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Occasional Paper No. 2000-01
February, 2000

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the Rise of Feudal Democracy
in Japan?

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An earlier and expanded version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Japan Seminar,
University of Illinois-Chicago, February 11, 2000

The Decline of Bureaucrats and the Rise of Feudal Democracy in Japan?

1. Introduction.

The bureaucracy has historically influenced Asian politics and Japan is no exception. The relationship between the bureaucracy and polity is central to Japanese history and politics. Many authors have written on this relationship, but since the 1970s a wave of pluralist views dominated writing on Japanese politics (Fukui, 1977; Allinson, 1989). Pluralist's writing emerged in reaction to an earlier tradition of legalistic writing as well as the image of Japan as a monolithic elitist society caricatured as "Japan Inc." Pluralists emphasize the differentiation of bureaucracy from the polity, the fragmentation of private interests and the fluidity and processual nature of Japanese politics. Pluralist scholars are most at home examining informal individual or interactional processes (e.g. interest group struggles, negotiations, etc.) and making inferences from micro to macro levels of analysis. However, their optimism about pluralism, democracy and a meritocratic basis for political participation tends to de-focalize the structural linkages between the bureaucracy and polity (Alford and Friedland, 1985; Schwartz, 1998).

Another strand of literature has developed alongside the pluralists. This literature focuses on the Japanese State and policy and is characterized as the "managerial" or "statist" paradigm (Allison, 1971; Alford and Friedland, 1985; Schwartz, 1998). Managerial views are counter posed to explanations of Japanese politics based on cultural uniqueness, unilinear developmental models (cf. Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995) and pluralists' notion of influence as individual and fluid. Sometimes they focus on specific ministries (Okimoto, 1989; Johnson, 1982) and the internal structure of the state and its societal relations (Evans, 1995; Pempel, 1998). Thus, the home domain for the managerialist is either at the level of the Japanese State or a specific ministry of the state. The

conceptual vision of managerialists is so abstract and essentialistic that they often rely on simple correspondences, neglecting or obscuring the specific relationships between the bureaucracy and polity. Thus, for reasons internal to the paradigms, both groups of scholars tend to “de-focalize” the relationship between the bureaucracy and polity.

Although current scholarly writing may be organized around the pluralist-managerialist paradigms (Fukui, 1977; Muramatsu and Krause, 1984; Allinson, 1989; Keehn, 1990; Kerbo, 1996; Schwartz, 1998), paradigmatic distinctions often revel in questions, principles, levels of analysis and methodology to the neglect of concrete empirical demonstration of substantively important issues. Both paradigms share one central question: Is the Japanese polity ensconced in a monolithic elite power structure or is Japan a pluralistic democracy with a plurality of interest groups and mass participation? Basic to this question is the empirical examination of the relationship between the bureaucracy and polity. Differentiation and independence of the two is a necessary structural presumption of the pluralist arguments. Integration and cohesion is a necessary presumption of the managerial arguments. A critical indicator of the differentiation or integration of the bureaucracy and polity is *chii riyo*. *Chii riyo* is the movement of retiring bureaucrats into political office (Thayer, 1969; Johnson, 1974). High profile political positions into which ex-bureaucrats move include: prime ministership, cabinet membership, and the elected positions of the Lower House of the Diet.

Although pluralists and managerialists differ in their interpretations of *chii riyo*, neither provides systematic empirical foundations for their interpretations

To move beyond the presumptions held by both pluralists and managerialists, this paper examines the patterns of *chii riyo* politicians since WWII. We sketch the basic parameters of the

issues of *chii riyo*. First, we review the predominant views of *chii riyo*. Second, we discuss the changing patterns of *chii riyo*. Third, we examine the educational and family backgrounds of prime ministers, cabinet members, and Lower House Diet members.

2. Literature.

The importance of *chii riyo* resides in the question of the changing patterns of elite cohesion and fragmentation. This is not an issue of cohesion or fragmentation, but the degree and location of cohesion or fragmentation. Scholars working out of the managerial model postulate a general cohesion between bureaucratic and political elites (cf. Johnson, 1974; Scalapino, 1968). This cohesion has been expressed as “fusion” of the two (Pempel, 1998) or “corporate cohesion” of the state (Evans, 1995). Alternatively, pluralists postulate a general differentiation or cleavage between the bureaucracy and the polity. The critical question is: How much pluralism is there in contemporary Japan? The larger significance of *chii riyo* for paradigmatic debates may be understood by a brief review of the theoretical architecture of managerial and pluralist explanations.

Managerialists focus on relations between the bureaucracy and society or the industrial policy of specific ministries. They ignore specific internal relations of the state--between the bureaucracy and the polity. Instead they tend to deductively presume cohesion or a “loyalty of the rest of the state apparatus” to an autonomous bureaucracy (cf. Evans, 1995:40-41). Okimoto (1989) and Johnson (1982) are so concerned with the examination of MITI policies that they fail to turn their gaze toward the relation of MITI to the polity, much less the entire ensemble of ministries and agencies to the polity. Pempel (1998), as the exception, addresses the movement of ex-bureaucrats to the Diet but provides only anecdotal evidence concerning the LDP. He simply mentions that

“retired bureaucrats (*chii riyo*) did poorly in the 1996 Lower House elections . . .” (Pempel, 1998: 141) as evidence of the breaking of LDP power in the mid-1990s. However, Pempel points to the election results as evidence of the weakness of the LDP and does not implicate the election results in terms of the cohesion between the bureaucracy and LDP. In addition, he cites only one election out of the context of the historical pattern. Our research indicates that his characterization of the 1996 election is at best misleading (discussed below) and those *chii riyo* representatives in the Diet were stable throughout the 1990s.

Pluralist interpretations of Japanese politics have been on the ascendancy since the 1970s in Japan and the 1980s in the United States (Fukui, 1977; Allinson, 1989). Pluralists provide evidence that Japanese politics is not dominated by a small group of elites (bureaucrats or politicians). Rather, they view the central government as an arena of contested political power (Allinson, 1989; Schwartz, 1998). In addition, they show that political decisions involve a wide range of elites and non-elites.

Allinson (1993) exemplifies the optimism of the fully developed pluralist argument by presuming the emergence of fragmented sectionalism and subgovernments as the larger structural context with which to view the decline of *chii riyo* as evidence for a “dispersal of power.” He contends that Japan has undergone a structural transformation from the early postwar decades. This change represents “a steadily more competitive polity” in the 1980s and 1990s (Allinson, 1993: 17-49). The structural fragmentation resulted from economic expansion, and led to the financial enfranchisement of “economic citizenship” and the increasing political participation of the Japanese people. The fragmentation also resulted from an increasing number of interest groups (a surrogate for economic citizenship) which were themselves the outcome of economic expansion. Thus, *chii*

riyo politicians, in the 1950s and 1960s, dominated the prime ministership, key cabinet posts and major leadership positions in the private sector. However, according to Allinson (1993:3), the issue is the development of “skills and talent” where by the 1970s ex-bureaucrats (*chii riyo*) were almost “shut out of top positions in favor of men groomed from within.”

Allinson claims that changes in these larger patterns led to greater merit-based competition among politicians and corresponding erosion of the advantages based on career connections to the bureaucracy as in *chii riyo*. His evidence comes from the decline of *chii riyo* politicians from top political positions (prime minister and cabinet) corresponding to the rise of *zoku* politicians (policy specialists). Allinson’s pluralist optimism stems from a loose correspondence between the decline in *chii riyo* politicians, the increased recognition of *zoku* politicians, and the presumption of a corresponding increase in the merit-based recruitment and promotion within the LDP.

In sum, the literature takes the relationship between the bureaucracy and polity out of direct systematic empirical focus. The pluralists, based on their individual-level analysis, see pluralistic democracy in the rise of professional politicians operating in small group negotiation processes within an inferred context of substantial differentiation between bureaucratic and political elites and fragmentation within these institutions. Managerialist’s concern for state-society relations or the industrial policy of particular ministries leads them to ignore bureaucracy-polity relations or to deductively presume a coherent cooperative integration between the two. Managerialist’s assertions of an abstract state essence (e.g., developmental state, capitalist state, etc.) imply a coherence and unity to state structures that rarely if ever occur (Hooks, 1999). We contend that the relationship between the bureaucracy and polity is an empirical issue, not an assumption supported only with

sketchy data, anecdotes and assertions.

3. Explanations of the Changing Pattern of *Chii riyo*.

The notion of the decline of *chii riyo* has led to several alternative and somewhat complementary explanations suggesting different points of change: the rise of the *zoku* politician; generational changes in faction leaders; the increasing enforcement of the LDP seniority system; and the rise of the hereditary politician. We review the notion of the demise of *chii riyo* in more detail.

The primary pluralist interpretation of *chii riyo* politicians is that their importance has eroded because of the rise of *zoku giin* (tribe politicians). The rise of *zoku giin* has changed the balance of relations between politicians and bureaucrats since the late 1960s (Uchida, 1993; Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986; Park, 1986; Mabuchi, 1997; Richardson, 1997).

A second explanation of the decline of *chii riyo* politicians focuses on a generational change in faction leaders within the LDP. Curtis (1988:81) points out that the patron-client relationship between factional bosses and their followers became weaker in the 1980s due to a generational change in the leaders. Gone are those entrepreneurial old-line party bosses who built the factions. In the early post war period the factions were smaller and more numerous. Each faction involved the inner core of loyal followers marked by a strong *oyabun-kobun* (patron-client) relationship whereby the faction leader provided political funds and access to party posts in return for support and votes. A third factor believed to have led to the decline of *chii riyo* is the increasing importance of career time within the LDP. The bureaucracy “was the primary recruiting ground for the party leadership” between 1955-80 and there was considerable room for “the fast-track.” In the early post war period several *chii riyo* politicians were able to start political careers in their mid-40s, after a

first career in the bureaucracy and still become prime minister. Since the early 1970s, or the Tanaka Prime Ministership, the accelerated career track has almost been eliminated. There is little or no credit for time served in the bureaucracy, upper house or local political office (e.g. governorship), as had been routine practice in the earlier period. LDP party members were all required to move up the same seniority ladder (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986). Today, it takes 25-30 years of career experience in party politics to rise to the level of prime ministership. This suggests the possibility of seeking a second career in high political positions for any bureaucrat almost unlikely.

A fourth interpretation of the decline of the *chii riyo* politician involves the corresponding rise of the hereditary politician. Hereditary politician (*seshu giin*) means a politician who 'inherited' their family's wealth (*kaban*), reputation (*kanban*), and political network and social organization (*jiban*). These resources are then directly converted into election to office. Yet, technically, hereditary politicians include: adopted sons, sons-in-law; even nephews and brothers. The rise of the hereditary politician builds on the previous explanation (Uchida, 1993; Rothacher, 1993). The increasing enforcement of the seniority rules within the LDP, coupled with the decentralization of political fund raising, has contributed to the success of home grown hereditary politicians.

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the literature on the decline of *chii riyo* reveals at least three weaknesses. First, the so-called decline of *chii riyo* is based primarily on the backgrounds of prime ministers and tends to ignore cabinet and Diet members. Second, the explanations for the decline of *chii riyo* are based on correspondence with the occurrence of some other political phenomena. There is no demonstration of a causal link (cf. *zoku* and hereditary politicians). Third, the explanations appear to be constructed by working backwards from the presumed decline of *chii*

riyo to make inferences back to an event (1976 law) or presumed events (generation changes and strict enforcement of seniority in the LDP). The decline of *chii riyo* is neither demonstrated, nor are there any compelling causal explanations. We will investigate *chii riyo* patterns among prime ministers, cabinets, Diet and LDP members and the correspondence with changes in other institutional patterns to suggest some other explanations.

4. Results

To examine the notion of the demise of *chii riyo* we have assembled data at three top positions: prime ministers, cabinet posts, and the Lower House LDP memberships over selected time points since WWII. This design allows the identification of the degree of cohesion or fragmentation and to discuss the degree and location of “fusion” between the bureaucracy and polity and their implications for pluralists and managerial positions. In addition, we examine two other related features of the politician’s background: graduation from Tokyo University (Todai) and family background (hereditary politicians).

Table 1 lists the names, dates and duration in office, age at election to the prime ministership and career and family backgrounds of all post-war prime ministers. There have been 24 prime ministerships, and of those 24, nine were *chii riyo*, retired bureaucrats, representing 37.5%. These nine prime ministerships (8 prime ministers) held office for almost 28, out of the 54, years since Yoshida’s first prime ministership or over 52% of the time period covered (1946-1999). If the placement and tenure of ex-bureaucrats to the prime ministership is an indication of the cohesion of the bureaucracy and polity, then the influence of *chii riyo* politicians is significant.

However, it is the pattern of change over this period that is the issue. In the last 20 years,

since Suzuki's election in 1980, only one prime minister had a background in the bureaucracy, Kiichi Miyazawa. In contrast, between 1946 and 1980, seven ex-bureaucrats occupied eight prime ministerships, serving 320 months out of 409, or 78% of the time. From 1980 to the present, a period of 20 years, there was only one *chii riyo* prime minister, Miyazawa, serving less than 10% of the total time, 21 months. Thus, the data support the notion that *chii riyo* politicians are declining among prime ministerships.

In addition, Table 1 shows the number of years each prime minister served in the Diet before they took office and their age at the time of appointment to the prime ministership. The issue of the increasingly strict enforcement of the LDP seniority system has been argued to relate to the decline of *chii riyo*. Before Tanaka, prime ministers averaged less than 15 years experience in the Diet. From Tanaka's prime ministership, the average experience has more than doubled to thirty years. Miyazawa, the only *chii riyo* politician to become prime minister in the 1990s, left the bureaucracy at the age of 34 and then spent 38 years in the Diet before becoming prime minister at the age of 72. This changing seniority profile suggests more limited possibilities for *chii riyo* politicians to gain the prime ministership. Data in Table 1 support the notion of increasing strictness of the LDP seniority system.

The pattern of prime ministers since WWII also illustrates the importance of benefiting from coming from a political family. The LDP's enforcement of a seniority system places a premium on starting young and on the use of money and political resources. The access to existing political resources in the family (money, organization, and reputation) mitigates obstacles for new politicians. It is striking in Table 1 that almost fifty percent of the post war prime ministers came from "political

families.” Eleven of 23 prime ministers were hereditary politicians (including brothers). In the last 10 years (since 1989), five of eight prime ministers were hereditary politicians.

Overall, the data in Table 1 do not indicate the hereditary politician has squeezed out the ex-bureaucrat. Instead, the two categories overlap. Of the eight *chii riyo* prime ministers, five were hereditary politicians. This suggests that the benefits of coming from the bureaucracy were compounded with the advantages of inheriting the money, organization and reputation of family politicians. These two institutional features do not support the notion that there is any necessary inverse relationship between *chii riyo* and hereditary politicians

The examination of a third institution (educational background) may shed light on the pattern of *chii riyo* and hereditary politicians becoming prime minister. Six of the eight post-war *chii riyo* prime ministers were Todai graduates. Little however may be drawn of any pattern over time. The institutional mechanisms of Todai graduation as a dominant credential of top politicians have declined with a corresponding diversity of educational background of prime ministers. Pedigree was not the same after Tanaka.

Next we examine the pattern of *chii riyo* politicians occupying cabinet positions. Table 2 provides a summary of the cabinet posts. The Ikeda cabinet of 1963 is the peak administration for *chii riyo* representation with 11 *chii riyo* politicians out of 21 positions or 52.4% of the cabinet. Subsequently, the percentage of ex-bureaucrats declined to a low of 20% in 1998.

In addition, one might note a similar decline in the percentage of Todai graduates on the cabinets, from a high of 61.9% in 1963 to a low of 28% in 1998. This declining percentage of Todai graduates mirrors the pattern we noticed in Table 1 on the prime ministers.

In addition, Table 2 summarizes the percent of hereditary politicians in each of the cabinets we sampled. Both “second generation” and “family politician” categories represent the same pattern. In the Yoshida cabinet of 1953, only two of twenty (10%) of the cabinet members were hereditary politicians. By the Obuchi cabinet of 1998, eleven of twenty five members (44%) of the cabinet members were hereditary politicians. The four intervening cabinets indicate an incrementally increasing representation of hereditary politicians at the level of cabinet members.

Taken together, Table 2 suggests there has been a dramatic structural shift in background characteristics of cabinet members. The decline of ex-bureaucrats, along with the decline of Todai graduates, suggest that the elite Todai and ex-bureaucrat tracks into politics are on a definite decline at the level of the cabinet. At the same time, hereditary politicians are on the rise in their representation on these cabinets.

The next table compares patterns of *chii riyo*, Todai graduates and hereditary politicians for the Lower House LDP members. Table 3 shows LDP members and their background characteristics for the elections of 1953, 1967, 1972, 1983 and 1993. We supplemented our data with estimates from other sources to better identify patterns. What we see in Table 3 is not a decline in *chii riyo*. Looking down the column headed “*chii riyo*,” we see a steady percentage of ex-bureaucrats as LDP Diet members from 1953 to 1993. According to our calculations, LDP Diet members with bureaucratic backgrounds ranged from a high of 22.1 in 1993 to 18% in 1953. Though not presented here, our examination of the percentage of *chii riyo* for **all** Lower House members reflects a similar stability over time.

Turning to educational background in Table 3, the percentage of Todai graduates among

LDP members was 24.4% in 1953. In 1993, the percentage of LDP members graduating from Todai was 23%. Between these elections, the highest level of Tokyo University graduates occurred in 1967 when fully one-third of all LDP members were alumni. If we consider the entire post war period, graduates of Todai are relatively stable, but spiked up between 1967 and 1983 elections.

The last column of Table 3 represents the percentage of Lower House LDP members with backgrounds of hereditary politicians. In 1953, we see 6.4% of LDP members were hereditary politicians. In 1993, we see 39% of LDP Diet members were hereditary politicians. Between these two elections is a consistent increase over time. Other sources indicate the same pattern but suggest slightly higher percentages. Data in Table 3 indicate a high and increasing concentration of hereditary politicians from LDP members within the Lower House.

Table 4 shows the ministry of origin for LDP members for selected post-war years. From Table 3, we saw that the percentage of ex-bureaucrats is steady. Table 4 suggests that the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is the most represented. Home Ministry was by the far the largest supplier of *chii riyo* in the 1950s and 1960s. The Home Ministry was the largest ministry until GHQ broken it into several ministries. MITI and Agriculture show signs of increase over time. The patterns of increase for MOF, MITI and Agriculture contradict those who say the rise of the *zoku* politician has diminished the need for x-bureaucrat's information and technical skills (Kawakita, 1989; Mabuchi, 1997).

Table 4 also illustrates that the fusion of the bureaucracy and polity is based on only a few ministries. In the case of *chii riyo*, MOF, Home Ministry, MITI, Foreign Affairs, and Agriculture are important sources of positions. These five ministries accounted for 77% (51 of 66) of *chii riyo*

Diet politicians overall and 80% (40 or 50) for LDP Lower House members in 1993. Taking the broader view, we see that MOF, Home Affairs, MITI, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture accounted for 73% (220 of 302) of all *chii riyo* politicians in the Lower House for those selected years. The fact that only a handful of ministries produce *chii riyo* politicians illustrates the problem of managerialist discussions of the state and its relations. As Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) point out:

Indeed, it seems to me that, when you take a close look at what goes on inside what we call the 'state' you immediately annul most of the scholastic problems that scholars, armchair Marxists and other speculative sociologists, keep raising about the state.... In fact, what we encounter, concretely, is an ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields (they often take the empirical form of commissions, bureaus, and boards) within which agents and categories of agents, governmental and nongovernmental, struggle over this peculiar form of authority (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 111).

Further, Table 4 reveals an unusual overlap of the two background characteristics, particularly for MOF. Twenty of the 77 (26%) of *chii riyo* politicians out of MOF were also hereditary. This overlap of elite characteristics emanating from MOF supports the notion that elements of elite unity reside in particular ministries.

Conclusion

We found mixed support for the notion that there has been a decline in *chii riyo*. The results depend on the level of political office examined. There has been a decline in *chii riyo* in the post WWII prime ministerships and cabinet memberships. Even though over 50% of the last 54 years have had a *chii riyo* prime minister in office, there was only one ex-bureaucrat prime minister in the last 20 years. Only five (20%) of the cabinet members in 1998 were *chii riyo* politicians, down from over 50% in 1963. However, we see a stable percentage of *chii riyo* politicians for LDP Diet members

However, what is important is the relative stability of the twin credentials of *chii riyo* and Todai graduation as a percentage of LDP Lower House membership. This result contradicts authors contending there has been an elimination of *chii riyo* politicians. At the level of LDP membership *chii riyo* and Todai continue to provide cache in the political sphere. It is at this level that there is a substantial fusion of the bureaucracy and polity. Thus, in the 1970s and 1980s the previous fusion was split at the level of prime minister and cabinet member, but the fusion continued at the levels of the Lower House LDP membership.

The more dramatic finding is the significant and increasing penetration of hereditary politicians at the levels of prime minister, cabinet, and LDP Diet members (Lower House). Hereditary politicians dominate at all these levels of political office. The percentage of hereditary politicians in the cabinet has steadily risen from 10.5% in 1953 to 44% in 1998. The percent of hereditary politicians among LDP members paralleled the cabinet rise from 6.4% in 1953 to 39% in 1993.

Our analysis of *chii riyo* by the ministry of origin suggests the relative influence of the different ministries at the level of Lower House membership. Table 4 indicated that over time MOF and the Ministry of Home Affairs have had far and away the most *chii riyo* politicians in the Diet (Lower House). However, Home Affairs representatives declined, reflecting the break up of the once dominant ministry. The most recent information indicates that MOF, MITI and Agriculture look as if they may be better represented in the Diet with their ex-bureaucrats. In this sense, the operationalization of cohesion between the bureaucracy and polity rests squarely on MOF, MITI, Agriculture, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. In the specific sense of our findings, five ministries

provide the basis for claims of 'cohesion'.

At first blush the results of *chii riyo* and *Todai* graduates in the prime ministerships and cabinets appears to lend support to pluralist arguments about the declining influence of bureaucracy over the political process and an accompanying diversity of the career backgrounds of politicians. Yet, the increasing rate of hereditary politicians may represent a direct contradiction to pluralist's notions of diversity and merit. Some contend that the hereditary politician represents the feudal character of Japan. The inheritance of occupation from one's father is a tradition in Japan usually associated with physicians and Buddhist priests. Others equate the rise of hereditary politicians with a modern adaptation to the explosion in election costs. Citing a *Washington Post* article, Schwartz (1998:33) reports that the typical Lower House member spent four times as much money on the election as the average U.S. House representative. Hereditary politicians receive money, organization, and reputation from their families as an advantage to win high office. This is the opposite of pluralistic notions of equality of opportunity and merit suggested by Allinson (1993). In many ways, the rise of hereditary politicians and the stability of *chii riyo* politicians are the nightmare of pluralism, not its validation.

The pluralist concern for *chii riyo* as anathema to democratic politics, the independence of the polity and a representation of privilege (compared to merit) may find the rise of hereditary politicians the petard upon which pluralism may be hoisted. The already high and increasing percentage of hereditary politicians at the prime minister, cabinet and members of the LDP (Lower House) is a major challenge to pluralist optimism about democracy in Japan. The rise of hereditary politicians is a movement toward competition, merit and 'dispersal of power' only in the narrowest

sense of elite competition. Hereditary politicians do not represent diversity as much as they reflect money politics and the cohesion of the LDP with private sector interests.

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Table 1
Prime Ministerships since 1946, Japan*

	Year/Month/ Day	Duration (in mos)	Yrs. in pol. career	Prime Minister's name	Age**	Career background	Yrs. served In bureau.	University graduated	Family background
1	1946.5.12 - 1947.5.24	12	1	Shigeru YOSHIDA	68	Bureaucrat (MFA)	1906-1939	Tokyo	father=politician
2	1947.5.24 - 1948.3.10	10	20	Tetsu KATAYAMA	60	Politician		Tokyo	
3	1948.3.10 - 1948.10.15	7	16	Hitoshi ASHIDA	61	Bureaucrat (MFA)	1912-1932	Tokyo	father=politician
4	1948.10.15 - 1954.12.10	74	3	Shigeru YOSHIDA	61	Bureaucrat (MFA)	1906-1939	Tokyo	father=politician
5	1954.12.10 - 1955.12.23	24	39	Ichiro HATOYAMA	71	Politician		Tokyo	father=politician
6	1956.12.23 - 1957.2.25	2	9	Tanzan ISHIBASHI	72	Journalist		Waseda	
7	1957.2.25 - 1960.7.19	41	15	Nobusuke KISHI	61	Bureaucrat (MCI)***	1920-41	Tokyo	brother=E. Sato
8	1960.7.19 - 1964.11.09	52	11	Hayato IKEDA	61	Bureaucrat (MOF)	1925-47	Kyoto	
9	1964.11.9 - 1972.7.7	92	15	Eisaku SATO	63	Bureaucrat (MOR)#	1938-48	Tokyo	brother=N. Kishi
10	1972.7.7 - 1974.12.9	29	25	Kakuei TANAKA	54	Businessman		----	
11	1974.12.9 - 1976.12.24	24	37	Takeo MIKI	67	Politician		Meiji	brothers=politicians
12	1976.12.24 - 1978.12.7	24	24	Takeo FUKUDA	71	Bureaucrat (MOF)	1929-50	Tokyo	
13	1978.12.7 - 1980.6.12	18	26	Masayoshi OHIRA	68	Bureaucrat (MOF)	1936-51	Hitotsubashi	
14	1980.7.17 - 1982.11.27	46	33	Zenko SUZUKI	69	Interest group (fisheries)		Tokyo Suisan	
15	1982.11.27 - 1987.11.6	59	35	Yasuhiro NAKASONE	64	Politician##		Tokyo	
16	1987.11.6 - 1989.6.2	19	29	Noboru TAKESHITA	63	Prefectural assemblyman		Waseda	
17	1989.6.3 - 1989.8.10	2	29	Sosuke UNO	67	Politician		----	grand father=mayor
18	1989.8.10 - 1991.11.5	26	29	Toshiki KAIFU	58	Politician		Waseda	
19	1991.11.5 - 1993.8.9	21	38	Kiichi MIYAZAWA	72	Bureaucrat (MOF)	1942-52	Tokyo	father=politician
20	1993.8.9 - 1994.4.27	8	22	Morihiro HOSOKAWA	55	Politician		Sophia	
21	1994.4.28 - 1994.6.29	2	25	Tsutomu HATA	59	Politician		Seijo	father=politician
22	1994.6.30 - 1996.1.11	18	22	Tomiichi MURAYAMA	70	Politician		Meiji	
23	1996.1.11 - 1998.7.30	31	33	Ryutaro HASHIMOTO	59	Politician		Keio	father=politician
24	1998.7.30 -	12	35	Keizo OBUCHI	61	Politician		Waseda	father=politician

* 1955 is the year the Liberal Democratic Party was formed. The party captured the majority in the lower house from 1955 to 1993.

+ Years in political career = the number of years it took to become prime minister after winning the first lower house (or upper house) election.

**Age refers to the age at the beginning of prime ministership.

*** MCI= Ministry of Commerce and Industry (precursor to MITI).

Ministry of Railroad (Tetsudo sho).

Nakasone was a civil servant (Home Ministry) but left the bureaucracy in 6 years and entered politics when he was 29 years old.

Table 2
Summary of Cabinet Members by Background

Prime Minister	1953 Yoshida	1963 Ikeda	1972 Sato	1983 Nakasone	1993 Hosokawa	1998 Obuchi
Size of Cabinet (N)*	20	21	21	23	22	25
N Chii-riyo	5 (25.0%)	11 (52.4%)	7 (33.3%)	6 (26.1%)	6 (27.3%)	5 (20.0%)
N Todai graduates	9 (45.0%)	13 (61.9%)	9 (42.9%)	8 (34.8%)	7 (31.8%)	7 (28.0%)
2 nd generation	2 (10.0%)	2 (9.5%)	2 (9.5%)	5 (21.7%)	6 (27.3%)	10 (40.0%)
Family w/ politicians	2 (10.0%)	3 (14.3%)	3 (14.3%)	7 (30.4%)	6 (27.3%)	11 (44.0%)

Source: Gikai seido kenkyu kai (1995). Rekidai Kokkai Giin Meikan and Naigai Associates Inc. (1990). Japanese Statesmen.

* Number refers to cabinet members with valid data. The total number of cabinet members was: 21 in 1953, 1963 and 1972; 23 in 1983; 22 in 1993; and 25 in 1998.

Table 3
Chii-riyo, Todai Graduates and Second generation politicians
among LDP members of the Lower House for selected election years

Election Dates	Data Source	LDP N	Chii-riyo	Tokyo Univ. Graduates	2 nd	Family Generation politicians
1947.4.25	(1)	120 (Liberal party)	17 (14.2%)			
	(1)	106 (Progressive)	8 (7.5%)			
1949.1.23	(1)	261 (L. Democratic)	44 (16.8%)			
	(1)	75 (Democratic)	13 (17.3%)			
1953.4.19	(1)	237 (Liberal)	58 (24.5%)			
	(1)	76 (Progressive)	14 (18.4%)			
	(2)	283 (Lib + Prog)*	51 (18.0%)	69 (24.4%)	15 (5.3%)	18 (6.4%)
1958.5.22	(1)	298	79 (26.5%)			
1967.1.29	(2)	278	56 (20.1%)	94 (33.8%)	33 (11.9%)	52 (18.7%)
1972.12.10	(2)	282	56 (19.9%)	88 (31.2%)	51 (18.1%)	68 (24.1%)
1979.10.7		302	79 (26.2%)			
1983.12.18	(2)	236**	51 (21.6%)	72 (30.5%)	73 (30.9%)	87 (36.9%)
1986.7.6	(3)	304	70 (23.6%)	67 (22.6%)	115 (38.7%)	
	(4)	297	67 (22.6%)			133 (44.8%)
1993.7.18	(2)	226	50 (22.1%)	52 (23.0%)	83 (36.7%)	88 (39.0%)

Source: (1) - Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi (1962). *Gendai Nihon no Seito to Seiji*. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, Appendix Table 3, pp. 2-3.

(2) - Chikako Usui's calculation based on *Kokkai Benran*, 1968, 1973, 1984, 1994; and Japanese Statesman (Nichigai Associates, Inc., 1990).

(3) - Asahi Shinbun, 1986, July 8, p. 9.

(4) - Kenzo Uchida (1989). *Gendai nihon no hoshu seiji*. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, p. 162.

* There were 309 members of the Liberal and the Progressive Parties but the data were missing for 26 cases. Thus the percentages were calculated based on 283 (309 minus 26).

** There were 240 LDP members but the data were missing for 4 cases. Thus, the percentages were calculated based on 236 (240 minus 4).

Second generation (2nd generation) refers to those politicians who inherited political machineries directly from one's parents (including adoptive parents and father-in-laws). Family politician refers to those who have family politicians, including spouses, brothers and sisters, uncles, and grandfathers.

TABLE 4
Ministry of Origin for Chii Riyo: Lower House Members

Ministry of Origin	1953	1967	1973	1983	1993	Total	origin
Ministry of Finance	6 (1)*	14 (3)	17 (4)	18 (5)	22 (7)	77 (20)	.26
Home Affairs	22 (1)	16 (1)	14 (3)	7 (1)	5	64 (6)	.09
MITI	6	6	3	5 (3)	10 (1)	30 (4)	.13
Agriculture	3	6	4 (1)	5 (1)	9 (1)	27 (3)	.11
Foreign Affairs	8 (2)	4	1	4 (1)	5 (1)	22 (4)	.18
Transport	3	6	5	3	0	17	.00
Labor	0	2	3 (1)	6	1	12 (1)	.08
Posts & Telecommunication	5 (1)	1	5	0	1	12 (1)	.08
Construction	0	0	0	3	6	9	.00
Health & Welfare	0	3 (1)	0	2 (1)	3 (1)	8 (3)	.37**
Police	0	2	0	1	1	4	.00
Defense	0	1	1	1	0	3	.00
Education	1	0	0	0	1	2	.00
other ministries/agencies	2	2	4	5	2	15	.00
Total	56	63	57	60	66	302 (40)	.13

Ministry of Origin for Chii Riyo: LDP Diet Members (Lower House)

Ministry of Origin	1953	1967	1972	1983	1993	Total
Ministry of Finance	5	14	19	19	19	76
Home Affairs	24	14	14	11	6	69
Agriculture	5	5	4	5	7	26
MITI	4	7	4	4	5	24
Foreign Affairs	6	3	1	3	3	16
Transport	2	5	4	2	0	13
Labor	0	2	3	4	1	10
Post & Telecommunication	4	1	3	0	0	8
Construction	0	0	1	1	5	7
Health & Welfare	0	3	1	1	2	7
Defense	0	1	1	0	0	2
Police	0	0	0	1	1	2
Education	1	0	0	0	0	1
other ministries/agencies	0	1	1	0	1	3
Total	51	56	56	51	50	264

Source: Kokkai Binran 1973, 1983, and 1993. Tabulations are done by the authors of the paper.

* Numbers in parentheses refer to hereditary politicians (second or third generation politicians).

** Numbers are too small to draw any substantial interpretation.