

University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL

UMSL Global

1-1-1983

Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen-Peace Protest and Social Movements in the Two Germanies

Joyce Marie Mushaben
mushaben@umsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://irl.umsl.edu/cis>



Part of the [International and Area Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Mushaben, Joyce Marie, "Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen-Peace Protest and Social Movements in the Two Germanies" (1983). *UMSL Global*. 274.

Available at: <https://irl.umsl.edu/cis/274>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in UMSL Global by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

Occasional Papers

The Center for International Studies of the University of Missouri-St. Louis issues Occasional Papers at irregular intervals from ongoing research projects, thereby providing a viable means for communicating tentative results. Such "informal" publications reduce somewhat the delay between research and publication, offering an opportunity for the investigator to obtain reactions while still engaged in the research. Comments on these papers, therefore, are particularly welcome. Occasional Papers should not be reproduced or quoted at length without the consent of the author or of the Center for International Studies.

Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen:
Peace Protests and Social Movements
in the Two Germanies


by

Joyce Marie Mushaben

FRIEDEN SCHAFFEN OHNE WAFFEN:
PEACE PROTESTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
IN THE TWO GERMANIES

Joyce Marie Mushaben
Assistant Professor of Political Science, &
Fellow, Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri 63121

NOTE: Not for quotation without permission of the author.



They shall beat their swords into plowshares
and their spears into sickles;
nation shall not lift sword against nation
nor ever again be trained for war,
and each man shall dwell under his own vine,
under his own fig-tree, undisturbed.
For the Lord of Hosts himself has spoken.

--Book of Micah, 4:3

War must never again be launched from German soil.

--Helmut Schmidt

War must never again be fought on German soil.

--Erich Honecker

Since 1972, the chances that an exacerbation of political tensions may result in a direct military confrontation between the two German states have declined dramatically. The likelihood that the German Federal Republic (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) might one day serve as the center stage for a major military showdown between the superpowers nonetheless persists. The ratification of the Basic Treaty by the two Germanies in 1972 brought about a partial mitigation of East-West tensions, which contributed to a sense of domestic stability in both of the newly declared sovereign states. By the late 1970's, however, the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater reawakened fears that the two German zones could one day become a nuclear "ground zero" for reasons unrelated to their specific security needs.

Since 1979, the race to deploy ever more sophisticated weapons in Central Europe has begun to take its toll on the balance of socio-political forces internal to the East and West German states. While ostensibly rooted in an ongoing crisis of superpower relations, the long-term political significance of both the bloc-based arms race and the commensurate growth of national peace movements in the FRG and the GDR well may rest in their contributions to a new chapter on German-German relations.

This essay undertakes a comparison of recent developments in the East and West German campaigns for peace and disarmament, focusing on the differences in their constituent social bases, the perceived political stakes involved, and specific organizational qua evolutionary forces behind the respective movements. Part One seeks to analyze peace protests in the Federal Republic in the context of earlier protest movements, looking to carry-overs from the anti-rearmament and anti-nuclear campaigns of the late fifties and sixties. It moreover explores the extent to which a variety of protest issues have begun to converge over three decades, producing an anti-nuclear groundswell for which the Green/Alternative Parties have become something of a political clearing house. Part Two treats peace protest in the German Democratic Republic as a much younger phenomenon, albeit one which has also come to encompass a broader range of societal concerns, despite more limited opportunities for channeling activists' political demands. The resulting profiles pay special attention to the pivotal role ascribed to religious groups, in particular the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, in forging a critical link between East and West protest movements. The final section addresses the relationship between the two peace movements and what seems to be the Gretchenfrage of postwar European history: the question of German national identity and the prospects for reunification.

This paper advances the proposition that the East and West German peace movements may have more critical elements in common with each other than they do with movements in other countries with which they are respectively allied. Unfortunately, time and space constraints preclude exactly the kind of systematic comparison, i.e. with developments in Hungary, Romania, the Netherlands, Britain and the US, that a rigorous analysis would require. Since the work devotes at least one section to the role of the church, the

reader can perhaps be imposed upon to make an occasional "leap of faith" regarding the general thrust of the comparisons herein. The second argument developed below holds that while peace initiatives in East Germany have benefited tremendously from the impulses provided by protests in the West, they cannot be construed as efforts to produce either a carbon copy or a mirror image of the FRG movements. East German organizers are careful to distinguish between the instrumental value of Western support and important substantive limitations. Finally (and more philosophically), the paper contends that peace movements of the magnitude now witnessed in Germany cannot be divorced from broader questions of political legitimacy, questions which are likely to remain unanswered long after the anticipated deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in the fall of 1983.

I. FROM OLD LEFT TO NEW LEFT TO NON LEFT:
CYCLES OF PROTEST IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

A. The Formative Years, 1945-1970

A rapidly expanding movement aimed at preventing the 1983 deployment of additional theater nuclear forces (TNF) in West Germany has its roots in a thirty year old tradition of peace protest. As early as 1950, the Lutheran Church (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland = EKD) expressed its opposition to any and all plans for rearming the Federal Republic, which religious leaders feared would ultimately result in the permanent division of Germany. The experiences under National Socialism, and perhaps a sense of Mitverantwortung (co-responsibility) in the absence of a church-wide resistance movement during the thirties and forties, led the Evangelical community to break temporarily with traditional precepts of war theology, i.e. the concept of a "just war." The Church did an about-face in 1952, however, maintaining that the question of German rearmament and the question

of peace were not identical (Pestalozzi, 1982).

Initial discussion of plans to rearm Germany drew sporadic expressions of protest, beginning in 1952, from pacifist factions within the protestant churches, as well as within the German Trade Union Federation (DGB). Early organizational efforts culminated in a demonstration of 1000 at the St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt on January 29, 1955, in opposition to the Paris Agreements granting the Federal Republic new status as a full partner to NATO. Legislation promulgated by the Bundestag provided for voluntary military service in 1955, approved the production of war materials, and subsequently jettisoned voluntary service in favor of universal conscription in 1956 (Graf, 1976).

By 1957 opposition to the remilitarization of German society had waned to the point that the Lutheran Church even agreed to conduct secret negotiations with the Bonn government, the outcome of which was a contract obliging the Church to attend to the spiritual needs of military recruits (Pestalozzi, 1982). The year 1957 nonetheless commenced with another round of intense, church-internal discussions on the moral dimensions of rearmament. Debate ensued when in February, 1957, Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss announced his intention to consider West German adoption of American-supplied "tactical" atomic weapons -- some of which, it was revealed in March, had already been deployed (Graf, 1976: p. 177).

In April, a group of prominent scientists, including three Nobel Prize winners, issued a public appeal in April, the Göttingen Manifesto, which served as a rallying point for those fundamentally opposed to atomic weapons, especially for Germany. Other scholars joined in the protest, as did a newly founded German Peace Society and the Union of Persons Persecuted by the Nazi Regime. Opposition was quasi-institutionalized by way of the

"Fight Atomic Death" campaign that gained momentum in 1957-58, paralleled by the growth of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Great Britain (Duff, 1971).

It is at least striking, if not "a lasting indictment of the 'official' Left that it failed to assume the initiative in the anti-nuclear arms campaign" during the late 1950's (Graf, 1976: p. 178). The SPD offered support of the bandwagon variety, more intent on cultivating an image of respectability in preparation for the 1957 elections than on playing out its role as formal Opposition. Labor attempted to maintain a stance of party-political neutrality, until it was overtaken by reports of astonishingly broad-based support for the anti-nuclear drive. A March 1958 poll revealed that 83 percent of a representative sample, including a majority of CDU/CSU voters, rejected Bonn's rearmament plans, and 52 percent would support a call for a general strike as a form of protest (Rupp, 1970: p. 167). Having lost a critical Bundestag vote in March, nuclear opponents resorted to a strategy of extraparliamentary mobilization, i.e. silent marches attracting several hundred thousands, work stoppages, church appeals and 1500 May Day demonstrations. Electoral problems at the Länder level led the SPD to water down its anti-armament commitment even more. The strongest trade unions followed suit, realizing that a campaign without formal party backing was doomed (Helm, 1979). A Federal Constitutional Court verdict proscribing three Länder plebiscites on the nuclear issue as unconstitutional caused the "Fight Atomic Death" movement to run aground shortly thereafter.

A number of religious-pacifist groups continued their push for a formal Church "No to Nuclear Weapons." Enjoying nominal EKD support, a new group called "Action Reconciliation/Peace Services" emerged in 1958 with an

emphasis on voluntarism and interest in Third World problems, but its focus quickly turned to peace. A growing division among the ecclesiastical ranks found expression in the Heidelberg Theses issued in 1959, outlining two essentially contradictory principles:

Thesis 7: The Church must recognize the renunciation of arms as a Christian course of action.

Thesis 8: The Church must recognize participation in the attempt to secure peace in freedom through the presence of atomic weapons as a course of action that is still possible for Christians today (Klatt, 1982: p. 22).

The words "still" and "today" kept alive hopes that the EKD would reevaluate its position, until 1967 when the annual synod in Hannover substituted the "static" formula: "Peace Service with and without weapons" (Klatt, 1982: 22). The position of the Catholic Church, bearing the imprint of doctrinaire anti-communism, was much less ambivalent (Zeller, 1982).

The early 1960's were relatively quiescent, the major exceptions being the progressively more successful Easter March appeals, modeled after the British CND's efforts to take the peace message to the countryside, literally. The number of participants rose from 1,000 in 1960, to 100,000 in 1964, to 150,000 in 1967 (Graf, 1976: p. 257). The function of the Easter March Movement changed with the times. Operating at first as a forum for protests of conscience on behalf of a vaguely defined "peace" issue, it became a vehicle for collecting information and opposing specific security issues, expanding its organizational base. The mobilizational capacity of the Marches was tactically reinforced by the student movement and substantively redirected by the parliament's deliberations on Emergency Powers Legislation in May, 1966.

Under mounting pressure from the SDS, the issue focus was broadened, as anti-legislation groups joined others in opposing Bonn's support for the

Iranian Shah and for American involvement in Viet Nam. The shift was reflected in a name change for the Easter Movement, known as the Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament after January, 1968. An assassination attempt against Rudi Dutschke on Holy Thursday, 1968, produced the largest march turnout ever, with subsequent demonstrations doubling as an anti-Springer (very conservative newspaper monopoly) campaign. The proliferation of causes, growing factionalization among the Left, an increasing proclivity for violent forms of direct action -- these factors contribute to the deterioration of the movement, its demise coinciding with the promulgation of the emergency provisions (made possible by SPD acquiescence).

The protests directed against NATO's plans to equip the West German military with "the most modern weapons available" in the late 1950's were politically significant in three respects. First and foremost, the decision to rearm the FRG in general and to deploy atomic weapons in particular represented a dramatic reversal of Western Occupational policy. Plans for rearmament "from above" -- whether or not they were construed as a response to heightened Cold War tensions -- testified to a change in Allied perceptions regarding the value of policies designed to de-nazify and democratize, much less to demilitarize the former Reich. Chancellor Adenauer's determined backing of NATO plans signified the beginning of a qualitatively different German-American relationship. Having identified for ten years with the respective roles of the-subjugated-and-the-conquerer, the two states would subsequently relate to each other as partner-and-protector.

Secondly, the late fifties campaign marked the end of an era of unprecedented domestic consensus with respect to foreign policy (which is not to underestimate the significance of the SPD's attempts to block the currency reform and early waves of "fundamental opposition" to rearmament,

1950-1954). Prior consensus on the need to accept collective sacrifices as a vehicle for expediting economic reconstruction had been virtually unanimous. After 1958, West German foreign and defense policy served as a major stimulant to an ongoing nation-wide debate, ideological polarization and outright protest, in part because a measure of economic security left more time for the consideration of new and controversial issues (Baker, Dalton, Hildebrandt, 1981).

Finally, the "Fight Atomic Death" movement appears, in retrospect, to have been structurally significant for the polity as a whole. When activists realized in January, 1958, that protests articulated by means of parliamentary debates, referenda, petitions and public surveys were ineffective in compelling a response from Adenauer, they resorted to a strategy of extraparliamentary opposition. In shifting to these unconventional forms of participation, they set a precedent for a second wave of protesters who adopted similar tactics during the late 1960's. Boycotts, teach-ins, etc. became the trademark of a quasi-organized Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO), following an SDS/SPD split. APO was even more effective than the Atomic Death Campaign in mobilizing major segments of the university population and radical trade union elements, once dissenters realized that their ability to command much policy influence through normal participatory channels was limited by the peculiar political constraints of the Grand Coalition, 1966-1969.

Brandt's successful electoral bid in 1969, based on a promise to "dare more democracy," enabled opposition groups to pursue a dual strategy. APO continued to employ unconventional tactics, i.e. in opposition to the Viet Nam War, but these measures were complemented by plans for a Long March through the institutions, orchestrated by reformists who believed that the

Social Democrats would dramatically alter the course of socio-economic development in the FRG. Chancellor Brandt's vigorous search for a viable Ostpolitik and his interest in a peaceful settlement of the Oder-Neisse conflict reinforced hopes that reform-from-within was indeed possible, thus depriving many marchers of their key issue. Reactions to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia created serious rifts among communist organizers, and the revolutionary brouhaha of the SDS was increasingly criticized for detracting from the earnestness of the pacifist movement. Had Viet Nam not provided a common cause, the APO movement would have collapsed completely by 1970; as a single movement, its days were nevertheless numbered.

B. The "Successor Generation" in the 1970's and 1980's

The level of mobilization among leftists was still quite high when the Viet Nam War came to a rather abrupt end in 1972, ideological fragmentation notwithstanding. The Bonn government was caught off guard when large numbers of critical, politicized, newly enfranchised citizens suddenly shifted their protest focus and redirected their organizational energies against nuclear energy and environmental hazards. The economic shock waves generated by the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 left the Social-Liberal coalition with few immediate alternatives to the development of indigenous nuclear energy capabilities, despite increasing opposition. The post-embargo recession brought other reform programs, such as university expansion, to a dramatic halt.

The period 1972-1977 witnessed a transfer of protest momentum from one social movement to another, as experienced pacifists and blooming ecologists found common cause in the threat of environmental destruction. A proliferation of protest initiatives at the local and regional levels led to

an emphasis on a presumed, logical connection between the dangers inherent to the civilian and the military uses of nuclear technology. In contrast, the leftist and pacifist groups of the sixties were inclined to support atomic research for civilian purposes ("Atoms for Peace"), but rejected outright nuclear development for use by the military (Otto, 1977). While both the German and the British trade union federations could be expected to join forces with the anti-atomic marchers in the fifties and sixties, the spectre of mass unemployment frightened many individual unions instead into forging coalitions with pro-nuclear elements, particularly after 1973. (Helm, 1982; Duff, 1971).

Campaigns against US imperialism and assaults on creeping "consumer terrorism" may have been morally uplifting for the protesters of the sixties, but in retrospect they were not nearly as effective as the Anti-Nuclear Energy Movement (AKK) has been in mobilizing the Herr and Frau Müllers of the Silent Majority. One of the most valuable lessons gleaned from the site occupations at Wyhl and Brokdorf rests with the fact that smaller, locally based groups were able to mobilize more demonstrators, faster. A decentralization of protest activities generated alternative sources of information and moreover served as an antidote to bureaucratic alienation and disillusionment with the SPD at the national level. The first "citizen initiative" groups born of the late sixties were viewed at the time as political action committees appended to the SPD, whose activism in the environmental field was expected to complement party platform efforts. Since the mid seventies, however, the Bürgerinitiativen (BI) have become an autonomous political force; indeed they now lay claim to the title "reincarnated extraparlimentary opposition" in their dealings with the established party system (Huber, 1981).

There are now an estimated 38,000 BI's in the Federal Republic, backed by at least 15 million sympathizers (Huber, 1981). Membership figures outstrip those of the established parties, and the model has been emulated by citizens throughout Western Europe (Berger, 1979). Over the last ten years, citizen activists have gradually developed a more systematic political critique directed against unrestricted economic growth and technological destruction of the environment -- a theme shared with the born-again peace movement. Membership profiles indicate that many former activists from the APO/Long March generation have found a second home in the BI's. Participants share upper middle class backgrounds, are highly educated, critically informed and self-confident with respect to their own political-organizational skills. The BürgerInitiativen have provided very fertile ground for the seeds of a new anti-nuclear weapons movement.

The wide-scale deployment of Soviet SS-20's carried out in 1977-78 induced Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to push for a US response to a Warsaw Pact buildup. The outcome of discussions based on perceptions of Soviet nuclear superiority in the European theater was the NATO "two-track" decision of December 12, 1979, which foresaw a modernization of NATO nuclear capabilities through deployment of 572 new Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles (see Appendix A). But the agreement simultaneously obliged NATO members, in particular the US, to pursue serious arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union in the hopes of rendering the deployments unnecessary (Kaldor and Smith, 1982).

No longer a NATO weakling, the Federal Republic has come to occupy a pivotal position among the European peace movements. The long-standing Cold War question, "What will we do when the Russians come?" has been subject to reformulation since 1978: "What will we do if the Americans stay?" In

comparison to the peace mobilization efforts of two decades ago, the latest campaign is characterized by significantly less ideological purity. A strong religious component and a strong secular-"alternative" component enjoy pre-eminent influence in what has loosely been labeled "the movement," which has hit the FRG in two waves. The first surge of protest flowed rather unexpectedly out of the 19th annual Congress of the German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, which drew 150,000 participant observers to Hamburg in June, 1981; it peaked with a non-violent demonstration of 300,000 in Bonn on October 10, 1981. The second wave was unleashed by Reagan's statements in late October, 1981 on the topic of a conceivably winnable, limited nuclear war. This secular impetus swelled the protest ranks even more, culminating in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June 10, 1982 held in Bonn and Berlin. Organizational efforts are continuing on both the religious and secular fronts, often overlapping. Indeed, one must be careful not to adhere too rigidly to a particular organizational classification or ideological delineation of groups, given the highly decentralized nature of the movement as a whole.

The EKD'S ambivalent stance with respect to the morality of nuclear warfare, as manifested in the 1959 Heidelberg Theses, resurfaced in the 1970's. A group of "radical-pacifist" church members founded a peace initiative in 1978, "Live Without Armaments," whose adherents now number over 150,000. A counter group emerged within the church in 1980, calling itself "Secure the Peace." Religious activists opposing the arms race derived inspiration from a Dutch initiative organized in 1977 by the InterChurch Peace Council (IKV) under the motto, "rid the earth of weapons, begin with the Netherlands" (Deile, 1981). The EKD-affiliated Action Reconciliation/Peace Services (AS/F) joined the IKV in sponsoring the first

FRG-wide peace week in November, 1980, introducing the theme Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen -- Create Peace Without Weapons.

Manifold actions followed. A meeting of NATO officials in Bonn drew 25,000 demonstrators in April, 1981, a student rally in May brought together 40,000 for "Bafög [student loans and grants], not bombs." Another 20,000 staged a Peace March Against Atomic Weapons in Frankfurt, also in May, and 30 organizations sponsored a joint peace forum in Marburg. Hannover hosted a demonstration in support of the "Krefeld Appeal," a petition signed by two million people to date, calling for a European referendum on disarmament (see Appendix B). By the time the 19th Lutheran Congress was convened on June 17th, its theme "Fear Not" had attracted 300 peace groups, 65 specifically religious initiatives and many unexpected guests who imposed their own theme, "Have Fear -- Atomic Death Threatens Us All" (Der Spiegel, 22. June 1981). Top SPD officials became the target of reproach, understandable in light of Chancellor Schmidt's comment made one month earlier: "The sermon on the mount [blessed are the peacemakers] offers no practical guidelines for modern day politicians . . . That's not what it was intended for" (Der Spiegel, 8. June 1981). The AS/F, which assumed primary responsibility for organizing the massive Bonn demonstration the following October, benefited greatly from the momentum generated by the EKD meeting. The 1000+ groups represented in Bonn hoped their event would serve as a stimulant to greater grass roots involvement (Deile, 1981).

Whether or not the EKD leadership intended to do anything more than provide a forum for discussion, the large turnout and extensive media coverage led many to interpret the Hamburg Congress as a de facto endorsement of the movement by the Church. One noticeable outcome was a rapid increase in the number of young German males filing for conscientious

objector status. Since the promulgation of the Law of Military Obligation in 1956, C.O. applications tallied about 3000 a year through the 1960's (this excludes any male residing in Berlin, who is exempt from the 18 months of mandatory service). A 1977 liberalization of the draft law produced such a flood of applications -- 40,000 between August and December, including 6,000 from soldiers -- that the CDU/CSU filed suit in the Federal Constitutional Court and won its case, obligating the SPD-FDP coalition to reimpose tighter "test standards." Nevertheless, the number of draft resisters in 1981 rose to 50-60,000, including 5454 soldiers. Approximately 30-40,000 men between 18-25 annually pursue the alternative service option, i.e. working in nursing homes, mental institutions, etc. (Lange, 1982: pp. 126-27, 131). The term for "civilian service" was recently extended from 16 to 20 months (Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 March 1983).

The Hamburg Congress also assisted organizers in bringing the peace movement to the more conservative provinces. The next 12 months witnessed several hundred "peace weeks" and workshops on nonviolent action being planned and executed at the local level, many in conjunction with individual parishes. Hans Pestalozzi reports that by 1982 there were over 2,300 local, national and international initiatives and institutions serving European peace activists. The Social Democrats were sufficiently sobered by their Hamburg experience that the party conducted its own Peace Forum in Bonn on August 27, 1981, inviting such prominent dissidents as Rudolf Bahro and General Gert Bastian (Apel, et al, 1981). The Easter March was reinstituted in April 1982, turning out 30-40,000 in Frankfurt, and 160-380 in small towns like Sachsenhausen and Michelstadt im Odenwald.

In recent years the movement has derived further moral support from parallel demonstrations in neighboring countries: 400,000 in Amsterdam in

November, 50,000 in Bern in December, 1981; 200,000 in Paris and nearly 500,000 in New York in June, 1982. For the most part, organizers have stressed their contacts with protest groups in the US as evidence that the campaigns are not an exercise in anti-Americanism. The notion that this is a movement "made in Moscow" is undermined by the degree of church support it attracts -- ironically, arrangements for the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June, 1982 fell to the Evangelical Student Community, according to a rotation system worked out by the leaders of various groups. Efforts by the West German Communist Party to put its stamp on the movement have been quickly dismissed by other groups (Die Zeit, 29 October 1982). The Soviets have come in for their share of criticism as well: demonstrators turned out full force in honor of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in November, 1981.

Maintaining a rather anomalous position in a crowded field of peace organizers is the West German Catholic Church. A group of the "devout left" tried to mobilize participants at the 1968 Essener Congress, with no noticeable effect. At present the most active faction by far has been the Catholic Youth Organization, boasting 650,000 members who have adopted "Peace and Justice" as their key theme for the next three years. The German branch of Pax Christi cannot hold the proverbial candle to Action Reconciliation in terms of active cooperation with other peace groups. But it does appear that "the last major social bastion has finally been infected with the peace movement virus" (Die Zeit, 17. September 1982). The 87th Catholic Congress met in Düsseldorf in September, 1982 under the rubric "Turn Around - Disarm Yourself." Challenged by the contents of the pastoral letter issued by American Catholic bishops, German ecclesiastics are recognizing a need to "add the moral rigor of Catholicism to the pragmatism of Protestantism" (Die Zeit, 17. September 1982).

Protest mathematics dictates a lowest common denominator strategy for determining movement goals in the FRG: the sole shared objective is to prevent the 1983 deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, as required by the NATO Double Decision. The common conviction is that additional theater nuclear forces will render the Federal Republic the "ground zero" of a superpower confrontation. The tactical questions are unresolved. Contradictory opinions are voiced with respect to the desirability of unilateral or multilateral disarmament agreements. The definition of parity and the logical limits of deterrence are open to debate. Activists are divided over whether or not to demand simultaneous reductions in the Eastern bloc, and uncertain how to deal with nuclear proliferation in the Third World. No clear answer emerges to the question whether or not a build-up of conventional forces offers a morally or politically acceptable alternative. One discerns no single position with respect to the feasibility of a nuclear-free zone, prospects for alternative defense concepts or the inevitability of a political-bloc concept of security. Organizers have therefore made a conscious effort to avoid mobilizing around a single political party, which could put an end to its mass (if messy) base. Party political stances within the disarmament movement are still too preponderant (Pestalozzi, 1982: p. 95).

As explicitly political representatives of the peace movement, the Green and Alternative parties have made impressive electoral gains over the last three years. Alternative parties moreover enjoy substantial support among otherwise apolitical youth, i.e. members of the New Wave and squatters' scenes. The 1981 Shell study reveals that among 15-24 year olds, following the 32 percent who identify with no party, 20 percent back the Greens (Jugendwerk, 1981). However, even with 27 seats in the Bundestag as

of March, 1983, "the Greens" remain a very loose confederation of pro-ecology, anti-nuclear, grass-roots democrats who lack a coherent ideological base. The Greens comprise the Long March arm of the peace movement, whose self-proclaimed responsibility lies in furthering the prospects of success for extraparlimentary opposition to the 1983 deployments (Mettke, 1982). One occasionally senses, however, that the Greens may be developing a hidden agenda relating not only to a denuclearization of the FRG, but to the promotion of peace between the two Germanies. I will return to this possibility in the concluding portion of the paper.

II. THE MILITARIZED SOCIETY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: EXTRA-PARTY OPPOSITION IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

A. State and Church Accommodation. 1945 to 1978

When analyzing political trends in East European countries, it is unfair to assume that the strength of a protest movement lies in its numbers. Crowds of 700 to 7,000 attending peace events in the German Democratic Republic can only be compared with demonstrations of 30,000 to 300,000 in the Federal Republic when they are weighted to reflect the considerable personal-political risks involved for the individual participant. As a general rule, East German activists work to avoid creating a highly mobilized, mass based organization, the appearance of which would provoke a major crackdown by the regime against alleged enemies of the state. Developments over the last three years have nonetheless effected significant qualitative changes in the pacifist movement, despite the low-keyed, highly decentralized nature of GDR protests. The movement can no longer be dismissed as a temporal phenomenon; rather, it is a political factor with which the Socialist Unity Party (SED) must learn to deal. The

SED cannot get around recent waves of protest by expelling the leading dissidents: There are none. If the party opts for an iron-hand approach, it faces the risk of losing the hearts and minds of a whole generation of socialist-style "post-materialist" youth (Inglehart, 1971, 1982; Ash, 1981).

As in the FRG, the Lutheran Church has -- rather unintentionally -- become a major conduit for opposition to the arms race, as well as a chief mediator between a youth afflicted with existential Angst and a state which justifies its actions in the name of Realpolitik. Although the GDR does not have to contend with the presence of nuclear devices within its own borders, its proximity to the NATO deployment sites renders it as vulnerable to "ground zero" effects as the FRG. The anti-Pershing and cruise theme finds some expression in the pacifist movement, but to concentrate on a situation that a Warsaw-Pact nation is powerless to change would waste valuable energies. Limited influence with respect to Soviet defense policies also constrains activists in developing an anti-SS 20's theme. The topic that has come to dominate the protest agenda is one which most directly challenges the ideological legitimacy of the SED, namely, the protest against the increasing militarization of socialist society.

The East German peace campaign lacks much of the intensity, breadth and depth associated with the thirty-year protest tradition in the neighboring state, but it is not a movement born yesterday. Unlike the Federal Republic, the GDR has assumed little of the historical responsibility for the holocaust, though it has had its own problems mastering the legacy of Stalinism (Deutschland Archiv, No. 3, March 1979). In embracing Marxism-Leninism as "the peace concept par excellence," the SED used the immediate postwar period to profess the class character and the socio-economic roots of war in such a way that it was able to denounce

pacifism as a vehicle for undermining the resistance of the masses to imperialist forces. In 1952 the SED undertook the first in a series of measures aimed at socializing its citizens into a state of national alert, providing a target for subsequent if sporadic protests.

Responding to a "request" from the party-affiliated Free German Youth Organization (FDJ) in 1952, the SED established the Society for Sports and Technical Sciences (GST) for the purpose of promoting paramilitary physical-education and recreational activities for youth. In 1956 the FDJ enthusiastically welcomed the creation of the National People's Army, and following the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, orchestrated an "enlistment appeal" to all males 18-25 years old. Falling short of its recruitment goals, the SED introduced universal conscription in 1962. The law carried a penalty of three years in prison for men refusing induction, which the Lutheran Church interpreted as a violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of belief. In a 1963 document, "Ten Articles Concerning Peace and Service of the Church," the religious hierarchy recognized its obligation to provide legal protection for conscientious objectors and spiritual guidance for conscripts (Büscher, et al., 1982). Under pressure from the Church the SED introduced a special army division, the "construction units" (Baueinheiten), in September 1964, as a form of military service without weapons for religious objectors; but it refused to consider a non-uniformed alternative service independent of military control. The Church countered in 1965 with an "Outreach" memorandum outlining its criteria for meaningful spiritual assistance to conscripts on active duty, a source of considerable tension between Church and state for the next several years (Büscher, 1982).

From 1964-65 the state continued to expand the range of pre- and paramilitary training programs through the FDJ, the Young Pioneers and the Red Cross in the form of sports competitions, apprenticeships and work groups. Their general purpose was to foster a positive identification between children and the state as early as possible, to create emotional ties to the NVA and the Soviet Union based on heroic images, and to inculcate youth with the values of courage, endurance, decisiveness (!), "socialist alertness" regarding suspicious modes of behavior, unconditional loyalty and, last but not least, class consciousness (Deutschland Archiv, No. 12, December, 1981). Between 1965 and 1969 the FDJ continued to function as a channel in generating enthusiasm for the military, introducing its first "Recruitment Collectives" in the elite senior high schools. The principle of selecting-out in the ninth, eighth or as early as the fifth grade those students with military leadership potential was extended to the general polytechnical schools in 1973. It was the addition of a module for military training to the ninth and tenth grade curriculum and a twelve-day, obligatory (military or paramedic) intensive session for Abitur classes, however, that provoked the most significant waves of parental and parish opposition.

The Theological Studies Division of the EKB (which had been forced to undergo formal separation from the West German EKD in 1969) announced its own proposal for a mandatory "peace education" course for the grade schools. Religious leaders created a Church Office for Peace Research, known after 1971 as the Study Group for Peace Questions, who made it their task to convey the results of scientific peace research to ecumenical groups, as well as information about International Third World and Human Rights Conferences.

Perhaps as a means of improving its image abroad, and in an effort to

afford Christians an opportunity for a more positive identification with the East German state, the SED moved to improve relations with the Lutheran Church as an institution (Deutschland Archiv, No. 11, November, 1981). A less obvious but not inconceivable motive was the desire to drive a further wedge between the East and West German Church federations. The party tolerated the sense of "special community" that clearly existed between the two, but coupled this with pressures for EKB (Kirchenbund) engagement in socialist ecumenism, i.e. through closer ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. The SED maintained an intentionally ambivalent stance, so that Christians would not feel compelled to choose between Church and State. That it met with some success is attested to by the fact that the 1971 Eisenacher Synod announced: "We do not want to be the Church against, nor the Church next to, but rather the Church in Socialism" (Deutschland Archiv, No. 4, April 1978: p. 352).

The period of rapprochement 1972-1973 corresponded with the high point of Ostpolitik negotiations, which might suggest that good SED-EKB relations serve as a barometer for the level of German-German tensions. The party leadership soon discovered that permitting more extensive contacts between the West and East German protestant communities also brought in welcome hard currency during a period of rising import costs. The state's willingness to provide capital assistance for new church and hospital construction, to recognize its role as a coordinator for charitable, cultural and youth work, as well as to engage in discussions on abortion and the Helsinki accords, still had not resulted in noticeable improvements for individual practicing Christians, however. School-aged youths were subject to considerable ideological pressure. A decision to become a "construction soldier" almost automatically precluded access to higher education and other career

opportunities.

Because any effort to establish a formal organization of conscientious objectors would immediately be outlawed as inimical to the state, the Church has been called upon by growing numbers of individuals to function as a de facto institutional base. For practicing Christians the problem is not only that pacifist alternatives are limited either to military-related construction duties or to work in special police or state security units; it is also the case that the legal options are not publicized. It is up to the candidate to search out and abide by formal requirements. Since 1964, some 5,000 males have refused regular induction, involving 18 months of active and two years of reserve duty up to age 50. This does not include the "total resisters," i.e. Jehovah's Witnesses, who face ever stiffer prison sentences. About 250-280 youth are drafted into the construction ranks at 18 month intervals; an estimated 500, mostly theology students, escape being called into service at all (Deutschland Archiv, No. 1, January, 1979; Ehring and Dallwitz, 1982). A reorganization of the construction units precipitated an initiative among young men lobbying for alternative service in 1975. As a clever albeit subversive means of raising consciousness, they committed themselves to a nineteenth month of voluntary service in charitable or church-affiliated institutions to demonstrate their idea of a truly alternative service.

The EKB has done its bit by organizing regular regional meetings as a way of facilitating contacts between former and future resisters. Still, the Church suffers from a case of organizational schizophrenia, in that it continues to make gains as an institution, but is relatively powerless in cases when there is a need to protect the individuals who look to it for moral leadership. The self-immolation of Paster Brüsewitz in August, 1976

delivered a major jolt to church consciousness with respect to the inherent dangers of its accommodationist strategy.

The years 1975-77 were marked by growing unrest among East German intellectuals who were said to have contracted the "Helsinki fever," and among youth who clashed with police over the reglementation of free time, i.e., the ban on rock concerts in East Berlin, Wittenberge and Erfurt. The state began to see certain advantages in upholding the Church as a credible, yet responsible forum for limited socio-political "competition." Soviet protests against the neutron bomb and NATO modernization plans opened the door for Church attacks on the arms race (a revolving door, it was not). GDR officials nevertheless attempted to maintain distance between the organized Church and intellectual dissidents, reacting allergically when poet-musician Wolf Bierman was invited to perform on church property, for example.

Good relations between the Kirchenbund and the SED reached their peak with the March 6, 1978 summit meeting between the Lutheran primate Bishop Albrecht Schönherr and General Secretary Erich Honecker. The party granted more concessions, again in relation to the Church's institutional standing, approving joint preparations for the 500th anniversary of Luther's birth, offering expanded discussions on economic and environmental problems and the like. In all probability, these additional concessions would have made it ever more difficult for the religious hierarchy to convince the parish faithful that it represented an autonomous moral force, had the political leadership not introduced new measures in 1978 further infringing upon individual conscience.

B. Peace With or Without Weapons? 1978 to Present

In June 1978, the East German Minister of Education announced a plan to introduce obligatory military education into the ninth and tenth grade curricula, a plan that had been in the making for two years. The Conference of Evangelical Church Directorates (KEK) called a special meeting in East Berlin to protest its exclusion from any discussion of the proposed changes and to formulate a letter to all parishes opposing the intensified militarization of East German society.

The SED refused to hear a direct appeal by the Conference urging it to reconsider. It justified its actions by arguing that these measures were not to be judged in isolation, but only in the context of the government's general "peace policy." Military education and defense preparedness added credibility to the GDR's pursuit of peace, made for good pedagogy and promoted physical development. The SED stressed that participation in actual weapons training for boys was entirely voluntary, although 100 percent participation would, of course, be desirable. Clergy and parents objected that military education for school children would contribute to an atmosphere of anxiety, foster a hatred of the "enemy" contradictory to Christian teachings, and instill in impressionable youth the belief that military action was an acceptable behavioral norm for conflict resolution. The military education requirements phased in during September 1978 and 1979 spawned a number of "Peace Education" initiatives at parish and regional levels.

The events of 1980 bring a new quality to the East German pacifist movement. Eight regional spring and fall synods adopted peace as their discussion theme, and a series of German-German Church consultations on questions of peace took place with SED approval in East Berlin. The party was less tolerant of discussions between the Kirchenbund and the Dutch KV,

when the EKB showed signs of adopting the Dutch self-denuclearization model. The Lutherans grew more reluctant to restrict themselves to critiques of NATO.

The Church qua institution formally joined the ranks of the opposition by sponsoring its first "peace decade" November 9-19, 1980, declaring the traditional Advent Repentance Day a "Disarmament Day." They adopted the motto gaining popularity in the West -- Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen. To avoid allegations of Western infiltration, organizers designed a sew-on badge, replicating the Soviet memorial statue at the UN of a muscular male figure pounding his sword into a plowshare. The badge became an instant best-seller among adolescents. The "decade" was staged partially in response to the GDR sanctions imposed due to the Polish crisis (Büscher, 1982). A second nation-wide "decade" took place November 8-18, 1981.

By the autumn of 1981, it was the SED's turn to face up to the accommodationist's dilemma. For the last two years the official party daily, Neues Deutschland, has carried enthusiastic reports of anti-NATO protests in the West. But the more extensive these reports have become, the more difficult it has been for the state to repress comparable mobilizations within its own borders. Conversely, the more glowing the reports on Eastern developments that appear in the Western media, the harder it has become for GDR activists to maneuver within an already restrictive political environment.

The Dresden Forum of February 13, 1982 can be considered the East German analog to the 1981 Evangelical Congress in Hamburg. The Forum also signals a severing of ties between the official and unofficial peace movements. The meeting commemorating the thirty-seventh anniversary of the Dresden bombings attracted 5,000 East German youth, despite official efforts

to suppress publication of the event. Discussion topics ranged from the significance of the "Berlin Appeal" circulated by dissident Rainer Eppelmann (see Appendix C), to the sanctions being imposed at school and workplace against those displaying the "Swords to Plowshares" badges. The Forum message quickly spread to the provinces, as crowds of 2,000-7,000 assembled at synods from Jena to Brandenburg. Less than six months later, the Lutheran Church publicly took its leave of the government's position on disarmament. In July, 1982, the Conference of Church Directorates proclaimed the production, development, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons "a moral evil." It held that nuclear deployments "regardless of where and by whom" ought to be abjured by all religions, thereby calling for a complete freeze and a "moratorium on inimical rhetoric" (Der Tagesspiegel-Berlin, 7 July 1982).

The SED's troubled reaction to a set of conditions it has in part helped to create are reflected in a comment by a representative of the "official" peace movement, embodied in the East German Peace Council: "Why do you want to mobilize on your own? That will only undermine our national movement" (Die Zeit, 11 February 1983). It has attempted to counter this form of extra-party opposition -- ironically -- by expanding the organizational base of the movement, rallying its own troops in support of the official "peace policy." The FDJ has been pushed to center stage, in light of the regime's particular concern with growing youth unrest. Youth organizers have adopted the themes Gegen NATO Waffen, Frieden Schaffen (Make Peace Against NATO Weapons) and "Peace Must Be Defended, Peace Must Be Armed." The FDJ has in turn adopted clever but subversive tactics, emulating the headbands, badges and T-shirts of the other movement, also scheduling officially-sanctioned-rock concerts and candlelight marches "like

in Bonn" (Die Zeit, 28 May 1982).

Like its counterpart in the Federal Republic, the Catholic Church in the GDR has remained conspicuously passive over the last two decades. It has largely produced memos for internal consumption, in which it asserts the right of military conscripts to practice their faith and continues to uphold the "just war thesis." In 1968 diocesan youth offices instigated a discussion series titled "Peace Is Possible;" but in 1978 there was no open debate among Catholics concerning parental rights and military education in the schools.

Despite what appears to be a unified pro-freeze stance on the part of the Evangelical Church, the unofficial East German peace movement is likely to continue developing along regional-parish lines. At this level activist groups will continue their efforts to bring about the creation of a social-civilian service option for conscientious objectors, a purging of school texts of glorified military images and the elimination of "war toys" from schools and daycare centers. Instead of merging protest issues, religious elements are attempting to present their causes as criticisms of specific policies, and not as an assault on the political regime per se.

In youth circles, there is a growing feeling of alienation towards the system which finds its parallels in the FRG. Politicians and psychologists on both sides of the border are witnessing the development of a "second culture," a pattern of "internal emigration" based on a rejection of establishment values, whether they be capitalist or socialist. The large numbers of adolescents flocking to ecclesiastical synods do not necessarily signify that a major religious revival is in the making. Rather, it is the Church's century-old tradition of providing sanctuary that has attracted so many displaced flower-children. They see the Church as a place where they

are free to ask questions and where they can find a sense of belonging among others who share their fears. In stark contrast to the FRG, however, the majority of those resisting military induction and chanting for peace in the GDR tend to be manual or semiskilled workers and apprentices, not university students. As one visitor to Dresden explained: "I am only 19 and already have nothing more to lose" (Büscher, 1982:p.280). Upwardly mobile Abitur-students are much less inclined to jeopardize their chances for university admission and professional careers.

A third component of the pacifist movement, composed of dissident intellectuals, poses a potentially greater -- if unintentional -- political threat to the GDR leadership. On the surface at least, the major issues raised by this group run parallel to questions posed by the Alternative Parties in the west regarding the status of Germany in the disarmament process. Implicit in their criticisms and deliberations is a recognition that it may be time to reopen the Pandora's box of German nationalism.

III. NEUTRO-NATIONALISM "MADE IN GERMANY"

For both German states, the special political significance of the peace movements must be ascribed to the security dilemma presented by their respective geostrategic locations. The security policies of both countries are strictly delimited by their mutual dependence on another major power. This dependence has become a critical element in the self-image of these states and has significantly influenced their definitions of power with respect to foreign policy.

Article 5 of the 1972 Basic Treaty commits the FRG and the GDR to a search for measures to bring about arms reductions in Europe and a mutual support of efforts to place the remainder under effective international

control. Yet neither side has seen fit to exploit opportunities made possible by a general improvement in German-German relations, for the purpose of establishing "confidence-building" measures. Instead, "many West German policy makers... have gladly used international complications surrounding the German question as a way of reducing their responsibility for (irrational) relations with the other German state," according to former FRG representative to the GDR, Günter Gaus (Die Zeit, 4 June 1982). The converse no doubt holds true for the East German leadership.

But the more strained the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union becomes, the greater the inclination among some disarmament proponents to move the question of inter-German relations to the center stage. It would be overstating the case to argue for all demonstrators that "in light of world political developments over the last two years, the German question has permeated our consciousness as the key to European peace" (Pestalozzi, 1982:p. 321). A unique meeting of the minds in East Berlin during December of 1981, on the one-hand, and a bevy of media reports on neutro-nationalism, national-neutralism, crypto-nationalism and "German patriotism," on the other, indicate a significant degree of interest in the topic on both sides of the border nonetheless.

Some 100 writers, artists and scholars from East and West attended an officially sanctioned conference at the "Hotel Stadt Berlin" on December 13-14, 1981, at the same time Schmidt and Honecker were engaged in a summit meeting at Wehrbellin (both disrupted by the imposition of martial law in Poland). For East Germans the meeting was particularly significant in that it provided an official forum for known critics of the regime, in contrast to the heavy-handed expulsion tactics used against intellectual dissidents in the 1970's. For the West Germans it was an opportunity to hear Eastern

intellectuals address the peace question in their own terms, devoid of the ideological defensiveness characteristic of other gatherings (Deutschland Archiv, No. 3, March, 1982).

The December meeting does not represent the first call for an intensified German-German dialogue to have grown out of the peace movement. Nor, fittingly, has it been the first appeal to come from Berlin. What is more surprising, however, is the fact that the subject of German nationalism is generating a lot of positive interest among the political Left. One would expect to hear praise for "German patriotism" coming from Otto von Bismarck, but not from Heinrich Böll (Die Zeit, 20 November 1981). In fact, West-Berlin's Alternative List Party has devoted some time and platform space to the Deutschlandfrage ever since its 1981 electoral campaign.

Always prepared to rush in where more celestial powers prefer not to tread, the Alternative List (AL) has issued a four-point challenge to a Germany which has accepted its division as the status quo. Militarily, the AL ardently supports the creation of a German nuclear-free zone, the withdrawal of all but a symbolic contingent of occupational forces from both Berlins, termination of FRG and GDR membership in the NATO and Warsaw Pacts, respectively. Politically, the Alternatives advocate a loose confederation of the two German states, which would allow for cooperation in the fields of economics, environmental protection, transportation, urban development, science, culture, sports and Third World assistance. They also press for a liberalization of travel rights for East Germans. On the economic front, the AL has proposed an extension of the "special ties" concept (Quadripartite Agreement of 1971) to permit the inclusion of the GDR in GATT, to establish the convertability of the East German Mark and to promote West Berlin integration into the East German economy. With respect to legal

status, the Alternatives want to see a formal peace treaty along the lines of the Austrian model and the elimination of a priori prohibitions on reunification talks. The reunification they have in mind, however, would not resemble the centralized Prussian-national state of Bismarck; "It would be neither a camouflaged FRG nor an overextended GDR" (Die Zeit, 20 November 1981). The object is to substitute a new Heimat-Gefühl for a thirty year old "hostage" consciousness. The system parties find this proposal to "open old wounds" very unsettling.

The "Berlin Appeal," mentioned earlier as a topic finding resonance among youth at the Dresden Forum, is equally disconcerting to East German authorities, who have never been partial to the idea of reunification. The petition which began circulating in the GDR in early 1982 not only calls for a peace treaty and withdrawal of foreign troops, greater freedom of political expression, an end to military parades and civil defense exercises. It moreover pleads for direct negotiations between the two Germanies regarding the creation of their own nuclear free zone.

The appeal to German-German survival instincts implicit in this document is unlikely to provoke a positive response from the superpowers. But it does emphasize that no state has a monopoly on the desire for peace. At this point, German reunification is a highly unlikely proposition. Perhaps the disarmament movement arouses memories of the anti-rearmament days when reunification was a dream kept very much alive by the conservative government. One may wish to discount the reunification proposals as little more than an exercise in radical-romanticism. The question of German national identity, however, can not be so quickly dismissed.

I would like to suggest that the two German states are only now confronting the full-fledged political effects connected with the missing

generation phenomenon. Demographic polarization in the FRG and the GDR has been a major factor in youth's strong attraction to the peace movement in both systems. First of all, a majority of the peace activists are too young to have experienced fascism directly; they are tired of the national guilt complex imposed on them for atrocities they never committed. They have witnessed a different kind of destruction of the environment in their own lifetime, however, whose costs they shall also have to pay: Hence, the connection between the two anti-nuclear movements.

Second, a German baby-boom delayed by the imperatives of reconstruction has reached employable age, just as worsening economic conditions dictate dramatic cutbacks in educational and career opportunities, construction of housing and recreational facilities, and other services important to youth -- in the East as well as in the West. Arms expenditures have become a significant source of resentment towards the system and towards the superpowers who stand behind them.

Third, the younger generations have been strongly influenced by an ongoing exposure to nonconventional forms of participation. The mass media have tended to reinforce -- if at times they have overestimated significance of demonstrations, boycotts, and other types of direct action. The publicity generated by the student movement, "citizen initiatives" and mass marches for peace has led the younger activists to accept extraparliamentary tactics as more or less "conventional" forms of political behavior. Youth's growing distrust and cynicism with respect to its own political leaders and institutions have moreover displaced the vigilance of earlier years directed against the external enemy.

Finally, for many of the 1980's protesters a world divided into ideological spheres of influence is an historical given, and not a

particularly useful one at that. They have on occasion sought to channel their demands through the established institutions, for which they have been rebuffed, vilified, black-listed (Berufsverbot) and even imprisoned. Anti-nuclear protesters have attempted to add important items to the political agenda. They have found greater personal satisfaction and a sense of community in grass-roots involvement, in pragmatic rather than in ideological politics. Neither governments in the West or East have lived up to their respective promises to "dare more democracy" and to provide for "each according to his or her need."

For these reasons, the peace movements in the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic have become an important vehicle for political expression. Their significance will not be measurable in terms of how many Pershing II and cruise missiles are actually deployed at the end of 1983. The hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people mobilized in opposition to further military build-ups are unlikely to settle for a peace defined as "no war." As recently expelled East German writer Thomas Brasch reflected at the December, 1981 gathering of intellectuals: "The 'peace' I have lived through for the last twenty years was a horrendous experience, devoid of productivity and creativity" (Deutschland Archiv, No. 3, March, 1982:p. 335). Of course, the alternative could be much worse -- unless these movements somehow succeed in creating a peace without weapons.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Communiqués
Brussels, December 12, 13, 14, 1979**

**SPECIAL COMMUNIQUE, THEATRE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, DECEMBER 12, 1979**

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th December 1979:
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre rôle. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.
4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.
5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.
6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.
7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads.

All the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of rôles and systems in NATO's nuclear armory as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the rôle of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

Der Appell von Krefeld: Keine Atomraketen in Europa

Immer offensichtlicher erweist sich der Nachrüstungsbeschluß der NATO vom 12. Dezember 1979 als verhängnisvolle Fehlentscheidung. Die Erwartung, wonach Vereinbarungen zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion zur Begrenzung der eurostrategischen Waffensysteme noch vor der Stationierung einer neuen Generation amerikanischer nuklearer Mittelstreckenwaffen in Westeuropa erreicht werden könnten, scheint sich nicht zu erfüllen.

Ein Jahr nach Brüssel ist noch nicht einmal der Beginn solcher Verhandlungen in Sicht. Im Gegenteil: Der neugewählte Präsident der USA erklärt unumwunden, selbst den bereits unterzeichneten SALT II-Vertrag zur Begrenzung der sowjetischen und amerikanischen strategischen Nuklearwaffen nicht akzeptieren und deshalb dem Senat nicht zur Ratifizierung zuleiten zu wollen.

Mit der Verweigerung dieser Ratifizierung durch die USA würde jedoch die Aussicht auf Verhandlungen zur Begrenzung der eurostrategischen Nuklearwaffen unvermeidbar in noch weitere Ferne rücken. Ein selbstmörderischer Rüstungswettkampf könnte nicht im letzten Augenblick gestoppt werden; seine zunehmende Beschleunigung und offenbar konkreter werdende Vorstellungen von der scheinbaren Begrenzbarkeit eines Nuklearkrieges müßten in erster Linie die europäischen Völker einem untragbaren Risiko aussetzen.

Die Teilnehmer am Krefelder Gespräch vom 15. und 16. November 1980 appellieren daher gemeinsam an die Bundesregierung,

- die Zustimmung zur Stationierung von Pershing-II-Raketen und Marschflugkörpern in Mitteleuropa zurückzuziehen;
- im Bündnis künftig eine Haltung einzunehmen, die unser Land nicht länger dem Verdacht aussetzt, Wegbereiter eines neuen, vor allem die Europäer gefährdenden nuklearen Wettrennens sein zu wollen.

In der Öffentlichkeit wächst die Sorge über die jüngste Entwicklung. Immer entschiedener werden die Möglichkeiten einer alternativen Sicherheitspolitik diskutiert.

Solche Überlegungen sind von großer Bedeutung für den demokratischen Prozeß der Willensbildung und können dazu beitragen, daß unser Volk sich nicht plötzlich vollzogenen Tatsachen gegenübergestellt sieht.

Alle Mitbürgerinnen und Mitbürger werden deshalb aufgerufen, diesen Appell zu unterstützen, um durch unablässigen und wachsenden Druck der öffentlichen Meinung eine Sicherheitspolitik zu erzwingen, die

- eine Aufrüstung Mitteleuropas zur nuklearen Waffenplattform der USA nicht zuläßt;
- Abrüstung für wichtiger hält als Abschreckung;
- die Entwicklung der Bundeswehr an dieser Zielsetzung orientiert.

Erstunterzeichner: Gert Bastian - Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Karl Bechert, Mainz - Petra K. Kelly, Nürnberg - D. Martin Niemöller, Wiesbaden - Prof. Dr. Helmut Ridder, Gießen - Christoph Strasser, Münster - Gösta von Uexküll, Hamburg - Josef Weber, Köln

**Der „Berliner Appell – Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen“
(25.1.1982)**

1

Es kann in Europa nur noch einen Krieg geben, den Atomkrieg. Die in Ost und West angehäuften Waffen werden uns nicht schützen, sondern vernichten. Wir werden alle längst gestorben sein, wenn die Soldaten in den Panzern und Raketenbasen und die Generäle und Politiker in den Schutzbunkern, auf deren Schutz wir vertrauten, noch leben und fortfahren zu vernichten, was noch übrig geblieben ist.

2

Darum: Wenn wir leben wollen, fort mit den Waffen! Und als erstes: Fort mit den Atomwaffen. Ganz Europa muß zur atomwaffenfreien Zone werden. Wir schlagen vor: Verhandlungen zwischen den Regierungen der beiden deutschen Staaten über die Entfernung aller Atomwaffen aus Deutschland.

3

Das geteilte Deutschland ist zur Aufmarschbasis der beiden großen Atomkräfte geworden. Wir schlagen vor, diese lebensgefährliche Konfrontation zu beenden. Die Siegerkräfte des 2. Weltkrieges müssen endlich die Friedensverträge mit den beiden deutschen Staaten schließen, wie es im Potsdamer Abkommen von 1945 beschlossen worden ist. Danach sollten die ehemaligen Alliierten ihre Besatzungstruppen aus Deutschland abziehen und Garantien über die Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der beiden deutschen Staaten vereinbaren.

4

Wir schlagen vor, in einer Atmosphäre der Toleranz und der Anerkennung des Rechts auf freie Meinungsäußerung die große Aussprache über die Fragen des Friedens zu führen, und jede spontane Bekundung des Friedenswillens in der Öffentlichkeit zu billigen und zu fördern. Wir wenden uns an die Öffentlichkeit und an unsere Regierung, über die folgenden Fragen zu beraten und zu entscheiden:

- a) Sollten wir nicht auf die Produktion, den Verkauf und die Einfuhr von sogenanntem Kriegsspielzeug verzichten?
- b) Sollten wir nicht anstelle des Wehrkundeunterrichts an unseren Schulen einen Unterricht über Fragen des Friedens einführen?
- c) Sollten wir nicht anstelle des jetzigen Wehersatzdienstes für Kriegsdienstverweigerer einen sozialen Friedensdienst zulassen?
- d) Sollten wir nicht auf alle Demonstrationen militärischer Machtmittel in der Öffentlichkeit verzichten und unsere staatlichen Feiern statt dessen dazu benutzen, den Friedenswillen des Volkes kundzutun?

e) Sollten wir nicht auf die Übungen zur sogenannten Zivilverteidigung verzichten? Da es im Atomkrieg keine Möglichkeit einer sinnvollen Zivilverteidigung gibt, wird durch diese Übungen nur der Atomkrieg verharmlost. Ist es nicht womöglich eine Art psychologischer Kriegsvorbereitung?

5

Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen – das bedeutet nicht nur: Sicherheit zu schaffen für unser eigenes Überleben. Es bedeutet auch das Ende der sinnlosen Verschwendung von Arbeitskraft und Reichtum unseres Volkes für die Produktion von Kriegswerkzeug und die Ausrüstung riesiger Armeen junger Menschen, die dadurch der produktiven Arbeit entzogen werden. Sollten wir nicht lieber den Hungernden in aller Welt helfen, statt fortzufahren, unseren Tod vorzubereiten?

Selig sind die Sanftmütigen,
Denn sie werden das Erbreich besitzen.
(Jesus von Nazareth in der Bergpredigt)

Das Gleichgewicht des Schreckens hat den Atomkrieg bisher nur dadurch verhindert, daß es ihn immer wieder auf morgen vertagt hat. Vor diesem herannahenden Morgen des Schreckens fürchten sich die Völker. Sie suchen nach neuen Wegen, dem Frieden eine bessere Grundlage zu geben. Auch der „Berliner Appell“ ist ein Ausdruck dieses Suchens. Denkt über ihn nach, macht unseren Politikern Vorschläge und diskutiert überall die Frage: Was führt zum Frieden, was zum Krieg?

Bekräftigt Eure Zustimmung zum „Berliner Appell“ durch Eure Unterschrift.

Berlin, den 25. Januar 1982

Namen der Erstunterzeichner (DDR-Bürger aus verschiedenen Städten):

Reiner Eppelmann, Pfarrer der Samaritergemeinde Friedrichshain und Kreisjugendpfarrer; Manfred Altmann, Handwerker; Axel Bayer, Arbeiter; Evelyn Bayer, Arbeiterin; Eva-Maria Eppelmann, Hausfrau; Volker Elste, Diakon-Schüler; Stefan Freyer, Mechaniker; Lorenz Göring, Diakon-Schüler; Katja Havemann, Hausfrau; Robert Havemann, Wissenschaftler; Eberhard Henke, Manager; Ralf Hirsch, Schlosser; Michael Heinisch, Diakon-Schüler; Christfried Heinke, Diakon-Schüler; Gerd Jäger, Diakon; Daniela Karschewsky, Angestellte; Rosemarie Keßler, Arbeiterin; Günter Keßler, Arbeiter; Olaf Kraenkel, Angestellter; Detlef Kucharzewski, Arbeiter; Regine Maywald, Angestellte; Johannes Maywald, Angestellter; Lothar Niederohe, Arbeiter; Rudi Pahnke, Gemeindepfarrer und Kreisjugendpfarrer; Jürgen Pagel, Diakon-Schüler; Lutz Rathenow, Schriftsteller; Thomas Schulz, Arbeiter; Ralph Syrowatka, Diakon; Friedhart Steinert, Arbeiter; Bernd Schulz, Arbeiter; Winfried Weu, Mechaniker; Andrea Weu, Krankenschwester; Günter Weu, Kreiskatechet; Bernd Weu, Ingenieur; Hans-Jochen Tschiche, Pfarrer und Leiter der Evangelischen Akademie Magdeburg.

Bibliography

- Ash, Timothy Garten. UND WILLST DU NICHT MEIN BRUDER SEIN - DIE DDR HEUTE. Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981.
- Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. "Germany, Europe and the United States -- Is Anti-Americanism Significant?" Report of an International Conference, Aspen Institute Berlin, 81/2, June 28-July 1, 1981.
- Bahr, Hans-Eckehard. WISSEN WOFÜR MAN LEBT. JUGEND PROTEST - AUFBRUCH IN EINE VERÄNDERTE ZUKUNFT, München: Kindler, 1982.
- Baker, Kendall with Russell J. Dalton, Kai Hildebrandt. GERMANY TRANSFORMED - POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE NEW POLITICS, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Benewick, Robert and Trevor Smith. DIRECT ACTION AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1972.
- Berger, Suzanne. "Politics and Anti-Politics in Western Europe in the Seventies," DAEDALUS, Winter 1979, pp. 27-50.
- Brand, Karl-Werner. "Institutionalisierung und 'Bewegung': ein falscher Gegensatz," paper presented at the 1982 Meeting of the Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft (DVPW), Berlin, 4.-7. October 1982.
- Büscher, Wolfgang, Peter Wensierski, et al., Hrsg. FRIEDENSBEWEGUNG IN DER DDR, Hattingen: Scandica Verlag, 1982.
- Deile, Volkmar, Hrsg. BONN, 10. 10. 81. FRIEDENSDEMONSTRATION FÜR ABRÜSTUNG UND ENTSPANNUNG IN EUROPA, Bornheim: Laumuv Verlag, 1981.
- Duff, Peggy, LEFT, LEFT, LEFT. A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF SIX PROTEST CAMPAIGNS 1945-1965, London: Allison & Busby, 1971.
- Ehring, Klaus und Martin Dallwitz. SCHWERTER ZU PFLUGSCHAREN - FRIEDENSBEWEGUNG IN DER DDR. Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982.
- Eppler, Erhard. WEGE AUS DER GEFAHR. Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981.
- Fichter, Tilman und Siegwald Lönnendörner. KLEINE GESCHICHTE DES SDS. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1971.
- Flood, Michael and Robin Grove-White. NUCLEAR PROSPECTS - A COMMENT ON THE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE AND NUCLEAR POWER, London: Robendene Ltd., 1976.
- FRIEDENSMANIFEST DER GRÜNEN, Bonn: Bundesgeschäftsstelle der Partei, 1982.
- Glotz, Peter. DIE BEWEGLICHKEIT DES TANKERS. DIE SOZIALDEMOKRATIE ZWISCHEN STAAT UND SOZIALEN BEWEGUNGEN, München: C. Bertelsmann, 1981.

Graf, William D. THE GERMAN LEFT SINCE 1945 - SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC. Cambridge, UK: Oleander Press, 1976.

Grieffenhagen, Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen. EIN SCHWIERIGES VATERLAND. ZUR POLITISCHEN KULTUR DEUTSCHLANDS, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1981.

Haller, Michael, Hrsg. AUSSTEIGEN ODER REBELLIEREN -- JUGENDLICHE GEGEN STAAT UND GESELLSCHAFT, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Spiegelbuch, Rowohlt, 1981.

Helm, Jutta A. "Extraparliamentary Protest in West Germany," paper presented at the Third CES Conference of Europeanists, Washington, D.C., April 29-May 1, 1982. **

Inglehart, Ronald. "Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 75, No. 4, December, 1981. pp. 880-899.

_____. "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," APSR, Vol. 65, 1971. pp. 991-1017.

Jänicke, Martin. "Ökologische Krise und das Versagen der etablierten politischen Strukturen: 10 Thesen," paper presented at the DVPW meeting, Berlin, October, 1982.

Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell. JUGEND '81: LEBENSENTWÜRF, ALLTAGSKULTUREN, ZUKUNFTSBILDER. Hamburg: JDS, 1981.

Kaase, Max. "Partizipatorische Revolution - Ende der Parteien?" in Joachim Raschke (Hrsg.) BÜRGER UND PARTEIEN, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982, pp. 173-189.

Kaldor, Mary and Dan Smith, eds. DISARMING EUROPE, London: Merlin Press, 1982.

Karasek, Horst. DAS DORF IM FLORSHEIMER WALD - EINE CHRONIK VOM ALLTÄGLICHEN WIDERSTAND GEGEN DIE STARTBAHN WEST, Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1981.

KURSBUCH 65 - DER GROSSE BRUCH - REVOLTE '81, Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1981.

Marcuse, Herbert. COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLT, London: Penguin Press, 1972.

Mettke, Jorg R., Hrsg. DIE GRÜNEN - REGIERUNGSPARTNER VON MORGEN? Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982.

Neikin, Dorothy and Michael Pollack. THE ATOM BESIEGED: EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY DISSENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981.

Otto, Karl. VOM OSTERMARSCH ZUR APO, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 1977.

Pestalozzi, Hans A. Hrsg. FRIEDEN IN DEUTSCHLAND - DIE FRIEDENSBEWEGUNG, WAS SIE IST, WAS SIE WERDEN KANN. München: Wilhelm Goldman Verlag, 1982. (Essays by Klatt, Zeller

Raschke, Joachim, Hrsg. BÜRGER UND PARTEIEN - ANSICHTEN UND ANALYSEN EINER SCHWIERIGEN BEZIEHUNG, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982.

Helm, Jutta. "Protest and Political Change in West Germany: Evidence from Three Decades." Paper presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31 - September 3, 1979. **

Roos, Peter, Hrsg. TRAU KEINEM ÜBER DREISSIG - EINE GENERATION ZWISCHEN BESETZTEN STÜHLEN, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1982.

Rucht, Dieter. "Institutionalisierungstendenzen der Neuen Sozialen Bewegungen," paper presented at the DVPW meeting, Berlin, October, 1982.

Rupp, Hans-Karl. AUSSERPARLAMENTARISCHE OPPOSITION IN ARA DER ADENAUER. DER KAMPF GEGEN ATOMBEWAFFNUNG IN DEN FUNFZIGER JAHREN. Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1970.

Schlicht, Uwe. VOM BURSCHENSCHAFTER BIS ZUM SPONTI - STUDENTISCHE OPPOSITION GESTERN UND HEUTE. Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1980.

SICHERHEITSPOLITIK CONTRA FRIEDEN? EIN FORUM (SPD) Berlin/Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz, 1981.
Hrsg. ^ H. Apel.

Tarrow, Sidney. "Social Movements, Resource Mobilization and Reform during Cycles of Protest: A Bibliographic and Critical Essay," Project on Social Protest and Policy Innovation, Cornell University, Working Paper No. 1, January, 1982.

Tilly, Charles. "Collective Violence in European Perspective," in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA - HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, eds. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979 edition, pp. 83-118.

Thompson, E.P. ZERO OPTION, London: Merlin Press, 1982.

Zeuner, Bodo, with Lillian Klotzsch, Klaus Konemann, Jorg Wischermann. "Alternative im Parlament - Neue Soziale Bewegungen und parlamentarische Repräsentation," paper presented at the DVPW meeting, Berlin, October, 1982.

Zwischenbericht der Enquete-Kommission. JUGENDPROTEST IM DEMOKRATISCHEN STAAT, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 9/1607 vom 28. April 1982.