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AN ANALYSIS OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN  
ARMS TRANSFERS AND SUBSEQUENT  
MILITARY INTERVENTION

by

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An Analysis of the Linkage Between  
Arms Transfers and Subsequent Military Intervention\*

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An Analysis of the Linkage Between  
Arms Transfers and Subsequent Military Intervention

Introduction and Hypotheses

Two basic arguments have emerged concerning the relationship between arms transfers and subsequent foreign military intervention in the country receiving the arms. One perspective, reflected in its American version in the so-called Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970's, held that the dispatch of arms lessens the need for sending troops abroad, since improvements in the recipients' armed forces make them better able to defend themselves against foreign and domestic threats. The Nixon Doctrine can be seen as a way of substituting a lucrative trade in American arms for American troops in post-Vietnam efforts to police Third World regions against unwanted revolutions.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, critics of uncontrolled or extensive arms transfers, and particularly those of the early Carter Administration days, argued that transfers increase the stakes of the transferring nation in the fate of the recipients, and therefore can lead to deeper intervention, both political and military.<sup>2</sup> Transfers can also lead to intensified combat and adventurist foreign or domestic policies, which might ultimately threaten the existing recipient regime and confront the supplier with the choice of intervening to protect past investments in that regime. This study is aimed at evaluating the contrary claims entailed in these arguments.

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<sup>1</sup>Changes in military doctrines can often be seen in weapons transfers patterns. In the 1960's the U.S. sold relatively little advanced weaponry to the Third World, and concentrated instead on weapons useful in counter-insurgency warfare. Far more costly and advanced weapons were transferred in the 1970's as the bitter Vietnam experience (together with lagging trade balances, and the lure of petro dollars) was reflected in the Nixon Doctrine. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age; A Handbook (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1976), p. 165; and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-77 (Washington, DC: October, 1979), p. 23.

<sup>2</sup>For one summary of this familiar perspective, see Edward C. Luck, "The Arms Trade," Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, vol. 32, no. 4 (1977), p. 172.

In one sense, arms transfers and military intervention can be seen as part of the same policy cloth. Whenever weapons are sold by one government to another, or even by private firms to foreign governments, military consultation takes place both within and between the states involved. The ties between corporations and defense ministries and departments in the major arms exporting nations are extensive and complex. Sales are also subject to political pressures and controls, as governments try to prop up favored regimes abroad and gain political influence. Military intervention, the dispatch of troops to influence conditions or policies in a foreign state, is another more drastic means of gaining such influence. Kolodziej has noted the close connections of arms transfers and overseas military bases, with the accompanying chicken and egg analytical problem of determining which comes first and which leads to further subsequent involvement.<sup>3</sup>

We encounter the same difficulties trying to determine the frequency of interventionary combat stemming from arms transfers, since intervention can follow from, accompany, or precede transfers. The effects of transfers on intervention are further complicated by the fact that arms transferred to one country can be used against the interests of the transferring state, as when French sales to Libya came back to haunt French troops in Chad.<sup>4</sup> Transfers can also enable the recipient to intervene abroad, or bring counter-intervention inside the recipient by a major power. Furthermore, interventions can lead to subsequent arms transfers to shore up client regimes in and around the combat zones. Yet despite difficulties in distinguishing causes and effects, the continuing debate in the United States and other countries about possible further "Vietnam-like" involvements in arms recipients such as El Salvador means that investigation of entanglement patterns remains crucial.

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<sup>3</sup>Edward A. Kolodziej, "Arms Transfers and International Politics," in Arms Transfers in the Modern World, ed. by Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 11-12; and "Determinants of French Arms Sales: Security Implications," in Threats, Weapons, and Foreign Policy, ed. by Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Beverly Hills, Ca: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 137-75.

<sup>4</sup>Kolodziej, "Arms Transfers," p. 12.

Ideally the entangling effects of various types of weapons systems should be examined, i.e., artillery vs. aircraft, electronic vs. less sophisticated models, construction vs. combat equipment, etc. This initial study, however, will be confined to a general overview of links between total transfers and subsequent intervention by the major post-World War II weapons exporters: the US, USSR, France, and Britain.<sup>5</sup>

In a previous study of US interventions, strategic interests, as measured by US military aid to Third World countries, was found to be the most reliable predictor of American interventions. However, findings varied according to regions and time periods; prior military assistance seemed strongly related to intervention in East Asia in the 1950's and to the Vietnam intervention of 1965, but in the 1960's, in general, intervention targets did not receive unusually large amounts of American military aid (Laos received high per capita levels of military aid). Economic aid became a better predictor of Asian interventions in the 1960's, and economic (trade) interests were important in Latin America. Domestic violence in the target state was also severe in nine of 12 US interventions in states which were major regional recipients of US military assistance; a mixture of strategic interests and domestic unrest and violence characterized the majority of US interventions to support foreign regimes. In the years 1950-67, the probability of US intervention in the Third World was greatest for countries importing large quantities of US products, receiving large amounts of US military aid, and suffering internal political disruption.<sup>6</sup>

A revolution occurred in US military assistance policy during the 1960's, with government-to-government military sales coming to outweigh formal military assistance as the primary means of arms transfer. While credits for sales were still

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<sup>5</sup>According to SIPRI, in the mid-1970's West Germany quietly displaced Britain as the fourth leading arms exporter. However, West Germany will not be included in this study.

<sup>6</sup>Frederic S. Pearson, "American Military Intervention Abroad: A Test of Economic and Noneconomic Explanations," in The Politics of Aid, Trade and Investment, ed. by Satish Raichur and Craig Liske (New York: Wiley, 1976), pp. 37-62.

offered, outright grants diminished as the balance of payments benefits of sales dawned even upon those in the Pentagon, and during the seventies, as wealth accumulated in the Middle East. Therefore, it is necessary to extend research on interventions and arms transfers to include all transfers, not simply grants and loans, to examine the interventionary record of other major powers as well, to bring the findings up to date, and to examine interventions in "First and Second World" (West Europe, the Pacific industrialized states, and East Europe) countries as well, since these states also purchase considerable armaments and are frequently within spheres of major power influence and concern.

A country's influence over policies and conditions in another state depends on the political context, including geographic, military, economic, and social factors, as well as the specific goals the influencer is trying to achieve. If goals are inappropriate to available means or prevailing regional or local conditions, even vast amounts of raw military or economic power might not succeed in achieving them. Hence, the dispatch of arms might remedy a threatening situation without a perceived need for intervention in one case, but might fail to achieve the desired effects in another case. Therefore, the likelihood of intervention might depend in part on the motives behind and the circumstances of the arms transfer. These motives and circumstances can vary widely. Transfers might be designed to support a favored government in a threatening conflict situation and might be aimed at a region considered vital to the transferring state. On the other hand, there might be no pressing international or domestic conflict, and transfers might be merely the price of continued political cooperation by the recipient state, as when American arms were sent to Spain as part of the renegotiation of base rights. Arms can be transferred to states highly dependent on the donor country for weapons supply, or to states with a variety of suppliers and options for acquiring weapons. Sales can be promoted for mainly economic reasons, or in the interest of political-strategic power balances (or both).

As a set of working hypotheses for this and future studies, the perceived

need for and likelihood of military intervention subsequent to arms transfers is likely to be greatest: (1) if recipient is located in a region considered to be a key strategic area, e.g., source of key resources, or which is in the "sphere of influence" of the country supplying the arms; (2) if transfers occur in the midst of intense civil or international warfare in such regions rather than as part of the "price" to assure continued cooperation or access to bases or as "part of the game" to compete with other major powers for regional influence; (3) if the recipient is highly dependent on the supplier for weapons supply.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, it is assumed generally that interventions are more likely to occur after large amounts of weapons have been transferred by the intervener to the target (of the intervention) country than if few shipments have been made, i.e., that arms transfers make both donor and recipient more subject to subsequent intervention by the donor.

As seen above, few interventions are predicted in areas where arms supply is competitive, with several major powers acting as weapons sources. In competitive regions there is danger that one major power's intervention will be countered by the other major power-arms supplier(s), thus leading to dangerous major power confrontations. Such confrontations have been avoided since World War II, with major powers opting to arm client states to carry on the fighting where possible in the Third World. While Vietnam is a geographical exception, most major power interventions since 1945 have been in "backyard" regions or areas of less intense major power rivalry.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, while major powers might be wary of entanglements in

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<sup>7</sup>This reasoning follows from the explanations of arms transfers offered by Robert Harkavy, The Arms Trade and International Systems (Cambridge, Ma: Ballinger, 1975), p. 106; Eric Weede, "U.S. Support for Foreign Governments, or Domestic Disorder and Imperial Intervention, 1958-1965," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 10 (January 1978), pp. 499-503; and Ilan Peleg, "Arms Supply to the Third World -- Models and Explanations," Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 15 (March 1977), pp. 91-105. Peleg argues that superpower competition in regions increases arms sales, but there is no reason to think that this will necessarily lead to superpower intervention.

<sup>8</sup>See Frederic S. Pearson, "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention: 1948-67," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 18 (September 1974), pp. 432-460.



ongoing wars, civil or international, since casualties and costs could be high, they are likely to deepen their military involvements to the point of intervention if hostilities threaten the survival of client states, especially in spheres of influence. If intervention occurs in regions with competitive arms supply patterns, rather than spheres of influence, it is more likely in states for which the intervener is the sole or dominant arms supplier than in states with multiple weapons suppliers.<sup>9</sup>

#### Operationalization of Concepts and Research Design

In order to test the hypothesized linkages between arms transfers and intervention, a quasi-experimental design will be utilized, with transfers considered to be the treatment condition. Potential occasions for intervention will be identified, and divided into instances in which the potential target (country) of intervention had or had not received large arms transfers from one of the four major arms suppliers. Differences will then be noted in the frequency of intervention and non-intervention by the four arms suppliers depending on whether the target had or had not received large shipments of arms the prior year. In other words, two basic analyses will be made to find: (1) the percentage of interventions and of non-interventions (i.e., instances which could have but did not result in a major power intervention) which were preceded by major arms shipments from potential or actual intervener to target government; and (2) the percentage of major arms transfers which were or were not followed by intervention by the donor in the recipient state.

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<sup>9</sup>Another hypothesis can be posed for future study of the types of weapons and transfer patterns most likely to lead to intervention: the transfer of weapons or military construction without accompanying transfer and improvement of military infrastructure in the recipient state is likely to lead to subsequent direct military intervention by the donor in a crisis situation. If, for technological or organizational reasons, states receiving modern armaments are unable to use them in combat effectively, the donor will be confronted with pressure for subsequent intervention. See Michael Mihalka, "Supplier-Client Patterns in Arms Transfers: The Developing Countries, 1967-76," in Modern World, ed. by Neuman and Harkavy, pp. 49-76.

The following definitions and measurements of variables and concepts will be utilized:

(1) Intervention is defined as the movement of troops or use of force by one independent country across the border of another independent country in the midst of some political controversy involving the target country, and without immediate retaliation and sustained bilateral fighting between organized armed forces of the two states. Troops and forces must be used in combat-related activities, rather than merely residing in bases or training the host state's troops. This definition is slightly different from the one utilized in the author's earlier work, and is meant to distinguish discreet interventions in the internal affairs of states from sustained wars.<sup>10</sup> Interventions are unilateral actions meant to influence the policies of a foreign state or conditions within a foreign state in ways desired by the intervener; this might even include the acquisition or control of territories. Interventions can be friendly or hostile to the government of the target state, and the target can retaliate or resist militarily or by a subsequent counter-intervention in the attacking state. But if sustained bilateral fighting develops, the conflict, which began as an intervention, must ultimately be considered a war as well.

The author's data on interventions from 1948-67 have been updated for this study to include cases of major power intervention through 1979, and to exclude interventions which merely entailed evacuations of foreign citizens or personnel from conflict zones. Data sources include the New York Times, scholarly compilations,<sup>11</sup> and historical analyses and case studies.

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<sup>10</sup>On this distinction see references to the work of W.E. Hall and the general discussion by R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 8-13.

<sup>11</sup>Compilations include: Robert Lyle Butterworth, with Margaret E. Scranton, Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-74: Data with Synopses (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for International Studies, 1976); Mark W. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946-77 (New York: Praeger, 1979), Appendix; and Istvan Kende, "Wars of Ten Years: 1967-1976," Journal of Peace Research, vol. 15, no. 3 (1978), pp. 227-241.

(2) It is assumed that new interventions can occur in any given year in any of the independent countries of the world (excluding such entities as Monaco, Lichtenstein, and the Vatican for this analysis, as well as colonial interventions). More than one new intervention can occur in a given year; a new level of military commitment is treated as a new intervention.

(3) Civil disputes in the target will be measured by the number of armed attacks by organized political groups against governmental authority. Data sources include the World Handbook II, supplemented for years after 1967 by Kende's collection of civil wars from 1967-77, and the Defense Monitor's description of wars underway in 1979.<sup>12</sup> Weede has spoken of countries' "passive provocation" of intervention, implying that countries can be attacked or invaded without any prior aggression toward the intervener. Weede's and the author's own prior empirical work indicates a strong connection between intervention and domestic disputes, especially interventions to prop up or support the existing regime in the target state.<sup>13</sup> Due to complications of data analysis, findings about the effects of civil disputes on the arms transfer intervention relationship will be presented in a later study.

(4) Regional arms competition among major suppliers will be measured according to criteria employed by Harkavy, in particular the aggregate of arms transferred to the region by each of the superpowers (US and USSR). A region will be considered competitive if the US or USSR each supplied 33% or more of all arms during the year under consideration. Noncompetitive regions are those where only one superpower supplied 33% or more of the arms, and "neutral" regions include

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<sup>12</sup>Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); Kende, "Wars of Ten Years," and Center for Defense Information, The Defense Monitor, vol. 8, no. 10 (Washington, DC: November, 1979).

<sup>13</sup>Weede (pp. 511-512) found that about 35% of the variance in American interventions was accounted for by domestic disorder, measured in much the same way as in this study. See Erich Weede, "U.S. Support for Foreign Governments," pp. 509 ff.; and Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Intervention in Domestic Disputes," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 18 (September 1974), pp. 259-290.

areas in which neither superpower supplied 33%. British and French transfers are not included in these definitions because of the concentrated patterns of their regional arms supply and because their military power was too limited during the postwar years to define exclusive spheres of influence.

Similar measurements will be made to determine the dependency of any one state on a single arms supplier. Sole supplier relationships will be those in which the client received all of its armaments from one of the four major suppliers during the years under consideration; dominant supplier relationships will encompass countries receiving between 60 and 99% of their arms from one major supplier; and multiple supplier relationships include nations receiving no more than 59% of their supplies from any single country. Data are derived from Harkavy's and Mihalka's studies<sup>14</sup> and supplemented with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and SIPRI data where necessary (minimizing the mixture of different transfer definitions).

(5) Arms transfers are operationalized both as the dollar value (in constant dollars) of major weapons transferred from 1950-78, and of all weapons transferred between 1963 and 1978. A one year time lag will be employed in analyses associating transfers with subsequent interventions. Most of the data on major weapons come from a 1975 study by SIPRI, updated and supplemented with other SIPRI information.<sup>15</sup> Major weapons include such items as aircraft, missiles, armored vehicles, and warships which were delivered in the given year. Data on all government-to-government arms transfers, by sales, grants, or loans, were also derived for later years from ACDA studies. The major weapons data are likely to understate transfers to poorer Third World nations unable to afford relatively sophisticated weapons systems, and to understate slightly transfers in the 1960's, when small arms

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<sup>14</sup>Harkavy, The Arms Trade, Ch. 4; and Mihalka, "Supplier-Client Patterns," pp. 49-76.

<sup>15</sup>SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975); and Yearbooks, 1968-80.

exports by the US predominated over advanced systems. Unfortunately, other authors have noted consistent understating in the ACDA data as well.<sup>16</sup> They remain the most comprehensive available set, however.

Arms transfer data will be treated both in ordinal and interval scales. The SIPRI major weapons data are divided into five categories: (1) zero; (2) less than \$10 million; (3) \$10-50 million; (4) \$50-100 million; and (5) more than \$100 million. ACDA data on all weapons will be analyzed in raw dollar totals and according to percentage of increase or decrease.

Essentially, then, we will examine the level of or percentage change in arms transfers in years prior to interventions and non-interventions (i.e., years in which the arms supplier did not intervene in the recipient). We will calculate percentages of high and low transfer years which were followed by intervention -- hypothesizing that high transfers will lead to intervention relatively more frequently. We will also calculate the percentage of intervention and non-intervention years which were preceded by high or low levels of arms transfers -- hypothesizing that interventions will have a higher percentage of high prior transfers than non-interventions. Only cases (years) of new interventions will be counted; if interventions last for more than one year, the subsequent intervention years will be excluded from the analysis for the intervening country, since we would learn little about the effect of prior arms transfers on subsequent interventions by including them. Arms transfers are likely to increase as a result of ongoing interventions; analysis of this possibility awaits a future study.

### Findings

Looking first at the overall relationship between interventions and major weapons transfers (Table 1, page 11), in relatively few cases were military moves preceded by years with weapons transfers of more than \$10 million. Since only ma-

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<sup>16</sup>See, for example, Edward A. Kolodziej, "Measuring French Arms Transfers: A Problem of Sources and Some Sources of Problems with ACDA Data," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 23 (June 1979), pp. 195-227.

Table 1

Interventions and Prior Major Weapons Transfers  
By the Four Major Transferring States, 1950-79

<u>Prior Year Transfer Level</u>	<u>Number of Interventions</u>	<u>% of Intervention Years Preceded By This Transfer Level</u>	<u>% of Non-Intervention Years for 4 Powers Preceded This Transfer Level</u>	<u>% of All Years of Transfers at This Level By 4 Powers Followed By Intervention</u>
0	28 (29)*	40%	76%	.2%
Less than \$10 million	23 (25)	40%	14%	1.1%
\$10-50 million	7 (4)	11%	6%	.73%
\$50-100 million	1 (4)	6%	2%	1.4%
\$100 + million	4 (2)	2%	2%	.4%

Intervention N = 64 (64) Intervention N = 47 Non-Intervention N = 11,800

\*Figures in parentheses are for transfer levels two years prior to intervention. All other figures are for transfers one year prior.

major weapons are considered, it is possible that significant amounts of small arms were shipped in certain areas, a possibility to be addressed below. Also, although the study includes industrialized as well as Third World arms recipients, we might expect a large number of low arms transfer scores since the bulk of the Third World lacks funds. Of the 12 interventions preceded by more than \$10 million of major transfers by the intervener, seven were undertaken by the US, two by France (Zaire, 1977 and '78), and three by the USSR (Czechoslovakia, 1968; Egypt, 1970, both of which exceeded \$100 million; and Ethiopia, 1977; transfers to Afghanistan in 1978 were missing from our data, but we suspect they too exceeded \$10 million). Four of the US cases were in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, 1964 and '75; Thailand, 1962; and South Vietnam, 1965), with two others in Taiwan in the late 1950's. While repeated interventions in the same country did not always lead to increased arms transfers (Britain intervened repeatedly in Oman for instance, with zero prior major weapons transfers in each case), the second US intervention in South Vietnam (1965) and third in Cambodia (1975) were immediately preceded by far higher transfer levels than the previous interventions in those countries. American stakes in the survival of Southeast Asian clients increased during the Vietnam war years.

Evidently when stakes increased they did so gradually, since a look at arms transfers two years prior to intervention shows roughly the same proportion of major weapons deliveries of more than \$10 million. Soviet interventions in particular have been characterized by well established arms supply relations with the target state, as Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Egypt<sup>17</sup> all had Soviet transfer levels in excess of \$50 million two years prior to the Soviet intervention, and Ethiopia had received over \$10 million. While on the whole there is no indication that high levels of major weapons transfers are necessary or even sufficient conditions for intervention, for the Soviet Union at least they seem to signal a willingness to risk direct military involvement to support the client. Or, conversely, if

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<sup>17</sup>Data for Soviet Eastern European interventions in the 1950's were lacking.

the Soviets have not dispatched large amounts of sophisticated weapons to a country, they seem unlikely to be willing to dispatch troops to protect its government.

The impact of arms transfers can be seen more clearly by comparing interventions to non-interventions (Table 1). A much higher percentage of non-intervention years had no prior major arms transfers and a much higher percentage of intervention years had between \$10- and 100 million worth of prior arms transfers. At the highest arms transfer levels, over \$100 million, there were no differences. This pattern is also reflected slightly in the percentages of all transfers at high and low levels which were followed the next year by interventions (subtract this percentage from 100 to derive the proportions for non-intervention years); moderate levels of major arms transfers were most associated with interventions, though clearly the vast bulk of arms transfers at all levels did not result in intervention. At least half of interventions were preceded by more than \$10 million of arms transfers, while only 10% of non-intervention years were preceded by such transfers.

In an effort to determine the effects of all arms transfers, rather than only major weapons transfers, available data were analyzed for interventions after 1963 (Table 2, page 14). In half the interventions reviewed, transfers from the intervener increased between the year before and the year of intervention, and in over a third of the cases the increase was greater than 50%. Some of these increases were possibly due to the intervention itself, especially if the intervention occurred in the beginning of the year. As a verification, a separate analysis was run for changes from two years to one year before the intervention. Here, with missing data reducing the number of interventions analyzed, the proportion of substantial arms transfer increases drops to less than 30%. Therefore, although the sample is too small for statistical validity, it seems that total arms transfers may build just prior to and during the early stages of some interventions, but that at least half of interventions are preceded by no arms transfer increases or indeed by decreases.



Table 2

Percentage of Change in Value of Weapons  
Agreements Between Intervener and Target Country  
Prior to Intervention, 1963-79\*

<u>Preceded by % Change</u>	<u>Number of Interventions</u>	
51% or more Decrease	1	(2)+
1 - 50% Decrease	1	(5)
No Change	11	(6)
1 - 50% Increase	3	(1)
51 - 100% Increase	3	(3)
101% or more Increase	7	(1)

\*Increases in transfers following years in which zero transfers had been made are estimated by using \$1 million as an arbitrarily small starting score and calculating the percentage of change. If transfers went from 0-\$1 million, a 100% increase was arbitrarily assigned; from 0-\$2 million a 200% increase; in all other cases, percentages were calculated.

+Figures in parentheses are percentage changes from two years to one year prior to intervention.

Turning to hypotheses about interventions in countries dependent for armaments on the intervener or other major powers, we find (Table 3, page 15) that roughly 45% of all interventions occurred when the intervener "enjoyed" a sole or dominant supply relationship with the target state. Another 44% occurred in multiple supply relationships. This finding does not tend to support hypotheses 3; interventions are about as likely to occur in multiple as in dominant or sole supply relationships. However, we do not yet know the percentage of all sole or dominant vs multiple supply relationships in the world which resulted in interventions during the years under study. It is worth noting, nevertheless, 87% of interventions in dominant or sole supply relationships were by the main supplier. If anyone is going

Table 3

Weapons Dependency of Recipient States  
1950-79

Supply Relationship with Intervener

	Sole (100%)	Dominant (66-99%)	Multiple (Up to 59%)	Low Level of Transfers
Number of Interventions	3*	30	32	3

Supply Relationship with Other Major Suppliers

	Sole	Dominant		
Number of Interventions	2+	3		
Total Interventions	5	33	32	3 = 73

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\*The hostile Soviet intervention inside the Chinese border in 1969 occurred when China was technically in a sole supply relationship with the USSR, but no known arms shipments had been made since 1964.

+The US bombing attack on Soviet territory during the Korean war is treated as an intervention with the USSR as its own sole arms supplier. The other incident was the US Korean war attack on Chinese territory, with the USSR as China's arms supplier.

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to intervene in dependent states, it will clearly be the state providing the bulk of the arms.

While a major power's monopoly of arms sales to a given region does not necessarily mean that the region is firmly ensconced in that power's sphere of influence, it is one indicator of a degree of influence and commitment that might give other major powers pause about intervening in the region. Major powers have shied away from direct confrontation, and if one power is already well established in a region, it could make the others wary. US and Soviet aggregate transfers have been used to define regional competitiveness in arms transfer.

Most interventions (Table 4, page 16) during the 1960's and 70's occurred in

Table 4

Intervention in Competitive vs Non-Competitive Regions,  
1963-77

<u>Region</u>	<u>Regional Arms Supply Status</u>	<u>Number of Interventions</u>	<u>Interventions by Dominant State</u>
NATO & Western Europe 1963-77	Noncompetitive (US dominant)	1	
Warsaw Pact Europe 1963-77	Noncompetitive (USSR dominant)	1	1
North America & Oceania 1963-77	Noncompetitive (US dominant)	0	
Latin America 1963-73	Noncompetitive (US dominant)	1	1
1973-77	Neutral	0	
Sub-Saharan Africa 1963-66	Neutral	12*	
1967-77	Noncompetitive (USSR dominant)	7	1
North Africa 1963-77	Noncompetitive (USSR dominant)	0	
Middle East 1963-64	Noncompetitive (USSR dominant)	0	
1965	Noncompetitive (US dominant)	2	
1966-67	Noncompetitive (USSR dominant)	0	
1968-77	Competitive	1	
South Asia 1963-64	Neutral	0	
1965-77	Noncompetitive (USSR dominant)	1 <sup>+</sup>	1
East Asia 1963-65	Noncompetitive (US dominant)	5	4
1966-69	Competitive	2*	
1970-77	Noncompetitive (US dominant)	1	1

\*If an intervention occurred in a year in which the status of the region changed, it is scored here for the prior year's status, since the change of status could have been affected by the intervention.

+If an intervention occurred in 1978 or 79, it is scored here for the regional status in 1977 (e.g., USSR-Afghanistan)

Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia, with France and the US the prime interveners. To a lesser extent, Britain and the Soviet Union intervened directly in the Middle East and South Asia, and Soviet planes flew Cuban troops into certain African conflicts. Soviet pilots also assisted the Egyptian airforce in battles against Israel in 1970, and Soviet troops streamed into Afghanistan in 1979. Britain stepped in to assist certain Arabian sheikhs and the Sultan of Oman as part of its Middle Eastern swan-song in 1966.

Most regions of the world were non-competitive in arms shipments, with more than 33% of transfers coming from one of the superpowers at any given time. Not surprisingly statistically or according to hypothesis 1, therefore, most (19 of 34, or 56%) interventions after 1963 occurred in non-competitive regions. In Western and Eastern Europe, as well as Latin America, spheres of influence definitely made intervention planning easier as American and Soviet leaders did not have to worry about counter-intervention by the other superpower. Of course we do not yet know what effect the pronounced shift in Latin American arms trade after 1973 will have on future intervention decisions. Shifting transfer patterns are important in other regions as well.

Despite the frequency of interventions in non-competitive regions, 44% of interventions were in regions where no one power dominated, with 35% in "neutral" regions where no one power supplied as much as 33% of arms. While East Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa were frequently non-competitive, their arms trade patterns showed considerable variation.

Africa, the scene of 19 interventions (56%) during this period, oscillated between arms neutrality and dependence on Soviet supplies. We must remember that the French kept up a constant supply of arms to certain friendly regimes,<sup>18</sup> and the UK and US had significant minority shares of the market as well. While sporadically noncompetitive, with either the US or USSR ascendent, the Middle East also emerged as a basically competitive arms market in the 1970's, and was clearly in no one's exclusive political sphere of influence. The same might be said of East Asia, al-

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<sup>18</sup>French major arms sales to Sub-Saharan Africa reached about 36% of the market from 1970-74. and averaged around 25% of the total weapons market: there from 1965 on.

though the extraordinary trauma and efforts of the Vietnam struggles left the US dominating the overall arms market for a long period; significant Soviet supplies shadowed the American transfers. Therefore, these regions which remain, at least in the major powers' views, politically "up for grabs" are also basically competitive arms markets as well, but in a pattern which swings from one dominant supplier to another. Therefore, while many Afro-Asian interventions occurred in technically non-competitive regions, there was considerable political and military competition in those regions between the superpowers and among all four major powers.

Nevertheless, only nine percent of interventions occurred when the heat of competition was high enough that both superpowers simultaneously pumped in over 33% of a region's arms. High perceived stakes were involved in each of these occurrences, and all involved the superpowers themselves. Furthermore, as predicted above, all interventions in competitive regions were confined to states for which the intervener was the sole or dominant weapons supplier at the time. The arms dependence of particular countries may have more to do with intervention decisions than the dependence of the region. Soviet pilots flew to protect Egyptian ports against the Israelis along the Suez Canal, a confrontation that seemed ultimately to lead to renewed interest in a Canal settlement. The Soviets and Chinese skirmished along their border, and the US bombed its adversaries in Cambodia in 1970. In each case the intervener was relatively assured that the other superpower would not retaliate as long as the fighting did not get out of control. Nevertheless, the powers seemed to edge rather close to dangerous escalation in these cases, and at least in the Israeli case, possibilities of confrontation in politically competitive regions seemed to cool heads on all sides rather rapidly.

In situations where one superpower dominated regional arms supplies, other powers ventured to intervene in ten of 19 cases. Occasionally, as when the British moved to shore up favored Arab regimes, the dominant regional supplier, in that case the US, approved of or was not adversely affected by the intervention. Frequently, though, the French employed their troops in Africa despite, or perhaps in

part because of significant Soviet interests and influence in the region. Arms trade alone is not sufficient to define the kind of overall regional control which represents a "hands off" warning to other powers; it seems that clear military superiority in and dominance of the region is necessary for such deterrence. Yet in regions such as Africa undisputed dominance is especially difficult to achieve and maintain.

### Conclusion

While arms transfers do not invariably or even often involve the supplier in military adventures in the recipient state, they do seem to signal the degree of commitment that will produce intervention if other conditions are "right." It is a rare Soviet intervention, for example, that occurs in a state that is not already a prime Soviet arms client. If we want advance warning of the places in which major power intervention could occur, their military sales, grants, and loans are a tip off. Keep in mind, however, that 40-50% of major power interventions were preceded by no major weapons sales at all, and that total transfer levels either stayed the same or decreased before 50% of interventions. Moderate arms transfer levels, i.e., those between \$10- and 100 million, are more likely to be followed by intervention than very low or very high transfer levels.

Interventions seem about as likely to occur in states dependent on one major power arms supplier as in states with multiple suppliers, but if any state intervenes in a dependent country, it is very likely to be its arms supplier. Furthermore, interventions are rare in regions where the heat of US-Soviet competition in arms supply is very intense; they are far more prevalent in regions either supplied mainly by one power (with that power likely to be the intervener), or in which a number of suppliers maintain market shares, with none greater than 33%.

Among the "right" conditions that could produce intervention in states receiving major power arms is severe internal political disruption and/or violence in the recipient state. Certainly the Soviets seem to have responded when their clients seemed in danger of losing power to domestic dissident groups, or in Egypt's and

Ethiopia's cases, to hostile neighboring states. US interventions in the Dominican Republic, South Korea, and initially in Vietnam also reflected these concerns, as did French interventions in Africa and British moves in the Middle East. Once on-going war developed, as in Vietnam, other motives seemed to become prominent, as US forces pursued elusive Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in neighboring Southeast Asian countries, and sought to quell domestic uprisings in those countries as well.

The next logical research step is to examine the causal effects over time of domestic unrest, arms shipments, and military intervention. Peleg has offered an explanatory model for arms transfers in which he posits internal disruption and local conflict, as well as regional competition among major powers as prime factors leading to arms transfers. We might presume that transfers in the midst of such regional and civil violence and unrest are more likely to produce ultimate intervention by the supplier state than arms transfers in more tranquil circumstances. The causal sequence might be: (1) intensity of local or domestic conflict, in (2) countries depending on one major arms supplier leading to (3) moderate levels of arms transfer, especially if the region is the preserve of one superpower or subject to arms sales competition among numerous major powers, leading to (4) military intervention by the primary arms supplier. Variations in this model could posit the initial transfer of arms, perhaps as in response to "politically motivated demands for arms,"<sup>19</sup> followed by local violence -- perhaps as a result of increased arms shipments -- leading to major power intervention. Transfers might lead to more ultimate internal or regional violence, as the recipient government either attempts to clamp down on domestic opponents, or launches into attacks on hostile neighbors, or "passively provokes" attacks by such neighbors. Therefore, the arms recipient might become involved in intervention as a target for its own arms supplier, for other major powers, for hostile neighbors, and as an intervener itself in regional conflicts.

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<sup>19</sup>Peleg, "Arms Supply," p. 95.

## APPENDIX

## Major Power Interventions, 1950-1979

<u>starting date</u>	<u>ending date</u>	<u>target.</u>	<u>intervener</u>
1/13/60	1960	Cameroon	France
11/11/67	1967	Cen. Af. Rep.	France
9/00/79	1979	Cen. Af. Rep.	France
00/00/67	1971	Chad	France
4/00/78	1978	Chad	France
8/63	1963	Congo (B)	France
8/13/64	1964	Congo (K)	USA
11/23/64	1964	Congo (K)	USA
7/10/67	1967	Congo (K)	USA
00/00/77	1977	Zaire	France
5/18/78	1978	Zaire	France
5/00/78	1978	Zaire	USA
00/00/77	1978	Ethiopia	USSR
2/19/64	1964	Gabon	France
1/24/64	1964	Kenya	U.K.
12/00/77	1978	Mauritania	France
1/25/64	1964	Tanganyika	U.K.
1/23/64	1964	Uganda	U.K.
12/3/65	1966	Zambia	U.K.
1/12/64	1964	Zanzibar	U.K.
9/15/53	1953	Abu Dhabi	U.K.
10/55	1955	Abu Dhabi	U.K.



<u>starting date</u>	<u>ending date</u>	<u>target</u>	<u>intervener</u>
11/3/56	1956	Bahrein	U.K.
10/31/56	1956	Egypt	France
10/31/56	1956	Egypt	U.K.
00/00/70	1970	Egypt	USSR
7/17/58	1958	Jordan	U.K.
7/17/58	1958	Jordan	USA
7/1/61	1961	Kuwait	U.K.
7/15/58	1958	Lebanon	USA
7/3/56	1957	Morocco	France
10/55	1956	Muscat-Oman	U.K.
7/57	1958	Muscat-Oman	U.K.
11/1/58	1961	Muscat-Oman	U.K.
00/00/66	1977	Oman	U.K.
4/52	1952	S. Arab Sheiks	U.K.
5/56	1957	S. Arab Sheiks	U.K.
8/57	1958	S. Arab Sheiks	U.K.
7/66	1966	S. Arab Sheiks	U.K.
5/19/56	1958	Tunisia	France
2/8/58	1960	Tunisia	France
7/19/61	1961	Tunisia	France
6/17/53	1954	East Germany	USSR
10/20/56	1956	Poland	USSR
10/24/56	1956	Hungary	USSR
12/30/63	1964	Cyprus	U.K.
10/8/50	1950	USSR	USA
8/20/68	1968	Czechoslovakia	USSR

<u>starting date</u>	<u>ending date</u>	<u>target</u>	<u>intervener</u>
7/28/58	1958	Cuba	USA
4/28/65	1965	Dominican Rep.	USA
12/00/79	1980	Afghanistan	USSR
12/8/62	1962	Brunei	U.K.
3/19/64	1970	Cambodia	USA
5/00/70	1973	Cambodia	USA
5/00/75	1975	Cambodia	USA
8/27/50	1950	China	USA
3/00/69	1969	China	USSR
6/50	1950	China, Rep. of	USA
1/55	1955	China, Rep. of	USA
9/4/58	1958	China, Rep. of	USA
11/62	1962	India	USA
7/2/50	1953	N. Korea	USA
6/27/50	1953	S. Korea	USA
3/61	1964	Laos	USA
5/64	1973	Laos	USA
8/31/57	1963	Malaya	U.K.
9/16/63	1966	Malaysia	U.K.
10/25/51	1951	Philippines	USA
5/17/62	1976	Thailand	USA
5/24/62	1962	Thailand	U.K.
8/4/64	1973	N. Vietnam	USA
12/11/61	1965	S. Vietnam	USA
3/7/65	1973	S. Vietnam	USA