

University of Missouri, St. Louis

IRL @ UMSL

UMSL Global

1-1-1988

From Collective Identity to Collective Security--Changing Perceptions of Alliance Issues Among the West German Successor Generations

Joyce Marie Mushaben
mushaben@umsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://irl.umsl.edu/cis>



Part of the [International and Area Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Mushaben, Joyce Marie, "From Collective Identity to Collective Security--Changing Perceptions of Alliance Issues Among the West German Successor Generations" (1988). *UMSL Global*. 287.
Available at: <https://irl.umsl.edu/cis/287>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in UMSL Global by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.

Occasional Papers

The Center for International Studies of the University of Missouri-St. Louis issues Occasional Papers at irregular intervals from ongoing research projects, thereby providing a viable means for communicating tentative results. Such "informal" publications reduce somewhat the delay between research and publication, offering an opportunity for the investigator to obtain reactions while still engaged in the research. Comments on these papers, therefore, are particularly welcome. Occasional Papers should not be reproduced or quoted at length without the consent of the author or of the Center for International Studies.

From Collective Identity to
Collective Security? Changing
Perceptions of Alliance Issues Among
the West German Successor Generations

Joyce Marie Mushaben

From Collective Identity to Collective Security?
Changing Perceptions of Alliance Issues
among the West German Successor Generations

Joyce Marie Mushaben
Department of Political Science, and
Center for International Studies
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri 63121-4499

Paper prepared for the Sixth International Conference of Europeanists,
Washington, D.C., 30 October-1 November, 1987.

Zur Nation Euch zu bilden, Ihr hofft es, Deutsche, vergebens. Bildet, Ihr konnt es, dafur freier zu Menschen Euch aus.

--Friedrich Schiller
Xenian

"...it is not only the Germans who should study the German Problem. For it is not to Germany that we should go today to find the most egregious examples of ambition outrunning resources, nor it might be argued, is it the Germans whose arrogant failure to adjust to a new world strains the international system beyond endurance."

--David Calleo
The German Problem Reconsidered, 1978

While the two German states have come to occupy a well-respected niche in the international community over the last two decades, they have yet to find an acceptable home for their problematic "national identity." To many outside observers, the series of treaties promulgated during the early years of detente signaled an effort to close the book on a particularly ignominious chapter of German history.¹ Many a foreign leader breathed a *klammheimliche* sigh of relief over *Ostpolitik's* unspoken acceptance of the status quo by the two states most obviously affected by the postwar division of Europe. Although a majority no doubt agreed with the sentiments expressed by Andreotti some 12 years later, official policy nonetheless required at least a few heads of state to feign surprise at the provocative nature of the statement: "There are two German states, and two they shall remain."² Reactions from the Federal Republic were appropriately incensed or ambivalent.

But as Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker has observed in reviewing four decades of postwar German history, "a question does not simply cease to exist because no one has an answer for it, especially when the state of affairs is such that it keeps raising the question anew."³ *Ostpolitik*, as perceived by outsiders, marked the end of the Germans' search for a postwar "national" identity and for an acceptable role in the global community; for the citizens residing in the now more or less sovereign "rump states," however, *Ostpolitik* represented only a beginning.

The pace of normalization, as mandated by the 1972 Basis of Relations Treaty, has been dramatically accelerated over the last ten years, but there has been little clarification as to *wohin* [whither] the ongoing improvement in East-West German relations is supposed to lead. Indeed, the 1980's have witnessed a renewed debate among political and intellectual forces within the Federal Republic as to the "open" or "closed" nature of the German Question, defined in terms of the Oder-Neisse borders and the historical "uniqueness" of Holocaust atrocities. Not even Erich Honecker's first official visit to the FRG in September, 1987 is likely to expunge the term "reunification" from the vocabulary of foreign journalists and political pundits for years to come. Nevertheless, the most significant aspect of this long-awaited political "happening" was not that the GDR Premier was accorded military honors usually reserved for leaders of *de jure* sovereign states, but the fact that his visit could be and was characterized as otherwise "breathtaking in its normality."⁴ As substantive reports of the Kohl-Honecker exchanges reveal, "the" German Question has given birth to many new German Questions, all hungering after real-political answers.⁵

I. Defining the German Questions

As originally conceived, the intention of this paper was to present the preliminary findings of an 18-month study of "Security Conceptions and Successor Generations" conducted by this author in the Federal Republic under the auspices of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (July, 1985 through December, 1986). The methodology employed in the investigation has been eclectic, to say in the least. Approximately half of my research energies have been devoted to a secondary analysis of some 30 years of German survey research data in reference to four key "question complexes" outlined below, which I have undertaken in an effort to determine the breadth and depth of generational differences over security issues. The second, equally exhausting but all the more exhilarating phase of this project consisted of a series of more than 50 loosely structured, in-depth interviews (lasting 1 to 5 hours,

but averaging 1 1/2 hours each) with prominent members of the West German political and media establishments during the height of the 1986/87 national election campaign. I could not possibly do justice to the wealth of data and impressions I accumulated in the short time/space afforded here. Rather than overwhelm the reader with a mass of tabular data fraught with subtle complexities, I have opted to present a number of general trend lines and an overarching interpretative framework, for which I draw most heavily upon the many personal interviews I conducted.⁶

The three-part thesis upon which this investigation is based reads:

First, at least four factors, namely, demographic polarization, coupled with a unique geo-strategic location, the absence of a shared sense of national identity, and the accelerated pace of political-economic change in post-industrial society, have played a key role in the rapid mobilization of protestors linked to the German peace movement(s) of the 1980's.

Secondly, the diverse historical and political socialization experiences of three discernible postwar generations have resulted in conflicting, generation-specific definitions of "German" national security needs, elements of which also seem to clash directly with the security doctrines and strategies which currently prevail within the Atlantic Alliance.⁷

Thirdly, insofar as many of these generational differences hold longer-term consequences for West German participation in the NATO alliance, any effective attempt to reconcile or redress these differences will have to include a systematic re-evaluation of the postwar "German identity" and its role in the development of an East-West "collective security" or "security partnership" system.

After briefly outlining the four points of inquiry addressed in my open ended interviews, I will define the concept of "collective identity" as a basis for improved relations between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, noting the nature of generational differences along the way. In the third part of the paper I

will address the equally controversial and complicated topic of "collective" or "common" security (*Gemeinsame Sicherheit*) which usually evokes a strong sense of suspicion and mistrust on this side of the Atlantic. Finally, I will undertake to interpret the born-again "search for a German identity," as well as the younger generations' ostensible dissatisfaction with existing Alliance structures and strategies, in terms of a Maslowian hierarchy of national interests and needs.

The following points provided the framework for a four-page questionnaire consisting of roughly 30 individual questions. In summary, they read:

1. How do the (three) successor generations which have reached political maturity during the 1950's, the late 1960's/early 1970's, and late 1970's/early 1980's respectively, differ in the significance they ascribe to the peace movements and to the politics of detente, as both have evolved over the past ten years? What accounts for those differences?
2. How do the postwar generations differ in the degree of "national identification" they exhibit towards the Federal Republic? How do they differ in their sense of what it is to be "German?" How strong is their respective identification with "the other Germany" or with "Europe"? What accounts for these differences?
3. Is there such a thing as "the new German nationalism?" If so, what are its substantive dimensions? Does it reject traditional precepts of national sovereignty and the earlier dream of reunification, in favor of neutralism or maintenance of the status quo between the two German states? Who are the agents of this new nationalism, and what are the key issues that have given rise to it?
4. How do the three postwar generations differ in their perceptions of the Atlantic Alliance as the most effective "keeper of the peace" in Central Europe? What ramifications do they hold for the further cultivation of a Verantwortungsgemeinschaft ["community of responsibility"] between the two Germanies? What implications do they hold for the Federal Republic's current and future role in NATO?

II. The Dilemma of "Zuviel" - "Zuwenig": National vs. Collective Identity

Historically speaking, "the Germans" have demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for shifting from one extreme to another, at least as far as the problem of "national consciousness" is concerned.⁸ A nation in search of statehood prior to the Bismarckian consolidation of the late nineteenth century, Germans found themselves moving along the spectrum from "too little" to "too much" nationalism during the period 1871 through 1945. In the aftermath of conditionless surrender, they were reduced to two states deprived of the right to a clearly defined national consciousness, whether for reasons of a self-imposed constitutional "muzzling" or by virtue of an externally imposed proletarian internationalism. While select groups attempted to keep the dream of reunification high on the political agenda (despite Adenauer's ostensible rejection of this dream), effective moves in the direction of reunification were clearly out of the question during the ten years of occupation.

What little national consciousness or "love of Fatherland" remained had to anchor itself to the realities of two diametrically opposed systems stripped for a time of their formal sovereignty and former legitimacy. More deep-seated emotional attachments were neither encouraged nor pursued, either for fear of raising suspicions among victorious powers and vanquished neighbors, or because such pursuits could have compromised a widespread, albeit abstract hope that reunification could "someday" be achieved. By the 1960's both Germanies had opted for a pride-in-state vested in the material benefits of their respective economic miracles, as a non-antagonistic surrogate for national identity lost. Two decades later, critics from diverse ideological camps have joined forces to protest the lack of and to reclaim their right to a bona fide "German" national consciousness.⁹

Despite the flood of publications generated by these coalescing old and new schools of identity-patriots over the last five years, the content of this national consciousness has yet to be clearly defined. It is still difficult to delineate what

Deutschland als Ganzes ought to include, or to ascertain what *Deutsche Identität heute* should mean. Anyone seeking to predict *Was wird aus den Deutschen?* must first be able to determine *Wo Deutschland liegt* -- whether in the West, in the East, or somewhere in the middle of Europe. For many participant-observers of this debate, this *Nachdenken über Deutschland* finds its denouement in a *Ratlose Normalität*. For others who wish to promote *Deutschland als Aufgabe* more actively, there exists the optimistic perspective that *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt*. Yet another school would issue a more reserved but nonetheless hopeful appeal, *Ohne Deutschland geht es nicht*. Even though *Die Angst der Deutschen* and the *Angst vor Deutschland* persists, it is indeed the case that *Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter*. In view of the ongoing *Historikerstreit* that has challenged the historical uniqueness of national socialist extermination policies, one can only hope that "the Germans" -- whoever they may be -- are not marching to the beat of "two steps forward, one step backwards."¹⁰

Traditionally defined in terms of a sense of belonging which derives from a common language, religion, customs, history and related socio-cultural traits, national consciousness neither automatically includes nor excludes an explicitly "political" dimension, that is, an identification with a specific set of governmental institutions.¹¹ Similarly, Willy Brandt's 1970 characterization of the German plight as "two states in one nation" need not point in the direction of an ineluctable reunion of the FRG and the GDR under the same political roof.

In his efforts to delineate the generic, socio-psychological features of nationalism, Herbert Kelman maintains that a nation "goes beyond the conception of 'this is the way we do things' to a conception of 'there is something unique, special and valuable about our way of doing things'". It is ideologizing of this sort that makes it possible to develop allegiance to and invest one's identity in a collectivity that goes beyond - in both space and time - one's primary-groups, face-to-face contacts."¹² For a nation seeking to incorporate itself within the institutional

boundaries of statehood, the sources of political legitimacy (viewed in either sentimental or instrumental terms) are two-fold: 1) the system will reflect and respect the ethnic and cultural identity of its subjects; and 2) it will respond effectively to the actual needs and interests of its constituents.¹³

Part of the uniqueness of the two Germanies' need to/need not to press for a recognizable "identity" rests with the order in which the stages of collective consciousness-building must occur. As Kelman contends, "the push from state to nation may violate the ideal model of the modern nation-state, which is presumably based on an already existing sense of national identity, but it is not at all inconsistent with historical precedents. Whether such a push will succeed... depends on the extent to which the state contains a well-functioning society with members who are interdependent and whose needs and interests are adequately met."¹⁴ This still leaves unresolved the question as to whether or not Germans at home in either state will benefit from an identity that is "national" in the conventional sense. For this reason, Harro Honalka's concept of "collective identity" seems to provide a much more accurate yet flexible label for the generational trends and "normalization" trends emerging from my own investigation.¹⁵

"Collective identity," in theory, transcends the physical as well as psychological boundaries of "national" consciousness; it permits, indeed encourages a discussion of commonalities and ties not firmly attached to a single state entity and incorporates images of other collective identities such as extended family or neighborhood. This is especially relevant in relation to FRG-GDR ties, insofar as the loss of older cohorts' family connections and personal contacts with the "other Germany" makes it increasingly difficult to sustain the sentimental bonds of the last twenty years, and necessitates their replacement with more instrumental ties (e.g. class trips for school-aged youth and sister-city programs). The gradual development of a collective German identity should not be construed as a rejection of "West-

integration" (in the GDR's case, "East-integration"); rather, it is the completion of those two processes that makes a collective orientation possible, since the critical parameters have been thereby defined.

The search for a "collective identity" does not anticipate a return to the not-so-golden, tension-ridden thirties and forties. Klönne's ruminations under the heading *Zurück zur Nation?* notwithstanding, it is hard to return to a "nation" that never really was.¹⁶ The strengthening of a positive, collective identity would have as its purpose the replacement of the negative ersatz-identities grounded in sclerotic anti-communism and polemical anti-capitalism, respectively; it could moreover be used to deflect attention from or to overcome pressing system-internal contradictions and imbalances. With its emphasis on the positive, that is, on the common features of German-German consciousness, collective identity could become a vehicle for confidence-building within the framework of a larger European peace-and-security order.

This new collective identity would have to bear a strong historical imprint, in part as an antidote to younger cohorts' lack of perspective and consequent lack of sensitivity regarding the age-old problems of German nationalism. The overbearing, imbalanced or altogether-missing treatments of the Nazi era in West German secondary schools has resulted in visibly alienated, *die-Schnauze-voll* reactions tending in two somewhat extreme directions, in my experiences with younger discussion partners: one faction feels the burden of history weighing too heavily upon its shoulders, and consequently holds that no national identity is a good identity; a second contingent rejects any implication of collective or generationally transferable guilt, which leads these individuals to claim national identity as a right (and occasionally even finds them denying that the Nazis could have been all that bad).¹⁷

It appears (at this stage of my analysis) that at least a small segment of the "economic miracle" and "student movement" generations would be satisfied with the

development of a "constitutional identity," representing their internalization of the democratic values contained in the Basic Law: e.g., the free development of the personality, equality between the sexes, freedom of religion, speech, assembly, art, teaching and research, social solidarity, the right to asylum, and the ban on preparations for an offensive war. It is nevertheless conceivable, especially in a nuclear age, that a crisis of unprecedented magnitude could compel either of the two states to draw upon a sense of legitimacy that supercedes mere material satisfaction; such a crisis might compel their respective leaderships to rely upon loyalties that transcend popular attachments to specific institutions (as the embodiments of constitutionally prescribed values) -- until such time as confidence in those institutions and the normal power equilibrium could be restored.

A second possibility, two separate-but-equal German identities loosely connected by a depoliticized, reciprocal attachment to the *Kulturnation*, may find greater resonance than a proposed resuscitation of the *Staatsnation* -- but it might prove just as difficult to sustain as long as the underlying ideological differences are perceived to be irreconcilable. As Egon Bahr commented to this author, it has often been more difficult to negotiate with officials from the *Bruderland* than with those from other socialist states. He correctly anticipated that disagreement over a comprehensive cultural treaty between the two states would be among the most difficult to resolve; for an accord which touches directly upon the substance of the common cultural past would make it more difficult for the GDR to pursue its identity as a new socialist nation exonerated from other aspects of that past (personal interview, June 13, 1986).

When asked point blank whether they "felt" themselves to be "Germans," "Federal Republicans," "Europeans" or *sonst was* (and in what order), the generations evinced the following breakdown. Those whom I considered to be members of the oldest generation (based largely on year of birth) might best be labeled *die Gesamtdeutschen*

[the Pan-Germans]. This group can be further subdivided into the classes 1) "sentimental-wistful" Germans, 2) socialized-but-distant Germans, and 3) the forcefully expelled, actively pro-reunification Germans. The second generation appears to be having the most trouble in balancing the past- versus-future components of its identity; the subdivisions within this group are consequently more radically defined. Their ranks include: 1) the "no-identity" internationalists; 2) the "Europeanists" (further subdivided into "enthusiastic" and "resigned"); 3) the "rapprochement" Germans (usually with some connection to Berlin) who first discovered their "German-ness" based on their interactions with other European peace movement groups; and 4) those who see their nationality as a *verwaltungstechnische Notwendigkeit* [a matter of "administrative-technical necessity"]. Members of the youngest generation, the alleged beneficiaries of "the blessing of late birth," appear to fall into two categories: 1) the *Gesinnungsdeutsche* (mostly conservative "Germans of conviction" who often have refugee parents or relatives in the GDR) and 2) the "no-big-deal" Federal Republicans. I did not find a single member of the Bundestag willing to label her/himself first and foremost as an FRG-citizen (which made me sometimes question in jest, "then why are you in the Bundestag as a duly elected representative of that constituency?"). A majority of the parliamentary respondents nevertheless admitted that their children were probably much more inclined to identify directly with the FRG.

With approximately two-thirds of the current West German population having been born after WWII, the younger cohorts have in fact distanced themselves from the very character traits for which Germans have been best known. As representatives of the so called "me-generation," younger citizens reject a simplistic attachment to duty, diligence, law and order; whatever negative traits might be inherent in their presumed focus on immediate gratification and individual satisfaction, their *neue Unbefangenheit* ["unaffectedness by events of the past"] has at least contributed to an increase in tolerance and diversity within the postwar political culture. It is the

loosening of older, personal ties to the other Germany that has resulted in youth's greater independence of thought and action which, in my judgment, could provide a bloc-transcending basis for peaceful coexistence in Central Europe, if properly channeled.

The dilemma of German identity rests with the need, so parsimoniously defined by David Schoenbaum, "to be *and* not to be."¹⁸ The danger of a resurgent, militaristic form of nationalism would seem to be greater if left to the separate identity-building forces in each state (e.g., those seeking to relativize the Holocaust period à la the *Historikerstreit*, or those behind the militarization of school curricula in the GDR). It is the fact that German "national consciousness" remains so vague, so pathos-ridden and so variable that renders it all the more vulnerable to old conceptualizations in a world where other countries are so adamantly defending "national" interests thousands of miles distant from their own borders.¹⁹ The forging of a collective, "responsible" identity must include a more conscientious effort to explain to neighbors and allies the purpose and use of particular instruments in advancing the cause of "good neighborly relations" between the two Germanies. Bonn may have to shoulder a greater part of the responsibility for advancing a more cooperative, collective identity for the present -- the preamble notwithstanding -- in recognition of the fact that "*was die Bundesbürger gewannen, bezahlten offenbar die Bürger der DDR.*"²⁰ Having already "found" its identity as proclaimed in the 1974 Constitution, the GDR leadership will have to be persuaded that a collective identity is intended to complement, not to displace its consciousness as the German "socialist nation."

Among the potential foundation stones for the construction of this collective identity, I would include: a) a critically conscious, self-reflective knowledge of the past, coupled with grassroots reconciliation efforts; b) an awareness of the transnational consequences of (recent) chemical and nuclear disasters, as a basis for a mutually active commitment to environmental protection; c) an openness and

sensitivity to global developments, linked to domestic efforts to breakdown stereotypical images of "the enemy"; d) replacement of a long-standing emphasis on conflict and crisis management with more hands-on training in the fields of crisis prevention and conflict mediation for the next generation of political leaders; e) a mutual respect for the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states; and, finally, f) an understanding that an overarching FRG-GDR identity is but a first step, a necessary but insufficient condition for the development of a collective European security identity. If these elements were to comprise the core of the new German identity [and were clearly articulated as such], there would be few grounds for suspicion and much less opposition to its pursuit across the generations or even abroad. The development of a collective identity for the two Germanies is not without significant strategic implications, however, and it is to the common nature of German security needs and interests that I now turn.

III. Collective Security: From "Gegeneinander" to "Nebeneinander" to "Miteinander"

Early references to the concept of a "security partnership" focused primarily on the bonds uniting members of the Western Alliance.²¹ Helmut Schmidt was the first statesman to apply the term to the peculiar security dilemma of the two front-line states on May 25, 1978. The thrust of Schmidt's argument, raised in a speech at the United Nations Special Assembly on Disarmament, was that no country could unilaterally guarantee its own security and peace; the thought was quickly taken up by a school of peace researchers under the direction of Egon Bahr, who have since sought to couple the idea of "partnership" with the Palme Commission's principle of "common security" - and to turn both into "household words" in the Federal Republic (with variable degrees of success).

As my interviews have revealed, not even members of the Bundestag (MdBs) specializing in alliance/security matters are capable of drawing the proverbial fine line between these two analytically distinct constructs.⁵ For the most part, the two

terms (*Sicherheitspartnerschaft* and *Gemeinsame Sicherheit*) have been used interchangeably among my respondents, regardless of whether one is "for" or "against." Rather than walk that fine line myself, I will adhere to the concept of *Gemeinsame Sicherheit* as propounded by *Ostpolitik*-Diplomat, Egon Bahr -- with one qualification. The translation of *Gemeinsame Sicherheit* as "common security" brings to mind in the US a vision of the two German states being defended by a single, that is shared, troops-and-weapons structure not intended by this author (nor by Bahr). I will therefore employ the term "collective security" instead, in the hopes of evoking the same sense of "overarching" security interests and bonds implicit in the foregoing discussion of "collective identity."

As published and presented to the Palme Commission in 1982, Bahr's conceptualization reads:

The ideological differences between the two camps are rooted in world-views and deep convictions, that can not be reduced to a single denominator and for which no convergence is to be expected.... There can be no war of beliefs between East and West... In the age of atomic weapons this path is forbidden; it would be fatal for all. That means: The preservation of peace has a higher priority than the enforcement of the respective ideology. That means: The common survival is more important than the risk, better said: The certainty of common annihilation...

Common survival requires collective security.

In an age of mutually assured destruction, security can no longer [be achieved] against the opponent, rather it can only be achieved with the opponent. The opponents would be unified in ruin; it is only together that they can survive.

Collective security requires a reorientation of thought which accepts the opponent as a partner, because and after he can no longer be defeated through the application of force.²²

In contrast to deterrence doctrine, which is held to be competitive, confrontational, and subject to destabilization through technological leaps and bounds, a collective security system that transcends ideological boundaries would be cooperative, evolutionary and committed to confidence-building measures.²³ Deterrence is seen to seek protection in the dual (offensive and defensive) character of ever

more weapons systems and in the lowering of nuclear-thresholds, which serves to enhance the credibility of the threat by blurring the dividing line between conventional and nuclear exchanges. Collective security would rest on the development of a conventional, "structurally non-offensive," weapons capability [*strukturelle Nichtangriffsfähigkeit*] and would move to reduce the number of high risk areas through the introduction of chemical-and nuclear-free zones.²⁴ Proponents stress that *Gemeinsame Sicherheit* is not a call for an unqualified, disarmed neutrality; its key emphasis lies on changing one's own perception of the threat to include a recognition of the valid security needs of one's rival.²⁵

There are discernible differences among the generations' reactions to questions about the meaning and feasibility of a partnership-based, collective security system, although they are hard to compare across one or two dimensions. Without being able to define these concepts in concrete terms, the oldest generation tends to be divided along party lines as "favoring" or "opposing" a collective security system that would challenge or radically transform existing alliance structures. Even those who favor the principle intimate they would be very reluctant to jettison NATO's prevailing strategies and weapons systems short-term. The second generation appears to be quite open to an exploration of German-German security interests [could be a sampling-bias] but clearly rejects any talk of a German *Sonderweg* [special path]. For representatives of the youngest generation, the terms *Sicherheitspartnerschaft*, *Gemeinsame Sicherheit* and *Verantwortungsgemeinschaft* usually draw a blank, even among self-proclaimed peace movement sympathizers. Since my younger discussion partners do not occupy political office as do/did older respondents, they are unlikely to have been exposed to these terms on a regular basis. Responses to specific security items (e.g., desirability of nuclear free zones, dis/approval of SDI) are much more clear cut and also reflect a liberal-conservative divide.

The links between collective identity and collective security derive from three commonalities emphasized by Dieter Lutz: the commonality of goals, the commonality of activities, and the commonality of "affectedness" (*Betroffenheit*).²⁶ It is the last point that seems to mobilize the youngest cohorts most quickly--the sense that they are already being/will be more personally affected by environmental hazards, including the possibility of nuclear war. The opportunity for one-to-one contacts and the identification of common "youth problems" in conjunction with *Klassenreisen* to the GDR (a number of which were cancelled in the immediate wake of Chernobyl) might serve to promote a depoliticized/nonideological sense of collective identification.

The student movement generation has contributed significantly to the reservoir of unconventional participatory actions and protest tactics which have become almost conventional by virtue of frequent use in the Federal Republic (e.g., mass demonstrations). As the coalition dynamics of the peace movement has led many an organizer to discover, "common action leads to more togetherness than common papers."²⁷ Ironically, this also seems to be the generation that has been slowest to "discover" the GDR for reasons connected with the clerical anti-monopoly capitalism and New Left fragmentation of the late sixties. These are nevertheless the cohorts who can be expected to implement and extend the many FRG-GDR accords and exchange agreements promulgated and ratified over the last ten years, as figures such as Oskar Lafontaine and Jo Leinen continue their Long March through the institutions. Political activism is a difficult habit to kick.

Consisting of individuals like Schmidt, Wehner and Brandt, who have been pushed to release the institutional reins of power, the oldest generation has had to overcome its fixation with the commonality of goals, or lack thereof, as expressed in diametrically opposed ideologies. Since 1982, the conservative *Wende-Regierung* [turnabout government] itself has pledged to continue the rapprochement policies it

once opposed, intending as it did then to force the "socalled *GDR*" into a repudiation of its Marxist-Leninist goals as the *sine qua non* of negotiation.

The growing perception of commonalities in these three areas is quintessential to the creation of a security system no longer primarily based on the threat of mutually assured destruction. The recognition of shared security interests reflects the combined influences of generational change and political "coming of age" or "normalization" processes, along with dramatic changes in the weapons-technological character of the international environment that have taken place over the past 10 years. I am not suggesting the Federal Republicans can easily cast aside their fear of "decoupling," or that the creation of a bloc-overarching collective security system requires little more than a strong show of political will. I am merely seek to assess the current discourse on *deutsche Identität* in the grander scheme of things, as a means of reducing the *Angst*-potential usually associated with this topic. It is my contention that East-West security debates conducted at the alliance-level have paid too little attention to the internal dynamics of postwar development in the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. I offer one possible framework for analysis of these system-internal developments in the concluding section below.

IV. Conclusion: The Evolution of Identity and Security Needs

Kelman has argued, and I concur, that the "ultimate justification for maintaining, strengthening, or establishing a political system with jurisdiction over a particular population... is that this system is most naturally and effectively representative of that population."²⁸ There was nothing "natural" about the creation of two separate German states, but this has not precluded efforts on the part of both governments to become more effective representatives of their own citizens' interests within the courts of their respective alliances. The FRG and the GDR have both evolved into very complex, interdependent systems, now searching for new strategies that will help them to balance and coordinate their competing interests with their mutual or reciprocal needs. The level of stability characteristic of East and West German political institutions infers a measure of diffuse (if not active) support for the respective system that renders internal legitimation no longer dependent on economic performance alone. In this respect, Kelman is also correct in suggesting that "the perception of the state as representative of national unity can compensate for failures to meet the peoples' needs and interests. On the other hand, the perception of the state as meeting the people's needs and interests can compensate for a lacking sense of national identity, and can in fact help to create such an identity."²⁹

As heralds of the Era of New Politics in *Germany Transformed*, Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt were among the first to suggest the existence of a Maslowian-type scale of national needs and political interests rooted in Inglehart's framework of "post-materialism."³⁰ The latter hypothesized that "given individuals pursue various goals in hierarchical order -- giving maximum attention to the things they sense to be the most important unsatisfied needs at a given time."³¹ The economic miracles of the fifties and sixties, he argued, have made it possible for citizens of the seventies and eighties to pursue political goals and causes which "no longer have a direct relationship to the imperatives of economic security."³² The internal logic of this

scale of needs, as applied to the systemic level by Baker et al., dictates that "the approaching resolution of material and security issues will result in the addition of new issues to the political agenda. Increasingly, politics will be concerned with questions of life styles and the *quality* of life, rather than the *quantity* of economic rewards."³³

In his own work on motivational theory, Maslow posits five categories of needs ordered according to a "hierarchy of relative prepotency": the theory presumes that as each need is satisfied, new and still higher needs will emerge that come to dominate the individual [or collective] organism.³⁴ In ascending order, this hierarchy or scale consists of: 1) the physiological or sustenance needs; 2) the safety or security needs; 3) the belongingness and love needs; 4) the esteem or status and independence needs; and finally, 5) the need for self-actualization.

Maslow's five classes of needs correspond surprisingly well with the 5-stage periodization employed by von Beyme in his separate treatments of politics and policymaking in the FRG and the GDR.³⁵ The reconstruction era, extending from the late 1940's through the early 1960's, saw its main task in the fulfillment of *sustenance needs*. Initial scarcity problems, reconstruction and redistribution imperatives made it necessary for both systems to develop a variety of burden-sharing mechanisms in the form of social (welfare) policies. Economic and welfare activities provided the new leaderships with "compensation for the lack of national legitimation for the West German rump state" and for its East German counterparts.³⁶ The economy was permitted to develop relatively free of regulation in the Federal Republic, while the German Democratic Republic committed itself to a "closed system" approach. Each system has witnessed its share of relative successes and later setbacks over the last four decades.

Freed from the yoke of formal Occupation by the late fifties, the two states were forced into a new calculation of their *safety needs* through the early and mid-

sixties. The shift in focus was precipitated by the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, as well as by the intensification of East-West hostilities manifested in the Cuban missile crisis and quantum leaps in nuclear weapons proliferation. Both systems adhered to a set of demarcation policies designed to preclude a formal recognition of the other's existence in any but life-threatening terms, i.e. through Bonn's application of the Hallstein Doctrine and East-Berlin's utilization of more draconian anti-contact, gatekeeping mechanisms. Both systems moreover sought greater economic protection and ideological reinforcement in the integration opportunities afforded by the "deepening" of their respective Common Market or COMECON relationships.

The processes of West- and East-integration were essentially complete by the second half of the decade, while the Test Ban Treaty, summit diplomacy, and preparations for a multilateral Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty served to stabilize East-West conflict at the superpower level -- or at least to shift the frontline to the far eastern theater of Viet Nam. The two states could thus proceed to address the class of *belongingness and love needs* between 1966 and 1973. They did this, first, by soliciting greater acceptance among their own populations based on (attempted) major social reform programs and, secondly, by undertaking unprecedented diplomatic steps to turn inter-German enmity into "good neighborly relations."

The Federal Republic recovered quickly from its brief but worrisome recession of 1966-67. The SPD's rise to power in 1969 unleashed a wave of "reform euphoria," and moreover signalled a new openness to government intervention in the economy for the purpose of promoting growth, full-employment, and greater educational opportunity. Brandt's proclaimed willingness to "dare more democracy" met with an outbreak of student protests, followed by a rash of movements of the "New Politics" type, which in my judgment, represented a transition from "subject" to "civic" culture in the Bundesrepublik, based on an internalization of grassroots participatory values in the society at large.

The "other" Germany, meanwhile, had begun to reap the benefits of an earlier economic decentralization experiment, as corrected by the *Kombinate* [combined industries] system introduced to coordinate production and investment after 1968, resulting in a marked increase in per capita income.³⁶ Even the system-critical Lutheran Church sought to afford East German citizens additional opportunities for cultivating a sense of belonging, with its 1971 self-characterization as "not the Church against, nor the Church next to, but rather the Church in Socialism."³⁷ By the early 1970's both Germanies had been recognized and accepted as full members, as well as reliable partners and ready contributors, to their respective alliances. "Belongingness" at the international level found further expression in the two states' admission to the United Nations in 1973.

The strong leadership of Helmut Schmidt, paralleled by Honecker's "staying power" through the trying times after the oil embargo, turned an incipient measure of grudging international respect for the two systems into outright admiration for *Modell Deutschland* during the phase 1974-1979. The developments of this era corresponded with the projection of *esteem needs*, defined by Maslow to include "the desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and competence, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom ... the desire for reputation, prestige ... recognition, attention, importance, or appreciation."³⁸ The label "made in Germany" (affixed just as indiscriminately to products of GDR origin as to Western exports) soon translated into quality and technical reliability on the world market. Schmidt and Honecker were both relatively successful in their efforts to impose a number of stiff "economization" measures in response to the post-embargo resource crunch, thus demonstrating a peculiarly German capacity for "taking what comes" and coming to terms with it.³⁹ The GDR was especially determined to have itself perceived not as just-a-part-of-the-German-problem, but rather as an influential member within its own bloc and as a country of achievement in its own right. Even more important,

perhaps, was the unique contribution that the two states made to European cooperation and detente under the headings of *Ost-*, *West-* and *Deutschlandpolitik*.

Granted, the desire for "independence and freedom" had yet to be fulfilled by 1980. While the West German Basic Law constitutionally mandates movement towards "unity and freedom," the East German constitution of 1974 insists upon the existence of two separate German "nations," one socialist, the other capitalist. The "independence" issue thus threatens to remain one of the unresolvable paradoxes of post-war European history.⁴⁰ The early 1980's have found the FRG and the GDR giving expression to a new, if unsettling set of *self-actualization needs* -- packaged as a renewed "search for German identity." It is not only the fact that the ranks of the Founder generation are being biologically depleted that has given rise to this search; equally significant is the call raised by the successor generations for a *reconsideration* of German safety and security needs in conjunction with the Pershing II and GCLM deployments. The lesson here is that it is possible, and perhaps even necessary from time to time, to move back down the scale before moving on to higher order needs, insofar as each class may be subject to redefinition under changing environmental conditions. The fulfillment of re-intervening need requirements notwithstanding, Maslow himself anticipated the rise of a "new discontent and restlessness" in the face of a repressed "desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming."⁴¹ In other words, "what a man (sic) *can* be, he *must* be," in order "to be ultimately at peace with himself" and with the rest of the world.⁴² The Germans must reclaim their right to be "Germans," not in the militaristic-nationalistic mode of earlier eras, but as a national community that has worked through its past (which cannot otherwise be "conquered") for the purpose of ensuring itself a peaceful future. They must be free to articulate a unique and legitimate set of "German" political and economic interests, and to have these interests duly considered by members of their respective alliances.

The two states have begun to rediscover the common bonds of history, as evinced by their mutual-but-separate 500th anniversary observances of Martin Luther's birth in 1983 and, more recently, with their also-separate commemorations of Berlin's 750th founding anniversary in 1987. In a concerted effort to "limit the damage" to detente, both Honecker and Kohl have moreover used the conflict-ridden deployment of additional theater nuclear forces to express their mutual interest in an evolving "community of responsibility," based on a "coalition of reason."⁴³

The path to self-actualization remains strewn with ideological hurdles and historically based fears. It will certainly not be an easy task for the two states to dispel persisting doubts about having "earned" their right to independence and "national identity" within the global community. The GDR leadership is still inclined to overreact to signs of citizen dissensus; the lesson was reiterated by the *Volkspolizei* response to youth protestors who had gathered to catch the sounds of a West-Berlin rock concert drifting over the Wall in June, 1987 and again in June, 1988 (Michael Jackson!). The SED has nevertheless come a long way in its efforts to effect greater citizen integration, as evidenced in its official publications on *Bürgerinitiativen* ["citizen initiatives"] in the socialist state, as well as by its hesitant but visible response to autonomous ecology and peace movement demands.⁴⁴ By its own standards, it has become extremely generous in allowing increasing numbers of its citizens to visit the West for "urgent family reasons" and permitting thousands more to emigrate permanently. The CDU has yet to put the lid on right-wing *Gesinnungsvertriebene* ("refugees of conviction") demands for a return to the 1937 borders, but it did prevent a repeat of the harmful rhetoric that became the smokescreen justification for cancellation of Honecker's intended first visit in 1985.

Thus defined, this Maslowian hierarchy of needs does appear to be an important constituent element in the policy agendas of the FRG and the GDR, which have changed over time to accommodate the economics of reconstruction, the politics of external

security, the pressures for major social reform, and the mediation of internal conflicts over security issues, respectively. No longer content with the old pattern of *reactive* foreign policymaking in relation to occupation, integration and bloc-based security issues, leaders in Bonn and East Berlin have become more active in their pursuit of cooperation, detente and possibly a security partnership with the other side. The "Search for Identity" -- whether ultimately national or collective in character -- should not be construed as a force in its own right but as a vehicle for the attainment of other, i.e., collective, security goals. The push for a new, post-postwar German identity attests to the fact that citizens of the Federal Republic have begun to develop confidence in themselves and in their own "free-democratic basic order" -- a development meriting the active support of her Western partners. The emergence of independent peace and ecology groups, along with Erich Honecker's own "damage limitation" activism since the 1983 commencement of NATO deployments, indicates that both states have experienced "change through rapprochement" [*Wandel durch Annäherung*] as well as "rapprochement through change" [*Annäherung durch Wandel*].

It is incumbent upon the two Germanies that they develop new approaches to the peculiar identity problems and security dilemmas they share. They should be encouraged by the international community to make use of whatever opportunities arise outside the arena of traditional power politics. It is nonetheless imperative that they convey the full range of negotiation successes and failures to their respective allies. The principles best suited to normalization, rapprochement and good neighborly relations between the two are the same as the prerequisites for effective East-West arms control and disarmament: namely, balance, territorial integrity, confidence-building, verifiability and predictability. A divided but collectively conscious Germany can become a laboratory for positive, responsible, peaceful East-West change.

Footnotes

1. Walther Leisler Kiep, "The New Deutschlandpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85, p. 316.
2. Theo Sommer, "Lieber zweimal Deutschland als einmal? Andreotti's undiplomatische Wahrheiten," Die Zeit, 28. September 1984.
3. Richard von Weizsäcker, Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter, München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985, p. 8.
4. Elizabeth Pond, "Most Germans Applaud Honecker Visit," The Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1987.
5. Robert Leicht, "Gute Deutsche und gute Europäer?"; Carl-Christian Kaiser, "Viele Wahrheiten, Kein Augenzwinkern,"; Gerd Bucerius, "Aus der Vergangenheit nichts gelernt?"; Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, "Ob endlich die Zukunft beginnt?" - All articles appeared in the 18. September 1987 edition of Die Zeit.
6. My sample was not "representative" in the rigorous, statistical sense. I attempted to include representatives from all three generations and from all four party camps; where possible I sought a balance of male and female discussion partners. Drawing heavily from the Bundestag, I also included prominent figures from the Vertriebenen Verbände and the peace movement. A three-page letter outlining the nature of my project and requesting roughly an hour of interview time resulted in over 50 actual interviews among the 60+ plus recipients - a rather astounding rate of return in view of the fact that I undertook these interviews during the four months immediately prior to the January, 1987 elections.
7. For analytical purposes, I have divided the postwar population into three groups, the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle") Generation, the Langer Marsch ("student movement") Generation, and the motley No Future-Wende ("turning point") Generation, respectively. For an elaboration on these divisions, see Joyce M. Mushaben, "Anti-Politics and Successor Generations: The Role of Youth in the West and East German Peace Movements," Journal of Military and Political Sociology, 1984, Vol. 12 (Spring); pp. 171-190.
8. David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978; Gordon Craig, The Germans, New York: Putnam, 1982; Rudolf von Thadden, "Das Schwierige Vaterland," in Werner Weidenfeld's Die Identität der Deutschen, München/Wien: Hanser, 1983, pp. 51-63.
9. See in particular Wolfgang Venohr, Hrsg., Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt, Bergisch Gladbach: 1982; also, Peter Brandt und Herbert Ammon, Die Linke und die nationale Frage, Dokumente zur deutschen Einheit seit 1945, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1981.
10. Gottfried Lieger, Boris Meissner, Dieter Blumenwitz, Deutschland als Ganzes-Rechtliche und historische Überlegungen, Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985; Peter von Berglar, Hans Filbinger et al., Deutsche Identität heute, Studienzentrum Weikersheim: Hase und Kohler, 1983; Egon Bahr, Was wird aus den Deutschen? Fragen und Antworten, Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982; Günter

- Gaus, Wo Deutschland liegt - Eine Ortsbestimmung, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1983; Werner Weidenfeld, Hrsg., Nachdenken über Deutschland, Bielefeld: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985; Werner Weidenfeld, Ratlose Normalität - Die Deutschen auf die Suche nach sich selbst, Osnabrück: Interfrom, 1984. J.B. Gradl, Deutschland als Aufgabe, Köln: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1986; Wolfgang Venohr, Die deutsche Einheit..., op. cit.; Wolfgang Venohr, Ohne Deutschland geht es nicht-7 Autoren zur Lage der Nation, Drefeld: SINUS, 1985. Jürgen Leinemann, Die Angst der Deutschen. Beobachtungen zur Bewusstseinslage der Nation, Reinbeck bei Hamburg; Spiegel/Rowohlt, 1982; Christiane Rix, Hrsg., Angst vor Deutschland. Die Antwort von Europäern auf die deutsche Frage, Opladen: Leske + Budrich, forthcoming, 1988; Richard von Weizsäcker, Die deutsche Geschichte..., op. cit.; "Historikerstreit" - Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung, München/Zürich: Piper, 1987.
11. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, New York/Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley and Technology Press, 1953; Peter Alter, Nationalismus, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1985; Tilman Mayer, Prinzip Nation. Dimensionen der nationalen Frage am Beispiel Deutschlands, Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1986.
 12. Herbert C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 276-288.
 13. Ibid., p. 283.
 14. Ibid., p. 285.
 15. Harro Honolka, "Kollektive Identität und Friedenspolitik. Zu den Möglichkeiten und Gefahren einer Stärkung des friedenspolitischen Patriotismus in der Bundesrepublik", Starnberg: Forschungsinstitut für Friedenspolitik E.V., März, 1986.
 16. Arnold Klönne, Zurück zur Nation? Kontroversen zu deutschen Fragen, Köln: Diederichs, 1984.
 17. Peter Sichrovsky, Schuldig geboren. Kinder aus Nazifamilien, Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1987.
 18. Cited in Wolfgang Pollack and Derek Rutter, eds., German Identity - Forty Years after Zero, Liberale Texte, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Sankt Augustin: Comdok, 1987, p. 159 (my emphasis).
 19. See the survey results compiled by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, Die verletzte Nation - Über den Versuch der Deutschen, ihren Charakter zu ändern, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1987.
 20. Honolka, op. cit., p. 100.
 21. See, for example, Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Hrsg., Weissbuch 1985. Zur Lage und Entwicklung der Bundeswehr, Bonn: Juni, 1985, p. 5, 16, 33.

22. Cited by Dieter S. Lutz, "Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Zur Entstehung einer neuen Konzeption und zur bisherigen Resonanz in der Bundesrepublik," Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, Mai 1986, pp. 3-4.
23. Dieter S. Lutz, "Gemeinsame Sicherheit - Das neue Konzept, Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, Jg.3, Heft 4, 1985, pp. 201-214.
24. See Andreas von Bülow's wave-making discussion of the structural question in Das Bülow Papier - Strategie vertrauensschaffender Sicherheitsstrukturen in Europe. Wege zur Sicherheitspartnerschaft, Frankfurt a.M.: Eichborn, 1985.
25. Reinhard Mutz, "Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Grundzüge einer Alternative zum Abschreckungsfrieden," Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, März 1986.
26. Lutz, "GS-Das neue Konzept," op. cit., p. 208.
27. Joyce Marie Mushaben, "The Struggle Within: Conflict, Consensus and Decisionmaking among National Coordinators and Grassroots Organizers in the West German Peace Movement," in Bert Klandermans, ed., Organizing for Change - Social Movement Organizations across Cultures, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, forthcoming, 1988.
28. Kelman, op. cit., p. 277.
29. Ibid., p. 285.
30. Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton and Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed - Political Culture and the New Politics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
31. Ronald Ingelhart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," American Political Science Review Vol. 65 (1971), pp. 991.
32. Ibid., p. 991.
33. Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt, loc. cit., p. 2.
34. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper, 1954, p. 83.
35. The periodizations for the two Germanies do not overlap exactly, as defined by von Beyme, but the thrust of the arguments remains essentially the same. For the Federal Republic, von Beyme refers to the periods 1949-1966; 1966-1969; 1969-1973; 1974-1982; and 1982 to present. For the German Democratic Republic, we can extrapolate the periods 1949-1961 (qualified by the chronic shortage of housing and consumer goods that extends well into the 1970's even though the basic biological needs have long been met); 1961-1971; 1971-1973; 1973-1983; 1983 to present. See Klaus von Beyme and Manfred G. Schmidt, eds., Policy and Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany (translated by Eileen Martin), Aldershot, Hants, UK: 1985; further, Klaus von Beyme and Hartmut Zimmerman (sic), eds., Policymaking in the German Democratic Republic (translated by Eileen Martin), Aldershot, Hants, UK: 1984.

36. Von Beyme and Schmidt, *ibid.*, p. 5.
37. For a treatment of church and state reconciliation, see Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Swords to Plowshares: The Church, the State and the East German Peace Movement," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 123-135.
38. Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 90. We are also forewarned by Maslow that the thwarting of these needs, e.g., to feel "useful and necessary in the world ... in turn give rise to either basic discouragement or else compensatory or neurotic trends," or even severe traumatic neurosis (91). This is the same point argued in real-political terms by Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985.
39. Von Beyme and Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
40. For a detailed consideration of this "paradox" theme, see Joyce Marie Mushaben, "A Search for Identity: The German Question in Atlantic Alliance Relations," in World Politics, Vol. XL, no. 3, April, 1988, pp. 395-417.
41. Maslow, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
43. Erich Honecker, Koalition der Vernunft. Standpunkte, Informationen, Vorschläge, Begegnungen (Hrsg. Parteivorstand der DKP), Neuss: Plambeck & Co. Druck, 1986.
44. Peter Wensierski, Von oben nach unten wächst gar nichts - Umweltzerstörung und Protest in der DDR, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1986; Gerhard Schulze, Kurt Müller, Heidrun Pohl, Bürgeranliegen - Bürgerinitiative (Bd. 64, Recht in unserer Zeit), Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1985.