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Frederic S. Pearson

Robert A. Raumann

Gordon N. Bardos

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Arms Transfers:
Effects on African Interstate Wars
and Interventions

Frederic S. Pearson,
Robert A. Baumann, and
Gordon N. Bardos

**"ARMS TRANSFERS: EFFECTS ON AFRICAN INTERSTATE WARS AND
INTERVENTIONS"***

**Frederic S. Pearson
Department of Political Science, and
Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis**

**Robert A. Baumann
Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis**

**Gordon N. Bardos
Department of Political Science, and
Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis**

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Arms Transfers: Effects on African Interstate
Wars and Interventions*

Introduction

The relationship of armaments and war has long been a topic of debate and research. Nearly all studies of the subject have concentrated on the role of armament in the onset of war, with controversy about balances of military power, deterrence, and arms races. Findings generally have indicated that armaments do not necessarily "cause" war, although rising levels of arms can aggravate existing tensions, thus leading to violence. Most arms races between nations do not end in warfare, but disputes which are accompanied by arms races are far more likely to end in war than those which are not so accompanied.¹

Despite such research, little or no attention has been paid to the effect of armament during warfare on the escalation and deescalation patterns of wars. Harkavy, for example, has noted "the almost complete absence of any focused, comparative analysis of arms transfer diplomacy after the onset of and during conflict" (original emphasis).² Yet, in view of the increasing military carnage and social dislocation in much of the Third World, restraining or controlling the flow of arms has been suggested as one method of conflict control.

It has been argued that weapons transfers to warring parties, or the withholding of arms resupply can profoundly affect the outcome of a war or prospects for peace, especially where combatants are highly dependent on foreign arms suppliers. Governments which provide arms to combatants frequently claim a desire to influence the outcome of the war, and to hasten peace. Indeed a U.S.-U.K. arms embargo of India and Pakistan in 1965 generally is credited with bringing their South Asian war to a grinding halt, but also with stimulating both the growth of indigenous arms industries in, and the

search for alternate arms suppliers by India and Pakistan, enabling them to fight further wars.

One region of the world which is particularly dependent on the outside supply of arms is Africa. While arms transfers to Africa do not compare with the 43% of global arms imports going to the Middle East, and while arms imports to the region have been declining throughout the 1980s, Africa was still second among Third World regions in 1984 with nearly 14% of world arms imports.⁴ As in other parts of the world, African states increasingly have diversified their arms suppliers, but with the exception of South Africa, generally they remain too new and too poor to have developed much arms self-sufficiency or to pay for the most advanced weapons systems. African states, perhaps more than those in other regions, also have been willing to preserve long-standing client relationships with major powers, even including former colonial patrons, and the Soviet Union has come to provide upwards of 50% of African arms.⁵

Critics of the arms trade note that it worsens African economic woes and exacerbates political conflict, while defenders of arms shipments note the need to promote security and balance cold war competition in the region.⁶ There is doubt about the degree of influence over African foreign policies afforded by arms transfers, and therefore, doubt as well about the role of arms supply in fomenting, moderating, or precluding African international warfare and military interventions. Endemic African political turmoil, together with recipients' ability to "shop around" and tendencies to pursue independent foreign policies frequently confound influence attempts. Indeed, Africa ranks as highly as it does in arms imports partly because of the existing wars and disputes which have opened the way for Soviet, Chinese, and Western shipments, with suppliers and recipients often rapidly changing partners.⁷ Neither defenders nor critics are yet in a position to specify the pacifying or fortifying effects of arms supplies on the course of these wars.

This study is designed, then, to determine the effects of weapons transfers and resupply, and denial of such supplies, on the escalation or deescalation of international violence, on third party intervention in warfare, and on the progress of negotiations. We will examine arms shipments by major and/or minor powers to African combatants in the post-independence period.

The basic rival hypotheses being tested are that: (1) the arrival of new arms supplies fortifies the recipient so that violence is averted, the need for third party intervention is precluded, or the end of war is hastened and violence abated; (2) the arrival of new arms supplies increases the likelihood of crises breaking into warfare, of subsequent third party intervention in the war by the arms donor or others, of violence escalating, or negotiations failing in ongoing warfare; and (3) an arms embargo or limitation of resupply promotes restraint by the state denied arms, thus precluding the outbreak of war or hastening the end of war.⁸ We note as well that the escalation of fighting in the short-run can also lead to a longer term reduction in conflict, if not to conflict resolution, if one side gains clear dominance; therefore, arms transfers which lead to increased fighting can have either stabilizing or destabilizing effects on conflict escalation.

Prior Findings

Those who have examined the relationships of arms supplies and recent wars have determined that the pre-war supply pattern is likely to change with the onset of hostilities. Superpowers often attach restrictions to their resupplies of weapons during war, or try to use such supplies to bring pressure to bear on recipients. Therefore particularly in relatively long interstate wars, recipients frequently have switched and increased diversity of arms sources; the struggle in the Horn of Africa was a prime example of such arms procurement volatility. On the other hand, during short wars and civil wars or insurgencies, existing arms supply dependencies have tended to be maintained or reinforced.⁹

It also appears that countries with large pre-war weapons inventories have been more likely to initiate war than countries with smaller stocks (though this can depend on the definition of large vs. small). The quality (as opposed to quantity) of both weapons available and troop morale and training has served defenders well in repelling such attacks, and helped bring wars to a close.¹⁰

The type of arms transferred to potential combatants has varied by region, with larger shipments and more sophisticated and up-to-date equipment going to the Middle East than to regions such as Africa. In assessing the impact of arms resupply before or during warfare, the importance of regional context must be remembered. Arms sent to Africa need not be as sophisticated as those sent to the Middle East to have a profound impact on strategic and political calculations, since the general level of African armament is lower. Also, weapons' appropriateness for warfare in the regional context will strongly affect conflict outcomes; Soviet supplies to Angola have been less sophisticated but more effective in achieving wartime goals than those sent to Egypt and Syria in 1967 and 1973.¹¹ In the Middle East and other regions as well, superpowers have not achieved great influence over the initiation of wars through arms supplies, although in some cases refusals or threatened refusals to resupply needed arms evidently have hastened wars' termination. Influence is complicated in that extensive initial supplies seem necessary for subsequent withholding of or permission to resupply to have much effect on recipients' policies. Even so, "in no [Arab-Israeli] cases were any superpower goals achieved against the perceived interests of its client. . ."¹² Major powers undergo pressures to prove their support for clients and allies by resupplying them, so that even relatively weak and dependent clients achieve considerable reverse influence on the arms supplier. Arms recipients also can be very resistant to outside diplomatic pressure when perceiving crucial issues of national survival at stake in warfare.

As arms have flowed more slowly into Africa than into the Middle East, patterns of arms resupply also have varied according to supplier. The Soviet Union has tended to

send weapons in "surges" of relatively less sophisticated equipment, aiming to bail out beleaguered clients engaged in counter-insurgency or territorial wars against outside invaders -- as in Angola and Ethiopia. Western suppliers have been more deliberate in supplying smaller quantities of more sophisticated weapons over longer periods, often to cultivate patron-client relations or commercial interests.¹³

The superpowers have been reluctant to escalate Third World warfare by indiscriminantly pouring in weapons during the early stages of fighting. Only when "some obvious political or strategic advantage has been perceived," or some grave disadvantage expected with the loss of a favored client, have the Americans or Soviets opened wide the resupply pipeline. This has been true of the Ethiopia-Somalia as well as Arab-Israeli wars. The longer a case of Third World fighting goes on, of course, the greater the need for and chance of resupply. In regions with less extensive major power alliance commitments, such as Africa, the equipment finally released has been well below "state of the art" levels, and has been "conditioned on significant political or military concessions from the combatants" (such as rights to use bases).¹⁴

A study of eight recent cross-border wars in the Third World also has shown that in all but one case, arms resupply played an important role in providing clear advantages to one side in the fighting. In such cases, which included the Bangladesh war (1971), Arabs vs. Israel (1973 and 1982); China vs. Vietnam, Ethiopia vs. Somalia (late 1970s), Zaire's Shaba crises (late 1970s), Morocco vs. Polisario, and Iraq vs. Iran, combatants with such advantages generally were able to repel initial attacks, recoup losses, or at least hold their own in the fighting. Such defensive success did not necessarily translate into successful cross-border counter-attacks or long-term settlement of issues, however.¹⁵

These observations mean that arms transfers during warfare could have especially strong impact on the conclusion of African wars. The fact that wars in the Third World appear to start with relatively little major power political input, and that they are carried on with a premium on numbers of weapons, the element of surprise, and human

capabilities on the battlefield (as opposed to the sophistication of weapon systems), means that Third World combatants are likely to get in over their heads if wars are allowed to become prolonged. Hence, despite the possibilities of shifting suppliers in prolonged wars, dependence on arms suppliers, and responsiveness to their demands, is likely to be strong during intensive warfare. Whether arms donors choose to attempt influence over wars' outcomes, and whether many Third World wars are sustained for long periods at highly intensive levels, therefore, appear to be the key variables moderating hostilities once begun. However, long term conflict settlement appears unlikely without political accommodation as well.¹⁶

Methodology

A set of six African international wars will be examined in depth to associate the timing of arms shipments with effects on the level of fighting and/or progress of negotiations. These include: Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenyan skirmishes of the 1960s; resumption of Ethiopia-Somalia fighting in the 1970s; Morocco's campaign in the Western Sahara against Polisario insurgents; the Tanzania-Uganda war which deposed Idi Amin; and the two Shaba province secession struggles involving outside interveners in Zaire in the 1970s. Obviously a number of other border and internationalized civil wars could have been examined, but these have appeared in previous studies cited above, and seem to provide a reasonably good cross-section representing both large and smaller scale warfare, regular combat and insurgency conflicts, and early and late post-colonial periods.

These selections exclude colonial wars (it was decided to examine only independent states able to procure arms from other states) and wars which were predominantly domestic (such as the Zimbabwe, Chad, and Sudan struggles). South African interventions, as in Angola, also are not included in this study because of the significant South African autonomy in arms acquisition. The Moroccan, Shaba, and early Kenyan cases arguably are mainly insurgencies rather than international wars, but there is a significant amount of cross-border combat or foreign military intervention in each case.¹⁷

Thus, we include cases of sustained cross-border fighting involving at least one independent state. The set provides examples of wars of varying length and magnitude, which generally were long enough to involve some weapons resupply.

Month by month chronologies of these wars were developed, showing major escalation or deescalation of the cross-border fighting between regular national armed forces. An ordinal scale was used to distinguish "major" fighting from "some" fighting from "no reported" fighting, with the former category consisting of relatively large scale (in the context of the particular war) fighting, involving armor, artillery, and/or air attacks in sustained combat for specific objectives. Sporadic or intermittent fighting or isolated attacks not part of ongoing battles were categorized as "some fighting." Fighting between regular forces and insurgents was noted, but not included in these scales unless some data on arms transfers to the insurgents were available (i.e., only in the Polisario case).

Developments on the negotiation front and military interventions of all types by third parties also were noted. A corresponding chronology of arms shipments received by the combatants was formulated, so that such shipments could be superimposed on the conflict chronology in order to test the hypotheses. Events relating to arms transfer agreements and negotiations have been sub-divided into two categories: "positive arms transfer diplomacy" and "negative arms transfer diplomacy." Positive A.T.D. refers to the successful completion of arms transfer agreements for individual weapons systems, or, in some cases, weapons packages. Negative A.T.D. refers to a rejection by the supplier of such aid to a country seeking arms. Extraneous events which could affect the progress of fighting or negotiations also were noted. Charts were developed for each case which indicate reports of developments in the war, rather than frequency counts of events themselves.

Most analysts of international arms transfers are well aware of the inadequacies of the available data.¹⁸ Such inadequacies are compounded for LDCs in Africa, and in

attempts to specify the month in which arms were received. Where possible we have used the month of delivery specified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for major weapons, or by other sources such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Africa Research Bulletin, Africa Contemporary Record, and in scholarly studies of specific wars. Where arms deliveries were reported only by year, we have arbitrarily specified December of that year as the delivery date (or June if delivery were in "mid-year"). Obviously, this is a less than satisfactory way to test hypotheses about the immediate effects of arms deliveries, but at this point it is the only alternative.

The African wars were classified according to duration, regional and historical context, degree of major power involvement and interest, type of issues in dispute, role of regional or international organizations, and type of arms dependencies in order to determine arms supply effects on various types of wars. Conceivably for example, arms shipments could have had greater impact in the early post-colonial period, when ties to former colonial powers and arms dependencies were greater than in recent times. Similarly, substantial arms supply by major powers could mean greater impact on the outcome of a war than more diversified supplies by major and/or minor powers.

In short then, the analysis, based on detailed chronologies, will focus more specifically on the complex effects of arms resupply than in previous exploratory studies. Prior studies have been confined to general examination of who supplies arms and whether suppliers appear to be getting their way in dealings with recipients. The present study begins to make it possible to trace the effect, if any, of arms shipments or arms refusals on the prospects for continued warfare or peace in various contexts and circumstances.

Findings

Despite conventional expectations, it does not appear that arms transfers generally closely precede expanded or escalated fighting in African wars. Instead, the contrary seems true, i.e., that the bulk of new arms supplies seem to arrive after fighting is

underway and as a result of heavy attrition. (see Figures 1-6 for the charts for each case and Appendices A and B for accompanying annotation of key reports). Thus, for instance, in the later Ethiopia-Somalia war, emergency Soviet supplies arrived once Ethiopia had been attacked and was reeling from the Somali invasion. In African wars, the defending state (i.e., the one whose territory was invaded) was especially likely to be resupplied by outside patrons. Naturally, such resupply allowed fighting to continue when it might have ended sooner in surrender, but from the point of view of those opposing aggression, arms transfers tended to slow down the attacker and make conquest more costly. Even unpopular defenders, such as Uganda in its war with Tanzania, found patrons -- e.g., Libya -- willing to ride to the rescue (note that Uganda previously had attacked Tanzania as well).

Resupply of relatively well armed attackers was far less certain. The U.S. delayed quite long before finally shipping major equipment to and consulting militarily with Morocco in its Saharan annexation campaigns. A combination of Moroccan assistance in other matters, notably the Middle East and Zairian disputes, and the relatively poor Moroccan showing against the Polisario seemed to condition the ultimate American commitment. Similarly, numerous Somalian requests for military assistance were turned down by potential patrons as its Ogaden attacks unfolded, and actual resupply during the fighting was kept to a relative minimum in terms of Somali needs. If the attacker is a guerrilla organization, as in Shaba, the level of outside arms required appears considerably lower than that for regular forces, since up to 90% of arms are picked up from the harrassed enemy.

Looking at the six cases in turn, we find some differences in arms supply effects between prolonged and short duration wars, and wars in which outside powers did or did not intervene or take a keen interest. In longer wars, the parties need and have the opportunity to obtain resupply, which can in turn further lengthen the war. However, even in such cases, resupply tended to occur as a result of heavy losses, and seldom clearly

corresponded to an impending offensive. In addition, it does not appear that attackers relied on recent arms transfers (i.e., those in the preceding year) in planning for the initiation of warfare; arms generally had been absorbed into the attacker's forces from two to four years before the war. Finally, it appears that arms resupply often corresponds to major power efforts to control the war or to intervene directly with troops.

In the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya fighting of 1964-67, the parties, two of which were newly independent, had relatively little time to build up armament prior to the war. (see Figure 1). Ethiopia and Kenya received some arms in 1963 from the U.S. and U.K. respectively (landing craft to Ethiopia and light planes to Kenya). The Soviets supplied Somalia with six MiG aircraft and contracted to train a 10,000 man army. This may have given the Somalis the confidence to pursue irredentist claims against both of their neighbors.

Yet the only major cross border fighting between regular troops occurred on the Ethiopian border in the first quarter of 1964; Ethiopian and Somali forces clashed again along the border in mid-1965. The rest of the prolonged and sporadic conflict involved Somali tribal raiders attempting subversion mainly in Kenya.

Nevertheless, the major powers evidently sought to maintain military balance between Ethiopia and Somalia, with stepped up arms deliveries in 1965 and '66, including Soviet MiG and transport deliveries to Somalia and U.S. F-5 aircraft to Ethiopia in 1966. No fighting to speak of occurred during that year, perhaps because of the balance of power. If so, the expectation that in the early post-colonial period major powers could prevent wars by denying arms to African states appears to miss the realities wherein arms transfers to African states do not necessarily fuel open international warfare, as opposed to other forms of conflict and attempts at subversion.

Smaller arms suppliers played a role as well, with France sending helicopters to Ethiopia in 1964 and Kenya in 1967, Canada supplying light aircraft and Britain naval patrol craft to Kenya, and Egypt providing Soviet equipment to Somalia. However, a

change in the Somali government, more than any apparent effects of arms transfers, seemed to speed the end of fighting, despite continued irredentist claims, in negotiated settlements in 1967.

In the other extended Ethiopian-Somalian fighting of 1977-79, both combatants appeared to have built up their arsenals well before the outbreak of fighting, in 1974-75. (see Figure 2). Soviet MiG-21 fighters, landing craft and utility helicopters had arrived in Somalia at that time. Most of the major American arms supplies for Ethiopia had been contracted in 1973 and evidently arrived in 1976. Thus, again the immediate outbreak of war did not depend on the dispatch of arms.

Moscow did extend a treaty of cooperation to Ethiopia in mid-1977, but it was Somalia that initiated major fighting in July-September of that year. By September, the USSR had agreed to a major resupply of the beleaguered Ethiopian forces. Meanwhile, Iraq had provided needed spare parts to the Somalis. The Soviets appeared to promote restraint by their two client states early in the dispute, but came to choose the Ethiopian side while denying Somali resupply requests. Somalia's role as instigator may have played a part in this stance. France promised to resupply Somalia in 1977, but evidently reconsidered this policy and, along with the U.S., held up Somali arms supplies during 1977. The Arab League also refused official support, although Saudi Arabia reportedly promised major financial subsidies for Somali arms purchases.

The Soviet Union stopped sending arms to Somalia in October, having committed to a major Ethiopian resupply the prior month, and the first significant Soviet and East European shipments reached Ethiopia in October. This corresponded with the Cuban intervention, and the launching of Cuban-Ethiopian counter-attacks in November. The U.S. refused another Somali arms request in January of 1978, just prior to the major Ethiopian offensive in February, spearheaded and planned by East bloc personnel. Israel also sold arms to Ethiopia during this period, while France, Italy, and Egypt supplied Somalia with just enough light arms and ammunition to keep its war effort going.

Despite evident sympathies for the Somali side later in the war, the American arms embargo evidently was maintained, although Somalia did manage to obtain U.S. made helicopters, left over from Vietnam, through private dealers in Thailand. The Shah of Iran may have aided Somalia with light arms as well in 1978, and threatened to send troops to halt the Ethiopian advances.

Therefore, difficulties in obtaining arms resupply, at least in comparison to the torrent of older vintage arms showered on Ethiopia, may have played some role in the ultimate Somali defeat. Somalia did, however, receive nearly \$160-million worth of arms in 1978 alone (compared to over a billion dollars worth for Ethiopia, by U.S. estimates), and when combined with their large initial arms advantage over Ethiopia, it appears that the presence of the Cubans had far more to do with the Somali downfall than shortage of supplies.

The twelve year Saharan war between the Polisario liberation organization and Moroccan and Mauritanian armed forces has been the longest of the cases reviewed. It has involved numerous changes of strategy and diplomatic and military initiatives, outside intervention by the U.S. and France, Arab financing of Morocco, external support of Polisario by Algeria and Libya, and OAU settlement attempts. During this protracted struggle, arms resupply, or refusal to resupply have at times been quite important influences on the pace and extent of fighting, but generally such supply decisions have been part of larger diplomatic and political commitments which have entailed intervention, strategic training, or pressure for settlement. These basic political and strategic decisions probably have been more crucial than the arms transfers which reflect them (see Figure 3).

The war began in 1975 with Morocco's famous "peaceful" march to claim the former Spanish Sahara. Prior to this, Morocco had received relatively little armament, particularly little from the U.S. Polisario, intent on establishing an independent Saharan republic, had received light weapons from Algeria, and garnered additional arms in

relatively successful attacks on the Moroccan army. France, which came to provide 80% of Morocco's arms (the U.S. provided the other 20% by the 1980s), immediately moved to replace lost Moroccan aircraft. A process of gradual arms buildup began as, for example, Jordan transferred U.S. equipment to Morocco, allowing the scale of encounters to increase with considerable Polisario successes against both Morocco and Mauritania. French-supplied armored cars helped Mauritania stem the initial tide. The attrition rate on Moroccan equipment and planes remained quite high through 1976, and at one point Polisario made overtures for Morocco to leave the war while attacks were concentrated on Mauritania.

Foreign powers began to get more interested in the struggle as Morocco, technically the original attacking state, slipped militarily. South Africa was approached for the supply of French personnel carriers, and finally French military experts arrived, with arms supplies, to help Morocco in October and November of 1977, and evidently took part in bombing campaigns. Meanwhile Spain and then the United States (under President Carter) suspended arms shipments to Morocco. Some U.S. equipment, mainly for air defense, continued to get through, however, and fighting continued with Polisario raids on both Morocco and Mauritania in 1978. Finally, a Mauritanian coup took that government effectively out of the war in July, while at the same time the French commitment deepened with a major Moroccan arms agreement.

The major powers seemed to grow more concerned with each major Moroccan setback, and the Americans increased support as Moroccan diplomacy carved out an important role in the Middle East and Zairian disputes. After a major Polisario offensive in January 1979, U.S. helicopter sales were authorized in February. While the Moroccan armed forces were completely resupplied with modern weapons in 1979, and while the air force had some success attacking Polisario in the desert, Rabat's fortunes were still mixed. A low point was reached in March 1980, as a Polisario ambush inflicted heavy losses. Moroccan strategy still entailed massive sweeps with long columns in the Sahara.

Evidently, Moroccan resolve to resist OAU peace plans in 1980 stemmed from a strategic shift toward construction of the now famous "wall" enclosing the mineral rich portions of the Western Sahara. By 1981, the Reagan Administration, cooperating in this strategy, renewed arms support and released equipment held up by Carter. Morocco also took the diplomatic initiative by raising the possibility of various types of referenda for the Saharan people. Polisario held to the hard liberation line, and temporarily lost impact in the OAU.

It took Polisario some time to adjust to the reality of the wall as it was constructed. They successfully inflicted heavy losses on a Moroccan garrison in October 1981, in what was then the largest battle of the war. Libyan supplied Brazilian Cascavel armored vehicles and Soviet made SAMs, evidently from Algeria, had been crucial in the attack. As a result, U.S. instructors began training Moroccan pilots in anti-missile techniques in December. With considerable Arab support for Morocco, Algeria was in a difficult position, and in a key turning point began to slacken its support of Polisario in 1982, with Libya following suit later. Polisario victories declined, and they were increasingly confined to Mauritanian bases and campaigns.

Moroccan access to French arms supplies hit a temporary snag due to mounting debts in early 1982, but was renewed under a rescheduling plan. Also, by 1982 a Saudi subsidy was underwriting 80% of Morocco's war effort.¹⁹ Meanwhile, U.S. involvements mounted, as Moroccans were instructed in mobile commando operations appropriate to the wall. Cluster bombs were provided, and more arms sales were concluded. This led to Polisario threats to acquire arms directly from the Soviet Union. OAU summits were disrupted over the issue of seating Polisario. The rug was increasingly pulled from under Polisario as both Algeria and Libya began consulting Morocco about more normal relations. Reacting to the American aid and Moroccan intransigence, Polisario broke its one year self-proclaimed truce and launched a new type of attack successfully against the wall in the summer of 1983, with massive artillery barrages. Morocco was at a

disadvantage in terms of artillery. Sporadic incidents continued into 1985, but Polisario could not continue broadsides against the wall as Libya and Morocco concluded their "union," and arms supplies dwindled. Finally, with their Saharan claim rather well enclosed, Morocco declared a unilateral ceasefire in October of 1985.

Many of the hypothesized effects of arms transfers were seen more clearly in this prolonged struggle than in other wars, and particularly the effects of arms supply restrictions late in the war on guerrillas' ability to mount major campaigns in difficult terrain. Willingness to negotiate also seemed eroded at times by the optimism generated by new military assistance. Strategic advice and assistance by major powers enabled Morocco to retain control of disputed territory, albeit at a heavy price. Arms transfers led to major power military intervention, though not full scale combat participation, as the recipients' use of weapons became problematic. While these transfers also hardened the resolve of Morocco's opponents, the opponents could not find sufficient patronage to maintain the struggle against heavy odds. The charts for this case show, (allowing for uncertainties about weapon delivery dates), that as in the other wars, arms transfers and arms transfer diplomacy were as likely to follow as to precede combat escalation.

The Tanzania-Uganda struggle was considerably shorter than those in the Horn or the Sahara, stretching from late 1978 to mid-1979. (see Figure 4). Uganda had acquired substantial military equipment in 1975 and '76, mostly from the Soviet Union. This included MiG-21 fighters, anti-aircraft missiles, and tanks. Older MiGs came from Iraq, while Libya provided 40 Mirage 5's to replace planes destroyed in Israel's Entebbe raid. The U.S. also allowed the sale of a Bell helicopter and small transport aircraft in 1976. Relatively fewer items arrived in 1977, the period leading up to the outbreak of fighting. Tanzania evidently got relatively little equipment during the same periods, and finally undertook the invasion of Uganda without much evident rearmament.

Although this war intensified more quickly than the others we have reviewed, as in the other cases negotiation and settlement attempts also began quite quickly. African

states were uncomfortable with such open warfare. By holding their own despite Uganda's initial invasion in October, Tanzanian troops reportedly were able to pick up 90% of their small arms needs from the retreating Ugandans. China sped deliveries of previously ordered supplies to Tanzania in November, and Ethiopia, Algeria, and the "frontline" states (Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola) sent either small arms or token shipments in December. The Soviet Union also supplied tanks and other equipment in 1978 and SAMs in 1979.

On the other hand, with Uganda's poor showing, arms dealers having access to Soviet equipment began to demand cash payments, and could offer only twelve month delivery terms to Uganda. As Tanzanian troops closed to within 30 miles of Kampala, however, Libya attempted to rescue the Amin government, sending in tons of military equipment and its own combat brigades. PLO forces arrived as well. Tanzania failed in efforts to acquire Soviet arms at the same time, but its advance continued despite the infusion of foreign assistance to Amin. Once again it appears that arms supplied to hard pressed defenders often entail military intervention as well, although such intervention by no means assures ultimate victory.

The two Shaba crises, in 1977 and '78, also were condensed in terms of time, but involved very little cross-border fighting between organized regular troops. Instead, most of the action involved the Zairian army trying to oust well-entrenched Katangan rebels invading from neighboring Angola. Finally, a mixed group of outside interveners, spearheaded by France, Belgium, and Morocco, had to come to Zaire's rescue, and it is fighting by these interveners that is considered cross-border warfare in this case. Zaire had acquired three Canadian transport planes in 1976 (ordered in 1974), while Morocco had geared up militarily for its Saharan war by 1976.

Military supplies flowed quickly and in considerable numbers from the U.S. and Belgium to Zaire shortly after the initial rebel attack in March (see Figure 5). Washington relied on its European allies, France and Belgium, for the bulk of heavy

equipment supplies and concentrated on transport and "non-lethal" supplies. The Zairians were falling back consistently despite the arrival of new and relatively sophisticated equipment (e.g., French Mirages). China also sent assistance, and South Africa provided fuel. Finally, Morocco intervened with approximately 1500 men in March. In April, Belgian and French officers were training Zairian troops.

With Moroccan troops now in the fight, Zaire launched some offensives, and was charged with attacking Angolan border villages. The French withdrew as Morocco spearheaded the fighting. By mid-May, Egypt, concerned about purported Soviet influence, promised military assistance, and sent pilots and mechanics to Zaire. The rebel campaign was largely broken by May. The U.S., having accused Cuba and the Soviets of training the rebels, had pumped \$36-million of military equipment into Morocco and \$11-million into Zaire in 1977. In this case, third party intervention, rather than arms supplies per se or any mediation or conciliation approaches, settled the matter.

Yet fighting resumed in round two of the Shaba rebellion in May of 1978, despite what Fidel Castro claimed were his efforts in April to dissuade the Katangans from attacking (see Figure 6). This time white settlers in Zaire were killed by unruly troops early in the fighting, bringing a swifter and more direct Euro-American intervention. The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division was put on alert in May, and Belgium immediately dispatched 1750 paratroopers. U.S. "non-lethal" military aid and transport flights continued, as French paratroops also went to the aid of foreigners in Zaire.

The rebels were soon in retreat and there was little need for much more resupply of Zaire. Kolwezi was recaptured, and French troops began a withdrawal in May, to be replaced by Moroccans. Belgian troops stayed on longer to reassure foreigners. African states were persuaded to form a joint peacekeeping force, finally composed two-thirds of Moroccan troops, with the rest from the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Togo. The Americans shuttled these troops in as replacements for the French legionnaires in early June. Faced with a clear major power commitment to Zairian integrity, the Angolan government

disarmed the Katangans in Angola by the end of June, and went on to agree with Zaire on a joint border security commission in August.²⁰

Conclusions

Dealing with this study's original hypotheses, it does not appear that the first set of assumptions about the pacifying effects of arms transfers are entirely accurate. While counter-balancing arms transfers seemed to avert combat escalation in the early Ethiopia-Somalia case, they did not appear to have that effect in other disputes. Certainly arms supplies are no reliable substitute for direct military intervention; they seem to lead (at least in Africa) ultimately to intervention in a disturbingly large proportion of cases. Resupply, and occasionally intervention as well, tended to bolster the defensive side in African wars, and lead to the preservation of territorial integrity albeit at a high cost in lives. Arms resupply, along with considerable American and French logistical assistance, also enabled Morocco to carry on a war of territorial expansion in an undefined zone, perhaps an easier task than invading a defined territorial state. No amount of arms resupply seemed to help defensive forces which lacked the discipline, motivation, and training to use them effectively, as in Amin's Uganda and in Zaire prior to outside intervention.

Neither did the arrival of arms seem necessarily to increase the likelihood of crises breaking out in warfare or of warfare escalating in the period immediately following the delivery. Instead, it appears that arms often arrived or were sought during or after major campaigns, to replenish depleted stocks. The time necessary for the absorption of new materiel, and the risks of losing it quickly again may temper commanders' willingness to mount new offensives quickly. The psychological effect of weapons agreements and treaties of support and friendship may be more important than specific weapon deliveries in bolstering recipients' risk taking propensities, as Somalia's timing of attacks on Ethiopia may demonstrate. Morocco also seemed decidedly less interested in negotiations with Polisario after the fortification of American security commitments. While

negotiations do not seem intimately related to the arrival of arms, there is this occasional dampening effect.

Finally, the strategically timed arms denial or embargo can have significant dampening effects on African, and presumably other Third World wars as well. Somalia found it relatively difficult to find arms patrons in prosecuting its later Ethiopian campaigns, and was rather quickly turned back by superior forces, although it is unlikely that greater arms supply would have mattered much. Polisario also appeared to be materially impaired by eventual Algerian and Libyan limitations on arms patronage and political support.

It appears that arms transfers had their greatest impact on longer African wars; the shorter wars depended more either on outside intervention or the skill and motivation of the respective forces. Still, even in long wars, arms alone seldom made the difference for attacker or defender, as outside intervention or strategic consultation bolstered one party over the long run. In only one of the wars was there no outside military intervener (the first Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya struggle), and a balance on major power arms transfers seemed to limit the combat in that case. In one other, Uganda-Tanzania, the intervener was a regional as opposed to major power (Libya), and arms supply had little effect in changing the course of battle. In the other cases, crucial arms transfers accompanied direct major and regional power intervention.

Arms dependencies affected Somalia in its Ethiopian campaigns, as Soviet arms were a necessity. Tanzania was able to garner its opponents' weapons on the battlefield to offset its own East bloc dependencies, but outside suppliers were hardly reluctant to support the Tanzanians anyway. Likewise, Polisario was able to augment supplies received through Algeria and Libya, but could not mount the firepower necessary to besiege the Moroccan wall without these patrons. Zaire received considerable armament from its West bloc supporters, as did Ethiopia from the East, but both still required their patrons' intervention.

In only the Zairian case was an international organization able to generate a peacekeeping force to supplant such interventions and arms infusions. The Western Sahara dilemma caused great upheaval in the OAU, but diplomacy leading to a de facto settlement came mostly in bilateral behind the scenes meetings.

In short, then, the effect of arms transfers on warfare varies with circumstance. It is impossible to categorize resupply as invariably destructive or foolhardy, especially when it enables a state to resist aggression. By the same token, however, resuppliers should be on notice concerning the relatively high probability that such transfers will lead to pressures for direct intervention. At least judging by the African experience, as well, restrictions on the flow of arms during warfare can have important dampening effects on the intensity of fighting and can hasten the end of combat, even while not necessarily leading to a negotiated settlement.

ENDNOTES

1. See the discussion and references by David W. Ziegler, War, Peace, and International Politics, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), Ch. 12; and Francis A. Beer, Peace Against War (San Francisco: Freeman, 1981, pp. 269-74.
2. Robert E. Harkavy, "Arms Resupply During Conflict: A Framework for Analysis," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 7, no. 3 (1985), p. 6.
3. Reflecting this uncertainty and ambiguity, as well as the temptations of the arms export business, for example, Britain's reformulated policy guidelines for arms supplies in the Persian Gulf war in 1985 included a continued refusal to supply lethal equipment to either side, an attempt to fulfill existing arms supply contracts, and a ban on future orders which would "significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict." Sir Geoffrey Howe, House of Commons Official Report, Annex C, Written Answers (London: Hansard, vol. 84, no. 172, 29 October, 1985), col. 454.
4. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, April 1987), p. 7.
5. Ibid., p. 143; and Joseph P. Smaldone, "Foreign Arms and African Armies: Exploring the Limits of Soviet and American Influence," paper presented to the International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, IL, October 1983.
6. For example, see the arguments of Arthur Gavshon, "Superpower Arms Sales Have Caused African Instability," and of Kenneth L. Adelman, "Superpower Arms Sales Promote African Stability," in Problems of Africa: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. by Janelle Rohr (St. Paul, MN: Greenhaven Press, 1986), pp. 84-98.
7. See Paul L. Ferrari, Jeffrey W. Knopf, and Raul L. Madrid, U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and Contractors (Washington, DC: Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc., 1987), Chs. 5 and 8.
8. During the early 1970s, for example, the "Nixon Doctrine" was premised largely on the former logic in substituting a lucrative trade in American arms for the presence of American troops in foreign disputes, and relying on Third World powers themselves to police trouble-spots. However, critics soon noted that such transfers increase the stakes of the transferring nation in the fate of the recipients, thus promoting military intervention, intensifying combat and adventurist foreign or domestic policies abroad. See for example, Edward C. Luck, "The Arms Trade," Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, vol. 32, no. 4 (1977), p. 172. Motives either for resupplying or refusing to resupply combatants are discussed in detail by Harkavy, "Arms Resupply," pp. 15-16, and can include factors as diverse as efforts to maintain credibility, to preclude nuclear proliferation, to test new weapons under battlefield conditions, to avoid a "slippery slope" of commitments, to avoid shortages in one's own military stocks, as well as moral, legal, and logistical concerns.
9. Stephanie G. Neuman, "The Arms Trade in Recent Wars," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 40, no. 1 (Summer 1986), p. 82.

10. Ibid., pp. 90-92; see also, Neuman, Military Assistance in Recent Wars: The Dominance of the Superpowers, The Washington Papers/122. (Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University). New York: Praeger, 1986; and Frank W. Wayman, J. David Singer, and Gary Goertz, "Capabilities, Allocations, and Conflict-Avoidance Among Major Powers, 1816-1976: A Research Note." University of Michigan, March 1987.
11. Michael Moodie, "Arms Transfers and Future Conflict," in The Future of Conflict in the 1980s, ed by William J. Taylor, Jr. and Steven A. Maaranen (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1982, pp. 62-63; and Neuman, "Arms Trade," pp. 87-88.
12. Keith Krause, "Arms Transfers, Conflict Management and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Conflict Management in the Middle East, ed by David Dewitt and Gabriel Ben-Dor, forthcoming.
13. Neuman, "Arms Trade," p. 87.
14. Neuman, "Arms Trade," pp. 92-97.
15. Harkavy, "Arms Resupply," Table 3.
16. Moodie, "Future Conflict," pp. 69-74.
17. See Harkavy's classification, "Arms Resupply," Table 3.
18. See, for example, Edward A. Kolodziej, "Determinants of French Arms Sales: Security Implications," in Threats, Weapons and Foreign Policy, ed. by Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Vol. 5, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: Sage, 1980), p. 171; Kolodziej, "Measuring French Arms Transfers: A Problem of Sources and Some Sources of Problems with ACDA Data," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23, 2 (June 1979), pp. 195-227; Edward J. Laurance and Ronald G. Sherwin, "Understanding Arms Transfers Through Data Analysis," in Arms Transfers and the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries, ed. by Uri Ra'anani, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 87-106; David Louscher and Michael D. Salamone, "Arms Transfer Data: A Search for New Perspectives on Old Problems," paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 1984; and Edward T. Fei, "Understanding Arms Transfers and Military Expenditures: Data Problems," in Arms Transfers in the Modern World, ed. by Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (New York: Praeger, 1980, pp. 37-46. Some interesting critiques of studies of the arms trade with the Third World are provided in the following: Ulrich Albrecht, "The Study of International Trade in Arms and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research, 2, 2 (1972), pp. 165-178; Geoffrey Kemp, "Strategy, Arms and the Third World," Orbis (Fall 1972), pp. 809-816; and Amelia C. Leiss, "Comments on 'The Study of International Trade in Arms and Peace Research' by Ulrich Albrecht," Journal of Peace Research, 2, 2 (1972), pp. 179-82.
19. Neuman, Military Assistance..., p. 103.
20. As a post-script, Belgium sent 250 more paratroopers to protect whites in Kinshasa in February of 1979. By June the Moroccans wanted out of Zaire, and the U.S. obliged with transportation.

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APPENDIX A

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ARMS TRANSFER DIPLOMACY

(see last page of appendix for a list of abbreviations)

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA-KENYA

DATE (mo./yr.)	EVENT	DESCRIPTION
x/63 (x=month not known)	Positive Arms Transfer Diplomacy (P.A.T.D.)	USA, W. Germany, and Italy offered Somalia a \$10 million program to train an army of 6,000 men for internal security tasks and civic action. The Somali government rejected this offer. Instead, it accepted a \$32 million Soviet program for forming an army of 10,000 men.
11/63	Negative Arms Transfer Diplomacy (N.A.T.D.)	Somalia broke off negotiations with the UK for an arms transfer supply agreement (on the grounds that the arms offered were inferior in quantity and quality to those supplied to Ethiopia) in favor of an agreement with the USSR.
x/63	Arms Transfer (A.T.)	6 Chipmunk T 21 aircraft to Kenya from UK.
x/63	A.T.	2 LCM type LCs to Ethiopia from the USA.
x/63	A.T.	2 LCVP type LCs to Ethiopia from the USA.
x/63	A.T.	6 MiG-15 UTI fighters to Somalia from the USSR.
5/64	P.A.T.D.	Kenya government reported to be negotiating with Canadian De Havilland Co. for multi-purpose Caribou transport aircraft.
7/64	P.A.T.D.	Soviet Ambassador to Kenya announced that in the summer of 1964 full agreement was reached on the type of arms to be supplied by the USSR.
x/64	P.A.T.D.	Italian Cabinet passed a bill granting technical military assistance to the Somali Republic for the period 1964-66.
6/64	A.T.	The UK's military assistance to Kenya announced in London on June 3, included a gift of £ 3.5 m. worth of arms, equipment, vehicles, aircraft, armored cars, and the latest infantry weapons.

10/64	A.T.	The first two Beaver Reconnaissance and communication aircraft for the Kenyan airforce arrived from Canada on October 12.
x/64	A.T.	2 SUD Alouette III helicopters to Ethiopia from France.
x/64	A.T.	1 Seaward defense vessel (Ford class) to Kenya from the UK.
5/65	N.A.T.D.	The Soviet Ambassador to Kenya announced that the Soviet government now considered itself absolved from further commitments under the arms transfer agreement made with Kenya in July of 1964, which was unilaterally abrogated by Kenya.
x/65	A.T.	7 DHC-2 Beaver light aircraft to Kenya from UK/Canada.
x/65	A.T.	4 DHC-4 Caribou aircraft to Kenya from U.K./Canada.
x/65	A.T.	3 MiG-15 fighter/trainers to Somalia from USSR.
x/65	A.T.	20 Yak-11 aircraft to Somalia from the USSR.
x/65	A.T.	65 BTR-152 APCs to Somalia from the USSR.
x/65	A.T.	1 DH Dove Mk 8 aircraft to Ethiopia from the UK.
x/65	A.T.	5 SUD Alouette III aircraft to Ethiopia from France.
x/65	A.T.	1 Il-14 aircraft to Ethiopia from the USSR.
x/65	A.T.	2 Mi-8 helicopters to Ethiopia from the USSR.
12/66	N.A.T.D.	Kenya mounted a diplomatic offensive to stop the supply of land mines by Arab countries to Somalia.
5/66	A.T.	12 Northrop F-5a freedom fighters to Ethiopia from the USA.
5/66	A.T.	2 Northrop F-5b freedom fighters to Ethiopia from the USA.
7/66	A.T.	Kenya received 3 Patrol boats from U.K.
x/66	A.T.	12 NA T-28 D aircraft to Ethiopia from the USA.

x/66	A.T.	12 MiG-17 fighter aircraft to Somalia from the USSR.
x/66	A.T.	(3) MiG-15 fighter/trainers to Somalia from the USSR.
x/66	A.T.	3 An-2 aircraft to Somalia from the USSR.
x/66	A.T.	2 Patrol Boats, Poluchati class, to Somalia from the USSR.
2/67	P.A.T.D.	Emperor Haile Selassie, on a visit to Washington, urged American officials to reassess military aid to Ethiopia in light of Soviet arms assistance to Somalia and mounting tensions in the Red Sea area.
5/67	N.A.T.D.	Kenyan Vice President announced on May 15 that the UAR had assured Kenya that it was no longer supplying Somalia with Arms.
5/67	N.A.T.D.	Somalia Minister of Information urged the UK to make certain that British men and materials were not used in N.E. frontier district.
3/67	A.T.	Kenyan army equipped with Saladin armored cars from UK.
x/67	A.T.	3 Sud Alouette II aircraft to Kenya from France.
x/67	A.T.	4 DHC-2 Beaver aircraft to Kenya from Canada.
x/67	A.T.	4 Harbour defense craft, Caroline class, to Ethiopia from the U.S.A.
x/67	A.T.	(2) Il-28 aircraft to Somalia from the USSR.
x/67	A.T.	150 T-34 tanks to Somalia from the USSR.

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA

9/77	N.A.T.D.	France refused to provide arms to Somalia while fighting in Ogaden continued.
9/77	N.A.T.D.	USA also refused to provide arms to Somalia.
9/77	P.A.T.D.	USSR signed £ 220 million agreement with Ethiopia to supply 48 MiG-21 fighters, up to 200 model T-54/T-55 tanks, SA-3/-7 SAM and SAGGER anti-tank missiles.

9/77	N.A.T.D.	On September 29, USA rejected requests to resume arms supplies to Ethiopia.
9/77	P.A.T.D.	Reports said Saudi Arabia promised \$400 million to Somalia to buy arms from the West, in addition to \$60 million already given by the Saudis.
10/77	N.A.T.D.	USSR publicly declared she had stopped sending arms to Somalia.
8/77	A.T.	Reports that Iraq provided some spare parts for Somalia's Soviet made tanks and planes.
x/77	A.T.	1 EDIC/EDA type LC to Ethiopia from France.
x/77	A.T.	4 SWIFT type patrol vessels to Ethiopia from USA.
x/77	A.T.	6 MiG-17F to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	2 AN-12 CUB-A military transport aircraft to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	100 BRT-60P APCs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	50 T-34 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	20 T-62 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	6 AN-26 CURL military transport aircraft to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	40 T-S5 tank to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	100 BMP-1 MICV's to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	40 BTR-152 APCs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	50 BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	100 T-54 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	15 SA-3 SAMS to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	40 BRDM-1 SC's to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	100 D-20 152 MM howitzers to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	30 M-47 Patton tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.

x/77	A.T.	100 S-23 180MM artillery pieces to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	35 T-34 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	50 MiG-21MF fighter aircraft to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	1000 AT-3 SAGGER ATGWs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	150 D-30 122MM THs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	20 MiG-23 to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	1500 SA-7 GRAIL Port SAMs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	300 SA-3 GOA Landmob SAMs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/77	A.T.	50 M-47 Patton tanks to Ethiopia from Yugoslavia.
x/77	A.T.	35 T-54 tanks to Somalia from Egypt.
x/77	A.T.	3 MOL class FACs to Somalia from USSR.
1/78	N.A.T.D.	USA rejected Somali plea for military aid against Ethiopia.
1/78	P.A.T.D.	F.R. Germany gave Somalia \$18 million in aid, with no controls on how to use it.
2/78	P.A.T.D.	USA tightened the arms embargo against Ethiopia by blocking shipment of 2 patrol boats and other military equipment valued at \$5.9 million; however, it permitted delivery of 23 trucks and trailers valued at \$700 thousand.
2/78	A.T.	Egypt admitted sending small arms and annunition to Somalia. Cairo based diplomatic source said Egypt had been sending a plane load of light arms and ammunition to the Somalis daily.
2/78	A.T.	France provided Somalia with some anti-air and anti-tank armaments, but not the large scale supplies Somalia needed.
2/78	A.T.	Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan said Israel had sold weapons to Ethiopia. Ethiopia later admitted buying arms from Israel.

3/78	A.T.	Report said that Iran had supplied Somalia with medical assistance and home-produced light arms.
x/78	A.T.	10 SA-3 SAMS to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	60 T-55 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	1 OSA-2 class FAC to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	100 T-54 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	200 SA-3 GOA Landmob SAMs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	2 MOL class ships to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	1500 SA-7 Grail Port SAMs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	10 MI-6 Hook helicopters to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	25 BM-21 122 mm multiple rocket launchers to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	11 MiG-17F fighter aircraft to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	20 ZSU-23-4 Shilka AAV's to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	1000 AT-3 Sagger ATGWs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	60 BTR-152 APCs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	10 ZSU-57-2 AAVs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	15 MI-8 HIP helicopters to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	65 T-34 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	40 T-72 tanks to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	20 BMD-20 mm airborne MICVs to Ethiopia from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	20 SA-3 GOA Landmob SAMs to Somalia from Egypt.
x/78	A.T.	2 SA-3 SAMS to Somalia from Egypt.
x/78	A.T.	100 SA-7 Grail Port SAMs to Somalia from Iran.

x/78	A.T.	10 Type-6616 ACs to Somalia from Italy.
x/78	A.T.	100 Type-6614 APCs to Somalia from Italy.

ZAIRE: SHABA I

9/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Canada 3 DHC-5D Buffalo Transports to Zaire.
x/76	A.T.	3 DHC-5D Buffalo Transports to Zaire from Canada.
x/76	A.T.	15 Model 150 lightplanes to Zaire from USA.
x/76	A.T.	(50) AS-30 ASMs to Zaire from France.
3/77	P.A.T.D.	Zaire requested spare parts for C-130s from the USA.
3/77	P.A.T.D.	Belgium to send 30 planeloads of infantry weapons, ammunition and other military equipment to Zaire.
3/77	P.A.T.D.	The U.S. State Department said that Belgium and France were supplying military equipment, but the USA will limit its support to non-lethal equipment.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with China for 60 T-62 light tanks to Zaire.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with U.S.A. for 1 C-130 H Hercules Transport to Zaire.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for 20 Cessna-337 Milirole light strike aircraft.
3/77	A.T.	USA sent Zaire a DC-8 loaded with parachutes, medical supplies, backpacks, communications equipment, and portable fuel containers costing \$1 million.
3/77	A.T.	Belgium accelerated delivery of military hardware already ordered by Zaire.
3/77	A.T.	Zaire received 14 of 17 Mirage planes from France.
3/77	A.T.	30 tons of military equipment was sent to Zaire from China.

3/77	A.T.	France gave a fleet of military transport planes including 10 French Transalls and 1 American made DC-8 to Morocco for use in Zaire. The planes carried equipment but no soldiers.
x/77	A.T.	60 T-62 light tanks to Zaire from China.
x/77	A.T.	1 C-130 H Hercules transport aircraft to Zaire from the USA.
x/77	A.T.	(x) M-113-A1 APCs to Zaire from the USA.

ZAIRE: SHABA II

3/77	P.A.T.D.	Zaire requested spare parts for C-130s from USA.
3/77	P.A.T.D.	Belgium agreed to send 30 planeloads of infantry weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment to Zaire.
3/77	P.A.T.D.	U.S. State Department said that Belgium and France were supplying military equipment, but that USA will limit its support to non-lethal aid.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with PRC for 60 T-62 light tanks to Zaire.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for 20 Cessna-337 . Milirole light-strike aircraft to Zaire.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with the USA for 1 C-130 H Hercules transport aircraft to Zaire.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USSR for 5 AN-26 transports to Angola.
3/77	A.T.	USA sent Zaire a DC-8 loaded with parachutes, medical supplies, backpacks, communications equipment, and portable fuel containers costing \$1 million.
3/77	A.T.	Belgium accelerated delivery of military hardware already ordered by Zaire.
3/77	A.T.	Zaire received 14 of 17 Mirage planes from France.
3/77	A.T.	30 tons of military equipment was sent to Zaire from China.
3/77	A.T.	France gave a fleet of military transport planes including French Transalls and 1 American

		made DC-8 to Morocco for use in Zaire. The planes carried equipment but no soldiers.
x/77	A.T.	60 T-62 light tanks to Zaire from China.
x/77	A.T.	1 C-130 H Hercules transport aircraft to Zaire from the USA.
x/77	A.T.	(x) M-113-A1 APC to Zaire from the USA.
5/78	P.A.T.D.	Belgium, France and Zaire asked the USA for logistical aid.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with the PRC for 4 Huchuan Class hydrofoil FACs to Zaire.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for (1) SA-321 Helicopter to Zaire.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with North Korea for (100) M-1938 122 mm TG to Zaire.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with the PRC for 2 SIAI Marchetti gun boats to Zaire.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for 12 SF-260 M Trainers to Zaire.
5/78	A.T.	18 U.S. Air Force C-141 transports participated in French and Belgian airlifts; airlift included \$17.5 million in non-lethal military and medical aid from the USA.
x/78	A.T.	(1) SA-321 helicopter to Zaire from France.
x/78	A.T.	(100) M-1938 122 mm TG to Zaire from North Korea.
x/78	A.T.	16 BN-2A Transports to Angola from Romania.

TANZANIA-UGANDA

12/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Canada for future delivery of 4 DHC-5D transport aircraft to Tanzania.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of 2 AB-206 B-2 helicopters.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USSR for future delivery of 350 T-54 MBTs to Tanzania.

x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Switzerland for future delivery of 6 AS-202 Bravo trainers to Uganda.
x/77	A.T.	3 HS-748 M transports to Tanzania from UK.
x/77	A.T.	20 type 531 APCs to Tanzania from China.
x/77	A.T.	6 AS-202 Bravo Trainers to Uganda from Switzerland.
x/77	A.T.	40 Dassault Mirage 5 fighter aircraft to Uganda from Libya.
9/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with UK for future delivery of 36 Scorpion FV-101 light tanks to Tanzania.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USSR for future delivery of (20) BRDM-2 SCs to Tanzania.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USSR for future delivery of (4) SA-6 SAMS to Tanzania.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USSR for future delivery of (20) SA-6 Gainful SAMS to Tanzania.
x/78	A.T.	4 DHC-5D Buffalo transports to Tanzania from Canada.
x/78	A.T.	2 AB-206 B-2 helicopters to Tanzania from Italy.
x/78	A.T.	1 HS-748 M transport to Tanzania from UK.
x/78	A.T.	350 T-54 MBTs to Tanzania from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	20 BRDM-2 SCs to Tanzania from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Algeria sent shipments of small arms to Tanzania.
x/78	A.T.	China sped up delivery to Tanzania of previously ordered supplies.
2/79	P.A.T.D.	Uganda sent delegations to Spain, Portugal, and Iraq to buy Soviet arms. Arms dealers in all three countries demanded cash in advance and 12 months to deliver.
3/79	N.A.T.D.	Tanzania tried and failed to get arms from the Soviet Union.
x/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of 6 AB-205 helicopters to Tanzania.

x/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with North Korea for future delivery of 4 Nampo class LCs to Tanzania.
3/79	A.T.	Libya airlifted supplies to Uganda. Reliable reports said 3000 Libyan troops and six Mirage and seven MiG-21's arrived from Tripoli. Tupolev-22 high attitude bombers were also observed.
x/79	A.T.	1 survey ship to Tanzania from France.
x/79	A.T.	6 AB-205 helicopters to Tanzania from Italy.
x/79	A.T.	4 DHC-5D Buffalo transport aircraft to Tanzania from Canada.
x/79	A.T.	6 FV-101 Scorpion LTs to Tanzania from U.K.
x/79	A.T.	4 SA-6 SAMS to Tanzania from USSR.
x/79	A.T.	20 SA-6 Gainful Landmob SAM to Tanzania from USSR.

WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

6/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 12 Beech T-34C light aircraft to Morocco.
12/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 100 BGM-71a Tow ATMs to Morocco.
12/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 25 Mirage F-1 fighters to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (29) SA-330 Puma helicopters to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 423 VAB APCs to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 15 Crotale SAMS to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 32 R-440 Crotale landmobile SAMS to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (300) R-550 Magic AAMs to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 3 Batral Class LCs to Morocco.

x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of 8 AB-206B helicopters to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of (5) AB-212 helicopters to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 100 M-48 Patton MBTs to Morocco.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 1 Douglas C-54 transport aircraft to Mauritania.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France/USA for future delivery of 2 Reims Cessna FTR 337 Milirole light trainer aircraft to Mauritania.
x/75	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with UK/Belgium for future delivery of 4 Fairey-Britten Defender STOL transport aircraft to Mauritania.
3/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 24 F-5E fighters to Morocco.
5/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 6 C-130 transport aircraft to Morocco.
5/76	P.A.T.D.	USA authorized the transfer of 20 F-5a aircraft from Jordan to Morocco.
5/76	P.A.T.D.	USA authorized the transfer of 20 F-5a aircraft from Jordan to Morocco.
6/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Spain for future delivery of 5 frigates and 1 corvette to Morocco.
7/76	P.A.T.D.	USA authorized the transfer of 5000 M-1 rifles, 30 30 caliber rifles, and 150 30 caliber machine guns from Jordan to Mauritania.
7/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Spain for future delivery of 2 patrol boats to Mauritania.
9/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 20 T-2 Buckeye training aircraft to Morocco.
10/76	P.A.T.D.	USA authorized the transfer to 16 155mm mortars from Jordan to Morocco.
12/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with UK for future delivery of 2 Defender MR/COIN aircraft to Mauritania.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 300 R-550 Magic AAMs to Morocco.

x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of 28 SF-260 training aircraft to Morocco.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (x) AML ACs to Mauritania.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 12 SA-342K Gazelle helicopters to Morocco.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 334 M-113 APCs to Morocco.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 1 HH-43F Huskie helicopter to Morocco.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery (14) M-114 155 mm THs to Morocco.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 37 M54 Chapparral mobile SAM systems to Morocco.
x/76	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 504 MIM-72C landmobile SAMs to Morocco.
6/76	A.T.	(x) AML ACs to Mauritania from France.
x/76	A.T.	8 AB-206 B helicopters to Morocco from Italy.
x/76	A.T.	(5) AB-212 helicopters to Morocco from Italy.
x/76	A.T.	1 HH-43F Huskie helicopter to Morocco from USA.
x/76	A.T.	(14) M-114 155mm THs to Morocco from USA.
x/76	A.T.	1 Douglas C-54 transport aircraft to Mauritania from France.
x/76	A.T.	2 Reims Cessna FTR 337 to Mauritania from France/USA.
x/76	A.T.	4 Fairey-Britten Defenders to Mauritania from UK/Belgium.
3/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 25 Mirage F-1 fighters to Morocco.
6/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Switzerland for future delivery of 10 AS 202/18A training aircraft to Morocco.
9/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Canada for future delivery of 2 DHC-5D transport aircraft to Mauritania.

12/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 1 AD system to Morocco.
12/77	N.A.T.D.	Marcelino Oreja, Spain's Foreign Minister announced a halt in arms shipments to Morocco and Mauritania.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 1 Gulfstream-2 transport to Morocco.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of (2000) FGM-77A Dragon ATMs to Morocco.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Spain for future delivery of 1 F-30 class frigate to Morocco.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Spain for future delivery of 4 Lazaga Class PC/FAC to Morocco.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of 1 Aspide/Albatross ShAM/ShShM launcher to Morocco.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of (24) Aspide AAM/SAM/ShAM to Morocco.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Spain for future delivery of 2 Patrol craft to Mauritania.
x/77	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 4 Cessna F-337 trainers to Mauritania.
1/77	A.T.	Reports of AML-90 mm troop carriers manufactured under French license in South Africa to Morocco.
11/77	A.T.	Reports of daily deliveries of arms to Mauritania from France.
x/77	A.T.	25 Mirage F-1 fighter planes to Morocco from France.
x/77	A.T.	(300) R-550 Magic AAMs to Morocco from France.
x/77	A.T.	3 Batral Class LCs to Morocco from France.
x/77	A.T.	12 Beech T-34C light aircraft to Morocco from USA.
x/77	A.T.	100 M-48 Patton MBTs to Morocco from USA.
x/77	A.T.	1 Gulfstream 2 transport to Morocco from USA.

2/78	N.A.T.D.	Carter administration briefly placed some restrictions on USA arms sales to Morocco. A planned sale of 24 OV-10 "Broncos" and 24 Bell Cobra helicopter gunships was cancelled and the Moroccan government was asked to stop using F-5s in the Western Sahara.
3/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 24 Alpha jet training aircraft to Morocco.
5/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (x) Crotale SAMs to Morocco.
7/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of 6 CH-47C helicopters to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with FR Germany for future delivery of (30) UR-416 APCs to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with FR Germany for future delivery of (30) Cobra-2000 ATMs to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (140) AML-90 ACs to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 4 MM-38L ShShM launchers to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 48 MM-38 Exocet ShShM to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Austria for future delivery of 121 Cuirassier LT/TDs to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 100 M-48 Patton MBTs to Morocco.
x/78	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USSR for future delivery of (100) SA-7 Grail Port SAMs to Morocco.
4/78	A.T.	Westinghouse installs a \$200 million air-defense system in Morocco and Western Sahara.
x/78	A.T.	1000 BGM-71A TOW ATMs to Morocco from USA.
x/78	A.T.	6 C-130 transport aircraft to Morocco from USA.
x/78	A.T.	12 SA-342 K Gazelle Helicopters to Morocco from France.
x/78	A.T.	10 AS 202/18A training aircraft to Morocco from Switzerland.

x/78	A.T.	(2000) FGM-77A Dragon ATMs to Morocco from USA.
x/78	A.T.	(30) Cobra-2000 ATMs from FR Germany to Morocco.
x/78	A.T.	(30) UR-416 APCs to Morocco from FR Germany.
x/78	A.T.	(100) SA-7 Grail Port SAMs to Morocco from USSR.
x/78	A.T.	2 patrol craft to Mauritania from Spain.
x/78	A.T.	4 Cessna F-337 trainers to Mauritania from France.
x/78	A.T.	2 Skyvan-3M transports to Mauritania from UK.
x/78	A.T.	4 IA-58A Pucara trainer/COIN to Mauritania from Argentina.
1/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Spain for future delivery of 1 frigate to Morocco.
2/79	P.A.T.D.	U.S. State Department approves the sale of 6 Chinook CH-47 helicopters to Morocco.
3/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 400 VAB ACs to Morocco.
5/79	P.A.T.D.	U.S. State Department approved plans by Northrop Page Communications, a subsidiary of Northrop Corp. to sell Morocco a \$200 million electronic integrated intrusion detection system.
8/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of 6 A-109 utility helicopters to Morocco.
8/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with FR Germany for future delivery of 10 Do-28D Skyservant transport aircraft to Morocco.
8/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with for France for future delivery of 100 AMX-10RC armored cars to Morocco.
10/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 30 M-113 APCs to Morocco.
10/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 40 M-163 Vulcan 20mm SP AA guns to Morocco.

10/79	P.A.T.D.	Policy Review Committee of the National Security Council, USA, advised President Carter to drop the restrictions on arms sales to Morocco.
11/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 10 Mirage F-1 CH fighter aircraft to Morocco.
x/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (x) M-3 APCs to Morocco.
x/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with South Africa for future delivery of (150) Eland-60 APc to Morocco.
x/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with South Africa for future delivery of (100) Eland-90 ACs to Morocco.
x/79	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with South Africa for future delivery of (80) Ratel-20 ICVs to Morocco.
3/79	A.T.	\$3 million worth of ammunition for F-5s and \$24 million worth of spare parts for F-5s and Hercules C-130s shipped to Morocco from USA.
10/79	A.T.	25 Mirage F-1C fighters to Morocco from France.
x/79	A.T.	121 Cuirassier LT/TD to Morocco from Austria.
x/79	A.T.	100 M-48 Patton MBTs to Morocco from USA.
x/79	A.T.	(29) SA-330 Puma helicopters to Morocco from France.
x/79	A.T.	15 Crotale SAMs to Morocco from France.
x/79	A.T.	32 R-440 Crotale landmobile SAMs to Morocco from France.
x/79	A.T.	334 M-113 APCs to Morocco from USA.
x/79	A.T.	300 R-550 Magic AAMs to Morocco from France.
x/79	A.T.	Reports of tanks being supplied to Morocco from Romania.
x/79	A.T.	(100) M-3 APCs to Morocco from France.
x/79	A.T.	1 patrol boat to Mauritania from Spain.
1/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 20 F-5E fighter aircraft from USA.

1/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 24 Hughes 500D Defender helicopters from USA; 12 with TOW; 12 gunships.
1/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 6 OV-10 Bronco COIN aircraft from USA.
3/80	P.A.T.D.	Carter administration announced that it would sell 125 Maverick air-to-ground missiles costing \$7 million to Morocco. They are for Morocco's F-5 aircraft.
11/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 19 AB-206 Jetranger helicopters from Italy.
11/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 6 AB-212 helicopters from Italy.
11/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 5 CH-47C transport helicopters from Italy.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (25) OT-62 APCs from Egypt.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (100) Ertac ATMs from France.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 1 Falcon-50 transport from France.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 12 SA-342 K Gazelle helicopters from France.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 1 MM-40L ShShM launchers from France.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (12) MM-40 Exocet ShShM/SShMs from France.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (10) Steyr-4K 7FA APCs from Austria.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (12) M-46 130 mm TGs from Egypt.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (20) AMX-10P MICVs from Israel.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (30) light gun 105 mm TGs from UK.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered (10) D-30 122 mm THs from USSR.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Morocco ordered 3 KC-120H tanker/transport from USA.

x/80	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 2 PA-31 Cheyenne Maritime patrol aircraft to Mauritania.
x/80	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 1 Patra class PC/FAC to Mauritania.
x/80	A.T.	37 M-54 Chapparral, mobile SAMs to Morocco from USA.
x/80	A.T.	504 MIM-72C landmobile SAMs to Morocco from USA.
x/80	A.T.	6 CH-47C helicopters to Morocco from Italy.
x/80	A.T.	1 Falcon-50 transport to Morocco from France.
x/80	A.T.	(25) OT-62 APCs to Morocco from Egypt.
x/80	A.T.	(100) ENTAC ATMs to Morocco from France.
1/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 24 Gazelle helicopters to Morocco.
1/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 100 AMX-10C armored reconnaissance vehicles to Morocco.
3/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 108 M-60 A3 medium tanks to Morocco.
6/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 7 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to Morocco.
x/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (3) AMX-13 ARVs to Morocco.
x/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 12 AMX-13 DCA AAVs to Morocco.
x/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (50) AMX-155 MK-F3 SPHs to Morocco.
x/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 3 Super King Air transport aircraft to Morocco.
x/81	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of (30) M-101-A1 105 MM TH to Morocco.
x/81	A.T.	24 F-5E fighters to Morocco from USA.

x/81	A.T.	(30) M-101-A1 105 mm THs to Morocco from USA.
x/81	A.T.	2 PA-31 Cheyenne Maritime patrol aircraft to Morocco from USA.
x/81	A.T.	20 F-5E fighters to Morocco from USA.
x/81	A.T.	24 Hughes 500D Defender helicopter; 12 with TOW; 12 gunships; to Morocco from USA.
x/81	A.T.	6 OV-10 Bronco COIN aircraft to Morocco from USA.
x/81	A.T.	3 KC-130 H tanker/transport to Morocco from USA.
x/81	A.T.	24 ALPHA training aircraft to Morocco from France.
x/81	A.T.	(80) Ratel-20 ICVs to Morocco from South Africa.
x/81	A.T.	(10) D-30 122 mm THs to Morocco from USSR.
x/81	A.T.	(10) Steyr-4K 7FA APCs to Morocco from Austria.
x/81	A.T.	(12) M-46 130 mm TGs to Morocco from Egypt.
x/81	A.T.	(20) AMX-10P MICVs to Morocco from Israel.
x/81	A.T.	(30) 105 mm light TGs to Morocco from UK.
1/82	N.A.T.D.	Qadhafi visited Rabat, promised that Libya would no longer provide arms to Polisario.
1/82	N.A.T.D.	Early in 1982 France briefly interrupted the flow of arms to Morocco when the Moroccan government fell behind in its debt payments.
4/82	P.A.T.D.	Deliveries of French arms to Morocco were resumed after an agreement was signed on April 4, 1982 to reschedule 2 billion FFR of debts incurred for arms purchases.
4/82	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Italy for future delivery of (x) Aspide SAMs to Morocco.
4/82	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 381 AGM-65B ASMs to Morocco.
x/82	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 1 AS-365N helicopter to Morocco.

x/82	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of 2 Mystere-20 transports to Morocco.
x/82	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with France for future delivery of (60) HOT ATMs to Morocco.
x/82	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 1 KC-130H tanker/transport to Morocco.
x/82	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of (20) M-125-A1 APCs to Morocco.
7/82	A.T.	It was disclosed that the USA had sold anti-personnel cluster bombs to Morocco.
x/82	A.T.	12 AMX-13 DCA AAVs to Morocco from France.
x/82	A.T.	2 Mystere-20 transports to Morocco from France.
x/82	A.T.	(60) HOT ATMs to Morocco from France.
x/82	A.T.	4 MM-38L ShShM launchers to Morocco from France.
x/82	A.T.	48 MM-38 Exocet ShShMS to Morocco from France.
x/82	A.T.	5 CH-47C transport helicopters to Morocco from Italy.
x/82	A.T.	7 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to Morocco from USA.
x/82	A.T.	(20) M-125-A1 APCs to Morocco from USA.
x/82	A.T.	40 M-163 Vulcan 20 mm SP AA guns to Morocco from USA.
x/82	A.T.	10 DO-28D Sky servant transport aircraft to Morocco from FR Germany.
x/82	A.T.	4 Lazaga class PC/FACs to Morocco from Spain.
x/82	A.T.	1 patrol boat to Mauritania from Spain.
x/82	A.T.	1 Patra class PC/FAC to Mauritania from France.
5/83	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 24 Hughes 500MD Defender helicopters to Morocco.

x/83	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Israel for future delivery of (3) RAM V-1 reconnaissance ACs to Morocco.
x/83	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 1 B-707-320C transport to Morocco.
x/83	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 1 Super King Air transport to Morocco.
x/83	A.T.	1 F-30 class frigate to Morocco from Spain.
x/83	A.T.	1 Aspide/Albatross ShAM/ShShM to Morocco from Italy.
x/83	A.T.	(24) Aspide AAM/SAM/ShAM to Morocco from Italy.
x/83	A.T.	12 SA-342 K Gazelle helicopters to Morocco from France.
x/83	A.T.	1 MM-40L ShShM launchers to Morocco from France.
x/83	A.T.	(12) MM-40 Exocet ShShM/SShMs to Morocco from France.
x/83	A.T.	(3) AMX-13 ARVs to Morocco from France.
x/83	A.T.	(50) AMX-155 MK-F3 SPHs to Morocco from France.
x/83	A.T.	1 AS-365 N helicopter to Morocco from France.
x/83	A.T.	3 Super King Air transport aircraft to Morocco from USA.
x/83	A.T.	1 KC-130 H tanker/transport to Morocco from USA.
x/83	A.T.	381 AGM-65B ASMs to Morocco from USA.
x/83	A.T.	(3) RAM V-1 reconnaissance AC to Morocco from Israel.
8/84	N.A.T.D.	Morocco and Libya signed a union agreement, depriving Polisario of an important source of arms. Libya stopped arms shipments to the guerillas.
x/84	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Egypt for future delivery of (5) BRDM-2 Sagger TD(M) to Morocco.
x/84	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Egypt for future delivery of (60) AT-3 Sagger ATMs to Morocco.

x/84	A.T.	423 VAB APCs to Morocco from France.
x/84	A.T.	40 AMX10 RC ACs to Morocco from France.
x/84	A.T.	(150) Eland-60 ACs to Morocco from South Africa.
x/84	A.T.	(100) Eland-90 ACs to Morocco from South Africa.
x/84	A.T.	1 Super King Air transport to Morocco from USA.
x/84	A.T.	(5) BRDM-2 Sagger TD(M) to Morocco from Egypt.
x/84	A.T.	(60) AT-3 Sagger ATMs to Morocco from Egypt.
3/85	P.A.T.D.	Moroccan officials said that in late 1984 Polisario took delivery of large quantities of Soviet-made weapons, including advance BMP-1 armored vehicles, eight of which were captured intact near the Algerian border in October 1984. Guerillas also had Soviet-made anti-aircraft missiles.
10/85	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Spain for future delivery of 6 Vigilance-class patrol boats to Morocco.
x/85	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Argentina for future delivery of (20) IA-59A Pucara COIN to Morocco.
x/85	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with Brazil for future delivery of 60 EE-11 Urutu APCs to Morocco.
x/85	P.A.T.D.	Agreement with USA for future delivery of 1 KC-130H tanker/transport.
x/85	A.T.	(140) AML-90 AGs to Morocco from France.

Abbreviations

AA	Anti-aircraft
AAM	Air-to-air missile
AAV	Anti-aircraft vehicle
AC	Armored car
APC	Armored personnel carrier
ARV	Armored recovery vehicle
ASM	Air-to-surface missile
ATM	Anti-tank missile
COIN	Counter-insurgency
FAC	Fast attack craft
ICV	Infantry combat vehicle
LC	Landing craft
LT	Light tank
MBT	Main battle tank
MICV	Mechanized infantry combat vehicle
SAM	Surface-to-air missile
SC	Scout car
ShAM	Ship-to-air missile
ShShM	Ship-to-Ship missile
SPH	Self-propelled howitzer
STOL	Short take-off and landing
TD	Tank destroyer
TG	Towed gun
TH	Towed howitzer

APPENDIX B

NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA-KENYA

- 02/16/64 Ethiopia and Somalia agree to a cease-fire after a series of border clashes.
- 03/30/64 OAU sponsored peace talks in Khartoum succeed in getting Ethiopia and Somalia to agree to a number of points, including the withdrawal of military forces to a line 15 km. from the border.
- 05/30/64 A joint Somali-Ethiopian Commission established under the auspices of the OAU to supervise the withdrawal of troops by both countries from the border areas announced the completion of its work. Indications were that agreements had been reached on all points.
- 07/08/64 The Kenyan government announced that the Somali Republic and Kenya had agreed to preliminary discussions on matters of mutual interest with special reference to the North-Eastern region.
- 11/13/64 At its third meeting in Nairobi the Kenya-Ethiopia Consultative Council discussed the problem of border raids from Ethiopia. Ethiopia assured Kenya that it will take vigorous measures to arrest and prosecute persons involved in the recent Turkana border incident.
- 04/12/65 Reports in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu report that the meeting of the Ethiopia-Somalia border commission in Terfer had taken place in a good atmosphere.
- 09/23/65 The Somali Ministry of Information reported that meetings which had "ended in cordial agreement" had been held on the "artificial" Kenya-Somalia border by officials of the two governments. The announcement said that administrative matters concerning the "Somali territory" of Kenya's North-Eastern Province had been discussed.
- 10/27/65 The Somali and Ethiopian governments announced that they had agreed at the OAU Assembly in Accra to cease their exchange of hostile press and radio propaganda.
- 12/13/65 The Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Kenya and the Somali Republic met at Arusha, Tanzania in an effort sponsored by President Julius Nyerere to cool down the dispute over Kenya's Somali-inhabited North-Eastern Region. Foreign Minister Joseph Murumbi of Kenya told a news conference that the talks had brought no change at all in Kenyan-Somali relations and had broken down when Somali representatives revived "old arguments for territorial expansion" in defiance of the OAU resolution on national boundaries. In Mogadishu spokesmen for the Somali delegation rejected Kenyan allegations and charged that Kenya had even turned down a Somali offer to sign a propaganda cease-fire in line with the OAU resolutions of Dar es Salaam and Lagos.

- 05/66 Sudanese Prime Minister Mr. Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub said in Khartoum that his country had decided to mediate the dispute between Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.
- 07/66 Kenyan and Ethiopian officials met in Addis Ababa on July 15 to develop a tougher strategy for dealing with shifta.
- 07/15/66 Ethiopia-Somalia border commission meeting at Abud Wak failed to agree on measures to reduce border tensions.
- 04/14/67 Kenyan Minister of Defense Njoroge Mungai stated three conditions Somalia must agree to before talks are held on the dispute over the North Eastern province. The three conditions included a halt to subversive activities aimed at Kenya, a withdrawal of weapons supplied to the Somali insurgents, and a discontinuation of training for the rebels.
- 05/01/67 In a reply to the Kenya Defense Minister's proposal for talks (see 4/67), the Somali Foreign Ministry claimed that it had consistently conformed with the resolutions of the February 1964 OAU conference in Lagos, and welcomed Kenya's threat to call for OAU and UN intervention.
- 09/19/67 Ethiopia and Somalia held talks in Addis Ababa to discuss ways of improving relations. The two sides agreed to the establishment of a joint military commission to deal with violations of the Khartoum Agreement.
- 10/28/67 The President of Kenya and the Prime Minister of Somalia signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" in Arusha, Tanzania. The Memorandum recognized the need to restore normal and peaceful relations between the two countries, reaffirmed their adherence to the declaration of the OAU conference at Kinshasa and agreed to refrain from conducting hostile propaganda against each other.

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA

- 08/77 Ethiopia demanded an emergency meeting of the OAU to discuss the Ogaden fighting.
- 08/77 The USSR invited Somali President Siad Barre to Moscow; the talks broke up after two days with no agreement reached.
- 08/06/77 The Foreign Ministers of Ethiopia and Somalia met in Libreville, Gabon, for an emergency meeting of a special 8-nation mediation commission. The talks failed. The OAU fully supported the Ethiopian position.
- 09/05/77 The Arab League Foreign Ministers, meeting in Cairo, refuse to support Somalia against Ethiopia.
- 09/07/77 Ethiopia broke diplomatic relations with Somalia.
- 09/77 The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) rejected cease-fire negotiations until every inch of the Ogaden was liberated.

- 10/77 Ethiopia and Somalia rejected the mediation effort by U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim; African states reported favoring leaving the dispute to the OAU.
- 01/78 The Western Allies (U.S., Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy) pledged full support for the OAU's efforts to promote a peaceful settlement to the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict.
- 01/78 Somali President Siad Barre said he saw no chance of a negotiated settlement with Ethiopia.
- 03/09/78 Somalia announced that it had ordered its troops to pull out of the Ogaden area. The Somali government requested the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Horn of Africa, including Soviet and Cuban personnel aiding Ethiopian forces.

ZAIRE: SHABA I

- 03/77 France supported Belgium in urging diplomatic and military sessions with NATO to discuss the Zairian situation in early March.
- 03/77 A Nigerian diplomat in Zaire said that a Nigerian representative will be sent to Angola to strongly condemn the invasion.
- 03/77 Nigeria requested that the Soviet Union and the U.S. stay out of Zaire, and called for an African solution.
- 04/77 A Franco-African summit conference was held in Dakar, Senegal, with 18 African states (Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Togo, Upper Volta, Burundi, Central African Empire, Comoros, and Guinea Bissau) and France. France was praised for its support of the Zairean government.

ZAIRE: SHABA II

- 05/78 Prime Minister Tindemans of Belgium called for the creation of an all-African peace-keeping force.
- 05/78 Morocco, Mali, Senegal, and Gabon agreed to cooperate in the formation of a joint peacekeeping force.
- 06/78 U.S., France, Belgium, West Germany, and Britain met in Paris to discuss the Shaba invasion.
- 06/78 Pres. Neto of Angola ordered Katangans disarmed.
- 08/78 Angola and Zaire decided to establish a joint commission to increase security on the border.

TANZANIA-UGANDA

- 10/31/78 Kenya offered to mediate the conflict between Tanzania and Uganda, and called on both sides to pull back their troops.
- 11/05/78 Uganda Radio announced on 11/5 that Amin was willing to accept the mediation offer made by Libyan leader Gaddafi.
- 11/08/78 Nyrere of Tanzania rejected the mediation of Gaddafi.
- 11/78 Amin offered to pull troops back. The about-face by Amin was engineered principally by the special envoy of the OAU and Pres. Numeiry.
- 11/16/78 Nigerian delegation arrived in Tanzania from Kampala to try to convince Tanzania that the Uganda withdrawal was a reality.
- 11/29/78 OAU Secretary General Numeiry visited Tanzania and Uganda and announced that a special OAU committee would be set up to try to resolve the border dispute.
- 12/78 In early December Numeiry told Kenya that Tanzania and Uganda had asked Kenya to pursue its attempts to find a peaceful solution.
- 02/14/79 Amin requested an immediate meeting of the U.N. Security Council. The President of the Security Council said Amin's request was not properly worded and therefore he did not propose to convene the council.
- 02/14/79 The Libyan Foreign Minister visited both Uganda and Tanzania in an attempt at mediation.
- 02/21/79 The OAU mediation committee met in Kenya to try to achieve a cease-fire. Members of the committee were the Central African Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia, Zaire and Zambia.
- 02/25/79 Amin met with an OAU delegation; later that same day the delegation met with Nyrere. Kenya appealed to Tanzania and Uganda to cease fire and pull back.
- 02/28/79 Amin asked Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi to try to convince Nyerere to accept the OAU's peace efforts.
- 03/03/79 Tanzania criticized the OAU's mediation committee for failing to end the fighting between Tanzania and Uganda. On 3/2 the committee had said it could do no more to settle the conflict and noted that Amin had accepted all OAU peace proposals. Zambia also criticized the OAU.
- 04/11/79 Kampala fell to invading forces; a provisional government was formed under Lule, which was immediately recognized by Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and others.

WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT

- 11/14/75 Spain agreed to hand over administration of the Spanish Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania (known as the Tripartite agreement. Algeria criticized the agreement and called for U.N. administration of the region).
- 02/05/76 Egypt announced a cease-fire in the Algeria-Morocco dispute over the Spanish Sahara.
- 02/12/76 Algeria reported the collapse of the Egyptian mediation effort.
- 09/77 Polisario made overtures to Morocco via secret contacts in Madrid and Rome offering to settle if Morocco would abandon its support of Mauritania. Morocco refused.
- 07/78 After the Mauritanian leader Ould Daddah was overthrown (on 7/10/78), the new leader, Lt. Col. Salek moved to improve relations with Algeria and to stop the guerilla war with the Polisario in the Western Sahara. On 7/12, the Polisario proclaimed a cease-fire with Mauritania.
- 07/78 At the 15th OAU Summit meeting in Khartoum, Sudan, Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri was commissioned to form an ad hoc committee of "wisemen" to seek a solution to the Saharan conflict compatible with the right of self-determination.
- 10/78 Morocco accepted mediation by Nigeria and four African states to try to settle Western Sahara dispute.
- 10/78 Public and private talks between Polisario and Mauritanian leaders, encouraged by Algeria and Libya, began; continued sporadically for a year.
- 05/79 In early May, Bouceif declared Mauritania was ready to seek peace in the Western Sahara "on the basis of internationally recognized principles, as we adhere to the principle of self-determination."
- 07/79 At the OAU's summit meeting in Monrovia, Liberia, the "Wisemens" committee called for an immediate and general cease-fire in the Sahara and recommended the exercise of the right of self-determination by the Sahrawi population through a free and general referendum. Several delegations, including those from Morocco and Senegal, walked out.

- 08/79 Mauritania signed a peace agreement with Polisario and renounced all claims to the former Spanish Sahara.
- 11/79 U.N.G.A. resolution recommended that Polisario "the representative of the people of Western Sahara" should participate in any search for a solution of the question.
- 12/79 The OAU's "Wisemens" committee, meeting in Monrovia, Liberia, recommended that a peacekeeping force supervise a Cease-fire in the Western Sahara in preparation for a referendum. Also, they called for Moroccan withdrawal from the former Mauritanian sector of the Western Sahara.
- 07/80 OAU summit met in Freetown, Sierra Leone; postponed a decision on membership for Polisario for three months. By this time 23 African states had recognized the SDAR (Saharan Democratic Arab Republic.) During the summit three additional states, including Libya, supported the admission of the SDAR into the OAU, constituting a majority of 26 out of 50 OAU members.
- 09/80 OAU's "Wisemens" committee, meeting in Freetown, ended in failure.
- 11/80 U.N.G.A. Res. #3519 reaffirmed the right of the Sahrawi population to self-determination and independence, and urged Morocco and Polisario to enter into direct negotiations.
- 06/81 At the OAU meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, Hassan II offered to hold a "controlled referendum." A seven nation OAU committee was formed to meet before the end of August with the parties to the conflict to organize a cease-fire and a referendum on self-determination. Both decisions represented important concessions on Morocco's part. However, at this meeting the diplomatic momentum shifted in Morocco's favor. In the 1981 OAU resolution the Polisario was not mentioned by name. Also, at the 1980 OAU summit 26 African states supported admission of the SDAR; in 1981 the issue was pushed off of the agenda.
- 07/81 In mid-July the Polisario issued a communique containing a series of hard-line conditions for a referendum. Included were direct negotiations with Morocco, a general, free, and regular referendum, and the complete withdrawal of Moroccan forces.
- 08/81 In late-August the "Implementation Committee" of the OAU met in Nairobi and issued its decision calling for a cease-fire, U.N. collaboration, etc.
- 11/81 U.N.G.A. adopted an Algerian resolution urging the two parties to the conflict to enter into direct negotiations, establish a cease-fire and organize a referendum.
- 02/82 The Polisario was admitted to an OAU meeting; 19 members of the OAU boycotted the meeting in Addis Ababa in protest.
- 02/83 King Hassan II and Algerian Pres. Chadi Benjedid held direct talks on the Western Sahara problem.

- 06/83 The OAU opened a four day summit with Polisario agreeing not to attend; the meeting concluded with the adoption of a peace plan for the Western Sahara.
- 03/85 King Hassan confirmed on March 3 that he was engaged in secret negotiations with Algeria.
- 03/85 Plans for a Maghreb summit (to include Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Algeria) fell apart.
- 10/85 Morocco's Prime Minister, in an address before the UN General Assembly, declared a unilateral cease-fire in the ten year war in the Western Sahara.

APPENDIX C

DATA SOURCES:

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
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FIGURE 1


Ethiopia - Somalia - Kenya

for the year 1963




Ethiopia - Somalia - Kenya

for the year 1964



Ethiopia - Somalia - Kenya

for the year 1965



Ethiopia - Somalia - Kenya

for the year 1966





FIGURE 2

Ethiopia - Somalia
for the year 1977

Legend:
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X = POSITIVE ARMS
TRANSFER
Y = NEGATIVE ARMS
TRANSFER
+ = NEGOTIATIONS &
SETTLEMENTS

LEVELS OF FIGHTING
MAJOR FIGHTING
SOME FIGHTING
NO FIGHTING



Ethiopia - Somalia
for the year 1978

Legend:
• = ARMS TRANSFER
X = POSITIVE ARMS
TRANSFER
Y = NEGATIVE ARMS
TRANSFER
+ = NEGOTIATIONS &
SETTLEMENTS

LEVELS OF FIGHTING
MAJOR FIGHTING
SOME FIGHTING
NO FIGHTING





FIGURE 3


Morocco - Polisario

for the year 1975




Morocco - Polisario

for the year 1976



Morocco - Polisario

for the year 1977



Morocco - Polisario

for the year 1978






FIGURE 3


Morocco - Polisario for the year 1979



Morocco - Polisario for the year 1980



Morocco - Polisario for the year 1981



Morocco - Polisario for the year 1982





FIGURE 3


Morocco - Polisario

for the year 1983



Morocco - Polisario

for the year 1984



Morocco - Polisario

for the year 1985





FIGURE 4


Tanzania - Uganda

for the year 1977



Tanzania - Uganda

for the year 1978



Tanzania - Uganda

for the year 1979




FIGURE 5





FIGURE 6


Shaba II

for the year 1977



Shaba II

for the year 1978



NOTES TO FIGURES

ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA - KENYA CONFLICT

- 1) Although only brief periods of interstate fighting are shown on the chart, a relatively continuous guerilla war was occurring in the North-East Frontier District of Kenya throughout the period 1963-1967, involving ethnic Somali tribal raiders known as shifta, and Kenyan forces. The extent to which the shifta were supplied and/or supported by the Somali government has never been established.

ETHIOPIA - SOMALIA CONFLICT OF 1977 - 78

- 1) The majority of the arms transfers indicated for December 1977 and 1978 were Soviet supplies sent to Ethiopia. Although it has proven impossible to trace the exact date of what weapons arrived when, it can be said that most of these weapons began arriving after the massive Soviet resupply operation began in mid-October 1977.

MOROCCO - POLISARIO CONFLICT 1975 - 1985

- 1) Note that King Hassan's announcement of a cease fire in October 1985 was chosen as an ending date more as a matter of convenience than an indication of a settlement to the issue. Although there have been no major new developments in the past two years, the conflict is as of yet unresolved.

SHABA CONFLICTS I & II, 1976-1978

- 1) In the Shaba II case (Figure 6) data on arms transfers to Angola are included because of Angolan involvement in the conflict. Angolan data was not included in Figure 5. Thus, Figures 5 and 6 differ for 1977.