average in the country at the time (1991 Census). Kibungo also experienced the lowest death rates during the genocide, further evidence that land and food insecurity were contributing factors to the violence in 1994 in poorer, food insecure regions. There were fewer disagreements and tensions over land reclamation during the post-genocide period (1995 – 2000), compared to other districts facing pervasive violence over land disputes.

As one of the original sites of extensive resettlement and agricultural development immediately after the genocide, 92% of Kibungo’s population was already situated in *imidugudu* by 1998; a significant number of people continue to settle in government villages to this day. The national average of residents in *imidugudu* stood at 19% in 2011 (Third Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV3: 29). Only 5% of Kibungo’s population lived in isolated dwellings at the outset, compared with the national average of 64% (EICV3; 2002/2003 Census Data). By 2002, 28% already had access to piped water, verses the national average of 24%. Safe water is a persistent problem in Rwanda, but great strides are being made in Kibungo due to the government’s collaboration with a number of foreign firms from China and Japan.

District and sector officials indicated resettlement was no longer occurring and all land had been consolidated by 2007 – 2008. After 2011 the focus shifted to ensuring “land rights and ownership” (Kairaba interview) and the titling of land. This was grounds for skepticism, however. I did see evidence of ongoing resettlement in Kigali as a new road leading from the airport to the downtown business district was being constructed through the middle of several neighborhoods and people had been resettled to make way for its construction.

Image 2: Kigali, Rwanda



A second reason for choosing Kibungo was there had been limited research in this particular sector regarding the challenges of implementing Vision 2020. As the district seat of Ngoma, Kibungo is home to a number of high ranking district officials, so there is significant political influence in the area to attract funding for key development projects and initiatives.

Health care has also been targeted by district leaders in a number of imihigo contracts since 2006. Kibungo has a population of 46,000 and a population growth rate of 3.7% (2002 – 2012). There were 18 health centers located throughout Ngoma in 2010, with the main hospital located in the center of Kibungo. The average walking distance to the nearest health facility was 59 minutes in 2010 (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 18); quite far for those in need of preventative care and emergency medical treatment. The hospital is centrally located but still requires patients to supply their own blankets, food, and other necessities. Often these goods are delivered by family and friends, still, 86% of the population was already covered by health insurance in 2011 (African Development Bank 2012), which is high considering the GoR did not begin instituting its national health care program until 2008 (Rosenberg 2012).

Kibungo is known for its educational institutions and as a market center for the Eastern Province. I was assisted by individuals from the Institute of Agriculture, Technology and Education in Kibungo (INATEK) during my time there. Its curriculum focuses on the agricultural sciences and rural development, so there were several opportunities to meet with faculty and students and ask them about Vision 2020. Working near INATEK granted me a firsthand look into key agricultural policies developed and supported by the college, as well as access to the individuals directly involved in this research, data and methods. As a major producer of bananas, the Eastern Province is an important destination for officials learning about banana production and marketing.

Dr. Mathusalem Kanobana, Director of Research at INATEK, was one of the individuals tasked with evaluating and planning rural policies in the *imidugudu* located in and around Kibungo. He provided information about the Integrated Watershed Management System Project (IWMS). This project was to begin “soon;” but Dr. Kanobana, but uncertain as to the specific start date. Kibungo is the location of the pilot project, which will later be replicated in other regions (No status updates were available in 2012). This suggests that the implementation had either not been well-defined or that this particular project has been replaced with one centering on the same outcomes, whatever those outcomes may be.

As a market center, Kibungo attracts business interests from not only Rwanda but traders from neighboring Tanzania, making it a unique location to study commercialization and trade. Kibungo is the primary point of entry in Rwanda as one travels west from Tanzania. It has done very well in terms of rural development, according to George Mupenzi, District Vive-mayor for Economic Affairs. Trade has generated significant tax revenues, compared to other parts of Rwanda (Interview, June 21, 2011); generating revenue for Kibungo which is then used to finance projects outlined in *imihigo* contracts. This gives the District Mayor an advantage in that he has a tax base that can be tapped to finance specific projects and allow for a degree of autonomy from the state when it comes to adopting and implementing public policy. For example, in 2010 Ngoma District generated 568,264,561 RwF (approximately \$847,000 USD) (RPF Inkotanyi 2013) in tax revenue.

Kibungo has two main roads, but only one was paved in 2011, which increases transportation costs and makes it difficult for farmers who remain in isolated locales to get their products to the market. One road extends from Kibungo westward to Tanzania, while the other is a north south road beginning in Uganda, continuing through Rwanda, and ending in Burundi to

the south. The infrastructure is developed enough to support a comparatively active and dynamic economy.

Population increased between 2002 and 2011, attributed to the development of Kibungo as a market and educational center for the Eastern Province (Field Interview, 2011). The workforce is also more advanced than other districts: 94% are classified as farmers or skilled laborers. Overall, 94% of Ngoma is economically active in agriculture, forestry, or fishing (EICV3; 2002/2003 Census).

As noted earlier, mechanization is important for the rural poor because it is “recognized as a means to enhance productivity of human labor in farming” (MINAGRI 2010b: 7). Beyond the direct benefits of increased production, mechanization creates off-farm employment opportunities in sectors such as assembly, manufacturing, and tractor repair and irrigation (Republic of Rwanda / MINAGRI 2010b: 9). However, mechanized farm machinery is limited due to the hilly terrain, but other forms of mechanization such as irrigation and washing machines have become more common in recent years.

The political economy in Ngoma district, Kibungo sector (2011)

Kibungo is representative of many issues surrounding rural public policy in Rwanda. Poverty declined in the Eastern Province between 2000 and 2006 from 65% to 52% (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 26). Extreme poverty is defined by the EDPRS as “the level of expenditure needed to provide minimum food requirements of 2,100 kcal per adult per day” and in 2007 one-third of the country’s population fell into this category (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 12). Kibungo has the largest population of all sectors, and yet remains the least densely populated. Land disputes, while present, are generally not resolved violently but rather through local legal

institutions that are seen as legitimate by many residents. Once again supporting the contention that legal reform, clear policy goals, and formalizing land tenure supports stability and cooperation among the rural poor.

Recent economic reports from Kibungo are indications of successful implementation of Vision 2020 and illustrate why the international community praises Rwanda as an example of successful post-conflict reconstruction and development. The other side to this story pertains to the way in which economic conditions are shaping political institutions in this rural community. Vision 2020 affirms the importance of a participatory approach to development that includes all actors who are invested in the success of these programs. But does this emphasis on participation in the economy translate to political participation and competition?

Resettling the rural poor into *imidugudu* makes it easier for the GoR to provide services such as safe water, access to needed agricultural inputs, and cooperatives. But villagization also enables government officials to monitor political activity in each household. The decentralized structure of the state creates a strict hierarchy: each administrative unit is dependent on others for everything from financing to political support for district officials. It also enables sector and cell officials to monitor activity in each *imidugudu*. The *imihigo* contracts and the concept of *Ubudehe* ensure rewards for those who succeed at implementation, and punishments for those who resist key policies. What applies to elected and appointed officials also holds true for the rural poor who are dependent on these same officials for their livelihoods. Michel Foucault's concept of biopower (Foucault: 1977 and 1978) accurately describes Rwanda due to the way in which the GoR has constructed an administrative system that serves a double purpose of enacting national policies while maintaining strict control over the use and distribution land.

The Rwandan state has relied on the history of genocide and the need for land among the peasant society to justify decentralization and resettlement since 2000. This is masked by an official policy that calls for commercialization and market reforms that has been seen as favorable by the international community. Poverty reduction, rural development, and gender mainstreaming are popular topics in the world of international development, and the GoR has incorporated these concepts into its post-genocide narrative of development. This is the point where the implementation of policies defined in this way provides a view into the state via the plan for rural development outlined in Vision 2020.

Political and economic accountability

Public policy implementation in Kibungo is a complex process involving many different agencies and actors. Vision 2020: *Umurenge* encourages popular participation in developing and implementing key policies, but villagization and commercialization strategies are adopted with limited popular participation or consultation. The rural poor understand there are problems, but due to factors such as illiteracy and limited financial means to purchase inputs such as fertilizer, they are often hesitant to adopt certain schemes until they see a neighbor family member having success. One thing everyone seems to be very much aware of is the possibility of having their land expropriated. According to the Valuation and Expropriation Laws, land that is not being used, or is not being used efficiently, may be seized by local officials. The decision to expropriate land is made between district officials and the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC). Many of the decisions come down to whether or not the land is being used in a way that will allow district mayors to meet their *imihigo* goals.

There are different perspectives regarding the planning of which crops to plant and where crops should be planted. The District Vice-Mayor claimed that this was a consultative process between local framers and officials from the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI). Experts from Kigali travel to Kibungo to carry out soil and land assessments and then meet with his office to determine if the goals in the District Performance Contracts (*imihigo*) are realistic, based on MINAGRI's conclusions. This process can cause tensions over competing claims to knowledge between local farmers and MINAGRI. District mayors are held personally accountable by President Paul Kagame for meeting the benchmarks of *imihigo* contracts; they make decisions based on considerations for re-election as well as the demands from the state to ensure significant returns on the financial support coming from Kigali. Ostensibly, the Decentralization Policy Framework ensures accountability to both local residents and Vision 2020. This is why MINAGRI is sent in to consult with district mayors as they develop their *imihigo* contracts. Official expertise is supposed to compliment that of the local community. District officials cannot ignore either set of interests, in theory, but the question is who they feel they are more accountable to: The local residents who re-elect them, or the national government they depend upon for financial support for achieving their *imihigo* goals.

Approximately 90% of district funds comes from the national government and Community Development Funds (CDF's) (Republic of Rwanda 2007a: 105); 10% of these funds are specifically allocated for projects identified in the District Development Plans (DDP's) (EDPRS 2007b: 105). The national budget is comprised of significant foreign aid, so the district officials are, in a sense, also accountable to foreign donors such as the UK's Department for International Development (DFiD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). If the GoR did not receive this foreign aid, it is likely that it would be unable to

finance the CDFs and DDPs. Accountability is reinforced through periodic elections. Local officials are aware of specific problems, such as illiteracy and lack of infrastructure, which they identify in their reports and budgets. Many issues such as education and infrastructure are considered hindrances to operationalizing Vision 2020, suggesting an awareness that they must deliver to their constituents as well as to the central government when designing and implementing key policies. The bureaucratic hierarchy extends from the national government all the way to individual villages to ensure representation for the different administrative levels of government. The bureaucracy is meant to protect against corruption by ensuring all officials, both elected and appointed, are accountable both vertically and horizontally. For example, the sector (*Umurenge*) committees are comprised of a president, vice-president, secretary, accountant, three councilors, and three auditors (Republic of Rwanda 2007b). Some of these sector committees include individuals such as local agronomists as members in order to have local expertise represented on the committee (Republic of Rwanda 2007b).

While everything is being measured and quantified at the district level, the politics take place in the cell and *imidugudu*. *Imidugudu* leaders are elected by the residents of each *imidugudu*, ensuring that the village leadership is known to the residents. The elected leaders then assist the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) and the National Land Bureau in determining boundaries for plots of land in each *imidugudu* (NIS interview), each of which consist of 100 – 200 homes in and around Kibungo. There is little evidence of how village or cell leaders take advantage of this type of local governance; it does seem to provide opportunities for extortion and exploitation by corrupt officials. At the same time, Rwanda has a strong culture of adherence to authority and a reciprocal relationship between leaders and constituents (Newbury 1993; Verwimp 2003).

This “decentralized” system can both streamline decision-making as well as hinder it. On the one hand, delivering services and inputs through a decentralized committee system strengthens access to the political system; citizen input determines the amount of financing and types of services being delivered. Ostensibly, this approach will ensure efficiency as government investment and inputs will match up to the needs on the ground in each village. However, the more complex a system becomes the more opportunities exist for corruption and manipulation of local institutions. While I did not witness this directly, many local officials felt certain policies were being imposed on them with little concern for what the people expected or wanted. A university lecturer at INATEK indicated that the GoR was intent on mechanization in Kibungo, but the hills prohibited things like tractors. Despite the anecdotal tone, he did indicate the GoR was encouraging certain policies that did not coincide with the geographical reality of Kibungo.

My experience of getting a research permit was indicative of things to follow in Kibungo, once I began interviewing local officials. Nobody in Kigali wanted to admit that their office was not responsible for issuing permits. This led to several days of visiting numerous bureaucrats while trying to obtain the required permit allowing me to speak with elected officials once I arrived in Kibungo. Second, there was clearly some political posturing going on in the MINALOC office judging by the various reactions of the three officials who were there when I and my assistant, Robert, arrived. I could glean the pecking order after only a few minutes, especially considering the third official never intervened or offered an input. Finally, the process of obtaining the research permit was the first indication of miscommunication and / or misunderstandings between ministries when it came to policy. Everyone who does research in Rwanda today is required to have a research permit; no official was ever surprised when we

inquired about one.⁸ At the same time, everyone claimed to be the office that issued the permit. This suggests that social hierarchies are still important within the bureaucracy, which is a barrier to successful implementation of Vision 2020 in rural areas distant from the center of power in Kigali. This is another reason why villagization can be seen as a mechanism for suppressing political and administrative dissent: by grouping people into villages the GoR is able to extend its influence into the most remote communities throughout Rwanda while elected officials are tasked with following national initiatives, regardless of whether or not they fully understand the details of these plans.

Food security and proper nutrition are persistent problems in Kibungo and local officials are expected to minimize hunger through the DDP's. A group of researchers working on a project for the United Nations in Kibungo informed me of the high rates of malnutrition. They saw evidence of childhood malnutrition by noting white patches on the heads of children, a strong indication that food insecurity was still a persistent issue in Kibungo (Personal interviews). However, according to a sector official, Kibungo had resolved malnutrition. When asked if malnutrition remained an issue he claimed that, on average, people eat three meals a day, consisting of staple foods including "rice, banana, Irish potato, vegetable, beans, and potatoes," all of which were grown in Kibungo. This directly contradicted what the UN team had discovered through their research. Although I was unable to follow up on either claim, one does get the impression he was simply repeating the official narrative that Vision 2020 was a success and achieving the goals it had set out to achieve.

Other officials such as the District Vice-Mayor and District Land Officer, tended to offer more direct answers as to what could be done better or what was missing when it came to

⁸ See Appendix 2 for a copy of the letter requesting a research permit that was submitted to the National Institute of Statistics

achieving key goals such as increased agricultural production. The common answers revolved around inadequate infrastructure, illiteracy, and health related problems such as sanitation and clean water. All government officials followed a pattern in their answers that corresponded with the actual text of Vision 2020. They discussed how *imidugudu* was necessary to ensure that services reached the most vulnerable populations and to increase agricultural production in the countryside.

Through the course of random conversations with the rural poor themselves and non-governmental individuals, I was able to obtain different perspectives. One of these conversations was with a young man named from Kibungo, who had worked with numerous NGO's and private firms in the Eastern Province. His mother was a local farmer well-known for a large banana plantation that had been in their family for several generations. He provided me with multiple perspectives on rural development in Kibungo as he could speak from personal experiences and offered impressions of resettlement and commercialization. He was surprised to learn I was studying *imidugudu* as he did not see what the "big deal" was with resettlement. He mentioned that *imidugudu* were necessary to consolidate land and scattered populations into more centralized units, in order to increase access to clean water and health care. He had been working with a Japanese NGO that was installing water taps throughout Rwagamana District (Eastern Province, north of Kibungo). The aim was to have a water tap every 500 meters in the Eastern Province and, eventually, throughout the country. It would be difficult to achieve this as long as residents were living in scattered settlements; resettlement was necessary to ensure access to these taps.

This raises the question as to who decided what, when and where to plant key cash and food crops. My friend from Kibungo noted that residents of *imidugudu* were told what to grow

but could decide for themselves where to plant the crops. This indicates there is little real popular participation in decisions regarding policy development and planning; there is more direct participation and consultation when it came to implementation, however each district determines which crops to plant; at times this requires district officials to force rural residents to adopt new crops. Homes are generally situated at the tops of hills and fields are at the bottom (Interview with Fidele Kayigire, District Infrastructure Officer in Kibungo, June 22, 2011) in order to maximize the use of arable land. Instead of living in a home on top of fertile soil, the residents are moved to different locations, their homes are then torn down, and the land is then converted to farmland.

There are clearly differences between what district, sector and cell officials say and the impressions conveyed by residents and outsiders. Each administrative unit has its own constituency to consider when implementing policy. Cell officials are much closer, both geographically and politically, to those they represent. If there are diverging interests, the cell officials are the first to address the concerns of the residents of the *imidugudu*. Sector officials are also local in that they live in close proximity to the numerous cells in their sector. This is one reason the GoR established Vision 2020: Umurenge as it recognizes sector officials as being the most effective in ensuring implementation as well as in relaying local demands to district and national authorities. Varying roles and responsibilities explain the different answers to identical questions. It is not so much that they are covering up facts or lying outright, but rather they are interpreting policies differently than, say, district mayors or even *imidugudu* residents, based on their position.

There is a general impression in Kibungo that the narrative of development is one of slow progress. Most in Kibungo recognize the shortcomings of Vision 2020 but seem hesitant to

dismiss it entirely as a set of policies aimed at long-term development. A number of factors inhibit the success of Vision 2020, including high turnover rates in the local government, the expense of mechanization in a hilly terrain, and persistent poverty that poses its own set of challenges for even the best intentioned officials and individuals.

Results of implementation in Kibungo: 2000 – 2011

The period between 2008 and 2012 was a critical phase for the implementation of Vision 2020, which was divided into three separate phases. Each phase emphasizes a different component of implementation. The first phase (2000 – 2008) was devoted to a short-term strategy of ensuring macroeconomic stability and economic growth to reduce aid dependency (ADB 2008). The second phase, or medium-term strategy (2008 – 2012), was focused on transitioning from an agrarian to a knowledge-based economy that stressed education in areas such as information technologies and business. The third phase, or long-term strategy (2012 – 2020), aims at the creation of a middle class and an economy that will facilitate private wealth and business ownership (ADB 2008).

I have focused on the medium-term strategy (2008 – 2012) for the case study of Kibungo. This phase was elaborated in the first poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) in 2000. The main components of this phase were sustainable job growth, implementing Vision 2020 *Umurenge*, and ensuring good governance (ADB 2008: 9). While good governance is important, I chose to look only at employment trends and the details of Vision 2020: *Umurenge* as these are the factors most relevant to this study.

The Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV) is conducted every five years and provides data on the living conditions of Rwandans. The indicators used in these

reports include poverty trends, employment and unemployment by sector, and housing conditions, and consumption trends. I chose the period of 2000 – 2010 to compare poverty reduction and commercialization between Kibungo and national averages because 2005 marks the first stage in implementing policies such as decentralization. It is also the period that precedes the administrative restructuring of 2006. I do not include the period of 2000 – 2005 because that was considered the start up phase and I did not expect any positive results in such a short period of time. This was the period when the country was being prepared for the full scale implementation of Vision 2020.

Several indicators are used here to reflect trends in development, focusing specifically on food security, poverty reduction, education and access to safe drinking water. These are the core areas targeted for improvement under Vision 2020, underlying villagization and the commercialization of agriculture (see Table 9). The first indicators in each section are for Kibungo, specifically, accompanied by a comparison for nationwide indicators as well as a comparison to rural trends in Rwanda since 2000.

The producer price “measures the average change over time in the selling prices received by domestic producers for their output” (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). It provides a good measure for the commercial benefits of certain crops between 2000 and 2011 because it captures longitudinal trends in prices paid for staple cash and food crops.

Table 9: Eastern Province: Indicators of poverty reduction (2000 – 2010)

Integrated Housing Living Conditions Survey	EICV1 (2000)	EICV2 (2005)	EICV3 (2010)
% of HH Income Spent on Food	68%	63%	59%
Rwanda	68%	64%	61%
Rural	**	66%	63%
% of Consumption Spent on Food ⁹	27%	27%	26%
Poverty ¹⁰	59%	52%	43%
Rwanda	59%	57%	45%
Rural	**	62%	49%
Extreme Poverty	39%	30%	21%
Rwanda	40%	36%	24%
Rural	**	40%	26%
Secondary Education Enrollment	**	11%	12%
Rwanda		10%	21%
Rural		8%	18%
Access to Improved Drinking Water		58%	67%
Rwanda		70%	74%
Rural		68%	72%

Source: Republic of Rwanda, EICV3 2012a

The period 2000 – 2011 saw an increase in the availability of credit, membership in cooperatives, mechanization, and use of technologies such as fertilizer and improved seed varieties. These were all considered critical factors in reducing poverty, commercializing the rural economy, and addressing food insecurity. The data above indicate there were improvements as households spent less on food in 2010 than in 2000, and those living in extreme poverty fell by 18%. The next stage for development is ensuring access to credit and savings, both seen as necessary by the GoR for long-term growth and economic stability.

⁹ This countrywide indicator presents the share of a households (HH) total consumption that is devoted to purchasing food. These numbers indicate that food makes up approximately 26% - 27% of all goods purchased in the average household. Given the previous indicator % of HH income spent on food, these numbers suggest that in 2010, on average, 61% of all income was devoted to providing 26% of all goods consumed in each household. This indicates that food purchases consume the majority of the income in each household.

¹⁰ Poverty is defined as those living on less than 64,000 RWF per year, which was approximately \$95 USD in 2012

Two institutions are considered key to providing access to finance and markets for Kibungo's rural poor. The first is a member run financial institution known as a savings and credit cooperative (SACCO). SACCOs may be found all over the global south; they offer members access to credit and loans to finance farm operations. In addition to SACCO's, a variety of cooperatives that assist farmers in many different ways to ensure higher yields, fair prices, and assist in obtaining inputs such as credit and fertilizer. In 2011, 38% of the residents in Ngoma District had at least one savings account, which is slightly lower than the national average of 40% (Republic of Rwanda 2011a: 19). It is unclear why the rate is lower in Ngoma, but it could be attributed to a general lack of knowledge and trust in these institutions at this time. This is a key factor in low rates of savings not only in Rwanda, but throughout the global south in general.

The second set of institutions is the numerous farmer's cooperatives representing the rural poor in Kibungo. Farmer's cooperatives are member owned and provide numerous economic and social services that would be otherwise unavailable to the rural poor. The most common type of cooperative is an agricultural marketing and supply cooperative (AMS), which provides services such as access to inputs and markets. These institutions are designed to minimize risk by linking farmers to the market. Cooperatives facilitate market transactions by guarding against exploitation and ensuring fair prices for crops. Kibungo currently has 25 cooperatives that represent interests ranging from poor farmers to basket weavers to moto-taxi drivers. Regardless of the industry, the cooperatives serve the same purpose of offering members regular access to markets and support.

The relationship between SACCOs, cooperatives and the GoR is usually a beneficial one. In 1995 the National Bank of Rwanda (BNR) was given power to supervise and coordinate the

banking system (Kantengwa 2008). Kibungo had the least coverage when it came to microfinance, but it is also considered a market center due to the presence of a large central market as well as its proximity to Tanzania. It could be the case that microfinance has not been as critical in Kibungo due to an already emerging local economy. This is not to say that no microfinance organizations operate in Kibungo; but based on a countrywide comparison, Kibungo had the fewest Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in all of Rwanda in 2008 – 2009.

Challenges to Implementation in Kibungo

One problem the GoR seems to have resolved, at least on the surface, is corruption. Since the RPF has a strong influence over all economic and political activities, there is a small likelihood on the part of elected and appointed officials to engage in local level corruption. Corruption was seen as less of a problem in 2011 than in 2002; according to many I interviewed it was not as prevalent in 2011 as in previous years. The GoR has created an Office of the Ombudsman which collects reports of potential fraud and corruption, then investigates complaints. This is apparently working well for foreign investors: Rwanda is seen as one of the easiest countries in which to do business and is often at the top of many lists for transparency.

Another problem related to implementation is the high turnover rate of local officials, both elected and appointed. The Executive Secretary of Kibungo Sector in 2011 was Arcade Muragijemngu - he had only held his position for one year at the time of our interview (June 22, 2011). The Vice Mayor in charge of Economic Affairs, George Mupenzi, had only been in his position for four months at the time of our interview (June 21, 2011). The short tenure of important officials contributes to a lack of experience in implementation, thus hindering progress towards a middle-income economy.

Another challenge with which local officials have had to contend are persistent land disputes. On average, a farmer in Rwanda cultivates 3 ha (5 acres). This small plot of land is often used for food production and cash cropping, influencing the decisions farmers must make when it comes to land use. MINALOC and MINAGRI are the two main entities tasked with determining the types of crops to be planted and cultivation methods. This is where local authorities have met with the most resistance from the rural poor. New techniques often require capital, which the rural poor do not have. MFIs and SACCOs are important sources of startup capital needed to meet the demands of national agencies who are determining what should be planted. Once again, district officials are “caught” between the preferences of the rural farmers and the orders from various ministries that dictate the inputs needed for local agricultural commercialization and development.

The rural poor who are forced to relocate are often encouraged by promised access to running water, electricity, and better infrastructure, easier access to markets, schools and health centers. Kibungo was making strides in receiving the access to water, but improved infrastructure seemed to be a recurring problem in the eyes of local officials. Mupenzi and Muragijemngu both acknowledged that one of the biggest obstacles with which they had to contend was the lack of infrastructure in their district and sector, respectively. These officials also noted that the high levels of illiteracy were also impeding operationalization of their policies because rural farmers waited to see how family members and neighbors fared once they adopted certain practices before following suit. Mupenzi lamented that if the people could read, many of the issues affecting implementation would be resolved, as far as he was concerned (June 21, 2011). The goal of the Economic Development Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EDPRS) was to have 100% of the rural population supporting decentralization, governance procedures

(EDPRS 2008: 53). This was clearly not the case in 2011 as many local officials noted a lack of understanding of key land laws and the underlying purposes of land expropriation (Interviews, June 6 – June 27, 2011).

The Land Question: Issues and Disputes

The District Land Bureau is responsible for the coordination and transfer of land in Kibungo. Its mission is defined in the 2004 National Land Policy as implementing land reform based ‘on community consultations’ (Republic of Rwanda 2004c: 27). This official stance was predicated by experiences in Kibungo prior to 2004 when the equitable sharing of land became a prominent goal for rural development. In other words, the GoR hopes to replicate the successes seen in Kibungo during the early years of Vision 2020 in other parts of the country.

Land disputes have been a persistent problem in Kibungo since the adoption of Vision 2020. Musahara (2006) conducted a study and determined that lack of formal land ownership was not the only problem facing the people in Kibungo. The main cause of disputes was land sharing (37%), conflicts over grazing land (8%), family disputes (19%), land grabbing (29%), problems with local leadership (5%), and finally problems with the national government (1%) (Musahara 2006: 12). When studying rural development, one must keep in mind that land is an asset, much as financial capital is an asset in more developed countries. Land reform can have the same social and psychological impact on the rural poor as financial reform has on bankers and investors in the developed world. Land assets are also necessary for credit and profit maximization; in addition to providing food land is needed to pull households out of poverty via modern credit and banking mechanisms. Land tenure, thus, translates into economic diversification.

When disputes arise, a group of mediators known as *Abunzi* step in to facilitate discussions between citizens and government officials. Adopted in 2006, these mediation committees were another aspect of the VUP that re-structured Vision 2020 to focus specifically on the sector. Like the concepts of *imidugudu*, *imihigo*, and *ududehe*, the *Abunzi* committees are references to pre-colonial traditions of local responsibility and cooperation (Rwanda Governance Board; Mutisi 2013). In this sense, the *Abunzi* are another link in the chain of decentralization in that minor civil and criminal disputes are adjudicated by local authorities who are in direct contact with the people on a regular basis, thereby ensuring local legitimacy when resolving disputes.

Conclusion

Comparatively speaking, Kibungo began the process of rural reform under more favorable conditions compared to other regions in Rwanda. Being the first to experience villagization after 1994, land disputes that led to violence in other regions were greatly minimized. Kibungo also has the advantage of being a market and educational center for the Eastern Province which has brought additional revenue into the community. These conditions offer opportunities to people that are absent elsewhere: Students have access to education that prepares them for non-farm employment and many rural farmers now have markets in close proximity to their homes to sell their goods.

Kibungo also provides insights into the limitations of rapid reform. The high turnover rate among elected and appointed officials indicates there is limited tolerance for failure from the state. The six officials interviewed for this project seemed reluctant to criticize policies overtly, but did indicate that areas such as education and infrastructure were making their jobs more

difficult, by putting them at risk for not meeting the goals of the *imihigo* contracts they had signed with President Kagame.

The lesson learned from Kibungo is that economic development is being driven by the goals of Vision 2020, and it seems to be successful. However, this economic development has yet to translate into truly participatory institutions where the rural poor have a true voice to express their dissatisfaction over certain policies. There is a significant amount of discontent and mistrust among the rural poor, not only towards officials but each other as well. How is this discontent expressed? That is the question that will guide future field research, but one that must be answered sooner than later if the reforms that have occurred since 2000 are to be sustainable.

Chapter Seven: Conclusions: Pro-poor development in a post-conflict state

Summary of Dissertation

Post-genocide development in Rwanda is predicated on the realities of ethnic fragmentation and authoritarian governance that guides policy development. The operationalization of these policies is dependent on local authorities whose positions are tied to the success and failure of implementation in the context of extreme poverty and post-conflict divisionism that continues to impact rural Rwandans. I set out to study the implementation of public policy in a post-conflict country; what I discovered was that the process of developing and operationalizing public policy reflects the *raison d'état* of the Kagame regime and state authority as much as a plan for poverty reduction. At the same time, it is apparent that progress is being made in Rwanda and much of it is attributed to the strong state that has been intentionally designed by Kagame to both facilitate development and keeping the RPF in control of the country.

The literature on rural development argues that under conditions of land scarcity and food insecurity people may resort to violence to acquire what they need to survive (Homer-Dixon (1994); Collier (2000)). I have relied on Michel Foucault's concept of biopower to frame the analysis of implementation in Rwanda because the *raison d'etat* is defined by a history of divisionism, genocide, and authoritarian politics. Coupled with the global agenda for poverty reduction and the emphasis on pro-poor growth, Rwanda has used rural public policy to rationalize authoritarian governance. When dealing with poverty reduction in agrarian societies, the issue is one of how the state uses its authority to maintain political control over marginalized peoples.

Chapter three argued that implementation is difficult under the best of conditions, but when extreme poverty is a persistent problem administrators must structure policies in ways that account for limited infrastructure, land, and capacity to carry out reforms. Rwanda exhibits the added complications of high population density and a society still recovering from civil war. These factors have shaped the way in which the GoR has identified problems and solutions by understanding society as one of victims and killers. Explicitly, this has led to policies that treat everyone as entitled to access to formal land rights and markets. Implicitly, however, the state has used the country's history to justify strong-handed approaches to development that curtail political rights in favor of economic development. Villagization is an example of a national policy that deprives people of a fundamental right to decide where they reside. This policy in particular is illustrative of Foucault's idea of ordering populations in a manner that allows the state to both maintain stability while ensuring acquiescence to the regime. It also makes the population legible, a crucial factor when developing policy.

Chapter four described the decentralized administrative structure that supports implementation. Officially, decentralization encourages accountability and reduces incidences of corruption by making local officials accountable to both the national government and their constituents. Like villagization, though, decentralization creates a direct link between the RPF and the residents of *imidugudu* and allows the GoR to control political activity in each village. In practice Rwanda has a deconcentrated system where local administrators and elected officials are accountable to the RPF, even though they are not necessarily hand-selected by the RPF. Supporting documents such as the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (SPAT) and the National Agriculture Policy (NAP) are examples of formal declarations of development that are agreeable to the World Bank and the United States, both of which provide significant aid

to Rwanda. The GoR has not deviated from the original intent of Vision 2020, but has adopted new policies such as *Vision 2020: Umurenge* that prioritize Sector and District level policy implementation. *Imihigo* contracts are another example of strengthening accountability between Kagame and local officials. These contracts are now being signed between residents and cell leaders to further strengthen the relationship between citizens and government. Elected officials are in a position where they must balance demands from the state and the desires of their constituents, but often defer to their obligations to Kagame and the RPF at the expense of constituents.

Chapter five outlined the details of rural development and identified the priorities for national and local administrators essential to the operationalization of Vision 2020. Public policy is developed at the national level and is expected to be implemented with only minor adjustments. As was argued in previous chapters, Vision 2020 has not changed in terms of its original intent, suggesting the GoR has already decided what needs to occur over the course of twenty years to bring the majority of Rwandans out of poverty. It is then up to local administrators and residents to operationalize these plans regardless of whether those most directly impacted agree with these goals or not.

Chapter six provided a specific case study of a region that had experienced less violence during the genocide, had been the first to re-integrate refugees, and has long been considered a thriving market center because of its banana production and agricultural schools that trained agronomists and technicians. Kibungo was selected because, compared to the rest of the country, it was in the best economic, social and geographical position to achieve the goals laid out in Vision 2020. As argued, though, while Kibungo may be best able to accommodate villagization and commercialization, policy development is not determined by popular consensus

but by local and national authorities. Kibungo would be an ideal location to return in 2020 to determine whether development has led to more political participation as it has a history of stability and cooperation between various groups, including Hutu and Tutsi as well as between the people and local government.

The politics of development in Rwanda: 2000 - 2013

Since 2011, there have been a number of changes, both positive and negative, in Rwanda that could impact Vision 2020. First, since 1994 Paul Kagame has governed Rwanda, ignoring international criticism of his political style. Official policy has been framed within the context of post-genocide development and criticisms of his governing style are met with reference to the world's complacency during 1994 when a million people were killed during 100 days of killing. The need to move forward from the divisiveness that has defined much of the country's post-colonial history has driven policy development and implementation since 2000. Kagame is notorious for suppressing political dissent and marginalizing political opposition parties, despite being lauded by the international community as a strong leader who is overseeing many positive changes in his tiny country. In recent years criticisms have become more direct. In 2012 the United Nations submitted a report which provided evidence that the Rwanda Patriotic Front was supporting the M23 rebel group operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.¹¹ Soon after the European Union suspended its foreign aid to Rwanda and the United States withheld aid in 2012; reducing the Rwandan government's budget by 50% and resulted in increased unemployment in sectors dependent on state funding.

¹¹ The M23 was a group of Congolese Tutsi operating near the city of Goma, DRC. The UN found evidence that members had received training in Rwanda and had several bases on Rwanda soil from which they used to regroup and launch attacks against the Congolese army (the FARDC) just over the border.

Secondly, the District Development Plans (DDPs) and Community Development Funds (CDFs) remain dependent on government revenue; international sanctions therefore have a detrimental effect on Vision 2020 policy implementation. The budget issues reveal another aspect of public policy in Rwanda today: Kagame and the RPF have been influenced as much by regional and international factors as well as by domestic ones. The RPF has always engaged in regional politics, and has regularly carried out military operations in neighboring DRC. As recently as 2014, Kagame continues to face accusations of supporting rebel groups as it continues to clash with Congolese government troops in North Kivu; this after a ceasefire was brokered in 2013. The DRC conflict has its roots in the Rwandan genocide, but recent instability has been due, in large part, to external interference, e.g. by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, as they seek to influence the Congolese crises in their favor by ensuring access to the country's resources and bring about a regime change in the Congolese government. In this complex scenario of regional conflict, the RPF must balance plans for development - which are heavily reliant on foreign aid and investment - with regional interests that evoke the ire of the same international actors financing Vision 2020.

If local civil, social and economic concerns are not addressed then violence related to land scarcity, local political grievance, and unequal access to food and agriculture by 2020 will continue; conditions that were in place prior to the genocide and drove much of the violence in the period 1990 – 1994. At the same time the GoR seems determined to remain militarily engaged in the DRC, thus driving away the international financial support for Vision 2020. If this financial support is absent, then local conditions will deteriorate and the gains made since 2000 will be eradicated and the people who have been told to expect middle-income livelihoods

will likely revolt. This is a dangerous scenario in a country still struggling to bring justice to victims and perpetrators of the genocide.

A third recent development is that the RPF remains in firm control after the September 16, 2013 parliamentary elections. The results benefit the RPF in two ways in particular: Rwanda continues to have the highest percentage of female legislative representatives (64%) in the world, giving Rwanda an image of gender equality that is attractive to many NGOs and activists that have traditionally been critical of the GoR. Secondly, the election has given Kagame the support he needs to finish his constitutionally mandated “final” term in office set, to expire in 2017. The political control exerted by the RPF is driving Vision 2020, but once that party is out of power, it is unlikely there will be a strong political consensus to complete implementation after 2017. It is also questionable whether Vision 2020 will continue to be implemented in the way it has over the past 13 years, relying on local administrators loyal to the RPF for their positions and funding. There is a lack of political opposition to criticize Vision 2020 at this time, but if that were to change then it could stall implementation as various political parties debated the best approaches for implementation. Finally, the rural poor have been led to expect dramatic improvements in their lives by 2020. If their expectations are not met, it is not inconceivable there would be considerable political unrest; driving the country into another civil war. To paraphrase a Congolese man I met in 2011, Rwandans are being told their country will look like New York City by 2020, but what will happen if it doesn't?

Competing expectations of the state and the rural poor

The discourse coming from the state is one of development and prosperity, promising a better future for those who work hard by abiding by the directives of cell, sector, and district

leaders. During any given week one can browse the newspapers and official web sites, and read about high-profile Rwandan officials visiting rural farmers, heaping praise on them for their integration into a modern system of commercialization, villagization, and economic activity. These events are meant to bring attention to particular individuals in the hopes that others will follow suit. According to national and local officials, Vision 2020 is an excellent idea aside from a few glitches; it is generally considered to be on track to being completed on time. Once the rural poor realize the benefits of living in villages, adopt new farming techniques and technologies, they become more enthusiastic about Vision 2020.

The rural poor do not have such uniform expectations. It is easy to be optimistic if you are in a high position and not wanting for food or health care. The fact remains that Rwanda has a long way to go over the next six years if it is to become a middle-income, educated country. I have focused on the policies of villagization and commercialization to illustrate the difficulties of achieving these goals. I have not elaborated on the political factors that can both help and hinder its implementation. I chose to study implementation objectively by relying on official documents and declarations produced by the GoR and intentionally avoided any inclusion of the political factors; specifically parties and elections. While local politics are important, I chose to forego an analysis of these institutions as it was difficult to ascertain the nuances of rural-urban politics in the short period of time I was in the country in 2011. A focus on Rwandan politics would have taken me away from the main emphasis; the mechanisms by which rural public policy is implemented in a post-conflict society.

During agrarian reform there are often competing “visions” when it comes to the expectations of the state and those of society. The 2004 National Land Policy mentions how pre-colonial land policy encouraged cooperation; it was not until the Hutu Revolution in 1959 that

land became a source of conflict for Rwandans. This is in line with the broader narrative in Rwanda today which prohibits casual discussions of ethnicity or genocide. Yet the GoR continues to refer to past injustices to validate contemporary policies. Pottier (2006: 525) notes the different meanings and purposes of land reform: For many farmers, having legal recourse during land disputes takes precedent over establishing formal, contractual land rights. These concerns are ultimately the same issue: legal, formalized rights that are protected by law.

Chapter three discussed the demographics and ways in which poverty and post-conflict ideology have defined Rwanda in the 21st century. There has been local resistance to policies but ultimately, whether by coercion or consensus, many rural poor have moved into *imidugudu* and are planting different crops today than they were ten years ago in some regions of the Eastern Province. Financially this approach to development makes sense as increases in production and overall national GDP have risen since 2005, but future research would focus more on the politics of this model.

Decentralization has produced a larger percentage of women holding executive positions at the Sector (9%), Cell (38%), and village (38%) administrative levels, but fewer than 10% of the District Mayoral seats are held by women. However approximately 45% of the District Council seats are held by women. These are decision-making institutions, so regardless of Mayoral seats, women are in an important position to influence district policies (AllAfrica, November 2013; National Gender Statistics Report 2013). Women make up 81% of the agricultural workforce, and since 2006 they now have strong representation in influential political and administrative institutions. Further research could focus on whether or not the presence of women in high posts translates into political reforms, or if women are simply abiding by the directives of the regime in the same manner that male officials do. A quick look at

Rwandan politics suggests the latter as political change has not accompanied socio-economic development since 2000.

The legal, social, and economic reforms enacted since 2000 have attracted the praise of both domestic and international actors including the World Bank and the United States. Rwandans recognize that the land reform and development schemes under Vision 2020 are very progressive in their design, but in practice do not address more fundamental issues such as political and social equality that concern many. Policies such as the Organic Law and Vision 2020: *Umurenge* offer good models for other countries struggling with development, but only address the economic side of poverty. Rwanda is not the first African country to justify villagization and forced resettlement as necessary for rural development, but this does not make the process any less responsible for denying the rural poor their right to decide where to live and work. If successful, this may be acceptable, but that would require that the rural poor are living much better lives in a short period of time. If Rwanda is not a middle-income country by 2020 then resettlement must be reevaluated in order to determine if its ends were merely to allow easier monitoring of political activities by framing the policy of *imidugudu* using the global development narrative of pro-poor growth and poverty reduction.

New wine in old bottles or progressive rural development?

Many of these policies were first introduced in Tanzania and Ethiopia during the 1960s and 1970s, although earlier attempts were driven by socialist and post-independence ideologies. Uganda instituted a decentralized political system in 1986 after Yoweri Museveni came into power, again establishing a model that was adopted by the GoR in 2000 (Manyak and Katano 2010; Bashaasha, et al 2011). Is Vision 2020 simply pouring new wine in old bottles, or is the

GoR sincere in its claim that it has learned from earlier failures in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda and other East African countries? As of 2011, the progress made in areas of education and health care suggest tangible results, but additional research should study the extent of the effect of villagization on these indicators. Would the progress that has been made have occurred without villagization? Could alternative policies have been adopted that would have achieved the same goals, avoiding the forced resettlement of millions of people?

Today there are several understandings of the meaning of *imidugudu*. In pre-colonial times *imidugudu* referred to a location of habitation, hence the reason the GoR typically uses this term in official documents and speeches. It refers to traditional Rwandan social conditions and seeks to minimize the divisions wrought by the civil war. But *imidugudu* has more recently come to connote an administrative unit under the Decentralization Act adopted in 2006. In this usage, the concept of *imidugudu* is more of a political unit than a location of habitation. *Imidugudu* are villages established by the government; they are therefore explicitly political in nature regardless of the context in which the term is applied. Taken up by a number of scholars in recent years (Ansoms 2007 and 2013; Pottier 2006), this issue is guiding my own research into relationships between food, land security and forced resettlement.

Nyerere in Tanzania, Mengistu and the current regime in Ethiopia, Museveni in Uganda, and the current scheme of land redistribution in Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe are all examples of using forced relocation to achieve national goals. Villagization is not new as it was a key policy for Julius Nyerere's plans for a socialist-based political and economic system in the 1960s and 1970s. The GoR has noted that *imidugudu* pre-dates the colonial era, and supports cooperation within rural communities, something that resonates with a society of survivors and accused killers trying to move forward together. The justification for villagization in Rwanda

was born of the immediate post-genocide era, to the extent that refugees flowing in and out of the country made it difficult to re-establish order. The *imidugudu* plan after 1994 was designed to provide basic services to the dispersed population while establishing governmental control throughout the countryside. The policy after 2000 is a bit more ambiguous as it is aimed at economic development while also ensuring political accountability to the RPF regime. Certainly success has been attained in some areas, but there have been no accompanying political reforms that would indicate significant participation in policy development.

The RPF is not a government that tolerates political opposition, especially over issues as important as access to land. By formalizing land tenure, the GoR is forcing some to relinquish land they claim as their own and transition into wage employment. This is further evidence that the rural poor may have little or no choice when it comes to resettlement and choosing occupations. A study of the politics of land reform would involve a closer look at how land is allocated and whether land reform is a political tool to reward compliance or punish dissent in the countryside.

Agricultural commercialization is directly related to the policy of villagization because it has involved large scale land reforms that have resulted in the resettlement of a large number of the rural poor, often through coercion. To address the logistical and political difficulties of implementing the policies of villagization and commercialization, the GoR adopted the Decentralization Act of 2001 which is intended to decentralize the process of reform and allow local populations and officials to take control of the implementation of these policies.

According to a 2013 report, 42% of the population now has access to safe drinking water (National Gender Statistics Report 2013: 38); some 45% of Rwandans report owning a mobile phone, yet another contemporary indicator for development as mobile technologies are used for

everything from communication to money transfers to updated commodity prices (43). Safe drinking water was an early priority of Visions 2020 and cell phone usage is suggestive of an increase in disposable income that may be used for items other than food and other basic necessities. Along with cell phone technology are the technicians and developers who maintain both the physical and software infrastructure needed for the network, thus moving people away from agriculture and into information, communications, and technology (ICT) fields to meet new demands.

The GoR is determined to avoid the pitfalls of past attempts at modernization, and reevaluates key policies as needed. Vision 2020: *Umurenge* (VUP) is an example of this, adopted in 2007, targeting pro-poor growth at the Sector (*Umurenge*) level. The VUP sought to address some of the short-comings of the initial Vision 2020 plan by streamlining the implementation of key policies in each Sector throughout Rwanda, e.g. by ensuring the rural poor had access to land via a system of formal land rights.

Land disputes often occur between individuals and communities who claim to have rights based on their status as either “old caseload” or “new caseload” refugees. The GoR has been implementing fair, equitable land reform within the context of this volatile situation. Land reform since 2000 has targeted poverty reduction while ensuring equality and mutual support programs among the rural areas. One strategy has been to reduce reliance on agriculture by creating non-farm employment opportunities. Mechanization and education are two ways this is being achieved. By mechanizing the countryside, not only is there an opportunity for an increase in crop yields but, like with the ICT sector, there will be a demand for mechanics and others who can keep the machines running. This will reduce the number of people dependent on farming and also encourage more to stay in school to learn new, more modern skills.

Summary of findings

Rwanda has made strides in reducing poverty through the commercialization of agriculture, but remains an impoverished country. After all of the money and effort that has gone into realizing Vision 2020, the GoR will be held accountable by its citizens and the international community. Rwandans want to believe in Vision 2020 to the point that all hardships associated with resettlement and suppression of political rights are worth the effort. There is evidence of progress: the increase in school enrollment and mechanization, access to safe drinking water and health care, and the improving status of women were key goals of Vision 2020 when it was adopted in 2000. But at the halfway mark it is unlikely Rwanda will be a middle income country by 2020 where the majority of citizens are earning \$1200 a year.

Rwanda is nonetheless considered to be a rare success story in Africa, as judged by western governments and international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. Much of that success is attributed to the plans and vision of Paul Kagame; even though critics argue his approach has been detrimental to democratic political development. For Kagame and the RPF, political democratization is an afterthought in the broader context of long term stability and economic development. The perspective of these elites seems to be one that is comfortable with authoritarian means to achieve the ends outlined in Vision 2020. Authoritarian regimes can be effective in guiding economic development, but eventually demands for political democratization lead to regime change. While short-term economic gains may appease the people and international observers, it is likely calls for political reform will be heard sooner than later.

Questions and considerations for future research

Many rural dwellers have multiple sources of income, so studying agricultural commercialization alone does not capture the full breadth of livelihoods and development in Rwanda. Agricultural commercialization is only one aspect of a larger system of rural employment and livelihood. Farming patterns are determined in large part by seasonal and crop variations, suggesting individuals will find other sources of income during the off-seasons. It would be interesting, and relevant, to determine the amount and type of revenue generated during these periods compared to harvest and planting seasons. By focusing on commercialization, factors such as off-farm opportunities are lost in the analysis. I am thinking specifically of jobs such as contingent or daily laborers, mechanics, retail operations, and transportation.

A relatively new topic of research involves using geographic information systems (GIS) to map socioeconomic trends, providing a quantitative analysis of whether or not villagization and commercialization are related. This method has been used in Somalia, for example, to track trends in famine and violence in arguing the relationship between food scarcity and conflict. The same methods could be used to provide a better understanding of how villagization contributes to development in Rwanda. An important study would be the variation in *imidugudu* vs. non-*imidugudu* residents when it comes to increased wages, food security, and access to health and education by measuring livelihoods based on the distance a family lives from the nearest *imidugudu*. Not only would this indicate whether or not *imidugudu* residents are better off than non-*imidugudu* residents, it could provide a better understanding of socioeconomic status in a country of government-mandated communities. The hypothesis is that those living in *imidugudu* are better off due to the fact they have acquiesced to state policy while those not living in *imidugudu* continue to struggle due to their resistance to villagization and land reform policies.

The GoR has been justifying policies such as forced resettlement by relying on the rhetoric of global development, specifically the need to modernize agriculture and create off-farm employment opportunities. This has so far gone over well with the international community as Rwanda continues to be viewed as a success story in Africa. At the same time, the political system is not open to any real, substantive criticism of these policies and this too is justified by referencing the genocide and the need to maintain order and harmony. The economic growth that Rwanda has experienced seems to be organized and effective but it has been accomplished by exploiting the reliance the people have on land and agriculture. Foucault's concept of biopower and the way a state manages its population is alive and well in Rwanda today. The state has ensured the people are reliant on it by controlling the distribution of resources through a decentralized system predicated on rewards and deprivation for everyone from the District officials to the individual residents of each *imidugudu*. It is difficult to distinguish between policies as pro-poor growth and the political priorities of a regime intent on maintaining control over political institutions.

Appendix 1: Interview Questionnaires

District, Sector and Cell questions

- 1) What are your thoughts about Vision 2020 as a framework for development?
- 2) What are three (3) issues that have been resolved or addressed since 2000 that have had the most positive effect on the people of Rwanda?
- 3) What are three (3) issues that still need to be addressed in Rwanda by 2020 that are being overlooked or under emphasized as of 2011?
- 4) What is Rwanda doing differently in terms of development that is unique to the African continent?
- 5) What are three (3) of the most important and immediate difficulties facing the people of Kibungo?
- 6) How well do the rural poor understand their rights when it comes to land and agricultural policies? Are the people of Kibungo familiar with the Organic Law?
- 7) Do the rural poor understand the need for resettlement? Do they understand the reasoning behind the policy?
- 8) What is the compensation for land expropriation? How are the people in Kibungo compensated if their land is expropriated for *umudugudu*?
- 9) Is there compensation for those being resettled but who have no land?
- 10) How do District Development Plans (DDP's) prioritize the needs of the rural poor?
- 11) What is the Ubudehe Process? How has this been implemented in Kibungo?
- 12) Why has the population in Kibungo increased since 2002? (i.e. Lower mortality rates? Population movements into Kibungo? Increase in non-ag economic activity?)
- 13) How is this population growth affecting the *umudugudu* policy?
- 14) What is going on in Kibungo that is not seen elsewhere in Rwanda? (mechanized agriculture?, extensive commercialization? new agricultural techniques and technologies? number of residents in *umudugudu*?)
- 15) Would you like to make any additional comments or mention anything we have not addressed?

National Land Bureau questions

- 1) What are your thoughts about Vision 2020 as a framework for development?
- 2) What are three (3) issues that have been resolved or addressed since 2000 that have had the most positive effect on the people of Rwanda?
- 3) What are three (3) issues that still need to be addressed in Rwanda by 2020 that are being overlooked or under emphasized as of 2011?
- 4) What is Rwanda doing differently in terms of development that is unique to the African continent?
- 5) What are three (3) of the most important and immediate difficulties facing the people of Kibungo?
- 6) How well do the rural poor understand their rights when it comes to land and agricultural policies? Are the people of Kibungo familiar with the Organic Law?
- 7) Do the rural poor understand the need for resettlement? Do they understand the reasoning behind the policy?
- 8) What is the compensation for land expropriation? How are the people in Kibungo compensated if their land is expropriated for *umudugudu*?
- 9) Is there compensation for those being resettled but who have no land?
- 10) How do District Development Plans (DDP's) prioritize the needs of the rural poor?
- 11) What is the Ubudehe Process? How has this been implemented in Kibungo?
- 12) Why has the population in Kibungo increased since 2002? (i.e. Lower mortality rates? Population movements into Kibungo? Increase in non-ag economic activity?)
- 13) How is this population growth affecting the *umudugudu* policy?
- 14) What is going on in Kibungo that is not seen elsewhere in Rwanda? (mechanized agriculture?, extensive commercialization? new agricultural techniques and technologies? number of residents in *umudugudu*?)
- 15) Would you like to make any additional comments or mention anything we have not addressed?

Annie Kairaba (Rwanda Institute for Sustainable Development)

- 1) What are your thoughts about Vision 2020 as a framework for development?
- 2) What are three (3) issues that have been resolved or addressed since 2000 that have had the most positive effect on the people of Rwanda?
- 3) What are three (3) issues that still need to be addressed in Rwanda by 2020 that are being overlooked or under emphasized as of 2011?
- 4) What is Rwanda doing differently in terms of development that is unique to the African continent?
- 5) Where is RISD involved (Districts?, Provinces, Cells, Sectors, etc..)?
- 6) When is land expropriation necessary?
- 7) How are people selected for relocation? What are the criteria for relocation?
- 8) How well do the affected people understand land laws and their personal role in the policies?
- 9) How are locations for *imidugudu* chosen? What are the criteria for sites?
- 10) How is compensation determined for those being relocated and land expropriation?
- 11) How involved are local officials in the process of determining relocation and expropriation? Please explain.
- 12) Are residents consulted prior to being relocated or having land expropriated? Please explain.
- 13) Is corruption present in the process of expropriation, relocation, and compensation?
- 14) Explain the relationship between RISD and Farmers Cooperatives. Specifically, CYEVIDEVECOOP
What role does RISD play in establishing coops?
- 15) Have coops been successful in contributing to / supporting the commercialization of agriculture? Please explain.
- 16) What projects is RISD currently involved with? Any projects of note?
- 17) Additional comments or thoughts?

Shirley Randell (Kigali Institute of Education)

- 1) What are your thoughts about Vision 2020 as a framework for development?
- 2) What are three (3) issues that have been resolved or addressed since 2000 that have had the biggest positive effect on the people of Rwanda?
- 3) What are three (3) issues that still need to be addressed in Rwanda by 2020 that are being overlooked or under emphasized as of 2011?
- 4) What is Rwanda doing differently in terms of development that is unique to the African continent?
- 5) Is Shirley Randell International involved with rural issues in Rwanda? Please Explain.
- 6) How are women affected by villagization and agricultural commercialization?
- 7) How do women benefit from these reforms in the immediate future? Long term?
- 8) What are the trends of employment for women living in imidugudu? (i.e. what are the primary employment opportunities available to women in imidugudu? Are women entering into the formal market more so than prior to 2000?)
- 9) Has the Organic Land Law had a positive effect on ensuring access to land for women? Please explain.
- 10) Are women benefitting from the strategies outlined in Vision 2020? Why or why not?
- 11) What impact do you think Vision 2020 has had on the people of Rwanda since 2000?
- 12) Are rates of child birth on track to be at 4 per woman by 2020? Why or why not?
- 13) In your opinion, how does Rwanda's approach to addressing gender equality and rights reflect its perspective on development?
- 14) Additional Comments? Thoughts? Which of my questions do you consider the most important?

Patrick Birasa (Vision Fund International)

- 1) How are 'individual rural farmers' defined?
- 2) What percentage of recipients are women?
- 3) What are the loans used for?
- 4) How is it determined who receives the loans?
What are the qualifications?
- 5) What is the smallest and largest coops receiving this product?
- 6) How do you determine which coops receive the product?
What is the process of determining eligibility?
What is the application process?
- 7) How are these loans used by the coops?
- 8) Are the loans distributed to individual members, or is the money kept in a community fund with the cooperative?
- 9) What kind of equipment? (Mechanized, hand tools, etc...??)
Where does the equipment come from?
What is the application process?
How do you determine who is eligible for micro-leasing?
Who is responsible for the maintenance of this equipment?
- 10) What is considered an 'emergency' situation?
How can these loans be used? Are there restrictions?
- 11) How has this worked out?
Does this approach improve personal responsibility and repayment rates?
How? Why?
- 12) Do you operate throughout the entire country or do you target specific regions?
Why these regions?
- 13) How do you measure success?
- 14) How are you funded?
- 15) Do loans compliment government programs or are they independent and privatized?
- 16) Overall, what percentage of recipients of each loan are women?

INATEK Questions

- 1) What are your thoughts about Vision 2020 as a framework for development?
- 2) What are three (3) issues that have been resolved or addressed since 2000 that have had the most positive effect on the people of Rwanda?
- 3) What are three (3) issues that still need to be addressed in Rwanda by 2020 that are being overlooked or under emphasized as of 2011?
- 4) What is Rwanda doing differently in terms of development that is unique to the African continent?
- 5) To what extent are the people of Kibungo aware of Vision 2020?
- 6) What is *umudugudu* and why is it being implemented in Kibungo?
- 7) Has villagization been successful in Kibungo?
- 8) How do you define “success” in regards to villagization?
- 9) How many *umudugudu* are present in Kibungo?
- 10) How has *umudugudu* contributed to / supported Vision 2020 in Kibungo?
- 11) How has *umudugudu* contributed to the commercialization of agriculture in Kibungo?
- 12) What does the ‘commercialization of agriculture’ mean in Kibungo?
- 13) Has agriculture been commercialized in Kibungo? If so, to what extent?
- 14) How do you define “success” in regards to commercialization?
Has agricultural commercialization been successful in Kibungo?
- 15) What is going on in Kibungo in regards to development that is not seen elsewhere in Rwanda?
- 16) What are the staple crops in Kibungo?
- 17) What are the main agricultural activities in Kibungo and the Eastern Province?
- 18) How many farmers cooperatives are operating in Kibungo?
In the Eastern Province?
- 19) Where do your students come from? Kibungo? Eastern Province? Rwanda? Uganda? Burundi? Tanzania?

- 20) What can you tell me about the various projects that are going on through INATEK?
- 21) How has the Integrated Watershed Management System Project (IWMS) been implemented?
- 22) Who is responsible for its implementation?
- 23) How successful has it been?
- 24) What is Participatory Rural Approval?
- 25) What is a Community Action Plan?
- 26) How do these contribute to the implementation to the IWMS?
- 27) Where does the funding for projects come from?
- 28) What role do local people play in the implementation of these projects?
- 29) Has agricultural production increased by 15%? Is it on track to do so?
- 30) Has soil erosion been controlled?
- 31) How has sericulture been promoted?
- 32) Is it considered successful?

National Land Center Questions

- 1) What does NLC do?
- 2) How is the NLC registering land?
- 3) Why do people choose to register their land? What are the benefits of and registration?
- 4) What is land consolidation?
- 5) Who determines what crops to plant?
- 6) What is Ubudehe? How does it contribute to / relate to decentralization?

National Institute of Statistics (Notes that guided an informal interview)

- 1) Looking for trends over the past 10 years
- 2) Does the data suggest the policies are successful? Why or why not?
- 3) Location of Imidugudu
- 4) Population and demographics of imidugudu
- 5) Location of non-imidugudu in relation to imidugudu
- 6) Location, activity and demographics of cooperatives
- 7) Commercialization: Consumption market, and longitudinal trends
- 8) On average, how far are the nearest health services from the *imidugudu*?
- 9) On average, how far are sources of clean water to *imidugudu*?
- 10) On average, how close are the fields / crops to *imidugudu*?
- 11) Has there been an increase in the mechanization of agriculture in this area?
- 12) How are villagization / *imidugudu* sites chosen / determined?

Appendix 2: Request for Research Permit letter

To: Dominique HABIMANA
Director, Statistical Methods, Research and Publication Unit
National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda

I will be in Rwanda between June 7, 2011 and July 14, 2011 conducting field research for my Doctoral Dissertation. I am submitting this letter to request a Research Permit allowing me to conduct interviews and collect data in Kigali City and Kibungo. The focus of my research is on the policies of *umudugudu* and agricultural commercialization and I will be traveling to Rwanda to learn more about the methods by which these policies are being implemented as well as how they are contributing to long-term economic development.

I will be conducting interviews with officials at the District, Sector, and Cell levels of government as well as citizens living in *umudugudu*. My intention for these interviews is to learn more about *umudugudu* and commercialization by contacting those officials who are directly involved with the implementation of these policies. In addition to meeting with government officials, I anticipate interviewing residents of rural *umudugudu* in order to gain a better perspective of how the policies are affecting the lives of the rural population. As of this time, I have not arranged to interview any specific government officials or residents of *umudugudu*. However, I am anticipating such opportunities upon my arrival which is why I am writing to you and requesting a research permit.

I will also be collecting data regarding the location and demographics of *umudugudu*. I will be collecting this data for the District, Sector, Cell, and *imidugudu* administrative units. I am looking for trends in the distribution and location of *imidugudu* in order to understand how and why the locations of *umudugudu* are chosen and how *umudugudu* contribute to the development and commercialization of the agricultural sector. My hope is to gather this information from the National Institute of Statistics in Kigali as I have been told this office has this data.

I have chosen to travel to Kibungo for several reasons. Firstly, it is one of the original locations where *umudugudu* were built and I am interested in learning how the villages have been administered and maintained since they were established. Second, I have been able to establish contacts at the Institute of Agriculture, Technology, and Education at Kibungo (INATEK) and I am aware that the University is involved in rural development projects. I would like to learn more about the role the institute has in facilitating agrarian development in and around Kibungo.

As mentioned above, this research is being used for the completion of my Doctoral Dissertation so there is a possibility that the results will be published at some point in the future. My goal is to publish the results in academic journals or as chapters in an edited book. The research in Rwanda will be contributing to a larger project I am interested in initiating that will be looking at trends of rural development in the 21st Century. I feel that the reforms which have been taking place in Rwanda since 2000 are indicative of broader trends in agrarian reform in other parts of Africa and will offer an excellent study of approaches to development in the 21st Century.

I want to thank you for considering my request for the research permit and I look forward to working with your office as I go about collecting my data once I arrive in Rwanda. Please contact me regarding any additional information or clarification.

Sincerely,

Sterling Recker
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Appendix 3: Assistant Contract

Herein is an agreement between Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA and Mr. Sterling Recker, effective June 16th, 2011 through July 6, 2011. The contract outlines a mutual agreement in regards to Mr. UWIZEYIMANA's assistance¹² with:

Assisting Mr. Recker upon his initial arrival in Kibungo. Including:

- 1a) Assistance in interpretation (If needed) upon Mr. Recker's arrival at the Centre Saint Joseph on June 16, 2011
- 1b) Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA's willingness to answer questions and provide general assistance in regards to: traveling in and around Kibungo, and any general questions Mr. Recker may have regarding staying in Kibungo upon arrival

Introducing¹³ Mr. Recker to:

- 2a) Staff at the University of Agriculture, Technology, and Education (referred to from here on as INATEK)
- 2b) Local officials in the Provincial, District, Cell, and Sector administrative units.

Accompanying¹⁴ Mr. Recker to initial meetings with:

- 3a) Provincial, District, Cell, and Sector officials
- 3b) Residents of umudugudu

Interpretation services for:

- 4a) Face to face interviews with local officials at the Provincial, District, Cell, and Sector levels of government
- 4b) For evaluating documents that may be acquired during the course of the field research

In return for the above services, Mr. Sterling Recker, by signing this contract, agrees to the following:

Payment will be made for: a total of 8 days (excluding weekends) at a rate of \$100 USD / day, for a total of \$800 payable by direct deposit into Mr. UWIZEYIMANA's bank account.

The initial \$400 will be paid on June 3, 2011 and the remaining \$400 will be paid upon Mr. Recker's return to the United States on July 18, 2011

Any days beyond the initial 8 will be paid based at the rate of \$100 a day and will be added to the \$400 deposit of July 18, 2011

The working hours of each day will be flexible but will not begin prior to 6:00 a.m. and will conclude prior to 4:00 p.m.

Mr. Recker acknowledges that Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA will not be under contract on Saturday and Sunday. Mr. Recker reserves the right to request assistance on these days if necessary but Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA is under no obligation, per the terms of this agreement, to assist on these days. If Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA does elect to assist, he will be paid the established rate of \$100 per day and any additional assistance will be paid for on July 18, 2011 through a direct deposit to Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA's bank account.

¹² "Assistance" refers to: interpretation services when needed during established hours outlined in contract, comments regarding the way the research is being carried out, ~~transportation as outlined in above contract~~, general assistance in regards to accompanying Mr. Recker during the course of his research in Kibungo ~~in explaining and acclimating Mr. Sterling Recker to Kibungo~~.

¹³ It is acknowledged by Mr. Sterling Recker that some introductions may be difficult but that Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA will assist in any manner that is acceptable and proper for the carrying out of necessary research.

¹⁴ It is acknowledged that Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA may not be available for every meeting but that he will, in good faith, accompany Mr. Sterling Recker to initial meetings with government officials in order to facilitate proper introductions.

Mr. Sterling Recker acknowledges that Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA is familiar with the working conditions and hours of officials and Mr. Sterling Recker is willing to defer to Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA's opinions on the best times and places to meet officials.

Mr. Sterling Recker is also willing to defer to Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA's comments and suggestions pertaining to any matter in which Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA feels should be addressed or acknowledged by Mr. Sterling Recker

The Undersigned have agreed upon the above stipulations of a contract between Mr. Valentin UWIZEYIMANA and Mr. Sterling Recker:

Valentin Uwizeyimana
Valentin UWIZEYIMANA

May 25th, 2011
Date

Sterling Recker

Date

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