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European Security Policy
and the Single European Act

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EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY AND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT*

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ABSTRACT

While most accounts of the Single European Act (SEA) attribute it to economic concerns, this study focuses on European security policy as an impetus for the SEA and greater European integration. Included is a discussion of background developments in the European Community and Parliament and a sampling of elite opinion drawn from debates in the European Parliament. SEA may be the first step toward greater Western European self-reliance and is based at least in part on technological developments in the defense field, but it seems unlikely that SEA, in its present form, will lead to greater strategic collaboration or political unity among the twelve.

EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY AND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

"...European unity will remain incomplete without any consideration for the security policy dimension (loud applause)... the formulation of a common European security policy is one of the priority tasks in the immediate future." -- Helmut Kohl, speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, March 9, 1988.

Introduction

In 1987 Americans read accounts of momentous events 200 years earlier, in which leaders of 13 confederated states on the North American continent sought to establish terms of unification. They read of leaders pursuing the goal of a single economic market, of major disagreements among states of contrasting size, wealth, and social system, and of the difficult compromises through which failure barely was averted. The main driving forces for agreement were the economic dislocation caused by impediments to trade and commerce, and the external security threat of nearby great powers.

It is difficult to say whether the momentous debates heard since 1984 in the European Community concerning renewed integration eventually will achieve either greater economic or political union among the twelve states. The resulting agreements so far fall far short of European unification, or even full confederation on the pre-1787 American model. While Europe is on course at least for a common internal market by 1992, some of the most difficult issues even for that limited agreement must be resolved in only two years, issues including tax harmonization, border controls, monetary cooperation, and welfare policy. However, many of these issues and background concerns appear comparable to their American counterparts. In this case, though, economic dislocations appear to be combined more with external technological than with impending military threats. While visions of a unified economic market again predominate, external security policy is drawn into the debate because of the close association these days between such policy and technological innovation.

Since 1957, the Community has made fitful progress toward greater coordination in eliminating formal tariffs, erecting common external tariffs and an agricultural support

system, promoting judicially sanctioned standards of social policy, and devising some common foreign policy principles. Yet real movement toward greater economic or political unity had effectively stalled by the end of the 1970s. Scholars even had lost interest in the integration concept. The unemployment shocks of the 80s, following as they did the oil and inflation shocks of the 70s, at first led to greater economic nationalism, to the expulsion of guest workers and reversion to deflationary policies. Yet additional factors seemed to spark a new realization that there was greater safety in numbers than in autarky.

Perhaps it was the growing belief that old manufacturing industries had to give way to new service and high technology industries. Perhaps it was revival of the traditional European penchant for large conglomerated corporate structures. Perhaps it was Japan's unmistakable success in penetrating trade markets, but also along with the US, in controlling important communication and electronics technologies that alarmed Europeans about the viability of their own economies. It was time to reconsider the basic political/economic structure in Europe, and to pay more than lip service to a combined population and market size greater than either the US or USSR.

This study is designed to focus on a different but related set of factors potentially driving European integration: the relatively neglected security policy impetus. Most accounts of the Single European Act (SEA) of 1985, the "enabling legislation" for a reinvigorated European Community, and particularly those in North America, attribute it to concern about: the tangle of separate rules, regulations, and impediments holding Europe back from exploiting the potential of its market size, and from competing effectively with other Western economic powers; and the crisis of unprecedented post-war unemployment levels.¹

Indeed the agencies and organizations which promoted renewed integration, i.e., the Commission, the European Parliament (EP-- popularly elected after 1979), and the European Council were largely concerned with promotion of economic development as

opposed to matters of security policy. The latter resided with separate national governments, with broader Atlantic institutions (NATO), and with the Western European Union (WEU), containing, in contrast to the EC, only NATO-aligned states (and excluding NATO mavericks Denmark and Greece). And yet, security policy concerns cannot be separated entirely from economic development because of the pivotal importance of high technology for both issues, because of European trade reliance on arms exports, and because the EC also had developed competence to consider foreign policy matters.

It may be coincidental, or it may be fundamentally important that the renewed integration impetus corresponded to increased European skepticism about the direction of Western security policy in the first Reagan administration. To many Europeans, American policy seemed dangerously aggressive in military and specifically nuclear strategy toward the USSR. While Americans were responding to a basically European request for nuclear weapons to offset growing intermediate range Soviet capabilities, the size and destabilizing potential of the US response, and talk in Washington about the possibility of fighting and winning a "limited" nuclear war in Europe alarmed Europeans of all political persuasions. Both continued doubt about the reliability of American security commitments, and a tremendous upsurge in "peace movements" resulted. At the same time, Washington's tendencies not to consult allies regarding security policy commitments in the Third World, sometimes involving forces stationed in Europe, fostered concern that reliance on American leadership could lead European states into unpopular and dangerous entanglements.

The basic question for discussion, then, is to what extent and in what ways security policy enters into the determination to form a more coherent Western European entity in the early 1990s. Are there, in the planned formation of a Euro-market, also greater efforts at strategic self-reliance? Did explicit concern about US security policy constitute at least part of the policy environment leading to the Single European Act? Or

did security policy, if it entered at all, come through the "back door" of broader concerns about Europe's technological disadvantages, economic viability, and jobs?

The basic approach to answering these questions involves a sampling of European elite opinion as the integration process was renewed. One of the best representative sources of such opinion is in the debates of the European Parliament. Here, in a body increasingly demanding integration, the views both of broad international party blocs, and of subgroups and splinter parties within each state are clearly expressed. The dialogue among larger, smaller, richer, poorer, aligned, and neutral states also at times takes on the nuances of those ringing debates in the Philadelphia of 1787. And there is the interplay of Parliament and Commission versus Council. While the ultimate decision to launch the SEA was taken in the Council, and while the powers afforded the Europe of 1992 are less than supranational and less than most members of Parliament (MEPs) had in mind, one nevertheless has the feeling of being a party to history in reading these debates and in charting the types of pressures brought to bear on the Council.

Background Developments

The initiative for greater integration came both from the European Commission and Parliament. Increased pressures for European union generally coincided with the direct EP election of 1979. Indeed, the first stirrings of interest in joint security policies and weapon procurement also came in 1978 with a WEU study claiming that the West European NATO arms market could be economical even without arms exports to the Third World. Such joint security approaches would prove difficult, however, because only four states produced most of Europe's weapons, because national governments varied in force preferences, and because the Rome Treaty, in addition to restricting security concerns, allowed states to protect their security information and their domestic arms industries.²

In the early 1980s, EC commissioners, conscious of the growing importance of high technology, of a mounting economic recession, and of the American and Japanese "challenges," advocated greater technological collaboration within the Community.

Armaments manufacture, as a reflection of high technology and as a leading export sector, was included in such desirable collaborative endeavors. Impending enlargement of the Community also made institutional reform more timely. Concomitantly, MEPs sought a greater raison d'être in enhanced EP legislative powers.³

The Parliament responded in 1984 with a draft treaty on European Union (EUT), derived through extensive committee consultation with interest groups and scholars, and submitted to the member states. The EUT entailed a federalized Western European government, centered on a bicameral (EP and Council) legislative and budgetary authority, and on the Commission as a powerful driving force for that legislation. Confederal aspects were retained in the area of foreign policy cooperation, and separate states were to retain authority in matters more efficiently handled at the national level. The Commission followed in 1985 with a White Paper on the technical implementation of an enlarged Euro-market, identifying 300 needed directives.⁴

In response to this bold initiative for European union, and in part to preclude that impetus, the European Council, representing the member governments, substituted the Single European Act in December of 1985 (signed in January 1986). Based loosely on the Council's Dooge Committee Report on institutional structure, SEA had some features in common with EUT, such as enhanced EP budgetary authority and qualified majority voting on many issues in the Council, but in retaining unanimity principles on important policy matters and in denying Parliament full legislative (initiative and amending) authority, SEA fell well short of union. Indeed, the Danish prime minister at the time expressed satisfaction with SEA since it did not involve any erosion of sovereignty.⁵

SEA appeared aimed mainly at facilitating industrial, commercial, technological and trade development through the free movement of capital and products, and secondarily, persons, i.e., the completion of the Rome Treaty. Even here, though, there would be no legal sanctions for not meeting the 1992 deadline. Heads of state rejected Commission and EP proposals for greater monetary coordination, and provided for only

unanimous voting on matters of fiscal (monetary and tax) policy, free movement of persons, or rights and interests of labor. Only tax harmonization needed to bring about the internal market would be considered (i.e., turnover, excise, and other indirect taxes). Foreign policy coordination remained voluntary. Thus, the Council seized upon the programmatic approach of the 1976 Tindemans Report to the EP, which stressed loose Community cooperation in foreign, security, and monetary policy, rather than the more revolutionary constitutional approach of the EUT, as enunciated by the Spinelli Report to EP from its Committee on Institutional Affairs in 1983.⁶

Two basic documents were combined in SEA. One was a draft treaty on European Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign policy, which largely codified existing procedures, while implementing a secretariat. The second dealt with changes in the Rome Treaty. In the draft EPC treaty, however, two controversial provisions were added on security: (1) recognition of the benefits of closer cooperation on European security to strengthen a European identity, and readiness to coordinate more closely on economic and political aspects of security; and (2) determination to maintain "technological and industrial conditions" necessary for security. The former appears to represent concerns about American leadership, the same concerns expressed in the 1984 revival of WEU machinery. The latter is seen by critics as sanctioning common European arms production and security standards. Even these provisions, however, did not go beyond prevailing practice or levels of commitment in prior agreements. Nothing here would mandate a common Community security policy even in the economic and political, let alone the military, spheres. While not explicitly included in SEA, common arms procurement and R&D in space and defense sectors could, however, become features of SEA, especially if envisioned common industrial policies materialize.⁷

Key reservations about European unification have been voiced by Britain, Denmark, Greece, and Ireland. The British government reluctantly accepted SEA as a commercial venture and in part for EPC, but impeded moves toward supranational

decision-making and monetary union. London remains reluctant to dismantle frontier restrictions, for fear of uncontrolled terrorism, drugs, epidemics, and immigration; Britain also resists Euro-enforced social and human rights policies.⁸ Although tentatively supporting SEA, Danish political leaders are concerned about being caught up in the foreign policy initiatives and military-industrial complex of the dominant European powers, France, Germany and Britain. SEA provisions about relations with states outside the Community in part were inserted to satisfy interests, such as Denmark's, in continued ties to EFTA. The Greek government and political parties voice similar concerns about large state dominance and extra-EC ties, and fear uneven development policies. The Greek left remains especially dubious of increased NATO militarization and defense collaboration. Ireland finds difficulties for its neutrality and inter-Irish policies in close coordination with NATO members, and particularly with the UK.

Thus, to preserve consensus within the Council, states more supportive of EUT, such as Italy and Benelux, and those at least lukewarm, France (worried about EPC) and Germany (concerned about agricultural subsidies and monetary restrictions), settled on the far less ambitious SEA. Continuation of the "Luxembourg Compromise," i.e., veto power in the Council for states with overriding national interests at stake, was a necessary concession to states such as Denmark and Britain. In reaching this accord to complete the internal EC market by 1992, the Council also endorsed Commission proposals on technical cooperation, or as some term it, a "Technological Community." This is understood to include support for the French EUREKA civil high technology project, although no specific project references or funding commitments were made in SEA, and although EUREKA remains open to states outside the Community.

Depending upon the issue, the European Parliament will have a "consultative, collaborative, or joint action" role in relation to the Council in promoting these and other developments under SEA. Collaborative legislative powers would allow EP deliberation on Commission proposals before they go to Council; consultation would take place in referral

to EP if Council disagreed; and joint legislative action would allow merely delay of Council action. The EP can only accept or reject initiatives or propose changes, rather than amend legislation. Council can override EP rejection with a unanimous vote.⁹

The Security Policy Debate

Aspects of security policy coordination were slipped into the various reports underlying SEA, and into the final act itself. In fact, Britain seemed more interested in defense policy coordination than other aspects of EPC, while German, Dutch, and Italian officials wanted joint foreign policy actions, and political/economic more than security coordination. Under SEA, common positions arising from EPC consultations will be communicated to security institutions such as NATO and WEU. Thus, closer security cooperation is feasible, and nothing in SEA is meant to impede membership in these other security organizations. While the topic remains controversial, a number of EP committee reports in the past decade already have advocated greater security policy coordination.¹⁰

Some of these reports were influential, though not decisive in the debate over EUT. As a result of doubts about US strategic and Euro-missile policy, the EP Political Affairs Committee in its second "Klepsch Report" (April 1984) recommended a common EC stance on security policy vis a vis Washington. Irish, Danish, Greek and other MEPs expressed strong reservations, and these committee recommendations did not find their way explicitly into the draft EUT, which was adopted in February 1984. Instead economic and political aspects of security, all the EC felt comfortable treating, were lumped into the sphere of political cooperation in foreign policy. But under EUT the European Council was authorized to extend this sphere to cover other aspects of security policy, namely arms procurement and sales, as well as defense and disarmament.¹¹

The importance of these EUT provisions was interpreted differently by various political factions. In the words of one German Christian Democrat, EUT contained only "a nod in the direction of security policy." However, the wording was permissive enough to allow a Conservative to observe that the Council could extend the role of the Union

beyond merely political/economic aspects of security "to the very teeth of defence itself" if it should wish. A Socialist saw the treaty as giving Europe a common direction, and moving it toward equal partner status in the North Atlantic Community at a time of US-European strain. This would be crucial in allowing Europe's future security to be determined in Europe. A French Liberal envisioned a future president of a United States of Europe moving decisively, on the basis of a unified European nuclear strike force, to end arms races and boost solidarity with the Third World: "As high technology in industry conditions economic and social well-being, so high technology in armaments conditions diplomatic influence."¹²

While US-European strategic strains formed a backdrop for EUT, more immediate economic (especially unemployment) and political concerns, including EC budgetary and programmatic stalemate at the recently completed Athens Council summit, were the driving forces. Scientific and technological advancement were seen as the keys for European resurgence and world power:

"The level of power and degree of independence of each State today in international affairs is commensurate with the level of scientific and technological development of that State. If we succeed in being competitive in the new key sectors we shall be treated with dignity, and as equals."¹³

With the substitution of SEA for EUT in 1985, the Council made additional somewhat vague references to necessary Euro-security preparations under political cooperation (noted above). In parliamentary debates concerning SEA, the technological rationale for security policy again was emphasized, along with new European assertiveness. Although certain states and political parties expressed misgivings about the wisdom of SEA (and particularly the diminished EP role in comparison to EUT) and/or of greater integration, the fundamental political consensus to support the agreement was based largely on two perspectives. Parties on the right, i.e., Conservatives, Christian Democrats, and nationalists, pointed to the technological-commercial-security benefits, and to defense of European civilization with a strong separate voice in NATO. Parties on the left tended to stress economic and employment benefits, and to voice suspicions both of

militarized technology and American security leadership. All parties have continued forming new perspectives on security, in the days of diminished perceived Soviet threat (INF treaty, glasnost and perestroika, lucrative possible East bloc investment opportunities). Indeed many now see the US-Japanese technological/trade threat as Europe's primary security concern.

On the extreme right, Euro-nationalists call for increased European military power and security collaboration. They speak of a crisis for European civilization which requires separate states to coalesce, defend themselves technologically from American and Japanese penetration, and form a European pillar within NATO at least as strong as the US. MEP Le Pen of France, for example, has lamented the lack of external border defenses as internal European frontiers are dismantled. "Europe must be a power in the world. . .there can be no power without common defense. . .a nuclear umbrella should be erected over the territory of the E.C." by the two European nuclear powers. He further advocates "proposals for an armaments production plan and a common space weapons plan."¹⁴ In the words of MEP Romualdi, a rightist who criticizes SEA as inadequate even to bring about a unified Euro-market by 1992, "Gorbachov and Reagan cannot go on for ever being the only ones to decide our fates: security, peace and the development of this part of the world needs [sic] a third protagonist."¹⁵

The center right parties, and especially the Christian Democrats, see SEA less as a defense vehicle than a way out of perceived economic stagnation and technological vulnerability, which they also interpret as security problems. They stress the free movement of capital, inflation control, progress toward monetary union, the internal market, and advanced technological projects which will both strengthen Europe internationally and ultimately provide jobs. As one Dutch Christian Democrat put it, with a large enough market in which to sell its high technology products, Europe would be able to keep up with the US and Japan "the European way. . .the social way," with

proper levels of social welfare benefits, increased employment, redistribution of work and reduction of hours.¹⁶ A German colleague noted further that,

"The new world structure -- Japan has 160m. inhabitants -- needs a new kind of assertion for us Europeans. In the long term even Denmark can guarantee its individuality, its originality, only through a united Europe."¹⁷

While many on the left agree with the need for a strong European voice in (or out of) NATO, and for technological advances, they stress, even more than Christian Democrats, economic and social concerns as opposed to military projects and power. They are suspicious and critical of American strategic policy, and tend to opt for a separate, some even say neutral European voice; some also would call for minimal rather than extensive European defense preparations. Socialists (generally not including the French) tend to be suspicious of military production and corporate conglomerates per se, but look to multinational European enterprises to provide employment in the "post-industrial" era. In this regard, some are suspicious of projects such as EUREKA and of cooperation with the US SDI initiative. They fear that "Technological Community" projects, outside direct EC control and with a bureaucracy all their own, would benefit mainly large firms with no necessary commitment to European labor and with projects spilling over into the military sphere.¹⁸

The traditional extreme left, the Communists, at least in Italy and France, have been rather enthusiastic about West European unity, even criticizing SEA for not going far enough. Communists, traditionally supportive of technology as a benefit to society, advocate European solutions in the weapons economy, whereby the interests of national defense firms, such as Westlands Helicopter in the UK, should take second place to Europe's joint needs to compete worldwide. Hence, Euro-weapons consortia should be developed, under governmental auspices and EC supervision, to keep production facilities from withering or falling into the hands either of the Americans or exploitative firms. The Italian Communists also want a positive response to East bloc and Chinese commercial and technological offers. Some French Communists worry that SEA provisions do not

clearly address unemployment, industrial and social policy, regional policy, and peace/disarmament. At the same time they see potential benefits for multinational corporations and US defense contractors both in the unified European market and in EPC treaty provisions for coordination and preparedness regarding political/economic aspects of security.¹⁹

In general, leftist supporters of EUREKA and a Technological Community tend to see it as a non-military alternative to SDI, while rightist supporters tend to see it as an SDI competitor. Leftist critics of EUREKA see it as inextricably linked to a highly militarized French technology program, in which Paris already is developing space weapons. Rightist critics see it as inadequate to the task of making Europe the third superpower.²⁰ Nevertheless, the EC appears ready to proceed with EUREKA for lack of ready alternatives and at least to mount some major technological projects.

Moderate parties of both the left and right, as well as European bureaucrats also have voiced both hopes for and doubts about the adequacy of SEA in bringing about the technological advancements considered essential for Europe's future. Commissioners lament the lack of majority voting provisions for funding and contracting within the proposed EC Technological Community. They argue that this will impede necessary ventures.²¹ Conservatives and Socialists doubt that EUREKA has the funding and focus necessary to compete with the US and Japan. While companies may be able to carry off coordinated development and marketing of specific "high tech" products, there is little coordination of "upstream" primary research, focussed on funding the "best," most up-to-date projects vis a vis Japan and the US.

Whether sympathetic or critical, Europeans have seen SDI as a tremendous challenge at the technological frontier, the latter-day equivalent of the moon shot. Some expect SDI to fail, but all note the large projected American R&D investments which are expected to bear fruit in one form or another. Europeans cite their own relatively successful positions in space, telecommunications, and nuclear technology, but see

themselves as falling dangerously behind in bio-technology, data processing, and other fields. Increasing technological dependency on the US and Japan in such areas could, it is feared, make Europe a techno/political colony. The lack of a unified market, along with disparate rules, standards, research, and contracting, and failure to generate American style giant "high tech" firms (IBM, AT&T), to nurture innovative small firms, and to develop university-corporate partnerships are identified by some as basic reasons for these disadvantages.

In this, the Parliament's Committee on Energy, Research, and Technology has now joined the Commission in arguing that while, "...we have heard talk...of military technology and civilian technology...[t]here is no difference." Large scale multinational projects are needed-- if not EUREKA, then something else, especially concentrating in bio-tech, space (presumably including lasers and optics), and electronics.²²

The debate on the ethics and feasibility of military vs. civilian technology in the "new Europe" has become quite pointed. Socialists and some Communists argue that science, which struggled for years to free itself from the Church and from despots, should not now be thrown to the military. Some Danish and Dutch parties further argue that high technology itself is a false and dehumanizing god, and join Greek Communists in arguing for "appropriate technologies" and the prerogatives of small states and enterprises.²³ But these views and cautions appear to remain slightly in the minority. One Danish Christian Democrat portrays technology, in providing goods and services, as the basis for humanity, rather than as de-humanizing. While religious ethics are needed to control technology, it is argued that religious based European culture depends on being able to reply to SS20s with more than bows and arrows.²⁴

The confusion about whether Europe can proceed with the development of essentially non-military high technology is reflected in the committees reporting to Parliament, as they patch together wording to satisfy all major parties. Thus, for example, in the draft resolution from the Committee on Energy, Research, and

Technology in 1985, controversial paragraphs called for focus on non-military aims and rejection of SDI research, as well as partnerships with countries not restricting technology transfers in joint ventures (implied USA). Yet immediately following were paragraphs calling for European coordination with the US and Japan in research beyond fusion and space, both of which clearly have military implications. Ultimately, the EP struck the anti-SDI paragraph from the resolution by a vote of 156-153, and then failed to insert a pro-SDI paragraph in its place.²⁵

Thus, European leaders want to distinguish themselves from what are seen as the pitfalls of heavy US reliance on military R&D, and yet must grapple with the size of US R&D expenditures and corporate entities, as well as expected civilian spinoffs from projects such as SDI. They would prefer to put a "humane face" on high technology, but also realize the close connection between civilian and military applications and the difficulties of racing against countries (US and Japan) with a head start.²⁶ They also want to include states outside the EC in joint ventures, as with EFTA or East bloc states, and Lome Convention or other Third World participants.

Hence, EC policy statements continue to stress civilian technology projects, in order to avoid controversies within the Community and in COCOM about sensitive technology transfers. Yet, given profit levels, past production trends, and existing or planned multinational partnerships, there is much temptation to subsidize military technology and to become involved in military production projects outside the EC. Indeed the Euro-group within NATO now has agreed that in view of common security interests, the US must be assured special access to the EC internal market.²⁷ As this implicates weapons procurement strategies, the pressure will build to expand the security sphere of SEA, as envisioned in EPC and by various EP committees, and to include European and Third World partners outside the EC. Since both West and East Europe/USSR share technological disadvantages vis a vis the US and Japan, the logic could even entail joint defense product ventures with the East. The recent reality of Soviet MiGs landing for the

first time in Britain for promotion at air shows, of East German associate member status in EUREKA, and of French cosmonauts joining their Soviet counterparts in joint space explorations could be a hint of things to come.²⁸

Conclusions

Security policy has entered the planning for the Single European Act mainly through a rather unbridled multi-party (of course with some exceptions) enthusiasm for the saving graces of technology in Europe's future. In response to EC policy stagnation, eroding competitiveness, and persistent unemployment levels, technology has been seized upon as something of a cure-all. With structural reforms to clear the way for, and increased investment in high technology partnerships, Europe is expected to regain world stature and influence, repel foreign penetration and domination, and employ the multitudes. Along with diminished Soviet threat, rejuvenation of the Western European Union, and growing French-German strategic consultation, trust grows that Europe might be freed from the vagaries of US strategic leadership as well.

Yet apart for the uncertainties of over-reliance on technology per se (e.g., possible future energy crises), certain structural contradictions could impede the fulfillment of these hopes and dreams. Since parties have agreed on SEA and the importance of technology for different reasons, developments could prompt disillusionment. If technological projects and enlarged markets include major military applications, or fail to stimulate employment of European workers, certain leftist parties and smaller states could withdraw their support. If, on the other hand, decisions for technological funding are delayed, if a "dirigist" EC approach to Technological Community regulations is adopted, or if projects do not produce breakthroughs enhancing Europe's competitiveness with the US and Japan, parties on the right could lose faith. If the benefits of technology are derived mainly by large British, French, or German firms, other member states could cry "foul." Community decision-making authority in SEA remains weak; the coalition

supporting the plan is fragile and subject to fragmentation, and opinions on the wisdom of military projects in SEA are nearly evenly divided.

In particular, as it is not clear that military and civilian technology can be separated fully, it is also not clear that European Community technology and/or security can be separated effectively from the rest of Western and Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere or the Orient. If the US and Japanese challenges are seen to persist or increase, or if Washington becomes increasingly preoccupied with the Pacific, new thinking about European security could take on continent-wide dimensions. On the other hand, if Washington were to open a very wide "two way street" in its defense production collaboration with NATO partners, EC coherence as a productive bloc might be diminished. The EC market is indeed large, but will also inevitably absorb products and techniques from other regions.

SEA has made provisions for such absorption and outside connections. But key questions remain. Is size and commitment enough to stimulate technological "takeoff" among twelve disparate states? How can West Europe emerge as an industrial and political, let alone a military superpower without a functioning West European government? SEA provisions for small subgroups of states to go ahead with joint technological and security projects if full EC participation is infeasible reflects uncertain commitments and prospects.

Security policy offers an example of these dilemmas in cases such as the Westlands Helicopter decision, in which a firm's own preferences, and those of its national government, ran counter to the preferences of other states and institutions in the EC. In the end, American penetration of the European defense helicopter market was sustained and enlarged because of the primacy of national decision-making centers and the priorities of those evaluating technological and funding capabilities. These decision-making prerogatives and funding needs have not been diminished under SEA. Thus, while many, especially on the right, have hopes for a West European pillar in NATO

equal to the US, the prospect appears dim until something more on the order of EUT is adopted.

Nevertheless, enthusiasm for increased integration appears high, and the impetus for an EC strategic alternative to NATO, as seen in various EP committee reports, is growing, brewing in conflicts over security policy and SDI implications, US technological dominance (stealth technology is the latest area where sharing appears minimal), the urge throughout NATO for defense budget cuts, Soviet arms control initiatives and American pressure for "burden sharing," uncertainties over markets and requirements for conventional weapons, coordinated arms control positions, and the appeal of West European partnerships with the East.

SEA contains language legitimizing and conceivably expanding collaborative European weapons production and export consortia. However, in the midst of collaboration is continued national armament production (sometimes, as in the case of French aircraft, competing with collaborative projects) and persistent myths of national arms autarky (seen most recently in British decisions to produce a new generation of tanks).²⁹ SEA, along with the revival of WEU, may indeed be the first step toward greater Western European self-reliance; but SEA, basically a commercial venture -- even in the security area, seems unlikely in its present form to spill over into greater strategic collaboration or greater political unity among the twelve.

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5. Bulletin of the European Community, 18, no. 11 (1985), p. 18.
6. Philippe de Schoutheete, "Le Rapport Tindemans: dix ans apres," Politique Etrangere, 51 (Summer 1986), pp. 527-538; and Lodge, op. cit., 1985 and 1986.
7. Bulletin of the European Community, op. cit., p. 16; European Community, Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, No. 2-33 (December 11, 1985), pp. 112 and 176; and Bill McSweeney, "The European Neutrals and the European Community," Journal of Peace Research, 25 (September 1988), pp. 205-211.
8. Timothy Aeppel, "British Balk at Attempts to Create European Central Bank," Christian Science Monitor (June 29, 1988), p. 7; Julian Baum, "Thatcher Attack on European Unity: More Bark than Bite?" Christian Science Monitor (September 22, 1988), p. 9, and "Thatcher Puts Limits on a United Europe," (July 29, 1988), pp. 1 and 8; John Yemma, "Should Britain Throw the Pound into Europe's Monetary Pot?"

Christian Science Monitor (June 10, 1988), p. 13; and "Euro Summit Shows Limits to any Leap Forward," The German Tribune (December 11, 1988), pp. 1-2.

9. See Lodge, op. cit. (1986), pp. 214-218.
10. These include two "Klepsch Reports," of 1978 and 1984, the "Haagerup Report" of 1982, the "Fergusson Report" of 1983, and the "Spinelli Report." In addition, the "Greenwood Report" of defense experts in 1981 advocated West European cooperation in military and civilian "high tech" fields.
11. European Community, Debates, op. cit., No. 1-313 (April 11, 1984), pp. 108-109; European Parliament, Working Documents, 1983-84, Doc. 1-1200/83/B (January 30, 1984).
12. European Community, Debates, op. cit., No. 1-309 (February 14, 1984), pp. 31-33 and 80-81.
13. Statement by MEP Zecchino, CDU, Italy, Ibid., p. 35.
14. European Community, Debates, op. cit., No. 2-346 (December 9, 1986), pp. 56-57.
15. European Community, Debates, op. cit., No. 2-363 (March 9, 1988), p. 112; and No. 2-334 (January 16, 1986), p. 213.
16. Ibid., p. 208.
17. European Community, Debates, op. cit., No. 2-333 (December 11, 1985), p. 177.
18. See for example, remarks by MEP Linkohr, FRG, Ibid., pp. 167-168; other Socialists, however, defend EUREKA as essentially non-military -- see MEP Ford's statements, Ibid., pp. 144-145.
19. Ibid., p. 151.
20. See statements by Conservative, Socialist, and Liberal MEPs, Ibid., pp. 144-161.
21. European Community, Debates, op. cit., No. 2-330 (October 8, 1985), pp. 47-49.
22. Statement by MEP Poniatowski, Liberals, Rapporteur for Committee, Ibid., p. 18; see also supportive Conservative and even Communist views on pp. 30-36.
23. Ibid., pp. 24-25 and 37-41.
24. Ibid., pp. 26-29. Of course, much political opportunism can be reflected in these philosophical positions; for example, the Christian Democratic mayor of Toulouse, a French city increasingly oriented toward high technology investment, also has called for European manned space shuttles and a coordinated space policy. French Communists, while critical of military applications, manage to approve of certain high technology projects with potential military spinoffs, such as Ariane, Airbus, and Esprit, which also happen to be French initiated. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
25. European Parliament, Working Documents, 1985-86, Doc. A2-109/85/A (September 30, 1985); and European Community, Debates, op. cit., No. 2-330 (October 8, 1985), pp. 78ff.

26. See the statement by Commissioner Narjes, who at the same time points to the blurred military-civilian distinction, and yet calls for a civilian European high technology program to recover a competitive position. Ibid., p. 50.
27. "Spending Dominates Defence Agenda," The German Tribune (December 11, 1988), p. 2.
28. Some possible policy initiatives are discussed in Europe: Dimensions of Peace, ed. by Bjorn Hettne (London: Zed Books and United Nations University, 1988).
29. Baum, "Britain Can Make its Own Tanks, Thanks," Christian Science Monitor (December 23, 1988), p. 11.