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Grassroots and Gewaltfreie Aktionen:
A Study of Mass Mobilization Strategies
in the West German Peace Movement

by

Joyce Marie Mushaben

GRASSROOTS AND GEWALTFREIE AKTIONEN:
A STUDY OF MASS MOBILIZATION STRATEGIES
IN THE WEST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT

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Abstract

The West German peace movement of the eighties has been subject to many of the "ebbs and flows" characteristic of protest movements of the late sixties and early seventies, with one important exception. In contrast to the more doctrinaire Marxist/socialist orientations evinced by those earlier movements, the mobilization against the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles has been grounded in sincere efforts on the part of core activists to develop a German tradition of non-violence and civil disobedience. The author presents a catalogue of strategies employed by movement participants since the promulgation of the 1979 NATO Double Decision, divided into the subcategories of consciousness-raising or "mobilization" activities, and direct action or "escalation" activities. The extensive but by no means comprehensive list of possible protest actions seeks to maximize the opportunities for participation and to intensify one's personal identification with the movement at the grassroots level. Even though they have proved unsuccessful in blocking additional theater nuclear deployments, peace protesters are judged to have contributed significantly to the "democratization" of postwar German society.

GRASSROOTS AND GEWALTFREIE AKTIONEN:
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The lawbreaker breaks the law surreptitiously and tries to avoid the penalty, not so the civil resister. He ever obeys the laws of the State to which he belongs, not out of fear of the sanctions but because he considers them to be good for the welfare of society. But there come occasions, generally rare, when he considers certain laws to be so unjust as to render obedience to them a dishonour. He then openly and civilly breaks them and quietly suffers the penalty for their breach. And in order to register his protest against the action of the law givers, it is open to him to withdraw his co-operation from the State by disobeying such other laws whose breach does not involve moral turpitude.

— M. K. Gandhi

Non-violent Resistance (Satyagraha)

Between 1981 and 1983, West German political leaders were forced to confront a massive wave of anti-nuclear protests, the likes of which they had not witnessed since the late 1960's. This recent mobilization of protest forces directed against the deployment of additional theater nuclear weapons on German soil finds its roots in a tradition of peace activism dating back to the 1950's, when the catalyst to protest was the decision to permit the rearmament of the former Reich. A number of undeniable historical parallels (Rupp 1980; Buro 1982; Mushaben 1984) could easily lead one to assume that many of the same

activists, the old vanguards of the late fifties, late sixties and early seventies, have reappeared on the protest scene, intent on building a new movement based on older objectives and strategies. A closer examination of the scale and the scope of protest activities that have charged the German political environment since 1981 nevertheless reveals that recent manifestations of social unrest are inspired by forces very different from the "spectres haunting" of earlier protest eras.

Against the backdrop of economic chaos and anti-democratic sentiment marking the twenties, thirties and forties, the Federal Republic now stands as a hotbed of participation, a linchpin in the structure of Atlantic security relations, as well as an anchor in the stormy seas of international political economy. The dramatic changes that have been wrought in West German political culture since 1945 are reflected in the composition of the "new social movements" which rest on a complex of disparate issues, conflicting goals and occasionally even contradictory political strategies (Brand 1982, 1983). Nuclear anxieties and "quality of life" concerns have called forth a new sensitivity with respect to environmental issues, along with new images of progress and reform (Huber 1982). Post-materialist values, e.g. the emphasis on self-actualization and greater individual autonomy, have moreover effected significant changes in citizen attitudes toward nonconventional participation and protest (Guggenberger 1980). In light of the traumatic historical experiences associated with mass movements, however, there are likely to be many Germans who fear that such large-scale protests pose an existential threat to the comparatively young democratic-constitutional order, or that the use of "direct-action" tactics amounts to a form of violent subversion against the State.

This author sets out on a dual quest, one in a theoretical direction, the

other more empirical in its orientation. The theoretical charge of this paper is to explore substantive connections between the emphasis on "grassroots" democracy, on the one hand, and the preference for non-violent, direct action tactics, on the other, that have recently surfaced as core themes in the new social movements. The second task will be to impose a degree of "scientific" order on an astounding array of protest tactics and consciousness-raising devices that have unfolded within the context of the "Eco-peace" movements in the FRG. This preliminary analysis rests on six months of participant observation in these movements undertaken by the author from July, 1983 to January, 1984.

The first section of the paper provides a brief overview of the peace movement as it has evolved in the FRG over the last three decades, followed by an equally telegraphic discussion of linkages between ends and means, between democracy, demonstrations and direct action. The second part seeks to distinguish between "mobilization" and "escalation" tactics, in an attempt to pigeon-hole a wide range of activities falling under each heading. The final portion of the paper summarizes a variety of "successes" to date, as defined by movement activists; it further suggests the areas in which much remains to be done, if the peace movement is to prevent itself from sinking into a morass of resentment and resignation, now that the first Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles have actually been deployed in Europe.

1. Peace Protests in a Democratic State

Since 1981, the Federal Republic has come to enjoy a pivotal position among the European peace movements, owing to its historical legacy, its geo-strategic location and also its effectiveness in mobilizing the largest protest-coalition known to postwar Germany. The current movement derives its strength from a thirty-year tradition of peace protest that began with a

campaign against German rearmament in the early 1950's (Mushaben 1985). Also contributing to its strength are the "extraparliamentary" experiences acquired by student activists of the late 1960's, who continued their "long march through the institutions" during the 1970's. Finally, a proliferation of citizen action groups (Bürgerinitiativen) at the local and regional levels has led to a new emphasis on the supposedly intimate substantive connection between the dangers inherent in both civilian and military utilization of nuclear technology (Otto 1982; Witt and Lorenz-Meyer 1983). Occupation experiences at the nuclear plant sites of Wyhl and Brokdorf during the mid-seventies imparted the valuable lesson that protest causes are better served by the mobilization of smaller, locally based groups than by the traditional reliance on mass rallies and intellectual appeals. Community ties developed over the last ten years, in fact, have enabled protest coordinators to call up more demonstrators, much faster (Buchele 1982; Brand 1982, 1983). The Bürgerinitiativen -- with a relatively well-developed repertoire of protest tactics at their disposal -- have provided very fertile ground for the seeds of a new anti-nuclear weapons movement (Kelly and Leinen 1982).

In comparison to the peace mobilization efforts of earlier decades -- notably the "Fight Atomic Death" (Kampf dem Atomtod) campaign of 1957-1959, the "Anti-Emergency Laws" (Notstandsgesetze) and "Extraparliamentary Opposition" protests of 1968-1969, and the anti-Viet Nam movement during the early 1970's -- the latest campaign is characterized by significantly less ideological purity and strategic consensus. A strong religious component, a specifically ecological element and a strong secular or "alternative culture" component enjoy pre-eminent influence in what has loosely been labeled "the movement," which has washed over the FRG in three waves. The first surge of peace protest flowed rather unexpectedly out of the 19th annual Congress of the German

Evangelical Church, which drew 150,000 participant observers to Hamburg in June, 1981. This phase gave birth to a growing (if somewhat amorphous) sense of existential Angst -- particularly among youth -- which peaked with a non-violent demonstration attracting over 300,000 to Bonn on October 10, 1981. The second wave was unleashed by Reagan's statements in late October, 1981, with regard to the "conceivability" of a winnable, limited nuclear war. During this phase, nuclear Angst acquired a concrete foundation as Central European residents began to ponder the true meaning and likely personal consequences of an atomic "flexible response." The secular impetus provided by ecological and political groups swelled the protest ranks substantially, their efforts culminating in the anti-Reagan demonstrations of June 10, 1982, held in Bonn and Berlin. The third stage commenced with Helmut Kohl's election to the chancellorship on March 6, 1983, which cleared the way for the December, 1983 deployments of the first Pershing II missiles. The highpoint of this phase -- saying "No" to a specific NATO decision -- coincided with the nationwide "Action Week" of October 15-22, which rallied an estimated two to four million direct participants. Momentum was sustained until efforts to "besiege the Bundestag" during two days of debate proved ineffective in blocking the parliament's November, 1983 decision to proceed with deployments. Grassroots activists have continued their organizational efforts on both the religious and eco-secular fronts, their tactics and prospective recruitment bases often overlapping.

With the completion of the initial Pershing II deployments, the peace movement has now entered its fourth phase. For months the protesters said NEIN! ("NO!"); within two days of responding DOCH! ("on the contrary!"), the government managed to sound the deathknell for the -- admittedly negative -- "minimal consensus" that kept a panoply of groups unified in the face of

incredible odds. The search for an heir is on, for a positive, mid-range consensus that will enable these groups to work cohesively in reducing the existing arsenals, eliminating the causes of war and in generating alternative defense concepts.

In studying what appear to be "cycles" of peace protest in the Federal Republic, I have deduced that political protest evinces both a substantive dimension [i.e. focusing on a specific issue such as "peace"] and a procedural dimension [i.e. involving tactics such as decentralization] (Mushaben 1985). For the most part there has been a tendency to treat the means as analytically distinct from the ends, among protesters as well as among those who have studied them. The movements of the fifties and sixties focused more on the substantive goals (opposing rearmament), relying on demonstrations, sit-ins, and whatever other tactics happened to be available. During the seventies, protesters became more selective once they realized that some means (decentralization, site occupations) were more effective than others. They also learned that a simple transfer of the means adopted at one site (Wyhl) could not guarantee successful protest outcomes at another (Brokdorf) — especially if no precautions had been taken to school demonstrators in nonviolence and to prepare and involve the local population (interviews with Roland Vogt, member of parliament, and Michael Schroeren, press speaker for the Greens in Bonn, October 18, 1983).

The movements of the eighties evince a greater sensitivity to both the substantive and procedural dimensions of protest. Conflicts between citizen-activists and the Bonn government have not been confined to a disagreement over policy content (e.g., Pershing II's versus some other type of weapons); just as significant is the extent to which dissenters have opposed the decision-making process (e.g., refusal to permit a binding referendum).

Protesters over the last three years have moreover become increasingly conscious of the need to express their opposition through behaviors consonant with their own substantive goals. The belief that the ends can no longer be used to justify any means has led to a fusion of the two, a fusion manifested in the heavy emphasis now placed on non-violent forms of direct action.

Frequent governmental and media references to the "hot autumn" of 1983 led many to fear that the upcoming peace campaign would inevitably result in violent confrontations between demonstrators and police, as well as in the destruction of military property (Die Zeit Series 1983). Implicit in this projection are three misconceptions regarding the role of "protest" in postwar democracies. The first derives from a tendency to equate "protest" with mass demonstrations; as the next section shows, demonstrations are not even the tip of the iceberg with respect to the level and range of peace activities found in the FRG. Secondly, there is the tendency to equate protest, demonstrations and other forms of "direct action" with violent action, which fails to distinguish between violence as stimulus and response, between the structural and situational contexts that precipitate the use of force. Finally, there is a tendency to perceive protest expressed through direct action — a set of behaviors ranging from unconventional yet legal forms of participation, to civil disobedience, to terrorism and sabotage (Benewick 1972) — as something inherently anti-democratic.

Focusing on the link between demonstrations and democracy, Wolf-Dieter Narr (1983 a,b,c) has argued that the more democratic a society wishes to become, the more radical the freedom to demonstrate it must grant to its citizens. Protest and democracy are inherently linked, not only by virtue of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly (Art. 1/20 Grundgesetz, Art. 8/1 GG), but also in view of the danger that political

institutions over time may align themselves with a specific set of interests. The freedom to demonstrate is a fundamental right, since it is the means by which the true agents of democratic sovereignty, namely the people, find their most direct expression. Protest provides a necessary corrective for a democratic process that is no longer perceived to guarantee equal access and protection for all citizens. Moreover, it is beyond the province of state officials to require "that demonstrations, open air parades and assemblies be planned and executed in an orderly fashion, equipped with a leader, in the style of authoritative military marches" (Narr 1983a: 40).¹ To do so fails to recognize its function as an anti-authoritarian, differentiated, non-institutionalized expression of the popular will (Narr 1983b).

The second misperception fails to differentiate between causes and effects. While violence may occur in the context of a particular demonstration, the demonstrations themselves are being directed against violence of a greater order. Government predictions of impending violence may be used to intimidate or otherwise deter citizens from exercising their constitutional rights of free speech and assembly, just as the full-scale deployment of police forces at demonstrations — 8000 at Kalkar in 1977, an anticipated need for 15,000 police at Wyhl in 1983 — represents a provocation and potential abuse of state power (Geulen 1983; Narr 1983a; Schroeder 1983).

The amount of "goal displacement" that occurs in the wake of a violent confrontation has become a matter of particular concern to the new generation of peace activists. In determining the responsibility for the use of violence, authorities seem intent on discovering who threw the first stone, as if the individual undertaking this singular action might be responsible for all of the "trouble" (Parekh 1972). This response to violence permits no insight as to the motives of the 300,000-minus-one who have not thrown stones. There is a growing

recognition among protest participants that "violence" has occurred long before a particular protest group meets up with police batons and teargas, or reaches for its own bricks (Volmerg 1983). The new movement evinces a willingness and determination to come to grips with the structural defects of society. It believes that the elimination of structural violence inherent to the global community will be the most effective deterrent to nuclear annihilation. It further holds that changes in the structure of society are contingent upon changes in individual behavior. The self-proclaimed "leftists" or radical democrats who profess a belief in freedom, equality and solidarity have a special obligation to distinguish themselves by denouncing violence against persons, by eliminating hatred and images of a dehumanized enemy (Feinbilder) from the language of political conflict (Buro 1983; Narr 1983a).

On a less philosophical plane, movement organizers have a number of practical reasons for shifting to non-violent action (gewaltfreie Aktion). First, as battles over the construction of the airport runway in Frankfurt (Startbahn West) have shown, the demonstrators' successes in chasing away police and tearing down barriers have been short-lived at best. It is unlikely that those willing to engage in violent struggle will be able to match the state's resources over time, in light of the monopoly over physical force it enjoys in the Weberian sense. Secondly, when protesters do resort to acts of physical force, the "other side" manages to score a double victory: the demonstration, like scores of revolutions that have preceded it, will devour its own children by polarizing, alienating or scaring off many potential sympathizers, and the protest will succumb to the logic of gleeful authorities who view violence a self-fulfilling prophecy. A third reason is that the more regularly demonstrations and other forms of direct action come to be characterized by acts of violence, the more likely a self-selection process

will occur among those who participate. Just as those who oppose or fear personal injury and destruction of property will avoid such encounters, those who look to violence "for kicks" or see violence as an end in itself will be drawn to participate without committing themselves to the movement's aims. This will only add credence to the state's claims that the entire movement has been undermined by "communists and chaotics." Finally, a self-imposed ban on the use of physical force is judged essential to the preservation of the identity and self-worth of the individual participant. The self-dynamic inherent to the use of force produces a boomerang effect; it reduces the primary goal to a secondary concern, and negatively transforms the participant (Buro 1983a; Mumkler 1983). As a rule, s/he who lives by the sword, shall perish by the sword.

As protesters shift their emphasis to peaceful forms of political action, they have had to compensate for the lack of a German tradition of civil disobedience and non-violence. Hence, they draw heavily on the writings of Gandhi (1961), Thoreau (1966) and Martin Luther King, Jr. Recently they have begun to look to their own experiences with "Paragraph 218" (the campaign to legalize abortion), the activities of the "squatters," as well as to the peaceful blockades at Grossengstingen and Murlangen as the first steps in building a national tradition (Ebert 1982; 1981a). The framework for action outlined in the section below is indicative of the significant progress that has been made in this direction to date.

2. A Peace Movement in Seven Acts: Mobilization and Escalation

There is general consensus among representatives of the 30 German organizations comprising the national Coordination Committee (who met at regular intervals in Bonn from 1981 to 1984) that the religious-eco-pacifist coalition will continue to serve as a vital source of opposition to the nuclear

arms race being staged in Central Europe. The 64,000 D-Mark question is "how?" There is universal agreement on the need to continue a nationwide information campaign. There is major agreement on the need to begin the real political work — which does not necessarily mean bringing out the "Green" vote, but rather launching assaults on arms export policies, lobbying for additional economic assistance to the Third World, and compelling a reconsideration of the German role in NATO (Aktion Suhnezeichen 1984). There are growing reservations, however, regarding the effectiveness of mass mobilization exercises, as well as increasing tensions between die da oben (Bonn, alias the Coordinating Committee) and grassroots activists (die Basis).

Reservations derive from practical experiences with the mass protests of earlier decades. Organizers have learned that after each major "demo," it is too easy for too many people to have a few beers and then head for home feeling that they have done their bit for the movement. The fact that a demonstration of 300,000 or a human chain stretching 108 kilometers from Stuttgart to Neu Ulm might have been totally ineffective in changing official policy (clearly not its only aim) may escape the notice of many a self-righteous participant, at least until it is time to don one's parka and half-heartedly march off to the next demonstration.

A decentralization of protest activities, intended as an antidote to "passive" protest of this sort, goes hand in hand with the new interest in civil disobedience and non-violent action. While "civil disobedience" allows for many different manifestations, common to all acts that now fall under this heading is the rediscovery of a sense of personal responsibility grounded in political engagement. The willingness to assume this responsibility springs from the individual's recognition that s/he will be directly affected (Betroffenheit) by even the most restrained of "limited nuclear wars."

The peace movement faces a three-fold task: 1) it must raise the consciousness of heretofore unmobilized constituencies; 2) it must provide mechanisms for information gathering and social learning that will enable these groups to become self-mobilizing; and 3) it must constrain groups from resorting to more radical or even violent strategies before all legal-democratic channels have been exhausted, while at the same time gradually building a willingness on the part of ever larger numbers of citizens to intensify the struggle as necessary.

In attempting to impose a degree of analytical order on the plethora of strategies, tactics, group reflections and learning experiences to which I was exposed, I find it useful to distinguish between mobilization and escalation activities, defined in greater detail below. The tactics contained in the former category, by definition, fall within the realm of constitutionally sanctioned behaviors; alternatively, those in the latter category constitute a grey zone, or involve a conscious violation of the law. It is presumed that the number of citizens ready to engage in acts of mobilization will far exceed those prepared to commit themselves to escalation tactics. The willingness to pursue either strategy would seem to depend on a number of factors, such as the personal capabilities of the would-be participant (e.g., involving health, job, family responsibilities); systemic constraints on protest; the failure of conventional mechanisms and extraparliamentary alternatives; the (perceived) immanence of the threat; and, the (perceived) consequences of non-resistance. Time and space constraints preclude an effort to assess the relative importance of each of these factors.

Similarly, I have opted for comprehensiveness in lieu of elegant prose in presenting and classifying the many activities below. Each subcategory will be prefaced with a brief definitional statement, followed by a list of activities

and concrete examples (in parentheses) where relevant. Table 1 provides an overview of the classification scheme.²

(Table 1 here.)

2.1 Mobilization, Phase One: Outlining the Dangers

The activities contained in the first four subcategories correspond to the first task of the peace movement noted above, namely, the need to raise public consciousness regarding the threat of nuclear war and its devastating consequences for residents of the Federal Republic. The idea is to trigger a personal-emotional response, as well as to break a long standing tabu, proscribing public discussion of national security and defense issues in view of postwar Germany's occupied status. The responsibility for organizing most of these activities has rested at the local or regional level.

- A. Information-gathering as protest: Documenting and analyzing the dangers of nuclear war by means of teach-ins and tribunals (the Green's Nuremberg Tribunal, February 18-20, 1983); audio-visual presentations, art exhibits, films (The Day After); publication of individual pacifists' memoirs and pamphlets; information stands in shopping districts; sponsoring public fora featuring well-known intellectuals and political figures (Berliner Begegnung, December, 1981; Writers for Peace in Heilbronn, December, 1983).
- B. Devices aimed at changing cognitive orientations: Collecting signatures for public advertisements in newspapers (i.e., "Citizens of both German States urge the Bundestag to 'Say No'," General Anzeiger, November, 1983); petitions (Krefeld Appeal); personal declarations of opposition (Gunther Grass'

Table 1. Framework of Action for
the West German Peace Movement

Mobilization Strategy	Escalation Strategy
<p>I. Outlining the Dangers</p> <p>A. Information gathering</p> <p>B. Changing cognitive orientation</p> <p>C. Changing affect/self-demonstration</p> <p>D. "Dramatics"</p> <p>E. "Soft" Protest</p> <p>II. Outlining Alternatives</p> <p>A. Cognitive devices</p> <p>B. "Dramatics"</p> <p>C. "Soft" devices</p> <p>III. Creative, Personal Engagement</p> <p>A. Self-consciousness raising</p> <p>B. Political action</p> <p>C. Symbolic action</p> <p>IV. Developing an Infrastructure</p> <p>A. Special interest groups</p> <p>B. Networking</p> <p>C. Training and research promotion</p>	<p>I. Legal Forms of Noncooperation</p> <p>A. Personal noncooperation</p> <p>B. Social and economic boycotts</p> <p>C. Parliamentary and Extraparliamentary Action</p> <p>D. Juridical action</p> <p>II. Civil Disobedience, Sensationalism</p> <p>A. Individual acts</p> <p>B. Blockades and group disruptions</p> <p>III. Sabotage, Resistance and Force</p> <p>A. Destruction of Property</p> <p>B. Violence against people</p> <p>C. Violence against self</p> <p>D. Civil war</p>

open letter to the Bundestag, November, 1983); conducting consultative (nonbinding) referenda; organizing and publicizing the results of public opinion surveys (Schwabisch-Gmund); promulgating resolutions by legally constituted bodies (urging reconsideration of the NATO double decision, moratorium).

C. Political self-demonstration and devices for changing system affect:

Writing detailed participant-observer reports and building files on local peace events (Bonn 10.10.81; Heilbronn 1981; "Work-Group: Peace," SPD-Stuttgart 1983); displaying buttons, bumperstickers, T-shirts, scarves, jewelry with peace motifs; arranging sports events, concerts; making small group pilgrimages (to Auschwitz, Dachau);

D. Dramatics: Staging "happenings," i. e., "last suppers" in town squares and market places (Bonn, November 21, 1983); participating in street theater, marches, mass demonstrations and die-ins, use of graffiti, skywriting.

E. "Soft" protests: Candlelight vigils; women's marches (from West to East, Spring, 1983); torch light processions (Hamburg, December 12, 1983); conducting a weekly "hour of silence" in crowded shopping areas; "fasting for life" (limited duration).

2.2 Mobilization, Phase Two: Outlining and Generating Acceptance for Alternatives

The purpose of consciousness-raising activities is not to terrorize citizens into a state of inaction, but to encourage them to generate their own security concepts in reaction to years of fruitless negotiation by "defense experts" whose grab-bag of conflict resolution devices contains only military options. The next set of activities seeks to highlight the consequences of inaction, to expose the logical fallacies of present defense doctrines and to

impart a sense of citizen efficacy, as well as "civil courage."

- A. Cognitive devices for exposing the logical inconsistencies of deterrence doctrine: Distributing essays, books, maps of weapons sites; convening public debates, professional congresses (inter alia Wissenschaftler fur den Frieden, January, 1983; Juristen gegen Kriegsgefahr, March, 1982); communicating the findings of public hearings, answers to "question periods" in parliament and commissioned reports; using films and slide presentations (including those produced by the defense industries) to demonstrate possible effects of disarmament/arms proliferation, the economic benefits of industrial conversion and to outline methods of "social defense;" circulating "how-to" books (Heine et al. 1983).
- B. Dramatic devices: Broadcasting radio plays and worst-case scenarios; (Hesse 1983); staging operas and fiction; organizing commemorative peace festivals (anniversary of Hiroshima/Nagasaki); arranging major "Rock against Rockets" concerts (Udo Lindenberg in East Berlin, 1983; "Say NO!" in Hamburg, 1983).
- C. Soft devices for promoting "civil courage": Religious services, parish peace weeks; prayer and study groups.

2.3 Mobilization. Phase Three: Fostering Creative and Personal Engagement

Consonant with the second general task confronting the peace movement, the idea is not only to expand the base of passive citizen support, but to turn potential sympathizers into self-mobilizers. Personal engagement is the key to a grassroots transformation not only of the protest movements themselves, but of the political system as a whole. The third class of activities builds on the belief, outlined earlier, that individuals will have to change before they can

hope to eliminate structural violence and the global-political causes of war.

- A. Reflection and personal behavior: Demilitarize language, use more selective criteria for TV viewing by children; stage public merchandise exchanges of "military toys," also develop children's games that emphasize cooperation and collective gains; encourage personal reflection on the relation of one's own occupation or career to the military-industrial complex; foster a choice of peace-serving research topics among students; facilitate extensive reporting on "positive" initiatives and outcomes by journalists; take up contacts, support community involvement with Third World visitors and foreign families living in Germany.
- B. Fostering attentive publics and political action: Making contributions to cover court costs for movement activists (case of Alexander Schubart); providing financial support for peace organizations; involvement in counseling work for conscientious objectors and unemployed youth; creating jobs for those who have chosen to leave defense-related industries; compiling local maps on atomic/military sites and reporting on "maneuvers" to the local community; lobbying vis a vis political representatives, church elders and employers (letters, telegrams, etc.); training in non-violence workshops.
- C. Symbolic actions: Creating medals, awards, scholarships named after pacifists for peace research (C. V. Ossietzky Medal); renaming streets and public libraries (Hamburg University); organizing regional demonstrations, "human chains," "human stars," alternative parliaments, "die-ins," setting up peace camps; participating

in workshops on civilian/social defense and passive resistance; renouncing one's willingness or right to be "defended" with weapons (Ohne Rüstung Leben); signing a "personal peace treaty" with someone in an East European country.

2.4 Mobilization, Phase Four: Developing an Infra-structure for Peace Initiatives and Protests

The "grassroots" orientation of the new social movements is in part a reaction against the hierarchical structure and "bureaucratic arrogance" characteristic of the political establishment. For this reason activists are reluctant to subsume the movement under a specific roof organization — hence, the love/hate relationship seen to exist between local initiatives and the Coordinating Committee. On the other hand, they realize that the "institutionalization" of certain functions is essential to the movement's long-term success in the face of short-term failures. Initial steps taken in this direction have had either a geographical or an occupational focus.

- A. Peace organizations for special-interest groups: For conscientious objectors and alternative-service candidates; for each of the professions (scientists, doctors, writers, nurses, lawyers, artists, trade unionists, athletes, social scientists); for women, for teachers, "peace educators," media specialists (Munich, Tübingen); for social and non-denominational service organizations (Action Reconciliation); for individual religious denominations (Pax Christi; Evangelische Studenten Gemeinde); for party members (in the Jusos and Junge Union); local or regional citizen initiatives against nuclear energy and nuclear weapons (Worpswede, Neu Ulm, Bremer Friedensforum)
- B. Networking and systematizing the division of labor: Set up

standing committees for the November "Peace Weeks" (3,000 formed in 1980) and the Easter Marches; regional coordinating committees for the "Autumn Actions" of 1983 and 1984; (Bonn, Stuttgart, Hamburg) and for the June 17, 1984 referendum; regional level evaluation and strategy meetings (Klausuren, Landestreff); partnerships, parish sponsorship of outside peace initiatives (between East and West German Evangelicals; between the FRG and Poland); build affiliations with other national and international peace organizations to promote joint sponsorship of events (END, Krefeld Appeal, Friends of the Earth, Atomwaffenfreies Europa, World Council of Churches, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Service Civil International).

- C. Training centers and research promotion: Establish clinics for non-violent action (Bildungs- und Begegnungsstätte für Gewaltfreie Aktion e. V., Wustrow); trainer collectives; "Friendship Homes" (Buckeburg); opening bookstores and libraries specializing in peace literature (Saarbrücken); supporting peace research institutes (Hessische Stiftung in Frankfurt, Institute for Peace and Security Policy in Hamburg, Berghof Stiftung in Berlin); setting up information services and clearing houses (Friedenszentrum Trier; Antikriegswerkstatt Sievershausen).

To say that this list of mobilizational devices and tactics is by no means exhaustive does not mean, of course, that each and every one has been or is currently being put to use in all of the local communities. Some of these require more financial support, or a greater degree of personal commitment than others. The object has been to provide as many participatory options as

possible in the hopes of integrating individuals whose personal capabilities, limited experience or lack of self-confidence might otherwise preclude involvement in more formalized structures. Ideally speaking, each of these activities might be expected to result in a social learning experience that will induce the individual to become more politically active, more adamantly opposed to further deployments and, if necessary, better prepared to engage in more radical forms of protest.

In addressing the question of radicalization, one leaves behind the "obviously democratic" sector and enters the grey zones of nonconventional, extralegal participation and extraparliamentary opposition. The forms of direct action considered below are aimed at more than consciousness-raising, agenda-setting and the mobilization of generalized support. The implicit aim is to force a more direct confrontation between citizens and the state. The escalation of protest is likely to occur in three more or less distinct stages.

2.5 Escalation. Phase One: Legal Forms of Noncooperation with the State and the Military-industrial Complex

By engaging in more radical forms of protest, individuals in effect begin to question the principle of majority rule.³ The protection of minority rights has been written into the political codex of the new social movements (Capra and Spretnak 1984; Huber 1983), providing a justification for extraparliamentary opposition. Individuals see themselves as struggling against a fate more horrible than a failure to accept "legitimation by procedure."

- A. Personal noncooperation: Refusing military induction completely or a mass filing for conscientious objector status (before its dissolution, the Coordination Committee called for a nation-wide campaign); refusing to participate in military or nuclear-related research and development projects, even in the face of possible dismissal ("Got-

tiger 18"); organizing solidarity actions for locales affected by military maneuvers and testing; participating in work stoppages of limited duration ("5 before 12," September, 1983); criticizing defense contracts and arms exports at corporate shareholders' meetings or plant assemblies; restricting agreements or terminating contracts with the state that provide ancillary services for military operations (e.g., chaplains).

- B. Social and economic boycott actions against the military apparatus and in opposition to the "militarization" of international conflicts: Avoidance of cultural programs with propagandistic or nationalistic themes, especially those sponsored by the armed forces, or by the Soviet and American Information Services; boycotting military parades, festivals and honorary celebrations sponsored by the armed services (induction ceremonies); cancellation of subscriptions to newspapers and journals with pro-armament editorial policies; consumer boycotts of businesses and products linked to military industries or engaged in Third World exploitation (manufacturers of "war toys," chemical industries); returning medals and refusing honors for past services (case of the Frankfurter Rundschau Editor); simultaneous withdrawal by peace supporters of all bank deposits to inflict credit losses ("Aktion Geldabheben, December 12, 1983); resignation from political office; termination of party membership; calls for a general strike.
- C. Parliamentary and extraparliamentary actions against militarization: Refusing to approve the defense budget; frequent use of parliamentary procedure to table discussion or delay promulgation of legislation in preparation for war; making extensive use of the parliamen-

tary "question period" to expose government intentions (a frequent tactic of the "Greens"); "leaking" (unclassified) government data and reports regarding the deployment sites and schedules, location of chemical and bacteriological weapons depots; publishing the routes to be used for military transports; promulgating resolutions at the communal and municipal levels which declare the locality a nuclear-free or demilitarized zone (Klein Pampau, Kassel).

- D. Juridical actions against organs of the state: Initiate suits against discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause [Art.3 GG, Art. 4 GG] on behalf of alternative service candidates now required to serve 20 months (18 months for regular conscripts); civil suits filed in administrative courts opposing the expropriation and use of public lands for military maneuvers; suits against noise pollution and failure to provide environmental impact statements in conjunction with military testing and exercises; constitutional suits seeking injunctions against the deployment of offensive weaponry [Art.26/1 GG], against violation of popular sovereignty [Art.20/2 GG], the right to human dignity and peace [Art.1 GG], the right to life and the free development of the personality [Art.2 GG] (over 100 filed); suits against the violation of international treaties, such as the Paris Treaty of 1955, Art.51 of the United Nations Charter, the 1948 Anti-Genocide Convention.

2.6 Escalation. Phase Two: Civil Disobedience and Sensationalism

Peace movement theorists have attempted to outline a set of preconditions and behavioral guidelines for civil disobedience in the context of their third general task — restricting the use of potentially alienating, illegal tactics before conventional channels have been proved inadequate (Ebert 1983b; Buro

1983). Civil disobedience is viewed as an inherently democratic method for publicizing perceived injustices and inducing a state response to fundamental conflicts among individuals who continue to regard themselves as full-fledged members of a political community. An ongoing commitment to that community is made evident by one's willingness to accept the state's right to impose sanctions for conscious violations of the law. Civil disobedience rests on the premise that the size of a group favoring a specific decision bears no direct relation to its moral rectitude, especially in instances where state action threatens to produce irreversible consequences.

- A. Individualized acts of civil disobedience: Violations of the ban on demonstrations within a one-mile zone of government buildings ("Besieging the Bundestag," November, 1983); wearing masks in violation of demonstration/assembly laws; burning draft cards; theft or destruction of military records; refusal on the part of state-employed teachers to impart civil defense information in the classrooms or to participate in other forms of (para)-military education; refusal to participate in career-related emergency drills and training (medical personnel; the 1983 women's initiative to abjure civilian service obligations imposed by Art. 12a/4 and Art. 12a/6 GG); illegal strikes in the defense and public service sectors, i. e., involving transportation and hospitals; tax evasion or channeling a percentage of one's taxes to charity or special funds (Friedenssteuerinitiativen, begun November, 1983); refusal to pay church taxes directly to the state; publication of classified material; use of "spies for peace" to reveal special civil defense plans for the political elites; refusal to obey military orders; trespassing for the purpose of carrying out sensation-

alistic acts (Blutattentat by a Green party member against a NATO commander, summer, 1983; the action "Human Blood - This is your business" at the IDEE Exhibition, May, 1982); use of physical-force to protest visits by foreign dignitaries (Bush visit in Krefeld, May, 1983; Berlin anti-Reagan riot, June, 1982).

B. Blockade of military sites and disruption of military activities:

Formation of "human carpets" along transport routes to prevent arms export shipments; attempts to disrupt military trade fairs and air shows (Ramstein in August, 1983); blockade of ports of entry for NATO equipment (Bremerhaven, October, 1983); "go-ins" at weapons factories; blockade of barracks, military command posts (EUROCOM in Stuttgart, December 12, 1982), military installations (Heilbronn-Waldheide, June 1983; the Celebrity Sit-in at Mutlangen, September, 1983); peace camps impeding military access; peaceful invasion of exercise grounds (Helgoland); sailing into military testing waters; blockade of the Defense Ministry (October, 1983); blockade of atomic depots (Grossengstingen, August, 1982).

2.7 Escalation. Phase Three: Sabotage, Resistance (Widerstand) and Force

The right to resist, as defined in Article 20/4 GG of the Basic Law can not be construed as an invitation to the use of force in the event that individual laws have been perceived as unjust. It is rather the existence of a recognizable threat to the free-democratic order as a whole that shall condition and dictate its use, e.g., in the case of an attempted coup d'etat (Ebert 1983; Daubler 1982). Such acts ultimately reflect a complete loss of faith in the self-corrective mechanisms of the system and in the mobilizational potential of the citizenry (Habermas 1983).

- A. Destruction of state and public property: Acts of computer sabotage; tearing up roads and access routes; tearing down fences at military installations; destruction of deployment-related equipment (e.g., the Pershing II transport put out of commission by the "Swords to Plowshares Four" group, December, 1983); cementing up storage facilities or launch equipment (Kinzig-Kreis, December, 1983).
- B. Violence against people: "Blood actions" and other acts of physical sabotage directed against officials; terrorist-type kidnappings, assassination attempts (none reported to date). [Note: Red Army Faction activities are not considered to be directly linked with the peace movement.]
- C. Violence against self: Fasting to death (Jo Jordan and others terminated their fast under pressure from movement activists in September, 1983); self-immolation (Pastor Brusewitz in the GDR, August 1976; Hartmut Grundler in Hamburg, 1977); allowing oneself to be run over by military vehicles, etc. (no such action reported to date).
- D. Civil War (unlikely at present)

Most of the tactics outlined in the last subcategory are likely to appeal to members of a very small minority, acting for the most part in isolation from one another. Despite the rhetoric of Kampf and Widerstand ("struggle" and "resistance") that made its way into the press immediately following the Bundestag vote of November 22, 1983, there is no concrete evidence that those who have been most heavily involved in carrying out the coordination tasks of the movement over the last three years are now prepared to engage in an escalation to the third degree. A little bit of careful content

analysis leads one to conclude that the term "resistance" is used broadly to signal a determination to keep the movement alive and mobilized (Leinen 1983, 1984; Dreier 1983). The call for a comprehensive draft-resistance campaign and the execution of a nationwide referendum on the nuclear issue during the June, 1984 elections to the European Parliament, sooner indicate that the reservoir containing legal acts of noncooperation and milder forms of civil disobedience has not yet run dry (Cornelsen 1984).

The movement has yet to cross the threshold separating violent forms of direct action from non-violent, constitutionally feasible forms and democratic politics, as difficult as it is to draw specific theoretical lines. Nor does it appear that the movement as a whole will be ready to take such a step in the foreseeable future. The rationale for avoiding acts of sabotage, violence and "civil war" rests with the broader definition of success and the emphasis on longer-term goals that have been adopted by the movement. Physical confrontations are viewed as the tactical equivalent to a zero-sum game; they do nothing to promote democratic changes in the "political opportunity structure" (Tarrow 1982). Even when it becomes ritualistic, violent action is, for the most part, devoid of political theory and, hence, evinces nothing of the developmental character that has become the life force of the new social movements.

In the judgment of protest coordinators, the drive for peace has developed into a powerful, non-violent, grassroots movement that has contributed significantly to a broader understanding of democratic processes in the Federal Republic (Aktion Suhrneszeichen 1983; Steinweg 1982). It has fostered a willingness on the part of heretofore unorganized or inactive constituencies to take advantage of their constitutional rights to assemble, speak, demonstrate and participate in defense of their own needs and interests. The peace movement

has raised the larger questions of how to create political will and promote political consensus in a pluralist society, in essence turning the tables on those who claim that its character is inherently undemocratic. Based on assessments by movement-insiders, the use of direct action tactics can be described as "extra-" but not as "anti-democratic" (Butterwegge et al. 1983; personal interviews with Jo Leinen, Volkmar Deile and Andreas Zumach, 1984). The informal requirement that individuals who join in group acts of civil disobedience first participate in non-violence training and align themselves with an "affinity group", (Bezugsgruppe) further attests to the movement's interest in combining social learning with experience in grassroots decision-making. Grossengstingen has become the model for would-be blockaders, just as Wyhl has served as something of a prototype for anti-nuclear energy protests. In both cases, the perceived "success" of these site occupations can not be divorced from the efforts made to establish a local base, before moving on to the next level of mobilization (Sternstein 1983). A new set of mobilizational imperatives awaits the West German peace movement, as it seeks to consolidate its gains, evaluate its losses and ambitiously commence with its fourth -- and perhaps most difficult -- phase.

3. Future Perspectives, The "Day After"

The government's decision to proceed with the deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles does not provide an adequate measure of success or failure for the anti-nuclear movement as it has evolved since 1981. In fact, it is not clear whether all factions within the movement ever really believed they would have been able to compel the conservative leadership to rescind German approval of the NATO Double Decision of December 12, 1979. This does not mean, however, that activists will sit passively awaiting the arrival of subsequent weapons, as the deployments continue through 1989. The "Autumn

Actions '84" were not as effective in drawing hundreds of thousands to protest events, as witnessed in October and November, 1983. Although the peace movement did not succeed in achieving its ostensible short-term goal of preventing the deployments altogether, it has been extraordinarily effective in alerting millions of residents to the perils posed by the 6,000-7,000 tactical nuclear warheads already in Germany, and the qualitatively different dangers associated with the Pershing II technology in particular (Perdelwitz and Bremer 1981; Rabe 1983).

In the short-run, what held the kaleidoscope of religious, ecological, leftist, feminist, pacifist, "new wave" and local action groups together over the last three years were their feelings of being directly imperiled (Betroffenheit) and the (now deceased) "minimal consensus" regarding a specific set of deployments. But there are many other factors which, in this author's judgment, will sustain a willingness to work collectively over the next few years, despite the fact that the movement has experienced an organizational identity crisis of sorts linked to the disbanding of the ex officio Coordinating Committee (Die Zeit February 17, 1984; Frankfurter Rundschau November, 1984). The first bond rests on a heightened sensitivity with respect to the need for environmental protection, and a growing inclination to link the hazards inherent to both civilian and military applications of nuclear technology. The second factor is the rejection of a long-standing tabu on public debate of security and defense policy in the Federal Republic, and the realization that protesters will be able to impose high political costs on leaders who agree to future weapons procurement programs (e.g., the so-called Roger's Plan, possible chemical weapons storage, and SDI or "Star-Wars" involvement). Two additional issues could either have a unifying effect, or an internally divisive one; they are the "national question" and the definition of

Germany's future role in NATO. The final factor is not without its potentially destabilizing aspects, but for now seems to contribute to the movement's strength, that is, the growing willingness to experiment with and participate in direct action politics in what was once labeled "the subject culture" (Almond and Verba 1980).

The West German peace movement has thus far been able to reflect consciously on its experiences and to prevent itself from slipping into a pattern of "directionless activism." It has managed to concentrate its energies by securing the consensus among critical elements of the protest-coalition (e.g. bridging the gap between communist and religious wings) before proceeding with specific tactics, usually at the expense of countless hours spent in meetings. Its most difficult political tasks will lie, first in strengthening its own political "center" lodged somewhere between religious, ecological and leftwing social-democratic forces, and secondly, in providing adequate representation for the smaller, less radical groups (e.g. parish-linked or local "initiatives" including farmers or older citizens) which tend to lack a well-developed organizational base (interview with Andreas Zumach and Volkmar Deile of Aktion Suhnezeichen, January 5, 1984).

These are only two of the many important "preliminary" tasks the movement will have to master if it is to realize its long-range goal of creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. Looking outward, activists will have to continue to weave and structure a network among the functionally diverse and regionally dispersed peace initiatives, and to provide for a continuous exchange of information among them. Secondly, protesters will have to provide active support for a spirit of anti-militarism, looking for ways to reduce the structural violence that gives rise to international confrontations. Third, the movement will need to expand its substantive focus by opposing research,

development, production and testing relative to other forms of warfare (chemical, bacteriological, laser); it must further renounce the exportation of such weapons for use in the highly unstable, underdeveloped portions of the world. Fourth, in attacking the logic and consequences associated with "balance of terror" and deterrence doctrines, peace theorists will find it necessary to forge a consensus regarding "alternative defense" concepts. This will require an open and intense debate on the structure of NATO, the German Role in the Atlantic Alliance, and the feasibility of a bloc-free European peace order. Fifth, it should not conclude that it has been driven into a defensive position by the short-term failure to prevent the current deployments, instead, the movement will have to generate framework proposals for reducing existing arsenals (although it rejects the Reagan version of a "build-down") in its efforts to promote a European nuclear-free zone. Sixth, activists will need to develop their own Ostpolitik concept and offer support for progressive movements in the East, in recognition of the special role to be played by both German states in maintaining the peace. Finally, disillusioned, disgruntled or skeptical groups within the movement should interpret the SPD's November, 1983 turnabout as proof of their own effectiveness, and not as a threat to their own "Green" issue-monopoly. It will also be necessary to seek more cooperation with the "system parties," the trade unions and established economic interests for the promotion of an industrial reconversion of the defense sector.

Regarding self-evaluation, West German protesters will need to develop a greater sensitivity to history, both with respect to the evolution of their own movement and in relation to the socio-historical conditions that have fueled the arms races of the last three decades. As but one component of a larger "new social movement" (one challenging the very premises of advanced industrial society in all of its ideological manifestations), it must recognize that it

has not yet reached its full potential and that it stands to benefit from active cooperation with ongoing youth movements, with feminist, ecological and Third World groups. Coordinators can be expected to take advantage of the extra-parliamentary mechanisms and strategies they have helped to develop in recent years, but they will need to monitor themselves closely to ensure that they adopt only such means as can be reconciled with the substantive aims of the movement, i.e., non-violent forms of civil disobedience.

As this paper demonstrates, the West German peace movement has consciously sought to establish and to reinforce a crucial, symbiotic link between non-violent and grassroots forms of protest and participation. The extent to which the last four years of protest have constituted a uniquely democratic experience for the Federal Republic is best summarized by one of the movement's own civil disobedience practitioners, following the 1982 blockade at Grossengstingen [my translation]:

The decisive question is therefore: Has this new organizational model unleashed new learning processes in the direction of greater democracy? . . . We have learned in these group sessions to listen more attentively to others, to be more tolerant, to search for representative compromises, to allow our own opinions to be questioned and to test them self-critically, [to learn] as group spokespersons to differentiate between our own opinions and those of the group itself, to distinguish between essentials and non-essentials and to have regard for the discussion as it develops, for the mood and the feelings of the participants. We have come to recognize a little more clearly our strengths and our weaknesses mirrored in the positions of others (Sternstein 1983, pp. 80-81).

These learning experiences provide the best evidence available to date that

German peace activists will not allow themselves to sink into the morass of resignation that has often characterized earlier protest campaigns in the Federal Republic. The final test as to the democratic nature of these protests will rest with the participants' ability to recognize that ebbs and flows are natural rhythms, that the need to forge a new consensus at critical junctures is inherent to the dynamic of movements committed to a fundamental transformation of political institutions and the promotion of social change.

Notes

1. Efforts by the CDU-government to impose a stricter Demonstration Law were recently overturned in a judgment handed down by the Federal Constitutional Court in July, 1985, which held that peaceful protesters cannot be subjected to arrest for failure to obey police orders to leave a demonstration where a minority may have engaged in acts of force, e.g. rock throwing.
2. I note with gratitude that the work of Theodore Ebert has provided an important catalyst for this mobilization/escalation framework. I have nonetheless subjected his Aktionskatalog to a number of additions and reclassifications (see Ebert 1984). I am also aware that some of the activities and categories are actually multifunctional, and that the reader may wish to take issue with specific designations and labels. Critical suggestions for improving this classificatory scheme are most welcome.
3. The March 6, 1983 election results confirming Helmut Kohl as Chancellor have been falsely interpreted, by the American media in particular, as a "public mandate" in favor of the November, 1983 decision to proceed with deployments. The election campaign focused primarily on economic issues. Polls taken two to four months prior to the Bundestag vote showed that public opposition to the deployments ran from 60 to 75 percent (depending on the specific poll).

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