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Bias Crime and Minority Threat

Michele Stacey
University of Missouri-St. Louis

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Michele Stacey
B.A., Sociology, University of Tennessee – Knoxville, 2005
B.A., Psychology, University of Tennessee – Knoxville, 2005
M.A., Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Missouri – St. Louis, 2009

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Advisory Committee
Richard Rosenfeld, Ph.D.
Chairperson

Kristin Carbone-Lopez, Ph.D.
Lee Ann Slocum, Ph.D.
Eric Stewart, Ph.D.

A**BSTRACT**

Beginning in the 1980s, the term hate crime became part of the research canon of criminologists across the United States. Researchers have examined the characteristics of hate crime victims, offenders, and offenses. However, little is known about the context of hate crime, and more specifically about the ways that the changing demographics of the United States have contributed to hate crime. The dissertation examines the relationship between these demographic shifts and the trend in hate crime from 2000 to 2007 through the use of population averaged panel models. These models assess changes over time and across place in the number of hate crimes in a state as a function of changing demographic, economic, and political conditions.

The findings show that there is considerable variation in anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, and anti-Gay/Lesbian hate crime across states and over time. These differing trends can be explained by changing demographic patterns as well as the political mobilization and visibility of minority groups. However, the results also suggest that much of the trend in hate crime is explained by the reporting practices of the differing states. As such the results indicate a need for policies to strengthen the reporting practices of law enforcement organizations and encourage reporting by the victims of these types of crimes. Additionally, the results suggest that there is a growing need for better data for the further examination of these questions.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Hate crimes[1] are committed by an individual or group because of a characteristic of the victim or their group position. In other words hate crimes are not only an attack on or a threat against the single victim, but often times are threatening to the entire group or community in which the victim belongs. For this reason, these crimes may have more severe consequences than similar crimes that are not motivated by some bias. As such, it is important to understand the causes and correlates of hate crime at the individual and macro level in order to inform policy and practice with the purpose of preventing hate crime.

Prior research on hate crime has focused primarily on the individual or the incident. This research has looked at the effects of the crime on the victim (Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1992), the types of offenders (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett 2002), and even the characteristics of the criminal incidents (Messner, McHugh, & Felson, 2004). At the macro level, studies have looked at within jurisdiction counts of racially motivated, primarily anti-black, hate crime (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998b; Lyons, 2007; Lyons, 2008). This dissertation expands on prior research at the macro level by assessing the relationship between a variety of state characteristics and counts of hate crime from multiple states.

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[1] The terms hate crime and bias crime are used interchangeably in this dissertation. While these terms are often used to indicate the same set of actions, there are semantic differences. "Bias crimes" are typically crimes that occur *because of* a specific victim characteristic, such as religious affiliation, race, age, or sexual orientation. The use of the term "because of" allows for few assumptions about the motivation of the offender (Jenness and Grattet, 2001:87). On the other hand, the term "hate crime" assumes a motivation of hatred or animus on the part of the offender towards some characteristic, such as race, of the victim and assumes that it was this prejudice that was the impetus for the actions of the criminal. (See Lawrence, 1999 for a more detailed discussion of the implications of this difference).

Three closely related theories have been applied in literature assessing the relationship between race and crime. These are Blalock's minority threat; Suttles's defended neighborhoods, and Blau's macrostructural opportunity theory. These theories propose relationships between the composition or distribution of race in an area and crime. As such, these theories can be extended to examine the relationship between prejudice and crime.

This dissertation expands the application of minority threat beyond the black-white relationship that has been the focus of the majority of prior research. Specifically, the propositions of minority threat are applied to racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities. While minority threat has been assessed to a large extent in relation to racial minorities, and to some extent with ethnic minorities (specifically Hispanics), the propositions have rarely been applied to other minority, or subordinate, groups.

The primary research question for this project is: What explains the level of and change in hate crime in a state? The propositions of Blalock's minority threat hypothesis are used as a guiding framework.

DEFINING HATE CRIME

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines a hate crime as "crimes motivated by racial, religious, disability, sexual-orientation, and ethnicity/national origin biases" (FBI, 2000). However, hate crimes can also be defined as a form of informal social control or as a manifestation of prejudice. Both of these definitions have implications for the application of theory to the study of hate crime, and each is discussed below.

Hate Crime as Social Control

The term hate crime was not part of the legal landscape until the mid-1980s (Jacobs & Potter, 1998); however, the United States is no stranger to racially motivated violence. In fact, one of the most prominent times in our country's history was during and after the Civil War, when many African-Americans were subjected to lynching. Research suggests that there is a link between the history of lynching in this country and the continued formal social control of blacks and other minority groups. For instance, Zimring (2003) describes a relationship between past lynching and current capital punishment through the values of what he terms a "vigilante influence". Zimring suggests that the same values of vigilante justice that contributed to lynching a century ago today lead to the use of capital punishment. Research also suggests a relationship between the past history of lynching and current hate crime. For instance, King, Messner, and Baller (2009) find a positive relationship between past lynching and the frequency of reported hate crimes. Researchers contend that hate crimes target entire groups as opposed to individuals and as such are "a means of controlling the behavior of an entire group through intimidation and often violence" (King et al., 2009: 292). Thus, it is possible to define hate crime as a form of social control; much like research has defined lynching as a form of social control (Tolnay & Beck, 1992).

There are two types of social control, formal and informal. Formal social control is that which is exerted by the state, while informal social control is exerted by an "informal" entity, typically the family. These are what Bursik and Grasmick (1993) refer to as private and public control. Black (1998) refers to informal social control as "self-help". Black suggests that crime may be used as a form of informal social control, or

self-help, when there is an absence of or a break down in formal social control. Thus, it would follow that there would be more informal social control where there is less formal social control.

While there is much debate about the definition of social control, one such definition comes from normative theory, which suggests that social control, whether formal or informal, is a tool used to bring behavior back within the normative guidelines defined by the group exerting the control, in other words the powerful group (Black, 1976; Sutherland, Cressey, & Luckenbill, 1992). To illustrate, take the example of homosexuality. Formal and informal social control have been used in an effort to criminalize or demoralize homosexual behavior. For example, formal laws criminalizing sodomy[2] in several states (e.g., Fla. Stat. 800.02; Miss. Rev. Stat. 566-090) in essence criminalized the private sexual behavior of consenting adults, in most cases gay men. Similarly, after President Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery, laws were instituted in the South to prevent blacks from having the ability to vote. These original grandfather clauses, requiring an individual to provide proof that their grandfather had the right to vote, were put into place by the white majority in an effort to keep blacks in the subordinate, and thus powerless, position that they had experienced during slavery.

Hate crime is a form of informal social control, in that it is a tool used by members of the dominant group, whether white, wealthy, or heterosexual, in an attempt to bring the subordinate groups back into the normative guidelines as defined by the dominant group. As with the previous examples, informal social control can be used to control behavior, for instance, as mentioned earlier the lynching of blacks was used for

[2] These laws were deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 2003 (*Lawrence v. Texas)*.

much of the late 1800s and the early part of the 20th century to control the behavior, and diminish the competition, of blacks.

An alternative definition of social control characterizes control as a means to protect scarce resources. This conception of social control suggests that those with power (i.e., the wealthy, the politically influential) will utilize social control, in most cases some form of punishment or law (i.e., formal social control) in order to maintain control over scarce resources. These scarce resources include "property, power, and status" (Tolnay & Beck, 1992) among others. For instance, as Tolnay and Beck point out in their study of lynchings in the South, once blacks had access to scarce resources, that is, once blacks were no longer simply property, the dominant class (i.e. white, wealthy men) felt threatened and began using lynching (a form of informal social control) to prevent blacks from gaining access to these scarce resources. Similarly, for the past decade the homosexual community in the United States, and many countries around the world, has been fighting for the right to marry. The dominant group, in this case religious fundamentalists and political conservatives, has used social control in the form of proposed amendments to the US constitution and individual state constitutions to prevent the gay and lesbian community from obtaining this scarce resource.

Hate Crime as a Manifestation of Prejudice

While hate crime has been defined as a form of social control it has also been deemed by some scholars as a form of prejudicial behavior. In 1954, Gordon Allport suggested five manifestations of prejudice that vary in degree from "the least energetic to the most" (1979:14). At the lower end of this scale is what Allport termed "antilocution", defined as a person simply talking about their antagonism freely with friends who share

similar beliefs. The second type of prejudice is avoidance, specifically active avoidance of members of the disliked groups, "even at the cost of considerable inconvenience" (1979:14). Third is discrimination or the active exclusion of members of the disliked group from various groups or organizations, including employment, residential housing, political rights, and churches. Fourth is physical attack. "Under conditions of heightened emotion prejudice may lead to acts of violence or semiviolence" (Allport, 1979: 15). Finally, at the extreme, is extermination, which as the term suggests involves the mass murder, or genocide, of an entire group.

Within this scale of acts of prejudice, hate crime would fall into the definition of physical attack with the more prejudiced individuals or groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and Hitler, advocating for the complete genocide of a group of people. Although many hate crimes are not explicitly violent, that is they do not involve the assault of one individual by another, the attack of a religious institution such as a synagogue is still a physical attack on a group or more specifically a symbol of that group.

CONTROLLING PREJUDICE

Over the course of the last century many attempts have been made by the legislatures of the United States and its component states to control prejudice and prejudicial behavior. These laws have taken on many forms and the development has largely been guided by social movements, such as the civil rights movement, the women's rights movement, the victim's rights movement, and the gay and lesbian movement.

These attempts to control prejudice began in the 1930s when Illinois passed a "group libel" statute in response to violent race rioting, which "punished those who make bigoted 'defamatory' statements against racial, religious, or ethnic groups" (Levin, 2001:725). However, these group libel statues were short lived. This law was repealed in 1961.

Group libel statutes were followed by legislation that was aimed at the extremist groups, such as the KKK, which were then and are still associated with hate activities. These statutes included anti-masking laws and bans on these groups' ability to congregate or parade (Walker, 1994). These anti-Klan statutes continued into the 1960s when the United States Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of laws criminalizing "terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969). The justices deemed the laws unconstitutional.

During the 1960s, the focus of law makers turned to civil rights violations. For instance, the Federally Protected Rights statute (18 U.S.C. § 245) was signed into law in 1968. This statute "prohibits interference with voting, obtaining government or federally funded benefits or services, accessing federal employment, or participation in a federal jury…the law also punishes the interference with six other federally protected activities, but only when they are committed on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin" (Levin, 2001:740).

These civil rights violation statutes, along with the victim's rights movement and a growing emphasis on punitive action in the 1970s, culminated in the passage of hate crime laws in the early 1980s (Jenness & Grattet, 2001). The first such law was passed in

1981 in Oregon and hate crime legislation quickly diffused across the United States (Grattet, Jenness, & Curry, 1998).

As with the earlier attempts to control prejudicial behavior, hate crime laws received constitutional setbacks during their early tenure. First, the hate speech ordinance in St. Paul, Minnesota was ruled unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1992 (R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 1992). In the same year, "the Supreme Court overturned a death sentence that was imposed in part on the basis of a convict's membership in a White supremacist group" (Dawson v. Delaware, 1992). However, in 1993 just one year after the St. Paul statute was deemed unconstitutional, Wisconsin's penalty enhancement statute was upheld by the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision (Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 1993).

> In reversing the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist cited three basic reasons for affirming the statute. First, whereas the government may not punish abstract beliefs, it can punish a vast array of depraved motives. The Court further found that penalty enhancement laws, unlike the statute at issue in *R.A.V.*, did not prevent people from expressing their views or punish them for doing so. Lastly, the Court pointed to the severity of hate crimes, stating that they are "thought to be more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harm on their victims and incite community unrest" (quoted in Levin, 2001:745).

Following the decision in *Wisconsin v. Mitchell* (1993), several states adopted or revised their hate crime statutes. By 2003, forty-six states and the federal government had some form of hate or bias crime legislation on the books (Jacobs & Potter, 1998).

TYPES OF HATE CRIME LAW

While the term hate crime is often used in public discourse as a singular indicator for crimes motivated by hate, bias, or prejudice, the definition of this term in truth applies to a wide range of crimes. These crimes are defined at two levels. The United States federal government has two types of hate crime law: data collection statutes and criminal statutes. Each state also has its own hate crime statute, taking one of five prominent forms: civil rights statutes, "freestanding" statutes, "coattailing" statutes, modifying statutes, and penalty enhancement statutes (Jenness & Grattet, 2001).

Federal Hate Crime Law

> This bill… represents more than merely collecting data about incidents of racial, religious, and ethnically motivated violence. It also will constitute a statement to the general public of our country that this Congress and this administration and, indeed, the State and local governments, will not tolerate further acts of violence. (quoted in Jenness & Grattet, 2001: 53)

The above quote comes from Arthur Green, the director of the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights, who testified at the first federal hearings on the proposed Hate Crime Statistics Act in 1985. The act was not confirmed until 1990 after the FBI raised concerns about the enforceability of the bill. The Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) of 1990, signed into law by then President George H.W. Bush, requires the U.S. attorney general to collect data on hate crime. This bill defines hate crime as "crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, including where appropriate the crimes of murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage, or vandalism of property" (Public Law 101-275). The law required this data collection effort to continue for four years. In 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act amended the HCSA. This amendment added the protected category of disability (Public Law 103-322) and called for the collection of hate crime statistics "for each calendar year" (Public Law 104-155). This data collection mandate fell to the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program.

The second type of federal hate crime law, unlike the reporting statutes, attaches a criminal penalty to hate crimes. In 1994, The Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act (HCSEA) defined eight predicate crimes for which judges could impose enhanced penalties. These crimes included murder; non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; aggravated assault; simple assault; intimidation; arson; and destruction, damage, or vandalism of property. The enhanced penalties the statute called for were limited to "not less than three offense levels for offenses that a finder of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt are hate crimes" (Public Law 103-322). Hate crime, for the purposes of the HCSEA, was defined as criminal conduct wherein "the defendant intentionally selected any victim or property as the object of the offense because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person" (Public Law 103-322). While seemingly broad, this penalty enhancement statute only addresses "those crimes that take place on federal lands and properties" (Jenness & Grattet, 2001:45).

For hate crimes that do not fall within the federal jurisdiction, the 50 States in the union have developed some form of hate crime law, many of which are similar to the federal penalty enhancement statute.

State Hate Crime Law

The state hate crime laws differ with respect to the status provisions (protected groups), the severity of criminal penalties, and the legal language in the statute (Grattet, Jenness, and Curry, 1998). Despite these differences, Jenness and Grattet (2001) identify five prominent forms of state hate crime statutes. The first are "*statutes that criminalize interference with civil rights*" (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 80; emphasis added). These statutes "criminalize actions that, by force or threat of force, interfere with or intimidate others in the exercise of their civil rights, and they specify a list of protected statuses" (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 80). In 2007, approximately 20% of the state statutes were civil rights statutes. The second group of state laws, *"freestanding" statutes*, "create a new and freestanding category of crime, commonly referred to as 'ethnic intimidation' or 'malicious harassment'" (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 80). In 2007, approximately 27% of state hate crime statutes created this freestanding category of crime. The third category, *"coattailing" statutes*, "create crimes of ethnic intimidation or malicious harassment by embedding them within previous established criminal codes" (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 81). For coattailing statutes approximately 6% of hate crime statutes created this new type of crime by adding them to existing criminal codes in 2007. Fourth, *modifying statutes*, "modify a preexisting statute by adding a clause that reclassifies the crime if it was committed because of the victim's race, religion, or other group status characteristic" (Jenness & Grattet, 2001; 82). Approximately 10% of state statutes in 2007 were modifying statutes. Finally, the last category is *penalty enhancement statutes*, approximately 45% of state statutes in 2007, which "increase the penalty for committing an enumerated crime when the crime was motivated by hate or bias" (Jenness & Grattet,

2001; 82). There are two ways in which a penalty enhancement may occur. First, the law may assign a higher sentence range for the offense. Second, the law may upgrade the offense (i.e., from a misdemeanor to a felony). For detailed examples of each of these state statutes refer to Appendix B.

Summary

Hate crime is a socially constructed concept which is defined in different ways at different times in history and across different places. Defining hate crime as a form of informal social control calls for the use of theories explaining patterns of social control to be applied to the explanation of hate crime. Defining hate crime as a manifestation of prejudice, specifically physical attack, requires the use of theories explaining prejudicial action to explain hate crime. The minority threat framework can be used to explain both patterns of social control and manifestations of prejudice and as such minority threat lends itself well to the explanation of hate crime.

Due to the differing social definitions of hate crime, the legal definition has changed over time. At one time crimes against minority groups were violations of civil rights, at another prejudicial actions were controlled through the use of statutes criminalizing hate groups. Today, these statutes vary by state and are different in the federal government, with the federal laws criminalizing those actions that impede civil liberties or crimes committed at the federal level because of the victim's membership in a particular group. The state laws on the other hand consist of five primary categories, ranging from those which criminalize the impediment of civil liberties to those which create a separate offense and those which add penalties for a bias motivation.

Each of these definitions, both social and legal, provide a framework for understanding hate crime. These potential explanations are discussed in the following pages.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Minority Threat

Consensus vs. Conflict Theory: Foundations of Modern Day Threat

The minority threat propositions are based largely in the conflict theory tradition, which is most often traced to the teachings of Karl Marx. Marx provided little in the way of a discussion about punishment; however, he spoke to a great degree about the source of power and the use of that power. Marx, writing during the time of the shift from feudalism to a capitalist society, proposed that it was this shift that produced the power dynamics and the changes to the systems of punishment that are still in place today. Marx suggested that as the population of owners of economic resources gained more capital they gained more power. In other words, Marx attributed the source of power to the ownership of the means of production. Those who owned the means of production he termed the bourgeoisie (Garland, 1990).

Additionally, Marx suggested that the shift from feudalism to capitalism produced a working class, or the proletariat. This class, in effect, lost control over the means of production turning them into nothing more than laborers. These laborers thus had little to no power (Cain & Hunt, 1979; Melossi, 1980; Vold, 2002).

Due to the redefinition of the power structure, Marx proposed, the punishment system and the development of the criminal law would fall to those in power, i.e., the

bourgeoisie. This upper class would use its power then to establish laws that would aid them in their quest for gaining even more capital and thus even more power. In doing so the bourgeoisie would further pauperize the proletariat and those privileges that the proletariat had previously enjoyed, such as the free collection of wood from the forest, were suddenly illegal. The changing of these laws thus criminalized many of the ways in which the proletariat had previously made money, and further marginalized them to the role of hard laborer (Cain & Hunt, 1979; Melossi, 1980; Vold, 2002).

Capitalism is still the predominant social structure in the United States, and the power struggles that Marx referred to between the rich and the poor are still very much alive. In today's terms these power struggles are often not relegated simply to the rich and the poor, or the upper class and the lower class, but also divide society across racial, ethnic, and religious lines, among others. As such, these divisions result in the similar use of criminal law and punishment by those who maintain power (i.e., the rich, the white, and the religious majority) on those with less power (i.e. the poor and the black/Hispanic) to further those divisions (Cain & Hunt, 1979; Melossi, 1980; Garland, 1990; Vold, 2002).

An alternative view of the production of law and the use of social control comes from consensus theories which are often traced to Emile Durkheim. Durkheim divided law into public law and private law. Public law he said, "is held to regulate the relationships of the individual with the state", while private law regulates the relationships "of individuals with one another" (Durkheim, 1984:28). Likewise, Durkheim defined a crime in terms of its offense against what he termed the collective consciousness. A collective consciousness, according to Durkheim, is "the totality of

beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of society [that] form a determinate system with a life of its own" (Durkheim, 1984:38-39). Thus crimes threaten the beliefs and sentiments of society, and as such must be punished accordingly. Punishment, Durkheim suggests, then is a measure of power in that power is measured "either by the degree of authority that [the collectivity] exercises over its citizens or by the degree of seriousness attributed to the crimes directed against it" (Durkheim, 1984:43). Thus, opposition to the collectivity stands to strengthen it. Drawing on these ideas from Durkheim, "consensus theory postulates that equality is a fundamental value and that sanctions are imposed more or less objectively on individuals who commit behavior that runs contrary to society's collective conscience" (Cureton, 2000:703).

Conflict theory suggests then that groups are defined according to the power that they possess. Consensus theory suggests that the existence of an out group, a group that is in opposition to the collective, will strengthen the cohesion of the collective. Minority threat draws largely from conflict theory, although it is related to consensus theory through this oppositional approach. That is, minority threat, like conflict theory, defines group divisions based on power, and likewise suggests that the presence of a threat will result in a coming together of the more powerful group in order to suppress that threat. Thus, the development of these two traditions in sociology and later in criminology led to the birth of minority threat.

The Birth of Minority Threat

In its original formulation, minority threat was not applied to social control, but instead was used to examine discrimination and prejudice. It was developed at a time when the civil rights movement was in full swing and discrimination and prejudice were

at the forefront of the popular consciousness. Thus, researchers set out to explain these behaviors.

While minority threat is traditionally traced to Hubert Blalock's seminal book, *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Threat* (1967), Herbert Blumer (1958) was the first to associate prejudice with group position instead of individual emotion or belief. He suggested that prejudice can be manifested in the group regardless of the individuals in that group. Prejudice, according to Blumer, is a "collective process" (1958: 3) in which one group defines itself by defining another group.

Like Blumer (1958), Blalock (1967) suggests that racial prejudice or animosity is tied to group position. The main tenet of minority threat, from Blalock's original theory, suggests a relationship between the size of the minority population and discrimination. Specifically, Blalock suggested that the size of the minority population should be positively associated with discrimination. He also proposed that this relationship would be nonlinear. In other words, Blalock suggests that there is a point at which the relationship between the relative size of the minority population and discrimination would change direction or change shape. That is at some point the positive relationship may become negative when the minority reaches a large enough portion of the population to be able to exert power. Blalock posited two specific reasons for the association between minority group size and discrimination. First, competition between groups (Figure 1.1A), specifically through labor surpluses, economic instability, or lack of education or resources of dominant group members, can result in discrimination (Blalock, 1967: 168). Second, political instability (Figure 1.1B) or the formation of an alliance between the minority group and another group that is perceived by the majority group to

provide power to the minority can result in discrimination (Blalock, 1967: 169). This second factor was referred to by Blalock as power threat, while the first was simply referred to as competition. Both of these factors have been explored in more detail in research that has been conducted since Blalock's original work. These concepts today are referred to as economic and political (or power) threat and are discussed in further detail below.

The Progression of Minority Threat

Blalock's (1967) original work, focusing on minority groups in general, resulted in a number of studies looking at the size of the minority population and various forms of discrimination. In addition, and most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the theory was applied to additional forms of social control that were directed at minority groups. Primarily applied to formal social control, this theory has undergone a number of changes, including the continuation and introduction of different forms of threat (e.g. economic and political threat as well as the fear of black crime hypothesis) and a theory that suggests the opposite effect of what Blalock originally posited, that is a negative relationship between the size of the minority population and social control (i.e., benign neglect).

Research has found some support (discussed further in Chapter 2) for the positive relationship between the size of the minority population and formal social control. As such one might wonder how the size of the minority group may relate to hate crime and other forms of informal social control, in light of the proposition discussed earlier that formal social control is inversely related to informal social control. Blalock and his successors, however, do not refer to absolute levels of formal social control, but rather to



Figure 1.1: Theoretical relationships between minority group size and discrimination (A) competition (B) power threat (Blalock, 1967)

the over-representation of minorities in the use of formal social control. Thus, the theory is still being used to predict forms of discrimination and prejudice. It would follow then

that the size of the minority population would be positively associated with hate crime, a form of prejudiced behavior, as it would be related to the overuse of formal social control on minority group members.

Original Formulation

As mentioned previously, Blalock's (1967) original formulation included a competition (or economic) and a power (or political) threat explanation. Specifically, Blalock suggested that under certain conditions (i.e., where economic competition is the primary source of prejudice) it would be possible to find a nonlinear positive relationship between the size of the minority population and economic discrimination. He suggested that as minority groups become more equal to the majority, competition will increase, resulting in a greater need for discrimination on the part of the majority. Where the gap was greater between the dominant and subordinate group, competition would be weaker and thus there would be less need for discrimination. In other words, discrimination will increase as competition increases, however at some point that discrimination will have the intended effect and will increase the gap between the minority and the majority, in affect reducing the level of competition. As competition decreases discrimination will likewise begin to decrease. Thus, while the relationship between minority group size and discrimination should be positive to a point it should also be nonlinear. In other words, at some point it may turn negative.

Blalock (1967) also suggested a relationship between power threat and discrimination. While he proposed a positive relationship with a decreasing slope for competition, he proposed a positive relationship with an increasing slope for power threat. In this proposition, Blalock suggests that the relationship between minority

population size and discrimination is a function of both resources and mobilization on the part of the dominant and subordinate groups. Specifically, Blalock proposes that power is "proportional to resources times mobilization" (p. 128). In other words, if the dominant group wishes to maintain power over the subordinate group it must effectively limit either or both the subordinate's resources or its ability to mobilize effectively. As the size of the minority group increases the resources afforded to the group will increase, therefore, in order to maintain dominance the majority must act to prevent the minority from mobilizing against them and taking away their power. Effectively accomplishing this, Blalock suggests, requires the majority group use discrimination. Blalock also notes that in order to maintain dominance the majority must amplify their mobilization, or discrimination, at a faster rate producing a positive relationship with an increasing slope.

These ideas of economic (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Eitle, D'Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002; Stults & Baumer, 2007) and political threat (Behrens, Uggen, & Manza, 2003) have continued to prevail in research looking at the discrimination, or marginalization, of minority groups. These hypotheses have largely maintained their original formulation.

Adding to the Minority Threat Canon

In conjunction with the further development of Blalock's original propositions, two other explanations have been added to the proposed relationship between the size of the minority population and the social control of that group. The first of these was developed largely from the fear of crime literature and proposes the intervening mechanism of fear of black crime instead of economic or political threat (Jackson, 1989; Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001; Stults & Baumer, 2007). The fear of crime literature

asserts a relationship between fear and the steps that people take to minimize that fear (Stults & Baumer, 2007). When the fear is directed specifically at a minority group, individuals may take actions against that group in order to protect themselves. Within the context of formal social control these actions may result in pressuring the police to arrest individuals belonging to this minority group. On the other hand, informal social control may also result from fear. Specifically, McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett (2002) suggest that hate crime offenders will sometimes act to defend their neighborhood from an influx of minority group members that they see as threatening. The fear of black crime hypothesis would posit that this threat came from the stereotype that blacks, specifically, are more apt to participate in criminal behavior than members of the white majority (Stults & Baumer, 2007). If this proposition is correct, that is if this stereotype holds, fear should be most prevalent in areas with a larger minority population and smaller in areas with more racial residential segregation or few minority members (Jackson, 1989).

Liska, Lawrence, and Benson (1981) and Liska and Yu (1992) added a fifth moderating factor to the minority threat canon. Liska and colleagues proposed that the degree to which a place is segregated will moderate[3] the relationship between the size of the minority population and social control. Specifically, those cities with a large minority population that are more segregated, thus having less interaction between minority group members and the majority, will have less social control which is contradictory to the threat framework. On the other hand, areas with a large minority population that is less segregated, and thus having more interaction between the minority group members and majority group members, will have more social control in line with the threat framework.

[3] A moderating variable is one that "partitions a focal independent variable into subgroups" (Baron & Kenny 1986) that define the effect on the dependent variable.

Liska, Lawrence, and Benson assessed the relationship between threat and police force size in cities. The authors introduced segregation as an alternative indicator of threat, that of culturally and racially dissimilar subordinate populations. The findings support this alternative measure of threatening people; however, the racial composition of the city remained the strongest predictor of police force size. The authors concluded that "the segregation effect depends on geographical region and year" (Liska et al., 1981:420). Likewise, Liska and Yu suggested that segregation acts as a form of informal social control which "may decrease the perceived threat to higher authorities, leading to decreases in formal controls, like police size and even arrests" (Liska & Yu, 1992:61). However, neither of these studies explicitly tested the moderating process between the degree of segregation and the relationship between minority group composition and social control.

Many studies have tested the minority threat propositions, including the direct relationship between the size of the minority population and social control, as well as the economic and political threat hypotheses. These studies have assessed minority threat, and more specifically racial threat, which defines the subordinate population as the minority racial group and in most cases the black/African-American population, in terms of its relationship to prejudice, formal control, and informal control. For instance, Taylor (1998) examined the relationship between racial composition and measures of prejudice[4] toward blacks, finding that the size of the minority population was significantly and positively related to prejudice. Likewise, King and Weiner (2007) assessed the

[4] Prejudice was measured based on three subscales from the General Social Survey including stereotyping of blacks, aversion to contact with blacks, and anti-egalitarianism.

relationship between minority threat and anti-Semitism[5], finding that the size of the Jewish population in a county was significantly and positively related to anti-Semitism.

Regarding formal social control, the propositions have been tested looking at sentencing and imprisonment (Britt, 2000; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), the size of the police department (D'Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg, 2004; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Liska et al., 1981; Holmes, Smith, Freng, & Muñoz, 2008), police brutality (Holmes, 2000; Smith & Holmes, 2003), and levels of (Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005) or opinions about capital punishment (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003). For instance, Britt (2000) found that the proportion black in a county was significantly and positively related to the individual level decision to incarcerate and the difference in whites' and blacks' per capita income is significantly and negatively associated with the incarceration decision. Britt concludes that this is support for the economic threat hypothesis indicating that "as the difference between whites' and blacks' incomes increase—suggesting greater racial income inequality—the mean risk of incarceration declines […] as a group becomes less of a real threat because the economic differences are so pronounced, punishments may become less severe" (p. 723).

Finally, in terms of informal social control, King and Brustein (2006) assessed the relationship between political threat and incidents of violent acts against Jews or Jewish property in pre-World War II Germany. While the authors did not find a significant relationship between the size of the Jewish population in Germany and anti-Jewish incidents, they did find a significant and positive relationship between their measure of political threat (electoral support for leftist parties) and anti-Jewish incidents.

[5] Anti-Semitism was measured using the 2003 American Mosaic Survey, based on three separate questions. Each question was assessed separately. A positive and significant relationship was found between Jewish population size and perceptions of Jewish power.

Seemingly Contradictory Theories

With every theory there come findings that contradict the theory. Minority threat is no exception. The theory proposes a positive relationship between minority population and social control. Liska and Chamlin (1984) noted, however, that this relationship is not always positive. They proposed that the opposite may be true. In certain situations, especially when the minority population is large, formal social control may actually decrease. This negative relationship may be the result of two processes, one that is victim generated and one that is police generated. On the one hand, minority group members have been found to be less trustful of the police (Hagan & Albonetti, 1982; Brunson, 2007) and so they may be less apt to report victimization, especially when the offender is white. On the other hand, when a minority group victim does report a crime they may be unable to convince the police that a crime did indeed occur or they may be unable to mobilize the police to act in their favor. This is known as the benign-neglect hypothesis, which suggests the relationship between minority population and social control is negative. This new hypothesis comes directly from the racial threat tradition, only once again proposes a separate mediating process. Here the mediating process is the ability of the group to mobilize the police. If thought about in terms of Blalock's (1967) power threat model, in which he suggests that power is a function of both the resources afforded the minority and the majority and the ability to mobilize on the part of the minority and the majority, benign-neglect can be seen as directly linked to racial threat, in the sense that it is a function of resources without mobilization on the part of the minority. Additionally, benign-neglect could be seen in this same vein as a function of less mobilization on the part of the majority in response to the lack of mobilization on the

part of the minority. This hypothesis is applied quite often to formal social control; however, the application to forms of informal social control is not intuitive. It would be quite difficult to suggest that the same mechanism producing the negative relationship in formal social control (e.g. inability to mobilize police) would be at work in informal social control.

As with the more traditional forms of the racial threat proposition, benign-neglect has found tentative support in prior research. For instance, Eitle, Stolzenberg, and D'Alessio (2005) concluded that white offenders are more likely to be arrested than black offenders for simple and aggravated assault. The authors suggested that this relationship could potentially be explained by benign-neglect in that police may put less value on assault cases involving black victims, since the majority of assault incidents were intraracial. Eitle and colleagues also proposed that when an assault occurred in a predominantly black neighborhood that was isolated from white neighborhoods, these crimes were not perceived as a threat to social order and thus were not policed heavily. Likewise, another study (Parker & Maggard, 2005) assessed the relationship between the size of the black population and black drug arrests and found the effect to be negative. The researchers concluded that "there is less pressure on the police to control crime because victims who are non-White are less likely to report crime or even when they do report crime, police may allocate fewer resources to resolve the offense" (Parker & Maggard, 2005; 539) because these crimes most often involve a black offender and a black victim.

These divergent findings may threaten the validity of the minority threat hypothesis; however, as Holmes (2000) suggests "threat has multiple dimensions,

involving the interests of both dominant group members" and the agents of social control (p. 349).

While Blalock (1967), and the majority of researchers who have examined threat, have looked almost solely at the relationship between blacks and whites, over the course of the last twenty years the minority threat framework has been expanded to other groups. This expanded proposition has primarily focused on assessing the Hispanic-White relationship. The theoretical assumption here is the same: as the size of the Hispanic population in a neighborhood increases, social control of Hispanics will also increase. Research on minority threat, using the percent Hispanic population in addition to percent black population, has found little to no support for a relationship between Hispanic population and overall social control (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005; D'Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg, 2004). This minority threat perspective has found preliminary support in literature assessing the relationship between men (the majority) and women (the minority) in business practices (South, Bonjean, Markham, & Corder, 1982) and has been extended to the voting behaviors of evangelical religious groups (Campbell, 2006).

Defended Neighborhoods

In addition to these hypotheses that propose straightforward relationships between minority group size and social control, there has been another theory developed that can be linked to Blalock's (1967) original minority threat propositions. The defended neighborhoods thesis is very similar to the fear of black crime hypothesis in that individuals will become defensive, but there is no fear of crime connection. This thesis was originally proposed by Suttles (1972) and suggests that when minority group

members begin to move into an area that has been predominantly and historically white, the members of that community will defend their community identity through the use of social control. Defended neighborhoods draws on the idea of a relationship between the size of the minority population and the use of social control, but it applies more readily to areas with a very small minority population and implies an interaction between the increasing of the minority population and the historical size of the majority population. So, while this theory may have started in the same tradition as the minority threat hypothesis, it has diverged from the basic relationship seen in the majority of the minority threat studies, and has produced an explanation for a relationship that minority threat as it was originally proposed could not capture, that of a small but increasing minority population and social control.

The defended neighborhoods hypothesis has primarily been applied to forms of informal social control. For instance, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998b) found support for their hypothesis that racially motivated crime should be highest in areas where minorities are beginning to move that have been historically white. Likewise, Lyons (2007) discovered that "the effect of informal social control on antiblack hate crime increases in racially homogeneous white communities that are experiencing recent in-migration of black newcomers" (p. 841). This hypothesis has also found support when college campuses are used as the measure of community (Van Dyke & Tester, 2005).

Opportunity or Contact

Two additional theories provide insight into the nature of intergroup relationships and the ways in which context shapes these dynamics. The first is Blau's macrostructural opportunity theory (1977) which suggests that minority group members are more likely to

come into contact with majority group members and are thus more likely to have conflict with majority group members, while majority group members are less likely to have contact with minority group members and thus are less likely to have conflict with them. In other words, Blau suggests that opportunity plays a large role in the likelihood of inter- vs. intra-group conflict. For the purpose of criminal conflict, there should be more opportunity for a minority group offender to commit an offense on a majority group member, than for the opposite to occur. That is, it should be relatively rare for a majority group member to have the opportunity to commit an offense against a minority group member.

An opposite hypothesis, known as the contact hypothesis (Williams, 1947; Allport, 1979), suggests that animosity between groups should be decreased with contact, especially under positive conditions. In other words, the more face-to-face contact a majority group member has with a member of the minority group the less animosity the majority group member should feel towards the minority group and thus the less conflict between the two groups.

Both of these hypotheses propose relationships between the likelihood of interactions between majority and minority group members and the resulting criminal patterns in an area. Blau (1977) suggests that the more interactions between minority and majority groups the more opportunity for criminal conflict and thus the more crime. Allport (1979) on the other hand suggests an increase in interaction between minority and majority groups should decrease animosity between the groups and thus should decrease crime.

Contact theory has found support across multiple research methods including field studies (Deutsch & Collins, 1951), archival research (Fine, 1979), survey research (Herek & Capitanio, 1996), and laboratory studies (Cook, 1978; Desforges et al., 1991) in relation to the effect of positive contact on levels of prejudice. In fact, in a meta-analysis of studies assessing this relationship, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) found that overall there is support for the contact hypothesis. However, few, if any, studies have assessed the relationship between the contact hypothesis and intergroup conflict and more specifically crime.

On the other hand, Blau's macrostructural opportunity theory has found much support in relation to the effect of the opportunity for intergroup contact on intergroup conflict. For instance, Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D'Alessio (2006) found that the size of the black population was related to white on black crime but not to black on white crime, suggesting that as the black population increases in size the opportunity for a white person to come into contact with a black person increases resulting in an increase in white on black conflict.

These theories and more have been used to explain prejudice and discrimination as well as both formal and informal social control. Given that hate crime is a form of both prejudiced behavior and informal social control these theories may be used to explain this phenomenon. However, given the multitude of different hypotheses that may be drawn from these theories, many of which are opposing, it is important to focus on a single theory. For the purpose of this dissertation the guiding framework is the basic minority threat hypothesis described by Blalock. This theory is meant to apply to all forms of discrimination and prejudicial behavior across all minority-majority group

comparisons. As such it provides a starting point for examinations of the trends in hate crime.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The minority threat framework provides five specific research questions that will be examined in the analysis.

1. Is there a relationship between the relative size of the minority population and the number of hate crimes in a state?

2. Is the political strength of the minority group related to the number of hate crimes in a state?

3. Does the level of economic competition in a state relate to the number of hate crimes?

4. Does the level of economic competition in a state or the political strength of the minority group explain the relationship between the relative size of the minority population and hate crime if one exists?

5. Are these relationships linear or curvilinear?

The specific expectations are illustrated by Table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1: Summary of Predictions based on Minority Threat Framework and Prior Research

	Dependent Variable		
Concept	African-American	Hispanic	Gay/Lesbian
Minority Group Size	+*	+*	+*
Minority/Majority Economic Competition	+*	+*	NS
Minority Group Political Power	+*	+*	+*

* Indicates the theory proposes the relationship should be curvilinear

SUMMARY

In summary, hate crimes are those actions that are committed against a member of a protected category based on their membership in that protected group. These crimes result in more severe consequences for the victim and for the group in which they belong and as such have resulted in several types of legal remedies. Because the motivation of the offender is the primary factor in distinguishing hate crime from other crimes it is this motivation that researchers and theorists attempt to explain. As such the theories that have been used to explain levels of hate crime are those that were originally developed to explain prejudice and discrimination. These theories include minority threat, defended neighborhoods, and macrostructural opportunity theory. Each of these relates the size or distribution of the minority group population to the prevalence of intergroup conflict. This study examines the relationship between these theories and the level of hate crime in a state while controlling for other potential covariates.

The following chapter reviews the relevant empirical literature on contextual influences on hate crime.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RESEARCH

Given the nature of discourse in the social sciences on race and other minority characteristics, it is not surprising that there has been much empirical research on the subject. The theories discussed in chapter one have received considerable attention. Less attention has been paid to the macro level covariates of hate crime. These empirical studies and the ways in which this study builds on them are discussed in the following pages.

HATE CRIME CONTEXT

Within Jurisdictional Variation in Hate Crime

While few studies have assessed the prevalence of hate crime on a national scale (for an example of this in Germany see King & Brustein, 2006), several studies have examined the incidence of hate crime within single jurisdictions or states. Two cities, Chicago and New York, have been studied in great depth. Lyons (2007) applied a social disorganization and defended neighborhoods framework to the prevalence of racially motivated crime using data from the Chicago Police Department. He finds limited support for the social disorganization framework in relation to racially motivated crime, as well as support for the defended neighborhoods hypothesis. Specifically, he finds no significant relationship between residential mobility, measured as the percent of the population who moved in the past five years, and either anti-white or anti-black incidents; however, economic disadvantage measured using the index of concentration at extremes (ICE) and racial composition measured as percent black, percent white, and percent

Hispanic, are significantly related to racially motivated crime. Lyons also finds that "the effect of informal social control on antiblack hate crime increases in racially homogenous white communities that are experiencing recent in-migration of black newcomers" (Lyons, 2007:841).

Likewise, Lyons (2008), applying a racial threat, defended neighborhoods, and ethnic heterogeneity framework to anti-black and anti-white incidents in Chicago, finds that increases in the black population result in increases in anti-black hate crimes when the community is predominantly white consistent with the defended neighborhoods proposition. On the other hand, a similarly white neighborhood not experiencing this increase in the black population did not experience the same increase in anti-black hate crimes (Lyons, 2008). Lyons also finds support for the racial threat arguments. Finally, in regards to the ethnic heterogeneity predictions, Lyons finds that communities with high heterogeneity, that is where there is a higher likelihood of interaction between blacks and whites, experience more anti-white hate crimes.

Green and colleagues (1998b) assessed the defended neighborhoods hypothesis in relation to racially motivated crime in New York City. The authors conclude that anti-Asian, anti-Latino, and anti-Black hate crime are influenced by a combination of a historically and predominantly white neighborhood and a growth in the minority population (Green et al., 1998b).

Likewise, Green and colleagues (2001) examined the relationship between population density and hate crime, specifically focusing on the density of the gay and lesbian population and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime. The authors conclude that there is a relationship between population density and hate crime, with neighborhoods with a

higher concentration of gay men or lesbians experiencing more anti-gay or lesbian hate crime respectively.

In another study, using data from the New York City Police Department's Bias Incident Investigative Unit (BIIU), Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998a) assessed the relationship between changes in economic conditions, specifically the unemployment rate, and monthly counts of hate crime incidents. The authors found little support for the argument that patterns of hate crime prevalence are related to or explained by fluctuations in the economic conditions in the city.

Finally, using a larger aggregate, specifically North Carolina, Green and Rich (1998) explored the relationship between white supremacist activity on the part of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and cross burnings. The authors find that a county's first white supremacist rally increased the incidence of cross burning (Green & Rich, 1998).

Prior research on the macro level context of hate crime suggests overall that there is a relationship between demographic changes and hate crime. However, this research has focused on single jurisdictions and as such while we know a great deal about those jurisdictions we cannot generalize to other jurisdictions based on these studies and so it is difficult to inform large scale policy based on these small scale studies. Additionally, the exclusive focus on single cities or states limits the generalizability of the findings. Thus it is the purpose of this dissertation to expand on this prior research by examining multiple jurisdictions and prevalence by using a national database of hate crime incident counts.

Hate Crime Reporting: An Alternative to Prevalence

One question that has plagued hate crime researchers interested in the prevalence of the event is whether it is possible to distinguish prevalence from reporting behavior using official crime statistics. Bowling (1993) acknowledges one study which suggests the true prevalence of racial violence in Great Britain is ten times that estimated by the Home Office using police records. Likewise, an analysis of data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) found that only 43.8% of hate crimes are reported to the police and only 44.1% of violent hate crimes are reported to the police (Harlow, 2005). In comparing the statistics of the NCVS and the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) indicated that 9,222 individual victims of hate crime were reported in the UCR in 2002 while the NCVS estimated approximately 190,840 annual hate crime incidents.

In addition to these attempts to measure what is commonly referred to as the "dark figure" of hate crime, many studies have examined the differential reporting practices of jurisdictions. For instance, in 1994, with "7,298 participating agencies, only 1,150 (or 16%) reported hate crimes as having actually occurred in their jurisdictions" (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999:113). Likewise, Nolan and Akiyama conclude that between 84% and 85% of jurisdictions reporting to the UCR each year report zero hate crimes.

This preponderance of zeros in the hate crime data has prompted some researchers to examine the correlates of reporting by police jurisdictions, police officers, and victims. McDevitt and colleagues (2003) categorized these correlates into two groups. The first are individual inhibitors and the second are police disincentives. Each of these factors that affect hate crime reporting are tied to one of seven key decision points in the

reporting of hate crime incidents. First, the victim must understand that a crime has been committed. Second, the victim must recognize that hate may be a motivating factor. Third, the victim or some other party must contact the police to intervene. Fourth, the victim or another party must communicate the possible motivation of the crime to the police. Fifth, the police officer must recognize the hate motivation. Sixth, the law enforcement officer must document the hate motivation and charge the suspect with a hate/bias offense. Finally, the law enforcement officer records the incident and submits the information to the UCR's Hate Crime Reporting Unit (McDevitt et al., 2003:79). The results of the study by McDevitt and colleagues suggest that a breakdown in the process of compiling hate crime reports causes many discrepancies between the perception of the prevalence of hate crime and the official records. This breakdown the authors suggest may occur at two points in the process: between the submission of reports by the local law enforcement agency to a state agency which then compiles the hate crime reports or between the notation of the bias motivation in a report and the report's arrival with the officer in charge of reporting.

Among the individual level predictors of non-reporting, police officers have identified policies that sensationalize hate crime to be burdensome and thus less likely to be followed by the police. Officers have also suggested personal beliefs as a reason for non-reporting. That is "they believe that all crimes of similar magnitude should be treated the same" (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999: 114). Levin (1992) suggests "police officers are conditioned to identify crimes based on the severity of injury or the magnitude of property damage… not on the basis of motive" (quoted in Nolan & Akiyama, 1999:114).

"The police believe that the most salient factors in discouraging victims from reporting is the police/victim interaction" (McDevitt et al., 2003:84).

Among the organizational predictors of non-reporting, Nolan and Akiyama (1999) cite insufficient resources and a belief on the part of administrators that the "identification of traditional crimes as hate crimes could divide their jurisdictions along racial lines" (p. 115).

In addition to the processes that may hinder the reporting of hate crime to the UCR, McDevitt and colleagues (2003) also suggest four elements that may encourage reporting. First, the presence of a formal hate crime policy may encourage reporting. Prior research (Walker & Katz, 1995; Nolan & Akiyama, 1999) has suggested that police officers will often follow policies they view as legitimate, and that they view most written formal policies as legitimate, suggesting that a formal hate crime policy would lead to more reporting. Additionally, the level of supervision or review of hate crime incidents can influence reporting; specifically, a more intense review process can increase reporting. Third, the presence of a single specialized officer or a unit designated to deal with hate crime may increase reporting. Finally, specialized training of police officers on matters of hate crime recognition and investigation can increase reporting. McDevitt and colleagues point out that each of these characteristics is more likely to be present in larger police departments.

Given the disparities in reporting, the majority of research examining the contextual covariates of hate crime, as illustrated in the previous section, has focused on within jurisdiction variation. Indeed, when a count of hate crimes has been used as a dependent variable at the national level, it has been assessed as an indicator of

compliance with hate crime law instead of an indicator of prevalence (King, Messner, & Baller, 2009). It is my belief, however, that it is possible to control for reporting practices and to begin to examine the variation in prevalence of hate crime across jurisdictions. Indeed, an examination of agencies that were consistent contributors[6] to the UCR hate crimes data collection revealed that "trends in the reported hate crimes by the consistent contributors are very similar to the trends reported … by all participating agencies" (Nolan et al., 2002:143). Thus, an additional question examined here is whether the minority threat relationships hold up when controlling for the reporting practices and differential definitions of hate crime in states?

TESTING THEORIES

Minority Threat

The majority of the early studies on minority threat treated threat as being manifested by the simple presence of a minority population. However, in Blumer's (1958) original description of the way in which racial prejudice manifested itself, and continuing into the more recent racial threat formulations, threat is treated as something that is not directly manifested by the presence of the minority group, but rather manifested through the perception of that group as threatening the political or economic status of the majority or their safety. This change in the conceptualization of threat resulted in a movement away from the use of the size of the minority population as the sole indicator of threat, and towards the use of direct measures of the intervening factors that are thought to result in perceptions of threat.

[6] Consistent contributors were defined as police agencies that "(a) participated in the national hate crime program each year from 1995 through 1998 and (b) during this time they reported at least one hate crime to the FBI" (Nolan et al., 2002:142).

Blalock (1967) suggested that at the time that he wrote his book it was not possible to directly measure discrimination, nor the intervening factors in his theory. The majority of studies that came out after this original statement of the theory simply took the size of the black population, usually measured using the decennial census and percent black, and suggested a relationship between this measure and various forms of social control or discrimination. This measurement was heavily criticized during the last two decades (Chamlin & Cochran, 2000) due primarily to the suggestion that percent black was merely measuring the size of the crime prone population and was not an indicator of threat.

Two major patterns present themselves in examining the minority threat literature. First, attempts to measure the curvilinear relationship through the use of quadratic measures and threshold effects have shown limited support. The binary measures intended to capture a proposed threshold effect (Wilson & Ruback, 2003; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2005) are based on the theoretical assumption that there is a point at which the relationship between the size of the minority population and social control changes direction (e.g., from positive to negative) or changes shape (e.g., begins to change at an increasing or decreasing rate). For instance, Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) proposed that capital punishment would be more likely in jurisdictions with a larger African-American population, so they specifically included a dichotomous measure indicating jurisdictions that were over 6.4% African-American (the state median) in their models. While this threshold effect was not significant in predicting the number of death sentences in states, it was significant and negative in relation to the absence of death sentences, indicating that where the size of the black population was

small there was a greater likelihood that the state would not sentence an offender to death consistent with what would be predicted based on the racial threat propositions.

In addition to the threshold effect, several continuous measures have also been examined. In an attempt to get at the curvilinear relationship, researchers have often included a quadratic transformation of the percent minority measures. The theoretical assumption behind the use of this measure is that at the extreme, that is where the minority population represents a very small proportion of the overall population or a very large proportion of the overall population, the social control of that group should be low. This is due to the idea that blacks are considered less threatening either because there are too few of them to produce tension or because they are the majority group in the population. An opposite proposal, that at the extremes social control should be at its highest, because it is when there is greater disconnect between the minority and majority groups that the majority will feel most threatened, has also been suggested. These quadratic relationships have rarely found support in practice (Tolnay et al., 1989; Holmes, 2000; Holmes, Smith, Freng, & Muñoz, 2008).

Second, some researchers have moved away from the use of the percent minority measure seen in the majority of the early studies of minority threat (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Tolnay, Beck, & Massey, 1989; Crawford, Chiricos, and Kleck, 1998). This has resulted in several new operational definitions of Blalock's (1967) key explanatory factor, the relative size of the minority population.

As a result of the criticisms against the use of the percent minority measure in studies of minority threat, especially that percent minority is truly measuring the crime prone population instead of threat, researchers began to directly measure the intervening

factors that Blalock (1967) and others suggested, even though Blalock originally proposed that the intervening factors could not be directly measured. Specifically, Blalock suggested that discrimination could not be directly measured, and so what he referred to as "inequalities" (p. 144) such as segregation which could be directly measured, were considered. The assumption was that discrimination would be the intervening mechanism by which the size of the minority population affected those inequalities. While discrimination has not been directly measured, more recent research has assessed the relationship between the size of the black population and measures of racial prejudice (Stults & Baumer, 2007). As Allport (1954) suggests, discrimination is one action in which a person can display prejudice. With this in mind, it is possible that racial prejudice, though not a direct measure of discrimination, is a close proxy.

The other mediating factors in which Blalock (1967) was interested but unable to directly capture, for economic threat, consisted of: a labor surplus, economic instability, and a lack of education or resources of dominant group members. For power threat, the mediating factors were political instability and the minority group allying itself with a powerful outside enemy of the majority. In recent research, more direct measures indicating economic threat and political threat have been proposed (Stults & Baumer, 2007).

Studies have attempted to directly measure economic and political threat in several ways. Economic threat, for instance, has commonly been measured using some variation on unemployment. Many studies have used the simple measure of the percent of the population that is unemployed to measure labor surplus (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004). Other studies have used what is commonly referred to as economic inequality

which has been defined as the ratio of black to white unemployment (Eitle et al., 2002) or the difference between white and black per capita income (Crawford et al., 1998; Jacobs & Helms, 1999; Britt, 2000). Additional studies have relied on the Gini coefficient, which is calculated as the average difference in income between all pairs of individuals in an area relative to the mean income of the area (Liska, Chamlin, & Reed, 1985; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003; Parker & Maggard, 2005). These measures have found mixed support in the literature. For instance, one study found an increase in the ratio of black to white per capita income to be significantly related to a decrease in the risk of incarceration (Britt, 2000). In contrast, Eitle and colleagues (2002) did not find a significant relationship between economic threat, measured as the ratio of black to white unemployment, and blacks' likelihood of arrest.

Similar to these attempts to measure economic threat, researchers have begun to directly measure political threat. Jacobs and Helms (1999) suggested race riots as a measure of political threat, using the natural log of the cumulative sum of riots to predict correctional expenditures. The findings indicate that an increase in the number of race riots was significantly and positively related to spending on corrections. Chamlin and Cochran (2000) also proposed that "race-related riots pose a direct physical and symbolic threat to the white majority and elites" (p. 87). Specifically, they suggested that the incidence of robbery arrests would increase following the 1967 race-related riot in Cincinnati, Ohio. The authors did not find a significant relationship between the race riot and robbery arrests. While, Chamlin and Cochran chose robbery as their outcome because it was thought to be "characterized as being more threatening to superordinate than subordinate groups" (p. 88), it is possible the use of a civil disorder measure, such as

race riots, would be more effective at predicting disorder related crimes than at predicting economic crimes.

Two other measures have been used to measure political threat. First, the ratio of black-to-white voting in South Carolina was proposed to be positively related to black arrests in the state, although this prediction was not supported (Eitle et al., 2002). Second, Stults and Baumer (2007) suggested the use of the ratio of elected black political officials to the proportion of the voting-age population that is black as an indicator of political threat. Similar to a number of other studies in which political threat was directly captured, Stults and Baumer's indicator was not significantly related to private police force size.

Additional direct measures of the proposed intervening mechanisms in the racial threat literature have been developed through the introduction and more widespread use of social surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American Mosaic Survey (AMS).

Stults and Baumer (2007), for instance, used measures from the GSS to assess the mediating processes between the size of the minority population and private police force size. The authors found a nonlinear relationship between the size of the black population and private police force size. Stults and Baumer then applied linear and quadratic measures of the economic threat, fear of crime, and racial prejudice measures to directly assess intervening mechanisms and their effect on the relationship between the black population and private police force size. Both the economic threat and fear of crime extensions of the racial threat propositions were supported. Specifically, the researchers concluded that relative to the economic threat perspective, "explicit efforts by the

majority to maintain economic dominance are likely to occur as the black population grows in relative size, but become less necessary as blacks begin to make up a substantial portion of the population" consistent with the significant nonlinear functional forms (Stults & Baumer, 2007: 536).

Likewise, King and Wheelock (2007), using the AMS to look at the association between the relative size of the minority population and punitive attitudes, proposed that "for white respondents, perceptions of racial threat explain the association between punitive attitudes and aggregate demographics and economic conditions" (p. 1261). The authors found a relationship between the change in the size of the black population and punitive attitudes suggesting that whites are more likely to be punitive in counties that experienced a recent in-migration of black residents. In addition, King and Wheelock found a significant and positive relationship between their measures of perceived threat and punitive attitudes that attenuated the relationship between change in black population size and punitive attitudes, but did not explain the relationship fully.

Summary

Research on minority threat has received mixed support. First, the proposed direct effect of the relative size of the black population on various measures of social control has been supported overall both in the positive formulation (Britt, 2000; Holmes, 2000; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001; Smith & Holmes, 2003; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2005) and the negative (or benign-neglect) formulation (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Eitle et al., 2005; Parker & Maggard, 2005). In addition, the curvilinear relationship has found some support in the quadratic (Jacobs et al., 2005) and the threshold effect (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004), but has also failed to find support in some studies (Holmes, 2000;

Cureton, 2000; Holmes et al., 2008). The economic threat hypothesis has been supported in relation to sentencing (Britt, 2000), incarceration (Jacobs & Carmichael, 2001), and police force size (D'Alessio et al., 2004). Political threat has also found support in relation to informal social control (King & Brustein, 2006), but has generally not been supported in relation to formal social control (Chamlin & Cochran, 2000; Stults & Baumer, 2007). The fear of crime mediation, or threat of black crime hypothesis, has found some support in relation to capital punishment (Jacobs et al., 2005). Finally, the perceived threat measures have found support generally for the economic threat and threat of black crime hypotheses (Stults & Baumer, 2007; King & Wheelock, 2007).

INTERRACIAL CRIME

By its very nature, bias crime is often interracial crime. While there has been little research on the prevalence of bias crime, non-bias interracial crime has been examined in some detail. This literature may be important for informing the analysis of bias motivated intergroup crime to the extent that all intergroup crime is similar. The majority of this research assesses the correlates of interracial homicide rates although a few recent studies have begun looking at interracial assault and robbery (Hipp, Tita, & Boggess, 2009).

The majority of studies of interracial crime have assessed three theoretical frameworks. First, Blau's macrostructural opportunity theory, discussed earlier, has been a primary focus of research on interracial homicide particularly (Messner & Golden, 1992; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Parker & McCall, 1999; Wadsworth & Kubrin, 2004;

McCall & Parker, 2005). This is due in large part to Blau's focus on the relationship between opportunity structure and the prevalence of crime.

Second, many researchers have focused on a frustration-aggression framework (Blau & Blau, 1982) to explain the motivation behind interracial crime (Messner & Golden, 1992; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Parker & McCall, 1999; Wasdsworth & Kubrin, 2004; McCall & Parker, 2005; Hipp et al., 2009). Specifically, frustration-aggression explanations hold that blacks (or other minorities) may feel compelled to succeed in the same spheres that whites have enjoyed success in for centuries, specifically work related avenues, but due to their subordinate status their means of achieving that success is limited. This inability to achieve success will result in frustration which will lead minorities to attempt to find relief for that frustration. This relief will come through aggressive action, in this case through violent action, directed at the perceived source of the frustration, in this case the dominant white population. In other words, the frustration-aggression hypothesis would suggest that as black economic opportunities decrease, blacks offending toward whites should increase.

Third, studies have assessed the relationship between social disorganization and interracial crime (Messner & Golden, 1992; Parker & McCall, 1999; Hipp et al., 2009). Based on the work of Shaw and McKay (1942) and further developed by Bursik (1988) social disorganization theory suggests that as the structural conditions in a neighborhood deteriorate and communities become more socially disorganized, they will lose their ability to maintain effective social control. In today's cities racial heterogeneity and residential mobility contribute to racial segregation in the inner city. This segregation

causes further deterioration and poverty in the inner city which in turn further weakens controls. These weakened controls result in increasing crime rates.

Studies assessing the relationship between these three theoretical perspectives and interracial homicide or violent crime have found mixed results. Messner and Golden (1992) find support for the frustration-aggression framework in relation to overall homicide, white offending, and black offending, but not for overall interracial homicide. Later work by Jacobs and Wood (1999) criticizes the use of the overall interracial homicide rate due to the assertion that Blau's structural theory in particular would predict differing relationships for black offender-white victim crimes and white offender-black victim crimes. Specifically, Blau would suggest that cities with few blacks will have a higher rate of black on white offending due to the increased likelihood of a black person coming into contact with a white person. However, the opposite effect would be true for white on black offending, because whites will have a lower likelihood of coming into contact with a black person in this situation. Jacobs and Wood thus disaggregate interracial homicide to account for these differing patterns and find support for Blau's theory in both analyses. Specifically, they find that "in cities with relatively few blacks… the association between the percentage of blacks and black killings of whites [is] negative" (Jacobs & Wood, 1999:179).

In a recent study by Hipp and colleagues (2009), the relationship between social disorganization, conflict theories as discussed earlier and interracial robbery and assault within Los Angeles was assessed. This analysis uses more recent data, from 2000 to 2006, and assesses the relationship between racial inequality, racial composition, and inter and intra-racial crime both within and between census tracts; however, the results do

not support Blau's theory. On the other hand, the authors find general support for a social disorganization model. Specifically, the authors find that for intragroup violence absolute racial inequality was associated with more violence for Latinos and African-Americans. The authors also find that relative inequality was positively associated with Latino on Black robbery.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The United States has a long history of violent behavior on the basis of prejudice (e.g., lynching). The most recent incarnation of this violence has been hate crime. Since the 1980s hate crime has been part of the policy debate in this country. Additionally, hate crime has become a part of research in many social sciences including psychology, sociology, and criminology. This research has suggested that hate crimes are distinct from other crimes in their effect on the victims and in the extent of the effect the crime has on the community at large. Given the findings of prior research, and the increased attention paid to hate crime in the political arena, gaining a better understanding of the phenomenon will lend itself to more effective policy discussions.

Research on crime in general has shown that human behavior, specifically criminal behavior, does not occur absent the environment. In fact, research in psychology suggests that all human behavior is shaped by the world around us. Macro level studies of crime suggest that crime is often a function of opportunity or criminogenic environments. This emphasis on the macro level context of crime has not been a major area of research on hate crime, however.

Prior research on the macro level context of hate crime suggests that demographic changes, intergroup contact, and a lack of economic disadvantage are related to an increased prevalence of hate crime. However, what is known about the macro level context of hate crime is based on a handful of studies conducted in two primary locations. The extent to which the findings of these studies may be generalized to other jurisdictions and other time periods is not known. In an effort to fill this gap in the empirical literature on hate crime this dissertation assesses the macro level context of hate crime using a database of hate crime incidents over a large number of jurisdictions and from recent years.

Additionally, the prior research on the macro level context of hate crime has tended to focus on racially motivated incidents. The same is true of studies using the minority threat framework to assess crime in general. In an effort to extend this minority threat framework into other groups this dissertation examines minority threat as a mechanism to explain other group dynamics beyond black-white.

The following chapter describes the methods that will be used to answer the questions listed in chapter 1.

CHAPTER 3

DATA AND VARIABLES

Sources

Data is drawn from eleven sources for the purposes of answering the research questions posed in chapter 1. First, the 2000-2007 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) is used for the hate crime measures. Collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the UCR provides information on all crimes known to the police. The *Hate Crimes Statistics* publication produced by the FBI provides counts of all known hate crimes since 1995 for all reporting law enforcement jurisdictions, cities, counties, and states. This publication also breaks down this information by the type of hate crime, including race, religion, ethnicity/national origin, sexual orientation, and disability.

The second, widely used in research on various topics, is the United States decennial census. The census is collected every ten years by the United States Census Bureau and provides aggregate population counts as well as economic indicators at various levels of aggregation. State level data is drawn from the 2000 census. Additionally, because the decennial census is only conducted every 10 years, and thus the 2010 census is only now being conducted, it is necessary to draw inter-censal estimates from another source. This source is the American Community Survey (ACS). This survey was fully implemented in 2002, and involves the collection of population data for each year. Because the ACS did not begin until 2002 and the census is only available for 2000, linear interpolation is used to compute the 2001 estimates for the variables of interest.

Fourth, several sources provide additional measures of minority threat. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides information on immigration patterns into the United States. The *Immigration Yearbook* published each year by DHS provides counts of several types of immigrants as well as information on their origin and destination. Additionally, for the gay and lesbian analysis, two groups that may feel particularly "threatened" by a growing homosexual population are political conservatives and religious fundamentalists. For the purpose of measuring conservatism, data is drawn from *Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections*. Religious fundamentalism data is drawn from the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Survey.

In addition, in order to control for organizational factors that may influence the reporting of hate crime to the UCR (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999), data is drawn from the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) from 2000 and 2003. Linear interpolation was used for the inter-survey years.

Political threat indicators were drawn from the Current Population Survey's (CPS) Voting and Registration Supplement. These represent the voting behavior of the minority groups. Additionally, a second political threat indicator was drawn from the Joint Center for Political and Social Research's (JCPSR) Roster of Black Elected Officials. Finally, in order to account for the political power of gays and lesbians data was drawn from the Human Rights Campaign and confirmed by state statutes and reports of court cases on the provision of civil rights protections for same-sex couples and homosexual individuals.

Table 3.1: Explanation of Predictors and Modeling Structure

	Dependent Variable			
Independent Variables	African-American	Hispanic	Gay/Lesbian	Description
%Blk/%Wh	X			Ratio of Black to White in State
Hispanic Immigration		X		Hispanic immigration rate per 100,000
W/B Unemployment	X			Ratio of White to Black Unemployed
H/W Unemployment		X		Ratio of Hispanic to White Unemployed
H/B Unemployment		X		Ratio of Hispanic to Black Unemployed
% Black Voters	X			% of Blacks age 18+ who Voted
% African-American Legislators	X			% of State Legislators who are African-American
% Hispanic Voters		X		% of Hispanics age 18+ who voted
Total Poverty	X	X		% of Population living below the Federal Poverty Line
% Young White Males	X	X		% of White Male population age 18 to 29
West	X	X		State in Western US
South	X	X		State in Southern US
% Urban	X	X		% of State Population residing in cities over 100,000
% Population Covered	X	X	X	% of State Population Covered by Reporting Agencies
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	X	X	X	% of Reporting Agencies indicating a Non-Zero Count
Aggravated Assault Rate	X	X		Aggravated Assault rate per 100,000
Reporting Statute	X	X		State has reporting statute only
Criminal Statute	X	X		State has criminal statute only
Reporting and Criminal Statute	X	X		State has both a reporting and a criminal statute
Police per Capita	X	X		Number of Police officers per 100,000
% Community Policing	X	X		% of Agencies indicating a Community Policing Policy
% Bias Unit	X	X		% of Agencies indicating the presence of a bias Unit or Other Specialized Personnel

Table 3.1: Explanation of Predictors and Modeling Structure

	Dependent Variable			
Independent Variables	African-American	Hispanic	Gay/Lesbian	Description
Sexual Orientation Statute	X	X		Sexual Orientation included as Protected Category
Disability Statute	X	X		Disability included as Protected Category
Bias Statute	X	X		Motivation is "because of" bias as opposed to hatred
Perception Statute	X	X		Statute includes perception clause
Civil Rights Statute	X	X		Statute is a civil rights statute
Freestanding Statute	X	X		Statute is a freestanding statute
Modifying Statute	X	X		statute is a modifying statute
Coattailing Statute	X	X		statute is a coattailing statute
Hispanic Population		X		Total Hispanic Population
Black Population	X			Total Black Population
% Same Sex HH			X	% of Unmarried Partner Households with Same-Sex Partners
% Republican			X	% Voting Republican
Evangelical Adherence			X	Rate per 1,000 of Evangelical Adherents
G/L Political Power			X	Gay and Lesbian Political Power Scale

Finally, due to the differing structures of hate crime law discussed previously (i.e. the absence of sexual orientation and/or disability from many statutes) and the possible discrepancies in reporting behavior across states, it is possible that some areas may treat hate crime differently than others. In order to control for this possible recording bias, data is collected from the state statutes themselves. Each statute is available online. The

coding of these statutes is discussed shortly. For a summary of which indicators are used in which analysis, see Table 3.1.[7]

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for the examination of trends in hate crime in this study is the state. The state was selected for two primary reasons. First, the state is the vehicle through which policy is made. Law makers produce policy at the state level. These policies filter down to the lower aggregations such that all jurisdictions in a state are subject to them. Thus, in order to inform policy the state is the ideal unit to examine. Second, hate crime is an extremely rare event, at least in terms of those crimes that come to the attention of the police. As a result there is limited variability at smaller levels of aggregation. The state as a result provides considerably more variability than these smaller units. Despite these benefits, the state is a heterogeneous unit. This heterogeneity may influence the results of the analysis. Specifically, it is possible that the heterogeneity of states may suppress some of the relationships that may be found at lower levels of aggregation. In other words, the increased heterogeneity of states may make it more difficult to detect a relationship between the predictors and hate crime. This is possible due to the fact that race, ethnicity, and other group characteristics are not evenly distributed in a state. For instance states that are more rural may have the greatest concentration of minorities in a small land area, such as a single large city, and thus the state as a whole may have fewer hate crimes. This is addressed here using a control indicator for percent urban described shortly.

[7] Due to data limitations discussed further in chapter 6, the gay/lesbian analysis was limited to only a few covariates.

Dependent Variables

The analysis involves the examination of three dependent variables. Each of these represents the number of bias crimes that occurred in the state each year from 2000 to 2007. There are a total of 51 states[8] (the 50 United States plus the District of Columbia) in the analysis. These count measures include the *total number of anti-black bias crimes, the total number of anti-Hispanic bias crimes, and the total number of anti-homosexual*[9] *bias crimes.* These represent three of the five major categories of bias crimes available in the UCR data. The two not included here are anti-religious incidents and anti-disability incidents. Anti-disability incidents represent such a small percentage of reported hate crime incidents each year that there are not enough incidents to be able to estimate a reliable regression model. Anti-religious incidents occur at about the same rate as sexual orientation crimes; however, the examination of this category is outside the scope of the present study.

Predictors

The relationship between several contextual indicators and bias crime is assessed. The indicators drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002-2007 ACS include indicators of the relative size of the minority population as defined by Blalock. Blalock suggests that it is not the overall size of the minority population, but the size of the minority group relative to the majority. As such indicators include the ratio of blacks to whites in the population, the percent of the population that is of Hispanic origin, and finally a proxy for the gay and lesbian population. Additionally, the rate of Hispanic immigration is included. This indicator is used to assess growth in the Hispanic

[8] Due to some data limitations this sample was limited in the anti-homosexual analysis.
[9] Anti-Homosexual bias crimes are defined by the UCR as anti-lesbian (female homosexual), anti-gay (male homosexual), and anti-homosexual. Anti-bisexual crimes will also be included in this measure.

population that can be attributed to a subgroup of the minority that may be considered particularly threatening to the majority group. Specifically, immigrants may be seen as a threat to the job security of the majority group since it is believed that many immigrants are willing to work for less pay and do not pay the same taxes (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997). This is drawn from the Department of Homeland Security's *Immigration Yearbook* for the years 2000 to 2007.

Also from the Census and ACS, in line with the economic threat perspectives, several measures of the economy are included where appropriate. Blalock refers to competition between groups. In an effort to capture this competition, indicators of the unemployment ratio, the income ratio, and the poverty ratio are included.

Also in line with the minority threat framework, the concept of political threat is measured using data from three sources. First, the Current Population Survey from 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 provides measures of participation in voting. Specifically, the percent of blacks over the age of 18 who voted in a given election year and the percent of Hispanics over the age of 18 who voted in a given election year are used. For non-election years the prior year's figures are used. In other words, the 2000 figures are used for 2001, etc. Second, the Joint Center for Political and Social Research publishes the Roster of Black Elected Officials each year. This provides an indicator of the percent of state legislators who are African-American. The political threat hypothesis would suggest that more participation in the political arena by the minority group will lead to a greater level of perceived threat and thus will lead to more hate crime. Finally, gay and lesbian political power is assessed using a proxy measure created by examining the civil

rights protections afforded gay and lesbian couples and individuals and developing a summative scale. This scale is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.

In addition to these minority, economic, and political threat indicators, control measures are drawn from the Census and ACS data. First, prior research (Comstock, 1991; Berrill, 1992; Messner et al., 2004) suggests that the majority of hate crime offenders are young white males. In order to control for differences in the size of the offending population the percent of the state population who are white males age 18 to 29 is included. Additionally, in order to control for some of the heterogeneity of states an indicator of the percent of the state population living in cities over 100,000 population (percent urban) is included. Finally, controls for the region the state is in are included. Additionally, a control for the overall economic conditions of the state is included in the form of the total percent poor. This is done in order to ensure that the indicators of competition are picking up competition and not the overall economy of the state.

A number of organizational measures, consistent with research looking at the reporting of crime statistics and in particular hate crime reporting, are drawn from both the LEMAS and the UCR data in an effort to control for reporting effects. First, the *average size of the police departments* is included. Prior research (McDevitt et al, 2003) has suggested that larger police agencies are more likely to have a hate crime policy, greater supervision over hate crime incidents, specialized training, and specialized officers or units to deal with hate crime each of which has been shown to encourage reporting. This indicator is drawn from the FBI's *Crime in the United States* publication for each year. Second, an indicator for the percent of police agencies in the state that maintain a *specialized officer or unit* for the investigation of hate crime is included from

the LEMAS dataset. It is likely that states that have more of these specialized units will be more sensitive to hate crime and will thus report more hate crime. The LEMAS dataset also provides an indicator of the percent of police agencies in the state that have a *community policing policy or program*. Prior research (Martin, 1996) suggests that community policing agencies may be more sensitive to the concerns of the community, and thus may be more concerned with the issues of hate crime. As a result these agencies may lead to a greater level of reporting of hate crime.

Additionally, the UCR data provides two indicators of reporting practices. The first is the *percent of the population covered by reporting agencies* and the second is the *percent of agencies reporting non-zero counts*. States that report more should have higher hate crime counts.

An indicator of the aggravated assault rate is drawn from the UCR. Messner and colleagues (2004) suggest that hate crimes are similar to all aggravated assaults. Thus, it is expected that there should be more hate crimes where there are more aggravated assaults.

Finally, measures are coded by the researcher directly from the state hate crime statutes of each state in the analysis. These indicators include, first, whether the statute calls for the reporting of hate crime (1= reporting statute, 0=other; reference category), the criminalization of hate crime (1=criminalizing statute, 0=other), or both (1=both reporting and criminal statute, 0=other). States that have a reporting statute which requires the collection of hate crime statistics should report more to the hate crime data collection program. Additionally, the statutes are coded as to which type of statute the state has (see chapter 1 for a description of the different statute types; penalty

enhancement statutes are the reference category). It is possible that the varying definitions of hate crime from one state to another may influence the state's reporting of hate crime. Third, each statute is coded as to the handling of the motivational criteria. Specifically, if the statute defines a hate crime as a crime in which the victim was chosen "because of" their membership in a protected group the statute is coded as a "bias crime" statute (1=bias statute, 0=hate statute). If the statute uses another strategy for defining the motivational component of hate crime the statute is coded as a "hate crime" statute (see Jenness & Grattet, 2001: 87-90 for a more detailed discussion of the difference between these wording choices). Bias statutes are more broadly defined and thus should have more crimes categorized as hate crime. Along the same lines, the statutes are each coded according to whether they include a "perception clause" (i.e., a person commits a felony because he or she perceives the victim to have some quality: 1=perception clause, 0=no perception clause). Finally, each statute is coded according to the level of inclusion of different groups (i.e. does the state include sexual orientation and disability in their statute: 1=included, 0=not included).

The state of Missouri, for instance, includes provisions for enhanced penalties for crimes "which the state believes to be knowingly motivated because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation or disability of the victim or victims, the state may charge the crime or crimes under this section" (557.035 RSMo). The statute provides for an increase in the case of assault in the third degree from a class A misdemeanor (565.070. 2 RSMo) to a class D felony (557.035. 2 RSMo). Missouri does not have a reporting statute. Illinois on the other hand does have a data collection statute calling for "an electronic data processing and computer center for the storage and

retrieval of data pertaining to criminal activity" (ILCS 2605/2605-45. 4). As another example, Utah up until 2004 linked crime committed due to bias or prejudice to civil rights violations; however, in 2004 this bill was repealed and replaced by a penalty enhancement statute. For more detailed examples of the coding scheme see Appendix B.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

The analysis involves the regression of the count dependent variables on the predictors and controls. These incident count indicators are used to assess the relationship between the contextual indicators and the number of hate crimes in the state. Negative Binomial Regression for panel data is used to assess the effects of the relevant contextual indicators on each of the bias crime types. These models allow for the assessment of changes over time in the number of bias crimes within a state while controlling for variation across states. Negative Binomial Regression corrects for the overdispersion that is often apparent in event count models.

In order to estimate negative binomial regression models in the face of serial autocorrelation (or time dependence of errors)[10], generalized estimating equations (GEE) are used. These models allow for the estimation of a population averaged model in which the within-group correlation structure can be specified.

Drawing a Picture of Minority Threat

The three dependent variables are examined separately and as such the minority threat framework is applied differently to each. As mentioned previously anti-black hate crime has been examined to some extent in prior research using minority threat. The

[10] A test for serial autocorrelation (xtserial in Stata) was significant, suggesting that there is time dependence of errors in this data.

proposed hypotheses are: first, that as the relative size of the black population in a state increases the number of hate crimes against blacks should increase. This hypothesis comes straight from the traditional minority threat framework. Likewise, as the political power of the black population within the state increases and as the white population becomes more economically disadvantaged the number of hate crimes against blacks should increase consistent with the political and economic threat arguments. Finally, straight from the minority threat framework it is expected that black to white competition and black political power will mediate[11] the relationship between the size of the black population and hate crime. Additionally, Blalock proposes that these relationships may be curvilinear. That is the relationship should be positive but at some point it may turn negative.



Figure 3.1: Proposed relationship between minority threat and Anti-Black and Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime

For the anti-Hispanic analysis the predicted relationships are very much the same. For instance, as the size of the Hispanic population increases so should hate crimes

[11] A mediating relationship suggests that a third variable acts to generate the "mechanism through which the focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent variable of interest" (Baron & Kenny, 1986). This mediating variable should thus explain the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.

against them. Additionally, as Hispanic political power increases and majority economic power decreases anti-Hispanic hate crime should increase. Finally, Hispanic political power and majority economic power should mediate the relationship between Hispanic group size and hate crime. The relationships for both anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crime are illustrated by Figure 3.1.



Figure 3.2: Proposed relationship between minority threat and Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime

The anti-gay and lesbian analysis is limited to the predictions of minority threat and political threat. While it is likely that economics will play a role in the explanation of anti-gay and lesbian crime, it is not likely that heterosexuals will feel threatened economically by their homosexual counterparts. On the other hand, consistent with the minority threat hypothesis, it is expected that as the relative size of the gay and lesbian population increases hate crimes against them will increase. Likewise, as gays and lesbians gain in political power the political conservatives are likely to feel threatened and as such crimes against gays and lesbians should increase. Finally, extending the concept of threat, a leading argument for the marginalization of gays and lesbians has been the definition of their private sexual behavior as sinful. As such religious

fundamentalists, or those who believe strongly in the teachings of the Bible, are likely to feel threatened by an encroaching and politically powerful gay and lesbian population. Given this extension an increase in the prevalence of religious fundamentalism in a state should result in an increase in anti-homosexual hate crimes. Likewise, similar to the other relationships that the minority threat framework suggests, this relationship should be curvilinear, such that at some point the positive relationship may turn negative.

OUTLINE OF WHAT IS TO COME

The dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 4 examines the relationship between minority threat and anti-racial hate crimes. Specifically, this chapter presents the results of the regression of the number of anti-black hate crimes on the relative size of the black population, the black political strength and black to white economic competition. Chapter 5 applies minority threat to anti-ethnic hate crimes, specifically anti-Hispanic. Like the anti-black analysis, this analysis examines the relationship between Hispanic population size, Hispanic to white and black economic competition, Hispanic political power, and the number of anti-Hispanic hate crimes in a state. Chapter 6 extends the analysis of minority threat to anti-homosexual hate crimes, specifically assessing the relationship between the size of the gay and lesbian population, political conservatism, religious fundamentalism and the number of crimes against gays and lesbians in the state. Finally, the last chapter discusses the ways in which the findings may contribute to the policy debate on hate crime as well as future research.

CHAPTER 4

MINORITY THREAT, REPORTING, AND ANTI-RACIAL HATE

Introduction

Since the time of slavery racial animosity has been the motivating factor in violence of all kinds. Lynching in the 1800s and the early part of the 1900s led to the violence that today is called hate crime. The civil rights movement was one of the primary driving forces behind the development of civil rights violation statutes which, as mentioned in chapter 1, led directly to the development of hate crime laws in the 1980s and 90s. As such anti-racial hate crimes have been the primary focus of the majority of hate crime research. This chapter extends the prior research on anti-racial crimes by examining the predictors of anti-racial hate crimes from 2000 to 2007 applying in particular a minority threat framework.

Trends in Anti-Racial Hate Crime

Anti-racial hate crime incidents comprise upwards of 50% of all hate crime incidents each year. The hate crime reporting program began reporting data in 1995 and since that time the number of reported incidents has increased; however, as Figure 4.1 below suggests the overall hate crime rate has decreased. This could be an artifact of reporting. Perhaps the increase in the number of hate crimes reported is the result of an increase in participation in the hate crime reporting program by police jurisdictions. An increase in coverage may lead to artificial increases in the reported number of hate crimes that are not translated into changes in the rate of hate crime once the adjustment for population size has been made. Alternatively, it may be that hate crimes have been

decreasing. However, this is not supported by some of the other trends in the hate crime data.

Figure 4.1: Total Hate Crime Rate, 1995-2008



To examine the possibility that the hate crime rate is decreasing due to changes in the reporting practices of agencies, Figure 4.2 below shows the trend in the percent of the population that is covered by the Hate Crime Reporting Program during the same time period. Looking at each of these figures suggests that while the overall hate crime rate has been steadily decreasing since 1995, the coverage of the hate crime reporting program has actually increased, from a low of about 74% in 1995 to a high of about 87% in 2008. Thus it would seem that it is not a decrease in reporting that explains the decrease in the overall hate crime rate, suggesting that there are other mechanisms at work that drive the trend in hate crime. Does this trend appear the same across bias motivations? And if so, what could explain these trends?

To answer the first question, figure 4.3 below shows the rate of anti-black bias crimes over the course of the hate crime reporting program. The decline in the anti-black

hate crime rate appears similar to the overall trend in hate crime, with a relatively steady decline; although in the last few years the rate seems to have leveled off.

Figure 4.2: % Population Covered by Reporting Agencies, 1995-2008



Figure 4.3: Anti-Black Hate Crime Rate, 1995-2008



The above figures suggest that there is variation in hate crime over time, but what about across place. In order to answer that question I have graphed the hate crime rate at lower levels of aggregation beginning with the region (Figure 4.4) and then the state (Figure 4.5). The regional graph suggests that not only is there variation across the four regions of the United States, but that variation changes over time. For example, looking at the West, in 2000 and 2001 the West had the highest racial bias crime rate in the country; however, beginning in 2002 the Midwest surpassed the West to become the highest. Additionally, the South, a region typically associated with racial bigotry has the lowest racial hate crime rate in the country across all eight years. Perhaps Southern states simply report fewer hate crimes because they are less likely to take hate crime seriously. While this is an interesting question it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine this possibility.

Figure 4.4: Racial Bias Motivation by Region, 2000-2007



Looking at variation in the racial bias crime rate by state provides an even more intriguing picture. Figure 4.5 below shows the racial hate crime rate from 2000 to 2007

for five states. These five states were chosen to represent all four regions of the United States. California regularly reports the largest number of hate crimes of any state to the FBI. However, California is also the largest state in the union and as such the hate crime rate is not much higher than the other states. The racial hate crime rate decreased in California from 2000 to the present. On the other hand, the other states in the graph appear overall to have relatively stable racial hate crime rates over time, with slight increases or decreases in some years. Tennessee is interesting in that in 2001 there was a large increase in the racial hate crime rate unlike the other states in the graph. Otherwise, Tennessee seems to have decreased in its overall racial hate crime rate, while remaining stable since 2002. While this graph is not conclusive in regards to its examination of the variation across states, it does suggest that there are differences across states and within states on the rate of racially motivated bias crime. The following analysis attempts to explain this variation by applying the minority threat perspective to within and between state level variation in the number of anti-black hate crimes.

Figure 4.5: Race Bias Crime Rate per 100,000 for Five States, 2000-2007



Minority Threat and Anti-Black Hate Crime

In order to explain the variation seen in the graphs above, the minority threat framework will be used. As with Blalock's original framework, the minority threat hypothesis suggests that the relative size of the black population should be positively and significantly related to the number of hate crimes. Additionally, the minority threat framework proposes two mediating relationships. First, where there is more economic competition between blacks and whites (the minority and the majority) there should be more hate crime, and this relationship should mediate the effect of the relative size of the black population and hate crime. Second, where the minority population has a stronger political presence there should be more hate crime against them. Also, like the economic competition argument the relationship between the relative size of the black population and hate crime should be mediated by the political strength of the minority population.

Data and Variables

The dependent variable is drawn from the 2000-2007 Uniform Crime Reports Hate Crime Reporting Program and represents the *number of anti-Black hate crimes* in a given state year. On average there were approximately 53 anti-black hate crime incidents in a given state year with a range from 0 to 606.

The state characteristics include, most importantly, the indicators for the three concepts in the minority threat framework. First, the indicator for the *relative size of the minority population* is drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002-2007 American Community Survey and represents the ratio of blacks to whites in the population (% Black/% White). Second, the measure for economic threat is the *ratio of black to white unemployment* (% Black Unemployed/% White Unemployed). Finally,

there are two indicators for political threat. The first is drawn from the Current Population Survey's Voting and Registration Supplement for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. It represents the *percent of the black population over the age of 18 who voted* (% Black Voters). For the inter-electoral years (i.e. 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007) the previous year's estimates were used. The second political threat indicator is drawn from The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies roster of Black Elected Officials for the years 2000-2007 and represents the *percent of State Legislators who are African-American.*

In addition to these minority threat indicators and the control measures described in chapter 3, the *total black population* is included in the models as an indicator of exposure. The inclusion of an exposure term allows for the interpretation of the regression results in terms of the hate crime rate instead of hate crime counts. The effect of the exposure term on the dependent variable is estimated by the model; however, the coefficient is constrained to 1.

Analysis

Event count models allow for the examination of the effects of a set of predictors on a count dependent variable. The standard event count models used in criminology are negative binomial models which correct for the overdispersion that is often a problem in crime counts. However, negative binomial models for panel data are not efficient when there is serial autocorrelation in the errors. In order to adjust for this time dependence of the errors a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) is suggested. These models allow for the specification of the within-group correlation structure.

For a cross-sectional (t=1) model where k is the number of covariates and β is a k X 1 vector of parameters, the standard GEE model is:

(4.1)

Where

Φ is a scale parameter which may or may not be of substantive interest

V_i of Y_i is specified as a function of g of the mean.

$D_i = \mu_i / \beta$

For models in which t>1 (panel models), the GEE equation remains unchanged, however, Y_{it} is the dependent variable and X_{it} are the covariates, where i indexes the N units of analysis ("cases" or "clusters") and t indexes the T time points (or repeated measurements), such that $\mathbf{Y_{it}}$ is a column vector of observations, $\mathbf{X_{it}}$ is a T x k matrix of covariates and $E(Y_{it}) = \mu_i$. Where the model does change is in the estimation of V_i. Specifically, for cases where T > 1, we specify a T X T matrix $R_i(\alpha)$ which becomes the working correlation matrix. This correlation matrix then enters the variance term V_i

(4.2)

where A_i are T X T diagonal matrices with $g(\mu_{it})$ as the *t*th diagonal element (Zorn, 2001; Hardin & Hilbe, 2003).

For the purposes of the following analysis, the working correlation matrix is estimated through the autoregressive correlation structure in which

where . This estimates the within-group correlation structure which has the structure

where R denotes the working correlation matrix for modeling the within-group correlation. This structure suggests that the within-group correlation will be one on the diagonal and lagged by one otherwise. These models estimate the marginal effect or the average effect across panels (Stata Corp, 2005).

Results

The discussion of the results will start with a look at the descriptive statistics, presented in table 4.1 below, of the measures used in the analysis. Looking at the primary predictors, the average ratio of blacks to whites in the population is 0.27 with a range from 0 to 2.259. For this indicator, where the ratio of blacks to whites is between 0 and 1 whites make up a greater percent of the population than do blacks. Where the ratio of blacks to whites is greater than one, blacks make up a greater proportion of the population in the state than do whites. A value of 1 on this indicator suggests equilibrium between the two races. The ratio of black to white unemployment on average is 2.274 with a range from 0 to 7.507. As with the minority threat indicator, a value of 0 to 1 on this ratio indicates a case where blacks have less unemployment relative to whites. A value over 1 indicates a case where blacks have more unemployment relative to whites, and a value of 1 indicates equilibrium. The percentage of legislators that are black on

average is 7.456 with a range from 0 to 25.862. The percentage of blacks who vote on average is 54.824 with a range from 0 to 100. As for the control measures, on average there is 12.579 percent of the state population living below the poverty line with a range from 6.429 to 21.609. Additionally, the percent of white males between the ages of 18 and 29 in a state on average is 8.119 with a range from 1.808 to 14.440. About 25% of the states are in the Western region of the United States and about 33% are in the Southern United States. Finally, on average approximately 21.332% of the population in states in any given year live in cities over 100,000 population.

As for the correlates of reporting, the average aggravated assault rate per 100,000 population is 274.122 with a range from 42.579 to 973.73. The average percentage of the state population covered by the reporting agencies is 82.186 percent with a range from 0 to 100. The average percent of reporting agencies that reported non-zero counts in a given state year was 20.599 percent with a range of 0 to 100. The average number of police officers per 100,000 population is 220.874 with a range from 47.571 to 823.306. The average percent of agencies in a state with a bias unit or other specialized personnel is 11.658 with a range from 0 to 100. The average percent of agencies in a state with a community policing policy is 47.219 with a range from 0 to 100. Finally, the average black population in a given state year is 1,088,384 with a range from 2,932 to 5,583,808.

In addition to these agency controls for reporting, additional controls in the form of state statute characteristics are assessed. These indicators are described in more detail in chapters 1 and 3. The percentage of cases (state-years) characterized by these definitions of hate crime in their state statutes is presented in Table 4.2 below.

Approximately 55.9% of cases include sexual orientation, and approximately 59.3% include disability as a protected category in their definition of hate crime.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of State Characteristics for Anti-Black Hate Crime Analysis

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts	52.669	83.595	0	606
% Black/% White	0.27	0.36	0	2.259
Black/White Unemployed	2.274	1.384	0	7.507
% African-American Legislators	7.456	7.298	0	25.862
% Black Voters	54.824	18.67	0	100
Total Poverty	12.579	3.227	6.429	21.609
% Young White Males	8.119	2.177	1.808	14.44
West	0.255	0.436	0	1
South	0.333	0.472	0	1
% Urban	21.332	18.957	0	100
Aggravated Assault Rate	274.122	150.953	42.579	973.73
% Population Covered	82.186	27.355	0	100
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	20.599	22.408	0	100
Police per Capita	220.874	112.104	47.571	823.306
% Bias Unit	11.658	15.799	0	100
% Community Policing	47.219	27.236	0	100
Black Population	1088384	1369358	2932	5583808

Approximately 2% of cases rely on a reporting statute alone, while a third of cases have a criminal statute alone, and 49.8% have both a reporting and a criminal statute. Cases that define a bias crime in terms of a crime committed because of the status characteristic of the victim instead of requiring some hate or animus to be involved represent approximately 59.6% of the cases in the analysis. Likewise, cases that define a hate crime as being caused by the perceived status characteristic of the victim represent approximately 31.6% of the cases.

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for State Statute Control Measures

	Percentage
Sexual Orientation Statute	55.9
Disability Statute	59.3
Reporting Statute	2
Criminal Statute	33.3
Reporting & Criminal Statute	49.8
Bias Statute	59.6
Perception Statute	31.6
Civil Rights Statute	19.6
Freestanding Statute	27.2
Coattailing Statute	5.9
Modifying Statute	9.1
Penalty Enhancement Statute	43.9
Obs	408
Groups	51

As for the type of hate crime statute in the state, approximately 19.6% of cases criminalize violations of civil rights. Freestanding statutes, those that create a new category of crime, represent 27.2% of the cases, while coattailing statutes represent 5.9% of cases. Modifying statutes represent 9.1% of cases. The largest category, penalty enhancement statutes represent 43.9% of cases.

The regression analysis proceeds in five steps, each of these is presented in table 4.3 below. Model 1 tests the first hypothesis, that the relative size of the minority population is positively related to the number of anti-black hate crimes in a state. The results suggest that on average in states where there are more blacks in relation to whites there are fewer hate crimes against blacks. Specifically, a one unit increase in the ratio of blacks to whites in the population decreases the average number of hate crimes in a state by a factor of 0.05. This is inconsistent with the predictions of the minority threat framework which would suggest that as the number of blacks relative to whites increases there will be more hate crimes against them.

Table 4.3: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts on State Structural Characteristics, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR
Intercept	-8.483**	-8.148**	-7.850**	-7.494**	-9.247**
	(0.175)	0.539	0.674	0.694	1.101
% Black/% White	-2.999**	-1.320**	-1.224*	-1.181*	-1.143
	(0.337)	0.456	0.539	0.548	0.692
	0.05	0.27	0.29	0.31	
Black/White Unemployed		-0.012	-0.027	-0.013	-0.070
		0.043	0.046	0.047	0.062
% African-American Legislators		-0.113**	-0.096**	-0.087**	-0.080**
		0.019	0.023	0.023	0.027
		0.89	0.91	0.92	0.92
% Black Voters		-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
		0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004
Total Poverty			-0.093**	-0.081*	-0.045
			0.034	0.034	0.036
			0.91	0.92	
% Young White Males			0.068	0.041	0.049
			0.054	0.055	0.075
West			0.284	0.587	0.402
			0.301	0.322	0.292
South			-0.307	-0.448	-0.540
			0.333	0.336	0.316
% Urban				-0.018*	-0.019*
				0.008	0.009
				0.98	0.98
Aggravated Assault Rate					-0.000
					0.001
% Population Covered					0.020**
					0.003
					1.02
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros					0.017**
					0.004
					1.02
Police per Capita					0.001
					0.002
% Bias Unit					0.010
					0.010
% Community Policing					-0.013*
					0.005
					0.97

Table 4.3: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts on State Structural Characteristics, 2000-2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors)

2000	0.027	0.069	0.065	0.021	0.142
	(0.107)	0.109	0.116	0.120	0.160
2002	-0.105	-0.040	-0.026	-0.047	-0.039
	(0.107)	0.092	0.097	0.100	0.134
2003	0.082	0.078	0.091	0.056	-0.515
	0.139	0.118	0.125	0.128	0.284
2004	0.201	0.189	0.227	0.164	-0.429
	0.158	0.132	0.141	0.144	0.284
2005	0.344	0.515**	0.859**	0.715**	0.190
	0.178	0.159	0.243	0.246	0.393
		1.67	2.36	2.04	
2006	0.397*	0.467**	0.801**	0.683**	0.113
	0.187	0.173	0.241	0.245	0.385
	1.49	1.60	2.23	1.98	
2007	0.410*	0.501**	0.784**	0.644**	0.131
	0.193	0.182	0.246	0.249	0.382
	1.51	1.65	2.19	1.90	
Exposure:					
Black Population	---	---	---	---	---
Wald χ2	119.93	147.97	179.46	185.29	291.36
Obs	408	400	400	400	400
Groups	51	50	50	50	50

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Model 2 assesses the economic and political threat hypotheses including the mediating effect proposed by Blalock. The results for the economic threat indicator do not support a relationship between the economic conditions in a state and hate crime; however, the political threat indicators provide a different picture. The percent of state legislators who are African-American is negatively associated with black hate crime. Specifically, a one unit increase in the percent black legislators results in a decrease of anti-black hate crime on average by a factor of 0.89. This negative relationship between political power and hate crime is also inconsistent with the predictions of political threat which suggests a positive relationship. However, Blalock also suggests that where

minority groups are equal to the majority in power there will be less hate crime. Additionally, model 2 does provide support for the mediating relationship between minority threat and hate crime. While it does not appear that minority group political power mediates the relationship completely, the magnitude of the effect of the relative size of the black population on hate crime is decreased considerably.

Model 3 adds in the controls. Of the controls the percent of the population living below poverty level is significant and negative, suggesting that states with less poverty overall have more black hate crime. Also of note is that the control measures do not seem to reduce the effect of the relative size of the minority population or the minority group political power on hate crime.

Model 4 adds the control for % Urban into the model. Urban population, while significant, does not reduce the effect of minority or political threat on hate crime; however, the more of a state's population that resides in larger cities the less hate crime in that state.

Model 5 adds in the controls for the correlates of reporting.[12] First, and most importantly, by adding the controls for the correlates of reporting the effect of the relative size of the minority population on anti-black hate crime is reduced to non-significance. This suggests that the relationship between minority threat and hate crime is explained by the reporting practices of the states. Second, the political power of the minority group not only remains significant but is not reduced in magnitude. Finally, of the reporting controls three are significant. First, the percent of the state population covered by reporting agencies is significant and positive, suggesting as would be expected that where

[12] The property crime rate per 100,000 was included in supplementary analyses but was non-significant and did not change the results of the analysis. (Results not shown.)

more of the state population is covered there is more reported anti-black hate crime. Second, also as would be expected, where the percentage of reporting agencies that report non-zero counts is greater the number of anti-black hate crimes on average is greater. Finally, there is a negative relationship between the percentage of community policing agencies in the state and anti-black hate crime, such that states with more community policing agencies have fewer anti-black hate crimes on average.[13]

Table 4.4 below assesses the relationships between the way a state defines hate crime, in terms of its statute, and the number of hate crimes that occur in the state. Additionally, these models assess whether the differing definitions across state explain the effect of the minority threat and control measures on hate crime. Overall, controlling for the differing definitions of hate crime across states does not add to the explanation of anti-black hate crime. Indeed, none of the statute controls is significant, and the relationships seen in Table 4.3 do not change dramatically by adding in the statute controls.

Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat: Income and Poverty

While changes in unemployment do not seem to have an effect on the prevalence of anti-black hate crime, this is not conclusive evidence that there is no economic threat effect. Indeed, it is possible that unemployment is simply not the best indicator of threat. In an effort to further elaborate the economic threat hypothesis two other potential indicators of threat were used. The first is the *ratio of black to white per capita income* in a state each year and the second is the *ratio of black to white poverty* (% living below the

[13] Temporal lags were added in supplementary analyses; however they did not produce significantly different results. (Results not shown.)

Table 4.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Black Hate Crimes, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Model 1 Coef (S.E.)	Model 2 Coef (S.E.)	Model 3 Coef (S.E.)	Model 4 Coef (S.E.)
Intercept	-8.786**	-8.412**	-8.035**	-9.280**
	0.276	0.347	0.878	1.191
% Black/White	-2.900**	-1.467**	-1.275*	-1.135
	0.356	0.527	0.634	0.731
Black/White Unemployed		-0.021	-0.028	-0.094
		0.052	0.057	0.068
% African-American Legislators		-0.114**	-0.082**	-0.074**
		0.022	0.026	0.029
% Black Voters		-0.000	-0.000	-0.002
		0.003	0.003	0.004
Total Poverty			-0.074*	-0.041
			0.036	0.038
% Young White Males			0.061	0.042
			0.065	0.081
West			0.594	0.330
			0.350	0.329
South			-0.450	-0.568
			0.342	0.332
% Urban			-0.014	-0.016
			0.008	0.009
Aggravated Assault Rate				-0.000
				0.001
% Population Covered				0.022**
				0.004
% Agencies: Non-Zero Count				0.017**
				0.004
Police per Capita				0.001
				0.002
% Bias Unit				0.009
				0.010
% Community Policing				-0.013*
				0.006
Sexual Orientation Statute	0.222	0.244	0.206	0.178
	0.250	0.254	0.265	0.265
Disability Statute	-0.332	-0.154	-0.127	-0.294
	0.263	0.279	0.283	0.283
Criminal Statute	-0.129	-0.281	-0.192	-0.172
	0.353	0.385	0.384	0.352

Table 4.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Black Hate Crimes, 2000-2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors)

		Model 1 Coef (S.E.)	Model 2 Coef (S.E.)	Model 3 Coef (S.E.)	Model 4 Coef (S.E.)
Reporting & Criminal Statute		0.214	0.000	0.105	-0.060
		0.393	0.421	0.421	0.394
Bias Statute		0.322	0.333	0.118	0.109
		0.270	0.304	0.291	0.259
Perception Statute		-0.085	-0.362	-0.287	-0.056
		0.237	0.259	0.297	0.288
Civil Rights Statute		0.522	0.352	0.405	0.111
		0.274	0.302	0.290	0.263
Freestanding Statute		-0.107	0.226	0.138	0.046
		0.250	0.271	0.264	0.246
Coattailing Statute		-0.340	0.028	-0.031	-0.069
		0.440	0.483	0.471	0.429
Modifying Statute		0.109	0.150	0.146	0.211
		0.344	0.360	0.356	0.348
	2000	0.081	0.136	0.099	0.198
		0.116	0.131	0.146	0.175
	2002	-0.135	-0.061	-0.062	-0.062
		0.116	0.110	0.121	0.146
	2003	0.018	0.055	0.046	-0.559
		0.150	0.141	0.153	0.302
	2004	0.198	0.197	0.185	-0.454
		0.168	0.153	0.167	0.300
	2005	0.347	0.500**	0.793**	0.140
		0.186	0.182	0.285	0.411
	2006	0.382	0.462*	0.756**	0.048
		0.194	0.197	0.279	0.400
	2007	0.377	0.505*	0.717*	0.072
		0.200	0.204	0.283	0.397
Exposure					
Black Population		---	---	---	---
Wald $\chi 2$		137.86	186.23	224.21	317.48
Obs		408	400	400	400
Groups		51	50	50	50

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

poverty line) in a state each year. Table 4.5 below presents the results of the regression analysis using these alternative indicators of economic threat.

Table 4.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat on Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Model 1 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 2 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 3 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 4 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 5 Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept	-7.876**	-9.772**	-8.138**	-7.377**	-9.451**
	0.691	1.097	0.275	0.907	1.290
% Black/% White	-0.956	-0.957	-1.291**	-1.127	-1.257
	0.500	0.649	0.466	0.579	0.704
Black/White Income	0.848*	0.922**			
	0.022	0.298			
Black/White Poverty			0.004	0.004	-0.000
			0.027	0.028	0.036
% African-American Legislators	-0.086**	-0.085**	-0.108**	-0.084**	-0.071*
	0.022	0.026	0.020	0.024	0.028
% Black Voters	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Total Poverty	-0.099**	-0.057		-0.096**	-0.062
	0.033	0.037		0.035	0.038
% Young White Males	0.030	0.047		0.048	0.071
	0.051	0.073		0.080	0.096
West	0.544	0.407		0.748*	0.633
	0.338	0.312		0.358	0.344
South	-0.465	-0.599		-0.413	-0.507
	0.350	0.341		0.353	0.348
% Urban	-0.015	-0.019*		-0.019*	-0.022*
	0.009	0.009		0.009	0.010
Aggravated Assault Rate		-0.000			-0.000
		0.001			0.001
% Population Covered		0.017**			0.018**
		0.003			0.003
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros		0.015**			0.016**
		0.003			0.004
Police per Capita		0.001			0.000
		0.002			0.002
% Bias Unit		0.013			0.012
		0.009			0.009
% Community Policing		-0.012*			-0.008
		0.005			0.005
2000	-0.021	-0.005	0.015	-0.025	-0.005
	0.081	0.107	0.079	0.085	0.108
2002	-0.036	-0.005	-0.056	-0.051	-0.019
	0.089	0.118	0.087	0.091	0.116

Table 4.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat on Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors)

		Model 1 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 2 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 3 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 4 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 5 Coef. (S.E.)
	2003	0.099	-0.365	0.082	0.060	-0.252
		0.116	0.260	0.112	0.118	0.274
	2004	0.122	-0.384	0.240	0.205	-0.173
		0.129	0.262	0.174	0.184	0.320
	2005	0.712**	0.303	0.596**	0.819*	0.548
		0.225	0.366	0.196	0.330	0.457
	2006	0.738**	0.288	0.466*	0.711*	0.349
		0.227	0.361	0.212	0.326	0.451
	2007	0.696**	0.300	0.410	0.656*	0.395
		0.232	0.360	0.220	0.332	0.452
Exposure:						
Black Population		---	---	---	---	---
Wald χ2		197.97	255.47	136.78	167.15	222.52
Obs		392	392	363	363	363
Groups		49	49	49	49	49

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Models 1 and 2 assess the relationship between the income ratio and anti-black hate crime. The income ratio is significant and positive, suggesting that on average in areas where blacks make more in comparison to whites there is more anti-black hate crime. This is consistent with the economic threat hypothesis that where there is more competition between the minority and majority groups there will be more hate crime. Also consistent with the economic threat hypothesis is that the inclusion of the income ratio in the model reduces the effect of the relative size of the black population to non-significance.

Models 3, 4, and 5 in Table 4.5 examine the relationship between the poverty ratio and anti-black hate crime. Unlike the income ratio this indicator is not significantly related to anti-black hate crime.

This analysis suggests that perhaps it is competition over income that matters in the explanation of anti-black hate crime. Also importantly, the income ratio remains significant when controlling for minority threat, political threat, and the reporting controls.

Testing Blalock's Proposed Curvilinear Effect

Another aspect of the minority threat framework is that the relationship between minority threat, economic threat, and political threat and hate crime is not linear. In order to test this hypothesis, quadratic terms were added for each of the minority, economic, and political threat indicators. Each of these terms was created by multiplying the linear term by itself. Table 4.6 below presents the results of this analysis. The minority threat model suggests that, consistent with Blalock's propositions, the relationship between minority threat and hate crime is curvilinear. The linear effect suggests that as with the previous models where there are more blacks relative to whites in the population there is less hate crime; however, the slope of this effect is decreasing at a progressively faster rate. The economic threat model suggests that there is no linear or curvilinear relationship between economic competition and hate crime.

The first political threat model suggests that where African-American's have more political strength there is less hate crime and that this relationship is not curvilinear. Finally, the fourth model in table 4.6 tests the curvilinear hypothesis in terms of the percent of blacks who voted. This model also provides support for the curvilinear hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between political threat and hate crime that is decreasing at a progressively faster rate, although the magnitude of the quadratic term is very small, suggesting that there is only a small curvilinear effect. The final

Table 4.6: Testing the Curvilinear Hypothesis: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Minority Threat	Economic Threat	Political Threat 1	Political Threat 2	Full Model
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
Intercept	-8.901**	-9.236**	-9.275**	-8.774**	-8.501**
	1.134	1.102	1.102	1.114	1.185
% Black/% White	-6.406**	-1.109	-1.395	-1.109	-6.025**
	1.827	0.693	0.714	0.663	1.895
Black/White Squared	3.932**				3.667**
	1.247				1.339
Black/White Unemployed	-0.081	-0.006	-0.076	-0.055	-0.007
	0.067	0.139	0.066	0.058	0.146
B/W Unemployed Squared		-0.014			-0.013
		0.029			0.030
% African-American Legislators	-0.042	-0.082**	-0.151**	-0.083**	-0.071
	0.029	0.027	0.053	0.027	0.063
A-A Legislators Squared			0.003		0.001
			0.002		0.002
% Black Voters	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.021*	-0.018
	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.010	0.012
Black Voters Squared				0.000*	0.000
				0.000	0.000
Total Poverty	-0.054	-0.046	-0.044	-0.046	-0.055
	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.037	0.036
% Young White Males	0.021	0.049	0.043	0.038	0.009
	0.077	0.075	0.075	0.074	0.078
West	0.182	0.400	0.244	0.309	0.052
	0.280	0.294	0.294	0.309	0.306
South	-0.220	-0.559	-0.515	-0.526	-0.217
	0.313	0.320	0.301	0.331	0.330
% Urban	-0.015	-0.020*	-0.015	-0.017	-0.013
	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.009
Aggravated Assault Rate	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000
	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
% Population Covered	0.023**	0.020**	0.023**	0.019**	0.022**
	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.004
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	0.018**	0.017**	0.018**	0.016**	0.018**
	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004
Police per Capita	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002
	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002

Table 4.6: Testing the Curvilinear Hypothesis: Regression of Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

		Minority Threat	Economic Threat	Political Threat 1	Political Threat 2	Full Model
		Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
		(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
% Bias Unit		0.011	0.010	0.010	0.012	0.013
		0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.010
% Community Policing		-0.016**	-0.013*	-0.015**	-0.012*	-0.015**
		0.006	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.006
	2000	0.169	0.161	0.160	0.099	0.151
		0.177	0.176	0.172	0.147	0.184
	2002	-0.066	-0.036	-0.052	0.051	0.019
		0.149	0.133	0.144	0.128	0.147
	2003	-0.604*	-0.531	-0.576*	-0.353	-0.480
		0.301	0.285	0.294	0.269	0.298
	2004	-0.536	-0.442	-0.507	-0.399	-0.536
		0.300	0.285	0.293	0.268	0.293
	2005	-0.277	0.180	0.055	0.193	-0.293
		0.443	0.393	0.403	0.374	0.437
	2006	-0.320	0.106	-0.015	0.197	-0.258
		0.427	0.384	0.393	0.364	0.420
	2007	-0.285	0.123	0.018	0.234	-0.202
		0.424	0.382	0.390	0.363	0.416
Exposure:						
Black Population		---	---	---	---	---
Wald $\chi 2$		345.45	287.75	329.10	271.80	322.12
Obs		400	400	400	400	400
Groups		50	50	50	50	50

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

model in Table 4.6 tests all of the curvilinear relationships at once. In other words, do the curvilinear effects seen in the prior models hold up when controlling for the other curvilinear relationships. The only significant minority threat indicator is the relative size of the black population and its quadratic. This is inconsistent with the predictions of the minority threat framework which would suggest that the relative size of the black population should be mediated by the political power of the minority.

Testing the Moderating Hypothesis (Interaction Effects)

The above analysis does not provide support for a mediating relationship between political or economic threat and minority threat. In other words, there is no evidence to suggest that the relationship between the relative size of the black population and the prevalence of anti-black hate crime is mediated by economic competition (as measured by unemployment, poverty, or income) or the political power of the minority group. However, perhaps it is not a mediating relationship, but instead a moderating one. In other words, perhaps instead of political or economic threat explaining the relationship between the relative size of the black population and anti-black hate crime away, perhaps the effect of the relative size of the black population on hate crime is different across varying levels of unemployment or political strength. In order to test these moderating hypotheses a series of interaction terms were added to the models. These interaction effects are presented in Table 4.7 below.

First and foremost, it is possible that the negative effect of the relative size of the black population on anti-black hate crime will be stronger where blacks have more political strength. In order to test this hypothesis an interaction term was created between the ratio of blacks to whites in the population and the percent of legislators who are African-American in a state.[14] The results of this analysis suggest there is not a moderating effect.

Second, in order to test the possibility that the effect of the relative size of the black population on anti-black hate crime may be different across levels of economic competition, an interaction effect between the ratio of blacks to whites in the population

[14] Both of these measures were grand mean centered (by subtracting the mean from the original value) prior to calculating the interaction term.

Table 4.7: Interaction Effects: Testing the Moderation of Threat for Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts

Minority Threat X African-American Legislators	
Intercept	-8.174**
% Black/White	-1.392**
% African-American Legislators	-0.111**
Interaction: B/W X AA Legislators	0.030
Minority Threat X B/W Unemployed	
Intercept	-8.080**
% Black/White	-1.245**
% B/W Unemployed	-0.043
Interaction: B/W X B/W Unemployed	-0.132
B/W Unemployed X African-American Legislators	
Intercept	-8.164**
% B/W Unemployed	-0.043
% African-American Legislators	-0.113**
Interaction: W/W Unemployed X AA Legislators	-0.002
Minority Threat X % Pop Covered	
Intercept	-9.351**
% B/W	-1.091
% Population Covered	0.022**
Interaction: % B/W X % Pop Cov	0.014
Minority Threat X % Non-Zero	
Intercept	-9.406**
% B/W	-1.097
% Agencies with Non-Zero Counts	0.023**
Interaction: % B/W X % Non-Zero	0.039
Minority Threat X % Community Policing	
Intercept	-9.283**
% B/W	-1.155
% Community Policing	-0.012
Interaction: % B/W X % Comm Pol	0.003

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

and the ratio of black to white unemployment was added into the models. This interaction term assesses the possibility that the negative effect of the relative size of the black population may be weaker in states where there is more economic competition. Again the results suggest this is not the case.

Third, an additional possibility is that economic competition and political power work together to explain the prevalence of anti-black hate crime. In other words, perhaps the effect of the minority group's political power on the prevalence of hate crime is weaker where there is more economic competition between groups. This hypothesis is examined by adding an interaction term between the percent of state legislators who are African-American and the ratio of black to white unemployment. Like the other models, there does not seem to be a moderating effect.

In addition to testing the moderating relationships of the minority, political, and economic threat indicators it is also possible that the effect of minority threat on anti-black hate crime may depend on the reporting practices of the states. In other words, perhaps reporting moderates the relationship between minority threat and hate crime. Specifically, it is possible that in states where reporting is high minority threat will have a stronger effect than in states where reporting is low. Two potential reasons for this association may exist. First, it is possible that the models are unable to pick up a minority threat effect in states where there is low reporting. Second, it is possible that states that do not report or have low reporting have what has been referred to by scholars as benign neglect (Liska & Chamlin, 1984). This concept refers to a lack of response on the part of police and other official agencies toward crimes that they see as lesser. In other words, it is possible that states that have low reporting do not take hate crimes as being serious and that this view may be related to the relative size of the minority population in the state. Where minority groups pose a greater threat crimes against them are not taken as seriously and thus are underreported.

In order to assess this possibility three interaction terms are examined. The first examines whether the effect of the relative size of the minority population depends on the percent of the population covered by reporting agencies. The second assesses whether the effect of the relative size of the minority population varies across levels of non-zero reporting agencies. Finally, the third tests the relationship between minority threat and hate crime by assessing the hypothesis that the effect of the relative size of the minority population varies across levels of community policing agencies. The interaction terms are non-significant and the direct effects seen in the previous analysis remain unchanged. This suggests that the reporting practices of states do not moderate the relationship between the relative size of the minority population and the prevalence of anti-black hate crime.

Discussion

Racial animosity has been a part of American culture sense the first settlers set foot on American soil. This animosity has presented itself in many forms since the beginning, from slavery to lynching, and most recently hate crime. As the descriptive analysis that started the chapter suggests there is variation across time and place in the level of anti-black hate crime. However, this descriptive analysis does not provide an explanation for this variation. I suggest that demographic shifts in line with the minority threat framework may be used to explain the variation in hate crime. The analysis tests the hypotheses proposed by this framework.

The results of the regression analysis suggest a number of interesting points. Particularly, the reporting practices of states explain much of the trend in anti-black hate crime, including the relationship between the relative size of the black population and

hate crime. Including several correlates of reporting that have been suggested by prior research in the regression equations reduces the relationship between the relative size of the black population and hate crime to non-significance where other controls did not. This suggests that perhaps the demographic make up of the population of a state does not matter when the reporting practices of that state are taken into account.

Of special interest is the significant relationship between the political power of the minority group, income ratio, and hate crime. Where blacks are more visible in the political arena there is less hate crime, and importantly this relationship remains significant after controlling for reporting, state structural characteristics, and differences in the definition of hate crime. The negative relationship, however, is inconsistent with the predictions of the minority threat framework, where it would be expected that blacks' political strength would be positively related to hate crime. There are two possible explanations for this negative relationship. First, it is possible that, consistent with the minority threat framework, once blacks become strong enough they will have gained influence and will be able to reduce prejudice and discrimination, and hate crime, against them. This hypothesis is not supported, however, by the absence of a significant curvilinear relationship between political threat and hate crime. The second possible explanation comes from the contact hypothesis. Research on the contact hypothesis (Rothbart & John, 1985; Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes, 2006) suggests that knowing a celebrity or other public figure who is black may reduce stereotypes and thus prejudice possibly resulting in less hate crime. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the percent of blacks who voted is not significant, but the percent of state legislators who are African-American is significant. State legislators are visible public figures and may

reduce stereotypes and prejudice among their constituents, even those who may not have voted for them.

Additionally, another finding that is interesting involves the curvilinear relationships, which suggest that where minority groups are larger in relation to whites there is less hate crime and this relationship is non-linear. Specifically, the non-linear effect suggests that at some point the negative relationship between the relative size of the Black population and anti-Black hate crime becomes weak and may reverse direction, becoming positive. Finally, it seems that it is not competition over jobs that is a threat to the majority group, but instead competition over income that generates the threat, suggesting that where minority groups begin to make more on average in relation to the white majority, that majority will feel threatened and will act to reduce that threat.

Thus, in terms of the minority threat framework, there is support for the economic threat hypothesis using the income ratio. However, some of the findings are inconsistent with the minority threat hypothesis. Specifically, where there are more blacks relative to whites in the population there is less hate crime whereas minority threat would predict the opposite. This could be explained by reporting, and in fact the regression results and the bivariate correlations (Appendix A) suggest that this may be the case. Specifically, the bivariate correlations suggest that there is less reporting in states that have more blacks relative to whites. It also seems that demographic shifts are not as important for explaining trends in hate crime as shifts in politics and reporting.

Overall the findings of the regression of the level of anti-Black hate crime in a state on state structural characteristics suggest that the primary driving force behind the trend in anti-Black hate crime over time has been a combination of changes in the

reporting practices of states and changes in the participation of the minority group in the political arena and even more so the visibility of that group in the political arena. What these findings mean for future research and policy will be discussed in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 5

MINORITY THREAT, POLITICS, AND ANTI-ETHNIC VIOLENCE

Introduction

Despite the characterization of the United States as a melting-pot, animosity between ethnic groups has been a predominant problem in this country. With the proximity of such countries as Mexico and Cuba, Hispanics have surpassed African-Americans as the largest minority group in the country. Alongside increased coverage of immigration patterns and debate within the political arena around immigration policies and practices, it is likely that Hispanics are becoming more threatening to the dominant groups. As such this chapter presents the results of the regression analysis assessing the predictors of anti-ethnic hate crime using minority threat as a guiding framework.

Trends in Anti-Ethnic Hate Crime

As with the anti-black trends discussed in the previous chapter, the anti-ethnic, and anti-Hispanic specifically, trends suggest variation across time and place. Figure 5.1 below shows the trend in the anti-Hispanic hate crime rate per 100,000 population from 1995 to 2008. This trend is somewhat more volatile than the anti-black trend primarily due to the fact that anti-Hispanic crimes are rarer than anti-black crimes. The overall trend is decreasing with a slightly increasing trend beginning in 2003. As with the trend in anti-black hate crime there appears to be a slight spike in 2000. This does not appear in the overall trend in hate crime presented in Chapter 4, and does not coincide with any major historical events as does the spike in 2001 after the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center in New York.

Figure 5.1: Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Rate, 1995-2008



Figure 5.2 below suggests variation across place. This figure shows the anti-ethnic hate crime rate per 100,000 population from 2000 to 2007. This graph shows a number of interesting characteristics of the anti-ethnic trend. First, there was a spike in all regions in 2001 in anti-ethnic violence. This is likely due to the terrorist attacks on September 11 of that year. Second, and relatedly, the Northeast and the West appear to have taken the biggest hits in 2001 with the West increasing from an average anti-ethnic hate crime rate of 0.7 incidents per 100,000 persons to approximately 1.5 incidents per 100,000, and the Northeast increasing from an average of 0.4 incidents per 100,000 to 1 per 100,000. Third, overall, with the exception of 2001, the trend in anti-ethnic incidents within regions is fairly stable. The South, as with the anti-racial trend, consistently has the lowest reported anti-ethnic hate crime rate each year. With the exception of 2006, the West consistently has the highest anti-ethnic hate crime rate each year.

Figure 5.2: Ethnic Bias Motivation by Region, 2000-2007



Figure 5.3: Ethnic Bias Crime Rate per 100,000 for Five States, 2000-2007



In addition to regional variation, there is variation at the state level. Figure 5.3 above shows the ethnic bias crime rate for five states across the same years. California has the highest hate crime rate consistently for all years. Likewise, Missouri has the lowest hate crime rate consistently for all years. While these figures suggest considerable variation across time and place, they do not explain this variation.

I propose that one possible explanation for this variation involves differing trends and patterns in immigration over time in different states. In addition to changes in the trend, there have been shifts in the discourse surrounding immigration. Specifically there is more attention paid to immigration in line with changing policies. Figure 5.4 below explores the relationship between immigration and anti-Hispanic hate crime by graphing side by side the Hispanic hate crime rate per 100,000 Hispanic population and the Hispanic immigration rate per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born for ten states across the U.S. These ten states represent both those with high immigration rates (Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Texas) and low immigration (Connecticut, Delaware, and Idaho).

This figure suggests that, at least, for some states, there is a relationship between Hispanic immigration and Hispanic hate crime; however, this relationship may be only moderate. Specifically, in states with a high immigration rate (Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Texas) immigration and hate crime appear to vary together. For those states with a low immigration rate (Delaware and Idaho) there does not appear to be a relationship. Florida has a high immigration rate but does not appear to show a relationship between immigration and hate crime. The fact that immigration

does not appear to increase dramatically in any of these states over this time period could make it difficult to detect a relationship between immigration and Hispanic hate crime.

Figure 5.4: Hispanic Hate Crime Rate and Hispanic Immigration Rate per 100,000 Foreign Born Hispanic Population across Ten States, 2000-2007



Note: Blue line indicates Hispanic Hate Crime rate per 100,000 Hispanic Persons. Green line indicates the logged Hispanic Immigration rate per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born persons.

Figure 5.4: Hispanic Hate Crime Rate and Hispanic Immigration Rate across Ten States, 2000-2007 cont.



Note: Blue line indicates Hispanic Hate Crime rate per 100,000 Hispanic Persons. Green line indicates the logged Hispanic Immigration rate per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born persons.

The following analysis examines the relationship between immigration and hate crime that is suggested by the above figures.

Structure, Threat, and Reporting: Factors used to Explain Anti-Hispanic Hate

Variables

The dependent variable, drawn from the UCR, represents the *number of Hispanic hate crimes* in a given state each year. On average there were approximately 13 anti-Hispanic hate crimes in a given state year for the 51 states with a range from 0 to 206.

The state characteristics include the control measures, as well as the controls for the correlates of reporting discussed in chapter 3. The measures for minority threat include ~~first~~ two indicators of minority group size: the *Hispanic immigration rate* and the *percent Hispanic*. The immigration rate is the rate per 100,000 of the Hispanic foreign born population that emigrated from four countries: Cuba, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. All together these countries represent approximately 25% of the total immigration each year into the United States and between approximately 65 and 76% of Hispanic immigration each year into the United States.[15] This measure is drawn from the Department of Homeland Security's Immigration Yearbooks published annually. The natural log is used to reduce the skew in the distribution. The more traditional indicator of minority group size in the percent of the total population that is of Hispanic origin is drawn from the 2000 Census and the 2002-2007 American Community Survey.

The economic threat indicators include the *ratio of Hispanic to white unemployment* (% Hispanic unemployed/% white unemployed) as well as *the ratio of Hispanic to black unemployment* (% Hispanic unemployed/% black unemployed). These are drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2002-2007 American Community Survey.

Finally, the political threat indicator is the *% Hispanic voters* drawn from the Current Population Survey's Voting and Registration Supplement. This is the percent of Hispanics over the age of 18 who voted. The *total Hispanic population* is included in the models as the indicator of exposure.

[15] In addition to these countries representing some of the largest contributors to Hispanic immigration in the United States, they also have no missing data at the state level.

Analysis

As with the models used in Chapter 4, in order to examine the relationship between the predictors and the number of anti-Hispanic hate crimes, a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) with an autoregressive working correlation structure is specified. These models allow for the examination of the marginal effect of the predictors on the dependent variable while adjusting for serial autocorrelation in the errors.

Results

Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of State Characteristics for Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Analysis for Sample of 39 States

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts	10.365	21.402	0	206
Hispanic Immigration Rate	7.374	0.544	5.702	9.796
% Hispanic	8.638	9.301	0.572	44.402
Hispanic/White Unemployed	1.407	0.661	0	3.490
Hispanic/Black Unemployed	0.480	0.376	0	3.925
% Hispanic Voters	15.953	9.282	0	60.417
Total Poverty	12.579	3.227	6.429	21.609
% Young White Males	8.119	2.177	1.808	14.440
West	0.255	0.436	0	1
South	0.333	0.472	0	1
% Urban	21.332	18.957	0	100
Aggravated Assault Rate	274.122	150.953	42.579	973.730
% Population Covered	82.186	27.355	0	100
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	20.599	22.408	0	100
Police per Capita	220.874	112.104	47.571	823.306
% Bias Unit	11.658	15.799	0	100
% Community Policing	47.219	27.236	0	100
Hispanic Population	786448.2	2007886	4339	13220888

As with the anti-black analysis, the anti-Hispanic analysis begins with an examination of the descriptive statistics of the indicators used in the regression analysis. These are presented in table 5.1 above. The average logged Hispanic immigration rate

per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born population is 7.374 with a range from 5.702 to 9.796. The average percent of the population in the state that are of Hispanic origin is 8.64% with a range from 0.57 to 44.4%.

The ratio of Hispanic to white unemployed on average is 1.407 with a range from 0 to 3.490 and the ratio of Hispanic to black unemployed on average is 0.480 with a range from 0 to 3.925. The political threat indicator, the percent of Hispanics who voted, on average is 15.953 with a range from 0 to 60.417. The average percent of the population living below the poverty line is 12.579 with a range of 6.429 to 21.609 and the average percent of the population who are young white males is 8.119 with a range from 1.808 to 14.440. Approximately 25% of the states are in the Western region of the United States and 33% are in the Southern United States. On average 21.332 percent of the state population reside in cities over 100,000 population. Finally, the average Hispanic population in a given state year is 1,012,180 with a range from 25,156 to 13,220,888.[16]

The distribution of state statutes as with the anti-Black analysis is as follows. Approximately 56 percent of the states include sexual orientation as a protected category, while nearly 59% include disability. The statutes are 2% reporting statutes alone, 33.3% criminal statutes alone, and 49.8% both reporting and criminal statutes. Additionally, 59.6% of the statutes are bias statutes and 31.6% include perception clauses. Finally, 19.6% are civil rights statutes, 27.2% are freestanding statutes, 5.9% are coattailing statutes, 9.1% are modifying statutes, and the majority (43.9%) are penalty enhancement statutes.

[16] For a review of the descriptive statistics of the correlates of reporting please refer to chapter 4.

Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for State Statute Control Measures

	Percentage
Sexual Orientation Statute	55.9
Disability Statute	59.3
Reporting Statute	2.0
Criminal Statute	33.3
Reporting & Criminal Statute	49.8
Bias Statute	59.6
Perception Statute	31.6
Civil Rights Statute	19.6
Freestanding Statute	27.2
Coattailing Statute	5.9
Modifying Statute	9.1
Penalty Enhancement Statute	43.9
Obs	408
Groups	51

As with the anti-black analysis, the regression analysis of the anti-Hispanic hate crime incidents proceeds in five steps. Each of these is presented in Table 5.3 below. Model 1[17] examines the relationship between minority threat, here measured as the Hispanic Immigration Rate, and Hispanic hate crime. The results suggest that immigration is positively associated with Hispanic hate crime. Specifically, a one unit increase in the rate of Hispanic immigration results on average in an increase in Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 1.328. Model 2 adds in the more traditional measure of minority threat in the percent of the population that is of Hispanic origin. Most importantly, the immigration term remains significant independent of the overall proportion of the population that is Hispanic and the percent Hispanic is significant with a one unit increase in the percent Hispanic population in the state decreasing anti-Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 0.96. Model 3 adds in the economic and political

[17] In addition to the analyses presented here, temporal lags were added to the models to examine the possibility that the size of the minority population, the level of economic competition, or the level of political strength in the previous year is significantly related to the following year's level of Hispanic hate crime. The results indicate that this is not the case. Results presented in Appendix C.

threat indicators. As with the anti-black analysis the economic threat indicators are not significant; however, unlike the anti-Black analysis, the political threat indicator is not significant. Model 3 adds in the control indicators. Of these, only one is significant. Specifically the percent of the population living below the poverty line indicates that poorer states have fewer hate crimes. Additionally, the inclusion of these control measures reduces the immigration term to non-significance.

The final model in Table 5.3 adds in the controls for the correlates of reporting.[18] Not only are these correlates of reporting added to the models in order to control for differences across states in reporting practices, but it is also possible that by adding these correlates of reporting to the model the relationships between the minority threat indicators and anti-Hispanic hate crime may change. Controlling for the correlates of reporting does not change the relationship between the percent Hispanic and Hispanic hate crime. Additionally, of the reporting controls, the percent of the population covered by the reporting agencies, the percent of agencies not reporting zeros, the average police per capita, and the percentage of agencies having a specialized bias unit or specialized bias personnel are significant predictors of Hispanic hate crime. The more of the state's population that is covered by the reporting agencies the more reported Hispanic hate crime. Specifically, a one unit increase in the population covered on average results in an increase in Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 1.02, and a one unit increase in the percent of agencies reporting non-zeros increases Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 1.01 on average. Additionally, a one unit increase in the average size of the police departments in the state decreases Hispanic hate crime by a factor of 0.996 on average. Finally, a one

[18] Adding the property crime rate in supplementary analyses did not change the results dramatically. (Results not shown.)

Table 5.3: Regression of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts on State Structural Characteristics, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR
Intercept	-12.879**	-12.281**	-12.135**	-11.948**	-12.415**
	(0.974)	(0.957)	(0.128)	(1.245)	(1.514)
LN Hisp Imm Rate	0.284*	0.263*	0.264*	0.212	0.191
	(0.129)	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.139)
	1.328	1.301	1.302		
% Hispanic		-0.046**	-0.048**	-0.051**	-0.062**
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)
		0.955	0.953	0.950	0.940
Hisp/Wh Unemployed			-0.149	-0.201	-0.245
			(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.146)
Hisp/Black Unemployed			0.273	0.348*	0.184
			(0.179)	(0.181)	(0.218)
				1.417	
% Hispanic Voters			-0.003	-0.005	-0.010
			(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Total Poverty				-0.075*	-0.015
				(0.035)	(0.035)
				0.928	
% White Males, 18-29				0.116	0.033
				(0.070)	(0.078)
West				0.285	0.213
				(0.252)	(0.235)
South				-0.169	-0.451
				(0.247)	(0.247)
State Hetero				0.002	0.006
				(0.006)	(0.007)
Aggravated Assault					0.001
					(0.001)
% Pop Covered					0.023**
					(0.004)
					1.023
% Report Non-Zeros					0.010*
					(0.004)
					1.010

Table 5.3: Regression of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts on State Structural Characteristics, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
		Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
		(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
		IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR
Police per Capita						-0.004**
						(0.001)
						0.996
% Bias Unit						0.018*
						(0.009)
						1.018
% Comm Pol						-0.009
						(0.006)
	2000	0.2667	0.189	0.211	0.123	0.113
		(0.182)	(0.177)	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.212)
	2002	-0.003	-0.026	-0.059	-0.046	-0.056
		(0.182)	(0.178)	(0.187)	(0.184)	(0.216)
	2003	0.149	0.120	0.053	0.069	-0.236
		(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.359)
	2004	0.164	0.293	0.133	0.156	-0.231
		(0.226)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.226)	(0.344)
	2005	0.349	0.224	0.286	0.800*	-0.001
		(0.227)	(0.228)	(0.225)	(0.348)	(0.494)
					2.225	
	2006	0.199	0.356	0.186	0.668*	-0.127
		(0.231)	(0.228)	(0.235)	(0.343)	(0.482)
					1.951	
	2007	0.416	0.356	0.299	0.761*	-0.061
		(0.229)	(0.226)	(0.234)	(0.337)	(0.472)
					2.140	
Exposure:						
Hispanic Population		---	---	---	---	---
Wald $\chi 2$		11.30	37.71	39.63	60.26	145.38
Obs		384	384	384	384	384
Groups		48	48	48	48	48

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

unit increase in the percent of the agencies in the state with a bias unit, or other specialized personnel for handling bias crimes, increases the reported number of Hispanic hate crimes by a factor of 1.02 on average.

As with the anti-black analysis in chapter 4, it is possible that these relationships will look differently if we take into account the differing definitions of hate crime. Table 5.4 below suggests that this is indeed the case. Immigration is not significantly related to Hispanic hate crime once the definition of hate crime is controlled. However, the percent Hispanic in the state remains significant even controlling for these differing definitions. Of particular interest in this analysis is that, unlike the anti-black analysis, the definition of hate crime in the state is significantly related in some respects to the prevalence of anti-Hispanic hate crime. Specifically, states with a bias statute as opposed to a hate statute on average have more reported hate crime. This is to be expected in some respects because bias statutes define hate crime more broadly than do hate statutes. Additionally, states with either just a criminal statute or both a criminal statute and a reporting statute report fewer hate crimes on average than do states with just a reporting statute. However, the criminal statute indicator loses significance once the other reporting practices of the states are controlled. Finally, of the types of hate crime statute two are significant. The first are coattailing statutes, which define hate crime by attaching it to a predefined criminal statute. States with coattailing statutes report more hate crime on average than do states with penalty enhancement statutes. Another interesting relationship that emerged in this analysis is the positive relationship of civil rights statutes and anti-Hispanic hate crime. Specifically, states with a civil rights statute report more Hispanic hate crime on average than states with penalty enhancement statutes. However, both of these effects loose significance when controlling for the reporting practices of the states.. As such, it appears that states with civil rights and coattailing statutes likely report differently than do states with penalty enhancement

Table 5.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crimes, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Model 1 Coef (S.E.)	Model 2 Coef (S.E.)	Model 3 Coef (S.E.)	Model 4 Coef (S.E.)	Model 5 Coef (S.E.)
Intercept	-12.437**	-12.170**	-12.021**	-11.405**	-12.322**
	(0.991)	(0.979)	(0.996)	(1.317)	(1.558)
LN Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.227	0.230	0.226	0.185	0.197
	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.146)
% Hispanic		-0.032**	-0.034**	-0.044**	-0.046**
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Hispanic/White Unemployed			-0.129	-0.187	-0.166
			(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.149)
Hispanic/Black Unemployed			0.270	0.289	0.099
			(0.175)	(0.187)	(0.213)
% Hispanic Voters			-0.003	-0.003	-0.005
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Total Poverty				-0.076	-0.036
				(0.040)	(0.040)
% Young White Males				0.071	0.003
				(0.076)	(0.083)
West				0.115	-0.032
				(0.313)	(0.295)
South				-0.326	-0.723**
				(0.267)	(0.270)
% Urban				0.013	0.007
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Aggravated Assault Rate					0.001
					(0.001)
% Population Covered					0.022**
					(0.004)
% Agencies: Non-Zero Count					0.011*
					(0.005)
Police per Capita					-0.003
					(0.001)
% Bias Unit					0.018*
					(0.009)
% Community Policing					-0.006
					(0.006)
Sexual Orientation Statute	0.066	0.127	0.149	0.074	0.082
	(0.253)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.261)	(0.239)
Disability Statute	-0.300	-0.162	-0.158	-0.261	-0.558*
	(0.247)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.264)	(0.253)

Table 5.4: Supplementary Analysis of Predictors on the Number of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crimes, 2000-2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors)

		Model 1 Coef (S.E.)	Model 2 Coef (S.E.)	Model 3 (S.E.)	Model 4 Coef (S.E.)	Model 5 Coef (S.E.)
Criminal Statute		-0.814*	-0.896**	-0.899**	-0.895*	-0.626
		(0.344)	(0.343)	(0.343)	(0.365)	(0.331)
Reporting & Criminal Statute		-0.723*	-0.756*	-0.753*	-0.617	-0.655*
		(0.351)	(0.353)	(0.353)	(0.366)	(0.339)
Bias Statute		0.905**	0.800**	0.799**	0.603*	0.587*
		(0.251)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.261)	(0.234)
Perception Statute		-0.587**	-0.383	-0.402	-0.472	-0.319
		(0.223)	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.279)	(0.265)
Civil Rights Statute		0.812**	0.761**	0.744**	0.769**	0.222
		(0.242)	(0.244)	(0.245)	(0.241)	(0.223)
Freestanding Statute		0.321	0.222	0.205	0.186	-0.031
		(0.222)	(0.229)	(0.231)	(0.237)	(0.227)
Coattailing Statute		1.103**	0.875*	0.878*	0.859*	0.526
		(0.373)	(0.391)	(0.396)	(0.395)	(0.372)
Modifying Statute		-0.032	-0.102	-0.084	-0.272	-0.060
		(0.339)	(0.341)	(0.343)	(0.337)	(0.329)
	2000	0.228	0.185	0.206	0.135	0.107
		(0.177)	(0.173)	(0.176)	(0.186)	(0.215)
	2002	-0.075	-0.062	-0.096	-0.068	-0.044
		(0.178)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.192)	(0.220)
	2003	0.094	0.076	0.045	0.110	-0.023
		(0.221)	(0.218)	(0.224)	(0.232)	(0.368)
	2004	0.129	0.127	0.136	0.200	-0.052
		(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.233)	(0.353)
	2005	0.282	0.270	0.260	0.661	0.077
		(0.229)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.370)	(0.511)
	2006	0.204	0.235	0.199	0.560	-0.007
		(0.232)	(0.230)	(0.238)	(0.364)	(0.500)
	2007	0.339	0.332	0.279	0.661	0.089
		(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.238)	(0.357)	(0.487)
Exposure						
Hispanic Population		---	---	---	---	---
Wald $\chi 2$		56.43	35.49	67.39	94.22	155.89
Obs		384	384	384	384	384
Groups		48	48	48	48	48

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

statutes and that it is this reporting that explains the relationship between these statutes and Hispanic hate crime.

Besides these relatively straightforward effects, another significant effect emerged. Specifically, when controlling for reporting states that include disability as a protected category have a higher Hispanic hate crime rate than do states that do not include disability. Although this is interesting it is likely that this effect is spurious.

Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat

As with the anti-black analysis it is possible that unemployment is not the best indicator of economic competition. As such, two additional indicators of economic threat are tested. Specifically, the income ratio (both Hispanic to white and Hispanic to black) as well as the poverty ratio (both Hispanic to white and Hispanic to black) are included in lieu of the unemployment ratio in table 5.5. Models 1-3 test the income ratio as the measure of economic threat while models 4-6 test the poverty ratio.

Of the four additional indicators of economic threat, the only significant relationship is an inverse relationship between the ratio of Hispanic to black per capita income and hate crime. However, this relationship loses significance when controlling for other state structural characteristics and reporting practices.

Testing Blalock's Curvilinear Hypotheses

As mentioned in Chapter 4, Blalock proposes that the relationship between the minority threat indicators and hate crime may not be linear. In an effort to examine these potential curvilinear relationships, quadratic terms for each of the economic and political threat indicators were added to the full model. These results are presented in table 5.6 below. Of the potential curvilinear relationships explored none are significant. This

Table 5.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat on Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Model 1 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 2 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 3 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 4 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 5 Coef. (S.E.)	Model 6 Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept	-11.811**	-11.796**	-12.750**	-11.942**	-12.113**	-12.134**
	(1.112)	(1.301)	(1.549)	(1.033)	(1.575)	(1.836)
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.255*	0.216	0.172	0.219	0.186	0.164
	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.148)
% Hispanic	-0.049**	-0.051**	-0.062**	-0.046**	-0.052**	-0.063**
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Hispanic/White Income	1.084	0.355	1.934			
	(1.261)	(1.384)	(1.471)			
Hispanic/Black Income	-1.145*	-0.528	-1.065			
	(0.531)	(0.599)	(0.642)			
Hispanic/ White Poverty				0.008	0.071	0.017
				(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.114)
Hispanic/Black Poverty				0.028	0.026	0.014
				(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.028)
% Hispanic Voters		-0.002	-0.007		-0.002	-0.008
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.012)	(0.012)
Total Poverty		-0.068	0.005		-0.093*	-0.027
		(0.036)	(0.034)		(0.038)	(0.038)
% Young White Males		0.099	-0.000		0.134	0.026
		(0.069)	(0.077)		(0.109)	(0.110)
West		0.255	0.164		0.522	0.426
		(0.258)	(0.235)		(0.295)	(0.280)
South		-0.136	-0.444		0.002	-0.349
		(0.243)	(0.234)		(0.258)	(0.254)
% Urban		0.002	0.005		0.002	0.005
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.008)
Aggravated Assault Rate			0.000			0.001
			(0.001)			(0.001)
% Population Covered			0.024**			0.022**
			(0.004)			(0.004)
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros			0.011*			0.010*
			(0.004)			(0.004)
Police per Capita			-0.004**			-0.004**
			(0.001)			(0.001)
% Bias Unit			0.020*			0.021*
			(0.009)			(0.009)
% Community Policing			-0.009			-0.013
			(0.006)			(0.007)

Table 5.5: Alternative Indicators of Economic Threat on Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 cont. (Robust Standard Errors)

	2000	0.170	0.084	0.111	0.043	-0.050	-0.009
		(0.184)	(0.180)	(0.218)	(0.175)	(0.180)	(0.215)
	2002	-0.029	-0.017	-0.060	-0.126	-0.076	-0.114
		(0.185)	(0.189)	(0.226)	(0.175)	(0.188)	(0.221)
	2003	0.123	0.110	-0.189	-0.003	0.044	-0.416
		(0.223)	(0.227)	(0.360)	(0.218)	(0.227)	(0.381)
	2004	0.132	0.143	-0.237	-0.174	-0.061	-0.530
		(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.344)	(0.258)	(0.266)	(0.396)
	2005	0.355	0.769*	-0.051	0.160	0.944	-0.193
		(0.227)	(0.344)	(0.493)	(0.314)	(0.611)	(0.695)
	2006	0.274	0.662*	-0.141	0.200	0.958	-0.159
		(0.232)	(0.340)	(0.485)	(0.319)	(0.593)	(0.675)
	2007	0.427	0.783*	-0.026	0.293	1.027	-0.138
		(0.230)	(0.334)	(0.474)	(0.323)	(0.592)	(0.672)
Exposure:							
Hispanic Population		---	---	---	---	---	---
Wald $\chi 2$		45.93	60.99	158.38	32.91	54.76	132.25
Obs		384	384	384	345	345	345
Groups		48	48	48	47	47	47

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

suggests that the observed relationship between the size of the Hispanic population and Hispanic hate crime is linear.

Table 5.6: Testing the Curvilinear Hypothesis: Regression of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts, 2000-2007 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Minority Threat 1	Minority Threat 2	Economic Threat 1	Economic Threat 2	Political Threat	Full Model
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept	-11.815**	-12.011**	-12.324**	-12.667**	-12.363**	-15.463*
	(1.298)	(1.519)	(1.549)	(1.534)	(1.511)	(7.119)
LN Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.983	0.176	0.187	0.197	0.193	1.069
	(1.825)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.138)	(1.845)
Hispanic Immigration Sq	-0.052					-0.059
	(0.121)					(0.122)
% Hispanic	-0.062**	-0.115**	-0.062**	-0.060**	-0.061**	-0.122**
	(0.012)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.040)
% Hispanic Sq		0.001				0.002
		(0.001)				(0.001)
Hispanic/ White Unemployed	-0.251	-0.232	-0.327	-0.338*	-0.241	-0.488
	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.372)	(0.166)	(0.147)	(0.413)
Hisp/White Unemployed Sq			0.029			0.046
			(0.123)			(0.129)
Hispanic/Black Unemployed	0.193	0.184	0.188	0.733	0.194	0.971**
	(0.217)	(0.211)	(0.218)	(0.468)	(0.218)	(0.496)
Hisp/Blk Unemployed Sq				-0.189		-0.271
				(0.146)		(0.153)
% Hispanic Voters	-0.010	-0.015	-0.011	-0.009	-0.024	-0.031
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Hispanic Voters Sq					0.000	0.000
					(0.001)	(0.001)
Total Poverty	-0.015	-0.031	-0.015	-0.014	-0.017	-0.035
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)
% Young White Males	0.034	0.035	0.033	0.057	0.038	0.076
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.081)
West	0.205	0.292	0.218	0.241	0.204	0.335
	(0.237)	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.238)	(0.235)	(0.246)
South	-0.449	-0.461	-0.446	-0.484*	-0.464	-0.516*
	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.248)

	Minority Threat 1	Minority Threat 2	Economic Threat 1	Economic Threat 2	Political Threat	Full Model
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
% Urban	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.003	0.006	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Aggravated Assault Rate	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
% Population Covered	0.023**	0.024**	0.023**	0.022**	0.023**	0.023**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	0.010*	0.011*	0.010*	0.009*	0.010*	0.010*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Police per Capita	-0.004**	-0.003*	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
% Bias Unit	0.018*	0.017*	0.018*	0.019*	0.018*	0.017*
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
% Community Policing	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	-0.011	-0.009	-0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
2000	0.115	0.102	0.118	0.121	0.113	0.124
	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.215)
2002	-0.025	-0.077	-0.061	-0.086	-0.074	-0.117
	(0.218)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.226)
2003	-0.194	-0.263	-0.245	-0.316	-0.253	-0.366
	(0.368)	(0.358)	(0.360)	(0.365)	(0.359)	(0.377)
2004	-0.203	-0.228	-0.237	-0.298	-0.229	-0.292
	(0.347)	(0.344)	(0.343)	(0.348)	(0.344)	(0.352)
2005	0.026	0.037	-0.007	0.017	0.022	0.116
	(0.497)	(0.496)	(0.493)	(0.500)	(0.495)	(0.504)
2006	-0.100	-0.110	-0.131	-0.117	-0.118	-0.059
	(0.486)	(0.483)	(0.481)	(0.487)	(0.482)	(0.490)
2007	-0.034	-0.033	-0.040	-0.056	-0.057	0.006
	(0.475)	(0.472)	(0.471)	(0.478)	(0.472)	(0.479)
Exposure: Hispanic Population	---	---	---	---	---	---
Wald $\chi 2$	143.73	152.55	145.57	144.17	146.90	155.20
Obs	384	384	384	384	384	384
Groups	48	48	48	48	48	48

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Table 5.7: Interaction Effects: Testing the Moderation of Threat for Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts

Immigration X H/W Unemployed	
Intercept	-12.423**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.192
H/W Unemployed	-0.241
Interaction: Immigration X Unemployed	-0.016
Immigration X H/B Unemployed	
Intercept	-12.089**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.158
% H/B Unemployed	0.131
Interaction: Immigration X Unemployed	0.232
Immigration X Hispanic Voters	
Intercept	-12.502**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.201
Hispanic Voters	-0.011
Interaction: Immigration X Hisp Voters	0.007
Hispanic Voters X H/B Unemployed	
Intercept	-12.660**
% Hispanic Voters	-0.015
% H/B Unemployed	0.457
Interaction: Hisp Voters X H/B Unemployed	-0.041
Hispanic Voters X H/W Unemployed	
Intercept	-12.365**
% Hispanic Voters	-0.012
% H/W Unemployed	-0.240
Interaction: Hisp Voters X H/W Unemployed	-0.005
Immigration X % Pop Covered	
Intercept	-12.431**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.192
% Population Covered	0.023
Interaction: Immigration X Pop Covered	0.001
Immigration X % Non-Zero	
Intercept	-12.411**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.189
% Non-Zero Count	0.010*
Interaction: Immigration X Non-Zero	-0.009
Immigration X % Community Policing	
Intercept	-12.524**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.203
% Community Policing	-0.062
Interaction: Immigration X Comm Pol	-0.001
Immigration X % Urban	
Intercept	-12.414**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.193
% Urban	0.006
Interaction: Immigration X % Urban	-0.004
Immigration X % Young White Males	
Intercept	-12.237**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.162
% Young White Males	0.043
Interaction: Immigration X Young White Males	0.107

% Hispanic X H/W Unemployed	
Intercept	-12.434**
% Hispanic	-0.061**
H/W Unemployed	-0.258
Interaction: % Hispanic X H/W Unemployed	-0.003
% Hispanic X H/B Unemployed	
Intercept	-12.418**
% Hispanic	-0.061**
H/B Unemployed	0.290
Interaction: % Hispanic X H/B Unemployed	-0.005
% Hispanic X Hispanic Voters	
Intercept	-12.491**
% Hispanic	-0.060**
Hispanic Voters	-0.011
Interaction: % Hispanic X Hispanic Voters	-0.000
% Hispanic X % Pop Covered	
Intercept	-12.492**
% Hispanic	-0.063**
% Pop Covered	0.023**
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Pop Covered	0.000
% Hispanic X % Non-Zero	
Intercept	-12.493**
% Hispanic	-0.061**
% Non-Zero	0.010*
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Non-Zero	0.000
% Hispanic X % Young White Males	
Intercept	-12.472**
% Hispanic	-0.062**
% Young White Males	0.039
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Young White Males	-0.001
% Hispanic X % Community Policing	
Intercept	-12.536**
% Hispanic	-0.063**
% Community Policing	-0.008
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Community Policing	0.000
% Hispanic X % Urban	
Intercept	-13.174**
% Hispanic	-0.077**
% Urban	-0.004
Interaction: % Hispanic X % Urban	0.001*
% Hispanic X Immigration	
Intercept	-12.382**
% Hispanic	-0.062**
Hispanic Immigration Rate	0.188
Interaction: % Hispanic X Immigration	-0.003

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Testing the Moderating Effects of Minority Threat and Reporting

While there does not seem to be a mediating relationship of economic or political threat on hate crime, as with the anti-black analysis, it is possible that there is a

moderating relationship. In other words, it is possible that the effect of the minority threat indicators may be stronger across levels of economic competition or minority group political strength. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.7 above. First, the effect of Hispanic immigration or percent Hispanic may vary across values on the respective unemployment ratios; however, this is not supported in the analysis. Second, the effect of immigration or percent Hispanic may vary across values of minority political power, but again this is not supported by the analysis. Third, the effect of minority group political power may vary across levels of economic threat, but as with the other hypotheses this is not supported by the analysis.

Additionally, it is possible that the effect of immigration or percent Hispanic may vary depending on the reporting practices of the states. Specifically, it is possible that immigration or percent Hispanic may have a stronger effect where there is more reporting such that, especially due to the rarity of Hispanic hate crime, it may be difficult to detect a significant relationship between minority group size and hate crime where there is little reporting. To test this interaction terms between immigration as well as percent Hispanic and the percent of the population covered by the reporting agencies, the percent of agencies reporting non-zero counts, and the percent of agencies with a community policing policy were included in the model. There does not appear to be a moderating relationship between minority group size and reporting.

Likewise, it is possible that the effect of minority group size varies across levels of the percent urban population. Specifically, it is possible that the effect of minority group size may be stronger in states with a larger proportion of their population residing in large cities. This may be due to a concentration of immigrants and Hispanics in

general in those large cities where there is greater access to jobs. While the relationship between immigration and hate crime does not appear to be moderated by the percent urban population, the effect of the percent Hispanic on hate crime is significantly different at different levels of percent urban. In other words, the negative relationship between percent Hispanic and hate crime is conditioned by the percentage of the population living in large cities, such that the effect will become stronger in states with more of their population in cities over 100,000 population.

Likewise, it may be that the effect of minority group size will be different across the different levels of the potential offending population. In other words, it is possible that the effect of minority group size may be stronger where there are a larger concentration of young white males. This hypothesis is not supported in the analysis. Finally, the effect of Hispanic immigration may depend on the overall size of the Hispanic population. Specifically, it is possible that where there is already a large concentration of Hispanics an increase in the size of the Hispanic immigrant population may not result in an increase in Hispanic hate crime. On the other hand, where there are few Hispanics an increase in the Hispanic immigrant population may result in a more dramatic increase in hate crime. This hypothesis was explored using a multiplicative interaction of the percent Hispanic and the Hispanic immigration rate, but the results indicate this is not the case.

Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term

There is little precedent at the macro level on the best way to measure immigration. In order to find the best measure of immigration over time at the state level data from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) *Immigration Yearbooks* are

used in the preceding analysis. However, DHS only provides the number of legal immigrants entering a given state each year that are from specific countries. In order to adjust for the different sizes of the 51 states that make up the continental United States, it was necessary to create a rate. This proved to be slightly more difficult than one would expect, because depending on the denominator chosen to make the rate and the sample used in the analysis the results were different. The take away point to this discussion is that the relationship between this indicator of immigration and hate crime is fragile. Thus, in order to determine which would be the best indicator of Hispanic immigration and what would be the best sample of states and years to use, a series of analyses were conducted. This analysis is presented in Appendix D.

Four sampling frames and four denominators were used. The four denominators are: first, the total population in the state; second, the total Hispanic population in the state; third, the total Hispanic foreign born population in the state; and fourth, the total foreign born population in the state. The first sample is the full set of 51 states for the years 2000-2007. The second sample is the full set of 51 states for a more limited time frame, 2000-2004. The third and fourth samples divide each of these two into a subsample consisting of those states that are at least 2% Hispanic in all years. In addition to examining different sampling frames the models were also assessed including and excluding the percent Hispanic measure.

The results of this fragility test suggest that regardless of the denominator used immigration is not related to Hispanic hate crime once reporting is controlled when using the full sample of 51 states. On the other hand, the results indicate that when controlling for the percent of the state that is Hispanic, immigration as a function of the Hispanic

population and immigration as a function of the Hispanic foreign born population are significant and positive in many of the models. Indeed the immigration terms are most consistently positive, with the exception of the term using the total population as the denominator which is negative. This total population denominator, however, is not substantively significant.

For the purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter Hispanic immigration was measured as the rate per 100,000 Hispanic foreign born persons coming from four countries (Cuba, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico). This indicator was chosen for two reasons. The first is conceptual. Specifically, the immigration term should capture increases in the immigrant population, as such this indicator captures year to year changes in the Hispanic foreign born population. The second is statistical. In examining the different immigration terms across samples the indicator used here was the most consistent. Specifically, the results were similar for both the period from 2000-2007 and the shorter period from 2000-2004. This suggests that while still fragile, this indicator may be the most robust indicator of Hispanic immigration.

Discussion

In the past ten years Hispanics have become the largest minority group in the United States. A large part of this shift in the demographic makeup of the country has been immigration. As a result of this increasing population, Hispanics today may be seen as an even greater threat to the majority white population than African-Americans.

The analysis in this chapter set out to examine the trend in anti-Hispanic hate crime, and specifically attempt to explain this trend using the minority threat framework. The findings suggest that while immigration explains some of the variation in hate crime

against Hispanics this relationship may be due to other structural characteristics of the state that are related to immigration. On the other hand, like the anti-Black analysis it appears that the overall size of the minority population is related to the level of hate crime, and is independent of the other state structural characteristics and reporting. Additionally, as with the previous examination of the anti-black hate crime trend, reporting seems to explain much of the variation in Hispanic hate crime.

In terms of the minority threat framework, the results do suggest a relationship between minority group size and hate crime, and suggest that this relationship is quite robust (at least in terms of the overall size of the minority group); although, the relationship appears to be negative which is contrary to the expectations of minority threat. Additionally, the minority threat framework proposes a positive relationship between the political strength of the minority group as well as the level of economic competition and hate crime, but this is not supported in the analysis. These findings are consistent with those from the previous chapter on anti-Black hate crime, except there does not appear to be a relationship between Hispanic political power and Hispanic hate crime.

Overall the findings from the analysis of the Hispanic hate crime trends suggest that much of the trend is explained by the reporting practices of the differing states. On the other hand, it appears that state structural characteristics and the differing definitions of hate crime also play majors roles. Of particular importance is the fact that an increasing Hispanic population appears to decrease hate crime against them, which may be of particular interest as the Hispanic population continues to grow in many states and in the country as a whole.

CHAPTER 6

TRENDS IN HOMOPHOBIC VIOLENCE

Introduction

The gay rights movement started on June 27, 1969 when a group of New York City police raided a gay bar in Greenwich Village. While raids were not unusual in 1969, this raid was special because on this day the people in the bar fought back. This resistance and the protests that followed became known as the Stonewall Riots and set the stage for the gay rights movement (Carter, 2004). Just under a decade later, on November 27, 1978, County Supervisor Harvey Milk, the first openly gay man to be elected to public office, was assassinated in San Francisco (Engel, 2001). Finally, two decades later, on October 12, 1998, Matthew Shepard was tortured and left to die in Wyoming. Each of these events has led to the political climate today surrounding sexual orientation as a protected category in hate crime law, and culminated in the passage of the Matthew Shepard Act signed into law in October of 2009 (Hatzenbuehler et al., 2010). The Matthew Shepard Act added sexual orientation and gender identity to the federal hate crime law. Many Christian organizations spoke out in opposition of the Matthew Shepard Act, as did many conservatives. Indeed, only 44 Republican members of the House of Representatives, and only 5 Senate Republicans voted in favor of the bill (Hulse, 2009).

This comingling of politics and religion surrounding the debate over gay rights issues has been a consistent theme over the course of the gay rights movement since the late 1960s. Religion has played a major role in the decision making process surrounding

the policies of many states and the federal government with regard to many issues, but in the past two decades has found its foothold in condemning policies which are seen to benefit gays and lesbians. Examples of this can be seen in discussion surrounding the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy (see Montopoli, 2010) which is regularly used to prevent "out" gays and lesbians from serving in the military, as well as discussions surrounding the issue of gay marriage. For instance, the Mormon and Catholic Churches were some of the largest contributors to the campaign for Proposition 8 in California (ABC 7 News; Mormons for 8) which contradicted a ruling by the California Supreme Court in 2008 that allowed same sex couples to marry in the state. [19]

The Gay Rights Movement

The Gay Rights movement, like the Civil Rights Movement, has been the primary driving force behind making policies to extend equal rights to gays and lesbians including equal protection against hate crime. The movement took off after the raid on the Stonewall Inn in New York City in 1969. A month later the first gay pride march was held organizing the gay and lesbian community. A decade later, Harvey Milk proved that the gay community could organize into an electoral constituency to make things happen for themselves when he was elected to the position of County Supervisor in San Francisco. After Milk was assassinated in 1979, a jury acquitted his killer, Dan White, of first-degree murder. The day the news of the acquittal came out thousands of protesters marched through the streets of San Francisco from the Castro District to City Hall, this became known as the White Night riots.

The gains made during the 1970s were handed a setback in 1981 when the first cases of AIDS were reported. The AIDS epidemic caused a backlash against the gay

[19] Proposition 8 was upheld by the California Supreme Court in 2009.

community, and became known as the "gay-disease". However, by the 1990s, the tragedy of the AIDS epidemic helped to rebuild sympathy for gays and lesbians and brought the community back together to fight for themselves again.

During the term of President Bill Clinton two major events in gay rights history occurred. First, the gay and lesbian community came together in support for the President's support of a bill that would allow gays to serve openly in the armed forces, but opposition to the movement resulted in the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, a watered down version of the original bill. Second, in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which prohibits the Federal Government from recognizing same-sex marriage, thus leaving the recognition of same-sex marriage to individual states to decide.

With the death of Matthew Shepard in October of 1998, the gay community turned toward the expansion of hate crime law to include protections for sexual orientation and gender identity. This expansion was accomplished in many states, and by the federal government with the passage of the Matthew Shepard Act in October of 2009.

The gay rights movement over the past decade has been centered on the issue of gay marriage. In 2000, Vermont became the first state to offer "civil unions" to same sex couples which offer some of the same privileges as marriage. Then in 2004, Massachusetts became the first state to recognize same-sex marriage. This was followed by Connecticut in 2008, Iowa in 2009, Vermont in 2009, the District of Columbia in 2010, and New Hampshire in 2010. However, this movement has faced many setbacks, with 29 states adding constitutional amendments banning same sex marriage, and 12 others restricting marriage to one man and one woman through legislation.[20]

[20] The majority of states have amended their constitutions to define marriage as only between a man and a woman including Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas,

Defining Homosexuality

The definition of homosexuality has changed dramatically over the past century. At one time homosexuality was defined as a mental disorder and was included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychological Association. Indeed, it was not until the third edition of the DSM that homosexuality was not included (Zucker & Spitzer, 2005). It has always been defined by most churches as a sin (McNeil, 1976), and seen as something that could be cured. Today there are many Christian groups that consider themselves to be "ex-gay" (Wolkomir, 2001). These groups are made up of individuals who have been "cured". On the other hand, there are some scientists today, and even some church organizations, which are beginning to concede that there may be a genetic component to sexual orientation (Johnson, 2003).

The question then is how these cultural patterns of discrimination and policy decisions translate into hate crime. As was established in chapter 1, hate crime is a manifestation of prejudice. It is a way for people who view someone as being lesser than themselves to establish their dominance. Homophobia[21] is still an acceptable prejudice to have (Hoffman, et al., 2000), and people who hold this view are even supported by many individuals, most importantly by their religious teachers. As with the other forms of hate crime examined in this text, this chapter proposes minority threat as an explanation for changes in the trend in sexual orientation hate crime over time and across states.

Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

[21] The term homophobia was originally defined to mean the trepidation of being close or in proximity to a homosexual (Weinberg, 1972). Since this original definition, however, the use of the term has broadened to include "a wide range of negative emotions, attitudes and behaviours toward homosexual people" (Haaga, 1991: 171). Thus, homophobia is similar to other prejudices (Herek, 2004), and will be treated here as the motivating prejudice behind anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime.

Minority Threat and Sexual Orientation Hate Crime

As mentioned previously Blalock's original formulation of his minority threat hypothesis suggested that as a minority group increases in size the majority group will feel threatened and will take action to reduce that threat. That action will be in the form of discrimination, formal social control, and informal social control. Blalock also proposed that one of the mechanisms leading to prejudiced behavior would be political threat. That is as the minority group became larger its political strength would increase and threaten the political power of the majority group. Over the course of the past two decades gays and lesbians have become an increasingly visible and powerful group. Advocacy groups such as the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF), and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) have worked to promote equal rights for all regardless of sexual orientation. States are faced with a growing demand from their LGBT community for equal protection under the law (West, 1998). Sexual orientation has been added to national laws protecting employment rights, voting rights, as well as the federal hate crime statutes (Barnard & Downing, 1999). If Blalock is correct the mobilization of the LGBT community around these political issues will pose a threat to the majority group, in this case heterosexuals. Evidence of this political threat abounds in the discussion surrounding the issue of gay marriage, with conservative and religious groups claiming that gay marriage threatens the very foundation of marriage and the family (Stacey, 1996).

Blalock's second mechanism through which minority threat should manifest is economic competition. Indeed, Christian Right leaders, specifically Tony Marco, have argued that gays and lesbians are immensely wealthy. He suggested:

> Homosexuals claim they are economically, educationally and culturally disadvantaged. Marketing studies refute those claims. Homosexuals have an average annual household income of $55,430, versus $32,144 for the general population and $12,166 for disadvantage African-American households. (Marco, 1992).

However, these statistics come from a survey done by the *Wall Street Journal* in 1991, and are thus likely skewed toward those individuals who are readers of the publication. Indeed, there is no good estimate of the affluence or lack thereof of the LGBT community. But some intuitive assumptions could be made. Specifically, it has been established in research that women on average make less money than do men for doing similar jobs (Crosby, Stockdale, & Ropp, 2007). Thus if one household has two men bringing home a paycheck, while another has a man and a woman bringing home a paycheck, it would make some sense that the two male incomes would be higher than the man and woman income combined. However, it also makes sense that a comparison between a "traditional" family (man and woman) and a lesbian couple (two women) would indicate the opposite. The combination of a man and a woman's incomes would be greater than the combination of two women's incomes. This becomes more complicated when considering families in which one parent stays at home. This suggests overall that at least in households in which both partners work, there should be a relative equality, or a slight disadvantage for lesbian couples, between heterosexual and homosexual couples.

Given this seemingly relative equality between heterosexual and homosexual households, this economic threat argument should be less relevant to gay and lesbian hate crime. Additionally, the majority of employers cannot tell whether an individual is gay or straight when they interview them, and there is no affirmative action for gay people.

So it is not likely that the sexual orientation of the individual will influence the hiring process. If anything, the research that has been done on prejudice may suggest that if the sexual orientation of the individual is known the prospective employer may be less inclined to hire that individual (Badgett, 1995). On the other hand, another possible relationship here is that it is not the actual threat of the loss of a job to someone who is gay or lesbian, but the perception of that threat. This is an argument similar to others that have been proposed in the minority threat framework. In other words, research suggests that many people do not necessarily understand "affirmative action" (Steeh & Krysan, 1996), and as such may think that if a gay/lesbian person is up for the same job that they are, because they are, in some states, a protected group, the gay/lesbian person may get the job instead of them. Research on affirmative action, however, focuses on race and ethnicity, and the perception of those groups as a protected category.

There is however another mechanism that may be considered in a minority threat framework explaining anti-homosexual/bisexual hate crime. This is what I call religious threat. Religion's definition of homosexuality as "an abomination" is the root of the social climate that leads to discrimination of gays and lesbians. This social climate is evidenced by the arguments made by Christian groups and society at large around issues of gay and lesbian relationships to children and influence over them. Specifically, questions exist over whether gays and lesbians should be able to adopt children, [22] teach in primary and secondary schools,[23] or even be portrayed by mainstream media. There is

[22] On the issue of adoption, 10 states and the District of Columbia allow second-parent adoption, or the adoption of a child by the non-biological same sex parent. 16 other states have some jurisdictions in which second parent adoption has been allowed. Additionally, 14 states and the District of Columbia allow same sex couples to jointly adopt a non-biological child. An additional 2 states have allowed joint adoption in some jurisdictions.

[23] Regarding the question of whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to teach, there are many examples in which a teacher was targeted for discrimination after coming out as gay or lesbian. One such

an assumption underlying each of these issues in which homosexuality is capable of corrupting, or is contagious, and thus may rub off on those individuals (children) over whom the gay or lesbian person has influence.

While this moral argument is based on more than just religion, its foundation is in religion. The view of homosexuality as being depraved, or corrupting, comes from a literal interpretation of the Bible. As such, it is expected that these moral arguments, this anti-gay/lesbian social climate, may be more pronounced in areas that are highly religious, and more specifically religiously conservative.

Additionally, it is possible that the political debate and the religiously conservative social climate may interact to create a new threat. As mentioned previously religion has played a major role in the debate over equal rights for gays and lesbians. It is possible then that the competing arguments, the debate between the pro-gay marriage groups and the anti-gay marriage groups for example, could add a level of threat to the landscape. For instance, it has been suggested by the anti-gay marriage campaigns (Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, & Wright, 2007) that homosexuality threatens the foundation of marriage and the family.

While Blalock's original treatment of minority threat did not address non-racial or ethnic minorities, he did suggest that his theory would apply to any minority group. As such it is my contention that the propositions supplied by the minority threat framework

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example is the case of Gerry Crane in Byron Center, Michigan. Crane was hired as a music teacher in the small town in 1993. He was given great reviews for the first two years of his tenure there. In 1995, Crane and his partner planned a commitment ceremony. When the town found out about the ceremony and the news got back to school officials, parents, and students, angry parents demanded the teacher resign or be fired. Parents pulled their children from Crane's classes. In December, 1995 the school board issued a statement that read in part, "individuals who espouse homosexuality do not constitute proper role models as teachers" (quoted in Yared, 1997). By the end of the year, after months of harassment, Crane resigned.

may be applied to hate crime against gays and lesbians as it has been applied to racial and ethnic violence in the past.

Sexual Orientation Hate Crime: What We Know

The majority of research on sexual orientation hate crime, as with hate crime in general, has been at the individual level. Specifically, research suggests that individuals who have been victimized because of their sexual orientation experience more negative consequences than gay and lesbian victims of non-bias crimes (Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). Additionally, research suggests that as with hate crime in general the offenders in sexual orientation bias crimes are generally young white males (Comstock, 1991). Sexual orientation bias crimes often occur in schools; studies suggest as many as 80% of gay and lesbian teens experience victimization in some form, mostly bullying, in high school (Berrill, 1992).

This examination of sexual orientation as a motivation for victimization at the individual level has not translated to the macro level. However, two studies have been conducted in this area. The first conducted by Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998a) adds credence to the assumption that there is no relationship between the economic conditions in an area and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime. Specifically, Green et al. found that monthly total unemployment rates are not significantly related to anti-gay/lesbian hate crime in New York City from January 1987 to December 1995. In fact the authors find no significant relationship between economic conditions and hate crime for many types, including anti-Asian, anti-Black, anti-Semitic, and anti-White hate crime. The second, conducted by Green, Strolovitch, Wong, and Bailey (2001) assessed the relationship

between the density of the gay and lesbian population[24] and hate crime against those groups in the five boroughs of New York City. The authors examined 1990 Census data and hate crime reports from the New York Police Department's Bias Incident Investigative Unit (BIIU) from 1994 to 1995. While controlling for the size of the white population, the population under the age of 5, median household income, and total poverty, the authors conclude that there is indeed a strong correlation (.83 for gay men and .90 for lesbians) between gay and lesbian population density and anti-gay and lesbian hate crime. This study was limited, however, to the examination of a single city and a limited time frame. Thus the authors were unable to examine changes over time. These are problems inherent in the measurement of the gay and lesbian population and are discussed further later in this chapter.

The Problem of Sexual Orientation Hate Crime

The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports defines sexual orientation hate crime as those against male homosexuals (gay men), female homosexuals (lesbians), homosexuals, bisexuals, or heterosexuals. Within this group the largest subgroup are gay men. Sexual orientation hate crimes account for approximately 15 to 20 percent of hate crime incidents reported to police annually. Gay male hate crimes account for approximately 60% of sexual orientation hate crimes. Anti-heterosexual hate crime accounts for only 2.5% of sexual orientation hate crimes annually.[25] Sexual orientation hate crimes are approximately 70% personal crimes annually, which is slightly higher than racial

[24] The authors measured gay male population density "by counting the number of households composed of two unrelated males over the age of 30… (in which) neither resident of the household could be enrolled in school". Lesbian population density was calculated the same way. This was done using census data at the census tract and zip code level (Green et al., 2001:284-285).

[25] Anti-heterosexual hate crimes are generally simple assaults and intimidation, do not involve weapons beyond hands and feet, mostly target young victims and involve young (17-29) adult offenders. Additionally, anti-heterosexual hate crimes generally involve female victims and male offenders, with the victims most often non-Hispanic whites, while the offenders may either be black or white.

incidents (64% personal crimes), similar to ethnic incidents, and considerably higher than religious incidents (about 30% personal crimes).

Figure 6.1 below shows the trend in anti-sexual orientation hate crimes from 2000 to 2008. This figure suggests that the sexual orientation hate crime rate has significantly decreased since 2000, specifically from approximately 0.58 per 100,000 persons to 0.49 per 100,000. This suggests that there is some variation in the trend in sexual orientation hate crime over time.

In addition to variation in the trend in sexual orientation hate crime over time, there is variation across region. This variation is suggested in Figure 6.2 below. As with the trends in anti-racial and anti-ethnic hate crime the South consistently has the lowest reported rate for all years, and with the exception of 2006 the West consistently has the highest rate for all years.

Finally, consistent with the analyses of the anti-black and anti-Hispanic hate crime trends, it is expected that the trend in sexual orientation hate crime will vary by state. This may be due to differences in the size of the gay and lesbian population, differences in the size and influence of the religiously conservative community, or differences in the social climate in the state. For instance, it is possible that states that are more politically liberal will be more likely to report sexual orientation hate crimes. Additionally, states that have a larger gay and lesbian population, especially one that is politically active, may report more sexual orientation hate crime.

Figure 6.1: Sexual Orientation Hate Crime Rate per 100,000, 2000-2008



Figure 6.2: Sexual Orientation Bias Motivation by Region, 2000-2007



This hypothesis is explored in Figure 6.3 below which examines the trend in the sexual orientation hate crime rate for the total population for six states from various regions across the United States. These six states represent a variety of conditions across the U.S. They were chosen to represent each of the regions in the US and some of the

various political and social climates that exist. For instance, Massachusetts is one of only a handful of states that has legalized gay marriage (in 2004). Massachusetts, California, Florida, and Georgia each have relatively large gay and lesbian populations, while Tennessee and Utah have relatively small, but existent, gay and lesbian populations. Additionally, the religious climate is different in each of these states, with Tennessee having a very large conservative religious population, as do Florida, Utah, and Georgia, while California and Massachusetts do not. Obviously, these six states do not represent all of the different derivations that exist across the U.S.; however, they provide some estimation of the amount of variation that does exist.

This figure suggests that in some states there was an overall decrease in sexual orientation hate crimes (California, Massachusetts, Utah, and Georgia), while in other states the trend was more volatile (Tennessee), and other states (Florida) had a more stable trend in sexual orientation hate crime from 2000 to 2008.

Figure 6.3: Sexual Orientation Hate Crime Rate per 100,000 total persons by State, 2000-2008



Figures 6.4 and 6.5[26] below show the sexual orientation hate crime rate for the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. and the political power of gays and lesbians[27] for 2001 and 2007 respectively. The maps suggest that there may be a relationship between the political power of the gay and lesbian population and hate crimes against them. Specifically, the Northeastern states have the highest concentration of gay and lesbian political power, evident by the larger circles in that region, and have the higher rates of sexual orientation motivated hate crime, evident by the blue color. Thus, these figures suggest that there is variation across time and place in sexual orientation hate crime and that there may be a relationship between the political strength of the minority group and hate crime against them.

Finally, Figure 6.6 shows the sexual orientation hate crime rate per 100,000 total population for the 48 contiguous states and the evangelical adherence rate per 1,000. While it was expected there would be a positive relationship between evangelical adherence and sexual orientation, it appears there may actually be an inverse relationship. Specifically, in states where there was more hate crime, such as California and the Northeast there are fewer evangelical adherents; however, as with any relationship there are some exceptions with states such as Kansas and Georgia having both larger evangelical adherence rates and higher sexual orientation hate crime rates. The remainder of this chapter will propose an explanation for the variation seen in the figures and will propose minority threat as this explanation for that variation.

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[26] These Maps were created using ArcGIS. The data was drawn from the Uniform Crime Reports Hate Crime Reporting Program, the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Survey, and the 2000 Census.

[27] This is a scale measure, described in more detail later in this chapter, ranging from 0 to 6 indicating states that provide certain civil rights protections, such as employment and school discrimination, adoption, and marriage to gays and lesbians.

Figure 6.4:


Sexual Orientation Hate Crime rate per 100,000
Total Population by Gay/Lesbian
Political Power, 2001
Legend
Power01
0.000000
0.000001 - 1.000000
1.000001 - 2.000000
2.000001 - 4.000000
4.000001 - 5.000000
tl_2009_us_state.SORate2000
0.000000
0.000001 - 0.332693
0.332694 - 0.674549
0.674550 - 0.927350
0.927351 - 1.168659
1.168660 - 1.634042
1.634043 - 2.195662

Figure 6.5:


Sexual Orientation Hate Crime Rate
per 100,000 Total Population
by Gay/Lesbian Political Power, 2007
Legend
S
Power07
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Rate07
0.000000
0.000001 - 0.393149
0.393150 - 0.742625
0.742626 - 1.217143
1.217144 - 2.457943
2.457944 - 3.698743
3.698744 - 4.929525

Figure 6.6:


Sexual Orientation Hate Crime Rate
by Evangelical Adherence Rate, 2000
Legend
Evan00
16.191636 - 33.249851
33.249852 - 77.307860
77.307861 - 102.824452
102.824453 - 130.709724
130.709725 - 171.090264
171.090265 - 294.003109
294.003110 - 431.483130
tl_2009_us_state.SORate00
0.000000
0.000001 - 0.268544
0.268545 - 0.405456
0.405457 - 0.598049
0.598050 - 0.879390
0.879391 - 1.526253
1.526254 - 2.208410

Data and Methods

For this analysis data are drawn from four sources. These include, the Uniform Crime Reports, which provide the dependent variable in the number of anti-homosexual hate crimes in the state each year from 2000 to 2007 for all 51 states (the 50 states of the US and the District of Columbia). These include those motivated by anti-gay male, anti-lesbian, anti-homosexual, and anti-bisexual bias.

Second, the majority group political power indicator is drawn from Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections from 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. This indicates the percent of votes for the Republican candidate in the senatorial race. It's expected that political conservatives will be more likely to vote for the Republican candidate in an election, and that a state's level of political conservatism will be related to the level of discrimination against gays and lesbians including hate crime. Estimates for inter-electoral years were drawn from the prior year's election such that the estimate for 2001 was the percentage from 2000, etc.

Third, the gay and lesbian population estimate is drawn from the 2000 Census and the 2002-2007 American Community Survey. This represents the percent of unmarried partner households that have same-sex partners. Prior research suggests that this proxy, or some derivation thereof, is a valid estimate of the gay and lesbian population (Black, Gates, Sanders, & Taylor, 2000; Green et al., 2001; Census, 2001; Gates & Ost, 2004).

The size of the conservative religious population was drawn from the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Survey and represents the rate of evangelical adherents per 1,000 persons in the population. Religious adherents include "all full members, their children, and others who regularly attend services or participate in the

congregation" (ARDA, 2001). The analysis was limited to evangelical[28] religious groups because not all religious groups have the same opinion of homosexuality. On the contrary, it is expected that the most conservative Christian groups, those that believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible and those that are most committed to their faith, will be the most likely to feel threatened by the increased policy attention paid to gay and lesbian issues in the past twenty years. Evangelical congregations generally represent these more conservative groups. These evangelical congregations are defined as those that "have typically sought more separation from the broader culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual conversion, and taught strict adherence to particular religious doctrines" (Steensland, Park, Regnerus, Robins, Wilcox, & Woodberry, 2000).

Finally, gay and lesbian political power is measured using a scale of civil rights protections afforded to gays and lesbians. Specifically, drawing from data collected by the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and confirmed by state statute provisions and case law, each state was coded as to whether it provided protection in six categories. First, each state was coded for protection from discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment (1 for protected, 0 for not protected). Second, each state was coded 1 if the state statutes protect individuals from discrimination, harassment, and/or bullying in schools based on their sexual orientation and 0 if not protected. Third, states which allow for second parent adoption were coded 1 while states that do not allow for second parent adoption were coded 0. Likewise, states were coded 1 if they allow for joint adoption and 0 otherwise. Finally, two measures were used to assess marriage equality. The first is whether the state has equal rights or equivalent rights for same sex couples (coded 1 if

[28] These include congregations such as the American Baptist Association, the Southern Baptist Convention, Seventh Day Adventist, and Pentecostal. For a complete list of congregation included in this measure see Steensland et al. 2000.

the state has equal rights and 0 otherwise). These equal or equivalent rights could refer to the legalization of gay marriage, but more often refer to states with some form of civil union.[29] The second measure is whether the state has a gay marriage prohibition (coded 1 if the state does not have a prohibition and 0 otherwise). While these two measures are somewhat related, they are far from perfectly correlated, because some states which prohibit gay marriage do allow some protections, such as civil unions, for gay and lesbian couples. For instance, California allows for domestic partnerships that extend equivalent rights to gay and lesbian couples but has an amendment to prohibit gay marriage. These six measures were then added together to create an additive scale (α is between a low of .645 in 2000 and a high of .841 in 2007) of gay and lesbian political power ranging from a low value of 0 (indicating a state with no civil rights protections for gays and lesbians) to 6 (indicating a state with all of the protections for gays and lesbians).

Due to data limitations that will be discussed further in the conclusion, the following analysis consists of an examination of the descriptive statistics of the variables described above, bivariate correlations of the relationships between each of the measures, and t-tests of differences between means. For the purpose of the t-tests the data was divided into groups according to the size of the gay and lesbian population and the political power of the gay and lesbian community. Finally, the sample was limited to the 2000 data alone and a cross sectional negative binomial regression model was used to assess the relationship between these indicators and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime. The panel models could not be estimated due to a lack of available data for some of the

[29] Civil unions offer some of the same responsibilities and privileges as does "marriage", with a few notable exceptions. First, civil unions often are not recognized outside of the state that the union was made in, while marriages are recognized anywhere the couple may go. Second, marriage is a legal status providing federal tax benefits, and other benefits, that are not extended to civil unions outside of the state.

indicators in the analysis over time. This limitation will be discussed further in the conclusion.

The standard negative binomial regression log likelihood function is (Hilbe, 2007):

_____ _____ – – (6.1)

This model allows for the regression of the predictors on the number of gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crimes in a given state in 2000 while adjusting for overdispersion in the dependent variable.

Results

The analysis began with an examination of the distribution of the predictors and the dependent variable for the years 2000 to 2007. Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics. On average there were 23.86 anti-gay/lesbian/bi hate crimes in a given state year with a range from 0 to 420. Additionally, on average the state was 9.15% gay/lesbian with a range from .43 to 31.71. The average score on the gay/lesbian political power scale was 1.43 with a range from 0 to 6. Finally, the average percent republican votes was 49.09 with a range from 0 to 99.18; however, the data on this measure was limited to 50 states and 270 state-years.

Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime Predictors by State-Year

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Obs/Groups
Anti-Homo	23.86	46.96	0	420	408/51
% Same-Sex Households	9.15	5.3	0.43	31.71	408/51
% Republican Votes	49.09	16.63	0	99.18	270/50
Gay/Lesbian Political Power	1.43	1.57	0	6	408/51

Table 6.2 below examines the bivariate correlations between the measures in the anti-homosexual hate crime analysis. Several of the bivariate relationships are significant. Specifically, the size of the gay and lesbian population is significantly and positively correlated with anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime. Likewise, the political strength of the gay and lesbian population is significantly and positively correlated with anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime. Finally, although the data is somewhat more limited, the percent of Republicans in the state is negatively and significantly correlated with anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime. In addition to the correlations between the predictors and anti-homosexual hate crime there are also significant relationships between the predictors. Specifically, the size of the gay/lesbian population is significantly and positively correlated with gay and lesbian political power while negatively and significantly correlated with the percent of Republican votes. This suggests that it is likely that gays and lesbians will have more political power where there are more gays and lesbians and less where there are more Republicans.

Table 6.2: Bivariate Correlations of Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime, 2000-2007

	Anti-Homo	% Same-Sex Households	% Republican Votes	Gay/Lesbian Political Power
Anti-Homo	1			
% Same-Sex Households	0.12*	1		
% Republican Votes	-0.20**	-0.06	1	
Gay/Lesbian Political Power	0.37**	0.20**	-0.40**	1

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Finally, the 2000-2007 data was broken down into groups according to the percent gay and lesbian population (Table 6.3) and the score on the gay/lesbian political

power scale (Table 6.4) and the means on each group were compared. Using a one-tailed test states that have less than average gay and lesbian population have significantly fewer anti-homosexual hate crimes than states with greater than average gay and lesbian persons consistent with the bivariate correlations. Likewise, states with fewer than average gays and lesbians score significantly lower on the gay and lesbian political power scale. Similarly, states that score less than the average on the gay and lesbian political power scale have significantly fewer anti-gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crimes, and states that score lower on the political power scale have significantly more Republican votes.

Table 6.3: Descriptives and T-Tests of Difference Between Means Gay/Lesbian Population Size, Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime

	Mean (Gay/Lesbian Pop > Mean)	Mean (Gay/Lesbian Pop < Mean)	T
Anti-Homo	28.26	16.62	-4.48**
Gay/Lesbian Political Power	1.57	1.19	-3.09**
Obs	254	154	
Groups	49	51	

Note: One tailed Test
$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Table 6.4: Descriptives and T-Tests of Difference Between Means by Gay/Lesbian Political Power, Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime

	Mean (Gay/Lesbian Political Power > Mean)	Mean (Gay/Lesbian Political Power < Mean)	T
Anti-Homo	44.98	14.86	-31.16**
% Republican Votes	38.79	53.5	13.97**
Obs	122	286	
Groups	19	38	

Note: One tailed Test
$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

The remainder of the analysis will use the 2000 cross sectional sample of states. Table 6.5 below presents the descriptive analysis for the 2000 data. On average in 2000

there were 25.06 anti-homosexual hate crimes with a range from 0 to 399. The average size of the gay and lesbian population was 11.89 with a range from 7.02 to 25.4. The average score on the gay and lesbian political power scale was 1.29 with a range from 0 to 4. The average evangelical adherence rate was 144.47 per 1,000 persons with a range from 16.19 to 431.48. Finally, two controls consistent with the previous analyses for the differential reporting practices of states were used. On average in 2000, 80.4% of the population was covered by reporting agencies and 22.69% of agencies reported non-zero counts.

Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics of Measures used in Cross Sectional Analysis

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Anti-Homo	25.06	57.07	0	399
% Same Sex	11.89	2.97	7.02	25.4
Gay/Lesbian Political Power	1.29	1.12	0	4
Evangelical Adherence Rate	144.47	113.87	16.19	431.48
% Pop Covered	80.4	30.32	0	100
% Non-Zero	22.69	26.71	0	100

Table 6.6 below presents the bivariate correlations of the measures used in the cross sectional analysis. There are a few significant bivariate correlations. First, there is a significant and positive relationship between the gay and lesbian political power scale and the gay and lesbian population. Likewise, as with the panel data, there is a significant and positive correlation between the size of the gay and lesbian population and the political power of gays and lesbians. There is a negative relationship between the evangelical adherence rate and gay and lesbian political power such that gays and lesbians have less power where there are more evangelicals. Similarly, gays and lesbians have more political power where more agencies report non-zero counts. It is possible

that states that are more sensitive to gay and lesbian issues may also be more sensitive to hate crime and other minority issues in general. Thus, states with a larger minority population may report more hate crime. Finally, there is a negative relationship between the evangelical adherence rate and the percent of the state population covered by reporting agencies, suggesting that states that have fewer evangelicals have a larger proportion of their population covered by their reporting agencies. It is possible that states with more conservative view points, including conservative Christian viewpoints, will be less likely to support laws that would provide special protections to certain groups and thus be less likely to report to programs measuring those types of crime; however, this is purely speculative.[30]

Finally, a negative binomial regression model was used to assess whether these bivariate relationships hold up when controlling for other covariates. The results of this regression analysis are presented in Table 6.7 below. The first model suggests that there is a relationship between the size of the gay and lesbian population and anti-homosexual hate crime, with a one unit increase in the size of the gay and lesbian population increasing the expected number of anti-homosexual hate crimes by 26%. The second model suggests that this relationship between gay and lesbian population size and hate crime is mediated by the political power of the gay and lesbian population consistent with Blalock's minority threat argument. However, the gay and lesbian political power is no longer significant when controlling for the rate of evangelical adherents (Model 3). The evangelical adherence rate is significantly and negatively related to anti-

[30] Additionally, it is possible that because the religious measure is limited to evangelicals, who may be more likely to "separate from the broader culture", this is simply picking up an avoidance of participation in that culture.

gay/lesbian/bisexual hate crime. Additionally, including this religious indicator in the model returns the percent gay and lesbian population to moderate significance.

Table 6.6: Bivariate Correlations of Measures used in Cross Sectional Analysis

	Anti-Homo	% Same Sex	Gay/Lesbian Political Power	Evangelical Adherence Rate	% Pop Covered	% Non-Zero
Anti-Homo	1					
% Same Sex	0.19	1				
Gay/Lesbian Political Power	0.31*	0.40**	1			
Evangelical Adherence Rate	-0.19	0.16	-0.33*	1		
% Pop Covered	0.19	-0.06	-0.12	-0.41**	1	
% Non-Zero	0.08	0.27	0.34*	0.12	-0.26	1

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Model 4 then adds in the first of the reporting controls and Model 5 adds in the second reporting control. The percent of the population covered by reporting agencies is significantly and positively related to anti-homosexual hate crime. Also of note, the inclusion of the reporting control does not decrease the effect of the evangelical adherence rate on anti-homosexual hate crime; however, the inclusion of the percent of agencies reporting non-zero counts does reduce the significance of the evangelical adherence rate to only moderate significance.

The results of this regression model suggest three additional hypotheses that are explored in table 6.8 below. Specifically, the results suggest that there may be some moderating relationships at work. First, the effect of the political power of the minority population may depend on the size of the gay and lesbian population. There are two

potential reasons this relationship may exist. The first is that it is possible that where gays and lesbians have more protections and thus greater political power gays and lesbians will be more likely to want to live there producing a greater level of threat to the majority group. Alternatively, and consistent with a minority threat argument, where the gay and lesbian population is larger they will be able to mobilize their resources more effectively to gain those civil rights protections and thus may pose a greater threat to the majority group. A second potential moderating relationship is that the effect of the size of the conservative religious population may be different depending on the size of the gay and lesbian population. Specifically, it is possible that where there are more gays and lesbians the religious conservative population may be more attuned to or sensitive to the issues of the gay and lesbian population. Finally, the political strength of the minority population may have a different effect on anti-gay and lesbian hate crime depending on the size of the conservative religious population. In other words, where gays and lesbians have more civil rights protections religious conservatives may feel especially threatened, such that they may feel that a powerful gay and lesbian population is a threat, and thus there may be a stronger relationship between the religious conservative population and hate crime.

Table 6.7: Cross-Sectional Regression of Anti-Homosexual Hate Crime on Predictors, 2000

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept	0.367	1.022	1.160	-0.337	-0.972
	(0.974)	(1.012)	(0.948)	(1.054)	(1.119)
% Same Sex HH	0.228**	0.111	0.172†	0.169†	0.170*
	(0.080)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.084)
Gay & Lesbian Political		0.488*	0.295	0.271	0.187
Power Scale		(0.198)	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.222)
Evangelical Adherence Rate			-0.005*	-0.004*	-0.004†
			(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
% Population Covered				0.017**	0.022**
				(0.006)	(0.007)
% Non-Zero Counts					0.011
					(0.008)
Log-Likelihood	-204.332	-201.342	-198.874	-195.565	-194.706
N			51		

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ * †p < .10

In order to assess these hypotheses interaction terms were added to the full model (Model 5 in Table 6.7). The results suggest that while the effect of religious conservatism does not vary across levels of the gay and lesbian population, or across levels of gay and lesbian political power, the effect of the size of the gay and lesbian population does depend on the amount of gay and lesbian political power. Specifically, the interaction term suggests that the effect of the gay and lesbian population will be attenuated by gay and lesbian political power. In other words, where there is more gay and lesbian political power the effect of the gay and lesbian population on hate crime will be reduced contrary to expectations.

Table 6.8: An Examination of Moderating Effects

% Same Sex X G/L Political Power	
Intercept	-1.724
% Same Sex	0.220*
G/L Political Power	0.278
Interaction: % Same Sex X G/L Political Power	-0.163**
% Same Sex X Evangelical Adherence	
Intercept	-1.324
% Same Sex	0.181*
Evangelical Adherence Rate	-0.004*
Interaction: % Same Sex X Evangelical Adherence	0.001
G/L Political Power X Evangelical Adherence	
Intercept	-1.552
G/L Political Power	0.649
Evangelical Adherence Rate	-0.003
Interaction: G/L Political Power X Evangelical	0.006

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Why Can't We Go Further?

When I set out to write my dissertation I wanted to examine the trends in anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, and anti-gay/lesbian hate crime. I encountered a number of problems, however, in attempting to find data to measure the terms I needed to assess the hypothesis that minority threat, and more specifically political threat and religious "threat", explained the trend in homophobic hate crime. These problems were primarily due to the limited availability of data over time. The limitations that I encountered will be addressed here, and potential solutions to those problems will be proposed.

First, as is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the data on hate crime is limited. There are few sources of hate crime at the macro level. This is even truer for the purpose of examining sexual orientation hate crime. Although the Uniform Crime Reports includes sexual orientation as a hate crime category, not all states include sexual orientation as a protected category in their hate crime statutes. Indeed, as was mentioned in previous chapters, only about 56% of states include sexual orientation as a protected

category. As a result the data on sexual orientation hate crime may be even more limited than other hate crime types.[31]

The hate crime data however was not the only dataset that proved problematic. Locating indicators for the political power of the gay and lesbian population as well as an indicator of religious conservatism also proved to be troublesome. While visibility of gays and lesbians is increasing in discussions about policy, voting surveys such as the Current Population Survey's Voting and Registration Supplement that was used in the previous chapters, and exit polls conducted by various news organizations, do not ask respondents about their sexual orientation. So there is no national estimate of the voting behavior of gays and lesbians. Additionally, while there are a handful of "out" political figures, such as Barney Frank (MA) and Tammy Baldwin (WI), there are no organizations that track them as there is with African-American elected officials. As a result of this dearth of political information regarding gays and lesbians this analysis is limited to a proxy indicator, which may have limited my ability to assess the relationship between the political strength of the minority group and hate crime against them.

Likewise, finding a yearly estimate of religious conservatism proved to be impossible. After contacting a handful of experts in religion (Chris Scheitle and Rodney Stark), I determined that there is no state level yearly estimate of religious affiliation in the United States. There are many potential reasons for this lack of information. First, the United States Census Bureau, which is intended to simply count the population, is limited in that it cannot ask respondents about their religious affiliation due to the separation of church and state required by the Constitution of the United States. Second,

[31] A dummy variable was added to the full model to control for those states that include sexual orientation as a protected category. The dummy measure was non-significant and did not change the results from the previous model. (Results not shown.)

while the General Social Survey (GSS) does ask its respondents to provide their religious affiliation, and asks several other questions about religion, the sampling frame for the GSS is not designed to be valid at the state level. Additionally, the sampling size of the GSS is so small in any given year that many years worth of data must be aggregated together in order to have a large enough sample size in the aggregate to make any accurate predictions. Thus, while the GSS would provide a good measure of religious affiliation in a cross section at the primary sampling unit (PSU) level it cannot be used to look at changes from one year to the next or in state level analyses. The data that is used in this analysis, drawn from the 2000 Religious Congregations and Membership Survey, is limited in that the survey is only conducted every ten years, similar to the census. As a result, it is not even possible to estimate a yearly rate using this data after 2000 until the 2010 data is released, which will not be until 2011 or 2012.

Finally, in terms of limitations of the data as mentioned earlier the indicator for the size of the gay and lesbian population is simply a proxy indicator. Because the indicator includes all two adult households in which the pair are unmarried and of the same-sex, it is possible that the indicator also includes college roommates or other relationships that may not be of a romantic nature. As a result the reliability of the indicator is uncertain.

Given the increased focus on gay and lesbian issues in policy, and the potential variation in violence against gays and lesbians there is a need for data to further assess explanations for this variation. Given that politics in particular seems to play a role in explaining the similar variation in anti-Black hate crime, there is a need for better sources of data on the levels of participation by gays and lesbians in the political procedures of

the country as both politicians and voters. Potential avenues for this type of data collection would be in the collection of information on the sexual orientation of respondents in voting polls, such as exit polls.

Conclusion

This chapter sets out to extend the minority threat framework, traditionally applied to racial and ethnic minority groups, to explain trends in anti-sexual orientation hate crime. Looking at the trends in anti-sexual orientation hate crime over the past ten years, it seems there is variation in sexual orientation hate crime across states that should be explained in order to better assess the problem and provide policies and programs to control the problem of hate crime. Due to data limitations this analysis was limited to descriptive and exploratory analyses of the panel data and a cross-sectional examination of the relationship between politics, religion and hate crime.

It is proposed that minority threat should be extended to include religious conservatives as a potential group that may feel threatened by the gay and lesbian minority population. Specifically, it is proposed that those religious groups that believe in the literal interpretation of the Bible and who are strongly attached to their religious faith will be more adverse to the continued attention paid to and "lifestyles" of gays and lesbians, and may use mechanisms of informal social control, such as hate crime, in an effort to control, or put back in their place, the minority group.

However, an examination of the relationship between religious conservatism and sexual orientation hate crime indicates that there may actually be an inverse relationship between the two. Because this was a cross-sectional analysis three potential explanations exist for this negative relationship. First, it is possible that because religion also holds

values such as tolerance and pacifism those areas that are more religious will have fewer hate crimes. Second, it is possible that areas that are more religiously conservative will be less likely to conform to laws they perceive to be providing special protections to those groups that they perceive as being unworthy of those protections and thus will report fewer hate crimes. Finally, because the analysis was unable to untangle the temporal ordering of these events, perhaps gays and lesbians are less likely to live in areas that are religiously conservative and as a result there are fewer potential victims and thus fewer victimizations. Future research is needed to disentangle this relationship.

A second hypothesis that was proposed is that consistent with the predictions of the minority threat framework there should be a positive relationship between the political strength of the gay and lesbian community and anti-sexual orientation hate crime. The results suggest that this is the case, both in cross-section and in the panel data, but that this relationship may be mediated by religious conservatism.

Overall, the results of the analysis in this chapter suggest a need for an increase in research on sexual orientation hate crime. However, until better data become available for the examination of these trends the research community may have to wait.

CHAPTER 7

WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE DON'T, AND WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

Introduction

Hate crime has been at the forefront of policy debates on minority issues for two and a half decades. But the majority of hate crime research up to this point has been focused on the individual victims and offenders, with a small number of studies examining the incident characteristics and still fewer on the prevalence of hate crime in various jurisdictions. While these macro level studies of hate crime have suggested many possible explanations for why one neighborhood may have more hate crime than another, these studies have been limited to single jurisdictions. This limitation has been primarily due to concerns over differences in reporting and definition across different jurisdictions.

One explanation that has been used in research on the treatment, and more accurately the mistreatment, of minority groups has been Blalock's minority threat framework. In its simplest form the minority threat framework suggests that an increase in the size of the minority group should result in an increase in the discrimination and social control of that minority group (Blalock, 1967). Blalock proposed two mechanisms of threat. First, political threat suggests that where the minority group is more politically powerful there will be more discrimination or social control of the minority group. Second, the economic threat hypothesis suggests that an increase in competition between the minority and majority group will result in more discrimination or social control of the minority group. Blalock also suggests that politics and economic competition should mediate the relationship between the size of the minority population and discrimination or social control.

Hate crime, like lynching, is a mechanism of informal social control. One goal of hate crime is to control minority groups, and to protect scarce resources (King et al., 2009). Research suggests that social control varies across place. Thus, it is likely that hate crime varies across place. Additionally, social control, and crime for that matter, varies across time. As such the purpose of this study was to propose a possible explanation for the variation in hate crime across time and place.

What We Know

Research on hate crime has focused on the individual and incident level. However, there have been a handful of studies examining hate crime at the macro level. Specifically, studies in New York City (Green & Rich, 1998; Green et al., 1998a; Green et al., 1998b; Green et al., 2001) and Chicago (Lyons, 2007; Lyons, 2008) suggest that demographic changes are related to hate crime. By controlling for possible correlates of hate crime reporting, this study attempts to build on this prior research by examining the macro level context of hate crime within and between states from 2000 to 2007.

Prior research has focused on within jurisdictional variation in primarily racial hate crime incidents. These studies have found that demographic shifts over time contribute to increases in hate crime, and that neighborhoods that are more affluent have more hate crime than disadvantage neighborhoods (Lyons, 2008). Due to strong criticism of hate crime research on the basis of differential reporting and differences in the definition of hate crime across jurisdictions (McDevitt et al., 2003), these studies have been limited to single jurisdictions, and thus are not easily generalizable to the broader hate crime spectrum. We do not know for instance if the mechanisms that shape hate crime in Chicago and New York City will be the same as those that shape hate crime in

Los Angeles and Salt Lake City. Additionally, because hate crime is a rare event, at least when measured using official crime statistics, the ability of these studies to look at non-racial hate crime is limited. Racially motivated hate crime make up between 50 and 60 percent of the annual reported hate crimes (FBI, 2004), and as such in a single jurisdiction there are more anti-racial incidents to be counted.

The current study attempted to build on this prior research by examining a large number of jurisdictions, multiple types of hate crime, and by controlling for potential correlates of hate crime reporting and the differential definitions of hate crime. The study suggests some similarities across the different types of hate crime, but also some differences in the explanations for the different patterns and trends.

First, in two of the analyses, the anti-Black and anti-Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual, and a similarity that stands out as the most interesting is the finding that the political power of the minority group is related to the prevalence of hate crime. However, despite the robust relationship between political strength and hate crime the implications of these relationships are different for each of the analyses. The political strength of the African-American community reduces hate crime victimization in that group as it increases. More specifically, at least for the African-American community, it seems likely that the more visible the community is in the political arena the less hate crime they experience. This suggests that perhaps it is the contact, even if it is through some secondary source, with a minority group member that reduces stereotypes and thus prejudices, rather than the simple strength of the minority group that matters as the contact hypothesis would suggest. It is possible that the same is true for the Hispanic population. That is it is possible that the more visible Hispanics are in the political arena, the less prejudice there

will be against them and thus the fewer hate crimes, but the data was not available to examine this possibility.

The results of the gay and lesbian analysis suggest a different picture. Where the gay and lesbian population has more civil rights protection, and thus more political strength, they are victimized more often. However, Blalock's minority threat framework suggests that at a certain point the minority group will become strong enough to decrease their risk of victimization. Thus, it is possible that the African-American population may have reached the point where they can exert enough power to reduce their victimization, but the gay and lesbian population has not yet reached that point.

The second consistent relationship in all three analyses is a significant relationship between the minority threat indicator and hate crime. However, again the implications of these relationships are different. Specifically, where there are more blacks relative to whites and where there are more Hispanics in general there is less anti-black or anti-Hispanic hate crime respectively. This is inconsistent with the predictions of the minority threat framework; however, given that Blalock suggested that there would be a point in which the minority group became large enough that they could reduce their victimization; it is possible that this relationship is consistent with minority threat. In order to examine this relationship the curvilinear relationships were assessed. The curvilinear effect was significant for the anti-Black analysis, it was also positive suggesting that as the size of the black population increases relative to whites the number of anti-black hate crimes decreases at a progressively faster rate. This would be consistent with the minority threat suggestion that when blacks are strong enough they may be able to reduce their victimization.

Finally, as for gay and lesbian hate crime, as the size of the gay and lesbian population increases there is more anti-gay/lesbian hate crime on average. This is consistent with the predictions of the minority threat framework, but inconsistent with the findings from the other two analyses. It is possible that unlike the Black and Hispanic populations, the gay and lesbian population has not reached the point where they are able to reduce their level of victimization.

Third, Blalock did not specify the best measure of economic competition. Research on minority threat has used various indicators of minority group and majority group economic status and various indicators of the competition between the minority and majority group, and it is not unusual for these indicators to provide different pictures of the relationship between economic competition and social control. The results of the analyses of anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crime in this study are no exception. Indeed, unemployment does not seem to be the best indicator of threat between the minority and majority groups in this study. Instead, it appears that competition between groups based on income is a better indicator of economic competition. For the anti-Black analysis the ratio of black to white unemployment is not significant, however, the ratio of black to white per capita income is significant and positive, consistent with the economic threat hypothesis. In other words, where blacks make more on average relative to whites there is more anti-Black hate crime. Additionally, including the income term in the model drops the ratio of blacks to whites in the population to non-significance. This has implications for research on hate crime, but also for the incorporation of research on income inequality and affirmative action policies into hate crime research. These implications are discussed shortly.

Fourth, the minority threat perspective proposes that the relationship between the relative size of the minority population and hate crime should be mediated by political and economic threat. This hypothesis overall is not supported, however, as mentioned the minority threat indicator is non-significant when the black to white income ratio is controlled. Some researchers have suggested that it is not a mediating relationship, but instead a moderating relationship. In other words, politics and economics do not explain the relationship between minority group size and hate crime, but instead the effect of minority group size on hate crime depends on levels of political power or economic competition. An examination of this moderating relationship, however, did not support this hypothesis.

Fifth, as mentioned, one of the primary reasons that prior research has been limited to single jurisdictions is due to reporting differences. Research on the reporting of hate crime suggests some potential correlates of hate crime reporting that may explain some of the variation within and between jurisdictions. Thus, in order to separate out the effects of reporting from the actual level of prevalence it is necessary to control for these reporting differences. Controlling for some of these potential correlates some of the relationships change, however, some remain the same. For instance, once reporting is controlled the ratio of blacks to whites in the population is no longer significant. However, after controlling for reporting the effect of the size of the Hispanic population on Hispanic hate crime is still significant, even controlling for the different definitions of hate crime across states. The political threat term for the black analysis remains significant even after controlling for reporting. The relationships for gay/lesbian hate crime hold up when controlling for reporting.

Finally, the gay and lesbian hate crime analysis includes an additional hypothesis, that gay and lesbian hate crime will be more prevalent in areas where there are more religious conservatives. However, the results indicate that there is an inverse relationship between the evangelical adherence rate and anti-gay and lesbian hate crime. As mentioned in Chapter 6, it is possible that because Christianity holds the values of pacifism and tolerance where they comprise more of the population there will be less hate crime. An alternative explanation is that where more of the population holds the values of conservative Christianity they will be less likely to take seriously those laws that may protect groups they see as unworthy and as such will report less anti-gay and lesbian hate crime.

What We Don't Know

As with any study on hate crime there are some limitations that are important to consider. The primary one deals with the hate crime data. The Uniform Crime Reports data is inherently limited, because it is official crime data. In other words, it relies on the reporting of crime (Gove, Hughes, & Geerken, 1985). Research suggests that a large number of crimes go unreported (Myers, 1980), and so they are an undercount of crime. However, the UCR is the only national level hate crime data collection that allows for the examination of hate crime across multiple jurisdictions over time. One alternative would be to use the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to examine these relationships, but the NCVS did not begin collecting hate crime data until 2000 (Harlow, 2005) and the data is still somewhat uncertain in that it relies on the victim's perception of the offender's motivation.

Additionally, even controlling for reporting, the use of official crime statistics means that it is reported hate crime. This requires that the victim reports the crime, the police recognize and record the crime as a hate crime, and finally the police report the crime as a hate crime to the UCR program. Given the fact that the reporting controls were consistently related to hate crime in all three analyses, it is possible that much of the trend in hate crime is still simply due to reporting practices, and that much of the variation across place is due to differences in those reporting practices.

In addition to problems in the measurement of hate crime, the ability to measure some of the concepts in the minority threat framework was limited. In particular, for the purpose of the gay and lesbian analysis the measurement of the minority group political power and religious conservatism was difficult. This required the use of proxy measures, and the limitation of the analysis to a cross-section. While this analysis suggests that minority threat may explain anti-gay/lesbian hate crime, until researchers are better able to measure the concepts in the minority threat framework in relation to this minority population the examination of trends in this type of crime is limited.

Finally, the analysis was limited to the state as the level of analysis. For the purpose of informing policy the state is an appropriate level of analysis given that policies are made at the state level. The state decides how to define hate crime, and much of the hate crime reporting is done through a state agency, but the enforcement of the laws occurs at the individual agency, or municipal level. States are highly heterogeneous areas which often have a combination of large cities and small towns. Research has not yet determined to what degree hate crime may be different between a rural and an urban area. Thus, it may be that aggregating the hate crime data to the state level has limited

the ability of the analysis to detect the relationships proposed by the minority threat framework. However, while controlling for the percent of the state's population residing in cities over 100,000 population several relationships remain significant. The question remains, however, as to whether these relationships will hold up at lower levels of aggregation.

Additionally, the data was limited to a relatively small period of time, 2000-2007, and as such the results may have differed had the time frame been extended or a different time frame been used. For instance, there was a relatively small change in the immigration rate during this time period, but at other times in United States history there were dramatic shifts in immigration.

Where Do We Go From Here?

The results of this study suggest a number of implications for research and policy. First, there are several suggestions for future research. The most important one is for this study to be replicated at lower levels of aggregation. Specifically, future research should examine the relationships seen here at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), the county, and the city levels. Replication at these lower levels of analysis, but still across jurisdiction, will provide researchers a better idea of what specifically it is about the place that shapes the macro level context of hate crime.

Additionally, the results of the income ratio suggest that this may be the best indicator of economic competition. This suggests that research conducted on income inequality that suggests disparities in income between different racial and ethnic groups (Darity & Mason, 1998) has important implications for hate crime victimization. Specifically, this research may provide greater insight into the mechanisms of economic

competition that explain the context of hate crime victimization. Additionally, research which addresses affirmative action policies, and opinions about those policies, should be incorporated into the hate crime research canon. Much of this research suggests biases in relation to the use of affirmative action policies (Fine, 1992), and as such those things which are related to negative opinions of affirmative action may also be related to hate crime.

Overall this research suggests that the macro level is an important area of study in hate crime research. As such this study should be extended to other hate crime types including religious hate crime. Additionally, macro level research on hate crime may benefit from a comparison of states over time that report consistently to the hate crime program such that the reporting practices can be better controlled. Finally, specifically for the examination of the trend in gay and lesbian hate crime this research suggests a need for better measures for the examination of the possible correlates of this type of hate crime, but more importantly there simply needs to be more research on this type of hate crime at the macro level.

In addition to the implications for research, this study also provides several implications for the development of hate crime policy. Given the consistent finding that reporting drives much of the trend in all three types of hate crime; it seems the best place at this point to focus policy attention is on the increase in reporting of hate crime. This should be done both in the encouraging of reporting of these types of incidents by the victims to the police, but also in the reporting of the incidents to the UCR program. Research at the individual level suggests that victims do not report hate crimes for many reasons, some of which are similar to other crimes, and others that are unique to hate

crime victimization (Harlow, 2005). For instance, research suggests that hate crime victims may believe that the police will not take hate crime seriously and thus they will not report their victimization (Harlow, 2005). Additionally, research suggests that blacks are more distrustful of the police than are whites (Brunson, 2007), and as such may be less likely to go to the police for help. Also, for gay and lesbian victims going to the police may result in "secondary victimization" due to the biases of the police officers who may further victimize the gay or lesbian person, but also because admitting that they are the victim of an anti-gay/lesbian hate crime may require them to "come out" as being gay or lesbian. This coming out may result in further victimization or discrimination by people they know, even their family (Garnets, Herek, & Levy, 1992). Finally, for immigrant groups, there may be a fear of deportation which may lead to underreporting of this type of hate crime (Kittrie, 2006). Thus, given the fear of mistreatment by the police, officers should be trained to deal with these types of victims and the delicate issues surrounding their victimization.

Another policy implication comes from the somewhat consistent finding of a relationship between the minority groups' political strength and hate crime. In particular, programs to encourage the participation of minority groups in the political process, including the increased visibility of minority politicians, could potentially decrease hate crime, although the possibility exists that victimization will increase until the minority group becomes powerful enough. That is, consistent with the results of the gay and lesbian analysis, while the minority group is growing in strength they will be more threatening to the majority and will experience more victimization.

Finally, the differential definition of hate crime is not significantly related to anti-black hate crime; however, it is related to anti-Hispanic hate crime. Race and ethnicity (or national origin) are consistently protected categories in the majority of hate crime laws. However, it appears that the broader definitions of hate crime lend themselves to the identification of more hate crimes in the state. This is to be expected, however, it suggests a possible implication for hate crime policy. Specifically, an important step may be to develop a universal definition of hate crime. This would limit the differences across jurisdictions and may result in better comparisons across those jurisdictions. The first step in this process of developing a universal definition of hate crime occurred in October of 2009, with the passage of the Matthew Shepard Act. This act now allows the federal government to intercede in the investigation of a hate crime in a jurisdiction that does not have the resources or experience to investigate these types of crimes.

Conclusion

The United States is often referred to as a melting pot. It has long been a place in which many cultures come together under the same legal system. However, those differences have long been a source of contention in the country. Beginning with the lynchings in the 19th and early 20th centuries, race has been at the forefront of the tensions between the different groups, with ethnicity a close second. The differences that divide the population into groups have continued to be the motivation for discrimination and violence. The latest manifestation of that discrimination and violence is hate crime. Early research on hate crime focused on the individual level, however, in the past decade a handful of researchers have turned toward macro level studies of hate crime. These studies have been limited to single jurisdictions due to concerns over the differences in

reporting and definition across jurisdictions. This dissertation attempts to build on these prior studies by controlling for correlates of reporting in an effort to examine trends in hate crime within and between jurisdictions.

The results show that demographic changes and other state structural characteristics are related to changes in hate crime. However, it appears that reporting is still a primary driving force behind these trends. These demographic changes and reporting influence the various types of hate crime differently. The dissertation suggests a need for better reporting and a more consistent definition of hate crime across jurisdictions. Overall, this dissertation suggests that the explanation for changes in hate crime may not be a simple one, and that further research is needed to fully understand the processes that lead to differences within and between jurisdictions, and across bias motivation. This dissertation is only one step in gaining that understanding.

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Appendix A: Additional Tables

Table A.1: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Black

	Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts	B/W Ratio	W/B Unem	% Black Legislators	% Black Voters
Anti-Black Hate Crime Counts	1				
% Black/% White	0.085	1			
White/Black Unemployed	0.05	0.107	1		
% African-American Legislators	0.189	0.857	0.006	1	
% Black Voters	0.159	0.214	0.106	0.256	1
Total Poverty	-0.104	0.339	-0.024	0.344	0.001
% Young White Males	-0.189	0.069	0.292	-0.205	0.064
West	0.043	-0.364	0.007	-0.411	-0.162
South	-0.095	0.66	0.037	0.587	0.075
% Urban	0.272	-0.04	0.071	0.041	-0.014
Aggravated Assault Rate	0.151	0.425	0.124	0.403	0.166
% Population Covered	0.264	-0.258	-0.006	-0.302	-0.018
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	0.226	-0.092	0.044	-0.045	0.144
Police per Capita	0.335	0.419	0.038	0.472	0.079
% Bias Unit	0.425	0.230	0.132	0.129	0.060
% Community Policing	0.143	0.199	0.452	0.086	0.006
2000	0.023	0.072	0.807	-0.009	0.137
2002	-0.013	0.073	-0.164	0.01	-0.134
2003	-0.008	0.078	-0.167	0.01	-0.134
2004	0.009	0.084	-0.174	0.01	0.244
2005	0.005	-0.135	-0.174	-0.003	0.237
2006	0.005	-0.129	-0.167	-0.003	-0.21
2007	0.007	-0.128	-0.154	-0.003	-0.21
Black Population	0.458	0.694	0.098	0.682	0.23

Table A.1: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Black cont.

	Total Pov	% YWM	West	South	State Hetero	Agg Asslt	% Pop Cov.
Total Poverty	1						
% Young White Males	-0.095	1					
West	-0.032	0.037	1				
South	0.516	-0.093	-0.407	1			
% Urban	0.02	-0.137	0.385	-0.203	1		
Aggravated Assault Rate	0.322	-0.177	0.048	0.424	0.279	1	
% Population Covered	-0.177	-0.002	-0.031	-0.073	-0.017	0.012	1
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	-0.235	-0.026	-0.051	-0.185	-0.135	0.004	-0.150
Police per Capita	0.022	-0.252	0.049	0.176	0.553	0.465	-0.033
% Bias Unit	-0.002	-0.121	-0.011	0.078	0.275	0.236	0.207
% Community Policing	0.006	0.033	-0.153	0.113	0.248	0.261	-0.114
2000	-0.058	0.281	-0.013	0.005	0.004	0.039	0.003
2002	-0.034	0.212	-0.013	0.005	0.002	0.018	0.025
2003	-0.009	0.229	-0.013	0.005	-0.004	-0.008	-0.027
2004	0.035	0.241	-0.013	0.005	-0.007	-0.015	0.052
2005	0.046	-0.423	-0.008	-0.006	-0.004	0.003	0.046
2006	0.042	-0.365	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007	0.003	0.053
2007	0.009	-0.364	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007	0.003	0.073
Black Population	0.199	-0.012	-0.316	0.403	0.198	0.37	-0.071

Table A.1: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Black cont.

	% Non-0	Pol per Cap	% Bias Unit	Comm. Pol	2000	2002	2003
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros	1						
Police per Capita	0.129	1					
% Bias Unit	0.166	0.428	1				
% Community Policing	0.120	0.328	0.420	1			
2000	0.049	-0.010	0.061	0.341	1		
2002	-0.023	0.008	0.072	0.372	-0.14	1	
2003	0.071	0.005	-0.056	-0.266	-0.14	-0.14	1
2004	-0.011	0.001	-0.050	-0.258	-0.14	-0.14	-0.14
2005	-0.001	0.002	-0.035	-0.244	-0.138	-0.138	-0.138
2006	-0.006	-0.028	-0.024	-0.227	-0.138	-0.138	-0.138
2007	-0.032	-0.031	-0.008	-0.192	-0.138	-0.138	-0.138
Black Population	0.006	0.549	0.253	0.198	0.07	0.064	0.07

Table A.1: Bivariate Correlations Matrix: Anti-Black cont.

	2004	2005	2006	2007	Black pop
2004	1				
2005	-0.138	1			
2006	-0.138	-0.136	1		
2007	-0.138	-0.136	-0.136	1	
Black Population	0.075	-0.108	-0.097	-0.096	1

Table A.2: Bivariate Correlations Matrix: Anti-Hispanic

		1	2	3	4	5	6
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Counts		1					
Hispanic Immigration Rate		0.04	1				
% Hispanic		0.51	0.01	1			
Hispanic/White Unemployment		0.08	0.04	0.16	1		
Hispanic/Black Unemployment		0.16	0.05	0.33	0.48	1	
% Hispanic Voters		-0.07	0.07	0.02	-0.13	-0.14	1
Total Poverty		-0.02	-0.09	0.15	-0.09	0.05	-0.1
% Young White Males		-0.16	-0.15	-0.28	0.12	-0.14	0.04
West		0.25	0	0.45	0.01	-0.03	0.1
South		-0.15	-0.17	-0.14	-0.12	0	-0.24
% Urban		0.27	0.06	0.50	0.22	0.23	-0.13
Aggravated Assault Rate		0.08	-0.06	0.30	0.14	0.23	-0.1
% Population Covered		0.21	0.09	0.12	0.02	0.08	0.03
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros		0.12	0.11	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.02
Police per Capita		0.14	-0.03	0.29	0.15	0.14	-0.05
% Bias Unit		0.22	0.1	0.22	0.09	0.11	-0.09
% Community Policing		0.13	0.01	0.17	0.17	0.11	0.01
	2000	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	0.07	-0.08	0.01
	2002	-0.01	0.08	-0.02	0.08	0.08	-0.08
	2003	-0.03	-0.25	-0.01	0.08	0.08	-0.08
	2004	-0.01	-0.12	0.02	0.06	-0.01	0.12
	2005	0	0.1	0.02	-0.09	-0.05	0.12
	2006	0.02	0.16	0.04	-0.11	-0.01	-0.15
	2007	0.03	0.07	0.04	-0.12	0.06	-0.14
Hispanic Population		0.83	0.02	0.67	0.07	0.16	-0.02

Table A.2: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Hispanic cont.

		7	8	9	10	11	12
Total Poverty		1					
% Young White Males		-0.09	1				
West		-0.05	0.03	1			
South		0.54	-0.09	-0.41	1		
% Urban		0.18	-0.1	0.27	-0.04	1	
Aggravated Assault Rate		0.41	-0.13	0	0.46	0.48	1
% Population Covered		-0.14	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06	0.05	0.06
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros		-0.14	0	0.09	-0.1	0.43	0.35
Police per Capita		0.22	-0.15	-0.02	0.27	0.73	0.63
% Bias Unit		0.16	-0.07	-0.01	0.23	0.61	0.56
% Community Policing		-0.03	0.19	0.12	0.05	0.35	0.27
	2000	-0.05	0.29	-0.01	0.01	0	0.03
	2002	-0.03	0.21	-0.01	0.01	0	0.02
	2003	0	0.22	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	2004	0.02	0.23	-0.02	0	0.01	-0.01
	2005	0.05	-0.42	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0
	2006	0.05	-0.37	0	0	0	0.01
	2007	0.01	-0.36	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Hispanic Population		0.11	-0.22	0.16	0	0.31	0.15

Table A.2: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Hispanic cont.

		13	14	15	16	17	18
% Population Covered		1					
% Agencies Reporting Non-Zeros		-0.08	1				
Police per Capita		0.05	0.43	1			
% Bias Unit		0.2	0.48	0.415	1		
% Community Policing		-0.08	0.24	0.433	0.84	1	
	2000	0	0.04	-0.01	0.094	0.224	1
	2002	0.03	-0.02	0.008	0.094	0.224	-0.14
	2003	-0.02	0.06	0.005	-0.049	-0.125	-0.14
	2004	0.04	-0.01	0.001	-0.049	-0.125	-0.14
	2005	0.05	0	0.002	-0.044	-0.121	-0.138
	2006	0.05	0	-0.028	-0.044	-0.121	-0.138
	2007	0.07	-0.03	-0.031	-0.044	-0.121	-0.138
Hispanic Population		0.14	0.06	0.21	0.18	0.12	-0.12

Table A.2: Bivariate Correlation Matrix: Anti-Hispanic cont.

		19	20	21	22	23	24	25
	2002	1						
	2003	-0.14	1					
	2004	-0.14	-0.14	1				
	2005	-0.138	-0.138	-0.138	1			
	2006	-0.138	-0.138	-0.138	-0.136	1		
	2007	-0.138	-0.138	-0.138	-0.136	-0.136	1	
Hispanic Population		-0.01	0	0	0.01	0.02	0.03	1

Appendix B: Coding the State Statutes: Examples

California Penal Code Section 422.6 is an example of a hate crime statute:

"No person, whether or not acting under color of law, shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the **free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege** (civil rights statute=1) secure to him or her by the Constitution or laws of this state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States in whole or in part because of one or more of the **actual or perceived** (perception clause=1) characteristics of the victim".

Likewise, Section 422.55 defines hate crime as:

"a criminal act committed, in whole or in part, **because of** (bias statute=1) one or more of the following **actual or perceived** characteristics of the victim:

(1) Disability. (disability=1)

(2) Gender.

(3) Nationality.

(4) Race or ethnicity.

(5) Religion.

(6) Sexual orientation. (sexual orientation=1)

(7) Association with a person or group with one or more of these **actual or perceived** characteristics."

As such the California State Statute is coded as having a perception clause, including both disability and sexual orientation as protected groups, and as a bias statute as opposed

to a hate statute. Additionally, the California statute is an example of a civil rights statute.

The Arizona Revised Statute section 41-1750 calls for the maintenance and collection of crime statistics which include "criminal offenses that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender or disability", (reporting statute=1) but does not include a similar criminal statute. On the other hand, Colorado Revised Statute Title 18-9-121 defines ethnic intimidation and states that "the advocacy of unlawful acts against persons and groups because of a person's or group's race, color, ancestry, religion, or national origin, for the purpose of inciting and provoking bodily injury or damage to property, poses a threat to public order and safety and should be the subject of criminal sanctions", (criminal statute=1) but does not include a similar reporting statute. Florida's "Hate Crimes Reporting Act" (Florida Statute 877.19) requires the Governor to "collect and disseminate data on incidents of criminal acts that evidence prejudice based on race, religion, ethnicity, color, ancestry, sexual orientation, or national origin" and section 775.085 reclassifies a crime "if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, mental or physical disability, or advanced age of the victim" (both reporting and criminal statute=1).

Unlike the California statute which is a bias statute, the Illinois hate crime statute which defines hate crime is a hate statute. Specifically, the Illinois statute 5/12-7.1 defines a hate crime "when, **by reason of** the actual or perceived race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, or national

origin of another individual or group of individuals, regardless of the existence of any other motivating factor or factors a person (commits a criminal offense)"(bias statute=0).

Idaho's hate crime statute (section 18-7902) defines malicious harassment as crimes in which "any person, maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, (commits a criminal offense)" as a "freestanding" statute (freestanding statute=1). Minnesota on the other hand, attaches harassment as a crime for those offenses committed "because of the victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability…, age, or national origin" (section 609.749) and as such is a "coattailing" statute (coattailing statute=1).

An example of a modifying statute is Kansas's section 21-4716, which adds hate as an aggravating factor to its sentencing laws. Specifically it defines hate crime when "the offense was motivated entirely or in part by the race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation of the victim or the offense was motivated by the defendant's belief or perception, entirely or in part, of the race, color, religion, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation of the victim whether or not the defendant's belief or perception was correct." (modifying statute=1)

Finally, an example of a penalty enhancement statute is Vermont's section 13-1455, which defines hate crime and lists a series of enhancement's, including that "if the maximum penalty for the underlying crime is one year or less, the penalty for a violation of this section shall be imprisonment for not more than two years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both". (penalty enhancement statute=1)

Appendix C: Regression of the Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime Count on Predictors, 2000-2007: Including the Temporal Lag

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)	Coef. (S.E.)
Intercept	-12.872**	-12.185**	-12.112**	-11.930**	-12.011**
	(1.797)	(1.646)	(1.633)	(1.630)	(1.648)
Hisp Imm Rate	0.095	0.153	0.152	0.159	0.160
	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
1 Yr. Lagged Imm Rate	0.146				
	(0.147)				
% Hispanic	-0.058**	-0.045	-0.057**	-0.059**	-0.056**
	(0.013)	(0.245)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
1 Yr. Lagged % Hisp		-0.120			
		(0.248)			
Hisp/Wh Unemployed	-0.263	-0.226	-0.211	-0.212	-0.240
	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.152)
1 yr. Lagged H/W Unem			-0.069		
			(0.140)		
Hisp/Black Unemployed	0.073	0.082	0.084	0.173	0.093
	(0.230)	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.232)	(0.232)
1 yr. Lagged H/B Unem				-0.521	
				(0.282)	
% Hispanic Voters	-0.002	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	0.015
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.016)
1 yr. Lagged Hisp. Voters					-0.026
					(0.016)
Total Poverty	-0.022	-0.021	-0.021	-0.020	-0.019
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)
% White Males, 18-29	0.047	0.048	0.049	0.020	0.042
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)
West	0.124	0.148	0.129	0.087	0.123
	(0.252)	(0.250)	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.255)
South	-0.397	-0.384	-0.395	-0.392	-0.416
	(0.267)	(0.265)	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.270)
State Hetero	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.010	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Aggravated Assault	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
% Pop Covered	0.024**	0.023**	0.023**	0.024**	0.023**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
% Report Non-Zeros	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)

		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
		Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
		(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)	(S.E.)
Police per Capita		-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.004**
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
% Bias Unit		0.019*	0.020*	0.020*	0.020*	0.021*
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
% Comm Pol		-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.010	-0.013*
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
	2002	-0.065	-0.027	-0.025	0.031	0.080
		(0.216)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.221)
	2003	-0.332	-0.322	-0.313	-0.127	-0.399
		(0.366)	(0.372)	(0.366)	(0.377)	(0.273)
	2004	-0.305	-0.366	-0.351	-0.171	-0.562
		(0.356)	(0.351)	(0.351)	(0.364)	(0.373)
	2005	-0.035	-0.068	-0.054	-0.043	-0.130
		(0.520)	(0.519)	(0.518)	(0.516)	(0.526)
	2006	-0.144	-0.161	-0.155	-0.121	-0.120
		(0.505)	(0.507)	(0.504)	(0.503)	(0.511)
	2007	-0.112	-0.094	-0.099	-0.068	-0.199
		(0.495)	(0.496)	(0.494)	(0.492)	(0.504)
Exposure:						
Hispanic Population		---	---	---	---	---
Wald $\chi 2$		129.52	128.20	127.95	129.78	125.73
Obs		341	336	336	336	336
Groups		49	48	48	48	48

$p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ *

Appendix D: Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term (Models based on Table 5.3)

Model 1: Baseline (Immigration and Year Dummies)	00-07 w/o % Hisp	00-07 2% Sample	00-07 w/% Hisp	00-04 w/o % Hisp	00-04 2% Sample	00-04 w/ % Hisp
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Persons	-0.174**	-0.210*	0.147	-0.132	-0.169	0.154
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Persons	0.202	0.222	0.237*	0.206	0.120	0.225
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Foreign Born Persons	0.284*	0.096	0.263*	0.351*	0.156	0.315*
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Foreign Born Persons	-0.040	-0.089	0.162	-0.019	-0.085	0.146

Model 2: Economic Threat Model	00-07 w/o % Hisp	00-07 2% Sample	00-07 w/% Hisp	00-04 w/o % Hisp	00-04 2% Sample	00-04 w/ % Hisp
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Persons	-0.168*	-0.210*	0.161	-0.135	-0.186	0.160
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Persons	0.215	0.219	0.241*	0.212	0.099	0.223
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Foreign Born Persons	0.126	0.086	0.260*	0.358*	0.129	0.323*
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Foreign Born Persons	-0.029	-0.082	0.167	-0.013	-0.086	0.149

Appendix D: Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term (Models based on Table 5.3) cont.

Model 3: Political Threat Model	00-07 w/o % Hisp	00-07 2% Sample	00-07 w/% Hisp	00-04 w/o % Hisp	00-04 2% Sample	00-04 w/ % Hisp
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Persons	-0.188**	-0.230*	0.153	-0.164*	-0.196	0.146
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Persons	0.207	0.173	0.233	0.202	0.053	0.210
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Foreign Born Persons	0.131	0.095	0.264*	0.367*	0.147	0.335*
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Foreign Born Persons	-0.053	-0.167	0.159	-0.040	-0.154	0.134

Model 4: Controls	00-07 w/o % Hisp	00-07 2% Sample	00-07 w/% Hisp	00-04 w/o % Hisp	00-04 2% Sample	00-04 w/ % Hisp
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Persons	-0.134	-0.225*	0.102	-0.182*	-0.269*	0.079
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Persons	0.212	0.136	0.264*	0.210	0.008	0.248
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Foreign Born Persons	0.083	0.006	0.213	0.287	-0.017	0.272
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Foreign Born Persons	0.012	-0.143	0.171	-0.012	-0.242	0.154

Appendix D: Testing the Fragility of the Immigration Term (Models based on Table 5.3) cont.

Model 5: % Urban	00-07 w/o % Hisp	00-07 2% Sample	00-07 w/% Hisp	00-04 w/o % Hisp	00-04 2% Sample	00-04 w/ % Hisp
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Persons	-0.074	-0.202	0.105	-0.124	-0.283*	0.074
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Persons	0.256*	0.178	0.268*	0.235	0.027	0.247
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Foreign Born Persons	0.086	0.029	0.212	0.279	-0.006	0.274
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Foreign Born Persons	0.075	-0.092	0.170	0.035	-0.224	0.152

Model 6: Full Model	00-07 w/o % Hisp	00-07 2% Sample	00-07 w/% Hisp	00-04 w/o % Hisp	00-04 2% Sample	00-04 w/ % Hisp
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Persons	-0.163	-0.232*	0.077	-0.193	-0.276*	0.062
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Persons	0.245	0.256	0.237	0.211	0.177	0.206
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Hispanic Foreign Born Persons	0.077	0.074	0.191	0.249	0.142	0.238
Hispanic Immigration per 100,000 Total Foreign Born Persons	0.040	0.024	0.181	0.001	-0.029	0.144

*p<.05 **p<.01