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The Politics of Policy
Coordination Within
The Warsaw Pact

Robin Alison Remington

THE POLITICS OF POLICY COORDINATION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT

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This paper was prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 20-23, 1986.

THE POLITICS OF POLICY COORDINATION WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT

In 1986 the Warsaw Treaty Organization has embarked on its fourth decade as the primary mechanism of political/military integration among the Soviet Union and Moscow's East European allies. There is no doubt that Leonid Brezhnev saw the Warsaw Pact as the "main centre" for coordinating the foreign policies of the European Communist states.¹ Nor is there any reason to think that the present General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Mikhail Gorbachev is any less serious when he talks about the need for unity and cohesion in Communist coalition politics. Indeed, the month after he took over as head of the Soviet Party, Gorbachev pressed his East European counterparts to sign up for another twenty years. He frequently refers to the importance of the Warsaw Pact both as a political actor in Europe and as a channel for the exchange of socialist experience, has made a point of allied support for his summit diplomacy, and alluded to the need for new mechanisms of cooperation.²

Western analysts have tended to look at the problem of policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact very much from the Soviet perspective; i.e. in what way does the alliance serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy vis-à-vis the West and how does it function to assure the Kremlin's control over Eastern Europe? Even Dan Nelson, who is generally skeptical of the view that the Warsaw Treaty Organization is a mirror of Soviet preferences, asserts that the major purpose of the alliance "is to further the political control of a dominant power over smaller member states."³ That is something of an oversimplification of the complex domestic-foreign policy linkages⁴ that led to setting up the Warsaw Pact in 1955. It may be an accurate description of the subsequent Soviet agenda, but in no sense does it

describe the purpose of the alliance as seen by East European decision-makers.

Moreover, since its founding in 1955, there have been open challenges to Soviet hegemony by every East European member of the Warsaw Pact except Bulgaria.⁵ These conflicts fall into three categories:

1) domestic change on the part of an East European member unacceptable to Moscow such as those proposed by the Nagy government in Hungary in 1956, the return of Gomulka as head of the Polish Party during Polish October of that same year, Dubcek's "socialism with a human face" that attempted to sweep the ashes of Stalinism from the Czechoslovak road to socialism in 1968, and the rise of Solidarity as a competitor for the Polish United Workers Party's leading role in 1980-1981;

2) resistance to Moscow's interpretation of intra-bloc or intra-Communist obligations such as Romanian balking at Khrushchev's international socialist division of labor in the 1960s, Albanian support for the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet split, Bucharest's refusal to go along with Moscow's desired level of WTO defense burden sharing in 1978;

3) foreign policies initiatives relating to non-Communist countries that refused to be coordinated, such as the Romanian recognition of Israel and West Germany; the East German initial resistance to the pace of detente in the late 1960s and reluctance to sacrifice East-West German relations to Soviet strategic policy in 1983-84.

In the 1980s, the tension between Soviet and East European agendas for the Warsaw Pact has been articulated in a debate over the role of "national initiatives" by small and medium-sized states with respect to European security and "international obligation" flowing from a correct, class-defined perspective. This paper assumes that military spending in East Europe is a reflection of country-specific positions relating to this more basic issue of

intra-alliance politics; that therefore, it is my job to establish the broader ideological/political context to set the stage for discussion, of determinants of East European military budgets and the impact of those budgets on individual East European economies.

There is another assumption as well. That is that the ability of the Soviet Union to translate its overwhelming power into the kind of influence that can bring about desired policy outcomes requires an agreed upon order of priorities in Moscow. Or, to put it differently, that to achieve Soviet-dominated policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact, cohesion must exist among the foreign policy elites in the USSR itself. These assumptions led me to speculate on some tentative hypotheses concerning the politics of foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact these days:

1) In ideological terms, the internal Soviet economic debate that Gorbachev defined as his number one priority at the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986 can be seen as an effort to transform the substance of "real socialism," Soviet style.

2) That effort interacts with economic and systemic dilemmas facing policymakers in the East European members of the Warsaw Pact so as to make their intra-alliance obligations more ambiguous while their national concerns become more pressing.

3) As a consequence, notwithstanding the rhetorical commitment to class-linked international obligations, Soviet ability to retain control over the direction of internal East European development and the level of commitment to defense burden sharing alike, could be expected to decline.

In considering these hypotheses, it is useful to keep in mind the context within which foreign policy coordination takes place. Who coordinates with whom in what political environments? This brings me to an analytical framework

of Soviet-East European decision-making⁶ rather different from the approaches in the increasingly prolific literature on the Warsaw Pact.

Political Identities and Environments:

Soviet and East European policymakers alike operate within four overlapping political environments. First, they are national political actors subject to a range of national pressures and concerns that differ greatly not only between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but within Eastern Europe as well. In this arena Soviet-East European interests may either coincide or conflict and must be evaluated in country-specific terms on a case-by-case basis.

Secondly, they are intra-bloc actors, relating to one another in terms of perceived alliance obligations involving both the WTO and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Within the bloc, the Soviets have an ongoing concern to control foreign policy and within somewhat blurred limits domestic political outcomes. East European policymakers alternate between seeking to expand their room for political maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow, to increase their input into joint decisions, and to secure Soviet support against one another. At this level, there is not one political game but many games with many possible alignments.

In turn, the intra-bloc dimension is influenced by the fact that all the actors involved share membership in a broader grouping that scholars call the Communist subsystem⁷ and the participants variously refer to as the "socialist commonwealth" or "family of socialist nations." Soviet and East European policymakers are operating in an intra-Communist political environment. As part of the world Communist movement, they are officially committed to a

transnational ideological/political campaign to change the international status quo. They share in-group norms, standards and values. They play the game of intra-Communist politics with reference to their own heroes, villains, and martyrs. The ideological language of politics tends to obscure more traditional conflicts of national interest. Esoteric debate and ritual behavior combine to confuse the underlying political dynamics.

There are rules of this game which do not apply to relations among these states and the non-Communist world. Nonetheless, the intra-Communist arena and the intra-bloc arena are also subject to influence stemming from Soviet and East European membership in an international system where Soviet and East European leaders interact within an East-West framework, with the developing countries of the Third World, and with a range of non-state actors such as the PLO, the Pope, and multinational corporations. Within the international political environment, there are constant tensions produced by the fact that the Soviet Union is a global power and East European countries are primarily regional actors, their ideological commitments notwithstanding.

These political environments can be seen as concentric circles surrounding the policymakers involved and structuring their relationships to one another. It makes the situation easier to visualize. However, it also is potentially misleading. For in terms of the postwar Soviet-East European interactions, the relationship of these four political environments to one another varies dramatically over time and depends on the mix of opportunities and obstacles within each environment at any given period.

In addition, these environments interact with the political identities of the East European leaders engaged in the politics of policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact. And from the very beginning the imperatives of the Stalinist succession struggle and conflicting East-West and intra-bloc

objectives in Moscow sent mixed signals to their East European allies about acceptable alliance behavior. In attempting to substitute institutional ties for the feudal, personalistic, Stalinist interstate system, Khrushchev's fascination with summit diplomacy led him to focus on the East-West implications of the alliance as a potential throw-away card in his meeting with Eisenhower. The result was a Treaty that stressed the principles of sovereignty, independence, and noninterference in internal affairs. Thus the language of the founding document of the Pact and its basic principles were a reaction to a condition within the Soviet national environment--an internal power struggle--and a perceived target of opportunity in the international environment. At the same time, the Soviets expected policy coordination to continue to reflect a dominant-subordinate Soviet-East relationship flowing from the fact that Moscow was the Mecca of the Communist World; the Soviet Union the leader of the Socialist Camp. In other words, Khrushchev and Molotov alike continued to assume that the primacy of the Soviet model (a principle of the intra-Communist environment) would dominate the new institutional infrastructure put in place to substitute for the myth of Stalin.

I have discussed the systemic transformations of each of these political
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environments elsewhere. From our point of view, there are several key points that should be kept in mind: A domestic transformation in the USSR following the death of Stalin meant that Soviet factional struggle simultaneously destabilized East European national environments and made East European Communist leaders more vulnerable to pressure from largely unfriendly populations. Those East European leaders who survived did so by a variety of political strategies. They were assisted in that process by the renationalization of East European armies after 1956 and a change in the power configuration of the intra-Communist environment brought about by the

Sino-Soviet split. At the same time, by 1960 Moscow's recognition that Socialism would not survive a nuclear war and subsequent shifts in Soviet strategic doctrine and capability interacted with the erosion of the bipolar post-war international system. The ENEMIES became limited adversaries in search of areas of cooperation as well as conflict. And on the road to detente, Soviet priorities for East-West gains (vis-à-vis the international environment) defined East European status as intra-bloc actors, this time reinforcing national initiatives in support of the jointly accepted goal.

In the meantime, Eurocommunist parties emerged in the intra-Communist environment. These parties were more devoted to parliamentary politics than to Leninism and were no longer willing to put Soviet-defined priorities above their own interests. The Soviet Union remained the first surviving socialist state; it was indisputably the most powerful socialist state. Yet step by step, the Soviet experience was seen as irrelevant; Leninism as uniquely Russian, the Soviet model as inappropriate.

The extent to which Soviet organizational control had slipped was evident at the long-awaited World Communist Conference in June 1969, aptly characterized by Kevin Devlin as the "institutionalization of diversity." Soviet-inspired attacks on the Chinese were countered by Eurocommunist condemnations of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Delegates publicized their own positions with little regard for Soviet objection. And instead of unanimity, the final declaration was not signed by some parties, signed in part by others and with "reservations" by still others.

This inability to mobilize desired outcomes at Communist meetings appeared even more starkly at the 1976 Pan-European Communist Conference in Berlin. There was no reference to Soviet-style "proletarian internationalism" as a basis for interparty relations, the general laws of socialist

development, or the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Rather, relations were to be based on "voluntary cooperation," reflecting the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for different roads to socialism.¹² The value of the Soviet model was ignored, as was Soviet leadership of the Socialist Commonwealth. Although Soviet censorship gave the impression that proletarian internationalism remained a fundamental guideline for interparty contacts, the East Germans published the text of all speeches. And, in the subsequent ideological exchanges over whether or not Eurocommunism was simply anti-Sovietism in disguise, the Hungarian leader Kadar came out with a carefully worded endorsement of socialist pluralism that balanced his support for "the leading role of the party" with the view that it was possible to build socialism in a multiparty system as well as a one party one.¹³

As domestic prospects of West European Communist parties declined in the 1980s, there has been a tendency to dismiss the importance of the Eurocommunists' procedural and ideological victories at the Berlin Conference. However, in my view, Moscow's reluctant acceptance of "voluntary cooperation" and "creative interpretation" along national roads to socialism in 1976 has spilled over into the intra-bloc arena with direct repercussions for the politics of policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact.

Not surprisingly, the long-standing Soviet-Romanian dispute over the "nation" as the primary political unit as opposed to "class" continued.¹⁴ Czechoslovakia predictably championed internationalism against the "national deviations" of unnamed Warsaw Pact allies.¹⁵ As anticipated, Hungarians came to the defense of Budapest's foreign policy initiatives, emphasizing the role of small and medium-sized countries in facilitating detente. That the Soviets showed their displeasure by reprinting parts of the Czechoslovak blast in Novoe vremya came as no surprise.¹⁶ But these ideological exchanges stopped

being business as usual when the East Germans reprinted the Hungarian side of the story, ignoring the criticism from Prague.¹⁷ This represented a visible break in the ranks of the Brezhnev era proponents of "real socialism."

By August 1984, such proxy polemics had given way to open differences between Moscow and the otherwise model "real socialists" leading the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) on how best to respond to the ongoing NATO deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Europe. Soviet attacks on close East-West German ties as opening the door to revanchist West German political and ideological influence--perhaps even casting doubt on West German commitments to the inviolability of borders pledged in the Moscow-Bonn Nonaggression Pact of August 1970--met with top level East German calls for a return to "peaceful economic and political relations through dialogue."

This dispute on the nature of inner German relations has lead to blunt East German reaffirmations of "the right of Communist Parties everywhere to follow their own paths and arrive at their own solutions and conclusions."¹⁸ This is in the context of asserting that "the international Communist movement is and remains a voluntary battle community of equal and independent parties" in which all parties work together "to preserve proletarian internationalism but...apply their own experience creatively to solve new problems."

The reference to proletarian internationalism in this article is particularly thought-provoking, coming as it does from an East German source. For after all, surely, the East Germans have been among the firm defenders of scientific, "real socialism." If I read Norbert's statement correctly, the question is not proletarian internationalism, but who decides how to creatively apply the principle.¹⁹ In that case, we could say that "real socialism" is measured by the extent of agreement between Soviet preferences and the interpretations of East European leaders bent on protecting visibly

national interests. If so, it is fair to conclude that a fundamental contradiction of "real socialism" is that notwithstanding the conviction among Communists that "correct solutions" exist both tactically and strategically, there are not universally agreed upon procedures for finding them.

This visible lack of cohesion within the intra-Communist environment makes it extremely difficult for the Soviets to pull ideological rank, so to speak, on their East European comrades with regard to intra-bloc issues. That weakening of ideological influence comes at a time when Soviet economic incentives also are increasingly in short supply.

Economic Restraints: The Pitfalls of Interdependence

In the West there has been a tendency to minimize the extent to which East European options are a function not only of the Soviet shadow across East Europe but of international trends and Western policy as well. Yet in the economic dimension, the importance of the big picture and Western input is inescapable.

The 1970s were a time of deceptive plenty. East European economies appeared stronger than they were. Western bankers needed markets to recycle OPEC petro-dollars. East European planners faced increasing energy costs and declining Soviet willingness to foot the bill. The political climate was encouraging. However ultimately illusory, detente legitimized more independent East European foreign policies and facilitated East-West economic deals. The loans were available. It was less painful to live on borrowed money than to cut back domestic consumption or investment.

Table I: East European Hard Currency Debt, 1975-1985
(Billion US\$)

	1975	1980	1983	1985
Bulgaria	2.6	3.5	2.3	3.1
Czechoslovakia	1.1	4.9	3.9	3.8
East Germany	5.3	14.1	12.8	13.9
Hungary	3.1	9.0	8.2	11.7
Poland	8.0	25.0	26.4	29.3
Romania	2.9	9.4	8.7	6.5

Source: CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, September 1986), p. 48.

In retrospect, the temptation of that economic strategy was much like that of the biblical apple in the Garden of Eden. Subsequent Western economic recession, high interest rates, and economic insecurity was bad news to East European policymakers and ordinary citizens alike. Whatever pleasure Party ideologues took in the ideological implications, East European countries increasingly dependent on new loans suffered from these "contradictions" of capitalism. Simultaneously, the political climate soured in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The hard choices could no longer be avoided.

Undoubtedly, a substantial part of the problem was economic mismanagement on the side of East European planners, that borrowed funds were used less effectively than they might have been. It is also true that even if economic management had been much better than it was, the East European options in the 1980s would be bleak, for small and medium-sized countries Communist and non-Communist alike are visibly not masters of their fate in the

international economic system. East European Communist regimes are even less so because they cannot control the spillover of U.S.-Soviet hostilities.

This is not to deny that debt-servicing will be less of a restraint for Bulgaria, where the Zhivkov regime saw the handwriting on the wall and adopted appropriate economic strategies, than for Poland where the galloping loans acted as precipitants for the systemic crisis in which Solidarity was born. Notwithstanding recent access to IMF funding, Poland's credit future in the West depends on highly political criteria that have inhibited access to credits.

In short, each East European member of the Warsaw Pact faces its own mix of favorable or unfavorable political environments, the consequences of its own past policies, and ongoing domestic pressures. Yet even in the most favorable of those situations politically, credit is hard to get and depends on potentially politically destabilizing austerity programs.

The receptivity, or lack of it, of the international community to East European economic needs, in turn, becomes a factor in the degree of dependence on the Soviet Union. Given the enormous differences in size between the Soviet economy and those of Moscow's East European allies, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union is the dominant regional supplier and customer. Trade with the Soviet Union is essential for economic development of Eastern Europe, primarily bilateral, and influenced by political/military considerations. With the exception of Romania--where Ceausescu has deliberately diversified--East European economies are symbiotically tied to their trade with the USSR.

Whether this situation is an asset or liability from the Soviet perspective has been a matter of considerable academic debate. For our purposes, the past in this regard is less important than the future. Ever

since the changing in CMEA pricing mechanisms in the mid-1970s to a moving average based on world prices, it has been clear that Moscow intended to cut its perceived losses, especially in the realm of energy subsidies to Eastern Europe. Whether this is because Soviet energy resources will peak in the 1980s as predicted, because Soviet policymakers need hard currency from energy sales for their global commitments, or for some other reason, does not change the consequence. East Europeans will have to pay more and look elsewhere to²³ meet their own projected energy consumption levels. In this sense, the declining availability of Soviet resources becomes a restraint to be reckoned with in the 1980s.

Earlier Western assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding, Soviet response to recent debt-servicing crises make quite clear that neither East European borrowers or Western lenders can count on a Soviet "umbrella" to²⁴ protect them from the fallout of potential defaults. Indeed, at the 1984 CMEA summit, the Soviet goal appeared to be to reduce East European trade deficits with the USSR, to get a better quality export from East European consumers of Soviet raw materials and to increase East European participation²⁵ in developing Soviet natural resources. Moscow was responding to the fact that on balance, East European policymakers had managed to at least contain their debt crises with the West and get the flow of Western credits moving again. Moreover, considering Soviet preoccupation with their own economic problems so evident at the 1986 27th Party Congress, Crane is undoubtedly correct that Soviet domestic needs will take priority over those of East²⁶ European economies.

Thus, despite the continued Soviet dominance of intra-CMEA economic options, Soviet policy itself is making it more and more essential for the East Europeans to seek other economic alternatives, suppliers and markets.

Whatever the formal commitment to increased integration and coordination of national plans within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the reality is that of less Soviet assistance. This reality was reflected in the 1984 CMEA Moscow Summit Declaration's insistence that CMEA countries have been "consistent opponents of economic isolationism;" the support for "increased exploitation of the potential for the development of business cooperation with capitalist states and also with their businesses and companies."²⁷

When that support translated into closer East-West German economic ties Moscow was bluntly unhappy. The Soviet transitional leadership was visibly alarmed that West German economic levers would influence East German options. Notwithstanding the conflicting signals from Moscow with respect to East European "national initiatives" since Gorbachev took over, nervousness has continued about economic dealings with the West.²⁸ Yet, East European policymakers are pressed forward by a mixture of economic and political imperatives for which there is no pat answer in Moscow.

The Search For Legitimacy

In addition, whereas energy expended in the search for a proper mix of internationalism and socialist patriotism is an ongoing source of tension between Soviet and East European Communists, that problem is exacerbated by the crisis of legitimacy that continues to plague East European Communist regimes. Undeniably, Eastern Europe underwent Communist revolutions. Yet with the exceptions of Yugoslavia and Albania, East European Communists rode to power on the coattails of the Red Army. Soviet liberation and "scientific socialism" cannot substitute for indigenous revolutionary myth. The rational-legal basis for legitimacy may exist on paper in the form of East European constitutions but these documents determine form, not content. Nor is charisma a strong point among East European party leaders, who at best are

essentially seen as the least worse choice by large parts of their populations. It is not an enviable position for any politician, and not surprisingly East European leaders have attempted to improve their image with various mixtures of cautious nationalism, consumerism, and cooptation of technical and cultural elites.

On balance, Western scholars tend to feel that it has not worked. Nonetheless, the process appears to have convinced those East Europeans dedicated to change that the only political game in town is tinkering with party reform under the mantle of "national roads" to socialism. It has created circumstances in which I would agree with Alfred Meyer that "throughout the European Communist World the societal base is tending to reassert its sovereignty over the political superstructure." ²⁹ There are obviously limits. The "Allied Socialist" invasion of Czechoslovakia that ruled out Dubcek's version of "socialism with a human face" attempted to draw the line. That Kadar subsequently went forward with the more modest Hungarian reforms without Soviet and more orthodox East European troops marching into Budapest, sends yet another message. The fact remains that whatever the perceived limits, as national actors East European leaders are under increasing pressure to tilt toward socialist patriotism.

With the rise of Solidarity in Poland in 1980-81, the Polish crisis of legitimacy became a full-scale ideological crisis in which the Polish workers attempted to become their own vanguard. With Polish workers demanding to speak for themselves and Solidarity insisting that the Polish United Workers ³⁰ Party put its "leading role" to a vote, Poland collapsed into martial law. Although the move to military rule prevented Poland from falling off the road to socialism altogether, it hardly increased the legitimacy of the Polish Party. In short, the official lifting of martial law in July 1983 notwith-

standing, Poland remained in the grip of an ideological crisis in which rebuilding the Party made slow progress. Footdragging in this regard, in turn, has produced less than perfect harmony between General Jaruzelski and his Soviet patrons.³¹

It is too soon to evaluate the political significance of the Polish United Workers' Party Congress during the summer of 1986. Regardless of whether Party politics are normalizing, for East European Communist leaders the Polish scenario is a nightmare. The spectre of rejection by dissatisfied workers has increased the urgency of genuine concessions to worker needs and at least the potential for changes in the priorities of party-run trade unions.

At the same time, party ideologues throughout Eastern Europe are struggling with a widening generation gap. Young people are dropping out. They are alienated, hostile to regimentation and bored by Marxism-Leninism in the ideological jargon of their grandfathers.³² This is a core problem of the nature of the ideological component of political socialization. Teenagers in East and West alike live in a youth culture permeated with political apathy. They are hard to reach. Parents, never mind politicians, don't talk their language.

In Communist systems this communication problem is compounded by the felt need to explain reality in ideological terms that give the appearance of unity whether or not it exists and obscures differences. Consider the following insightful Yugoslav analysis of this process.

, . . .if different socialist practices exist, it is quite natural that different views must also exist. Past experiences in the East, however, show that it is much easier to introduce "one's own practices" than admit publicly that such a practice actually exists. The same is true of debate. One gains the impression that different views are more readily tolerated than permitted to be discussed publicly; in the latter case the unity of

the "socialist community" would be considered weakened.

This is the result of a deeply rooted Soviet assumption that the appearance of unity, most especially unity that reflects Soviet practice, is an important validation of Soviet domestic choices. Tension arises because the appearance of unity so essential in terms of Moscow's political agenda is dysfunctional in terms of the concrete ideological/political crises facing East European Communist leaders, whose credibility depends on the appearance of "one's own practices." To come up with an ideological slight of hand that is all things to all people is not the answer.

One could obviously elaborate on the political dimension of these crises of legitimacy and communication on a country-by-country basis. However, let me turn to what I consider as the most serious of political transformation facing Eastern Europe as a whole, the problem of political institutionalization.

Crises of Political Development

Although for years the totalitarian model dominated Western analyses of East European political developments, by the 1960s attention began to be paid³⁴ to the usefulness of developmental and bureaucratic models as well. As Paul Johnson put it, "scholars were catching up with the march of events."³⁵ Studies of systemic change in Eastern Europe focused on mature Communism evolving into authoritarian oligarchies, with the Communist parties themselves³⁶ restructured into an "elite of elites."

Under the influence of mainstream comparative politics, East European systems were no longer considered immune to the normal pressures for change associated with political development. There were several provocative studies³⁷ exploring the consequences of modernization for East European politics.

In my view, Sam Huntington is correct to consider Leninism as a theory of political development intent on mobilization and political institutionalization.³⁸ Lenin was a genius at synthesizing theory and practice. But it is useful to remember that in fact the Bolsheviks did not make the Russian revolution of 1917 even if Lenin's organizational principles allowed the CPSU to outmaneuver their rivals and ride that revolutionary wave to power. Lenin's concept of party-building was developed to meet the needs of consolidating that power. He stopped substantially short of political institutionalization as elaborated in Huntington's own criteria--i.e.,³⁹ adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence. One could argue that Leninist organization principles as applied to the USSR implicitly included Huntington's indices of political institutionalization, although I have my own reservations even in that regard. The more fundamental problem comes with the internationalization of the Leninist model and the implications of seeing Soviet-East European relations in the dominant-subordinate terms implicit in recognition of Soviet leadership. Or to put it differently, if one agrees with Zimmerman that the Soviet bloc (Soviet-East Europe) is best conceived as an hierarchical, regional system, it becomes impossible for East European Communist parties to meet Huntington's criteria for political institutionalization because their autonomy is subject to Soviet veto.

Nor is this the only weak spot. It is true that East European Communist systems have survived for almost four decades, which might be seen as chronological adaptability. To the extent that these systems have become more⁴⁰ inclusive and adjusted to a range of system-maintenance demands, they have limited functional adaptability. However, East European parties have notoriously poor records with respect to generational adaptability. The top party leaders in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania assumed those positions in the

mid-1950s. Husak became head of the Czechoslovak Party (KSC) in 1969; Honecker of the SED in 1971. In Poland ever since 1956 leadership change has been a function of social disorders and workers protest in one form or another.

The advantages of complexity notwithstanding, coherence in Huntington's sense is also eroded by the international lack of autonomy exacerbated by Moscow's tendency to resolve East European leadership disputes in terms of Soviet policy preferences. This may be an issue of viability versus cohesion⁴¹ as seen from the Kremlin, but it makes it virtually impossible for East European parties to cope with their ongoing crises of participation. By cutting short Czechoslovak efforts toward the genuine party reform envisioned⁴² in the KSC 1968 draft statutes, "allied socialist forces" froze the process of political institutionalization underway during the Prague Spring in a distorted, artificial form that destroyed both the historically pro-Russian feelings of the majority of Czechs, if not Slovaks, and any vestige of legitimacy for the rebuilt Communist party. It is my own view that this has proved an exceedingly mixed blessing even from the Soviet perspective, but this is not the place to elaborate on that dimension.

Rather let me turn to what I consider the lesson of Poland in this regard. When Poland collapsed into martial law, the good news from the perspective of those anxious Warsaw watchers in the countries of "real socialism" was that Solidarity had been neutralized as an effective alternative to the "leading role of the Party." The bad news was that the Polish United Workers Party had essentially collapsed, its leading role assumed by the Polish military.

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Considering this the victory of "the Party in uniform" obscures the fundamental long term implications. It is undeniable that the civilian

leadership of the Polish United Workers Party proved incapable of dealing with the situation. The Polish party quite simply fell apart. As then Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski admitted in his interview with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci the party had "disintegrated."

. . . Which is quite clear since the military had to take its place in the government. Who could deny that it went bankrupt, intellectually, and politically, that it was unable to organize the society, to get the country out of disaster, even to defend the state? In the end you are right; we are the ones to be blamed, not Solidarity.⁴⁴

It is not surprising that the Soviets are less than fond of Rakowski. It is surprising that so little serious attention has been paid to what this oft quoted statement means.

Communist political systems had been assumed to be coup proof. The Leninist principle of civil-military relations that Mao Zedong so eloquently expressed as the party commanding the gun did not hold in Poland. Even if one accepts the Party in Uniform theory, the Polish military has become the vanguard of the Polish Party. This happened because the Polish party became a victim of political decay and essentially collapsed. The struggle for 'party renewal,' the euphemism for the attempt to rebuild the Polish United Workers' Party, underlines dilemmas of legitimacy and participation that are by no means uniquely Polish. How East European members of the Warsaw Pact deal with these domestic pressures is a factor in the politics of policy coordination within the alliance. It is also a function of Soviet domestic choices and the spillover of Gorbachev's reform strategies.

On the Contradictions of "Real Socialism"

Notwithstanding CIA reports denying that the Soviets are under sufficient economic pressure to force Moscow to cut an arms deal acceptable to

Washington, the CPSU 27th Party Congress came out firmly on the side of the need for economic reform. Gorbachev personally called for 'radical reform;' for a new understanding of what 'scientific socialism' meant in the 1980s. He bluntly warned his comrades that it would not do to adopt a "wait and see" policy or, like some character in Gogol drift off into fanciful ideas that "do not change anything." He said, "we will part ways with those who hope that everything will settle down and return to the old lines."⁴⁶

As a consequence, there is a remarkably frank debate on the substance of reform strategies among policymakers and within the academic/scholarly community. Rolf Theen has documented a fascinating degree of diversity among institutes and journals seeking to influence the direction of the policy process.⁴⁷ Official reformers as less open, but have their allies in the academic camps. Here domestic-foreign policy lines tend to blur as Soviet scholars lean toward Hungarian/GDR or even Bulgarian reform varieties, while East European reformers cite selectively from the Soviet debate to reinforce their arguments at home. Historically, the period reminds one of the maneuvering that surrounded Malenkov's New Course. Gorbachev himself has expressed less than complete satisfaction with the pace of implementation.⁴⁸ His speech to the Hungarian workers went so far as to recognize the contribution that an East European reform effort could make to the Soviet search for new directions, although he also warned that "some" East bloc countries had yet to demonstrate that they were capable of reform.

The CPSU looks with respect and attention on the search for solutions to complex economic and social problems that is taking place here in Hungary and other socialist countries. We are pleased with the accomplishments of our friends and strive to make use of anything that is advantageous or appropriate for our own country.⁴⁹

Moreover, if we look at the pattern of the General Secretary's travels in

relations to recent East European party congresses, it was probably "no accident" that he did not lead the Soviet delegations to Sofia and Prague, the strongholds of "real socialism" Soviet-style throughout the Brezhnev years. This appears to add up to what is an attempt by Gorbachev to use East European reformers to validate his domestic efforts. That effort, like the Brezhnev acceptance of independent East European initiatives in support of an elusive East-West detente can have unintended repercussions.

From the Soviet point of view, a worrisome spin-off of the 1975 Helsinki recognition of post-World War II borders combined with the pledge to foster mutually advantageous economic relations was an increasingly independent European policy on the part of East European members of the Warsaw Pact. But it was awkward to object. After all, the East European leaderships involved were conforming to jointly agreed upon alliance policies. This was foreign policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact. It was also an example of Soviet East-West priorities impacting on intra-bloc behaviors of the non-Soviet members of the Pact.

The desire of East European leaders to protect East-West European relations when detente went off track with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be considered the beginning. Poland tried to walk a tightrope of publicly taking the Soviet line, while desperately attempting to keep needed Western credits flowing. The rise of Solidarity and the collapse into martial law in part was a consequence of Gierek's failure to survive that balancing act. To whatever extent one accepts the theory of "organic" Soviet-East European relations, it is fair to say that the Polish political trauma in 1980-81 severely strained political cohesion within the alliance.

But even if one does not go into the issue of domestic conformity, the collapse of US-Soviet arms negotiations over the NATO deployment of Pershing

II and Cruise missiles in Europe, led to a visible problem in terms of foreign policy coordination. The Soviets stopped speaking, and Moscow walked out of the talks. East German leader Erich Honecker emphasized the need to continue dialogue and limit the damage. The Hungarians stressed the value of initiatives by small and medium-sized states in Europe to get detente back on track. Undoubtedly to Moscow's annoyance, the April 1984 Warsaw Pact statement on these matters came substantially closer to GDR-Hungarian positions than to the Soviet hardline.⁵⁰

Notwithstanding Gorbachev's plea for unity and discipline, a running debate on national inputs and international obligations within the Warsaw Pact has continued into the current chapter of alliance politics. These scarcely esoteric exchanges are well documented.⁵¹ They surrounded the October 1985 Warsaw Pact meeting and by December 1985 led to speculation that differences within the Pact had spread to issues of defense burden sharing.⁵² By any definition differences as to strategies vis-à-vis European detente, to say nothing of who pays the bills for Soviet countermeasures to NATO missiles and President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, are a problem of policy coordination.

For the time being, these differences are obscured by genuine support for Gorbachev's summit diplomacy. It is not a problem to coordinate support for a return to detente which the East European members of the Warsaw Pact see as a political climate that facilitates their access to Western credits and protects their room for political maneuver, while potentially cutting everyone's defense burden.

However, should the Iceland meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev prove to be a dead end street instead of a detour in U.S. strategic arms negotiations, coming to agreement on country-specific "fair shares" in

Warsaw Pact defense burden sharing will be substantially harder. To whatever extent Soviet internal reforms call for reallocation of resources devoted to Moscow's own military-industrial sector, we can expect Soviet pressure on their East European allies to pay more of the bill. Conversely, to whatever degree Gorbachev succeeds in supporting East European economic reformers, he may find them even less willing than Brezhnev's East European allies when the Soviets called upon the Warsaw Pact to increase its defense spending to match NATO increases in 1978.

Table II: East European Defense Spending 1978-1984 (in percentages)

	% of Government Spending					% of GNP/GDP			
	1978	1980	1981	1982	1984	1978	1980	1982	1984
Bulgaria	6.2	(6.6)	5.6	5.7 (6.1)	5.6	2.3-3	(3.2)	2.2-2.9	3.9
Czechoslovakia	7.1	(7.5)	7.4	7.7 (7.8)	8.3	3.4-3.9	(3.5)	2.8-5.2	4.0
GDR	7.9	(8.2)	8.4 (8.5)	8.4	8.0	5.0-8.1	(5.3)	3.7-6.5	7.7
Hungary	3.8	(5.3)	3.9	4.0 (4.0)	7.3	2.4	(2.3)	2.4	3.9
Poland	8.6	(5.3)	5.2	7.1 (7.2)	7.5	3.0	(2.7)	na	3.7
Romania	3.9	(3.5)	3.8	4.1 (4.4)	4.3	2.1	(1.7)	1.6	1.4

Source: IISS The Military Balance 1983-1984 and 1985-1986. (London: 1983, 1985, 1986)
 Note the figures in parentheses are from the 1985-1986 edition and with the exception of Hungary, were revised upwards from the 1983-1984 estimate. Also, the range of roughly 3% for Czechoslovakia in 1982, the GDR in both 1978 and 1982 does not give one much confidence in the precision of the calculation.

Given the need for economic performance to prop up the legitimacy of East

European regimes and Soviet policy of reducing East European deficits in terms of CMEA trade turnover, the likelihood of East European policymakers embracing higher defense budgets is very small. Such a policy would be difficult to coordinate "in principle." In reality, it would be even harder for East European leaders to be saddled with responsibility for further increases in defense spending per capita.

Table III: East European Defense Burden per Capita 1978 to 1983 (in US\$)

	1978	1980	1983
	----	----	----
Bulgaria	49	150	188
Czechoslovakia	124	225	299
GDR	375	387	515
Hungary	74	125	152
Poland	96	135	157
Romania	60	66	70

Source: IISS The Military Balance 1983-1984 and 1985-1986. (London: 1983, 1985). Figures for 1980 and 1983 are taken from the 1985 edition.

Table IV: East European Average Annual Rate of Growth, 1961-1985

	1961-65	1971-75	1981-85
Bulgaria	5.6	4.1	1.0
Czechoslovakia	1.7	2.7	1.2
East Germany	3.0	3.7	1.9
Hungary	3.6	3.0	0.8
Poland	3.2	5.5	-0.8
Romania	4.7	5.7	1.4

Source: CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics. (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, September 1986), p. 40.

This means that as in 1978, defense burden sharing policy coordination "in principle" might well get sidetracked when it came to potentially politically destabilizing trade-offs, especially if the country in question had become a part of the Soviet internal reform debate.

In addition, their own political/economic pressures can only intensify the felt need of East European members of the alliance for political and most especially economic ties to Western Europe. Such links reinforce these states' European as opposed to socialist identities and weaken the rationale for a divided Europe. That process implicitly undermines the Soviet desired "international obligations" as defined in Moscow. In this sense political developments within the national arena of East European policymakers and within the international arena alike have spilled over into intra-bloc politics; reordering East European multiple political roles.

Gorbachev has inherited the Warsaw Pact at a time when his East European comrades are pushed from below to put their national interests first; their intra-bloc obligations second. Eroding Soviet hegemony within the intra-Communist arena, the de facto legitimization of socialist pluralism at the

1976 Berlin Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, has functioned to rationalize that order of priorities.

This is not to imply that Moscow can not achieve desired outcomes. But acquiescence is not automatic and may require much political energy. Honecker backed off from his September 1984 visit to Bonn after months of acrimonious Soviet-East German exchanges.⁵³ In retrospect, it is clear that his postponed visit did not mean a major retreat from closer East-West German relations. However, whether or not that issue is a problem of Communist coalition politics depends to a large degree on Soviet perceptions and behaviors.

The extent to which such East-West European interactions are a liability or an asset for the alliance is tied both to Gorbachev's West European policy and to the threshold of Soviet tolerance for East European initiatives. Both in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, the room for independent East European policy expanded due to what is sometimes called Moscow's "dynamic ambiguity";⁵⁴ sometimes "benign neglect". The ongoing debate in Soviet media concerning national and international obligations indicates that ambiguity (dynamic or otherwise) has continued into the Gorbachev era.

I have no doubt that the current Soviet leadership has an atavistic preference for "real socialism" and the general laws of socialist development. Nonetheless, in my view, the bottom line for policy coordination in the Warsaw Pact is not the tug-of-war between national (East European) interests and "international" obligations, a euphemism for Soviet interests, but incremental changes taking place in the self-perceptions of political leaders in Moscow and Eastern Europe alike. We have some reason to think that even in the Soviet eyes the content of such laws can potentially change in directions that could make East European "national initiatives" less threatening.

However, even if such issues become less rather than more contentious within the Warsaw Pact, which is no sure thing, strains will continue. The Soviet Union is a superpower with global concerns that can and do conflict with the priorities of the Soviet's East European allies, and at times with Moscow's own intra-alliance preferred solutions. East European policymakers have become increasingly sophisticated at manipulating the resulting Soviet ambivalence.

Nor is the West a passive observer in that process. Warsaw Pact policy coordination, in part is a function of economic/ political options available to the non-Soviet members of the Pact. The current time of troubles afflicting Soviet and East European economies pushes East European policymakers to exploit opportunities inherent in their roles as international rather than intra-bloc actors. Competing economic demands have shrunk the size of the Soviet carrot and increased the cost of employing a military stick to achieve maximum Soviet objectives vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. This increases the difficulty of translating power into influence. Moreover, we do not yet know what East European leaders gained or lost patrons in the 27th CPSU Congress leadership shuffle: a factor that may be as significant as ideological/political issues when it comes to Soviet policy objectives.

Seen from this perspective, the decision to renew the Warsaw Pact for another twenty years, does not guarantee that the alliance will function as a reliable instrument of Soviet policy.

In these circumstances, it is possible the desired "unity and cohesion" of the Warsaw Pact as the "main centre" or coordinating Soviet-East European policies may be partially neutralized by the acceptance of socialist pluralism inherent in Gorbachev's own emphasis on "exchange of views" and "respect" for a range of socialist experience. Time will tell the ratio of signal to rhetoric.

But if so, policy coordination within the Warsaw Pact could become a process of bargaining and trade-offs that might be considered a step forward in translating the principle of mutual advantage into intra-alliance practice. Such an intra-bloc outcome depends heavily on what becomes "real socialism" Soviet-style during the Gorbachev era. It requires his own ability to survive the opposition to overhauling the Soviet economy and political spillover of economic reform within the USSR itself. It requires also international alternatives available to East European members of the Warsaw Pact who attempt to take "national initiatives."

Right now we are roughly in Act II, perhaps scene 2, of a political drama that will be at intermission during the US 1988 presidential election. Remembering the track record of those who predicted the outcome of the New Course, I will avoid predictions. But on reflection, that drama in itself has some implications for our analytical approaches to the study of Soviet politics in what is more a period of attempted systemic repair than system maintenance. Totalitarian and ideological models are not particularly helpful in following the reform debate in the Soviet Union or in coming to grips with Soviet-East European intra-alliance politics. Rather a mixture of personality/systemic explanations seemed to have some utility for understanding the power struggle swirling around Gorbachev. As for what Ron Linden alludes to as our East European foxes⁵⁵, the crab grass of political culture and an instinct for survival are easier to identify than "socialist content" in their approach to alliance policy coordination.

NOTES

1. Brezhnev speech to CPSU 24th Congress, Pravda, March 31, 1973.
2. Gorbachev's briefing to top leaders of Warsaw Pact states on the results of the Soviet-American summit in Geneva took place immediately following his meeting with Reagan, Pravda, November 21, 1985. See also address to East German Party Congress, Pravda, March 31, 1973.
3. Daniel N. Nelson, Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 5.
4. For an analysis of what appears to have been different Soviet conceptions of the WTO in 1955, Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1971), pp. 23-27.
5. And even Bulgaria has been less than fully responsive when it comes to moderating the rhythm of Bulgarian-Yugoslav polemics on the Macedonian question.
6. Elaborated in Robin Alison Remington, "Problems of Political Cohesion of the Warsaw Pact" as a conference paper for a two-day meeting dealing with the Warsaw Pact and the Question of Cohesion, Carleton University, March 14-16, 1986; forthcoming in Survey: Journal of East and West Studies, 1987. This analysis builds upon and is revised from that study.
7. See George Modelski, The Communist International System (Princeton University Press: Center for International Studies Monograph, 1960), p. 45.
8. Robin Alison Remington, "The Warsaw Treaty Organization's Third Decade: Systemic Transformations," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 42-66.

9. See Charles E. Timberlake, Detente: A Documentary Record (New York: Praeger, 1978).

10. See V.V. Asparturian, Jiri Valenta, and David Burke, eds., Euro-communism Between East and West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

11. Kevin Devlin, "The Interparty Drama," Problems of Communism, 24 (July-August 1975): 18-35.

12. Text of the final document, New Times (Moscow) 28 (July 1976): 17-32.

13. Janos Kadar, "On Several Hungarian Experiences in Building Socialism," Problems of Peace and Socialism, January 1977.

14. In April 1983 Bucharest's irredenta vis-à-vis Bessarabia escalated another notch with celebration of Bessarabia's union with Romania for the first time since World War II. Under the circumstances, the long delayed Soviet response to a major Romanian article defending "nation-state" criteria as of equal if not greater importance for understanding foreign policy than other unspecified "simplistic" and "dogmatic" interpretations was undoubtedly no accident. Vasile Iota in Contemporanul (Bucharest) 10 (March 5, 1982) and Novoe Vremya (Moscow) 16 (April 15, 1983).

15. Rude Pravo (Prague), March 30, 1984.

16. Novoe Vremya (Moscow), April 13, 1984.

17. Neus Deutschland, April 12 and 17, 1984. For analysis Ronald D. Asmus, "GDR Supports Hungarian Position on Bloc Relations," RFE-RL, May 9, 1984.

18. Harald Norbert, Horizont (August 7, 1984). Quoted from Elizabeth Pond's article in the Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1984.

19. The East German position appeared to blandly ignore an authoritative Soviet attempt to draw the line against precisely such "creative interpretations" in the Spring of 1984. O.V. Borisov, "Soyuz novogo tipa,"

Voprosy istorii IPSS, April 1984, pp. 34-49. Reaffirming the validity of general laws of socialist construction, this article attacked efforts to differentiate among socialist countries, the "dangerous preoccupation" with the particular over the general, of "national interests" over internationalism. For detailed analysis see Sallie Wise, "CPSU Journal Outlines Soviet Stance on Warsaw Pact Foreign Policy Dispute," RFE-RL, April 30, 1984.

20. Paul Marer, "East European Economies: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects," in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Communism in Eastern Europe, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 283-328.

21. Morris Bornstein, "Soviet-East European Economic Relations," in Bornstein, Gitelman and Zimmerman, op. cit., pp. 105-124.

22. See Paul Marer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to the Soviet Union?" (III) in Charles Gati, ed., The International Politics of Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1976, pp. 56-80. Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe: A Soviet Perspective (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983). In that different indicators give different pictures of the relationship, the debate is unlikely to be resolved. Its main political importance is that all parties involved can argue that they are disadvantaged from some perspective.

23. See Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

24. Paul Marer, "East Europe's Current Indebtedness: Causes and Consequences," paper presented to the American Historical Association, annual meeting in San Francisco, December 28-30, 1983.

25. CMEA statement, Pravda, June 16, 1984. Complete text in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP) XXXVI, 24 (July 11, 1984): 8-13.

26. Keith Crane, The Soviet Economic Dilemma of Eastern Europe (RAND: R-3368-AF, May 1986).

27. Pravda, June 16, 1984.

28. This may have been an even stronger reservation on the part of Gorbachev's subsequently out-manuevered rival, Romanov. Note his speech to the Hungarian Party Congress, March 26, 1986.

29. Alfred G. Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," Slavic Review XXVI, 1 (March 1967): 8-9.

30. Solidarity call for a national referendum on whether the Polish United Workers Party should be replaced, December 12, 1981.

31. Evident Soviet dissatisfaction was expressed both with the pace of rebuilding the party and toleration of Polish pluralism during May 1983, New Times (Moscow) 19 (May 1983): 18-20; response in Polish Polityka (Warsaw), May 12, 1983. New York Times, May 12, 1983.

32. Communique of the CC Secretaries Responsible for Foreign and Ideological Affairs, following a conference in Bucharest, December 19-20, 1985, Ager press (in English) December 20, 1985.

33. Politika (Belgrade), June 5, 1984.

34. See particularly the contribution by John Kautsky, "Communism and the Comparative Study of Development," Slavic Review XXVI, 1 (March 1967) 12-17. Also Alfred Meyer, "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," Ibid., pp. 3-12.

35. Paul M. Johnson, in Jan F. Triska and Paul M. Cocks, eds., Political Development in Easter Europe (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 31.

36. Zygmunt Bauman, "The Party in the System-Management Phase: Change and Continuity," in Andrew Janos, ed., Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe: Uniformity and Diversity in One-Party States. Research Series No. 28,

Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1976, pp. 81-108.

37. See Triska and Cocks, Political Development in Eastern Europe, op. cit., and Charles Gati, ed., The Politics of Modernization in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1974).

38. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 342 ff.

39. Ibid., pp. 12-24.

40. Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," Triska and Cocks, op. cit., pp. 93-118.

41. Andrzej Korbonski, "Eastern Europe," in Robert F. Byrnes, ed. After Brezhnev (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 303.

42. Text of the KSC Draft Statutes in Robin Alison Remington, Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 265-287.

43. Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, "The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems," The American Political Science Review 76, 4 (December 1982): 778-789.

44. The Times (London), February 23, 1982.

45. The New York Times, September 16, 1986.

46. Gorbachev speech to the CPSU 27th Congress, February 25, 1986.

47. Rolf H.W. Theen, "Current Reform Thinking in the Soviet Union," paper delivered at the Central Slavic annual conference, Kansas City, MO, October 9-10, 1986.

48. Speech to Central Committee Plenum, Pravda, June 17, 1986.

49. Pravda, June 10, 1986.

50. WTO Foreign Ministers' Conference Communique, TASS (English), April

20, 1984.

51. Ronald D. Asmus, (ed.) "East Berlin and Moscow: The Documentation of the Dispute," RFE Occasional Papers, no. 1 (Munich, March 1985) and his update "The National and International: Harmony or Discord?" Radio Free Europe Report, 10 December 1985.

52. Asmus, "Differences at Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers' Meeting?" Radio Free Europe Report, 9 December 1985.

53. And in this context, it is sometimes ignored that although Honecker stayed home, that very week, Gromyko was in New York resuming the "dialogue" on arms control that the East German leader had been concerned about salvaging, The New York Times, Sept. 26, 1984.

54. See Walter L. Barrows, "Speculations on a Multipolar 1984," in Louis J. Mensonides and James A. Kuhlman, eds., The Future of Inter-Bloc Relations in Europe (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 210; and Andrzej Korbonski, "Eastern Europe as an Internal Determinant of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 330.

55. Ronald H. Linden, Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of East European States, 1965-1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).