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Does Institutional Capacity Matter? A Case Study of the Zambian Forestry Department.

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Does Institutional Capacity Matter? A Case Study of the Zambian Forestry Department.

by

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A Dissertation

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For Mom and Dad

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Rose Fumpa Makano
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¹ A very dear friend acknowledged post humorously, but whose inspiration and great sense of humor has kept me going. He left too early to witness and celebrate this day!

Abstract

Understanding why some organizations are more effective in their service delivery than others is a central discourse in both public administration and political organization. Scholars and practitioners all agree that the defining factor is institutional (state) capacity.

Since the mid-1980s, deforestation in Zambia has been on the rise, especially in Protected Forest Areas, suggesting poor management by the Forestry Department, an institution mandated to manage these public lands. Ironically, despite the strategic position that forests hold in sustaining both the daily subsistence needs of over 90% of the Zambian population as well as the as the numerous industries that depend on this resource, the Forestry Department has not developed any specific strategies/interventions to combat forest degradation arguing that this problem is beyond its control; the department is underfunded and has inadequate forestry personnel to oversee its estates. Yet, the data shows that prior to 1980s Forestry Department operated very effectively on a relatively small budget and a lean structure.

Utilizing longitudinal and cross-sectional data, and based on a multi-method analysis, this study explores the nexus between public administration and program implementation on one hand and, the role of politics in policy implementation on the other. Contrary to the Forestry Department's mantra that inadequate financial outlays and field personnel have been the major factors contributing to forest degradation, this study has found that the problem is managerial incompetence, manifested in lack of visionary leadership, the practice of cronyism and clientelism, the breakdown in social capital support, including support by local Chiefs, and the poor quality of political connection between department managers and the larger political system. Clearly, resource allocation is a necessary but insufficient condition for improving institutional capacity, which is intimately connected to larger processes of governance. And this include, but not limited to, the rules, relationships and partnerships created among different actors, as well as the resultant environment that links these actors to the larger social capital outside ones' locale.

Glossary of Acronyms

ECA	Economic Commission for Africa.
EU	European Union.
CSO	Central Statistical Office.
CONASA	Community-based Natural Resource Management & Sustainable Agriculture.
DHRD	Department of Human Resources Development.
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization.
FC	Forestry Commission.
FD	Forestry Department.
FRD	Forest Research Division.
GDP	Gross Domestic Product.
GDS	Germany Development Services.
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia.
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische (Germany Technical Cooperation).
IMF	International monetary Fund.
IPD	Industrial Plantations Division.
MACO	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries.
MENR	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources.
MDD	Management Development Division.
MMD	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy.
MTENR	Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources.
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.
NEAP	National Environmental Action Programme.
NERP	National Economic Recovery Programme.
NCDP	National Commission on Development Planning.
NISIR	National Institute for Scientific and Industrial Research.
NDP	National Development Plan.
PACO	Policy Analysis and Coordination Unit.
PFAP	Provincial Forestry Action Programme.
PID	Planning and Information Department.
PSRP	Public Sector Reform Programme.
SOE	State-owned Enterprise.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme.
UNIP	United National Independence Party.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development.
ZAFFICO	Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation.
ZFAP	Zambia Forestry Action Programme.
ZFC	Zambia Forestry College.
WB	World Bank.
WCSZ	Wildlife Conservation Society of Zambia.
WWF-SARPO	World Wildlife Fund for Nature-Southern African Region Programme Office.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The economic importance of indigenous forests² to the Zambian economy and Forestry Department's role in ensuring that these resources are sustainably available to support both the industrial and daily subsistence needs of the Zambian people is well documented.³ These forests support not only the subsistence needs of over 90% of the Zambian population (in terms of food, medicines, building materials, ecological stability, etc.) but are also intricately connected to numerous industries such as copper mining, manufacturing, construction, transport (railways), energy, agriculture, tourism, and wood processing and allied companies.

Unfortunately, for some time now, at least since the late 1980s, forest degradation⁴ (arising mainly from deforestation) has been chipping away at this natural gem, a situation that is not only creating far

² These are also called natural or native forests to differentiate them from man-made industrial plantations, where typically exotic fast growing tree species are the norm. In the case of Zambia these include *Eucalyptus* and *Pine* species.

³ Forest Department, *National Forestry Policy of 1965; National Forestry Policy of 2000*; FD, Annual Reports, from 1965 to 2005; Oscar S. Kalumiana, *Study of the Demand and Supply of Firewood and Charcoal in Central Province*. 1996; GRZ, *Zambia Forest Action Plan (PFAP), 1998*; Esa Puustjarvi; Guni Mickels-Kokwe and Moses Chakanga, *The Contribution of the Forest Sector to the National Economy and Poverty Reduction in Zambia*, September 2005; MENR, *Zambia Forest Action Plan, 1996*, Volumes I, II and III.

⁴ Forest degradation is defined here as the loss of forest cover arising from various activities such as over-exploitation for timber and charcoal production, illegal human settlements or simply claiming parts of such lands for agricultural purposes – the result of which if exposed to severe weather conditions makes such areas vulnerable. Under these conditions degraded forests lose their ability to provide various products and services and this could lead to severe consequences that may affect the people miles away from where that forest is. For simplicity, deforestation and forest degradation are used interchangeably in this study.

reaching environmental problems such as floods or droughts⁵ that are exacerbating food insecurity, but is also raising concerns that the loss of natural forests could soon affect the industries that have close connections to this resource. Ultimately, this may cause further unintended consequences on job security, incomes and in the national economy. Yet despite this strategic position that natural forests occupy in the national economy (at least in the minds of those who appreciate this importance), and given the potential ripple effects that could arise from the mismanagement of these forests, forest degradation is not being addressed with the speed and urgency it deserves. The Forestry Department (FD), an institution mandated to manage Zambia's forests, has not developed any clear strategies to combat this problem.

In fact, forest degradation is particularly pronounced in the protected forest areas (PFAs), the estates directly administered by the Forestry Department, a central government bureau, than in the open forests which fall under the local Chiefs' jurisdiction. For instance, in 1986 it was estimated that Zambia was losing between 250,000 to 300,000 hectares (ha.) of forests per year,⁶ an outdated figure that Forestry Department continues to use to date. Since that time the department has not undertaken any forest inventory to establish the rate

⁵ Felix Ndlovu, *et al.*, *Key Threats and Opportunities to Biological Diversity Conservation in the Copperbelt Province*, 2004.

⁶ De Baker; Castro M.; Moses Chakanga, *et. al.*, *Wood Consumption Resource Survey, Technical Findings and Conclusion*. Field Document No. 2, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Zambia. 1986.

of forest loss. Yet, considering the intricate connections that indigenous forests have in people's daily lives and the national economy at large, one would expect FD to have taken this as a priority issue because left unresolved forest degradation could have far reaching ripple effects across the nation.

For over two decades (since mid 1980s) when forest degradation touched down and became recognized as a national problem, FD managers have continued to complain about inadequate funding and field personnel as two major constraints working against their efforts to manage the forest estates effectively. This argument is so entrenched it has become FD's mantra, and prominently features in all the department's official statements and reports both as an introduction as well as a conclusion. But since the department knows what is (or has been) causing forest degradation all these years, why has it continued to baby sit the problem for so long? How long should we buy into this argument that inadequate funding and labor shortage are really the [only] constraints not anything else? Why is it taking forever for the department to deal with a problem it has known for decades? Also considering that indigenous forests were in better shape at a time the department had fewer and a less qualified (skilled) labor force, doesn't this point towards managerial [in]competence rather than the other two capacities the department has championed every year? Obviously, this complaint raises an interesting hypothesis worth investigation.

It is important to note upfront that although FD is only directly responsible for the management of protected forest areas (PFAs), the focus of this study, the department also has indirect jurisdictional control over all natural (indigenous) forests in the country in that all forms of resource extractions (except those for home consumption) are licensed by the Forestry Department. It is therefore not an exaggeration to conceive FD's role as a guardian of all natural forests including open forests too, a public good and communally owned resource that changes hands through generational inheritance.⁷

Taking FD's official statements as an entry point, this study investigates why deforestation and, as a consequence, forest degradation have remained unresolved for so long. Why has FD failed to stop forest degradation? How do we explain the long staying power of this problem? In other words, what factors account for the decline in the extent and quality of protected forest estates, including the seemingly community indifference towards forest conservation? Is this due to lack of institutional capacity (IC)? Is IC the only capacity needed? Are there no other factors at play? And what is institutional capacity? I address these questions in the discussion that follow throughout this dissertation.

⁷ Land ownership in Chiefs' areas is based on one's lineage to a particular ethnic group. In the spirit of "One Zambia One Nation," Chiefs use their discretion to embrace people from other ethnic groups who choose to settle in other areas away from their ethnic groups. This topic is discussed later in Chapter 5 under the land tenure and ownership arrangements.

Institutional capacity means different things to different people.⁸ Some focus on tangible resources (as in factors of production);⁹ others on the technical knowledge and skills;¹⁰ while others emphasize the functional aspects that highlight the centrality of the human factor,¹¹ the glue that binds other resources to produce desirable outcome(s). In this study I conceptualize IC as comprising all the above: an organization has capacity when it has *adequate* and *appropriate* resources required to undertake a given task and to attain its goals.

From a functional perspective I define IC as an organization's *ability to create and sustain an environment and relationships that facilitate and support purposeful, collective action geared towards achieving its objectives.*¹² This definition is certainly more appropriate because it operationalizes IC and goes beyond the traditional conception that portrays IC in terms of *quantity* of the factors of production and overlooks the *functional* and *relational* interactions of the human factor with other factors both within and outside an organization. In this

⁸ This topic is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

⁹ Paul C. Nutt, *Making Tough Decisions: Tactics for Improving Managerial Decision-Making*, 1989; Victor A. Thompson, *Decision Theory, Pure and Applied*, 1971; Herbert A. Simon, *et. al.*, *Public Administration*, 1950; Gortner, *et. al.*, *Organization Theory: A Public Perspective*, (Dorsey Press), 1987.

¹⁰ Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, *et. al.*, *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems* (Earthscan Publications), 2002.

¹¹ Fritz W. Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research* (Westview Press), 1997; Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 1990; Sue E. Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, "A Grammar of Institutions," *American Political Science Review*, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3; Richard W. Scott, *Institutions and Organizations* (Sage), 1989:21.

¹² This definition draws on different scholars' conception of IC, e.g. Christine Lambert and Nick Oatley, "Capacity and Planning for Growth," in: Goran Cars, *et. al.* (eds.), *Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux*, 2002.

respect, IC is conceived both in terms of tangible inputs as well as the functional aspects.

Although the focus of this study is strictly institutional capacity and how this has influenced FD's performance outcomes on natural forests management, it is also important to note that other intervening factors such as climate, population growth, political economy dynamics, international treaties on forestry and the environment, and government policy reforms and interventions (e.g. the [in]famous World Bank/IMF sponsored structural adjustment program and its conditionalities) which have the potential to tilt the scale are also acknowledged as part of the larger discussion.

However, initially these external factors are kept constant so we can first analyze the institutional capacity dimension and its impacts. This is done on the assumption that these conditions applied equally to all sectors and agencies not just to forestry and the forest agency. The only difference is how the managers in respective bureaus responded to such conditions, which speaks to the idea of managerial capacity, the focus of this dissertation. For this reason, external factors re-appear as part of the larger discussion. As we will see later this helps to put FD's achievements and shortcomings into context that managerial capacity has been a defining characteristic on what was and was not achieved, and now continues to be a major weakness. And why should anyone care about this? One reason is that this kind of inquiry gives us the

opportunity to launch into a larger question of why forestry in Zambia contributes so little to the national gross domestic product (GDP), ranging from 0.02 to 0.09%.¹³ Secondly, and better still, since state capacity is a sum of its parts (i.e. its agencies), understanding the factors affecting the performance of individual bureaus is a good starting point to get to know how weak states, a common phenomenon on the African continent, come about. And Zambia is no exception. For instance, despite its natural wealth both below and above ground, Zambia has been successfully managed into oblivion. The country has fallen from being a medium high income nation to becoming a highly indebted poor country (HIPC). So the larger question worth investigating, which this study partially contributes to, is how did the Zambian government lose the ability to manage its economic affairs effectively? And what can be done to rectify the situation? Before addressing these institutional / state capacity issues a brief history about the case study and forestry work in Zambia will be appropriate.

The Case Study

Zambia covers a total area of 752,612 square kilometers (km²), just slightly bigger than the state of Texas, and shares borders with eight neighbors: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Administratively, the

¹³ CSO, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, from 1970 to 2005.

country is divided into nine provinces,¹⁴ and currently has a total population of 11.7 million¹⁵ people of which 35% live in urban areas and the remaining 65% are in the rural areas.¹⁶ This has been an interesting shift considering that for a long time Zambia has been the most urbanized country in Southern Africa, a phenomenon the Kaunda administration tried to change through its “go back to the land” policy but which never worked. Better living conditions in the urban areas (paid employment, good wages and availability of social services) acted as strong magnets that accelerated the rural-urban drift. But following some policy reforms in the 1990s and beyond that necessitated downsizing of the public service and closure of previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs) people have been forced to seek other means of livelihoods, and going back to the land became a natural, if not, the only choice. As a former colony British, and particularly for purposes of unifying the different ethnic groupings, English has been retained as the official language. Traditionally, Zambia boasts of 73 local languages (compressed to 7 for administrative convenience),¹⁷ which translate into an enormous cultural and linguistic diversity the Zambian social landscape is famous for (**Figure 1.1**).¹⁸

¹⁴ CSO, *Living Conditions* 2004c:1, 13.


¹⁵ CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html>. Accessed May 28, 2008.

¹⁶ CSO, *Living Conditions, Monitoring Survey Report, 2002-2003*, (CSO: Lusaka), 2004c:13

¹⁷ Hywel D. Davies, *Zambia in Maps*, (University of London Press), 1971:35; George Kay, *A Social Geography of Zambia*, 1967:44-45.

¹⁸ Scott. D. Taylor, *Cultures and Customs of Zambia*, (Greenwood Press: West Port, Connecticut), 2006.

Figure 1.1: Cultural and Linguistic Diversity in Zambia.



Source: Hywel D. Davies, *Zambia in Maps* (1967).


Politically, this cultural and ethnic diversity is a huge challenge in that these social groupings have different demands on the state. Not only do bureaucrats have to deal with various Chiefs in one Province, but they also have to know and respect the cultural aspects of these ethno-linguistic groupings. Therefore, to ensure program success, creating rapport with the indigenous people in their tribal areas is a must.

In terms of forestry resources, Zambia is one of the most forested countries in Southern Africa. Out of its total land mass (752,612 km²) about 60% (446,000 Km²) of it is covered by indigenous forests, of which roughly 9.8% (73,783 km²) are protected forest areas (directly managed by Forestry Department) while 8.4% are National Parks and Game Reserves (**Figure 1.2**), exclusively set aside as wildlife habitats and are managed by the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). Together this brings the total protected forest area to 18.2%.¹⁹ The remaining forest cover constitutes unprotected forests, commonly called open forests, which fall under the Chiefs' jurisdiction. A word of caution is appropriate here: the figures just quoted above should be taken with a pinch of salt in that the last forest survey was done in 1986 and since then a lot has changed.²⁰

¹⁹ Most likely these figures may have changed due to proposed degazettement of portions of some PFAs for human settlements and agricultural purposes. Also note that FD does not exclude forests that are already illegally settled. Thus, even without degazettement, the actual area on the ground is lower than what the official reports say. For some specific examples, see Felix Njovu, *et. al.*, *Key Threats and Opportunities to Biological Diversity Conservation in the Copperbelt Province*, 2004.

²⁰ Each year Forestry Department Annual Reports acknowledge that illegal encroachment is the biggest problem the department faces, including right now, so much so that some forests have since been degazetted. But FD still uses the outdated deforestation rates generated over 20 years during the 1986 forest survey where it was estimated that Zambia lost 250,000 to 300,000 ha. of indigenous forests each year.

Figure 1.2: Distribution of Protected Forest Areas in Zambia



Map created by: Rose Makano

Based on data from Forestry Department, *Provincial Forest Action Programme*, 2005²¹

Insert accessed from: <http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1997/ofr-97-470/OF97-470A/>

²¹ This map is based on data that has not been adjusted to incorporate forest loss due to illegal settlements. Because such areas have not been officially been degazetted, the Forestry Department counts them as if they still exist. Except for National Parks which are likely to be intact, the situation on the ground is quite different with respect to Protected Forests.

For instance, the consumption of forest products has gone up due to due population growth and also the high unemployment rate that has forced more people to depend on forests. Second, following the free market policy espoused under the structural adjustment program (SAP), a policy initiative dictated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), there has been an increase in the number of timber processing companies from 4 commercial sawmills in 1984 to 264 in 2000. When these companies are grouped according to the type of species they processed, 61.74% of these sawmills extract indigenous timber and only 38.26% dealt with plantation timber (**Table 1.1**).²² Therefore, with this increase in sawmills timber extracted will certainly be higher than what was extracted when sawmills were few, meaning that the deforestation rate should be higher now than then.

Table 1.1: Number of Timber Processing Companies, 1984-2000.

CATEGORY	SIZE AND TYPE OF SAWMILL				TOTAL	% of TOTAL
	<i>Commercial</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>Small</i>	<i>Pit-saws</i>		
Indigenous-based	59	-	-	104*	163	61.74
Plantation-based	8	10	83	-	101	38.26
TOTAL	67	10	83	104	264	100
% OF TOTAL	25.38	3.79	31.44	39.39		

* This figure covers only the period from 1994-2000.

²² The summary in Table 1.1 is based on information accessed from Export Board of Zambia, 2000; Forestry Department Annual Reports, 1984 to 2000. See also Rosemary Makano, *The Effect of the Structural Adjustment Program on Forest Management in Zambia*, (University of Missouri-St. Louis), MPPA Thesis, 2002 [unpublished].

Yet, forest managers continue to use old figures from 1986 wood consumption survey²³ as though no changes have taken place since then. What is the logic behind using outdated information that does not reflect the situation on the ground? Why doesn't FD update its data? I address these questions in **Chapter 4** where the research findings are discussed. For now let us briefly look at how forestry has evolved as an enterprise and what FD has done over the years.

Forestry Development in Zambia: An Overview.

Forestry work in Zambia began in 1931 as a section under the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. The primary purpose of the section was to deal with forestry issues faced by farmers. Later in 1947 the forestry section was transformed into a fully-fledged department: one that could deal with all forestry issues, including those related to commercial exploitation (e.g. timber for the mining industry, transportation, construction, etc. sectors), rather than for subsistence use only as the primary mandate seems to suggest. Thus, following this upgrade in 1947 the forestry section was moved from the Department of Agriculture to become a fully-fledged department, headed by the Chief Conservator of Forests,²⁴ in the

²³ De Baker; Castro M.; Moses Chakanga, *et. al.*, *Wood Consumption Resource Survey*, 1986.

²⁴ A name change to Director was proposed in the Forestry Act of 2000, which has not yet become law. There has been strong speculation that because this Act has proposed phasing out the Forestry Department to create the Forestry Commission (FC), the Director and probably others in the upper echelon are fearful of draining their own pond. The phasing out of the department means that all FD employees have to re-apply to join the FC.

Ministry of Lands and Water Affairs. And its mandate was substantially expanded. Although the forestry section was created in 1931, generally 1947 is taken as the beginning of scientific forest management in Zambia since that is the year when FD became a full-fledged department and embarked on a new course of systematic forest management, an area where the department performed exceptionally beyond expectations until the mid 1980s when the situation seemingly fell apart. The department was no longer able to increase the size of its estates let alone maintain the existing ones. Thus, both the size and quality of its estates started to deteriorate as evidence currently shows in the number of forests taken over by illegal settlers, which have further accelerated forest degradation. The question I ask and answer in this dissertation is how and why did this happen?

In the discussion that follows, I lay out in very broad strokes some of the issues or areas that may have led to the current problem, all of which have connections to management choices that the department took over the years. Either the department did something about the issue(s) and failed, done a little and abandoned it, completely ignored the issue(s), or was simply unaware of the issue(s) and therefore did not attend to them at all. Whatever the situation, we can only point a finger at forest managers and demand that keeping the status quo is certainly not working well, and therefore a new approach is needed.

Forestry Department's Mandate

Prior to 1965, the Forestry Department's mandate can be summarized as covering the following areas:²⁵

- a) To supply timber to the copper mines;
- b) To carry out enumeration surveys and to prepare management plans;
- c) To supply timber to industry;
- d) To carry out forest research and extension;
- e) To carry out reservation of forest estates in cooperation with the Chiefs and local government authorities; and
- f) To train junior staff in forestry.²⁶

But after 1965 the policy changed substantially to FD to do more than just forest conservation but also to develop forestry into an economic sector capable of creating job opportunities, a task partially achieved.

In terms of policy implementation, notice that that the law specifically mandated the department to work cooperatively with the Local Chiefs and local government authorities. This is particularly not inconsequential because Chiefs own much of the land in Zambia. Out of the nation's total landmass, Chiefs have 93.9% (70.5 million ha.) broken down into two categories: 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust land, and

²⁵ GRZ, *Forest Ordinance of 1947*.

²⁶ The training at this time was limited to non-degree level, mainly aimed at training Forest Rangers (1 year training) and Forest Guards (6 months training program).

36.2% (27.2 million ha) as Reserve land²⁷, while only 6% (4.5 million ha.) of the land, mainly found along the line of rail and commonly referred to as State land, belongs to central government. This land ownership arrangement dates back to the colonial era and the new republic chose to maintain it mainly because the modern contemporary or Weberian state could not dismantle the traditional state structures (kingdoms and chiefdoms) to create a unified state. Instead, the modern state superimposed itself over these traditional structures, choosing to work through them rather than destroy them as that could have created more problems. Thus, with respect to land tenure these two types of authority operate side by side, each with a different degree and sphere of control. I will discuss how this complicates land use in Zambia at a later stage. For now let us just note that this land ownership pattern has always put the Chiefs in a stronger position as to what can or cannot be done with their land. Central government cannot do anything in Chiefs' areas until each respective Chief approves it. In other words, when it comes to land, central government only has paper power: it has to get permission to use any portion of land that belongs to the Chiefs. At times central government has to exchange land with the Chiefs to implement certain projects of in Chiefs' areas. The Lake Kariba project in Southern Province, which feeds the Kariba Hydro-Power Station, the nation's

²⁷ M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in Ng'andwe, A. (ed.), *Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia*, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45

largest power source, is a good example in this regard. Central government had to give up part of its land to accommodate the people who were misplaced by the Lake Kariba project.

Also since the land given to central government for forest conservation is not sold but Chiefs only get into an agreement with central government that ascribes legal powers to FD to act as a manager over such lands, strictly speaking these forests still remain the Chiefs' property and can revert to the Chiefs whenever the Chiefs communicate to central government that they want their land back. This means that the FD operates at the Chiefs' pleasure. The department is obliged to abide by what the Chiefs want in their areas, which in this case may explain why local communities have the liberty to taken over the forests whenever they want.

Therefore, if FD has to be successful in getting more land from the Chiefs for protection, it needs both the blessings of the Chiefs (to operate in their Chiefdoms), and the cooperation of the larger community in those respective areas. This is the kind of support FD had always received and relied upon and gave FD the unmatched strength it exhibited. And because the Forest Act allowed the local communities free access to the forest resources provided the resource in question was for subsistence consumption, declaring any land a protected forest area did not alter, threaten or curtail people's access rights in any way. People paid fees only if one was extracting a resource for commercial use – i.e.

for resale. In a way this legal provision humanized government's intentions and dispelled fears for government take-over of communal lands. Free access for subsistence use assured the local communities that their government cared for their needs and gave them further hope that government would live by its word of managing these forests in a way that would create more job opportunities for them. As a result, there was a strong sense of government and local community partnership. And for the most part this arrangement worked quite well: there was mutual respect and trust between the FD and the local communities.

But as the FD exerted more power over the management of the PFAs and started to see the local communities as a problem and not part of the management team, this compromised local people's trust and sowed seeds of mistrust. For instance, government promulgated the laws on PFAs with no input from the Chiefs and their subjects, acting as though such lands no longer belonged to the Chiefs. This shift in relations created a sense of alienation among the local communities who saw the government as the new owners and managers of what previously belonged to them and felt cheated as having given up their property. Their alienation and eventual withdrawal of their involvement in forest conservation weakened the very source of the department's strength.

Some people might wonder: is this information necessary in a study looking at institutional capacity and not land ownership? The response is: certainly, yes! Part of the reason why there has been an

upswing in forest encroachments (which is contributing to forest degradation) is because people feel cheated and are now trying to reclaim their property. Whether their reaction is legal or illegal is a different matter all together. The key issue here is that these state-society relations need to be revisited if a lasting solution to forest degradation is to be found.

Sadly, the FD hardly views this problem from this angle. Instead, it sees these local communities as simply non-law abiding citizens who need to be dealt with legally. If anything, the best the department has done is pay lip service to the issue. Forest managers agree that they need to adopt joint forest management (JFM), an approach which incorporates local communities as equal partners in forest management. Yet, this idea still remains on government shelves. The 2000 Forest Act which gave legal recognition to the JFM concept has yet to become law. The Forestry Director has not prepared a Statutory Instrument, the last piece of paper work required to activate any Act into law. In the meantime, forest encroachments are on the rise. And as history has shown so far, whenever a forest has been heavily encroached, illegal settlers have always won – those forests always get degazetted!²⁸ In short, the strategy has been successful and underscores the fact that central government is aware of its power limitations over communal lands, and is therefore

²⁸ FD, *Annual Reports* from 1988 to 2005; Davy Siame, 1997; Felix Njovu, *et. al.*, 2004

usually not keen to put up a fight over what is known to belong to the people.

A point to note here is that this challenge is not peculiar to Zambia. It is a problem faced by any government where traditional structures of governance exist side by side with the modern contemporary state. The real challenge is how should these two layers of authority be reconciled to become one rather than continue to exist as two different entities, sharing the power base? I address these questions in Chapter 6 where I also offer some recommendations.

In terms of policy, although the latest Forest Policy of 1999 places more emphasis on provision of extension services, overall the policy intent in the two previous National Forest Policy documents (1947, and 1965) have more or less remained the same, essentially retaining the five main areas specified in the National Forest Policy of 1965.

The Economic Importance of Natural Forests

As noted in my opening statement, the economic importance of forests in Zambia is a matter that requires no further defense. To begin with, forests are the only secure safety net available to most people. About 80% of Zambia's population (or 90% in rural areas) depends on wood-based energy for cooking and heating their houses,²⁹ including a host of other products and services mentioned earlier. In other words,

²⁹ MENR, *Zambia Forest Action Plan*, Vol. II, 1998:16-17

these natural forests are literally the only source of survival available to most Zambians in one way or another. Viewed from a modern or western conception these forests are a drug store, a supermarket, a hardware outlet for timber and other building materials, as well as being ecological stabilizers. In terms of actual income, it has been estimated that forests contribute about US\$197 million annually to rural household incomes. But this figure drops to around US\$175 million (roughly 11% reduction) when forest degradation sets in,³⁰ meaning that when the forests are denuded of their ability to sustain rural life by providing basic necessities this has grave consequences on the rural and even unemployed urban population.

While the effect of forest degradation on rural income might look minimal to some above average (or well paid) sections of society, for a person solely dependent on these forests as their only or major source of livelihood, any decline is monumental. Any loss of income can be a matter of life and death for families without any other means of livelihood. This is precisely one reason why forest degradation is or has become a source of concern, particularly to the local communities around such forests that have been on the receiving end of the negative impacts that have arisen from this phenomenon. For many of these forest-dependent communities, whose survival rests entirely on the bounty provisions from mother nature that these forests provide in the

³⁰ Puustjarvi, Mickels-Kokwe and Chakanga, *The Contribution of the Forest Sector to the National Economy*, September 2005;

form of food, wood energy (fuelwood, charcoal), building materials, medicines and a host of other services e.g. the protection of headwaters, streams and rivers, etc., the loss of any forest has meant a corresponding loss of income and a slump in their socio-economic well being.

From a national perspective, forestry still occupies a very important and strategic position in the national economy through its connection to numerous industries in the manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation, energy, water, agriculture and, tourism sectors, including all the wood processing and allied industries that derive their existence directly from these natural forests. Left unchecked forest degradation has the potential to bring these industries to their knees, and the ripple effects on the economic well being of the nation are quite obvious.

For a long time forestry was perceived as a twin pillar to copper mining, Zambia's economic backbone. Thanks to previous FD management teams who successfully marketed the department as deserving this position and recognition. Prior to 1970s timber served as a major and cheapest energy source in the mining operations. Though not extensively used as a source of energy, timber still remains an important input for underground construction and support works.³¹

Unfortunately, these economic connections have not been highlighted and reinforced by latter FD management teams thereby

³¹ Dennis Musaba, Snr., Geologist (and Retired Mine Captain) under Chibuluma Copper Mines – *personal communication*, 2007.

making forestry look as though it has no economic value of national importance. This is one area where the FD has terribly failed. When forestry was seen as sustaining copper mining, the economic muscle of the nation, the department had unparalleled prominence in the policy arena. And this helped in making both the general and specific arguments about the economic importance of forests. Now FD's linkage to copper mining has waned off, leaving us to question why.

Although it is not easy to state with certainty how and why copper mining and forestry ceased to be seen as two sides of the same coin,³² one can speculate that the 'divorce' occurred (or at least that relationship was weakened) when the copper mines switched to using electricity as their source of energy. Timber was no longer the critical resource it had been portrayed to be for copper mining. As a result, the policy makers' perception of the importance of forests also changed. And since FD management has failed to re-invent or re-position the department either by reclaiming its previous position with the copper mines since timber is still extensively used for underground works, or connecting the department to other sectors such as health, agriculture, tourism, construction, wood processing industries, etc., where forests have close ties, this managerial failure has driven FD almost into oblivion, despite the various opportunities available. For instance, the heightened global interest and concerns about sustainable development and environmental

³² This is another possible area worth investigating since no specific study has been conducted in this respect.

management gives FD a seamless opportunity to be seen again as an important bureau. Also FD can still reposition itself using the numerous sectors and services that forestry supports and provides, respectively.

The second reason for FD's fall from grace can be found in the perceived sense of accomplishment that central government felt seeing the department's achievements. What do I mean by this? Simply put, the success of the industrial plantations project which culminated into planting over 60,000 hectares of plantations in the Copperbelt Province, home to copper mining, clearly demonstrated to central government that the country was able to handle any timber needs for the mines as well as other sectors. Consequently, this gave central government a sense of security to move on and support other sectors to reach a similar level of achievement and independence.

The third reason is the financial hard times and the regional political engagements that the Zambian government found itself in, both of which necessitated cutting down support to some sectors which in this case included forestry.

Finally, but definitely not the least, there is the question of national security. As a land-locked nation surrounded by eight neighbors, in a region still not completely free of civil wars and political upheaval,³³ Zambia's national security owes a lot to how its forests

³³ For instance, political liberation movements that characterized the region since 1960s to early 1990s offer good examples of how FD's professional excellence kept Zambia free of these potential problems.

within and along its borders are managed. Both rebel groups and migrating civilians running away from conflict zones are a political risk and can pose potential problems for a receiving peaceful nation like Zambia whose forests can easily be turned into illegal camps if they are not well policed and managed. And the opposite has been just as true.

With respect to management [in]capacity, FD's failure to manage these natural forests and especially its inability to deal with the problem of deforestation for so long raises concerns that there is much more to this problem than just inadequate funding and labor shortage at field staff level. Looking at this issue from a higher level, this may probably suggest that this type of work ethic permeates the Zambian bureaucracy so much so that it could explain why the country has not taken advantage of its natural capital to push its economy to a higher level.

Therefore, FD's failure to manage the nation's natural capital compromises people's livelihoods and negates the department's usefulness to society. For this reason, it becomes pertinent to question why the department is failing to fulfill its mandate and obligations.

The Global and Local Perspective

Although countries differ in the route they took to attain higher levels of economic development there is however one common denominator: those who excelled built their institutional capacities and

However, the ongoing civil war in Congo DR, up north, and the political instability in Zimbabwe now stand as new challenges Zambian foresters have to be on the lookout for.

used their resources prudently.³⁴ Of course this does not gloss over the fact that some countries learned this the hard way: they mortgaged long-term benefits for short-term economic gains. Japan, which harvested almost all of its forests for the ship industry, is a good example in this respect. However, Japan later embraced plantation forestry to rectify the error, which again speaks to the idea of having or building institutional capacity to do this. It takes visionary leaders to do this, which is clearly lacking in FD. In fact, if what is happening in the Forestry Department is an indicator of a general trend across the Zambian civil service, then it is time institutional capacity is taken as an issue requiring immediate attention on the national agenda.

As the world has come to appreciate, effects of forest degradation go beyond the immediate vicinity to affect people miles away, both within the national borders and beyond. In some cases land degradation has led to misplacement of people as such lands become inhabitable. In extreme cases such developments have ultimately lead to conflicts as people compete for the remaining parcels of land. The conflict in Dar Fur, Sudan presents itself as a classical example accelerated by shortage of land due to degradation.³⁵ For example, forest degradation in Zambia has been found to be an underlying cause to water shortage in some parts of the

³⁴ Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, *A Concise Economic History of the World*, (Oxford University Press), 2003; Edward B. Barbier, *Natural Resources and Economic Development*, (Cambridge University Press), 2005; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence*, (Cambridge University Press), 1994

³⁵ For more details on Dar Fur, see Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Gadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder), 2006.

Copperbelt Province and else. Forest depletion in the Lamba headwaters catchment area (source of the Kafue River and its tributaries) is causing soil erosion and choking the streams that feed into the Kafue River, the main supplier of water to the Copperbelt and other provinces downstream. If not mitigated this problem could escalate to affect other infrastructure such as the Kafue Gorge hydro-power station which is fed from the same river. As other case studies have shown, environmental problems associated with forest depletion are not unusual. They have been noted in varying degrees elsewhere too. For instance, Nepal, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Guinea faced similar challenges that fortunately have since been reversed with USAID's help.³⁶

Globally about one quarter of the world's rural population directly depend on forests for its livelihood.³⁷ And when forest degradation sets in their livelihood is compromised. Thus, forest degradation has gone beyond creating energy problems to affecting whole livelihoods. Indirectly, forest degradation has and continues to exacerbate food insecurity (and by extension poverty levels) as whole communities lose their crops due to flooding, soil erosion or drought thus creating more impoverished people in need of help.

In Zambia, the Eastern, Central and Northern Provinces, especially areas along the Luangwa River, have particularly suffered from flooding

³⁶ Robert Clausen and Amelia Hube, *USAID's Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Livelihoods, Landscapes, and Governance*, Vol. I, 2007:2-3

³⁷ Clausen and Hube, *USAID's Enduring Legacy in Natural Resources*, Vol. I, 2007:1.

while the people in Southern Province have been victims of drought. Either way the loss of crops (and farming areas) has accelerated their vulnerability to food insecurity. Also because forest loss, mainly due to unsustainable agricultural activities,³⁸ is higher in these provinces than elsewhere, forest degradation has been identified as having a connection to these problems in these provinces. Yet, for all these years the Forestry Department (FD) has just continued to stand by doing nothing to stop forest degradation. In an era when the global community has embraced sustainable development and its attention drawn towards achieving the millennium goals, one of which is poverty reduction, unfortunately FD is completely unaware of its role in working towards these global goals. This is in spite of the enormous potential that forests have to supply countless products and services all of which can lift people out of poverty. As case studies from across the globe have shown when forests are well managed there is a corresponding level of well being among those who derive their livelihood from there, either directly or indirectly.³⁹

National Economic and Political Importance

Strictly speaking Zambia is not poor, at least not from its natural resource endowment. All across the country there is an abundance of natural resources both under and above ground, and all of it with

³⁸ The Chitemene system of agriculture is overwhelmingly blamed for being responsible for extensive loss of forests in Northern and some parts of Central Provinces.

³⁹ Clausen and Hube, *USAID's Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Livelihoods, Landscapes, and Governance*, Vol. I, II and III, 2007.

enormous economic value.⁴⁰ None of the 9 Provinces can be singled out as not having anything of value. And this is particularly true on natural forests that are estimated to cover 60% (about 446 Km²) of the country's landmass; of which 9.6% are protected forest reserves,⁴¹ directly managed by the Forestry Department, and another 8.4% are in the form of National Parks (NPs) and Game Management Areas (GMAs)⁴² that fall under the jurisdiction of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). Thus, in total 18% of Zambia's landmass is technically classified as a protected forest area (**Figure 1.2**), while the rest are open forests that fall under the jurisdiction of traditional rulers (local Chiefs) or Ministry of Lands (State Land).

In respect to other natural resources, Zambia is also blessed with abundant water resources (**Figure 1.3**), fertile soils and a good tropical climate all of which are important ingredients that could propel a nation to economic and social well being. Furthermore, apart from its natural resource endowment, Zambia's other strength lies in being a demographically young nation which means that finding young energetic labor suitable for forestry jobs would not be a problem.

Out of its 11.7 million total population 51.4% is between 15-64 years of age, 45.8% is under 15 years, and only 2.8% is above 65 years


⁴⁰ MENR, *Zambia Forestry Action Plan, Vol. II – Challenges and Opportunities*, 1996:1

⁴¹ A note of caution is appropriate here. These figures have not been updated in years. The area under PFAs is less than what Forestry Department reports as this study has discovered and subsequently highlighted. See for instance MENR, *ZFAP, Vol. II*, 1996:58 and FD Annual Report for 2005 both of which quote the same figures 9 years apart despite their central argument that deforestation has been in the rise.

⁴² Davy Siame, "Forest Resource Management and Drought", in: IUCN, *The Environmental Impact of the 1991-1992 Drought on Zambia*, Proceedings of the IUCN Drought study Follow-up Workshop. 1997:74

old.⁴³ At 89% literacy level, and with 65% of the population living in rural areas,⁴⁴ availability of skilled labor force is also not a problem: it can be found everywhere. This social capital is clearly an economic asset if put to productive use.

Figure 1.3: Zambia: Major Freshwater Bodies.



Source: <http://unimaps.com/zambia/index.html>. Accessed: Sunday, May 25, 2008

⁴³ CSO, *Living Conditions*, 2004c:15

⁴⁴ CSO, *Living Conditions*, 2004c:14. This literacy rate refers to people 15 years and older.

While the nation's social capital is under threat from the HIV/AIDS pandemic (15.6% of the adult population was estimated to be HIV positive in 2001-2002),⁴⁵ there are positive signs that the situation is getting under control. Therefore, with the above factors of production in place the cloth is well cut for both government and private entrepreneurs to derive some economic benefits from these assets.

However, despite this enormous natural endowment, Zambia has slipped from being a medium income country to join the [in]famous club of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), a status earned in 2005. Unlike some countries that have had political upheavals, Zambia has enjoyed a relatively peaceful and stable political climate since independence.⁴⁶ The question then is why is a country so rich be poor? Could this be due to lack of institutional capacity in respective government agencies that are mandated to oversee how the country's resources are managed and utilized? Or are there other factors beyond this managerial capacity equation?

One such possibility would be climate change that has intermittently caused drought and floods, particularly starting from the 1990s. However, there is no evidence yet that shows a direct destructive effect of drought/floods over the forest resources.⁴⁷ The forests have been

⁴⁵ CSO, *Zambia: Sexual Behaviour Survey 2003*, CSO: Lusaka. March 2004a

⁴⁶ It is important to note that the country has experienced two coup attempts; one each during President Kenneth Kaunda's and Frederick Chiluba's administrations. But none of them caused any major disruptions.

⁴⁷ No research has been conducted on this topic yet. But the general observations shared during a review of the impact of the 1991/92 drought point to the fact that forestry and other sectors such as agriculture and

quite resilient to these climatic changes. Instead, the impact from climate change may be rather indirect. For instance, loss of agricultural production (crops and livestock) due to drought and, or floods has generally forced the affected populations to look to and (I dare say) “mine” the forests for their survival and livelihood. And this has been particularly telling in an era of high unemployment (over 50%) that has been accelerated by a poor economy.⁴⁸ In this context climate change may qualify to be on the list of “drivers” to forest loss.

Another factor relates to the policy choices or policy shifts that the Zambian government has embraced over the years, some of which were not sympathetic to forestry. The SAP qualifies here for its role and impact that arose from downsizing the Zambian bureaucracy (which cut down forestry personnel). While the SAP’s underlying rationale of promoting fiscal responsibility, a free market economy, and reducing government expenditures to balance the national budget were all noble in principle, their impact in forestry circles have been devastating. Reduction in government expenditure translated into low allocations to forestry programs and therefore ultimately dictated what could and could not be done. Currency devaluation, which was meant to make local products cheaper and therefore supposedly stimulate more exports, did the exact

tourism all suffered either directly or indirectly. For more details on this, see IUCN-The World Conservation Union, *The Impact of the 1991/92 Drought on Zambia*, 1997.

⁴⁸ Based on its poor economic status, Zambia was finally classified in 2005 as a Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). See CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html>. Accessed May 28, 2008

opposite both at individual and corporate levels. At the very best, currency devaluation only eroded people's lifelong savings and made it difficult for new investments to emerge. Put together these and other SAP conditionalities indirectly created a new set of challenges that forestry managers were hardly prepared to deal with. For example, privatization of parastatal companies or state-owned enterprises (SOEs), one condition and outcome of the SAP, led to the closure of these companies and ultimately contributed to the high unemployment. This loss of jobs forced more people to seek a livelihood from forests. Hence, like climate change, the impact from SAP has also been indirect.

Furthermore, the increase in national population and unemployment rates, all of which have potential to drive changes in forest status, are issues that need close examination. As population has grown from 3.4 million people at independence⁴⁹ in 1964 to 11.7 million to date,⁵⁰ so has the need for land and other resources. On the other hand, the high unemployment is in double figures, 11% in 2002-03,⁵¹ and currently estimated at around 50%. Therefore, forest loss may come not as a consequence of managerial incapacity but as a natural progression responding to population growth. I return to discuss these issues in Chapter 5 and 6.

⁴⁹ George Kay, *The Social Geography of Zambia* (University of London Press), 1957:46-47

⁵⁰ CIA - The World Factbook-Zambia, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html>. Accessed: May 28, 2008. In 2004 the Central Statistical Office in Zambia had estimated the national population to be 10, 757,192. see CSO, *Living Conditions, Monitoring Survey Report 2002-2003*, (Central Statistical Office: Lusaka), November 2004c:13

⁵¹ CSO, *Living Conditions*, 2004c:62

And finally, the policy reforms on land ownership cannot be ignored. There have been numerous changes to the Land Policy, one of which introduced title to land in Chiefs' areas to encourage private property ownership.⁵² Prior to this no title was allowed. Instead, land in Chiefs areas was (and still is) held as communal property, overseen by the local Chief, and passed along through generational inheritance. By allowing title to land in Chiefs' areas, the new policy has not just created new land tenure arrangements but has also opened up such lands to outsiders too who do not necessarily belong to that ethnic group.⁵³ People want to have security on property ownership, which title to land provides. And this is likely to encourage more people to seek land in Chiefs' areas.

What the discussion points to is that whether acting individually or together, put together, these factors have the potential to cause changes in forest estates. It is, therefore, reasonable to take them as alternative hypotheses that could affect forest quality. However, in spite of these connections I have just highlighted, how managers responded to these challenges will remain the deciding factor between good and poor performance. I return to these issues in Chapter 5 and 6 where I show why managerial in[capacity] still stands as an overriding factor to forest degradation and not these other possible factors.

⁵² The National Land Policy of 1996.

⁵³ Although people can access land and settle anywhere they like, however, land in Zambia is split along ethnic Chiefdoms, each region representing a particular ethnic grouping.

Although natural resource endowment is no guarantee that a country would automatically be propelled into economic well being,⁵⁴ however, there are also numerous examples across the globe pointing to the fact that resource endowment plays an important role in the economic development of a nation.⁵⁵ A case in point comes from early empires such as Great Britain that derived their economic power from their natural endowments such as coal as well as additional supplies of other commodities from their colonies.⁵⁶ In recent times, Malaysia stands out as another good example of a resource abundant nation that has demonstrated the economic power of natural wealth when supported by appropriate government investment behavior.⁵⁷ And of course the success story of the four “Tiger Nations” confirms that building strong economies and strong nations takes more than resource abundance.⁵⁸ Therefore, managed properly natural wealth has always acted as a springboard to the economic well being of many nations.

Notice here that by implication the word *management* suggests and brings into focus the presence and influence of managerial capacity and human capital on the natural wealth, thereby introducing it as an

⁵⁴ See Richard M. Auty (ed.), *Resource Abundance and Economic Development*, (Oxford University Press), 2001; Edward B. Barbier, *Natural Resources and Economic Development*, (Cambridge University Press: NY), 2005

⁵⁵ See for instance arguments advanced by Rondo Cameron and Larry Neal, *A Concise Economic History of the World*, (Oxford University Press), 2003; and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, *The Economic History of Latin America Since Independence*, (Cambridge University Press), 1994

⁵⁶ Cameron and Neal, *A Concise Economic History of the World*, 2003

⁵⁷ Mahani Zainal Abidin, “Competitive Industrialization with Natural Resource Abundance: Malaysia,” in: Richard Auty (ed.), *Natural Resource Abundance* (2001), Chapter 9, pp147-164.

⁵⁸ World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, (Oxford University Press, NY), 1993.

important input. As Abidin (2001) explains, one reason for Malaysia's success lies in the fact its government "invested heavily in human resource development,"⁵⁹ a strategy meant to create a large pool of skilled workers especially for the manufacturing industry that was expanding rapidly. By 1991 Malaysia's total expenditure on education was 5.5% of its GNP, a figure that surpassed even some developed countries such as the United States and Japan which invested 5.3% and 4.7% of their expenditures, respectively.⁶⁰

And all this is in agreement with what many scholars and practitioners have pointed out: the major determinant to economic development lies in how each nation uses its resource endowments, which is essentially an aspect of state / institutional capacity. Therefore, having a country that is naturally rich but economically poor, as Zambia is, raises an interesting question worth investigating. Given that Zambia has a rich natural resource base, state capacity seems to be a possible missing link that could explain government's poor performance. And since state capacity comes from the performance of individual bureaus, the best way to investigate state capacity is to look at what is happening at bureau level. Taking the management of indigenous forests in Zambia as a case study I pursue this line of inquiry to illustrate the point that managerial capacity matters. It is as important as the commonly known capacities, vis-à-vis the *factors of production*.

⁵⁹ Mahani Abidin, "Competitive Industrialization with Natural Resource Abundance," 2001:160-161

⁶⁰ Abidin, 2001:160.

Forestry offers a good example in that Forestry Department's achievements up until the 1970s stand in stark contrast with the current forest degradation that has become the order of the day. There is sufficient evidence of good performance prior to 1970s (a time when the department had a leaner and less educated work force and a moderate annual budget). And there is supporting evidence too for poor performance since the 1980s, a time when FD had slightly more and better qualified personnel. Yet, for the most part, Forestry Department claims that insufficient field staff and poor annual allocations are responsible for forest degradation. As a category of employees responsible for monitoring field operations field staff are essentially the first responders to all forest activities. And since they are right where action takes place, field staff are the department's eyes in the word's true meaning. Hence, field staff have a crucial role to play in ensuring that forests are managed well. Clearly, one can sympathize with the FD that operating from a position of insufficiency at this level puts the department in a tight corner. And of course the situation is made worse when the department is perpetually underfunded. This makes it harder, if not impossible, for its staff to get out in the field such that undertaking any fieldwork clearly becomes an uphill battle.

Indeed, the above arguments are credible, but considering that capacity includes far much more than human resources and finances, as some scholars have argued, should the department's argument pass for a

final conclusion? Is underfunding and insufficient field staff the only factors at play? This is where this study comes in. It sets out to test the department's assertion, to find out how true or valid this argument is. So we ask the question: Why are protected forest areas (PFAs) in Zambia in a state of decline – both in the area they cover and the quality of stock they contain? Is this decline really due to inadequate labor force and insufficient annual allocations? Could these problems be due to lack of institutional capacity in the Forestry Department? Or could this be due to other factors beyond the department's control?

Learning from the department's brief history – its successes, failures and apparently untamed opportunities – it is justifiable to believe that the department's shortcomings cannot simply be explained away by insufficient labor force and financial resources, though there is some credibility in that argument. Instead, the managerial dimension seems to be a plausible explanation which urgently requires scrutiny too. And this dissertation does just that. I posit that managerial capacity is a very important factor worth bringing to the fore because, as the data indicates, during the early days of FD's existence when the department had a relatively lean work force compared to its current level which is slightly higher (as in number of staff), the department was able to increase its forest estates and these forests were also well managed.⁶¹ Furthermore, FD has more and better qualified personnel now than in

⁶¹ See Appendix 5.

the early years of the department's existence. Therefore, the question we need to answer is: how did the department do so well at a time it had fewer and less technically qualified personnel? What capacities can we point to beyond labor and funds? Against this background, it is reasonable to hypothesize that managerial capacity is probably the missing link that has contributed to the current state of affairs. The stronger the department's managerial capacity the more likely that its forest estates would be well managed and vice versa. A quick look at the department's brief history seems to agree with observation. To help put this argument into context I sketch, in very broad strokes, the department's successes and current challenges to show why managerial [in]capacity seems to be the missing link. And I employ this historical approach because the data it offers serves both as a laboratory and a validation tool. We should not ignore the facts (i.e. what has happened). Rather we should use these facts to understand and, possibly try to explain, the present even as we plan for the future. Thus, FD's past experience is an excellent laboratory that should serve its rightful purpose in shaping the future of forest management in Zambia.

The Forestry Department: Its Successes and Current Challenges

If there is one public agency in Zambia for which there are still some 'remnants' of evidence as having been effective in its performance at one time, the Forestry Department scores not one but several

accolades. I call them *remnants* because much of what used to be protected forest areas are no longer there, except on paper. And this is where the argument becomes fluid. What should be counted as protected forests areas? Is it the hecterage of gazetted areas even when no forest exists on such lands anymore? Is it the number of forests with quality stock in them? Or is it both? From FD's point of view, the department seems content with counting the area covered regardless of the state of such forests – meaning that the area is counted even when that land has been depleted of its forest stock. But the big is question is: of what use is it to count an area which has been turned into farmland or human settlement? Isn't it misleading to count such areas which no longer have the resources they were reserved for? I choose not to offer any opinion now but come back to these issues in Chapter 5 and 6.

The other 'remnant' relates to the industrial plantations that the department established in the Copperbelt Province. Once a prominent feature in that province, these plantations are slowly disappearing even as arguments to privatize or keep them as state property remain unresolved.

From its humble beginning in 1931 as a section under the Department of Agriculture, the Forestry Department later emerged to become one among the best performing public agencies in Zambia. Prior to this the department's contributions were almost insignificant, generally absorbed under the agricultural extension services as a section

that provided technical advice to farmers on trees. Later as forestry became more defined as a discipline quite separate from agriculture, this led to the creation of a Forest Department in 1947. Over the years the Forest Department vigorously pursued an ambitious mission of making Zambia self-sufficient in timber and related forest products and ensuring that the forests are well managed.⁶² All this has been achieved.

Initially, forest research and forest inventories dominated earlier work that ultimately laid to a firm foundation for the scientific management techniques that followed and guided the FD's operations,⁶³ and whose dividends are now evident both in the extent of protected forest areas and the industrial plantations that were established across the nation over the years.

As at 1962 the Forest Department had 5 million hectares (ha.) of PFAs for which it has direct control, in addition to the open forests where the department also has indirect control. By 1983 PFAs had been increased to 7.6 million ha., the highest level reached.

On the exotic plantations side, the department planted over 1,000 ha. exclusively devoted to research purposes. And these research efforts later supported the establishment of 56,149 ha of industrial plantations,⁶⁴ of which 50,490 ha. were planted in the Copperbelt Province to supply timber to the copper mines. Based on the copper

⁶² For details see Forest Department, *Zambia National Forestry Policy 1965*; an abridged version of this policy is made available as Appendix 2 to this study.

⁶³ The Forest Research Library in Kitwe with its numerous stacks of publications attests to this effort.

⁶⁴ FAO, *Zambia: Identification of Forestry Investment Projects*, 1996.

mines demand for wood, which outweighed the regeneration rates of natural forests, foresters were quick to point out that such consumption could not be supported by natural forests alone. It therefore threatened their existence. Instead, there was urgent need to grow fast growing exotic species to supplement wood from the natural forest. And this marked the beginning of the industrial plantations project. In short, the industrial plantations were meant to become a buffer to the natural forests, while at the same time supporting copper mining. They helped deter over-logging (deforestation) of natural forests.

Although plantation establishment took place in all the 9 Provinces, the Copperbelt Province was taken as a special case due to the high demand for wood from the copper mines. Hence, FD deliberately concentrated its efforts of establishing the industrial plantations in Copperbelt Province. To speed up the process of plantation establishment, at a rate that matched demand for wood from the copper mines, the FD accessed a \$5.3 million loan from the World Bank in 1968 to finance the industrial plantations project.⁶⁵ And a new division, the Industrial Plantations Division (IPD) was created to oversee the project. Elsewhere, plantation establishment was undertaken through their respective Provincial Forest Offices, financed by central government. The success of these endeavors has made Zambia become self-sufficient in timber with surplus for export.

⁶⁵ This project phase ran from January 1, 1969 to June 30, 1977.

In the meantime, the Forest Department also pursued a vigorous human resource development program, raising the level of its staff from zero (local) professionals at independence (1964) to over 50 by 1981.⁶⁶ This figure reflects only those people who remained to work in the Forest Department and not necessarily the total number trained which is definitely higher. Some professional staff left the department for greener pastures elsewhere. A similar positive trend occurred in other staff categories too. By 1982 the department had 597 technical and field staff (up from 416 in 1970), an increase of 43.5%.⁶⁷

While the department scored numerous achievements from all its divisions – Forest Research, Forest Management (indigenous and plantations), Human Resource development and, Extension Services – the industrial plantations project deserves special mention. It stands out as the biggest landmark achievement not only in the extent of the plantations established but more importantly in its positive economic impact on society. This is one example where Forest Department clearly demonstrated its ability to translate government policy into tangible achievable goals as exemplified in the professional and managerial competence to deliver on government policy. The department successfully implemented each and every policy prescription⁶⁸ as I pointed out earlier, and has numerous positive outcomes to show for each policy

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⁶⁷ See Forest Department, *Forestry in Zambia Since Independence: 10 Years*, 1975; Forest Department *Annual Reports* from 1965 to 1987 and Appendix 5 in this dissertation.

⁶⁸ Refer to the National Forestry Policy of 1965 in Appendix 1 to this dissertation.

prescription, an amazing achievement for a department that for the most part was least funded compared to other bureaus.⁶⁹ And nowhere is this achievement so visible than under the industrial plantations project whose positive economic impact endures to date.

The industrial plantations project was so successful that IPD, the project management unit, was eventually incorporated into a parastatal company called ZAFFICO and became the largest timber company to own both the plantations and the sawmills. The other timber companies are wood processors that depend on ZAFFICO plantations or the natural forests. ZAFFICO employed over 3,000 people, and its impact on society is larger than this due to the ripple effects it has had on other industries. For instance, ZAFFICO plantations support numerous wood processing companies, carpentry and furniture shops. And there are also other industries that are indirectly supported by ZAFFICO such as the transportation industry, and so on. All this arose out of the wonderful work that FD executed so successfully.

Unfortunately, despite this seemingly solid foundation, the FD has not sustained this momentum. Since mid (and especially from late) 1980s the department's performance indicators all went south. Most of the activities that used to be done are no longer carried out. Apparently, the department has lost its vision and or the motivation to exist. Its

⁶⁹ Jones Akapelwa, "Forestry Policies of Selected Countries in Africa," in: FAO, *Paper No. 132*, 1996:527-546.

managers are frustrated and highly de-motivated. Consequently, the department has moved from being a star agency on the block to one that policymakers do not even pay attention to (or count) as an important bureau.

FD's performance since late 1980s has not been inspirational at all. Its forest estates are degraded and most of them illegally settled or exploited. Compared to the department's achievements in earlier years and the current deplorable state of its estates one wonders and questions what has befallen this previously high performing agency. Why has the department degenerated into a non-performer? Is this due to external pressures or simply a lack of institutional capacity within the department? I'm persuaded to think that this problem has its roots in managerial capacity and here is why I think so.

When one looks at the history of forestry development in Zambia two things stand out prominently. First, compared to other government agencies the FD has generally operated on a modest budget and a lean structure over its lifetime. Yet its achievements defied those constraints. Second, for a long time the Zambian government was engrossed in the political liberation struggle of the region by supporting freedom fighters in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe;⁷⁰ a

⁷⁰ For instance, Namibian SWAPO and South African ANC had bases in Zambia, while the other three countries were actively supported wherever they had set up camp. For more details see, Douglas Anglin and Timothy Shaw, *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence*, Westview Press) 1979:234-271 (Chap. 6); Marcia M. Burdette, *Zambia: Between Two Worlds* (Westview Press), 1988; Richard Hall, *Zambia* (Praeger: NY), 1965; Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the*

commitment that deviated resources to this regional endeavor instead of being invested locally. By allowing freedom fighters from the region to have bases in Zambia, South Africa and Zimbabwe subsequently classified Zambia as aiding terrorists and therefore deserved to pay for its involvement. In fact, South African President, John B. Vorster, is on record as having vowed that, "South Africa will hit Zambia so hard that she will never forget".⁷¹ And both Zimbabwe and South Africa waged military campaigns against Zambia though Zambia never responded, which helped to stop such military confrontations from escalating into full blown war. Based on such threats and subsequent direct military reprisals from South Africa and Zimbabwe⁷² the Zambian government was kept on its toes to secure its borders. Consequently, military spending was substantially increased to contain the situation.

Therefore, it is not an overstatement to say forestry programs paid the price as can be seen from the reductions in government funding to the department.⁷³ In fact, these political choices also created an additional layer of challenge for forest management in that foresters had to be even more vigilant in securing the forests to ensure national security.

White South (Africana Publishing Corporation: NY), 1970; Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict* (Davison Publishing Limited), 1974;

⁷¹ Quoted by Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), *The African Liberation Reader Vol. 3* (Zed Press), 1982:125.

⁷² de Braganca and Wallerstein (eds.), *The African Liberation Reader Vol. 3*, p.125, 1982. See also Vol. 2 by the same authors.

⁷³ Forestry Department, *Annual Reports* (1965 to 2005); GRZ, *Financial Reports* (1970 to 2005).

Remember, as I mentioned earlier, five out of eight countries that share boundaries with Zambia were actively engaged in political liberation struggles which had potential for their freedom fighters to use Zambia's forests as a safe haven, especially those groups not officially recognized by the Zambian government. Also the movement of refugees from conflict areas, freedom fighters, soldiers and even traders were issues of great national concern⁷⁴ in which forestry staff played a crucial role. But due to strong managerial competence the Forestry Department was able to handle these challenges with ease.

Notice that in spite of these constraints, FD achieved wonders under those difficult circumstances. The largest increase in plantation establishment, indigenous forest reservations, and human resource development occurred at the very time when the Zambian government relentlessly committed its national resources to the liberation struggle, determined to free the region from all forms of colonialism.⁷⁵

It is no secret that Zambia's role in the political liberation of the Southern African region did not come cheaply as government's degree of involvement suggests. In particular, the Kenneth Kaunda administration made a deliberate choice to house liberation movements from Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. These included: the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) from Namibia, headed by Sam Nujoma;

⁷⁴ Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict*, 1974:152

⁷⁵ Marcia Burdette, *Zambia: Between Two Worlds*, 1988; Richard Hall, *Zambia*, 1965; Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South*, 1970

Nelson Mandela's party, the African National Congress (ANC) from South Africa; and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) from Southern Rhodesia. In addition, the Zambian government also gave unwavering support to those who did not set up camp in Zambia but remained in their countries e.g. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in Angola and, Samora Machel's FRELIMO⁷⁶ (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Mozambique.

Surprisingly, all these political challenges that characterized the nation (and the region), which would have otherwise slowed the FD's operations, never did. Instead, the department defied all these odds and forged ahead, reaping so many successes that are now slowly becoming part of the good old days history and "there used to be"... is quickly becoming part of the everyday forestry vocabulary.

Without getting weighed down in the details of the broader challenges of the day, one simple question we can at least attempt to answer is: why is FD failing to manage its forest estates? What has happened to the once 'star' agency? It is important to get to know what has caused the FD to fall from grace because failures at agency level ultimately spiral upwards to national level. In any case the success of any nation is a mirror image of what happens at agency level, and vice versa. Therefore, getting to know the problems and solving them at

⁷⁶ Also known in Portuguese as Frente de Libertação de Moçambique.

agency level is the best way to solve what generally end up being national problems.

Conclusion

As I have repeatedly pointed out, Zambia is not poor. What has driven the country into becoming one among the poorest and highly indebted countries is clearly not lack of economic resources. Rather the problem can be attributed to lack of capacity to wisely manage and utilize its natural resource endowment. The lack of institutional capacity (at agency level) offers the only plausible explanation to this problem.

In this study institutional capacity is conceived as *having adequate and appropriate* productive resources required to undertake a given task. It means Forest Department has the *ability to create and sustain an environment and relationships that facilitate and support purposeful, collective action geared towards achieving its objectives.*⁷⁷ Extending the definition of IC in this manner makes it possible to quantify and analyze how IC becomes a defining factor in institutional performance from all the different angles. In fact, this Zambian case study provides a good example in that FD's past strength was derived from the strong ties and relationships that the department had with the local Chiefs and their people. But as central government assumed dominance, wanting to

⁷⁷ This definition draws on different scholars' conception of IC, e.g. Christine Lambert and Nick Oatley, "Capacity and Planning for Growth," in: Goran Cars, *et. al.* (eds.) *Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux*, (2002).

control all aspects of forest management in a policing fashion, this alienated the local people communities who eventually withdrew their support. Add this development to the modest budget that the department operated under, the result is total disaster. FD's capacity was subsequently weakened and therefore could not effectively manage its estates.

Given the Forestry Department's humble beginnings, counting its achievements over the years, and now observing its apparent death, the FD offers an excellent case study to test the hypothesis about state / institutional capacity and its effects on performance outcomes.

In this study, I argue that although FD was clearly affected by external factors, such as the IMF/World Bank sponsored Structural Adjustment Program, the main reason that accounts for its poor performance now is lack of institutional capacity. In particular, the department lacks visionary leadership and managerial capabilities to bring it back to its past glory. I follow this line of inquiry and demonstrate that given the modest budget and lean structure that FD has always operated under, the potential for failure or under-achieving was quite high. Forestry Department could have failed to achieve what it did had it not been for its managers' competence to plan, mobilize and utilize the resources at their disposal. Their effectiveness and footprints are easily noticeable in the presence of strategic and management plans, district management books, public-private partnerships (e.g. TV and

Radio Programs); a variety of programs they initiated and executed, and above all their active and enduring presence in the policy arena that helped influence government policy in favor of forestry to an extent where forestry and copper mining (Zambia's economic back-bone) were seen as two sides of the same coin, even though there was hardly any forest exports to brag about at the time. How did these managers do it? FD as a supplier of timber, a major source of energy in the copper mines at that time, forest managers seized the moment; they tied forestry to copper mining portraying it as a twin pillar to the copper mining industry. Naturally, this raised the department's profile and forestry in general. This also helped to make people to see forests as an important national asset.

Generally speaking, these managers were highly visionary and creative: they thought and operated outside the black box, mainly tapping into other types of capacities outside the department. For instance, as part of its vigorous campaign strategy, aimed at reaching a wider audience, FD developed TV and Radio forest extension programs and offered them to private companies interested to sponsor them in exchange for "free" advertising. The initiative was highly successful, private companies grabbed the moment. As a result, the department was able to air numerous TV and radio programs and this paid back immensely. Not only did this strategy enhance public awareness on

forestry but more importantly it created some loyal forestry supporters across all sections of society.

With international recognition of the important of and advocacy for sustainable development becoming stronger, the moment couldn't be better for these forest managers. In a triad partnership between FD, IUCN-The World Conservation Union and the Natural Resources Department, a *National Conservation Strategy* was developed. This document went beyond forests to emphasize integrated natural resources and environmental management. The National Conservation Strategy became a building block to what later became the National Environmental Policy.

Other landmark initiatives, to mention but a few, included the development of forestry clubs at schools (K-G12), community agro-forestry clubs and the declaration (by the Republican President, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda) of the National Tree Planting Day (December 15th) and National Tree Planting Month (December 15th to January 15th)⁷⁸. Not only was this national tree planting program launched by the Republican President, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, but he remained a constant Guest of Honor thereafter, which helped to keep the department's profile visibly high in the policy arena. Similarly, in each respective province, high level officials in government and the private sector emulated the president's

⁷⁸ To encourage tree planting, each year the Forestry Department gave up to a maximum of 100 free seedlings to any individual or group (e.g. community, 'conservation' or school clubs) who wanted to plant some trees during the annual tree planting day/month. See for instance, FD Annual Report for the Year 1988, p.1

example.⁷⁹ All these initiatives demonstrate not only managerial competence but their creativity too. Sadly, none of this is happening today.

Therefore, as these examples demonstrate, it is reasonable to argue that, in addition to the other capacities, managerial competence has always been the department's strongest asset and not necessarily the *quantities* of other productive resources at its disposal, which have generally been meager. Of course this does not in any way underestimate the importance of the other productive inputs but to emphasize the point that managerial competence acts as the glue that unites the other resources together to achieve the desired outcomes through collective action. Of course the availability of the primary factors of production is always an added advantage. However, without managerial competence these inputs would not yield much on their own.

The point I am making is that sometime back the Forest Department had strong management competence. Consequently, the department was able to design and implement government policy effectively going by the numerous achievements accrued over the years. Unfortunately, this momentum has been lost along the way, at least

⁷⁹ This tree planting program attracted such national attention and appeal that FD had to adjust its seedling distribution: 100 for each Primary and Secondary (High) School, 500 to each Institution of Higher Learning. ZIMCO had an obligation to finance the program – K50,000.00 for the Lusaka Fuel Wood Project, and K50,000.00 for the raising seedlings for the National Tree Planting Program. Refer to FD Annual Report for the Year 1988, p21-22.

since late 1980s. And its effects are particularly evident in the deplorable state of the forest estates.

As several scholars and practitioners⁸⁰ have unanimously agreed, institutional capacity clearly matters for any organization to function effectively. But I also add that knowing which capacity is lacking is even more important; it is the only way a dysfunctional organization such as FD can be pushed back on track by making the missing capacity available. Any organization with a weak institutional capacity is most likely doomed to fail. I build on this theme in the chapters that follow to illustrate that IC is clearly the only viable bridge that connects the policy implementation highway to the final destination – the policy outcomes.

Dissertation Layout

This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the question under investigation, “why are protected forest areas (PFAs) in Zambia in a state of decline – both in the area they cover and the quality of stock they contain?” Besides highlighting the research question, Chapter 1 also provides a brief historical perspective on the case study, giving a general overview on the extent of forest estates in Zambia, who is

⁸⁰ See, Kate McLaughlin, *et. al.*, (eds.), *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects*, (Routledge: London), 2002; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, *et. al.*, *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems*, (Earthscan Publications) 2002; Goran Cars, *et. al.*, *Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux*, (Ashgate: Burlington, USA), 2002; Robert Picciotto and Eduardo Wiesner, *Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension*, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA), 1998; Richard Walker and George Boyne, “Public Management and Organizational Performance...” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 25, number 2, 2006:371-393; Patricia W. Ingraham, *et. al.*, *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 2003.

responsible for what, and how this fits into the different land tenure arrangements.⁸¹

In particular, Chapter 1 also lays in very broad strokes the development of forestry in Zambia, *vis-à-vis*, how forestry has evolved over time both as a science and as an enterprise. The Chapter highlights Forestry Department's achievements and traces the challenges the department has confronted as a forestry manager over the years, and then questions why that momentum has been lost. Given the current deplorable condition of the forest estates, Chapter 1 ends with a question wanting to know what has led to this situation and leads us into the rest of the Chapters (4-6) that are devoted to answer this question.

Government policy goal on forestry aims at having at least 15% of Zambia's landmass to be reserved as protected forest areas;⁸² a mandate that Forestry Department (FD), the sole manager of Zambia's forestry resources, is supposed to pursue. But as the foregoing discussion illustrates, this task is becoming more illusive each day that passes.

⁸¹ Zambia has two land tenure systems: State land, and Trust land / Reserve land. Central government owns the State land, while Trust / Reserve land falls under the jurisdiction of traditional rulers (Chiefs). To create PFAs or alienate land for any purpose in the Trust / Reserve land, government has to get permission from the Chiefs.

For more details on this topic see: GRZ, *Report of the Land Commission*, (Lusaka), August 1967; GRZ, *Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296*, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970; GRZ *The Land Policy 1995*; D.J. Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), *Zambia in Maps*, University of London Press, Ltd, 1971:48-49; M. P. Mvunga, *The Colonial Foundations of Zambia's Land Tenure System*, (NecZam: Lusaka), 1980; M.P. Mvunga, *Land Law and Policy in Zambia*, (Mambo Press: Institute for African Studies, Zambian Papers No.17), 1982; Gear Kajoba, *The Landmarks of Zambia's Land Tenure System: From Protectionism to Empowerment*, (A Paper presented at the International Conference on Land Tenure in the Developing World with a Focus on Southern Africa, held at the University of Capetown, South Africa, 27-29 January, 1998); M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in Ng'andwe, A. (ed.), *Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia*, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45

⁸² Zambia Forestry Policy 1965: Item 5

Evidently, FD's most productive years in working towards this goal were during the 1960s through to early 1980s. Since then hardly any forest reservations have taken place; instead forest degazettions⁸³ have become the order of the day.

Apart from degazettions the remaining forest estates are also in a deplorable state; either there are illegal settlements or someone is illegally over-exploiting the resources thus compromising the purpose for which these forests were established.⁸⁴ It is these sad developments that have inspired this study asking the question: are these problems due to lack of institutional capacity in the Forestry Department? Or is it due to other factors beyond the department's control?

Chapter 2 delves into the theoretical basis of institutional capacity and its practical application. In particular, the Chapter gives a road map on how institutional capacity is connected or related to effective management and how this eventually influences [performance] outcomes. The chapter argues that it is almost inconceivable to talk about outcomes without looking back at IC, which covers both the physical (tangible) resources and the rules that regulate people's behavior: both as employees within an organization or as that organization's clientele.

⁸³ Refers to the forest estates that cease to be protected, declared through an act of law. It is the opposite of the protected (gazetted) forests or the legal process of setting aside a forest for conservation. Degazetted forest estates are released back to the owners (e.g. the local Chiefs, Central or Local Government) who will have expressed the desire to put such land to other land uses.

⁸⁴ PFAs are established to serve as protective or productive forests. Protective forests provide protective roles e.g. for water catchment areas, on mountains and along lakes to deter soil erosion; whereas productive forests are reserved as reservoirs of forest resources to be accessed in an organized manner based on Forestry Department's license system.

Since human resources drive action in any given situation, much of the discussion on IC revolves around people: how their actions can (and do) orient an organization towards success or failure. Managerial competence is identified as one important ingredient that leads to creation of effective organizations.

Chapter 3 explains how this study was conducted, and is linked to the theoretical aspects discussed in Chapter 2. It explains how institutional capacity is connected to forest degradation (one of FD's performance indicators) and how this connection has been assessed in this study.

The study findings are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 deals mainly with secondary aggregate data that were collected from public documents, from which we establish some connections between changes in the extent and quality of PFAs (a dependent variable) and institutional capacity (the explanatory variable) that is represented by levels of annual government funding to FD, and the number of staff in the Forestry Department. Given the central position that rules⁸⁵ and norms⁸⁶ occupy in shaping people's behavior and choices, the wider discussion also covers national statutes on forestry, traditional norms as well as other regulations that have a bearing on forestry (e.g. international treaties). These are part of the institutional capacity

⁸⁵ Douglass North, *Institutions*, 1990; Oliver Williams, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996.

⁸⁶ Powell and DiMaggio, *Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, 1991; André Lecours, *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis* (University of Toronto Press), 2005

variable, which in this case are considered as a control variable. The purpose is to highlight how these statutes have shaped the department's choices. The discussion in Chapter 4 is further complemented by a second layer of data from a survey of forestry officers, a subject of Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 discusses the field survey part of this study, based on information collected from 91 forest managers (drawn from senior, middle and junior management ranks)⁸⁷ who participated in the survey and commented on the extent of their involvement in the administration of the department as well as their knowledge about the structural adjustment program (an economic reform policy that Zambia has pursued since 1985).⁸⁸ In particular, this chapter highlights how much these managers know about government policy on forestry, and their role in working towards achieving the policy prescriptions. This is a chapter that dwells on management style and practices and their role in charting the department's path towards achieving its mission.

Finally, Chapter 6 pulls together the issues that have been identified as contributing to the department's poor performance, and offers some suggestions on how these problems can be resolved.

⁸⁷ Senior Managers typically are 4 year degree holders and above, Middle and Junior Managers must have a Forestry Diploma (equivalent to a 2 year Associate Degree) and a Certificate in Forestry, respectively.

⁸⁸ Although official records indicate 1985 as the year when Zambia adopted SAP, in reality this program started in 1973 when the Zambian government accessed the first stabilization loan from the IMF. By all stripes and intent, stabilization loans always marked the beginning of the road to SAP. 1985 marked the adoption of a full SAP.

Chapter 2

Institutional Capacity: An Overview

In this chapter I discuss the concept of institutional capacity (IC) and show how IC relates to effective management and performance outcomes. The first section focuses on the conceptual framework of IC. It traces the theoretical underpinnings of IC from classic management and administrative theorists⁸⁹ to the current schools of thought on state capacity,⁹⁰ the news ways of governing⁹¹ and capacity building.⁹² Arising from this literature review, it is easy to notice that IC is a multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary concept that embraces management, organization, administrative, political, sociological, and economic theories; with each discipline emphasizing certain aspects of IC – e.g.

⁸⁹ A sample of this literature includes: Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. II, No. 2 (June 1887), pp.197-222; Herbert Simon, “Proverbs of Administration,” *Public Administration Review*, vol. 6 (Winter 1946), pp. 53-67; Herbert Simon, et. al., *Public Administration* (Knopf: NY), 1950; Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration*. Sentry Press: New York. P.3-45; Frederick Taylor, “The Principles of Scientific Management”, in: Shafritz and Hyde (eds.), *Classic of Public Administration*, 1987; Henry Fayol, “The Administrative Theory in the State”, in: Gulick and Urwick (eds.) *Papers on the Science of Administration* 1937:106.

⁹⁰ Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” in: Peter Evans et. al. (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, 1985; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, 1994; Merilee S. Grindle, *Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa*, 1996.

⁹¹ For more details on this topic see, Kate McLaughlin, et. al., (eds.), *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects*, (Routledge: London), 2002; Goran Cars, et. al., *Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux*, (Ashgate: Burlington, USA), 2002; Robert Picciotto and Eduardo Wiesner, *Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension*, (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA), 1998; Richard Walker and George Boyne, “Public Management and Organizational Performance...” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 25, number2, 2006:371-393

⁹² Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems*, (Earthscan Publications) 2002

focusing on tangible resources, skills, relationships, the environment or simply rules.

Although some exceptions abound in each discipline, generally speaking, the administrative, management and organization theorists tend to emphasize management of productive inputs (tangible resources), people skills, the work environment and relationships among workers, which help to organize people and other factors of production. On the other hand the political, sociological and economic theorists lean towards rules (commonly referred to as institutions in economic conceptions), skills (strategic maneuvers), and relationships. While economists particularly emphasize that rules determine the outcomes by manipulating human behavior,⁹³ all the other groups also agree that rules are a common denominator: not only do rules influence human behavior and their choices but they particularly create and structure the environment where people finally operate.⁹⁴ Thus, there are clearly overlaps in how the different disciplines characterize and or define IC.

In the second section of this chapter I look at the applied version of IC: how different scholars and practitioners have defined and applied this concept. As noted above, their differences are cosmetic in nature; they

⁹³ See for instance, Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, (Cambridge University Press), 1990; Oliver Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, (Oxford University Press), 1996; Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and Development* (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA), 1998; Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, (Anchor Books: NY), 1999.

⁹⁴ The new institutionalism is particularly strong in this respect. See, Water W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, (The University of Chicago Press), 1991

tend to hold certain aspects of IC constant to emphasize other aspects perceived to be more important in their respective disciplines.

Finally, the third section deals with the *importance* of IC and its implications for today's organizations. For our case study, I use a policy history road map as a narrative tool based on its strength that enables us to see the effects of policy change over time.⁹⁵ This is especially important for this case study because the development of forestry in Zambia, both as a science and a business, is a product of incremental developments that have occurred over a long period of time, caused by shifts in government policy. A policy history road map enables us to see through the different phases and how each phase influenced the department's operations. Having said that what is institutional capacity? And how is it connected to outcomes? Does institutional capacity matter?

What is Institutional Capacity?

The word '*institution*' means different things to different people. It may mean the rules, regulations, laws or statutes that shape the work ethic or behavior of an organization⁹⁶, or it may refer to an entire organization; in which case it includes both the people and the rules⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Julian E. Zelizer, "Introduction: New Directions in Policy History," *Journal of Policy History*, vol. 17, No. 1, 2005:3,6-7

⁹⁶ Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 1990; Jeffrey Nugent, "Institutions, Markets, and Development Outcomes" in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and Development*, 1998: 9-10

⁹⁷ Kent R. Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, "Assessing the Effects of Institutions," in: Weaver & Rockman (eds.), *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, 1993; Joseph Litterer (ed.), *Organizations: Structure and Behavior*, 1980; Arturo Israel, *Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance*, 1987; Thrainn Eggertsson, "Comments on 'Institutions, Markets, and

that govern their behavior.⁹⁸ Attempting to define *institution* is as problematic as agreeing on its application; it depends on the discipline and the thematic area.⁹⁹ For instance, within the old institutionalism movement institutions were generally conceptualized as material entities. “They were constitutions, cabinets, parliaments, bureaucracies, courts, armies, ...and in some instances, party systems. In other words, institutions referred to the state” or more precisely to “government.”¹⁰⁰ And most institutionalists accept this material or structural definition.

However, not all new institutionalists agree with this position. For instance, the rational choice institutionalists conceptualize institutions from an actor-centered perspective¹⁰¹ that focuses on the rules of the game and highlights how institutions shape action by creating opportunities and constraints.¹⁰² Their main concern is “not so much what institutions are but what they represent: an equilibrium.”¹⁰³ Yet, other new institutionalists with a rationalistic orientation concentrate on the relationship between institutions and agents arguing that institutions only provide the context within which agents (actors) drive

Development Outcomes’ by Nugent” ” in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and Development*, 1998:24

⁹⁸ For a detailed treatment of this application, see: Max Weber’s *Bureaucracy* (1987) [original work 1922], where he conceptualized government as an institution with people and rules to regulate their behavior. See also Harold Gortner, *et. al.*, *Organization Theory: A Public Perspective*, (The Dorsey Press, Chicago, Il.), 1987:3

⁹⁹ André Lecours, *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis* (University of Toronto Press), 2005:6-11

¹⁰⁰ André Lecours, *New Institutionalism*, 2005:6

¹⁰¹ Fritz W. Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research* (Westview Press), 1997

¹⁰² North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 1990; Sue E. Crawford and Elinor Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” *American Political Science Review*, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3

¹⁰³ Lecours, 2005:6; Crawford and Ostrom, “A Grammar of Institutions,” *APSR*, 89, No. 3, 1995:582-3

action.¹⁰⁴ This stands in contrast with the other strand of conception that comes from those who posit that institutions drive human action by influencing their behavior by constraining people's choices.¹⁰⁵ But others are quick to point out that human behavior is not only shaped by utility calculations but more so from cultural norms and values or institutionalized standards that by themselves reproduce anticipated expectations, identity and habit.¹⁰⁶ Sociological institutionalists agree with this conception. They too view institutions in terms of norms, beliefs, values, and cognitive frameworks.¹⁰⁷ They stress the fact that cultural norms, beliefs, values, and ideas are internalized and once formed such institutions become entrenched (or institutionalized), allowing little room for acting outside the black box. This is problematic because it tends to stifle innovation or acceptance of new ideas.

Despite the different angles these definitions emphasize there are some common features or overlaps that bring these groups together. One is that the common purpose of institutions is to create a sense of continuity rather than change. For this reason, institutional continuity encourages and produces repetitive behavior, which ultimately affects the outcomes. Second, institutions (whether they be rules, values or

¹⁰⁴ James March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (Free Press), 1989; James March and Johan Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*, 78, 1984:734-49; James March and Johan Olsen, *Democratic Governance*, (Free Press), 1995

¹⁰⁵ North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 1990; Oliver Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996

¹⁰⁶ Lecours, 2005:10

¹⁰⁷ Richard W. Scott, *Institutions and Organizations* (Sage), 1989:21

organizations) are people-centered and people-oriented. They are intended to organize and regulate human behavior with a view of achieving some desired outcome.

It follows therefore that whatever angle one takes in defining and analyzing institutions it is impossible to ignore their connection with the people. For instance, those who look at institutions as rules conceptualize them in the context of how rules shape human behavior and their environment, while those who view institutions as organizations consider them as complete entities encompassing both the rules and the people that constitute them. Therefore, although coming from different entry points, both groups essentially look at people, the environment and the outcomes.

In this dissertation, unless otherwise indicated, institution means an organization. It refers to an entity comprising of people engaged in specialized yet interdependent activities¹⁰⁸ and, who have agreed to cooperate to accomplish a common goal.¹⁰⁹ And this institution is subject to the rules that give it its mandate and jurisdictional boundaries, prescribes its structure (e.g. the reporting hierarchy and resource requirements), and ultimately regulates the behavior of the people that constitute it. Although much of the literature on institutions portrays organizations as “passive, reacting entity entrapped or responding to

¹⁰⁸ Gortner, *et. al.*, *Organization Theory: A Public Perspective*, (The Dorsey Press), 1987:2

¹⁰⁹ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, (Harvard University Press), 1965; Gortner, *et. al.*, *Organization Theory*, 1987:2

coercive or cultural forces in its environment,” I take the view that organizations are active entities, comprising of “purposeful rational actors who are goal-oriented and in control of their own fate.”¹¹⁰ An organization is a place for collective action that may happen through bounded rationality, producing “institutions which in turn control and govern an organization’s actions.”¹¹¹ Thus, it is almost impossible to separate organizations from institutions, they tend to create and reproduce each other. For this reason, institution and organization will be used interchangeably here. However, for purposes of clarity, whenever reference is made to institutions as in rules, laws or statutes this will be stated explicitly as such.

How about capacity, how is this understood? *Capacity* also has various meanings: ranging from the notion of physical or mental *space to hold* or *accommodate* knowledge/something, to the *ability* to perform a duty/role, or as a *force* to induce a particular outcome.¹¹² In this study, *capacity* refers to an institution’s *ability* to effectively perform its functions and attain its goals. Capacity is considered as an enabling *force*¹¹³ that leads to particular desirable outcome. For our purposes, this latter definition is preferred because it operationalizes capacity as being a facilitator to achieving an outcome. It implies *having adequate* productive

¹¹⁰ Joseph Galaskiewicz, “Making Corporate Actors Accountable: Institutional Building in Minneapolis-St. Paul,” in: Powell and DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism*, 1991:293.

¹¹¹ Galaskiewicz, “Making Corporate Actors Accountable,” 1991:293

¹¹² These meanings are paraphrased from Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1993.

¹¹³ The word *force* as used here denotes those motivating elements that stimulate people to work as well as power relations between individuals, groups, or institutions – whose outcomes are usually dependent on the *type* and *quality* of resources at one’s disposal.

resources – (e.g. human, capital, technological resources and an enabling environment) – that are necessary for an organization to function effectively,¹¹⁴ which simply means that an organization has the *ability* to follow through its mission and achieve its goals.

However, in so far as capacity implies the *ability* or *effectiveness* in getting the expected result, measuring the final outcome also requires attention to *quality* as well as *quantity*. Just as absence of an outcome is an indicator of lack of capacity so too are poor or inferior outcomes; they also point in the same direction. For instance, it is better to have one good outcome than several outcomes of poor quality. For reason, no organization would qualify as having capacity if it produces poor outcomes. That by itself is an indicator of lack of capacity that would need to be addressed.

Similarly, attention to *quantity* and *quality* applies to resource *availability* too. When people talk about *adequate capacity* there is an implied assumption these resources are of good quality and in the right amounts needed for the job. Hence, *adequate capacity* implies *availability*, *quantity* and *quality* of that *ability*. Based on the strength of this assumption, rarely do people even care to specify what capacity means. In short therefore, capacity simply means *having adequate* and

¹¹⁴ Paul C. Nutt, *Making Tough Decisions: Tactics for Improving Managerial Decision-Making*, 1989; Victor A. Thompson, *Decision Theory, Pure and Applied*, 1971; Herbert A. Simon, *et. al.*, *Public Administration*, 1950

appropriate productive resources required to undertake a given task. And this is the working definition adopted in this study.

As can be seen from these explanations above capacity too (like institutions) has strong connections with the human factor; either as part of the capacity itself or as a resource at the center of organizing and utilizing other capacities (resources) to achieve a particular goal. Although capacity may be reduced to mean only what constitutes it (i.e. its inputs), at that level it remains only an abstract concept until it is attached to an outcome. In other words, the existence of capacity, be it at individual, group or national level, can only be confirmed when there is a product (outcome) to show for it. What do I mean by this?

For instance, if an organization has all the resources it needs to undertake a particular activity but fails to attain the anticipated outcomes, does it have the capacity or not? Asked differently, how do we know an organization has capacity? The best way is through its ability to achieve its goals. If an organization fails to achieve its goals that means there is a lack of capacity somewhere. And this may not be necessarily due to lack of resources (e.g. the quantity of its productive inputs) but probably be due to the type, or the environment is not conducive, or simply a lack managerial skills to put the available resources to good use. And because some of these aspects are embedded in other resources, they may not be easily identifiable and might be assumed as available, when in fact they are not, just because the resource they are

associated with is available. For example, if an organization has the required number of personnel as the organization structure prescribes one might assume there is adequate human resource capacity. Yet this might camouflage lack of managerial skills. This is a case in point in the Forest Department. Although its senior managers have more than the minimum professional qualifications¹¹⁵ required for these positions, all (but one senior manager with a Bachelor's degree) have Masters' degrees with over 8 years of field experience, yet the department's performance is way below the expected standards, suggesting that there is a managerial problem and not the quantity problem. Therefore, when analyzing capacity it is important that special attention is paid to these intricacies, which also tends to replay at national level as Bade Onimode (1988) and Nicholas Van de Walle (2001) have illustrated for Africa.¹¹⁶

As Christopher Clapham (2004) further explains, organizational failure is not necessarily due to lack of resources, sometimes productive resources might be available but that does not automatically translate into capacity. He points out that Africa, for instance, is highly endowed in natural resources yet it remains the least developed continent mainly due to poor leadership. Consequently, this has led to bad governance and poor political stewardship in most African states; with only a few exceptions such as Botswana, which at least has managed to use its

¹¹⁵ The minimum requirement is a Bachelor's degree.

¹¹⁶ Bade Onimode, *A Political Economy of the African Crisis*, (Zed Books: London), 1988; Nicholas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999* (Cambridge University Press), 2001

resources wisely to sustain both political and economic stability.¹¹⁷ In this case managerial and technical skills, integrity over public assets, etc. are just as important as other tangible resources. Therefore, whenever we discuss institutional capacity, it is important to put it into context. Capacity in and by itself is meaningless until measured in terms of outcomes, and as this will soon become evident, human intervention almost always is the defining factor. And this brings us back to the original question, what then is institutional capacity?

The Concept of Institutional Capacity

The literature on institutional capacity is rather sparse, and those who have done some work in this area don't seem to agree on one single definition.¹¹⁸ In general, institutional capacity refers to an organization's ability to do what it is designed to do. In the case of a government institution – the focus of this study – this means being able to formulate and successfully implement and evaluate government policies.

¹¹⁷ Christopher Clapham, "Global, Local Politics of State Decay," in: Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail*, 2004:89

¹¹⁸ For differences and overlaps on this topic, see Arturo Israel, *Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance*, (World Bank), 1987:117; Merilee S. Grindle, *Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa*, 1996:8; Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in: Peter Evans *et. al.* (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, 1985:15-18; Michael Bratton, "Peasant-State Relations in Post-Colonial Africa: Patterns of Engagement and Disengagement," in: Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, 1994:235; Peter B. Evans, "Transnational linkages and the Economic Role of the State," in: Evans, *et al.*(eds.) *Bringing the State Back In* (Oxford University Press), 1985:192; Goran Cars, *et. al.* (eds.), *Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux*, (Ashgate: Burlington, USA), 2002; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, *et. al.* (eds.), *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems*, (Earthscan Publications), 2002.

I define institutional capacity (IC) as *an organization's ability to create and sustain an environment and relationships that facilitate and support purposeful, collective action geared towards achieving its objectives.*¹¹⁹ I find this definition to be most appropriate in the sense that it encompasses key aspects of what constitutes *institution* and *capacity* that I talked about earlier. It also operationalizes the concept making it possible to assess and analyze how IC becomes a defining factor in institutional performance.

First and foremost, creating a productive environment starts with the availability of factors of production, *vis-à-vis*: human, capital,¹²⁰ infrastructural and technological resources¹²¹ as well as entrepreneurial skills. It is from these resources that an organization draws its strength to operate effectively. Second, it requires harnessing the skills of the social capital (employees) towards achieving an organization's objectives. In order to have a healthy and productive working environment people need to work cooperatively, both within and outside the organization, and that they are motivated to work towards a common goal, supported by the prevailing rules. Collective action is not something that creates itself; it comes from different levels of capacities and motivation such as management skills that create a sense of teamwork, individual choice to

¹¹⁹ This definition draws on different scholars' conception of IC, e.g. Christine Lambert and Nick Oatley, "Capacity and Planning for Growth," in: Goran Cars, *et. al.* (eds.) *Urban Governance*, 2002

¹²⁰ The human resource inherently covers technical knowledge and managerial expertise, whereas capital includes 'liquid' capital (e.g. funds) and 'physical' capital (land, machinery and infrastructure).

¹²¹ Merilee S. Grindle (ed.), *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey and Guildford: Surrey, UK), 1980:3-7

belong or self-interest propelled by anticipated gains from being involved in a particular activity. Hence, whatever angle is taken on IC, one fact remains intact: it is a bridge between the means and ends. It facilitates policy implementation. Put differently, when an institution has capacity it can be seen in its ability to plan and set goals, to create and sustain productive relationships,¹²² to solve problems and finally in its ability to achieve goals.¹²³

From an operational stand point IC can be broken down into three broad categories. The first represents the factors of production: human, capital, infrastructure, and technological resources; as basic *inputs* that any organization needs to function. The second relates to the rules that regulate human behavior both within and outside the organization. The third covers administrative competences of the staff to organize and utilize the other factors of production, and their ability to make decisions on what should or should not be done. It follows therefore, that an organization has capacity if it has these levels of capacities (inputs) that are considered essential for pursuing an organization's mandate.¹²⁴

As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that the presence of capacity (i.e. the availability of resources) does not automatically guarantee effectiveness in attainment of goals. Other parameters come to

¹²² Lambert and Oatley, "Capacity and Planning for Growth," in: Goran Cars, *et. al.* (eds.) *Urban Governance*, 2002:126-27

¹²³ Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, *et. al.* (eds.), *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems* (Earthscan: London), 2002:8

¹²⁴ Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation*, (University of California Press), 1973

bear, and these relate mainly to staff competences. For instance, how effective are managers (or supervisors) in organizing and utilizing the other resources under their jurisdictions? How well connected is the head of the organization to the political powerhouse – in or outside that organization?¹²⁵ Do all employees understand their role in achieving the organization's objectives? These and other managerial and political abilities are extremely important in pursuing an organization's mission. As Lambert and Oatley remind us, those who are “well connected and well informed” are able to mobilize quickly and capture the opportunities.¹²⁶ And the opposite is just as true for those who are not politically agile.

The Forestry Department provides an excellent example. Although the department oversees a sector from where more than 80% of the Zambian population derives its energy needs, senior managers have not marketed the department to policy makers and elected officials in a manner that highlights this and several other aspects of national importance. Consequently, the department hardly exists in the policy arena. This stands in contrast with previous forest managers who marketed the department as a backbone to copper mining, which depended on wood energy for its smelter plants. Naturally, government paid high priority to the department until some mines switched to electric power, which somehow weakened the marriage between forestry

¹²⁵ Lambert and Oatley, “Capacity and Planning for Growth,” 2002:126-27

¹²⁶ Lambert and Oatley, “Capacity and Planning for Growth,” 2002:126-27

and copper mining. The point I'm making is that what determines the effectiveness of an organization is not necessarily the *availability* of factors of production, although this is clearly essential. What is more important is the *ability* of its managers (or staff in general) to *mobilize* (organize) and *utilize* (allocate) those resources in a way that leads to accomplishment of an organization's goals.

An organization may have the resources but if it lacks the administrative competence to utilize them it would be as good as not having those resources. For this reason IC should be considered as a cocktail of capacities, representing both tangible and intangible inputs. It reflects an organization's ability to effectively *mobilize* and *utilize* these capacities, with managerial and political abilities being key ingredients in the policy implementation process. Expressed differently, capacity exists if an organization has these ingredients that are considered essential for policy implementation.¹²⁷ In short, institutional capacity boils down to the administrative competences of an institution to pursue its goals. Therefore, in analyzing the Forest Department's institutional capacity to effectively manage its estates, I rely and draw upon these benchmarks discussed above.

¹²⁷ Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation*, (University of California Press), 1973

The Importance of Institutional Capacity

Why should we study institutional capacity? What benefits or additions will this bring to the scholastic menu? One good reason is that IC is both the fuel and engine that propels action in any organization. Studying IC helps us to understand why some institutions perform better than others. This is especially valuable and timely for those interested in the Third World economic development dilemma.

In particular, if one takes the policy implementation framework to be schematically represented as an *input-output-outcome-impacts* process, clearly, the *inputs* in this equation represent institutional capacity. And it is these inputs that facilitate policy implementation, and therefore tends to determine policy failure or success depending on how they are utilized. An inquiry into the IC of Third World governments allows us to start addressing the problem of policy failure from the first portion of the policy implementation framework, instead of focusing on the *effects* of policy outcomes. As Arturo Israel (1987) and Peter Evans (1985) remind us weak state capacities, especially in the developing countries, has been a defining factor on how they have performed administratively, economically and politically.¹²⁸ The economic turn around and the ensuing economic boom that some East Asian countries have experienced in the recent past confirm this reality. As Robert Wade (1990) explains, government leadership through targeted investment

¹²⁸ Israel, 1987; Peter Evans, "Transnational linkages and the Economic Role of the State," 1985

accelerated development in these East Asian countries. Hence, government leadership, which promoted certain activities before others should be considered an important “variable, not a constant.”¹²⁹ And many lessons abound in the global arena. The gap between rich and poor countries, which has also continued to grow wider, can easily be explained by the differences in the IC of their governments.¹³⁰ However, the best way to confirm or refute such speculations is through evidence-based research as this study does. And Israel also notes:

“When that [*institutional*] capacity is particularly weak, as in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, the real choices are quite dramatic – but the choices become apparent only after a detailed analysis of the institutional capacity, and such analysis is seldom made.”¹³¹ (text in italics is my emphasis).

But analyses on institutional capacity need not be scarce because this is the only way to see if an organization is able to achieve its goals. Therefore, when evaluating a country’s economic performance or its [in]ability to execute specific programs, such work ought to take into account state capacity¹³² because a country’s “pattern of strengths and weaknesses” is not the same for all policies.¹³³ And this scenario repeats

¹²⁹ Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*, (Princeton University Press), 1990:5-6

¹³⁰ Israel, 1987:119-120; Evans, “Transnational linkages,” 1985:192-226

¹³¹ Israel, 1987:119-120

¹³² Skocpol, 1985; Migdal, *et. al.* 1994; Evans, 1995; Grindle, 1999; Migdal, 1988 and 2001

¹³³ Skocpol, 1985:17, quoting Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, p. 58

itself at agency level too.¹³⁴ The point I'm trying to make is that institutional capacity should be considered as an important variable in explaining performance, and its use should be "optimized" for future program design and implementation.¹³⁵

I begin by acknowledging that organizations are created for a particular purpose.¹³⁶ To accomplish its mission an organization requires a certain type and quantity of resources.¹³⁷ Therefore, assessing an institution's capacity would help to establish whether or not that institution is capable of realizing its mandate.¹³⁸ Yet despite this straightforward sketch of what IC entails and why it is important to study it, it seems there is no agreement on its definition, and consequently this has implications on how its connection to outcomes are analyzed and explained.

Grindle (1996) defines institutional capacity as the presence of rules to "regulate economic and political interactions" of a nation i.e. "the ability to assert the primacy of national policies, legal conventions, and norms of social and political behavior over those of other groupings."¹³⁹ She differentiates institutional capacity from the other forms of

¹³⁴ Grindle, 1980:10

¹³⁵ Israel, 1987:119

¹³⁶ Litterer, 1980:110; Florence Heffron, *Organization Theory and Public Organizations*, 1989:2; Harold F. Gortner, *Organization Theory: A Public Perspective*, 1987:2-5; Weber, 1987; William G. Scott and Terence R. Mitchell, *Organization Theory: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis*, 1972:37; R.M. Cyert and J.G. March, "A Behavioral Theory of Organizational Objectives," in: Litterer Joseph (ed.) *Organizations*, 1980:419; Harold Gortner, *Administration in the Public Sector*, 1977:4

¹³⁷ Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Study of Organizations*, (Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, California), 1980:81

¹³⁸ Aaron Wildavsky, "The Self-Evaluating Organization," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 32, Sept-Oct 1972, pp509-20

¹³⁹ Grindle, 1996:8

capacities, namely: technical, administrative, and political.¹⁴⁰ Grindle highlights the fact that capacity entails *having* the resources as well as the *ability* to use them. However, Grindle does not say what these resources are. For Michael Bratton (1994) “capacity exists when an organization possesses the full range of resources – human, financial, material, coercive [*power*], and symbolic [*recognition*]¹⁴¹ – that are required for the implementers to get things done.”¹⁴² Bratton’s argument is that unless these resources are available there is not much an organization can achieve. On the other hand, Israel (1987) views institutional capacity from a technical and administrative skills perspective. He is especially concerned with the human component and specifically advocates special investment in human resources because “...human resources are more important to development than natural resources or technology.”¹⁴³ In this respect, Israel is in agreement with the extensive literature on organization management, which argues that people are the primary building blocks of any organization.¹⁴⁴ According to Israel institutional capacity is a scarce resource and therefore needs special attention.

¹⁴⁰ Grindle, 1996:8

¹⁴¹ The italic emphasis in this statement is my addition.

¹⁴² Michael Bratton, “Peasant-State Relations in Post-Colonial Africa: Patterns of Engagement and Disengagement,” in: Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994:235

¹⁴³ Israel, 1987:117

¹⁴⁴ For details on this issue, see two pioneers on organization management: Max Weber, and Frederick Taylor. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, (Oxford University Press, New York) A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, trans and eds., 1947:333-334; Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in: Shafritz and Hyde (eds.) *Classics of Public Administration*, (The Dorsey Press: Chicago, Il.), 1987 [original work 1922]; Frederick W. Taylor, “The Principles of Scientific Management.”

“Institutional capabilities are not only one of the most important resources for development, but also one of the most scarce, if not the scarcest. It should be explicitly considered a separate resource in the design of development strategies.”¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, Israel argues that because IC is scarce, this in itself should provide a new perspective why its use should be optimized.¹⁴⁶

But Skocpol (1985), Migdal (1988; 1994) and Evans (1985) view IC from a political angle. They emphasize the state’s political ability to effectively use the resources at its disposal to get things done.¹⁴⁷

Skocpol (1985) specifically defines capacity as the means “to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socio-economic circumstances.”¹⁴⁸ But capacity need not be appreciated only when there is some form of opposition as Skocpol seems to suggest. In my view, being able to get things done even when there is no opposition on an issue also reflects capacity.

For Migdal (1988), state capabilities “include capacities to *penetrate* society, *regulate* social relationships, *extract* resources, and

¹⁴⁵ Israel, 1987:117; 119

¹⁴⁶ Israel, 1987:117; 119

¹⁴⁷ Theda Skocpol, 1985; Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, 1988; Joel Migdal, “The State in Society: An approach to Struggles for Domination,” in: Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds.) *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994; Peter Evans, 1985

¹⁴⁸ Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” 1985:9

appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”¹⁴⁹ Peter Evans (1985), on the other hand, understands the “classic locus of state power” as being its ability to regulate relations with the outside world.¹⁵⁰ Evans is more concerned with the state’s capability to handle trans-national challenges than internal matters.

The current schools of thought take institutional capacity to mean a state’s ability to govern. In this group, they too take availability of resources for granted and instead focus on creation and sustaining relations and environments that support achievement of goals.¹⁵¹ They argue that having the resources without the skills to motivate people to cooperate and work towards achieving a common goal is as good as not having those productive resources.¹⁵² Sociologists and economists are particularly strong on this type of characterization. They point out that outcomes are a product of both the choices people make as well as the relations they create in working towards a common goal or for self-gain, as in the case of economists and rational choice theorists.¹⁵³

Another level of capacity is identified as relating to the institutions (rules, laws, norms) that shape human behavior. Economists, psychologists and even sociologists define capacity as something

¹⁴⁹ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 1988:4

¹⁵⁰ Evans, “Transnational linkages and the Economic Role of the State,” 1985:192

¹⁵¹ See for instance, Goran Cars, et. al., *Urban Governance*, 2002

¹⁵² See also Stephen Browne (ed.), *Developing Capacity through Technical Cooperation* (Earthscan Publications), 2002; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., (eds.), *Capacity for Development*, 2002

¹⁵³ Fritz W. Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play*, 1997; For a detailed account of these views, see also Powell and DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, 1991; André Lecours, *New Institutionalism*, 2005:6-11

embedded in the rules that regulate human behavior.¹⁵⁴ In their view, not only do rules shape human behavior, they also limit the choices available to the people too!¹⁵⁵ This line of argument runs deeply in Douglass North's renditions. Because rules have potential to facilitate or inhibit resource availability, this means that rules ultimately influence the final outcomes. They further argue that institutions also demarcate boundaries on what can and cannot be done and consequently tend to influence how people operate and what resources they can tap into. Therefore, when evaluating the performance of any organization rules have a central role in shaping not only people's behavior but how much of each resource an organization can have at any given time. But Douglass North is quick to acknowledge and point out that people do ultimately influence the outcomes because "they define and enforce the economic rules."¹⁵⁶

Mustapha Nabli (1998) also agrees with this line of argument and advises that for this reason those dealing with institutions need to provide a clear definition of what they mean by institution. Specifically, Nabli argues that there is need to make a distinction between

¹⁵⁴ North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 2002; Oliver Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996; Powell and DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, 1991

¹⁵⁵ North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 2002; Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996:325-26

¹⁵⁶ North, "Economic Performance Through Time," 1994:366, *American Economic Review*, 84 (June):359-68.

institutions and policies and how to measure their impact on outcomes.¹⁵⁷

“Whether one uses a restrictive definition of institutions, such as “formal and informal rules that constrain behavior” or a more extensive one, such as argued by Jeffrey Nugent, the distinction has to be clearly kept in mind.”¹⁵⁸

According to Nugent, quoted in Picciotto and Wiesner (1998), an institution is a set of constraints that governs the behavioral relations among individuals and groups”.¹⁵⁹ In this context, therefore, most organizations are institutions because they provide rules that shape and govern the relationships between their members and non-members. Furthermore, it is important to differentiate between how rules apply in an individual institution (institutional arrangement) and to a set of other institutions in which the institutional arrangement is embedded (the institutional structure).¹⁶⁰

For instance, rules prescribe the size of organization, such as how many employees an organization may have and what other resources would be at its disposal. Depending on the circumstances, such prescriptions may become limitations and probably work against the survival of an organization or its desire to try new ways of doing things.

¹⁵⁷ Mustapha K. Nabli, “Comments on Institutions, Policies and Development Outcomes” by Chhiber, in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and Development: The Institutional Dimension*, 1998:50.

¹⁵⁸ Mustapha K. Nabli, “Comments on Institutions,” in: Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and Development*, 1998:50.

¹⁵⁹ Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and Development*, 1998:9.

¹⁶⁰ Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and Development*, 1998:9

This is especially true for a public institution like FD which is restricted to follow prescribed procedures. Unlike in a private company where owners can make changes anytime as circumstances dictate, FD does not have this flexibility. As a public institution it is bound to follow established standards of doing things.

For instance, its managers cannot alter the labor force requirements even though particular categories of staff may or may not be needed. This can only be done after such clearance is granted from Personnel Division at Cabinet Office. And neither can the department change the way it issues licenses until Parliament gives that approval. And for each of these actions there is a process to be followed that is also governed by its own rules. Thus, when evaluating the performance of public institutions it is important to factor in these institutionalized standards that quite often cause public organizations to be slow in the way they respond to various situations.

For whatever this is worth, advocates argue that observance of such procedures are not meant to cause delay but to create transparency, accountability, and more importantly to protect employees and civil society at large from abuse of power from those who may be privileged to hold such offices. If the recent fiasco at the World Bank involving its President, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, over his girlfriend's (Shaha Ali

Riza) pay¹⁶¹ has anything we can learn, I am persuaded to think that the advocates for adherence to rules and procedures have something in their favor. As Murray Waas points out, “Had the bank's board adhered to its ordinary rules, as Riza was shifted over to the State Department, she should have only been eligible for a raise of about \$20,000. Instead she was given a raise of \$47,340, whereupon her salary became \$180,000. Then last year, she received yet *another* raise which brought her salary to \$193,950. That salary increase not only meant that Riza earned more than Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, but apparently made her the single highest paid State Department official.”¹⁶²

Looking at the role of institutions, Oliver Williamson (1996) takes the topic to another level arguing that rules tend to influence capacity by creating transaction costs, which stop or prompt people from responding in a certain way. As rational creatures, people evaluate their choices using a cost-benefit scale. Before taking a particular course of action, they weigh their options against the transaction costs and this has implications the type of choices taken and eventually on the final outcomes. Of course, unlike in the economic perspective where this sort of calculation is mainly from a monetary point of view, in the political and policy arenas this quite often includes *moral* considerations as part

¹⁶¹ Karen De Young and Krissah Williams, “Wolfowitz Dictated Girlfriend’s Pay Deal,” *Washington Post Newspaper*, April 14, 2007, page A01; and Murray Waas, “Favoritism Shown Towards Wolfowitz’s Girlfriend” in *The Huffington Post* at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/murray-waas/favoritism-shown-towards_b_45038.html

¹⁶²

of the cost-benefit consideration, and the concern revolves around the impact of the outcome and who would be affected positively or negatively. As Deborah Stone (1997) puts it these considerations have no easy solutions: policy interventions and rules almost always tend to draw boundaries by permitting some aspects and excluding others, in which case they become exclusionary.¹⁶³ Similarly, public programs are analyzed in the same way such that an agency whose program intervention promises the highest positive impact is usually looked upon favorably.

The Forestry Department provides a good example of how these considerations play out in the real world. Because the effects of poor forest management are not usually immediate or as obvious as the ones from agriculture (e.g. food shortage due to drought) or health (due to disease outbreak), forestry hardly takes any front seats in the policy arena. It is not considered as important as agriculture or health. Thus, when central government shares the national cake, the Forestry Department is one among the least funded agencies.¹⁶⁴ I return to discuss these issues in greater detail later on in Chapter 5 and 6. The point I'm trying to make here is that even at central government level cost-benefit considerations are a key factor in deciding what bureau gets the most support.

¹⁶³ Deborah Stone, *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making* (WW Norton & Company: NY), 1997: Part II (Goals) and IV (Solutions).

¹⁶⁴ Jones S. Akapelwa, "Forestry Policies of Selected Countries in Africa," in: FAO, *Paper No. 132*, 1996:527-546.

Douglass North (2002) concurs with Oliver Williamson (1996) and notes that even without the issue of transaction costs, political and economic institutions (rules) in and by themselves do set the parameters for what is permissible, and this makes people to react in a certain way and therefore shape the way people behave and make choices. Clearly, rules and individual choices are important determinants of the effectiveness of organizations. They argue that governance, including economic, social and political behaviors are shaped not only by choices people make but more importantly by the rules that create the environment to which people respond.¹⁶⁵ In other words, institutions do facilitate or inhibit the way people operate, and by extension the outcomes.

But the rational-actor and public choice theorists take a slightly different view, highlighting the fact that actually it is the people who create such environments through their opportunistic, self-interested tendencies. They argue that people develop institutions that can yield what they desire. And it doesn't matter whether this is at individual or national level or for public or private gain. The motive remains the same. These individual choices have an enormous impact on the institutions that eventually get created. Therefore, it is erroneous to portray institutions as creating the environment that people eventually respond

¹⁶⁵ North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 2002; Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996; Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation & Development: The Institutional Dimension*, 1998; .

to. Instead, it should be the other way round: people create their own environment and by extension determine their fate.

The new sociological institutionalists take issue with this characterization.¹⁶⁶ Arguing against some institutional economists and public choice theorists that posit that people “construct the institutions that achieve the outcomes they desire,”¹⁶⁷ Powell & DiMaggio concur with Douglass North (1990) and Oliver Williamson (1996) and note that the opposite is what happens: institutions force people to adapt and behave in a particular manner, not vice versa. Although Powell and DiMaggio acknowledge “individuals’ attributes or motives” as factors in the larger equation, they still reject the rational-actor models arguing that institutions must be taken as “independent variables”¹⁶⁸ to which people respond.

Like Douglass North (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991) see institutionalism (e.g. institutionalized norms, beliefs, standards, etc.) as being potentially powerful in creating certain social relationships and actions, which over time comes to be taken for granted. For this reason, they see the public choice, rational-actor, and self-interest theories as being wrapped wrongly. In their view, institutions have a stronger impact on the people than people do on the institutions. “In the sociological tradition, institutionalization is both a ‘phenomenological process’ by

¹⁶⁶ Powell & DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, 1991.

¹⁶⁷ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:9

¹⁶⁸ Powell & DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, 1991:8

which certain social relationships and actions come to be taken for granted” as well as a “state of affairs in which shared cognitions define what has meaning and what actions are possible.”¹⁶⁹ Powell & DiMaggio (1991) further note that:

“Institutionalized arrangements are reproduced because individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives (or because they regard as unrealistic the alternatives they imagine). Institutions do not just constrain options: they establish the criteria by which people discover their preferences. In other words, some of the very sunk costs are cognitive.”¹⁷⁰

Powell and DiMaggio (1991) further explain that this type of assumption jumps the boat in that some institutional economists and public choice theorists rarely ask “where the preferences come from” and most likely do not even consider “feedback mechanisms between interests and institutions.”¹⁷¹ To drive their point home Powell and DiMaggio (1991) ask the question: “Do institutions reflect preferences of individuals or corporate actors, or do they represent collective outcomes that are not the simple sum of individual interests?”¹⁷² In their view, there is no cut and dry response to this question due to various reasons. One is that individuals cannot choose their options outside the accepted

¹⁶⁹ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:10-11

¹⁷⁰ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:11

¹⁷¹ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:9

¹⁷² Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:9

“institutions, customs, social norms or legal procedures”.¹⁷³ People are confined (and in a way forced) to follow institutionalized standards. For example, “one cannot decide to divorce in a new manner” outside the institutionalized procedures. The other is that individual choices mirror the “cultural and historical frameworks in which they are embedded.”¹⁷⁴

Although Powell and DiMaggio (1991) agree with economic and public choice theorists that people’s options are constrained by “sunk costs in existing arrangements” and “technical interdependence” that are partly responsible for creating institutional inertial and sometimes yielding “unintended effects”, they however still maintain their ground arguing that the thrust of this argument still remains the same: it is meant to convey the idea that institutional arrangements are a product of “opportunism, imperfect or asymmetric information, and costly monitoring” mechanisms.¹⁷⁵

Another consideration relates to autonomy, plasticity, and efficiency of institutions as well as response to change – the question of which has the most influence over the other; is it the institutions or the people? Powell and DiMaggio point out that institutions have a greater impact on the people because they are not easily malleable,¹⁷⁶ and they find alliances on this point from some political science and economic

¹⁷³ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:10

¹⁷⁴ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:10

¹⁷⁵ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:9-10

¹⁷⁶ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:10

institutionalists too.¹⁷⁷ Shepsle (1986, 1989), in particular, agrees to this view and gives an example of political institutions that are wired in such a way that it is not easy to change them, starting with the constitution. Instead, elected officials must adapt to those institutions if they have to make any progress. Economists, Nelson and Winter (1982), also agree with this view and single out the role of rules, norms, and culture in organizational change. Furthermore, Powell and DiMaggio emphasize that not only do institutional arrangements restrict individual behavior by rendering some options unviable, or simply prohibiting certain actions all together, but more importantly these constraints also restrain certain “patterns of resource allocation.”¹⁷⁸ As I have pointed out earlier, the point to note from these arguments is that any action that affects resource availability and allocation will ultimately affect capacity, performance and finally the outcomes.

In fact, when discussing capacity, individual preferences and economic development in general, Amartya Sen (1999) brings out one interesting point; he notes that institutionalism and individual choice or “freedom of choice” actually tend to be at each other’s throats, particularly in this era of modernity. According to him when societies embrace a “freedom-oriented perspective” people essentially strive for the

¹⁷⁷ For more details on this see Kenneth Shepsle, “Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions,” in: H. Weisburg (ed.), *Political Science: The Science of Politics*, (Agathon: NY), 1986:51-82; Kenneth Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1989, 1:131-47; Richard Nelson & Sidney Winter, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change*, (Harvard University Press) 1982.

¹⁷⁸ Powell & DiMaggio, 1991:10

liberty “to participate in deciding what traditions to observe” and don’t want any restrictions to be imposed by the institutions, national or local “guardians”, the “ayatollahs (or any religious authorities)”, political rulers, and not even by “cultural experts” be they local or foreign.¹⁷⁹ However, what this freedom generates is a struggle and conflict in deciding whether to preserve and what traditions should be preserved versus embracing the advantages of modernity.¹⁸⁰ And there are no easy solutions to these choices or considerations. Instead, they are or become real challenges for many organizations, especially those wanting to try new ways of doing things.

The US experience on “reinventing government” during Bill Clinton’s administration, over which Vice President Al Gore presided, stands as a good example.¹⁸¹ With respect to our case study, decentralization of the Forest Department’s operations whereby provincial forest offices are supposed to fall under the local government jurisdiction in their respective provinces and districts has always failed because FD Headquarters has always been uncomfortable relinquishing their control and power over the provincial offices.

As the “power to people” movement has taken a stronger voice all across the nation, as part of a process of implementing the

¹⁷⁹ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 1999:32

¹⁸⁰ Sen, *Development as Freedom*, 1999:32

¹⁸¹ Donald F. Kettl, *et. al.*, *Civil Reform: Building a Government that Works*, (Brookings Institution Press), 1996; Donald F. Kettl, *The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation of Governance*. (Brookings Institution Press), 2000.

Decentralization Policy, all Provincial Forest Offices now fall under their respective provincial jurisdictions. However, their linkage to central government still remains through Forestry Department Headquarters rather than their Provincial Permanent Secretary's office. In other words, Provincial officers have to report to two offices – FD Headquarters and Provincial Permanent Secretary (PS). But since their funding now comes through the Provincial PS's office, their relationship with FD HQ is slowly becoming weaker, and there is no motivation for them to report to FD HQ since the FD is not responsible for their budgets.

Indeed, all the issues raised in the foregoing arguments are quite pertinent, especially to public organizations where their employees are expected to follow existing procedures, almost to the letter. And yet in their daily activities these public employees do have some level of autonomy and freedom to decide on what is the best course of action, which might include whether to adhere to the established 'standards' and 'traditions' or to try something new. In my view, this is where the response to the question what impacts the other most would simply be, "it depends" on the timeframe and possibly the prevailing circumstances. By timeframe I mean the point being evaluated.

For instance, is it at a time when the institutions are being developed or are they already in existence? If they are just being created, the architects of such institutions will definitely try to cater for their self-interests – whatever purpose they envision to achieve. This is the point at

which rational-actor and public choice theorists are discussing. However, if these institutions are already in existence, people would have reacted to them over time, and established some sort of 'tradition' on what values, standards, norms, etc. that such institutions have helped to create and society has chosen to preserve them. Over time those standards, norms or expectations become institutionalized. This is the point where sociological conceptions (and others who think institutions impact people more) are taking place. In short, both groups have something to offer.

For capacity building specialists, institutional capacity is almost synonymous to good governance¹⁸² whose general indicators include having a representative government¹⁸³ that arise through democratic means (e.g. competitive elections); a transparent government free of corruption¹⁸⁴ that is accountable and efficient in its use of public resources; has a free judiciary, practices fairness and the rule of law, and upholds human rights¹⁸⁵. As a performance indicator, adherence to good governance (GG) is expected to ensure that government institutions are efficient and effective in serving civil society; meaning that they ought to

¹⁸² Lester M. Salamon (ed.), *The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance*, (2002).

¹⁸³ Jane Mansbridge, "Rethinking Representation," *American Political Science Review*, 2003, Vol. 97, No. 4, pp515-528

¹⁸⁴ Corruption is defined as the abuse of public authority or trust for private benefit. Corruption breeds in an environment characterized by poor governance.

¹⁸⁵ IMF, *Good Governance: The IMF's Role*. Washington D. C.

have a vision and goals to work towards, and be accountable to the people in delivering public goods.¹⁸⁶

However, Kettl (2000) quickly cautions that government institutions may not achieve this level of effective delivery systems until they orient themselves to a market economy in which chief executives of government agencies are rewarded just like their counterparts in the private sector. This would act as an incentive for them to work hard and be innovative in their service delivery.¹⁸⁷ By extension this would ensure that GG flourishes.¹⁸⁸ The problem with this incentive strategy is that rewarding the top tier only and leaving out the people below those ranks would clearly de-motivate the very people who are policy implementers. According to our survey results, the Forestry Department currently has a highly de-motivated workforce partly because their counterparts in other agencies e.g. in the Department of Agriculture are on higher salary scales than forestry personnel although they have similar workloads. Having been short-changed in this way, forestry personnel are not motivated to work hard. As can be expected this is having a toll on their department's overall performance.

¹⁸⁶ Donald Kettl, *The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation of Governance* (Brookings Institution Press), 2000:7

¹⁸⁷ A word of caution is appropriate here. Social service delivery, generally an indicator of an effective government and benefits from economic growth, is easy for developed countries which have the resources and infrastructure to do this. But for developing countries this is a huge challenge because of outside pressures particularly from International Financial Institutions (IFI) which finance implementation of their strategies, and therefore Third World countries have to follow IFI's prescriptions, most of which are moving targets (see Kettl, 2000:7).

¹⁸⁸ Kettl, 2000:7

According to the IMF, their view of GG concentrates on those aspects of governance that contribute to creating a stable macroeconomic environment that supports efficient private sector activities. It is from this perspective that the IMF/Bank uses GG as a surveillance tool to monitor success of the programs they have financed. But GG is as problematic to define as it is to measure simply because it is loaded with concepts such as democracy that have no single definition.¹⁸⁹ Even accountability is not easily agreed upon depending on what aspects one emphasizes. And neither have the IMF and the Bank, the strongest advocates for GG surveillance, provided any measurable indicators of these requirements thus leaving this issue open for anyone to set their own criteria and targets. This is where the GG concept starts to unravel. Accordingly, instead of being useful for capacity building GG, in fact, continues to attract suspicion and resentment from Third World governments who see the IMF and the Bank as overstepping their jurisdictional boundaries as project financiers to becoming political surveillance institutions. Except for the IMF and the World Bank who insist on GG as a measure of institutional capacity, its use as an analytical tool has not yet permeated the mainstream research arena.

¹⁸⁹ Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 1971:1-9; Jean-Germain Gros, "Introduction: Understanding democratization," in: Gros (ed.) *Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century Africa-Coping with uncertainty*. Greenwood Press: Westport, CT 1998; Goran Hyden, "Academic Freedom in Africa: A Right Long Overlooked," in: Cohen, Hyden and Nagan (Eds.) *Human Rights and Governance in Africa* (University Press of Florida), 1993: 256-257.

In another arena, management scholars and practitioners define institutions from two angles: first, as an entity (with structure shaped by its mandate and job positions) and second, as a system in which human interactions and resource allocation takes place. Their concern is on how to harness these interactions to promote good working relations that would eventually lead to high productivity.

In recent years, practitioners have taken transparency, accountability and good governance as new measures of productivity and effectiveness. That is to say, how open is the public entity to outside and inside oversight (audit); how good is the system at service delivery; and is that organization responding to people's needs in a fair and effective manner? Hence, capacity building has become an operative song. But a word of caution is appropriate here. When some practitioners talk about capacity building they tend to imply building *technical skills* that would ultimately lead to or enhance accountability and good governance¹⁹⁰ rather than the general view this dissertation has taken for which capacity improvement means making available the necessary productive resources, including technical skills.

As the above literature suggests, there are numerous conceptions and definitions of institutions. However, whether one looks at institutions from a materialist, rules or values (principles) perspective,

¹⁹⁰ Fukuda-Parr, *et. al.*, *Capacity for Development*, 2002; Patsy Healy, *et. al.*, "Transforming Governance, Institutional Analysis and Institutional Capacity," in: Goran Cars, *et.al.*, *Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux*, 2002:12-15.

the arguments converge on one point that: institutions shape behavior and influence the actions people take. People are motivated or constrained in one way or another by these institutions.¹⁹¹ Furthermore, despite how differently institutional capacity is different, it also converges on one theme: that capacity deals with “how implementation is achieved.”¹⁹² And this is the theme this dissertation draws its strength from.

As the foregoing discussion shows, the concept of institutional capacity is not new. The only difference is how it is labeled. Skocpol¹⁹³ labels it as *state capacity*, Stepan¹⁹⁴ and Shue¹⁹⁵ call it *state power*, while Migdal¹⁹⁶ sees it as *state authority / domination* or in a more general way as *state-society relations*.¹⁹⁷ For example, Skocpol (1985) claims that the state has control over policy, underscoring the fact that state capacity matters in national development.¹⁹⁸ Stepan (1985) and Shue (1994) follow a similar angle but emphasize social power, showing that state power is not cast in steel but that it is a shifting target constantly

¹⁹¹ North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 2002; Oliver Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996; Sen, Amartya *Development as Freedom*, 1999

¹⁹² Bratton, 1994:236

¹⁹³ Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In,” 1985:15-18

¹⁹⁴ Alfred Stepan, “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America,” in: Peter Evans, *et. al.* (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, 1985:318

¹⁹⁵ Vivienne Shue, “State Power and Social Organization in China,” in: Joel Migdal, *et al.*, (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994

¹⁹⁶ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 1988; Joel Migdal, “The State in Society: An approach to Struggles for Domination,” in: Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994:11-12;

¹⁹⁷ Joel Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, 2001

¹⁹⁸ Skocpol, 1985: 9-11; 15-18

redefined by social forces.¹⁹⁹ Migdal too walks the thin line on state-society relationships to show how state and society impact each other to shape a nation's socio-economic choices.²⁰⁰ The general theme is that the state and society both play a role in a nation's development process, and that quite often each group has its own priorities at any given time. For this reason, some form of compromise between state and society is always necessary. Therefore, success with any government policy depends on the level of support government receives from society. And this is where state capacity to solicit cooperation from civil society comes into play.

Clearly, Skocpol (1985), Migdal (1988; 1994) and Evans (1985) assume the resources exist and only care about how they are used. They view capacity from a functional role of putting resources to use and not from an *input* side that looks at *what* type of capacities exist. And their view generally resonates with the underlying assumptions found in the economic, management and administration literature. This, however, is the point of departure between their work and this study, which does not take resource availability for granted. Instead, we try to establish, starting at the *input* side, if the Forestry Department in Zambia had the capacity to design and implement government policy. The department's ability to design policy and programs it can effectively implement would

¹⁹⁹ Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society"; Vivienne Shue, "State Power and Social Organization in China," in: Migdal, *et al.*, (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994

²⁰⁰ Migdal, 1994; 2001

be a good indicator of both its leadership and managerial capacity. Since IC drives policy implementation and by implication determines policy outcomes, an assessment of the department's capacity will make it possible to see which type of capacities are lacking and how this has affected the department's performance. In a way this might also help us understand the sector's [poor] contribution to the national economy, which ranges between 0.02 to 0.09% of GDP.²⁰¹ Therefore, unless we find out what capacities exist or are lacking in the department, any strategies to fix the department's poor performance will at best be speculative in nature. Solving this problem is most likely going to resolve the larger question too on why the sector contributes minimally to the national economy. Indeed, on a wider scale, investigations into the institutional capacity of nations are just as worthwhile if we can link a nation's ability to successfully implement programs that propel it to economic development.²⁰²

Yet, as Israel explains, not many people are keen to take on this challenge. Researchers find institutional capacity a messy area and therefore unattractive to delve into. Neither management science nor development administration can easily be applied, especially to the problems of developing countries.²⁰³

²⁰¹ Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, [1965 to 2005]

²⁰² Peter Evans, "Transnational linkages and the Economic Role of the State," in: *Bringing the State Back In* 1985:192-226

²⁰³ Israel, 1987:1-7

“Institutional weakness is considered to be one of those problems about which not much can be done. Until recently many practitioners had given up trying. Instead, they suggested intensifying on other factors – investments, education, even cultural change – to see whether these troublesome institutional weaknesses could be overcome or bypassed, or whether institutions might solve the problem by themselves. Other specialists have adopted an intellectually elegant form of escapism; they ignore those aspects of the development process, such as institutional issues, that cannot be nicely quantified and concentrate on those that can be analyzed through equations.”²⁰⁴

Furthermore, Israel explains that the field of “development theory and practice” has been dominated by economists who have placed emphasis on “resource allocation and allocative efficiency” rather than “on the most effective ways” of *using* the available resources.²⁰⁵ In addition, even development strategies focus on planning and appraisal instead of implementation²⁰⁶.

But, as reality on Third World development issues shows, none of the above reasons offers a solution. Therefore, it is not right to succumb to escapism. Careful diagnosis of policy failure is important if the right treatment is to be prescribed for any ailing economy.²⁰⁷ And taking institutional capacity for granted is definitely not the best option either.

Although the aforementioned scholars have addressed the general theoretical question, “why some governments are more effective in their

²⁰⁴ Israel, 1987:2-3

²⁰⁵ Israel, 1987:3

²⁰⁶ Israel, 1987:3

²⁰⁷ Dixon and Powell, 1979:7-10

roles than others,” and agree that state capacity matters in shaping the socio-economic status of a nation,²⁰⁸ their perspective has generally looked at this question from a political stand point as in *state-society relationships* that tend to influence policy implementation rather than from an administrative perspective. They gloss over the issue of IC, which apparently they take for granted. Instead, they focus on *how* state capacity or social forces shape policy outcomes; and do not tell us *what* these states and social actors have that allows them do what they do. In other words, the question that needs attention is: what makes state-society capacities and their relationships with civil society work or fail to achieve policy objectives across nations? Is this due to their political systems, [in]ability to use the resources at their disposal, or simply lack of resources? Whichever route is taken is likely to circle back to the issue of capacity because organizations “have real limits” in what they can and cannot do.²⁰⁹ Knowing *what* the state-society actors have (an issue not addressed by these scholars) and how these resources are utilized is one of the core themes this study addresses. In fact, this is one of the contributions this study brings to the table in the way institutional capacity should be assessed and understood.

The *limits* of state power on society or society’s influence over the state can be linked to the resources at their disposal as well as the

²⁰⁸ Migdal, *et. al.* 1994:2

²⁰⁹ Migdal, 1994:14

prevailing circumstances that the state and society have to work with,²¹⁰ e.g. in times of peace versus war time. Knowing the locus of such limits is only possible if their capacity is assessed from an *input* perspective. Because governments are an amalgamation of various agencies, and knowing that the state's power (and economic development) depends on the contributions of each agency, it is important that states are disaggregated to understand the influence of their power at agency level. Thus, assessing the institutional capacity of individual state agencies – as this study does – is a good starting point in coming to grips with what makes some states (or their agencies) more effective in implementing their programs than others. This is one way to detect agencies that might have competence problems and specifically in which areas.

Theoretical Basis of Institutional Capacity

Conceptually, if we take the *inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts* process as a universal framework for analyzing policy outcomes,²¹¹ and therefore an institution's performance, one can see that institutional capacity is represented by *inputs*, which would then lead to the anticipated policy *outcomes* depending on how those *inputs* are utilized.

²¹⁰ Grindle, 1996

²¹¹ see: Frank Fischer, *Evaluating Public Policy*. Nelson-Hall Publishers, Chicago.1995; Weimer, L David and Vining, R. Aidan, *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice*, 1999:333-357; Robert Heineman, *et. al.*, *The World of a Policy Analyst*, 1997:43-51; . Merilee S. Grindle, and John W. Thomas, *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries*, 1991; Ronald Sylvia, *et. al.*, *Program Planning and Evaluation for the Public Manager*, 1997; Peter H. Rossi, *et. al.*, *Evaluation: A Systematic Approach*, 1999; Lisa Segnestam, *Environmental Performance Indicators*, Environment Department Papers, The World Bank. Paper No. 71, 1999:5-6

In theory, institutional capacity does not necessarily stand alone; it is wired indirectly in the organization, management and administrative theories²¹² where it is conveyed through various underlying principles such as organization structure;²¹³ division of labor;²¹⁴ scientific management;²¹⁵ personnel relations and behavior;²¹⁶ and leadership styles and patterns.²¹⁷ Thus, institutional capacity is a multi-discipline concept that cannot be reduced to one single theory. Therefore, it is important to understand what constitutes the theories in which it is anchored – namely, organization, management and administration. Discoveries made by theorists in these areas offer a road map on how to deal with management problems that may arise due to institutional capacity challenges.

The literature on these theories is extensive. What is used here is just a snap shot giving the historical context of their development and

²¹² Frederick Taylor, “Scientific Management,” in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) *Classics of Public Administration*, 1987; Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization,” in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration*, 1937:3-45; Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation*, 1973

²¹³ Weber, 1987

²¹⁴ Gulick, 1937:3-13, 21-30; Rolf E. Rogers, *Organization Theory*, 1975:47-61

²¹⁵ Taylor, 1987:29-33; Scott, 1969:150-51

²¹⁶ A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” *Psychological Review* 50 (July 1943), pp370-396 1943; Douglas M. McGregor, “The Human side of Enterprise,” in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) *Classics of Public Administration*, 1987; L. Urwick, “Organization as a Technical Problem,” in: William Sexton (ed.) *Organization Theories*, 1970

²¹⁷ Rogers, 1975:136-162; Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton*, 1997; Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan*, 1990; David James Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, 1972.

An extensive amount of literature exists on these theories and principles. For an extended bibliography see: Shafritz and Hyde, *Classics of Public Administration* (1987); Beckhard, *Organization Development: Strategies and Models* (1969); Litterer, *Organizations: Structure and Behavior* (1980); Scott, et. al., *Organization Theory: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis* (1972); and Rogers, *Organizational Theory* (1975).

the key concepts embedded in them. Without underrating the contributions that have been made over the years by various scholars, organization management is generally traced back to Max Weber and Frederick Taylor. Other classics of the time include Luther Gulick and Henry Fayol.

Max Weber developed what is known today as common features of an ideal bureaucracy.²¹⁸ According to Weber, an ideal bureaucratic organization would have 1) career bureaucrats who are 2) appointed to specific positions based on their 3) technical qualifications and whose 4) positions reflect some form of hierarchy in seniority among officers. Legally, each officer would have a 5) clearly defined sphere of official responsibility reflecting 6) the competence required for that position. 7) None of these officers own the organization but work for it. The job would be 8) a full time occupation, with 9) a salary commensurate with the position's duties and required skills. Other rewards of the job include 10) promotions, which are dependent on the judgment of superiors, and 11) pensions.²¹⁹ According to Gortner, it is these features that make the public bureaucracy a superior organization over others in that it guarantees precision, stability, discipline, and reliability.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Weber, "Bureaucracy," 1987 [original work 1922]

²¹⁹ Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (Oxford University Press, New York), 1947:58, 332-336; Gortner, *Administration in the Public Sector* (John Wiley & Sons, New York), 1977:86-87, 100

²²⁰ Gortner, 1977:88; Gortner, *et. al. Organization Theory: A Public Perspective*, (The Dorsey Press), 1987:3,

While the ideal organization concept may offer promise for effectiveness and possibly efficiency, the same features also create problems. For instance, a defined hierarchy among officers, which creates unity of command and is good for formal communication, may also create conditions ideal for abuse of authority by senior officers who may not be questioned by their junior staff, except through whistle blowing. Fortunately, Weber was aware of the limitations of his ideal model in the real world. His expectation was that organizations would perform better as they approached the ideals he envisioned. The challenge is that only a few of these ideals are achieved in most organizations and “no organization achieves all of the ideal” characteristics described.²²¹ But the problem is not Weber’s model, rather these problems occur because what is supposed to be a rational model is put into effect by *limitedly rational* human beings, whose rationality is constrained by numerous factors.²²² These include, but not limited to: the extent of knowledge and information an individual has for a particular activity; the capacity to analyze all the available alternatives; one’s skills, habits, values as well as conceptions of purpose.²²³

While Max Weber looked at the entire structure of an organization to find “one best way to arrange the offices and tasks so that maximum organizational coordination and efficiency could be attained,” Frederick

²²¹ Gortner, 1977:89

²²² Gortner, 1977:91; Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organization*, (The Free Press, New York), 1957:39-41

²²³ Simon, 1957:39-41; 241-242

Taylor (and his followers) concentrated on the individual and the actual job performed. Taylor, in his “scientific management,” was concerned with finding “one best way” to do a particular job;²²⁴ convinced that increased productivity required improvement in how each job was performed, and his investigations led to the development of numerous job evaluation techniques. He observed that many employees performed way below their full capacity, as he noted in an article published posthumously that, “...the average government employee does no more than one-third to one-half of a proper day’s work.”²²⁵ He therefore advocated for maximizing production from each employee through division of labor and specialization; arguing that this would not only increase productivity but also efficiency.²²⁶ In order to gain cooperation from workers, Taylor and his followers also acknowledged that human motivation was important.²²⁷

These two major strands of organization management developed by Weber and Taylor (including their respective followers) were afterwards found inadequate in that they forgot or simply ignored the human side of the organization. As Morgan explains, classical management theorists such as Frederick Taylor and others viewed “the design of organizations as a technical problem” until this was reduced to a problem of “paying

²²⁴ Gortner, 1977:92-93

²²⁵ Taylor, “Government Efficiency,” *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*, (December, 1916) pp.7-13

²²⁶ Taylor, “Scientific Management,” 1987; Gortner, 1977:92

²²⁷ Gortner, 1977:92

the right rate for the job.”²²⁸ Following the Hawthorne studies, integrating the needs of individuals and the organizations became a burning issue.²²⁹ Theorists on the human side of the enterprise argued that Weber and Taylor’s theories presented a closed system, which did not reflect the real world.

“In each case the theorists have ignored the implications of the fact that they are dealing with human beings. In order to improve the theories so that they are useful in managing the modern organization, it is essential to rediscover human beings. It is impossible to recognize man as a sociological and psychological being who may be rational, but who may also be irrational, and to maintain the closed system concept for which the theorists are striving.”²³⁰

Thus, another group emerged that focused on investigating the structure of the organization in search of “one best way” to organize the offices and tasks. These men were convinced that if the “universal rules of organization” were used, “functions of management would be made more efficient and successful.”²³¹ Gortner further explains that, “the number and order of these principles varied according to the author, but most rules were subsumed under five categories: unity of command;

²²⁸ Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization*, (Sage, Beverly Hills), 1986:41

²²⁹ Gortner, 1977:96-98; Morgan, 1986:41-12

²³⁰ Gortner, 1977:96-97

²³¹ Gortner, 1977:93

authority commensurate to responsibility; maximum delegation of authority; limited span of control; and power to organize.²³²

Various scholars further elaborated on the importance of these concepts arguing that not only does an organization require structure but also how labor is organized functionally, e.g. who supervises who and what are their accountabilities.²³³ It was during this time that Luther Gulick coined the popularly quoted acronym POSDCORB (Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting) to highlight the importance of organization theory in management.²³⁴ For practical application, POSDCORB²³⁵ simply describes the basic management functions / duties every manager should perform if the organization is to run smoothly and effectively. Another management practice widely used is PMOC, which stands for Planning, Motivating, Organizing, and Controlling.²³⁶ Unfortunately, out of all these important functions, the only activity forest managers perform is budgeting mainly because they have no choice or else the department would not be funded.

Concerns regarding the important role of humans in an organization paved the way to what is widely referred to as the behavioral sciences, which incorporated the human aspects to improve on earlier

²³² Gortner, 1977:93

²³³ Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration*, (Sentry Press, New York), 1937

²³⁴ Jay Shafritz and Hyde (eds.), *Classics of Public Administration*, (The Dorsey Press, Chicago: Il.), 1987

²³⁵ Gulick, 1937

²³⁶ Gortner, 1977:93

theories. Thus, organization theory, management theory, and administrative theory became dominant areas of study.

Organization theory (OT) aims at efficiency; it offers the principles aimed at allocating and utilizing the available resources in the best way possible. It is a theory concerned with the *structure, inter-relationships* and *functions* of the individuals and groups that constitute those organizations.²³⁷ It seeks to maximize “organizational rationality – narrowly defined as *efficiency*: the ratio of outputs to inputs.”²³⁸ And even though there is some disagreement on what areas OT emphasizes e.g. structure or human relationships, and whether organization behavior is a separate area of inquiry or a subfield of OT,²³⁹ one can see that the theory is people-centered and activity-oriented; covering decision-making, human relations within or among organizations and resource utilization.²⁴⁰ In practice, organization theory is also about management and administrative practices. Hence, OT is not a single theory. Rather it is multi-discipline in character, and draws its strength from various disciplines such as administration, political science, economics, psychology,²⁴¹ to name but a few.

For instance, public administrators and political scientists have enriched organization theory through policy analysis, where they

²³⁷ Heffron, 1989:3

²³⁸ Heffron, 1989:3

²³⁹ See: Learned and Sproat, *Organization Theory and Policy: Notes for Analysis*, 1966:4-7; Heffron, 1989:3

²⁴⁰ Gulick, 1937:3-44; Learned and Sproat, 1966:2-9

²⁴¹ Gortner, *et. al.*, *Organization Theory: A Public Perspective*, 1987:5-6; Learned and Sproat, 1966:3-7

investigate ways in which the political, professional, and technical characteristics of public organizations influence public policy making and execution. “These disciplines study the relationships between public organizations and their political environment.”²⁴² Economic analyses have also contributed to decision-making theories, while behavioral studies in psychology (and in particular industrial psychology) have focused on leadership, motivation, group interaction, and conflict.²⁴³ In sum, OT is a loose aggregate of various approaches that deal with organizational analysis.²⁴⁴

Like OT, management theory (MT) does not stand alone either. It incorporates aspects of OT and administration. Generally defined as “getting things done through others,”²⁴⁵ MT is concerned with *efficiency* in resource utilization. The theory embraces the idea of assembling the resources and directing them towards achieving the organization’s goals. Management is also process-oriented as reflected in Taylor’s “scientific management” theory, where he argues that there is more than one way to manage people, and offers a set of universal principles to be applied, e.g. providing staff training so they can do the work well; gaining staff cooperation to do the assigned job; and division of work based on staff

²⁴² ²⁴² Gortner, *et. al.*, 1987:6

²⁴³ Gortner, *et. al.*, 1987:5

²⁴⁴ Gortner, *et. al.*, 1987:5

²⁴⁵ Leslie W. Rue and Lloyd Byars, *Management Theory and Application*, 1983:8, 12

weakness and strengths.²⁴⁶ That is to say the right person for the right job.

Management involves administration in that both theories focus on people and decision-making. Specifically, the process of managing draws heavily on the fundamental principle of administration, that of *efficiency maximization*. As Simon puts it, “good” administration means adopting a decision (e.g. an intervention) that uses the least expenditure which leads to the greatest accomplishment.²⁴⁷ And this is just as true for management too. Thus, in practice, the line between management and administrative theories is not that obvious. The two theories seat side by side. Managerial functions constitute an administrative component just as administrative functions also constitute management functions. The other way to look at this is that management functions are long term, involving aspects of planning and resource allocation. On the other hand, the administrative role is transactional, making things done. It is a tactic to achieve a management goal. Management focuses on what needs to be done, while administration looks at how it needs to be done. In short, management equals effectiveness whereas administration goes for efficiency.

It should be clear by now that administrative theory shares common ground with OT and MT, and that all of them are intertwined.

²⁴⁶ Frederick W. Taylor, “The Principles of Scientific Management”

²⁴⁷ Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organization*, (The Free Press, New York), 1957b:39

Administrative theory is concerned with “how an organization should be constructed and operated in order to accomplish its work efficiently.”²⁴⁸ The theory emphasizes efficiency and effectiveness in managing the resources under one’s jurisdiction.²⁴⁹ According to Dahl, quoting Luther Gulick: “in the science of administration, whether public or private, the basic “good” is efficiency.”²⁵⁰ Administrative theory is centered on decision-making and advocates the principle of choice and rationality.²⁵¹

“A fundamental principle of administration, which follows almost immediately from the rational character of “good” administration, is that among several alternatives involving the same expenditure the one should always be selected which leads to the greatest accomplishment of administrative objectives; and among several alternatives that lead to the same accomplishment, the one should be selected which involves the least expenditure.”²⁵²

Administration entails the ability to plan, organize, command, coordinate, and control the activities relating to utilization of the resources.²⁵³ Administrative theory is both human and process-oriented. The theory is human-centered in that it takes the human resource as a center of activity: one that should decide what to do with the other

²⁴⁸ Simon, 1957b:38

²⁴⁹ Herbert Simon, “The Proverbs of Administration,” *Public Administrative Review*, vol. (6 Winter 1946) pp53-67

²⁵⁰ Robert Dahl, “The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems,” *Public Administration Review*, 7 No. 1, 1947:2; Leonard White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, 1955.

²⁵¹ Herbert Simon, *A Model of Man*, John Wiley & Sons: NY, 1957a

²⁵² Simon, 1957b:38-39

²⁵³ Fayol, 1937:101 [original work 1923], in: Gulick and Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration*.

resources. Yet it is also processed oriented because it emphasizes the aspect of *input* versus *outcomes*. Each activity – from planning to control – is aimed at efficiency: using the input with the least cost that gives highest outcome.²⁵⁴ Because information is never complete for any given situation and the fact that it is not possible to evaluate all possible alternatives, decisions adopted are often a matter of speculation.²⁵⁵ In practice, administration is management as its application suggests.²⁵⁶ In short, administration is about decision-making and selecting the best choice among several alternatives.

“Since the “principle of efficiency” is basically characteristic of any activity that attempts rationally to maximize the attainment of certain ends with the use of scarce means, it is characteristic of economic theory as it is of administrative theory. The “administrative man” takes his place alongside the classical “economic man.”²⁵⁷

Evidently, the general theme that runs through the above theories suggests that resource availability is a must if an organization is to operate as intended; needless to say these resources ought to be efficiently allocated to achieve the desired goals. The theory clearly takes resource availability for granted as can be seen from its emphasis on how to get the best out of the available resources. Like in the economic

²⁵⁴ Simon, 1957b:39

²⁵⁵ See Hebert Simon’s bounded rationality principle, *A Model of Man*, 1957:198

²⁵⁶ Jay Shafritz and E. Russell, *Defining Public Administration*, p.6-31

²⁵⁷ Simon, 1957b:39

literature where efficiency theory runs deeply and assumes *availability* of the resources to be utilized,²⁵⁸ the administration, organization, and management theories follow similar reasoning. They too take institutional capacity for granted and assume that the resources are available. The only challenge, therefore, is to figure out *how* [best] to organize and utilize those resources to achieve the best results at a minimum cost possible.²⁵⁹ In other words, management develops the policies and procedures, while administration implements them.

Theoretical Implications

How does institutional capacity relate to the above theories? One simple answer is that an assessment of capacity does not end at itemizing the resource inputs. The principles espoused in the above theories are part of what constitutes institutional capacity. However, in addition to having the actual inputs required for a particular task, an institution's ability to *mobilize, organize, and utilize* these resources to attain its policy goals are even more important aspects of institutional capacity. The latter reflects the managerial, leadership and organizational skills of the human resources who are supposed to mobilize and allocate other resources for various tasks.

²⁵⁸ Israel, 1987:3.

²⁵⁹ Simon, 1957b:39; Howard Carlisle, *Management: Concepts and Situations*, 1976:12-18.

Human relationships within and across organizations are an important factor that too often either gets overlooked or simply taken for granted as if they fall in place automatically. And this is where Skocpol's (1985), Migdal's (1988; 1994), and Evans' (1985) *state-society* functional models become helpful because managerial capabilities are very important. But quite often managerial capacities are subject to societal forces whose interests the state has to accommodate, at least in a responsive government. And since no organization operates in a vacuum devoid of such forces, be it from within or outside the organization, the effectiveness of an organization will depend on how well it responds to such pressures.

Fortunately, there is some agreement that organizations are dynamic social systems, driven by "patterned activities" of their members²⁶⁰ whose combined effort makes it possible to attain a common goal.²⁶¹ As a resource responsible for mobilizing, organizing, allocating and utilizing the other productive inputs, managers (and their staff) have a direct influence on an organization's ability to achieve its goals. Sadly, not all institutions possess this capacity: to supervise, coordinate and manage the other productive resources to achieve their goals.²⁶² In our case study, this is one among the several challenges the Forestry

²⁶⁰ Scott and Mitchell, *Organization Theory*, 1972:35-36; Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Study of Organizations*, 1980:82-84

²⁶¹ Herbert Kaufman, "Organization Theory and Political Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 58:5-14 (March 1964), p6

²⁶² Lewis Merriam, "Concepts of Reorganization," in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) *Classics of Public Administration* 1987:11-21; Urwick, 1970:20; Litterer, 1980:110

Department is facing. The department's physical presence to monitor forest activities has been declining since 1986 due to reductions in labor force and budgetary allocations from central government for its programs.²⁶³ For instance, its total labor force declined from the highest level of 3,280 in 1986²⁶⁴ to 814 (2004), while capital funding fell from K794.1 million (1986) to K57 million in 2000;²⁶⁵ representing a reduction of 25% on labor and 7.2% capital allocations to the dept, respectively.

Because policy implementation is a process that requires inputs on one end, and projected outputs/outcomes on the other end,²⁶⁶ a reduction in its inputs would clearly affect the outcomes. On the other hand, taking up another program, as Zambia did with the structural adjustment program (SAP), introduces additional responsibilities and increases performance expectations for the organization and its clients. All this requires additional capacity. This is where priority setting becomes crucial. However, deciding on what programs to implement first, let alone what changes to introduce in the course of implementing a new program is not an easy task because information to guide the decision making process is never complete.²⁶⁷ Also human inadequacy to precisely predict what the future holds adds to the complexity managers have to face and overcome to steer their organizations to success. Due to these

²⁶³ Forestry Department, *Annual Reports*, from 1970 to 2005.

²⁶⁴ At this time government had authorized employment of part-time and seasonal workers to boost FD's labor position as necessary, and this arrangement helped a lot for seasonal and highly labor intensive activities such forestry surveys, forest boundary maintenance, and forest nurseries.

²⁶⁵ These figures are expressed in real terms at 1994 value.

²⁶⁶ Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:168; Fischer, 1995:27-82

²⁶⁷ Victor A. Thompson, *Decision Theory, Pure and applied*, (General Learning Press: NY), 1971

uncertainties, incrementalism in decision making tends to have more appeal.²⁶⁸

The theories that underpin institutional capacity also convey the idea that resource utilization is about making choices. In our case, this means that the type of policy choices central government took subsequently determined the type of outcomes that could be anticipated.²⁶⁹ However, it is important to note that political commitment to follow through its policy choices, the zeal and commitment career bureaucrats attach to implementing these decisions have a huge impact too.²⁷⁰ Given the layers of decision makers in government, and the numerous policy choices to select from, information overload and uncertainty on which of the policy choices might work better can be daunting. It is therefore not surprising that agencies tend to adopt policy choices with minimum risk; not because these offer the best solutions but because it is not easy to fully account for uncertainty in the future.²⁷¹ It may also be the safest way to avoid blame for failure to attain projected outputs, just in case unintended consequences outweigh projected benefits.²⁷² Somehow, this is happening in forestry circles in Zambia, a topic I explore further in Chapter 5 and 6.

²⁶⁸ Victor A. Thompson, 1971:8-10

²⁶⁹ Cyert and March, 1980:418-419

²⁷⁰ Israel, 1987:137-141; Weaver and Rockman, 1993:5-40

²⁷¹ Grindle and Thomas, 1991:2, van de Walle, 2001:168-70

²⁷² Roger I. Roots, "When Laws Backfire: Unintended Consequences of Public Policy. *American Behavioral Scientist* Vo. 47, No. 11: 1376-1394 (July 2004) 2004:1376-1394

After implementing the civil service reforms, and noticing a corresponding increase in illegal activities in the forest estates, one would expect government officials to own up to the problem as part of the unintended consequences of the reforms, and hopefully hear some possible strategies being offered to address the problem. Surprisingly, FD managers have been busy blaming the victim, civil society, for the deplorable state of the forests, claiming that resource users are uncooperative and are fomenting a culture of lawlessness. Yet as this study has revealed, this problem lies internally in the bureau, whose capacity has been reduced and does not match its obligations: FD is no longer able to reach its clients and provide the necessary services.

While the foregoing theories are useful in linking capacity to performance, resource allocation across government agencies is a highly contested political battle that invites questions of who should get what, when, and how;²⁷³ and I would add *why*. From an administrative angle this almost always raises the question of resource availability and optimality. Does the agency have the capacity to implement a particular program? What type (and or quantity) of resources are needed? At what level is a particular resource optimal? And what level is performance ideal?²⁷⁴ Since individual organizations have different optimal benchmarks, theory has not prescribed a universal standard applicable

²⁷³ Stone, 1997:part I and II; Grindle, 1980.

²⁷⁴ In this case study, a department's structural requirements are dealt with by Management Development Division (Cabinet Office) while financial allocations are handled by Ministry of Finance, as approved by Parliament.

to all: it is simply not practical to do so. Even Frederick Taylor in his extensive work on scientific management did not attempt to do this. What comes close to being practical, in my opinion, is the use of an organization chart as a benchmark. Since an organization structure/chart²⁷⁵ shows not only a hierarchy of ranks and authority boundaries but also the implied activities to be carried out, it can serve as a basis for estimating, at least, the human resource required for an organization.²⁷⁶ The human resources then estimate the other input requirements that are needed to carry out their respective functions. This study draws heavily on this *structural-functional* model in determining the human resource requirements for the Forestry Department.

Obviously, the level of *autonomy* that managers have in making decisions and implementing them has enormous implications on an institution's performance.²⁷⁷ Managers can delay, facilitate or simply stop a program from being undertaken. The Forestry Department has numerous experiences in this regard. The department's successes in the 1960s to 1970s can easily be traced to the professional and highly inspirational leadership that existed in the department at the time, reinforced by teamwork – a spirit of working towards a common goal. The

²⁷⁵ An organization chart is a useful tool in determining, at least, the minimum requirements for human resources.

²⁷⁶ Henry Fayol, "The Administrative Theory in the State," in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration* 1937:106

²⁷⁷ Litterer, 1980:108

creation of the industrial plantations and protected forest areas are some of the success stories.

Accountability is another factor worth mentioning. When employees are held accountable, they tend to be more responsible both in their decisions and how they execute the functions of their offices. But for most government agencies this is where institutional weakness also begins. Despite their well-defined structures²⁷⁸ that neatly arrange employees in a “hierarchy of authority,”²⁷⁹ apportioning blame to individuals for program failure is not common in government, except if it takes the shape of theft, abuse of power, or corruption charges. Generally speaking, government work is considered as collective action that involves all employees.²⁸⁰ This feature has enormous implications not only on the role of institutional capacity on performance but also on how to explain its interactions with other confounding factors such as the influence of policy elites,²⁸¹ the political regime, and changing trends in the global markets. The Forest Department is a classical example in this respect. Despite the deplorable state of the forests, no one has been charged for negligence in carrying out their duties.

²⁷⁸ Gulick, 1987:79-85; Scott and Mitchell, 1972:40

²⁷⁹ Herbert A. Simon, 1946:53-56, “The Proverbs of Administration,” *Public Administration Review*, 6 (Winter 1946):53-67; Scott and Mitchell, 1972:37-39

²⁸⁰ Simon, 1946; Gulick, 1987:79-89; Taylor, 1987:29-33

²⁸¹ *Policy elites* is used here to refer to bureaucrats and other political actors whose strategic positions in the decision-making process have an enormous influence in shaping government policy. It will be used interchangeably with *decision makers* and *policy makers/planners*.

The influence of the policy elites on public policy and the interplay of politics in governance is a matter that needs no elaboration.²⁸² Politics is part of administration and has a huge influence on government choices.²⁸³ As Oliver Williamson (1996), quoting Douglass North explains, people do have a significant impact on economic performance because they define and enforce the rules.²⁸⁴ On the other hand, government is also big business in so far as its policies influence economic activity.²⁸⁵ Thus, the interplay of politics and administration is a real challenge on matters concerning public policy and its implementation. Although policy-making is a shared responsibility between enactment (policy makers) and implementation (bureaucrats), quite often implementers tend to control the outcomes of any policy,²⁸⁶ underscoring the influence that staff have in determining program success/failure.

A country may have good policies and programs but if the implementers (bureaucrats) do not support or understand those policies, such programs remain policy wishes. Quite frankly, the Zambian forest service fits in this mould from all dimensions. If achievements of yester years in forestry (e.g. the establishment of industrial timber plantations) can be taken as indicators of effectiveness, it seems the department's

²⁸² see: John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 1984; Stone, 1997

²⁸³ Frank J. Goodnow, "Politics and Administration," in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) *Classics of Public Administration*. 1987:28-29; Paul Appleby, "Government is Different," in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.), 1987:162

²⁸⁴ Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1996:325

²⁸⁵ Appleby, 1987:169-164

²⁸⁶ Bryan Jones, *Re-conceiving Decision Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice and Public Policy*, 1994:176-177

personnel at that time fully understood government policy goals on forestry, and worked towards achieving them. Zambia today has surplus timber because the bureaucrats in the FD pursued this policy goal. But the opposite is what is happening now. Out of 80 people (senior and middle managers) that responded to our survey, 55% said they have no idea whether or not the department develops annual plans; 89.6% said they don't have any plans to implement; and 70% are not involved in the department's performance evaluation, if at all any takes place. If senior and middle managers, who are the program implementers, do not know the policy goals they are supposed to achieve, can the department operate effectively?

Indeed, a theoretical presentation of institutional capacity (and performance) would be incomplete without mentioning incentives. Organizations, like individuals, respond to incentives. Starting with Taylor's scientific management²⁸⁷ to Maslow's human motivation theory,²⁸⁸ it is evident that people respond to incentives provided by their environment. However, Israel cautions that despite this general belief that incentives motivate people to perform better and that there is a linear relationship between incentives and performance, this does not stay constantly positive.²⁸⁹ As in any utility function, incentives stimulate performance only up to a certain peak point after which any additional

²⁸⁷ Taylor, 1987:29-32

²⁸⁸ Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50 (July 1943), pp370-396

²⁸⁹ Israel, 1980:64

incentives have no effect on improving performance. At that point, performance may remain the same or decline despite additional incentives.²⁹⁰ By extension, this law of diminishing returns applies equally to the production function of an organization too.

As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, none of the theories spells out *what* constitutes institutional capacity, much less *how* to assess it. Instead, they offer principles that would help create efficient and effective organizations. Organization management and administrative theorists concentrate on *how* best to organize and utilize the available resources, while political scientists dwell on relationships and ensuing outcomes, and barely show what capacities lead to those outcomes – which apparently is usually their main focus. All of them simply take institutional capacity for granted.

But in order to know what makes some institutions perform better than others understanding the differences in their institutional capacity offers a good starting point. Among the scholars that have touched on institutional capacity, only Bratton offers a framework that is possible to do this. Thus, this study draws heavily on Bratton's²⁹¹ conception of institutional capacity, and combines it with Grindle's²⁹² definition, which together offers the *input* and *functional* aspects of capacity. As mentioned earlier, I conceptualize institutional capacity representing those basic

²⁹⁰ Israel, 1987:64; Samuel Huntington, "Goals of Development," in: Weiner and Huntington (eds.). *Understanding Political Development*, (Waveland Press: Prospect Heights, Illinois) 1987:17

²⁹¹ Bratton, 1994

²⁹² Grindle, 1980:3-34; 1996

inputs needed for an organization to do its work, which includes: human, financial, and technological resources. In discussing the human element, their technical, administrative, and political capabilities are also covered.²⁹³ My argument is that when evaluating institutional performance it is important to start from the *inputs* side rather than focusing on policy *outcomes* and *impacts*. I should point out that policy can be evaluated at any stage of the *inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts* framework. The point I'm making is that in order to understand the role of institutional capacity on performance (outcomes), it is important to assess the availability of the inputs first because this is what drives achievement of the outcomes later on.

Probably the more complex question is the one I raised earlier: how does one know when the inputs are sufficient in relation to or independent of the anticipated outcomes? There is no simple answer to this. As I suggested earlier the organization structure is a good starting point; it specifies the initial human resource requirements and their managerial competences. These people would later determine what would be needed to pursue the mission of the organization, and adjust these requirements as they go along. It is for this reason that this study takes special interest in both the tangible inputs that were at FD's disposal as well as the managerial competences of its managers to design and implement government policy. Nonetheless, notwithstanding the above,

²⁹³ Grindle, 1996:8; Bratton, 1994:235

the nature of the bureaucracy is also likely to influence and eventually determine how these resources are organized and utilized.²⁹⁴ Agency rivalry in respect to sharing the national cake is another case in point. Those bureaus with prominent images on the policy arena are likely to be favored.

In conclusion, it is gratifying to note that regardless of the different conceptions people have of IC at least there is agreement that the *presence of capacity* and, more importantly, *how it is applied* are two fundamental ingredients that separates dysfunctional from effective organizations. In fact, the question we should be answering is not *'whether institutional capacity matters'* because of course it does matter. Instead, what we should be concerned with is to investigate *'what capacities matter'* most if dysfunctional organizations were to perform better. The chapters that follow build on this principle and illustrate how this has played out in the Zambian case study.

²⁹⁴ Weber, *Bureaucracy*, 1987:50-55; Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Little, Brown and Company), 1967

Chapter 3

Understanding the Connections

Interest in institutional capacity has been gaining momentum since the mid 1980s; the first of these concerns having been raised by political scientists²⁹⁵ who framed the issue in terms of state capacity. Later economists,²⁹⁶ practitioners (especially the multi-lateral lending institutions),²⁹⁷ policy analysts, administrators and management scholars ²⁹⁸ also joined – each highlighting specific aspects of capacity and their implications for the state’s ability to govern. Although these scholars differ in how they conceptualize capacity, their view on how institutional capacity (IC) is related to performance outcomes is somehow a straightforward issue. They all agree that a strong institutional capacity matters if an organization is to perform effectively and achieve its goals. Where the debate becomes slippery is on the question of what constitutes institutional capacity, which capacity matters most and,

²⁹⁵ See for example Peter, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In*, 1985; Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 1988.

²⁹⁶ Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, 1990; Oliver Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996.

²⁹⁷ In this category, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have been prominent in seeking to build institutional capacity to ensure project success for their programs. See for example, World Bank Annual Report for 2002; Arturo Israel, *Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance*, 1987; Carlos Lopes and Thomas Theisohn, *Ownership, Leadership and Transformation: Can We Do Better for Capacity Development?* (Earthscan Publications Ltd.: New York), 2003; Stephen Browne (ed.) *Developing Capacity Through Technical Cooperation* (Earthscan Publications Ltd.), 2002.

²⁹⁸ See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al. (eds.), *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems*, 2002; Goran Cars, et. al. (eds.), *Urban Governance, Institutional Capacity and the Social Milieux*, 2002; Picciotto and Wiesner (eds.), *Evaluation and development: The Institutional Dimension*, 1998.

especially how each of the various (or potential) IC parameters contribute to or impact the outcomes. None of the above provides a comprehensive solution.

As we saw in Chapter 2, management practitioners generally tend to interpret institutional capacity to imply availability of factors of production (including the technical skills) and argue that performance outcome depends on them. But political scientists, economists, sociologists and institutional scholars (from across different disciplines) disagree with this emphatic conclusion. While agreeing that these are important, they also point to other aspects such as the presence of an enabling environment e.g. the presence of appropriate statutes, national policy choices, stable government,²⁹⁹ etc. as being more important. They argue that performance outcomes are not strictly a function of factors of production but also depend on how people respond to their environment. In their view, the environment facilitates or inhibits certain choices. Even if the factors of production were available, if the environment is not supportive it could hinder the way any organization operates. Therefore, capacity is much more than the traditional conception of having productive resources. The question then is: what constitutes capacity? What is an ideal level of capacity? And how can we measure what portion of capacity is responsible for what outcome(s)?

²⁹⁹ See for instance Douglass North, *Institutions*, 1990; Oliver Williamson, *The Mechanisms of Governance*, 1996; Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago), 1991

This study addresses these questions using the Zambian Forestry Agency as a case study. We ask whether inadequate financial and human resources, as the bureaucrats in FD claim, are the only constraints contributing to forest degradation. Or are there other factors at play, as the literature suggests? As we have seen already, current theories leave this challenge for managers (or management teams) to decide what is appropriate in their situation. It is at this point that this study comes in to bridge the gap, albeit in a small way.

Defining the Problem

This study explores the nexus between public administration and policy implementation, looking specifically at institutional capacity and performance outcomes. Considering the department's previous achievements *versus* its current failures today this raises a red flag and makes us to ask what has caused this negative transition from being a high performing star agency to one that is almost non-existent.

For a long time forest managers have been complaining about inadequate labor force and financial outlays as two major reasons why the department has been failing to perform below expectation, vis-à-vis, effective management of its estates. They have espoused this claim for over two decades and no solution seems to be in sight,³⁰⁰ in spite of

³⁰⁰ MENR, *ZFAP Vol. II*, 1998.

numerous recommendations offered by various researchers.³⁰¹ In addition, despite the re-organization of the Zambian civil service as a whole, which incidentally which started with the Forestry Department as the first bureau to be restructured in 1997 (as a part of a broader intervention geared towards making the government more effective and efficient), unfortunately this too has not helped either. Gauging from the state of its estates, the department's performance has continued its downward spiral. Are inadequate labor force and financial outlays for forestry programs the only factors contributing to the department's poor performance? Can we continue to trust this assessment? Or could there be other factors at play that the department may have overlooked?

The best way to address the department's position is re-examine its assessment to find out how true this is. And this is the central question for this study. We take the department's complaint and turn it in a research hypothesis that the state of the forests depends on the strength of the institutional capacity. The stronger the institutional capacity the better and well managed the department's estates will be, and vice versa. In other words, institutional [in]capacity accounts for the decline of forest estates in Zambia, decline measured in terms of hecterage (or acreage) and quality of forest stock.

Therefore, taking the *input-outcomes* production process as a simplified framework in assessing an organization's performance, this

³⁰¹ MENR, *ZFAP, Vol. III*, 1998; Fynn, *Appraisal of Zambia's Forest Sector Commercial Systems*, 2004; FD, *PFAP*, 2000;

study looks at the inputs side *first* and then relates it to the outcomes to see how those inputs influenced the outcomes. Hence, rather than focusing on the *outcomes* this study contributes to the left side of the *input-outcomes* production process, and argues that since resource [in]adequacy (the *capacity*) is reflected in the outcomes, it is important to establish what capacities are available and whether or not that is adequate to accomplish the set goals.³⁰² More importantly, the analysis goes further to find out how each of these layers of capacities influenced the outcome(s) namely, the state of the forests, in this case measured in terms their extent and stock quality (which in this case is manifested in forest degradation). To illustrate this connection between inputs and outcomes, forest degradation is used as a performance indicator.

However, since it is likely that several other factors could also be at play, this investigation does not take FD's argument for granted. Rather, although this study argues that IC is the major underlying factor, we also reflect on those other possible factors such as government policy, population growth, and climate effects.

As the literature review in Chapter 2 reveals, the questions this study addresses have no standard answer and therefore challenge the existing administrative, economic and management theories that take IC for granted and instead focuses on how to *organize* and *utilize* the

³⁰² Lambert and Oatley, "Capacity and Planning for Growth," in: Goran Cars, *et. al.* (eds.) *Urban Governance*, 2002:126-27; Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, *et. al.* (eds.), *Capacity for Development*, 2002:8; Pressman and Wildavsky, *Implementation*, 1973.

productive resources. These theories assume resource availability and indirectly convey the message that all one needs is to figure out the best way [*how*] to use those resources. This assumption is so deeply engrained in the organization and management theories that they focus more on the best way to manage the available resources. The economic field, anchored in efficiency and effective use of the available resources, also suffers from this weakness. They assume resource availability (the idea that capacity exists) and emphasize tactics to maximize that capacity.

This study, on the other hand, seeks to find out first and foremost what capacity exists in terms of personnel and finances. Second, we seek to establish how each of these factors is contributing to the problem at hand, forest degradation. In other words, this study asks: does the FD have the capacity to carry out its mandate? And what part of its capacity is more important? Rather than just counting resource availability (the first question), this investigation is also interested in knowing the impact each of the different types of capacities exerted on the performance outcomes, i.e. how each is contributing to forest degradation.

Therefore, as part of a central argument of this study, knowing how each type of capacity contributes to or affects the outcomes is clearly important because not only does that knowledge help in designing the right interventions but more importantly it would be useful in timing and applying it at the point of weakness where the problem lies. As some

experiences have shown from capacity builders in the international development community most of the failures encountered arise precisely from this disconnection; not knowing how each input influenced the outcomes.³⁰³ And this brings us back to the original question: what constitutes institutional capacity? How can one tell when a particular resource is adequate? At what level is a given resource ideal and adequate? Between efficiency and effectiveness, which one is more important? These questions are addressed in subsequent chapters. This Chapter lays out the methodology used in this study and highlights why this was found appropriate.

Taking Mills' advice that the best way to analyze a scientific problem depends on the phenomena being investigated,³⁰⁴ a longitudinal approach rendered itself suitable and desirable in this case in the sense that it allows us to observe, over time, certain trends that are then used in explaining the relationships between forest degradation (the dependent variable) and factors that are assumed to accelerate it, namely a weak institutional capacity. IC is measured in terms of annual allocations to forestry programs and availability of forestry personnel, whereas forest

³⁰³ Timely examples abound across the globe. See for instance, Robert Clausen and Amelia Hube, *USAID's Enduring Legacy in Natural Forests: Landscapes, Livelihoods, and Governance* Vol. II, Accessed from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/environment/forestry/pubs/volume2_report.pdf October, 2007.

³⁰⁴ Wright C. Mills and Irving Louis Horowitz (eds.), *Power, Politics and People [The Collected Essays of Wright C. Mills]*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1963.

excisions, illegal encroachments and deforestation³⁰⁵ are taken as proxies for forest degradation, all of which culminate in changes in PFAs.

As acknowledged earlier, although there are several factors that could be contributing to forest degradation in Zambia, in this study I posit that a weak institutional capacity in the Forestry Department offers the most plausible explanation for the loss and poor state of protected forests. First, without adequate levels of budgetary allocations and forestry personnel to plan and oversee overall forest management, it is not possible to get out in the field to monitor or evaluate the field operations. Second, as an enterprise that relies on the physical presence of field personnel who patrol the estates to ensure that forest resource-users abide by the provisions of their licenses, the need for a strong human presence cannot be over emphasized. However, in between availability of these resources there is also the role of the forest managers (the managerial capacity) – are these people making the best use of what is at their disposal?

Since forest estates in Zambia are essentially public lands, held in trust for the people, this has tended to complicate the situation in terms of ownership and access to the forest resources.³⁰⁶ With an exception of the forest estates in State land, which belong to the central government, government (in this case represented by FD) does not own the estates

³⁰⁵ This include but not limited to forests lost due to over-exploitation of the forest resources (especially timber), illegal encroachments for settlements and agricultural activities, etc.

³⁰⁶ For more details on this, please refer to Chapter 3 in this study.

that fall in Chiefs' areas. Instead, it only has a surrogate managerial role over them. Therefore, as a public good, owned through generational inheritance, and I dare say, which had previously been well managed communally before government "took over", does FD still tap into this community capacity to manage these forests? Considering that most of these forests are now heavily encroached, would one say these forests suffering from the tragedy of the commons,³⁰⁷ a phenomenon that never existed prior to government's take over as a new manager? Or is this phenomenon a consequence of the absence of the manager or a perceived owner?

Research Questions

Government's policy on forestry can be summarized in two broad goals: To set aside sufficient forest areas in each district (at least 15% of Zambia's total land mass) as forest resource reservoirs to cater for the needs of both the present and future generations. Second, as part of a broader strategy on rural development, and in view of the challenges posed by the rural-urban migration, rural development was identified as a priority area³⁰⁸ in which forestry was expected to play a major role in creating job opportunities in rural areas where the bulk of the forests are

³⁰⁷ Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", *Science*, Vol. 162, 13 December 1968, pp.1243-1248; Zebedayo S.K. Mvena, The tragedy of the commons: is it applicable to East Africa? M.S. Thesis, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1981.

³⁰⁸ Alan Simmance, *Urbanization in Zambia*, 1972

found.³⁰⁹ Consequently, government looked to forestry and agriculture as possible solutions to this rural development dilemma.

For instance, between the 1960s and 70s the department scored a lot of successes in research on the ecology, protection, management, and restocking of indigenous forest areas; including the establishment, protection and management of plantations³¹⁰ as per government policy expectations.³¹¹ Its personnel worked diligently towards reaching the 15% policy benchmark on PFAs. Forest estates steadily increased from 5 million ha. in 1962 to over 7 million ha. by 1986 (roughly 9.8% of the total forest area), just short of 5.2% to reach the 15% national goal.³¹² And each of these forests was fairly well managed.

For each forest estate there was a management book outlining the annual activities to be carried out, which were quite useful in monitoring and evaluating not only changes in forest stock but in the overall stability of the forest ecosystem. But none of this is done anymore. The last management books were prepared in 1986, the very year Mr. BOM Chiyabwe, the person most people affectionately remember as the last visionary leader to head the department,³¹³ left on promotion to become Under Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources – where FD belonged at the time. In short, although the FD was quite successful

³⁰⁹ For more details on this topic, see The First (1966-71) and Second (1972-76) National Development Plans, and the Zambia National Forest Policy of 1965 captured in Appendix 2 to this dissertation.

³¹⁰ FD, *Annual Reports* for 1965; 1969 to 1979.

³¹¹ GRZ, *Zambia National Forest Policy*, 1965: Item 2.

³¹² GRZ, *Zambia National Forest Policy*, 1965: Item 8

³¹³ Reflections from personal interviews conducted in the course of this study.

in some other areas, just mentioned above, unfortunately the department has not lived up to the expectation of creating job opportunities in the rural areas.

Looking at the department's prior successes and comparing the same to the current deplorable state of affairs, it attracts interest to investigate what has caused such drastic changes. Why are forest estates in Zambia in a state of decline both in the area they cover and the quality of the forest stock? Is this due to lack of institutional capacity in the department or is it due to other factors outside the department's purview? To answer these questions one would need to look at the department's performance over the years.

- What is the extent of the forest estates that the department has established over the years, and why is it declining?
- How well managed are these forest estates?
- What is the status of its labor force? Is it adequate (and sufficiently qualified) to manage these forests?
- What has been central government's level of financial support to forestry programs?
- Considering that public policy is a political contest, how much political support is the department receiving from elected officials and policy makers both at central level and in respective local jurisdictions?

It is important to proceed in this manner of inquiry because unless the department is working towards fulfilling its primary mandate (the

establishment of forest reserves for protection and production purposes) there will be no basis to assess the rest of the policy expectations simply because there won't be any estates to assess. A point to note is here is that my emphasis on forest reservation does not in any way trivialize the fact that *how* these estates are managed is not important but to emphasize the fact that one would not talk about how well managed the forests are if the forests do not exist in the first place. At the same time to have the forests that are not well managed is as good as not having them at all. Therefore, achieving government's goal of creating the protected forests is as important as managing them, both of which depend on the department's institutional capacity to fulfill these policy expectations. It is for this reason that institutional capacity has been identified as a common denominator that accounts for changes in these performance indicators. But why should we care pursuing this line of inquiry?

There are several reasons. First, this apparently small question helps us to indirectly address a larger question on why forestry in Zambia contributes so minimally to the national GDP. Furthermore, one would like to know why Zambia, a relatively rich nation (so well endowed in natural resources both below and above the ground), is nonetheless so poor. In fact, I would argue that this apparently small question also indirectly addresses the larger question of challenges of [under]development in the Third World. What are the underlying causes

to this dilemma? Is it the statutes that shape and govern the economic and social interactions,³¹⁴ the national policies that set government's agenda,³¹⁵ or the implementation challenges?³¹⁶ Is it the social and economic demands exerted by the public³¹⁷ and or corporations,³¹⁸ respectively, or is it a question of state capacity to harness all the above?³¹⁹ The challenge, as Daniel Little (1991) reminds us, lies in how the data collected on all these areas is assessed, analyzed and interpreted.³²⁰

One plausible explanation for the country's failure to pull ahead economically seems to be the lack of institutional capacity in respective bureaus: the failure to prudently use Zambia's natural endowment. Because state capacity comes from the sum of its parts (bureaus), when problems at agency level are not resolved they spiral up and affect the center which, in this case, is central government. In this context, we can all agree that state capacity is a reflection of the strength of its agencies.³²¹

³¹⁴ See for instance, North, *Institutions, Institutional Change*, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, 1991; Andre Lecours (ed.), *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis*, 2005.

³¹⁵ Merilee Grindle and John Thomas, *Public Choices and Policy Change: The Political Economy of Reform in Developing Countries*, 1991, Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*, 2001;

³¹⁶ Merilee Grindle, *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*, 1980

³¹⁷ Deborah Brautigam, "State Capacity and Effective Governance" in: Benno Ndulu and Nicolas van de Walle (eds.), *Agenda for Africa's Economic Renewal*, 1996. Chapter 2, pp-81-108

³¹⁸ Peter Evans, *Embedded Autonomy*, 1995.

³¹⁹ Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 1985

³²⁰ Daniel Little, *Varieties of Social Explanation*, 1991

³²¹ Theda Skocpol, 1985; Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, 1988; Joel Migdal, "The State in Society: An approach to Struggles for Domination," in: Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (eds.) *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994; Peter Evans, 1985

The third reason, which is also closely linked to the above point is that, instead of using national indices such as the national GDP to understand Zambia's economic performance, one way to get to the bottom of this problem is to undertake sector case studies to see how individual agencies in each sector are performing. This permits us to identify the opportunities and problems peculiar to each agency. Because each agency (or sector) is likely to be affected and respond differently to government policy interventions, knowledge of their specific challenges becomes useful in finding appropriate interventions that would ensure that each agency is pushed to perform to its full potential. A sector approach, therefore, offers a great opportunity to see what is happening in each sector, and these results might be useful in raising hypotheses for other sectors too. Hence, the importance of these case studies cannot be over-emphasized. And this is the rationale behind this study. Investigating what is happening in each sector will help us get answers for the larger question on what is keeping Zambia in such economic despondency, despite being a rich country.

Coming back to the question under investigation, in order to understand why the FD's estates have been declining in size and quality, there is also a need to look closely at the manager and the other inputs at that person's (or the department's disposal) rather than the policy impacts. Resource availability, as I have argued earlier, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in the performance equation. Instead, a

skilled, entrepreneurial manager that has to put the other factors of production to good use is an extremely crucial input.³²² As Lynn (1996) explains, managerial “leadership counts” a lot.³²³ Not only do managers set the tone and direction on what is to be done, but they are in a privileged position to motivate or de-motivate the labor force both of which have enormous implications on the outcomes. And it is also important to note that availability of managers would not automatically fix the performance challenge if these people lack the necessary inputs to do their jobs. An ideal situation, therefore, requires the presence of both: a good manager and the other factors of production and, preferably both must be of good quality, not one or the other. Having said that, the responsibility of finding and utilizing these other resources still rests with managers. And this is why the role of forest managers, as in any organization, is so important.

For this reason, a total package of institutional capacity is considered as comprising adequate resource availability of good quality. For instance, is the FD adequately staffed and funded? Does it have skilled managers? And do these managers understand government policy on forestry? Have they translated these policies into attainable goals? What incentives does the department offer to motivate and retain its staff? How are the working relationships between FD and other

³²² Lawrence Lynn, Jr. *Public Management as Art, Science and Profession* (Chatham House Publishers), 1996:68-80

³²³ Lynn, *Public Management as Art, Science and Profession*, 1996:69

stakeholders? These and other questions open doors to a maze of structural, organizational and management issues facing the department, which in a way explains (or at least allows us to speculate), why the department is doing so poorly. In other words, what this study does is to answer a small question, which then contributes in explaining the larger problem on forest management, in particular how the FD performance fits into this larger picture.

Methodology and Study Design

This study utilizes two data sets: secondary and primary data generated from a desk research and a field survey, respectively. The survey took the form of a mail-in semi-structured questionnaire³²⁴ and personal interviews with senior government officials at various agencies including some all weather friends of the Forestry Department from bilateral agencies.³²⁵ Secondary data was generated through a desk research.

Overall, our analysis utilizes a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches, both of which have been very useful in getting a clearer picture on the various interactions. For instance, observing the changes (e.g. from line graphs) in forests estates, human resources and financials outlays helped to establish the direction of change both in the

³²⁴ Appendix 1

³²⁵ For a list of people consulted, see Appendix 3.

dependent and independent variables. However, it is not possible to tell the impact or *degree* of influence each independent variable is exerting on the dependent variable³²⁶ by simply looking at the trend of change. This is where quantitative analysis became useful; it clarified the data further. On the other hand, it was also important to understand what caused (or were causing) these changes in the first place (i.e. the underlying root causes). The qualitative analysis took an upper hand here. Thus, the two methods complement each other very well in this study. The regression analysis helped to clarify our findings that could have otherwise been misinterpreted or exaggerated the impact of some independent variables on the forest estates.

As King, *et. al.*, (1994) explain, using a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques is not unusual because “most research does not fit clearly into one category or the other. The best often combines features of each. In the same project, some data may be collected that is amenable to statistical analysis, while other equally important information is not”.³²⁷ And this was clearly the case in this study. The qualitative approach was found particularly appropriate in explaining the influence of policy elites on forestry policy and programs, which could not easily be operationalized to suit the quantitative analysis approaches. The managerial and organizational abilities of the forestry managers (or

³²⁶ Donald M. Pilcher, *Data Analysis for the Helping Professions: A Practical Guide* (Sage Publications: Newbury Park, California), 1990:107

³²⁷ King, *et. al.*, 1994:5

lack of it), which is a major theme of this dissertation, also easily fits into this category too.

Desk Research

Secondary aggregate data was mined from public documents³²⁸ through a desk research and helps us to trace changes in three variables: 1. the status of forest estates, 2. forestry staff (with special emphasis placed on forestry trained personnel who are the front liners on forest management) and, 3. Central government's funding³²⁹ to the Forestry Department from 1962 to 2005.

Considering that forestry programs have greatly benefited from external financiers such as FINNIDA, UNDP, the EU, World Bank, etc. (and continues to do so), these organizations were a great source of information too especially on the achievements and problems relating to forestry work in Zambia.

³²⁸ These include the Forestry Department Annual Reports (1965 to 2005); GRZ Financial Reports (1970 to 2005); CSO, *Monthly Statistical Digests* 1973 to 2005; Forestry Act of 1973 and 1999; National Forestry Policy, 1965 and 1998; the Land Act, 1967 and 1995; Land Policy, 2000; The First National Development Plan 1966 to 1970; Second National Development Plan 1972-1976; Third National Development Plan 1979-83; New Economic Recovery Programme 1987-89; Transitional National Development Plan 2002-2005; and the Fifth National Development Plan, 2006-2010.

³²⁹ In particular, these documents provided data on the extent of forest estates in Zambia, the number and quality (qualifications, management competence, etc.) of forestry personnel, central government's annual budget allocation to the Forestry Department (both for capital and operational expenses), as well as funds from external sources – received mainly in the form of bilateral aid, grants or technical assistance to Forestry Department (FD). To mention but a few these bilateral sources include the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden), Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, FAO, and recently (since the 1990s) the EU.

The Model

The first part of this study utilizes a quantitative analysis using a multiple linear regression model to analyze the hypothesis above, which posits that change in protected forest areas is dependent on FD's institutional capacity, herein represented by number of staff and annual financial allocations the Forestry Department has had over the years to implement its plans. In other words, forest degradation (a performance indicator, also a *dependent variable*) can be explained by changes in institutional capacity (the *independent variable*).³³⁰ The stronger the department's institutional capacity the better managed its forests would be, and vice versa.

To get a better understanding of how each category of forestry personnel influences this relationship, this variable is further broken down into three categories, namely professional, technical and field staff; based on the department's classification.³³¹

³³⁰ Only government funding is included in this model. External sources such as loans, grants and any types of aid are excluded because the bulk of this was not for management of natural forests. See Appendix 5.

³³¹ Professional staff includes all those with a 4 year degree and above, Technical covers those with a Forestry Diploma (equiv. to an Associate degree), while Field staff refers to those with at least 1 year forestry training. Senior and middle managers are appointed from the professional group, while junior managers are drawn from the technical group too.

As a multiple linear³³² regression model this hypothesis can be expressed as follows:

$$\text{CPFA} = B_0 + B_1\text{Staff} + B_2\text{Funds} + e$$

where, B_0 = slope intercept;

B_1, \dots, B_n = slope coefficients;

CPFA = Change in Protected Forest Areas;

Staff = number of staff per annum;

(broken down at three levels: professional, technical and field staff)

Funds = annual allocations to the department;

(broken down at two levels: operational and capital funds).

e = error

A full model is expressed as:

$$\text{CPFA} = B_0 + B_1\text{ProfStaff} + B_2\text{TechStaff} + B_3\text{FieldStaff} + B_4\text{OpFunds} + B_5\text{CapFunds} + e$$

Because this study deals with one case study (one bureau in one country), it was possible to initially control for some factors that can potentially also cause changes in forest estates such as population growth, political ideology, government regulations on trade, and climate³³³ primarily to make the analysis manageable but also based on the fact that these conditions also applied equally to other bureaus not only to FD. The only difference is how the managers in each bureau

³³² The researcher acknowledges the limitations associated with the assumption of having linear relationships as this equation suggests.

³³³ Climatic conditions can affect forest ecology by enhancing or altering the nature of the ecosystem. However, in this case study climate has not caused any drastic changes apart from making the forests more susceptible to fires in times of drought.

responded to the changing circumstances – be it to resource availability or policy shifts, and this matters a lot. Note that these variables were hardly static, they changed over time, which required a similar approach from the managers to adjust to the changing environment. Apparently, FD has not been responding in a similar manner. For this reason, the analysis pays special attention to management aspects over the various policy periods and highlights how the department’s activities/programs were impacted and why.

It is worth mentioning at this point that funds from external sources have been excluded from the regression analysis due to a methodological constraint. This variable could not fit into the model. Second, although external financiers³³⁴ have pumped in over \$494 million³³⁵ into forestry programs between 1986 and 2005, much of this (about 73%) was not for indigenous forest management. Out of 52 externally financed projects/programs only 16 of them (equiv. to 27%) with a total amount of \$135 million went into activities *related* to indigenous forest management such as training in beekeeping and provision of forest extension services. Slightly over \$2 million was specifically spent on capacity building, generally reduced to technical training and specifically in forestry. The rest went into industrial plantations development and baseline studies.³³⁶ However, despite this

³³⁴ MENR, *ZFAP Vol. II*, 1998

³³⁵ For more details see Appendix 4.

³³⁶ Appendix 4

imbalance in favor of exotic plantations, the fact that these finances supplemented government's efforts is something that cannot be ignored. Therefore, this is brought back in under the discussion dealing with policy changes.

Survey Research

The second level of analysis is based on survey data generated through a mail-in semi-structured questionnaire administered to senior middle and junior managers³³⁷ in FD as well as from personal interviews conducted with a few of them. The questionnaire was found ideal for its cost-effectiveness. It is easier and cheaper to reach large samples of respondents via a questionnaire than by any other means.³³⁸ And this worked well in this case where respondents were spread across the whole country. Both the questionnaire and personal interviews were aimed at assessing forest managers' knowledge about government policy on forestry as well as their level of involvement in planning and management of the department's programs. Unlike the questionnaire was restricted to the primary target group, coverage for personal interviews was expanded to include people from outside FD, namely: senior

³³⁷ Senior managers include the Head of the Department (Director of Forestry), the Head of the Branch (the Chief Forest Research Officer and Chief Extension Officer), all Provincial Heads as well as Heads of specialized sections such as Forestry Research Sections. Middle Managers are the second in-command to the Senior Managers. They serve directly under the senior managers (equiv. to deputies). Junior managers are typically in charge of districts. They fall under the Provincial Heads.

³³⁸ Peter Nardi, *Doing Survey Research*, 2003:59

government officials from Cabinet Office,³³⁹ Ministry of Finance, MTENR, Central Statistical Office, National Archives, retired forest officers, faculty at the University of Zambia (Biology and Development Studies Departments), and the Copperbelt University (School of Natural Sciences), which offer degrees in natural resource management, and forestry, respectively.

Apart from the generic questions seeking to find out the root causes to the problems FD faces today, the interviews were generally open-ended and unstructured. Unstructured interviews were preferred for their suitability to “exploratory research”³⁴⁰ such as this one where there was not as much information to work with. They also create a relaxed atmosphere that makes the conversations less formal and therefore permits both the interviewer and interviewee to converse freely.³⁴¹

Furthermore, unstructured interviews give the interviewer the flexibility to probe further on an issue or simply to adjust the interview to the unfolding scenario thereby achieving more clarity, which would otherwise not be possible in a structured interview.³⁴² And since recording the interviews makes people uncomfortable and therefore not free to express their views freely, most sessions were not recorded for

³³⁹ Out of four divisions under Cabinet Office, the researcher interviewed senior personnel from three sections: Management Development Division (MDD), Policy Analysis and Coordination Division (PAC) and Public Service Management Division (PSMD). Gender in Development Division (GID) was not covered due to its low relevance to this study.

³⁴⁰ Nardi, *Doing Survey Research*, 2003: 60

³⁴¹ Nardi, 2003:60

³⁴² Nardi, 2003:60

verbatim transcription except where the interviewees expressed no concerns. Instead, the researcher took notes freely which were later transcribed.

The survey generated data on FD's management practices/style and how well its managers understood government's policy on forestry, their role in achieving those policy goals, especially the ones promulgated under the structural adjustment program (SAP), which has been a dominant economic policy instrument since mid 1980s. Due to the disastrous effects that have occurred in the forest sector since adoption of SAP, we use it for this study as a demarcation line for *before* and *after* to see if this policy intervention has any connection to the question under investigation.

Because senior and middle managers are the first line of policy implementers (since they have the onerous duty of translating policy statements into achievable goals), this survey took them as the primary target group. But after a pre-test³⁴³ of the questionnaire in the field, the target group was expanded to include junior managers based on the recommendation from some officers³⁴⁴ in Lusaka (at Lusaka Forest Provincial Office, MENR and FD headquarters). They pointed out that under the department's organizational set up³⁴⁵ junior managers were, in

³⁴³ This researcher is grateful to the dissertation committee for this recommendation.

³⁴⁴ Davy Siame, Thompson Musonda (MENR HQ); Kenneth Kambeu (PEO, Lusaka Province); Obote Shakachite, Jack Mukosha (FD HQ) - *Personal communication*, July 2005

³⁴⁵ According to FD's organizational set up the Director, Heads of Extension and Research Branches at FD HQ (the Chief Extension and Chief Research Officer) and Provincial Heads (PEOs) belong to senior

fact, the actual policy implementers. They are the first people to know whether or not a particular policy would be successfully implemented given the challenges they encounter in the process. Hence, junior officers have always been useful in helping senior managers make the necessary modifications to steer whatever is being implemented in the right direction.

The survey was particularly useful in understanding the forest managers' degree of involvement in the day to day running of the department, and particularly what management style was in use. Taking our analysis to this lower operational level provided an opportunity to understand how managerial decisions in FD and at individual level were made and how this management style influenced the overall performance both at individual and departmental level.

Although organizational performance is expressed in constant value (e.g. forest degradation), or in aggregate numbers (e.g. revenues, production figures, GDPs, or whatever measure one chooses to use), in reality these outcomes are a product of a series of decisions and actions that managers and their production crews make. Therefore, it is important to understand how those decisions are arrived at. The other reality is that the more knowledge managers and their staff have on their role to implement a program, the higher the chances of success of such a program would be, and vice versa. For instance, FD's previous successful

management category. Those immediately under these positions are the middle managers. And finally, the junior managers who are in charge at district level.

undertaking in exotic plantations speaks for itself.³⁴⁶ The program was initiated and successfully implemented by the department, which demonstrates the fact that forestry managers who were assigned to oversee the industrial plantation project fully understood their roles. It is in view of such inspiring examples that it makes sense to find out if a similar situation existed on the SAP, which has been a dominant policy prescription. Did forestry staff understand SAP and their role in implementing it?

Conducted either in person or by phone, personal interviews were particularly useful in clarifying inconsistent data from public documents and also some issues that were raised in the survey. For instance, some respondents complained that part of the reason they were so demotivated is because they were paid less than their counterparts in other departments e.g. the Department of Agriculture despite having the same qualifications and doing similar jobs. My interviews with officials at Cabinet Office (the office responsible for such matters) confirmed that this is true and that this scenario is replicated across the civil service. The officials at Cabinet Office explained that agriculture and health whose mandates have a direct impact on human life generally have higher salary scales than other sectors. However, my contact was quick to point out that these standards are not cast in stone – they are always subject to change as long as a bureau is able to demonstrate how its

³⁴⁶ Staal and Kufakwandi, 1993; FAO, 1996:5-6; <http://worldbank.org/external/project>.

mandate affects human life directly. I thought this was a missed opportunity for forest managers who have failed to “promote” the department in this respect. With over 80% of the population solely dependent on forests for their daily survival (from building materials for their homes to food, energy, water, medicines, etc.), in a manner that essentially resembles forests as providing for their needs “from the cradle to grave,” how much more connection and impact does anyone need to show how important forests and forestry are in the *Zambian* context?!

Since *cause* and *effect* associations in social problems typically arise from the “intentional behavior of individuals,” as reflected in the rational choice theories, normative values, or moral and ideological properties of groups and, or institutions,³⁴⁷ the addition of managerial aspects to this analysis clearly complemented our attempt in understanding how decisions impact action. And since assessing performance implies assessing human action, adding managerial aspects to this analysis also improved the reliability of our causal inference.³⁴⁸ In fact, the very fact that no social problem is independent of human impact³⁴⁹ makes it imperative that social explanations be anchored in some form of micro-foundations that links cause and effect to human action.³⁵⁰ The assertion that forest estates are in a deplorable condition (alluding to the idea that FD is performing poorly), essentially calls into

³⁴⁷ Little, 1991:16

³⁴⁸ King, *et. al.*, 1994:29-33

³⁴⁹ Little, 1991:16, 19

³⁵⁰ Little, 1991:19

question the role of forestry personnel in managing these estates or the sector as a whole.

It is important to note that the addition of this second layer of factors clearly provided an “additional leverage over the causal inference”³⁵¹ which as our analysis later shows helped in explaining the department’s performance. What could not be accounted for by mere availability of staff and funds (or lack of both) were amplified (or at least made clearer) by these intervening variables. However, since it was not easy to quantitatively model this second layer of variables with the ones observed annually, these additional variables were analyzed qualitatively to complement the two primary independent variables, namely forestry personnel and financial outlays.

Important Land Marks

Let me turn to the issue of time frames. Why was 1962 chosen as the starting point for the question under investigation? Why not any other year?

To begin with, this study is about trying to understand how a once star agency has degenerated into non-existence. In other words, it is about comparing the time when FD performed better and now when nothing is working. For this reason 1962, shortly before the Zambia

³⁵¹ King, *et. al.* 1994:221

became an independent state, presents itself as an excellent starting point.

First, 1962 offers an excellent opportunity to see what the Zambian government inherited from the British colonial government in 1964, an inheritance that became a stepping-stone for the new government to build upon. Knowledge about the level of support that the colonial government extended to the Forestry Department in terms of annual financial allocations, personnel, statutes, and the general infrastructure meant to support forestry work are very important benchmarks. For instance, did the colonial government recognize forestry as an important sector or was this something the new government had to start building from the scratch? Considering that more land in Zambia (94%) falls under the jurisdiction of the local Chiefs, what did central government do that made the Chiefs release some of their land to be gazetted as PFAs? Did government get these lands by force or offered some incentives in exchange? Understanding the contractual details that promoted such cooperative relationships is very important because these eventually determine the success or failure of public policies relating to forest conservation and, or natural resource management in general.³⁵²

Second, 1962 also makes it possible to see how the Forestry Department performed under the colonial government – a period

³⁵² Peter H. Omara-Ojunga, *Resource Management in Developing Countries* (Longman Group), 1992: Chapters 3, 4 and 5; Owen J. Lynn and Janis B. Alcorn, “Tenurial Rights and Community-based Conservation,” in: David Western, et. al. (eds.), *Natural Connections*, 1994: Chapter 16

associated with an efficient and effective government. Putting aside the socio-economic and political inequalities that the colonial government perpetuated during its time in office, generally speaking the government of the day is credited for good governance and running an efficient social service delivery system.³⁵³ For this reason, 1962 provides a good baseline on what was inherited from a period of good governance and possibly good performance. FD's achievements dwarfs the colonial era's indicating that the new government certainly paid more attention to forestry or at least the foresters knew what they were doing. The other reason is that because forest crops have a long gestation / maturity period their effects may not be known until long after a program is phased out in which case what the colonial government may have initiated came to fruition years later after the new government took office. Picking 1962 gives us the flexibility to assess previous efforts in relation to what followed.

Fourth, having known what was inherited makes it easier to compare the department's performance before and after independence, both on its institutional capacity and performance outcomes, which in this case has allowed us to arrive at some reasonable conclusions. Furthermore, taking 1962 as the starting point also makes it possible to establish, right from the birth of the Zambian republic, a time-line of all

³⁵³ I wish to point out though that the efficiency of the system was geared towards benefiting the colonial government and its white settler communities rather than the indigenous people who were largely exploited. However, this matter is beyond the scope of this study. For details see Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, 1972, Chapter 5; Burdette, *Zambia Between Two Worlds*, 1988.

policy initiatives the new government pursued that could have accelerated or destroyed the momentum built on forest management by the previous government. Because public policy drives developmental actions in any nation, using this lens helps us to locate under which period the Forest Department achieved the most compared to other policy periods; without overlooking the cumulative effects (positive or negative) that may have arisen from previous policy periods. In fact, this is where the challenge lies: to pin point how respective policy initiatives accelerated or impeded the Forestry Department's performance.

Research Challenges

No research undertaking is free from any problems and this one is no exception. And these problems are noted here as Some of the challenges encountered are briefly discussed below, starting with the desk research. Note that these should serve as caveats too.

Desk Research

Contrary to the general notion that using existing secondary data is an easier and faster way of conducting research than generating primary data, this researcher experienced just the opposite. Despite all prior preparations to establish contacts in various government bureaus that this researcher anticipated to work with, the desk research was not only time consuming but also the most frustrating part of the field research

simply because forestry statistics have not been documented in any systematic fashion. Of course the contacts in FD were extremely helpful; they provided as much information as was available.

(a) Data Quality and Lack of Consistency

Forestry data, especially on the extent of the forest estates, should be taken with a pinch of salt. This information has not been updated since 1986 when the last forest inventory was undertaken, which too was not comprehensive since it covered only a few selected provinces.³⁵⁴

First, there is the issue of inconsistency in their reporting. Sometimes the Forestry Department reports the extent of its estates in hectares and at other times in kilometer squares (Km²), and this may appear in one report. If one is not careful, such figures can be lifted as they are which can lead to serious misrepresentation. The format of reporting was another problem. Here too there is no consistence. For instance, between 1970s and 1980s labor strength was broken down at all categories, a vital statistic for this study. But from the mid-1980s they stopped to do this, which makes it difficult to know the changes in the different categories. Considering that insufficient labor has been the department's main complaint, it was quite astonishing that this data is not available. This researcher had to use the provincial reports (within the same

³⁵⁴ de Baker, *et. al.*, *Wood Energy Resource Survey*, 1986.

annual reports) to re-classify labor according to the different categories. This also applied production figures from various types of forests, which the department no longer reports. Instead, the department's focus is on revenues where again it is not possible to know which products contributed what amounts. Certainly, there is need to revisit the reporting format, it must be standardized.

Secondly, there is the issue of discontinuity in reporting. Previously, provincial offices sent in monthly reports to the FD HQ, which made it easier to follow events in each province. In the absence of a departmental annual report, one could extract data from provincial reports. Currently, this practice has not been enforced vigorously. Some provinces submit their monthly reports, others do not, making it very difficult to know what is happening out there.

Clearly, the FD is supposed to be the best source of its data, at least through its annual reports. Unfortunately, here too there is a lot of inconsistency; the department has not consistently produced its annual reports either. There are no annual reports for 1990-1994 and 2001-2004. The data reported in this study under these years was accessed from provincial monthly reports (where available) and consultants' reports under the Provincial Forestry Action Programme (PFAP).

Furthermore, since 1995 the format of the annual reports has become highly descriptive, with forestry revenues being the only prominent tables. As one officer put it, "madam we don't have the type of

data you want. ...nobody cares about forest estates anymore. We only focus on revenues because that is the only item the Director of the Forestry is interested in.”³⁵⁵ The question then is: since data is not systematically captured on forest estates (e.g. the status of the forest stock, encroachment and deforestation rates in each province (preferably per district too), what information do the forest managers use to plan for their future activities? And how would they justify the department’s existence to government and the public? Is it possible to convince policymakers for better funding levels in the absence of such figures?

Another constraint relates to inconsistency in reporting periods to which the data relates. Financial allocations from government are reported annually while funding from external financiers are in 3-5 year periods and longer, often overlapping. Why doesn’t the department report annual releases from these sources too? I got the impression that such figures were merely lifted from project documents and had no resemblance to what was actually spent during the time in question. If a program is doing well (or badly), sometimes the financier can increase funding (or curtail) funding. It is important that the department shows exactly how much it received annually. That way one would be certain about what transpired.

Regarding data from Ministry of Finance, here too there were problems. Because of budget constraints, Ministry of Finance rarely

³⁵⁵ *Personal communication*, July 2005, from one forestry official who requested that the name not be revealed.

honors the approved budgets. What is “approved” rarely corresponded with “actual releases.” In most cases actual releases were lower than the former. Fortunately, Forestry Department had better information on this. But at times FD did not report supplementary funding it may have received during the year. Consequently, it became necessary to use audited reports from the Auditor General’s Office³⁵⁶ rather than FD annual reports.

(b) Lack of a Central Data Bank within the Department

Compounding the problem on forestry data is the fact that even the department’s own literature is not in one place. Since the relocation of its headquarters from Ndola to Lusaka in 1998, most of its documents are still at its former location in Ndola, piled up in its dysfunctional library. At the time of this study, none of the managers at FD HQ knew if a new library would be created in Lusaka, or if someone would be appointed to run the library in Ndola. From my observation, information management is evidently not a priority for FD.

This being an information era, it is inconceivable that the department has no electronic database (or a website) to make its documents easily accessible. A few reports that are in soft copy (e.g. those produced under the Zambia Forestry Action Programme (ZFAP) and PFAP) are also only available from respective project offices, not even

³⁵⁶ Accessed copies from Ministry of Finance.

from the department's headquarters *per se*. An intra-net set-up would have made sharing the information easier. And better still this problem can easily be overcome through interagency collaboration. Since the FD cannot possibly afford to set up its own website, one way to reach a wider audience would have been to upload its reports via the Central Statistical Office (CSO) website. Unfortunately, this opportunity remains unexploited. Having to access data from various sources was not only time consuming but extremely tedious too.

Finally, the National Archives³⁵⁷ bridged the gap – it became the best alternative. Other valuable sources were the University of Zambia and Ministry of Finance. Yet, if the department was well managed its data would be readily available because under normal circumstances information such as what this researcher was looking for would be captured in the department's annual reports, its research bulletins, occasional flyers (e.g. for extension purposes), or policy briefs (assuming forestry managers make use of their statistics to guide the policymakers).

(c) Incomplete and Un-captured Data

Another problem worth mentioning pertained to total lack of collaboration between FD and CSO, which is supposed to be a one-stop place for all national statistics. Yet, CSO hardly has any data on forestry.

³⁵⁷ Serves as a depository for public documents: the National Archives receives a copy of all government publications, statutes, newspapers, etc. whenever these are published, including closed files from all government bureaus.

Currently, the only forestry data at CSO, which is equally scanty, is on exports from a few wood-processing companies whose operations are reported via the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA).³⁵⁸ CSO has no data on wood consumed locally; an activity supposed to be captured by the FD.

According to one officer at CSO, “Forestry Department does not self-report its data as other departments do, such as Agriculture, Even when we ask for data from the Forestry Department no one responds to our requests. As a result, forestry keeps itself out of national statistics, and we (I mean CSO) can’t be blamed for this blackout.”³⁵⁹ The officer further explained that due to limited financial resources CSO is also unable to get in the field to collect data from all sectors, and this has essentially kept forestry out of CSO reports.

(d) Database Management and Staff Misplacement

Another problem relates to the department’s new structure (since 1997), which has no provision for a planning unit, a section that was previously responsible for data collection and management. Currently, no one is responsible for data collection and documentation. It appears each section (the Extension or Research Branch) has to do its own data collection and management, an arrangement that simply looked unattainable. Apart from having a skeleton staff at FD HQ in each

³⁵⁸ CSO captures this data as part of its larger mandate to document annual exports and imports and their value, and not necessarily out of interest to capture forestry data.

³⁵⁹ C. Muwele, CSO (*personal communication*, June 2005)

branch, none of the officers at FD headquarters are trained in data management, and no one was willing to do a job they have not been trained for. To compound this problem, trained personnel in forest data management have been misplaced to do forest extension work in the Provinces.

As a temporary measure three experts in geographical information systems (GIS) and data management have been pulled from the provinces, where their positions exist in the new structure, to come and help with data management. But even these officers are not happy being away from family but more importantly their provincial heads need them too.

By now, it must be clear to the reader that the biggest caveat concerns data quality. While every precaution was taken to collect good quality data, the researcher does not guarantee its quality. And if one is observant enough, most of these problems do not require huge sums of money to resolve them but only a little ingenuity from the forest managers, specifically at headquarters.³⁶⁰ Unfortunately, this too is completely lacking. Searching for data in different sources turned out to be a problem way bigger than envisioned. Surely, FD can do better than this!

I do realize that by now someone might be wondering why anyone should trust the findings from this study, given the problems just

³⁶⁰ Though it applies mainly to the American situation, these colleagues in FD would benefit from Camaron J. Thomas' *Managers, Part of the Problem?* (Quorum Books: Westport, Connecticut), 1999

highlighted. First, although data quality is questionable, the reality is that this is the closest best there is, it is the best that could be found. Besides that, these problems actually re-affirm and reflect the strength of this investigation. This confirms the core argument of this study; that is, managerial [in]capacity accounts for most, if not all, of the department's failures. If these managers ever report for work, which we know they do – 8 hours a day Monday to Friday (and sometimes weekends) – it is unbelievable that they can even fail to produce an annual report!

Field Research

In contrast with the desk research, the survey research was a blissful exercise, and definitely compensated for the frustrations encountered with the desk research. This project had a very good reception in the Forestry Department as well as from some of the major forestry financiers.³⁶¹ In fact, the Chief Extension Officer was so thrilled with the study he not only agreed to officially inform the provincial heads about this study but also offered to send the questionnaires to all the provinces through the official channel and also collected them back using the same way.³⁶²

³⁶¹ The Finnish Embassy was particularly helpful. At the time of this study the Finnish Embassy had just commissioned a study to look at the economic potential of the forestry sector in Zambia, vis-à-vis towards poverty reduction. This researcher net-worked with the Finnish Embassy's team of consultants and benefited greatly from their preliminary findings.

³⁶² I'm highly indebted to Mr. Obote Shakachite, the Chief Extension Officer (at that time), for embracing this study in such a manner. Mr Shakachite is currently the General Manager for ZAFFICO.

For full disclosure, the reader may wish to know that this researcher is a former employee of the Forestry Department and still has some colleagues working for the department. How much this contributed to the good reception is probably an obvious speculation.

Data Analysis and Inference

The foregoing discussion and the preceding chapters have all tried to make a case for why this study is important. In particular, this chapter has tried to explain the research agenda, the choice and source of data and how it was collected, as well as how it has been analyzed.

As alluded to earlier, making a case for *cause* and *effect* associations between institutional capacity and forest degradation does not imply that inadequate technical and administrative capacity are the only factors solely responsible for the poor state of forests. The argument I make is that it is the major one. Obvious, we cannot rule out the fact that other causal factors are at play at any given time which makes it impossible to fully account for all effects.³⁶³ As King, *et. al.* (1994) have extensively argued, this is the “fundamental problem of causal inference. ...no matter how perfect the research design, no matter how much data we collect, ...no matter how much experimental control we have, we will

³⁶³ Gary King, *et. al.*, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton University Press), 1994:85-89; Little, 1991:159-160

never know a causal inference for certain.”³⁶⁴ This study is not spared from this reality either. The best any causal explanation does is to approximate causation from one factor at a time and only helps to explain part of the effect.³⁶⁵ However, one takes comfort in the fact that any good research should be able to identify the main underlying causes to a problem³⁶⁶ and be able to explain the links between cause and effect.³⁶⁷ This dissertation does just that.

We start from the *input* side of the production process “listing the observable implications of our theory”³⁶⁸ – staff and finances – emphasizing the fact that no organization can operate without these two inputs. And since changes in performance are best observed over a period of time, and in this case while taking into consideration major policy changes, this study utilizes this tested technique which also makes it possible to compare *before* and *after* SAP (as one major policy the Zambian government implemented over the years). We take 1985 as the cutting point for *before* and *after* SAP, mainly as a gesture of staying within the ambit of political correctness.³⁶⁹

Although this study utilizes a multi-method approach, it is somehow heavily oriented towards qualitative analysis. But as Gary King,

³⁶⁴ King, *et. al.*, 1994:79

³⁶⁵ King, *et. al.*, 1994:79

³⁶⁶ King, *et. al.*, 1994:4

³⁶⁷ Peter M. Nardi, *Doing Survey Research: A Guide to Qualitative Methods*, (Pearson Education Inc.: Boston), 2003:10-12

³⁶⁸ King, 1994:221

³⁶⁹ Although one would argue that SAP strictly started in 1973 when the first stabilization loan was accessed from the IMF, officially the Zambian government declare 1985 as the year when the SAP was adopted. Therefore, we choose to stay within the ambit of political correctness.

et. al. (1994) have argued, this must not be a source of concern because the authenticity of any research findings is not dependent on the approach used but on the competence of the researcher to observe, connect, explain and interpret the numerous dots and puzzles that the data presents.³⁷⁰ In other words, the superiority of a study findings does not lie in the research methodology and analytical approach adopted but rather in how well the findings are explained and, or interpreted. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches have strengths and flaws that sometimes reside not in the research design but simply in how the research question is framed. Aware of such shortcomings, that almost all research suffers from one form of weakness, it is befitting to acknowledge that this one is no exception. And the biggest caveat is on the data quality, in particular, on the state of the forest estates, which most likely do not reflect the reality on the ground. What FD has reported is far more than the area covered by gazetted forests. This study makes an adjustment, based on Provincial reports, and shows how this may have progressed.

Since policy reform is a product of political maneuvers, consideration of the impact of policy elites is automatically part of the larger discussion. As policy architects, the influence of policy elites on forestry policy and subsequently on the department itself is quite obvious. Apart from controlling the forestry policy goals, policy elites also

³⁷⁰ King, *et.al.*, *Designing social Inquiry*, 1994

struggle to advance and protect their interests so much so that unless the department is supported by those groups that have the strongest influence in the policy arena chances of success with its programs would be next to none. Hence, the influence of policy elites on forestry policy and the industry in general is a real issue. Infrastructure and other technological resources that the department has been [un]able to tap into are also part of the larger discussion.

Conclusion

To summarize, this analysis has been performed from two angles: the *structural* and *functional* capacity of the department. The *structural* portion (which I prefer to call the *input* side) of institutional capacity was measured in terms of the number and quality³⁷¹ of forestry personnel staff and the annual outlays the department received for its programs. The *functional* aspect assessed the management practices, personnel knowledge about government policy (e.g. the SAP) and their role in implementing the same in the forestry sector.

In the larger discussion, we reflect on the relationships between forest managers and policy makers as well as the role of policy elites. Since policies are usually broad statements of intent,³⁷² the study tried to find out if forest managers planned together to break down such policy statements like the ones meant to pursue “product diversification” and

³⁷¹ Quality refers to their professional expertise and skills.

³⁷² Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:xiii-xv; Grindle, 1980:6

“growth from own resources”³⁷³ into implementable targets.³⁷⁴ Did these forest managers understand what such policy statements entailed? How far down the bureaucratic ladder were these policy goals understood? And how much support or opposition did the department receive/confront, within and outside government, in the course of pursuing the structural reforms?

This information is important not only because it would highlight the degree to which forest managers ‘owned’ the program (i.e. by being able to develop their own targets and objectives), but more importantly it would reflect the department’s capacity to interpret government policy into simplified workable goals that are understood by staff at all levels of the department’s structure.³⁷⁵ The ability to simplify broad policy statements into implementable goals does indicate availability of expertise on policy analysis, the ability to tailor a program to the local conditions and, a commitment to implement the program.³⁷⁶ A case in point is the success story about the industrial plantations, which later became a corporation.

Finally, since it is almost impossible to account for all interactions among the different variables in any given analysis, likewise, I do not claim to have accounted for all possible interactions in this study either.

³⁷³ GRZ, *New Economic Recovery Programme: Fourth National Development Plan 1989-1993. Vol. I and II*, 1989:29

³⁷⁴ Grindle, *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*, 1980:6-7

³⁷⁵ Quick, “The Paradox of Popularity: “Ideological” Program Implementation in Zambia,” in: Merilee S. Grindle (ed.), 1980; Israel, *Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance*, 1987:38

³⁷⁶ Cornia, et. al., *Adjustment with a Human Face*, 1987:8; Israel, *Institutional Development*, 1987:149-50

And this could be another source of weakness too. However, we should take comfort in the fact that every study is useful – either for contributing new knowledge and insights, raising questions to stimulate debate and further research, or simply providing some lessons on what pitfalls to avoid. My hope is that this study will be useful in all or some of these areas, particularly in raising interest for further debate and research.

Chapter 4

Research Findings

Taking the 1960s as a baseline for tracking how indigenous protected forests in Zambia have changed over time, the first thing one notices is that this has taken a full circle, from 5 million ha of forests in 1962 and back again to roughly the same figure (5.16 million ha.) in 2005.³⁷⁷ Notice that FD maintains that it has 7,103,099 ha as if no forest degradation is taking place anywhere.

Initially, there is a period of rapid increase in forest estates (1962-1983) from what seems to have been an ambitious expansion program. From 5 million hectares of gazetted forests in 1962³⁷⁸ this area steadily increased to 7.6 million by 1983, the highest level attained (**Figure 4.1**), which also represents a 69.8% increase.³⁷⁹ In fact, it is not an overstatement to say the first 15 years since independence (1964-1979) truly exemplifies professional excellence in the Forestry Department.

Sadly, thereafter, forest estates start to decline, at first gradually until 1994 when the first biggest slump occurred in which the department lost (degazetted) 611,527 hectares, mainly for subsistence farming and human


³⁷⁷ See Appendix 5 for details over this change.

³⁷⁸ FAO, *Forest Trends*, 1967:23

³⁷⁹ This calculation and the graph are based on data from FD, *Annual Reports* (1965 to 2005).

settlements.³⁸⁰ And this trend has continued to date, accelerated in particular by two more major slumps in 2000 and 2001 when the department again lost huge chunks of forests: 741,527 ha and 461,908 ha, respectively (**Figure 4.1** and **Appendix 4**). In general, the loss of forest estates has been mainly due to illegal encroachments,³⁸¹ whose roots can be traced to political economy factors, policy reforms, land tenure and ownership rights, population growth versus high unemployment dynamics, and political expedience. But over and above all this forest degradation has been permitted by a weak institutional capacity in FD, the inability to manage the internal and external challenges FD has faced.

Figure 4.1: Protected Forest Areas in Zambia, 1962-2005.




³⁸⁰ Davy Siame, "Forest Management under Drought Conditions," in: IUCN, *Proceedings of a Follow-up Workshop to the 1991-922 Drought Workshop*, p.74

³⁸¹ Davy Siame, "Forest Management under Drought Conditions," 1997:74; Felix Njovu, et. al., *Key Threats and Opportunities for Conservation of Biodiversity*, (WWF-SARPRO), 2004:8, 29-35, 45-47

According to FD's reports the extent of its forest estates is just slightly above 7.1 million ha., though in reality this has dropped to roughly 5.2 million ha.³⁸² as this study found out. **Figure 4.2** shows the change in indigenous forests based on what FD reports and what this study found, while **Table 4.1** shows how these estates are spread across the nation, based on FD's unadjusted data.³⁸³

Figure 4.2: Change in PFAs in Zambia, 1962-2005.



When viewed in terms of net gain and loss at 5-year intervals, here too the trend is quite distinct. Initially, there is a marked increase in net gain up until 1975. But this pattern suddenly changes to net losses starting from the 1980s with the situation becoming worse at the advent of the 1990s and

³⁸² This figure takes into consideration all those heavily encroached forests which the Forestry Department still maintains in its books despite the fact that technically these forests do not exist anymore.

³⁸³ This table does not adjust for any land that has not legally degazetted though the department is aware of illegal encroachments all across the country.

continues all the way into the new millennium (**Table 4.1** and **Figure 4.2**).³⁸⁴ The question is how did this come about? And what are the major factors at play that caused or are sustaining this downward spiral both in the extent and quality of indigenous forests?

Table 4.1: Protected Forest Areas by Location.³⁸⁵

Province	Gazetted Forests (Km ²) ^{a/}			% of Total Land Area
	National	Local	Total	
Central	3,775	2,244	6,019	6.4%
Copperbelt	5,136	488	5,624	17.9%
Eastern	6,833	1,653	8,486	12.3%
Luapula	2,125	2,271	4,396	6.9%
Lusaka	4	420	424	1.9%
Northern	8,016	3,089	11,105	7.5%
North-Western	20,650	4,026	24,676	23.4%
Southern	1,848	5,155	7,003	8.2%
Western	3,059	2,991	6,050	4.8%
TOTAL	51,446	22,337	73,783	9.8%

^{a/} 1 Km² = 1 hectare (ha); an hectare being 100 m x 100 m.


Source: FAO, *Zambia: Identification of Forestry Investment Projects*, (FAO: Rome), 1996.

³⁸⁴ Due to the various levels of jurisdictional authority on land ownership and the numerous players involved in negotiating for forest protection the process may take anywhere from one to five years before a forest is finally gazetted, whereas degazettement may take less than a year. See for instance, Forestry Department's Annual Reports for 1984 to 1986.

³⁸⁵ Based on FD's figures that have not adjusted for those forests which are severely encroached.

Table 4.2: Net Change in Forest Estates, 1960-2005.³⁸⁶

Year	PFA (ha.)	Net Change (ha)
1960	4,800,000	0
1965	5,236,200	436,200
1970	5,800,000	563,800
1975	7,160,000	1,360,000
1980	7,600,000	-440,000
1985	7,378,300	-221,700
1990	7,375,500	-2,800
1995	6,492,400	-883,100
2000	6,363,600	-128,800
2005	5,160,200	-1,203,400



One plausible explanation lies in the Forestry Department's capacity (labor and financial outlays) to manage its forest estates, while the other

³⁸⁶ Based on the adjusted figures from this study.

involves the external factors that came into play. Together this has created a complex and conducive environment that has made agents of forest degradation to thrive. The discussion that follows shows how this happened and is being sustained, but also offers some possible solutions to this problem.

Institutional Capacity as an Agent of Change

To understand how forest degradation in Zambia is connected to FD's institutional capacity and why this has been a continuing phenomenon, we begin by observing changes in forest estates in relation to the two primary levels of capacities in the Forestry Department – labor and financial outlays – while holding the external factors constant. It is important to start with these two *inputs* because not only does labor and capital belong to the first layer of *required* factors of production but more importantly they are precisely the *primary sources of capacity*. No organization can become operational without these two inputs. Therefore, whether it is a public or private enterprise, availability and adequacy of labor and capital is important. The second reason is that FD's complaints have always been about inadequate field staff and finances as the two biggest setbacks constraining its efforts to effectively manage its forest estates. This study responds verify these complaints, as a research hypothesis.


Except for some occasional peaks here and there, a quick look at the two sources of capacities reveals that both forestry personnel and funding

for forestry programs generally took a downward trend. A similar pattern is observed on the forest estates too, they decline in tandem with reductions in labor and funding (**Figure 4.4**). The changes in forest estates, following the reductions in forestry personnel and financial allocations, seem to suggest that these three factors are somehow connected. While correlation does not imply causality the trend is so distinct it is tempting one could easily conclude that a decline in capacity is contributing to the loss of forest estates. But a trend such as this one only establishes a direction of change, it does not tell the degree of impact and therefore it would be premature to rush to such a conclusion. Most likely there are other factors at play too, and I return to this later on in this Chapter.


Obviously, the connection between human and financial resources and the loss of forest estates should not come as a surprise in the sense that as a field enterprise forestry relies heavily on the physical presence of field staff who have to map not only forest stock densities but also to license and monitor forest operations. In addition, they have to establish the rights and levels of access for resources extraction to promote sustainable use, all of which requires adequate financial support.

Figure 4.4: Change in PFAs, Forestry Personnel, and Financial Outlays to Forestry Dept.


a) Protected Forest Areas, 1962-2005.




b) Change in Forestry Personnel, 1970-2005.¹



c) GRZ Annual Allocations to FD, 1970-2005.



d) Capital Funds for Forestry Projects 1970 to 2005.



¹ No data available on staff levels prior to 1970.

Therefore, a reduction in human and financial resources is likely to affect the quality of the forests, as it turned out in the *Zambian case study*. But to what degree did this contribute to the problem? I come back to discuss this later. For now let us take a closer look at these graphs to gain a better understanding on what is happening.

A related matter to the above, but somehow at a different level, concerns financial injections from external sources³⁸⁷ invested in forestry. It is possible, if not plausible, to argue that this external financial assistance, which somehow increased over the years³⁸⁸ should have helped to cushion the shortfall after government reduced its support to forestry. Unfortunately, this argument cannot hold because such monies did not go into natural forest management, except for the financial assistance from Germany channeled through *Gesellschaft Für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)* whose assistance, for a change, was specifically for the *Teak forests in Western Province*.

Therefore, although foreign financiers have strongly supported forestry development in *Zambia*, their emphasis has been in other areas not natural forests, and for this reason their efforts did not have much impact in natural forests. However, since the mid-1990s some organizations (e.g. the *FAO*, *FINNIDA*, and the *EU*) have financed a few area studies to understand the

³⁸⁷ This includes bilateral and multilateral loans and grants from various sources, notably from the *World Bank*, *FINNIDA*, *FAO*, *EU*, *IFAD*, *JICA*, *GTZ*, *Africare* and others. For more details on this see *Appendix 4 and 5*.

³⁸⁸ For details on this see *Appendix 4*

problems associated with indigenous forest management in Zambia.³⁸⁹ Their recommendations can be summarized as falling into three themes: 1. Streamlining the department's operations to make it more efficient and effective, 2. Capacity building (focusing on technical knowledge) to support the first recommendation, and 3. Introducing joint forestry management (JFM), a concept that advocates for inclusion of other stakeholders as partners in forest management.

Under the first theme, these recommendations include but not limited to: privatizing the department so it could be free of government interference; improving the department's revenue collection mechanism, one that would assign commercial concessioners real responsibility for re-stocking or re-planting the forests after their logging operations before moving to another area. Unfortunately, all of these sound recommendations continue to gather dust on the shelves mainly because they offer radical changes that threaten the current power base (and source of benefits), both within the department and the larger political arena. From my humble assessment of both the forestry law and the procedures that govern issuance of forest licenses, especially to commercial concessioners, I do not envision the Forestry Department to follow through on these recommendations anytime soon because both forestry officials and politicians benefit from the current weaknesses in the laws and the chaotic procedures surrounding issuance of licenses all of which obstruct true transparency and accountability.

³⁸⁹ See ZFAP and PFAP studies, and J.F.W. Fynn, *Appraisal of Zambia's Forest Sector Commercial Systems* (Scanagri: Finland), March 2004

As some scholars have noted, such behavior is common in public organizations, particularly if the policy required to be implemented is unpopular. Bureaucrats will do whatever is in their power to delay or simply ignore implementation of that particular policy. And this fits what is playing out in the Forestry Department. The only difference is that not all forestry personnel support this delay, most would like those recommendations implemented. But the Director of Forestry is reluctant to move on with the recommendations, one of which is the creation of the Forestry Commission to phase out the FD, which essentially amounts to draining one's pond.

Dependent vs. Independent Variables

Although the general trend suggests that the forest estates have moved in tandem with reductions in labor and financial outlays a closer look actually reveals some interesting contradictions, especially when viewed in the context of policy history, *vis-à-vis* bringing in certain policy landmarks such as before and after 1980s, when the Zambian government embraced the structural adjustment program (SAP), a World Bank/IMF sponsored economic policy meant to promote free market economic liberalism in the developing countries. SAP comes into play here because it stands out as a major landmark between the time when forests were well managed, the period before 1980s (i.e. before SAP), and the 1980s and beyond (after SAP) when everything fell apart as seen in the number of forests lost. Whether the

SAP is part of the factors contributing to forest degradation is a matter to be settled by findings from this study.

In the 1960s (and earlier) the department had fewer and less qualified personnel (**Table 5.2**) compared to early to mid-1980s and (**Table 5.3**)³⁹⁰ where there is some improvement, a positive outcome of investments pursued under the national building policy soon after independence.

Table 4.3: Staff Development, 10 Years after Independence.

Staff	1964	1974
Zambian Professionals	None ¹	5
Zambians at Universities	2	19
Foresters ² (trained in Zambia)	2	97
Forest Rangers ³ (trained in Zambia)	153	291
Forest Estates		
Protected Forests Areas, indigenous (ha.)	5,400,000	6,500,000
Percentage of national area	7.2%	9.4%
Area surveyed for management plans (ha.)		
Exotic Plantations (ha.)	1,060	22,500
¹ The department had 33 expatriate professionals at this time. ² Diploma in Forestry (equiv. to Associate Degree) ³ Certificate in Forestry (2-year program)		

Source: Forest Department, *Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years*, 1975:8-9

Out of the 33 professional staff³⁹¹ available at independence (1964) all of them were expatriates from Canada, Finland and the UK.³⁹² And the situation was not great in the junior categories too where the total number is

³⁹⁰ Forest Department, *Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years*, 1975:8-9

³⁹¹ Under the Forestry Department's staff classification system "professional" is loosely applied to cover all those with a 4-year college degree and above. For consistence, the same application is maintained in this study.

³⁹² Forestry Department, *Annual Report for 1964*, (1965)

also below the 1970 levels (**Table 4.3**). But the situation quickly improved as **Table 4.4** illustrates.

The period prior to 1980s also stands out as a period of nation building in all aspects – socio-political and economic – and this occurred across sectors³⁹³ despite the political challenges at that time.³⁹⁴ In particular, forestry received special attention on the policy agenda due to its connection to the copper industry as a source of wood energy as well as for construction works in the mines. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that forestry was regarded as twin industry to copper mining. As a source of wood energy, forests were perceived as sustaining the economic backbone of the nation and therefore had its status elevated on the political arena.

In contrast, the 1980s and beyond can be summed up in one word, chaotic – nationally and worse in forestry circles. It is a period known for some very unpopular economic policy reforms such as the SAP, a policy that created more problems than the solutions. Politically, this was also a time when Zambians started to seriously question [again]³⁹⁵ the moral basis of being a one Party state, running on a government-controlled economy that continued to drive the nation further into debt, and therefore unable to

³⁹³ Burdette, *Zambia: Between Two Worlds*, 1988; Richard Hall, *Zambia*, (Frederick A. Praeger Publishers: New York), 1967: Chapters 9 and 10.

³⁹⁴ Richard Hall, *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South* (Africana Publishing Corporation: New York), 1970

³⁹⁵ I say *again* because these changes were unpopular from the very beginning as evidenced by loss of life during demonstrations against the same. But the masses were finally subdued and forced to tolerate the situation by the strong hand of the state.

adequately finance its programs. The impact of these policy shifts is also evident in forestry circles as the previous observations illustrate, which also implies that we could look beyond the FD to find some explanations for what is happening to the forest estates. For now these factors are held constant until the investigation on internal capacity in FD is exhausted.

In terms of professional staff, the improvement that took place did not hold for a long time. Just after mid-1980s the number of professional staff suddenly went back to the 1960s levels, partly because most of those professionals joined ZAFFICO, while others left for greener pastures both within the country and abroad.

Faced with salary ceilings and restrictions that did not allow expansion of the department's structure, which were part of the SAP prescriptions, most professional staff found these conditions a disincentive that did not recognize and reward their expertise and also restricted their upward mobility. Therefore, they left. And this is not surprising because as the literature on organizational behavior and personnel management points out,³⁹⁶ providing the right incentives is important for staff motivation and retention.

³⁹⁶ There is a huge amount of literature on this topic. See for instance, Frederick Taylor, "Scientific Management," in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) *Classics of Public Administration*, 1987; Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in: Gulick and Urwick, (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration*, 1937:3-45; Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation*, 1973; Gulick, 1937:3-13, 21-30; Rolf E. Rogers, *Organization Theory*, 1975:47-61

Table 4.4: Change in Forestry Personnel, 1970-2005.

Year	Forestry Department Personnel ¹				Total Staff
	<i>Professional</i>	<i>Technical</i>	<i>Field</i>	<i>Admin</i>	
1970	33	66	350	145	594
1971	36	179	287	109	522
1972	33	166	280	119	598
1973	33	103	284	132	552
1974	26	84	284	132	552
1975	36	53	214	145	448
1976	28	82	267	145	522
1977	26	114	374	144	658
1978	37	118	367	135	657
1979	37	150	326	142	655
1980	41	190	222	132	585
1981	50	213	333	92	688
1982	47	244	353	161	805
1983	40	82	372	82	576
1984	40	81	365	80	566
1985	38	97	365	80	580
1986	35	113	3132	63	3343
1987	29	117	1410	58	1614
1988	21	108	1303	55	1487
1989	21	128	1303	55	1507
1990	19	152	1288	55	1514
1991	23	142	1273	62	1500
1992	23	130	1249	62	1464
1993	28	130	1247	54	1459
1994	28	128	1188	50	1394
1995	17	112	1120	64	1313
1996	21	124	1064	63	1272
1997	26	115	695	47	883
1998	26	115	695	47	883
1999	26	115	695	47	883
2000	41	539	478	60	883
2001	44	434	273	135	886
2002	22	439	384	82	927
2003	23	417	374	76	890
2004	23	418	374	76	891
2005	23	418	374	76	891

¹ No data available from 1962 (the baseline for this study) to 1969.

Source: FD Annual Reports for 1970 to 2005

And all of these depend on a number of factors, one of which is the rewards system.³⁹⁷ When the right incentives are not made available, exit always becomes the only option.

Therefore, what has been happening in the FD is nothing outside the expected. And because of such exits the number of professional staff dropped drastically, back to the 1960s level. In this respect, one can argue that the number of professional staff has generally remained almost at the same level, with just some modest increase in the 1980s and later between 2000 and 2001. But, notice that at a time when the department had fewer and less qualified personnel (1960s to 1970s), ironically that is also the time when it performed very well as witnessed in the enormous expansion of its estates (**Figure 4.4a**).³⁹⁸ And its achievements extend to other areas too, namely forest research, extension and training, and the establishment of industrial and local supply plantations.³⁹⁹ Local supply plantations, a smaller scale of the industrial plantations, were established in all provinces to deviate dependence on indigenous forests.

Its total labor strength between 1970 (the earliest time data is available) and 1979, when the highest level in forest expansion was achieved, was almost constant (**Figure 4.4a and b**). Also notice that the

³⁹⁷ A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50 (July 1943), pp370-396 1943; Douglas M. McGregor, "The Human side of Enterprise," in: Shafritz and Hyde (ed.) *Classics of Public Administration*, 1987; L. Urwick, "Organization as a Technical Problem," in: William Sexton (ed.) *Organization Theories*, 1970; Andrew D. Szilagy and Marc J. Wallace, *Organizational Behavior and Performance*, (Scott, Foresman and Company: Glenview, Il), 1987, 4th Edition. Part 3 and 5

³⁹⁸ Appendix 5

³⁹⁹ Forest Department, *Forestry in Zambia Since Independence -10 Years*, 1975:8-9

largest growth in forest estates (1972-1979) does not coincide with the increase in labor force; the former occurred at a time when the department still had a modest number of staff.

What is even more interesting is the fact that as the staff-hectare ratio declines, that is the time when forest degradation is increasing. Yet at a time one member of staff had more forest hectares to “watch” over when the department did better (**Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5**). Convention wisdom would make us believe that with fewer hectares to manage per individual the department should have done better than it did when its staff certainly had more hectares to manage.

In addition to these achievements, the department was able to plant over 60,000 ha of exotic plantations in the Copperbelt Province to provide wood to the copper mines. This project was such a success it was eventually incorporated as a state company called the Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation (ZAFFICO). To date ZAFFICO is the only and largest company dealing in plantation timber. Up until 2002 ZAFFICO also had sawmills, but these have been sold in response to the SAP privatization policy,⁴⁰⁰ a very unpopular reform policy that has sent a lot of people out of jobs thereby exacerbating pressure on the forests which became the only safety net for the unemployed.

⁴⁰⁰ Zambia Privatization Agency, *Privatization Status Report* (Lusaka, Zambia), 30th April, 2000

Table 4.5: Forest Staff to Forest Estates Ratio, 1964-2005.			
Year	Forest Estates (ha.)	No. of Staff *	Ha./Person
1964	5,229,167	153	34,178
1974	7,130,600	420	16,978
1984	7,462,149	486	15,354
1994	7,103,884	1,344	5,286
2005	5,160,137	815	6,331
* This number excludes administrative staff who are not directly involved in forest management activities.			

SAP aside, the achievements just alluded to are by no means meager; they signify the department's capacity not only to formulate and implement government policy but more importantly its ability to plan strategically and to achieve its objectives. Notice that all this happened at a time when its labor force was relatively low, not to mention the fact that even the annual allocation were far from being magnificent. Yet instead of sustaining this management style and the fiscal responsibility that accompanied it, somehow the department lost its performance momentum (measured in terms of the extent and quality of its forests).


The point I'm trying to make here is that forest loss occurred when there was an increase in personnel. Looking at the official statements (mostly as complaints) from the department, including the various studies it has

commissioned⁴⁰¹ they all point at two factors contributing to forest loss: 1. inadequate labor force to undertake the necessary field activities, and 2. financial constraints to facilitate executing the department's plans. Yet as **Table 4.5** and **Figure 4.5** indicate this argument is now highly debatable. At a time when labor force increased, that's when forest loss has also noticeably increased. How do we explain these contradictions? Why did forest degradation⁴⁰² accelerate at a time when the department's capacity had improved (as in number of personnel and their technical skills) and yet performance is going down?

The best way to handle this is to look at each institutional capacity variable individually to see how each is contributing to forest degradation. Starting with labor, the figures indicate that the department generally had a lean structure in its formative years. Yet this is also a time it did very well in terms of increasing the size of its estates, including the way they were managed as evidenced by the degree of importance attached to undertaking forest surveys and preparation of management plans.

⁴⁰¹ See for instance, the work done by various consultants under ZFAP and ZFAP.

⁴⁰² I use the word degradation here to signify a precursor situation in which a forest gets deforested such that it becomes necessary to give it up. Forests are never degazetted if they have not been abused, except under special circumstances. Usually when such a situation arises FD will bargain to exchange for another area. See for instance FD Annual Report 1975.

Figure 4.5: Forest Staff to Forest Estates Ratio, 1964-2005.

Several things can be attributed to this but three stand out and deserve mention up front. First is that the department had established very good relationships with the local Chiefs⁴⁰³ (and their subjects) and was, therefore, able to tap into and ride on the local community's long established capacity and commitment to manage their forests. These informal partnerships with the local communities gave the department additional capacity at local level. And because part-time forest patrolmen were employed from the respective local communities, this created a sense of

⁴⁰³ Under the nation's land tenure arrangements Chiefs own more land (Trust Land) than central government (State Land) and therefore all forest reservations in Trust Lands require the Chiefs' approval. Out of Zambia's total landmass, 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust Land, followed by 36.2% (27.2 million ha) Reserve Land, and 6% (4.5 million ha) as State Land. For more details on land ownership/tenure see: GRZ, *Report of the Land Commission*, Lusaka, August 1967; GRZ, *Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296*, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970; M. P. Mvunga, *The Colonial Foundations of Zambia's Land Tenure System*, (NecZam: Lusaka), 1980; M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in Ng'andwe, A. (ed.), *Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia*, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45; D.J. Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), *Zambia in Maps*, University of London Press, Ltd, 1971:48-49.

security (and hope) for job prospects and this helped to solidify these partnerships. It was not unusual for the local communities to apprehend offenders, or even fight forest fires without calling in forestry personnel.⁴⁰⁴ But all this has evaporated and replaced by anarchy. Local communities have become law unto themselves, as witnessed through illegal forest encroachments. With abolition of part-time positions for forest patrolmen, and the fact that all commercial sawmills are located in urban areas, local communities do not see any economic benefits accruing to them from their forests and therefore are up in arms to regain their property.⁴⁰⁵ They are demanding not only access to the forest resources but implicitly inclusion in the decision making process on what should be done to their land. And this situation is not peculiar to Zambia; it reflects a common response from indigenous people whenever their power base is threatened or harbor perceptions of being short-changed. Latin America provides a timely example.⁴⁰⁶

Second, there is the issue of respect for the law. Prior to 1980s the public had great respect for the laws relating to forest conservation and utilization. Although forests are a public good, that could have fallen prey to the tragedy of the commons syndrome, somehow this did not manifest as a problem. The public adhered to both the local and national laws and regulations on forests. But this moral fiber seems to have disintegrated

⁴⁰⁴ Fynn, *Appraisal of Zambia's Forest Sector Commercial Systems*, 2004:28

⁴⁰⁵ Fynn, 2004:28

⁴⁰⁶ Deborah J. Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Post-Liberal Challenge*, (Cambridge University Press), 2005.

starting around the mid to late 1980s when illegal forest encroachment suddenly reared its face, and has accelerated since then.⁴⁰⁷ In most cases local politicians encourage the practice who in return get votes from the public as a pay back for “fighting on their behalf” to get their land back from central govt. Although I might be walking on slippery ground here to suggest that this break down in morals that caused the public to invade the forests may have been due to the perceived political liberties that came at the dawn of a new era – i.e. transitioning from an authoritarian government into a democratic dispensation – I’m inclined to think that this political change did have some effect. As the demand for a reverting to a democratic government system engulfed the country suddenly there was a sense of liberty and empowerment across the country, which to some meant having the freedom to do as they wanted, especially with anything owned by government e.g. public lands. Suffice to say, this speculation is open for debate or systematic research. Why was there better forest management under an authoritarian regime compared to a democratic government?

Third, government’s adoption of the SAP has had severe implications on forests and the nation’s political economy in general. And since the SAP has been such a dominant as well as controversial policy it provides a good landmark for a *before* and *after* SAP analysis. It is dominant because it has been in force for over two decades and it is controversial in that no one likes it – the masses hate it and bureaucrats simply tolerate it – yet the powers

⁴⁰⁷ Davy Siame, “Forest Resource Management and Drought”, in: IUCN, *The Environmental Impact of the 1991-1992 Drought on Zambia*, 1997:73-73

that be have managed to keep it in play. In addition to the issues pointed out earlier, the other major problem that arose from the SAP, which directly affected the forests, relates to how the SAP contributed to increasing the unemployment rates and subsequently the poverty levels.

For instance, privatization of state-owned companies and market liberalization led to company closures and increased competition for the local companies such that local companies pushed out of business, respectively. And when government, the biggest employer, also downsized this caused the unemployment rate to swell over night. With no other means of livelihood in sight, people flocked to the forests to mine whatever could be sold – timber, wood fuel (used directly or burned to make charcoal), building sand, grass,⁴⁰⁸ and a host of other forest products. In this respect forests became the only viable alternative for millions and because of the heightened influx this caused dire consequences on the forests.

Although these effects have not been quantified yet, it is quite evident that joblessness has forced more people to embrace agriculture, which is a positive development if this transition can be harnessed. What is not good, from the forestry stand point is that this has increased pressure for degazetion of forests, especially those near the urban areas.⁴⁰⁹ Politically, this issue has become an octopus; both the public and politicians want to grab any forest claiming that more land is needed to accommodate those

⁴⁰⁸ Very popular in the leisure/hospitality industry where it is used for roofing e.g. chalets and similar infrastructure to keep that traditional appeal in play.

⁴⁰⁹ Njovu, Felix; Pia Chuzu; and Catherine Nguvulu, *Key Threats and Opportunities for the Conservation of Biodiversity in the Copperbelt Province*, 2004.

who want to return back to the land, a policy that never gained any traction under the Kaunda administration. Thus, it is not uncommon to hear complaints about land shortage in some areas when in fact this is not the case. The truth is having gotten used to urban lifestyle, those who have lost jobs still want to stay as close to urban pleasures as possible. This is why land shortage is only concentrated near urban areas.

Currency devaluation, one of the conditions of the SAP programs, eroded not only the local currency's purchasing power but worst of all it completely wiped out people's lifetime savings. With inflation rate changing from 0.02% in 1965, averaging between 0.05 to 0.06% in the 1970s and jumping to over 300% in the 1990s (before it come down to two figures in the new millennium), the Kwacha had become almost valueless. Currently, the exchange rate of the Kwacha to a US dollar stands at \$1=ZMK3,148.00!⁴¹⁰

The sudden loss of jobs, just mentioned earlier, also made these former employees vulnerable. Employees who had not anticipated early "retirement" suddenly found themselves on the streets with no means of livelihood, and having lost their savings through currency devaluation, this stripped off any investment possibilities that the savings could have been put to. As a result, most "retirees" turned to the forests as their only source of livelihood. Hence, the impact of the SAP on the forests is quite multi-faceted, and its contribution to forest degradation is indisputable. I discuss

⁴¹⁰ Daily updates on currency exchange rates are available at: <http://www.xe.com/ucc/>.


the SAP dimension later on in Chapter 6, under the section dealing with external factors.

The forest degradation problem can be approached from various angles. One is to look at what the department did [well] to stay on top of its challenges. The other is to try and understand other capacities, apart from the department's internal capacity. I return to this discussion later. For now let us look at how the department's internal capacity, labeled in terms of inadequate funding and forestry personnel.

Institutional Structure and Organizational Reforms

The other explanation for department's performance lies in its structure and the policy reforms. In particular, it is worth noting how the PSRP changed both the department's structure (**Figure 4.6** and **Figure 4.7**) and its mandate. There has been a titanic shift in the department's focus from forest management to forest extension, which as traditional foresters pointed out, has become the department's biggest weakness. As the department concentrates on forest extension, who will do forest management?


Figure 4.6: Forestry Department Organization Structure, before 1997.



¹ The Industrial Plantation ceased to be part of FD in 1985 when it was transformed into a parastatal called the Zambia Forestry and Forest Industries Corporation (ZAFFICO) Limited.

² Western Province had two Provincial Officers, one for the Teak Forests and the other for the rest of the Province.

Figure 4.7: Forestry Department Organization Structure, after 1997 (post PSRP).



¹ Western Province now has one Provincial head who is responsible for both the Teak Forests and the other forest types in the Province.

As observed earlier, FD performed better when it had a lean structure than when the level of its personnel increased. This does not imply that a lean structure is the solution, but to pose a question, how did it do that?

One explanation lies in the cordial relations that existed between FD and the Chiefs and their subjects. This is where FD's strength came from. There was, for instance, a deliberate policy to employ local people as part time or seasonal employees, which made the local communities to be part of the management team.

But it can also be argued that credit belongs to the Head of Department who provided good leadership both within and outside the department, which made the department to rise to such national prominence. Also the team spirit that those managers cultivated among the six specialized divisions propelled the department to professional excellence. As the responses from the survey indicate, and also speaking from experience as a former employer of the Forestry, this researcher do attest to the fact that that kind of environment encouraged cross-pollination of ideas among the managers which were then passed on down the ranks.

Some of the challenges facing the department relates to changes in its organizational structure and mandate. Up until the 1980s, the department had six specialized divisions (**Figure 4.6**); later reduced to six in 1986 when the IPD was incorporated into a quasi-government company.

In 1997, the department underwent a major overhaul under the public service reform program (PSRP), which further reduced the number of divisions to two: namely, the research and extensions branch. While all research work was retained in the research division, the functions of the rest of the divisions were condensed into the extension branch.

As various change management specialists and organization development experts have pointed out, change in and by itself can be a problem if not managed properly because it brings a host of insecurities about the future of the organization and even at individual level. How is the organization going to fair in its new outfit? Are the employees assured of job security? What will be the new focus? How does that fit into the old one?

Although the 1997 restructuring exercise is considered to have upgraded staff salary scales, functionally FD lost out by changing from five specialist divisions to two branches. The idea of retaining the most qualified for the job was well conceived and, in fact, just reaffirmed government's long established standards on merit-based recruitment for the civil service. What seems to have gone wrong is *how* the restructuring was implemented. The process retained supervisors at the various levels of the hierarchy and eliminated positions for people who actually carried out the field jobs.

In particular, the retrenchment of Forest Guards who were responsible for forest patrols and monitoring forest operations has been

the most damaging change the department ever made.⁴¹¹ Right now FD is only relying on the integrity of its clients to abide by the law. Yet, anyone familiar with the forestry business can guess what is actually happening, especially on timber extraction.

Both the personal interviews and questionnaire responses from the forest managers who participated in this study re-affirmed that forests have become a free-for-all resource! General lawlessness, forest encroachment and illegal settlements in protected forests, over-exploitation (and subsequently forest degradation) have all increased.

Furthermore, the change of emphasis from forest management, the department's core function, to forest extension has been another blunder FD committed in the PSRP process. As a result, the department is not paying attention to the resource base any more. Its main focus in recent years has been revenue collection, not even forest extension. Yet when one looks at the department's expertise over 70% of its staff are trained in forest management not forest extension, which has always been considered a "support" service! What was the rationale for switching from forest management, its core business, to forest extension? Looking at its

⁴¹¹ Apparently this problem is not confined to forestry alone as one senior official at Cabinet Office explained. The Department of Agriculture is also in a similar situation. All classified daily employee positions were also phased out and this has caused havoc on monitoring entry and exit of agricultural materials to and from Zambia. The 2004-2005 out-break of the foot and mouth disease for which Zambia has incurred high losses both on cattle and on vaccines to contain the disease, not to mention lost business on beef export, is a good example of the impact of retrenching the Caught-on-Guard personnel in the Dept of Agriculture. Management Development Division (MDD) is in the process of approving reinstatement of lower rank positions that were phased out in the Department of Agriculture (*personal communication*, August 2005).

professional expertise, is the department going to be effective doing what the majority of its personnel are not trained for?

Connected to these structural and operational changes there has been a loss of more experienced personnel who were laid off and this has wiped out the institutional memory creating a knowledge vacuum that has resulted in corporate Alzheimer.

Already signs of these weaknesses are quite glaring. Despite the preference to concentrate on forest extension, right now there are no projects to this effect, not even a radio talk show! Having put forest management in the back seat, the department has literally been choking itself. And the impact of this change is evident from loss of and the general quality of its estates, mainly due to illegal settlements but also from unsupervised over-logging. With hindsight, it appears the department did not anticipate these problems.

In an effort to address over-logging the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR) temporarily suspended issuing forest licenses to foreign-owned timber companies as part of a larger strategy to reduce over-extraction, especially for exports. Environment Deputy Minister, Nedson Nzowa announced that, "...because of poor logistical support to the Forestry Department (FD) it was difficult to patrol the forests and monitor the scale of extraction. ...We are now only giving licenses to indigenous people.if the forests

get destroyed, it will be us to blame.”⁴¹² Surely, is this a solution? From a policy maker?! If the indigenous people destroy the forests, does that make the act right?

There is no need to penalize private investors who are supposed to propel forestry into another economically viable sector. Actions such as the license suspension send insecurity signals to investors. FD needs to conduct a serious self-assessment of what it needs to do. Considering the numerous studies that FD and its parent Ministry (MTENR) have commissioned over the years e.g. through the National Environmental Action Programme (NEAP), the Zambia Forest Action Programme (ZFAP), including the ongoing Provincial Forest Action Programme (PFAP), one would expect FD and MTENR to be well aware of the factors accelerating forest over-exploitation and environmental degradation in Zambia.⁴¹³ It is therefore disappointing that despite all these studies, all of which have repeatedly pointed to the same issues,⁴¹⁴ the FD and Ministry still appear not to know how to resolve this problem! Suffice to say, forest degradation is widespread both in open forests and protected forest

⁴¹² The Post Newspaper, *Govt Suspends Issuance of Forest Licenses to Foreigners*, January 09, 2006. http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=5003

⁴¹³ For more details on these issues see MENR, 1994; MENR, 1999: Vol. I, II and III; and Chapter 5 and 6 of this dissertation.

⁴¹⁴ These issues include, but not limited to: a weak institutional capacity in FD to monitor and supervise forest operations; high unemployment rate; policy conflicts between agriculture policy and forestry policy and; absence of statistics on real value of forests and its contribution to national economy; poor perception of forestry by policy makers; and traditional beliefs that see forests as a free resource for all. See: MENR, 1994; MENR, 1999: Vol. I, II and III; and most recently, Njovu, *et. al.*, *Key Threats and Opportunities for Conservation of Biodiversity*, (WWF-SARPO), 2004:29-35, 45-47.

areas.⁴¹⁵ Furthermore, it seems the future does not promise anything better if FD's institutional capacity is not improved.⁴¹⁶

Forestry Personnel and Annual Allocations

Looking at the status of forestry personnel and finances, two contrasting scenarios arise (**Figure 5.5. and 5.6**). With respect to labor force, the scenario is mixed across the four categories. On average the professional and administrative (support) staff declined after the SAP, whereas technical and field staff increased, and quite substantially for the latter (**Figure 5.5.**). A word of caution is appropriate here. While the field staff shows a substantial increase, in reality this is no longer the case because the positions for part-time forest patrolmen, that added over two thousand people to the field staff category, were abolished a year after being in existence, which means that the department went back to relying on its former labor capacity. With respect to financial outlays, the general situation is one of complete withdraw; it is as though the department was being closed (**Figure 4.8**). How did this come about?

⁴¹⁵ The various studies undertaken by MENR, *National Environmental Action Programme*, 1994; and under *PFAP*; *ZFAP*, 1998 all point to the same issues.

⁴¹⁶ J F W Fynn, *Appraisal of Zambia's Forest Sector Commercial Systems*. MENR, Lusaka, Zambia.2004:11-12

Figure 4.8: Forestry Personnel, before and after SAP.





Figure 4.9: Mean Annual Financial Outlays, (1994=100)



As noted earlier, most of these problems can be explained in terms of the SAP impacts. Apart from the problems mentioned earlier, the SAP package also forced government to freeze salary increments for civil servants as part of the larger objective on fiscal responsibility. This became a disincentive and caused some foresters to leave for greener

pastures, thus setting in motion a brain drain with its attendant consequences on the department's institutional capacity.

Another relates to the public sector reform program (PSRP), basically an extension of the SAP, through which the actual government downsizing was implemented and the FD was the first department to undergo that surgery. Tie these two together (effects from SAP and PSRP) and a perfect stage is set for loss of institutional memory as this study has just found out (**Figure 4.10**). The department hired more younger people with less experience against a few who had more experience. The implications here are quite obvious.


Clearly, the loss of institutional memory left the new hires in a position of having to learn on their feet. If what is happening with the forest estates is anything to go by, the retrenchment of older experienced managers was definitely not a prudent strategy.

Also another feature arising from PSRP is that the bulk of the department's managers are young Turks: 17% are 20-29 years of age; 48% (30-39 years) and only 12% are above 50 years old (**Figure 4.11**). This is good in terms of expecting a longer service from these young employees. However, it has its down side – inexperience – and its cost is being seen in the quality of forest estates. Also because the PSRP process was so sudden⁴¹⁷ these young Turks (some of whom are non-foresters)

⁴¹⁷ According to one government official at Cabinet Office, speaking on condition of anonymity, the World Bank gave the Zambia government an ultimatum to cut its size to a level where government's wage bill did not exceed 8.9% of National GDP. Specifically, government was told to abolish all classified daily

suddenly found themselves in leadership positions but with no one to mentor them.

Figure 4.10: Forest Managers' Years of Service.⁴¹⁸




Now these new managers are learning on the job and trying to find their feet. How bad is the situation? 42% of the managers surveyed don't know if the department has any work plans; 40% have no idea who develops the work plans, if any exist; and 51% are not involved in any planning sessions. In other words, almost half the department's managers may not even know what a work plan is, let alone how to develop one! This is a serious weakness which speaks to the very core of policy/program implementation. In the absence of work plans, what road

employee (CDE) positions, considered non-essential. 24,000 CDEs were removed from the payroll and later some professionals too. *Personal communication, August 2005*

⁴¹⁸ Refers to the survey respondent's working life in the Forestry Department, which works out to be from 1980 to 2005 based on the longest (25 years) serving employees.

map do these managers have as their guide? What goals are they working towards?



As van de Walle reminds us, because state capacity is a sum of its bureaus, it is this type of poor organizational power and “weak administrative capabilities” that keep most African nations in a state of permanent crisis.⁴¹⁹ van de Walle further points out that “top technocrats may be very competent and well trained, but ...with very little data gathering, planning, and policy analysis capabilities”⁴²⁰ this ultimately translates into poor performance.

⁴¹⁹ Va de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis*, 2001:55

⁴²⁰ Va de Walle, 2001:55

The sudden implementation of PSRP and its implications are not only felt in forestry but other bureaus have experienced similar problems. As one government official from Cabinet Office explained, the unplanned nature of PSRP not only reduced government's capacity to function normally but it has been a costly undertaking.

“we were under so much pressure to cut down the civil service that our only choice was to meet their deadline or risk having no capital injection. ...Sadly, the repercussions have been so bad, and I regret to say contrary to reducing government expenditure, as these reforms were supposed to do, government has not saved a penny from staff retrenchments. Instead, this exercise has cost us way beyond the projected *savings* from retrenchments.”⁴²¹

Drawing on one incidence from the Department of Agriculture the official further explained how the loss of capacity in Department of Agriculture (DoA), translated into an economic melt-down for the farmers. As per instructions from the World Bank, government laid off all classified daily employees (CDEs) and general workers. As a result, the DoA had no “first responders” – workers that did the field inspections, e.g. monitoring on-farm activities. In addition, the DoA had also laid off the staff that dealt with phyto-sanitary certification of agricultural products at ports of entry. Consequently, national borders became porous, and people could bring in anything from anywhere. In the

⁴²¹ Director, MDD – *personal communication*, August 2005.

meantime, subsistence and small-scale farmers who are normally dependent on government, especially for livestock services, had no one to help them carry out preventive measures. Therefore, when the foot-and-mouth disease broke out in Southern Province, which quickly spread to other parts of the country, government had no capacity to response to the problem because, as the government official explained:

“We had just let go of the people that would have prevented the problem in the first place! We were in panic mode! In order to bring the situation under control, we rehired the retrenched staff as consultants, which meant paying them slightly more than their previous government salaries. Then more chemicals were needed to contain the disease. And since this had to be expedited shipping, it cost much more than usual. ...But worst of all the national cost came from loss of livestock and business, both locally and international. Domestic consumers stopped eating beef, while countries that imported beef from Zambia also put a trade embargo on Zambian beef. The situation was simply devastating to livestock farmers and government too. For close to a year Zambia did not export any beef! ...Put together all these costs were far beyond the wage bill that was supposedly “saved” through retrenchments! ...government ended up incurring unnecessary costs way beyond what should have been saved!To say the least, this exercise just taught us another good lesson on the ugly face of SAP, PSRP⁴²² or whatever name people call it...”⁴²³

⁴²² The actual exercise of government restructuring was implemented as a Public Service Reform Program (PSRP); a condition under SAP.

⁴²³ Director, MDD – *personal communication*, August 2005.

This official further explained that other departments have encountered similar problems too and their costs have not even been quantified yet. For instance, the health sector was suffering from the worst ever brain drain as medical doctors have left the public service for greener pastures abroad, and this impact was having reverberations across the nation. The only difference was that unlike in the agriculture department where positions were eliminated, in the health sector the positions are available, but no doctors to fill them. The out flow of nurses to other countries is creating a similar problem. Contemplating over the abolished positions for gauge-readers in the Department of Energy and Water Development, the officer simply said, “we are keeping our fingers crossed that we do not end up with another catastrophic situation on the hydro-power stations. That would simply be disastrous!”⁴²⁴

While reform is good, sometimes it can be destructive. The SAP certainly falls in this category, not only indirectly but also directly. For a long time government employees had lived under the veil of fear not knowing when their bureau would be restructured and whether or not they would be retained. This job insecurity did a lot of harm. An insecure worker is usually very unproductive too. Working under a management style that does not give them an avenue to speak out has been overly frustrating. Some of them confessed that they just report for work and

⁴²⁴ Courtesy of personal interviews – information provided on condition of anonymity, August 2005.

hardly do anything. The current environment does not encourage cross-pollination of ideas and a team spirit or accommodate dissenting views. Instead, a culture of clientelism and cronyism⁴²⁵ has captured the department and is slowly but surely establishing itself as new standard. Those with no “connections” are at peril.

According to the survey findings, although ‘management meetings’ are sometimes held, the Director wields such powers that there is no collective decision making yet asks for collective responsibility from the management team. In most cases, the director makes unilateral decisions affecting the general workforce, often flouting the existing regulations. At the time of this fieldwork there was an administrative inquiry why some middle manager’s positions had more than one office holder beyond what the establishment provides for. Apparently, the director had ‘swapped’ some officers (demoted and appointed new ones) for positions way beyond the jurisdictional powers of the director’s office.

When new appointees demanded their pay raises commensurate with their “promotions” Cabinet Office raised an issue wanting to know who had promoted them since that fell under Cabinet Office’s purview and not the director! According to the regulations for those positions, the director could only recommend a course of action and it is up to Cabinet Office to accept or reject it.

⁴²⁵ For details on this issue see an exposition by Krisdankorn Klinkesorn, *Clientelism and Instability: The Case of the Thai Highway Police*, (University of Missouri-St Louis), Ph.D. Dissertation, December 2004.

	No. of Respondents	% of Total Respondents
Gender		
Male	69	85
Female	12	15
Management level		
Senior	14	17
Middle	25	31
Junior	42	52
<i>Age Group (years)</i>		
20-29	14	17
30-39	39	48
40-49	19	23
>50	10	12
Years of Service in FD		
<5	30	37
5-15	31	38
16-25	9	11
>25	11	14
<i>Current Location (FD Section)^a</i>		
Forest Management	27	33
Forest Extension	70 ^b	75
Forest Research	5	6
Forest Products Research	2	2
Other	4	7
<i>Field of Specialization^a</i>		
Forest Management	26	32
Forest Extension	19	23
Forestry Research	9	11
GIS & Remote Sensing	2	2
Natural Resource Management	3	4
Agroforestry	2	2
Apiculture	5	6
Agric. Extension	7	9
Human Resource Management	4	5
Don't know	7	9
<p>^a Some people did not answer this question, hence the number is less than total respondents.</p> <p>^b Includes 7 people who indicated Beekeeping, which is no longer a separate unit.</p>		

Personal relationships (and mainly the lack of it) between the Director and other managers has clouded the department's performance. Often good ideas have not been used because the working environment does not permit it.

On the other hand, those in good standing with the director are favored in training, performance evaluations and other fringe benefits. This oppression of talent is manifesting itself in poor performance, but also challenges the status quo that actually the department does not lack the capacity to deliver; capacity is available but subdued. According to the respondents, it is unlikely that the department can improve its performance in its present form. It needs a major surgery to energize into action the under-utilized technical capacity. Maybe the long-awaited transformation of the department into a Forest Commission will bring in new people and fresh ideas that would ultimately invigorate everyone again.⁴²⁶

Administrative Practices and Inter-Agency Relations

Finally, there are also issues relating to the internal administrative dynamics within the bureau itself, starting with the organizational structure and extending to personnel relations and their involvement in

⁴²⁶ The Forestry Commission was supposed to have come into being in 1999. But the Forestry Director has not authorized it by failure to prepare a one page Statutory Instrument to activate the law that would bring the FC into being.

the routine operations of the department.⁴²⁷ Of course the multi-dimensional character of the Forest Department's mandate creates conflicts with various stakeholders who also may have jurisdictional powers over some portions of the forests. For instance, forests as habitats for wildlife and by extension their role in supporting eco-tourism have always sustained a 'sweet-sour' relationship between FD and the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), formerly the Wildlife Department, in the sense that although FD has the overall mandate over the forest resources across the nation, foresters cannot exercise this mandate in the National Parks and Game Management Areas (GMAs) except by invitation by ZAWA. Where some portions of the National Parks and GMAs overlap with the FD's estates, still the FD cannot exercise its mandate in those forests; wildlife conservation takes priority.

This jurisdictional overlap and separation puts the FD in a very awkward position because FD is supposed to oversee activities related to forest resource extraction from all forests in the country be it in protected or open forests. Yet its authority is not absolute: it is restricted in some ways. And of course when other [primary] land users' demands for agriculture, human settlements, industrial development, etc. and the wider social issues come into play, e.g. population growth (which induces demand for more land) this complicates the department's job even further. This is because for the most part such demands are directed at

⁴²⁷ Andrew D. Szilagy and Marc J. Wallace, *Organizational Behavior and Performance*, (Scott, Foresman and Company: Glenview, Il), 1987, 4th Edition. Part 3 and 5.

the department's estates. Hence, FD has to deal with these challenges as they arise both administratively and politically. And this requires good managerial skills.

Forest Management and Jurisdictional Boundaries

Although FD's mandate extends to all indigenous forests (protected or open forests),⁴²⁸ excluding private property, in reality its *real* authority and accountability only applies to the protected forest areas (PFAs) where the department does the actual forest management activities and is therefore *directly* accountable for what happens to these forests.

Protected forest areas (PFAs) serve different roles: for production or protection purposes or as wildlife habitats. Production forests serve as reservoirs of forest biodiversity for the present and future generations and as a source of government revenue. Protection forests provide protective roles such as protection of water catchment areas, act as reservoirs for endangered animal and plant species, buffers to soil erosion, etc. No extraction activities are allowed in protective forests. On the other hand, National Parks (NPs) and Game Management Areas (GMAs) exist as for wildlife conservation, which is the nation's backbone for eco-tourism. No logging operations are allowed in these areas either.

⁴²⁸ The Forest Act of 1973

The Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), a quasi-government body created in 1997, oversees the management of NPs and GMAs.

The department's accountability for the open forests, national parks and game reserves is *indirect* because those areas fall under other jurisdictions, namely the Chiefs and the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), respectively. The only accountability FD has over those areas is only to ensure that any forest products extracted for commercial use (i.e. any forest produce intended for sale) is licensed regardless of the source, except for game hunting which is ZAWA's responsibility. In other words, nothing goes to the market place without a license.

As might be expected, these jurisdictional arrangements have created some problems, one of them being inter-agency rivalry. For instance, because wildlife conservation is under another agency, FD has no powers over these forests except by invitation from ZAWA. And where the boundaries overlap between FD's estates and ZAWA's national parks (**Figure 1.1**), the Wildlife Act supersedes the Forest Act (forest conservation). In other words, ZAWA takes an upper hand over FD. Hence, instead of collaborative work between FD and ZAWA inter-agency rivalry has been common. Worse still, these battles become even more pronounced at budget time where ZAWA tends to be favored against FD, but the FD has always insisted that its mandate is more important because wildlife conservation (i.e. ZAWA's existence) depends on its work. Without healthy forests (as wildlife habitats) there would be no wildlife.

Functionally, the superiority of the Wildlife Act over the Forest Act is meant to protect foresters from being at risk working in National Parks. Also because tourism brings in more money than does forestry (whose data capture leaves much to be desired), that gives ZAWA a hedge over FD. But from an operational stand point FD has a point but because its argument is framed as a contest, it has not found many serious supporters. As Deborah Stone (1997) advises political battles are fought with and over words. People read different things in someone's words.

“People fight *with* ideas as well as about them. The different sides in a conflict create different portrayals of the battle – who is affected, how they are affected, and what is at stake. Political fights are conducted with money, with rules, with votes and with favors,but they are conducted above all with words and ideas.”⁴²⁹

Because policy formulation involves multiple players, how an issue is framed and portrayed⁴³⁰ can either make it shine or be shunned. Deborah further highlights the fact that policy debates are a contest when she says,

“Every idea about policy draws boundaries. It tells what or who is included or excluded in a category. These boundaries are more than intellectual – they define people in and out of a conflict or place them on different sides. In politics, the representation of issues is strategically designed to attract support to one's side, to

⁴²⁹ Stone, *The Policy Paradox*, 1997:34

⁴³⁰ See for instance, Rochefort and Cobb (eds.), *The Politics of Problem Definition*, 1994

forge some alliances and break others. Ideas and alliances are intimately connected.”⁴³¹

Thus, creating allies not enemies in the policy arena is a skill every bureaucrat, assuming the role of a policy entrepreneur, should learn and employ. Sadly, the current management team in FD is oblivious to these realities.

At times there have been suggestions for a merger between FD and ZAWA but these efforts have always fallen apart. My speculation is that because ZAWA has better conditions of service and is well funded, it wants to keep its turf. On the other hand keeping the status quo also helps the central government to keep its expenditure low; a merger would mean “upgrading” the conditions for FD employees too! Besides, even the politicians that oversee these entities also want to keep their jobs – a merger would send one of them off the rail.

The point I’m trying to make is that a merger between FD and ZAWA would definitely be good: it would bring synergy and enhance positive interdependence between the two agencies that are doing the same business: biodiversity conservation. Since FD would benefit more from this merger (by improved conditions of service and annual allocations) the department should refrain from complaining and casting its work as being superior over ZAWA to adopting a conciliatory position; one that promotes cooperation rather than competition because the

⁴³¹ Stone, 1997:34

cooperation creates alliances and alliances are more enduring.⁴³² And this is important because how an issue is framed can either deepen or solve a conflict.⁴³³ For this reason, it would be prudent for FD to reframe its concerns as one in which FD is advocating for pulling the expertise under one house. Otherwise, maintaining the current posture will only deepen the social conflict between FD and ZAWA, although inter-agency rivalry is still possible even under one roof. The only difference is it will be easier to reach some common ground when operating under one jurisdiction. As some scholars have pointed out, words and language do matter and they matter most in the polis where different interpretations get assigned to them.⁴³⁴

Because the Forestry Department is only *directly* responsible for its estates and *indirectly* for all other areas, this raises several complications. One is that the department is not held accountable to what happens in the open forests and GMAs where the Chiefs and ZAWA have jurisdictional mandate, respectively. Yet, because forest management is known to be a Forest Department's outfit, whenever any forest is in bad shape, FD gets the blame not the other entities. And this has contributed to the department's poor image where again the

⁴³² Deborah Stone, *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making* (WW Norton & Company: New York), 1997:26

⁴³³ David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, "Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective", in Rochefort and Cobb (eds.), *The Politics of Problem Definition* (University Press of Kansas), 1994:5

⁴³⁴ Rochefort and Cobb, 1994:5, 8-9; Stone, *Policy Paradox*, 1997

department has not done a good job educating the public on the limitations of its coverage and powers.

For example, under the Forest Act No. 39 of 1973, local communities are exempted from paying for forest products harvested from open forests that are intended for home use (subsistence consumption). As can be expected, this is another area where the ground is extremely slippery because the FD is basically at the mercy of its clients: it relies on their integrity and sincerity.

These user rights bring various complications. First, it is not easy to know if the product came from an open forest or a PFA. Second, monitoring that forest products collected for home use are not used for profit-making is a tall order; a challenge FD has faced over its lifetime. People who know this legal provision have [ab]used it only to evade paying but the product has in most cases ended up on the markets. As a former employee of the FD under the Forest Extension Division, what this researcher observed was that people would collect the product in relatively small quantities that would pass for home consumption and stockpile them until sufficient quantities have accumulated. Thereafter, an individual would either go to FD offices to get a conveyor's license, which permits them to sell the products or the product could be sold to a middle person who has to get the license to resale the products. Either way, there is loss of revenues at the first level.

From a management point of view, the exemption for subsistence consumption has been one of the largest loopholes on access to indigenous forests. It is not easy to distinguish between what is being collected for sale or for home use, other than relying on the individual's integrity. In an era where everyone wants to maximize profits, any loophole is exploited to its limits and this is one of them. For a department so low on field staff, and whose operations are geared towards policing its estates, it has increasingly become a tall order to police and monitor resource users taking advantage of this legal provision, in addition to any other activities. Tie this to high unemployment rates, which have pushed more people to rely on the forests, the result is that forests have become more or less a free resource, but more importantly the extraction for subsistence consumption must have increased and therefore is a factor worth looking at in relation to forest degradation.

International Treaties and Conventions – Multiple Players

So far this discussion has been confined to the local arena. But in the larger scheme of things international treaties need a special mention as they bring a different set of conditions and obligations. Although it is not mandatory to sign onto these treaties countries get compelled to belong to some groups because this makes it easier to be “heard” in the international area. As a member to some of the treaties on forestry or

biodiversity conservation in general, the Zambian government is under obligation to uphold the prescriptions under those treaties.

Not only does membership to these conventions bring multiple obligations but this also opens a country up to multiple players. Locally this further complicates the multi-layered jurisdictional powers too. For instance, although FD is the sole manager of Zambia's forest resources, there are also various government institutions whose mandates impact forest management.⁴³⁵ Each of these entities has its interests, and jurisdictional boundaries to protect and, most importantly, an agenda to pursue. To put it mildly, since FD's mandate overlaps over all the areas that these other agencies deal with, it requires that the department works collaboratively with these entities. But creating operational harmony not only at home (national) but also at international levels where each of these agencies have different conventions and treaties they have signed on is not an easy endeavor. Sometimes inter-agency conflict arises, as pointed out earlier.

In the same vein lack of specification of responsibility has sometimes led to intra-agency rivalry. After the civil service reforms, a new outfit has been the creation of planning departments in all ministries to coordinate all planning activities and provide policy advice

⁴³⁵ These include the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) – a regulatory body on the environment; the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) – in charge of wildlife conservation; and National Heritage Conservation Commission (NHCC) – which is responsible for preservation of monuments and sites of historical importance; and colleges that provide the necessary human resource e.g. the Zambia Forest College (ZFC), and the Copperbelt University School of Natural Resources- both of which produce graduates in forestry. In addition, various nongovernmental organizations are also involved. For further information, refer to MENR, *National Environmental Action Programme (NEAP)*, 1994.

for informed decision-making. In the case of the Ministry of Environment where the FD belongs the Planning and Information Department, under the MTENR, has assumed this role as a policy coordinator. However, because FD still wants to maintain some level of independence, tensions between the two departments over who should do what are fairly common. Sometimes these battles are over the boundaries of power while others are on policy strategies to deal with certain problems. And this takes us into statutory arena.

Multiple Regression Analysis

Up until now we have relied on observing the direction of change in the forest estates and the two measures of institutional capacity (**Figure 4.4**), and based on these trends we have been able to make certain inferences. However, as noted earlier, these trends cannot tell the actual causal relationships or specific impacts arising from each of these sources of capacity. Establishing the direction of change is a good thing but getting to know the *degree* of influence that the independent variables are exerting on the dependent variable is even better. Knowing the *degree of impact* from *each* of these factors is very important because that could be extremely useful in devising appropriate interventions to solve the problem. Therefore, until we know the degree of impact arising from each of these factors: that is, how they are contribution to the current problem, it would be premature to draw any final conclusion(s)

from these observations. To do this I now turn to the issue of causal effect, namely, how are the two sources of capacity contributing to forest degradation? And which one of these has a larger impact?

As discussed earlier (especially in Chapter 3), the department's capacity is primarily being assessed in terms of its human capital and financial outlays. Human capital has been broken down to three categories (professional, technical and field staff) while the financial status is divided into two - operational and capital outlays. Together this gives us five independent variables for our model, which are then subjected to a time series multiple regression analysis to further understand their interactions.

The regression analysis reveals some interesting results; some obvious others not quite so intuitive. Out of the five predictors, only two are statistically significant – professional and technical staff – the two groups where senior and middle managers are drawn from (**Table 4.5**). This result runs counter to official statements that have culminated into a long-held conviction that forest degradation is primarily a problem caused by insufficient funding and inadequate field staff to work the ground. Given the results just obtained, the question then is: why are financial resources and field staff not as important as traditional wisdom has portrayed them to be? How do we explain the fact that, in fact, managerial capacity is actually the problem?

According to this model, financial resources have no effect on the dependent variable. Instead, managerial capacity turns out to be the culprit. This is a very interesting revelation in the sense that for a long time the department has argued and continues to point to poor funding as insufficient field staff as its biggest obstacles hindering effective execution of its programs and by extension contributes to forest loss and degradation.

Table 4.7: Impact of IC predictors on Protected Forest Estates.

Predictors	Protected Forest Areas
	Coefficient [se] (t-Score)
Operational Outlays	-.0001 [.0001] (-1.01)
Capital Outlays	-.0000 [.0001] (-0.27)
Professional Staff	.0440 [.0111] (3.97)*
Technical Staff	-.0043 [.0007] (-6.07)*
Field Staff	.0002 [.0001] (1.48)
Constant	6.19 [.4315] (14.34)
	R^2 0.67
	Adj R-squared 0.61
	Prob > F 0.0000
	No. of Observations 36
* Significant at 95% confidence interval	

This study has generated some interesting findings that clearly render FD's argument open for debate. But considering the modeling limitations of this study, it is recommended that these findings be taken as preliminary pointers to be verified through a more sophisticated quantitative analysis.

The *t-scores* for the annual outlays and field staff are not statistically significant and neither are their coefficients. In other words, field staff and the level of funding to the department are not the biggest problems causing forest degradation. Rather forest managers are, represented by the professional and technical groups where senior and middle managers are appointed from, respectively.

From an administrative and management point of view this should not come as a surprise in the sense that managers set the tone and expected standards on what is achievable. Since managers are in charge of planning, organizing, directing and coordinating the functions of their respective sections means that they have a huge influence on what can and cannot be achieved. In this context, this finding simply validates the theories on good management practices.⁴³⁶ Therefore, rather than putting the blame on field staff we can agree that forest degradation arises from ineffective managerial capacity. In particular, senior forest managers have not provided the necessary guidance both to the middle

⁴³⁶ See for instance, Gortner, *Administration in the Public Sector* (1977); Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (1947); Herbert Simon, et. al., *Public Administration*, (1950); Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Process in Administrative Organizations*, (1957b).

managers and the field staff. As this study has also confirmed people in the lower ranks are completely ignorant about what they are supposed to do and teamwork is certainly lacking.

Managers at all levels responded that they do not participate in any form of planning (51%), an activity that is supposed to bring them together to chart the way forward at least annually. Also over half of the managers acknowledged that they do not know if the department has any strategic plans (58%) and goals (51%) to work towards. When asked differently if at least they knew what their role was in working towards those strategic goals, again the majority (46%) were only aware sometimes, 22% had completely no idea and only 32% said they always knew what their role was (**Table 5.8**).

This above revelation certainly does not reflect a good management style, and neither does it convey a sense of managerial competence. Leadership matters, but none of what is happening is anywhere near to indicate this.⁴³⁷ Managers ought to translate their formal authority into effective influence by providing the necessary guidance down the lower ranks. The management style in use suggests this might no be possible to do: there is hardly any planning is taking place, and when it is done the majority of the managers are not involved in the planning process. As a result they do not have even the most basic tool – a work plan – to guide their annual activities.

⁴³⁷ Lawrence E. Lynn Jr., *Public Management as Art, Science and Profession*, (Chatham House Publishers, Inc.: NJ), 1996:69-88

Table 4.8: Management Practices – Responses from the Field.

Question	Response	% of Total
Does the Forestry Department have a strategic plan?	<i>Yes</i>	42
	<i>No</i>	58
Does the FD set strategic goals?	<i>Yes</i>	62
	<i>No</i>	36
Do you know the department's strategic goals?	<i>Yes</i>	44
	<i>No</i>	56
Are you aware of your role in achieving the department's strategic goals?	<i>Always</i>	32
	<i>Sometimes</i>	46
	<i>Never</i>	22
Does the department have Annual Work Plans?	<i>Yes</i>	51
	<i>No</i>	6
	<i>Don't know</i>	43
Are you involved in developing FD's Work Plans?	<i>Always</i>	13
	<i>Sometimes</i>	36
	<i>Never</i>	51
Does the department evaluate its performance?	<i>Yes</i>	43
	<i>No</i>	26
	<i>Don't know</i>	31
Are you involved in evaluating the department's performance?	<i>Always</i>	10
	<i>Sometimes</i>	19
	<i>Never</i>	72

For instance, almost half of the managers do not have work plans. 51% of them acknowledged that the department has work plans while the other half (49%) do not know. If the majority of managers, who are supposed to provide guidance on government policy implementation, do

not know what they are supposed to work towards how can anyone expect the junior staff to work out miracles in the field?

What can be expected is exactly what is taking place right now: lawlessness and institutional breakdown. Therefore, it is not surprising to see what is happening to the forests. In the absence of managerial competence and guidance it is unrealistic to hold junior staff responsible for the poor performance.

In this case, senior and middle managers are an important layer of capacity and should therefore be strengthened. Their impact on the forest estates has been found to be statistically significant. For instance, an increase by one professional staffer would increase the forest estates by 0.044 ha. Likewise a reduction in technical staff would result in losing 0.0043 ha. What this means is that although all the positions are filled, as per current structure, these managers are not enough or are lacking in managerial skills to effectively supervise the lower levels. As a result, their presence and influence in the wider community is lacking. With such a lean structure one way these managers could strengthen the department's capacity is to establish partnerships with the local communities to help with forest management, as was the arrangement before. The absence of these partnerships might explain why forests have become free for all.

While this analysis has helped to isolate managerial capacity as a problem, the model only explains 61.07% of variation, suggesting that there are other factors at play that needs to be looked at. These internal factors (human and financial resources) do not tell the whole story. For this reason, the external environment, which may include but is not limited to land tenure and ownership arrangements, political economy dimensions, the legal environment, and of course the political aspects, may provide an answer. I return to these issues later. For now let us look at the problem of additive effects.

Considering that changes that occur in one year could potentially have cumulative effects in another year or years after, an autocorrelation test was performed to check for this problem. The results indicate no sign of autocorrelation; there is no distinct pattern of either increase or decrease (**Figure 4.12**).

Another test, a regression on *error*, also ruled out this problem. The model confirmed that the relationship between error this year (*e*) and error from last year (*elag*) is not significant. The $p=0.078$ is higher than the 0.05 threshold and $t=1.82$ is also less than 2.

In terms of correlation between the independent variables and their effect on the dependent variable, a multi-collinearity model also predicted that there is no problem. All values turned out to be less than 4, the threshold level (**Table 5.9**).

Figure 4.12: Annual Cumulative Effects.





Table 4.9: Multi-Collinearity Test

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
Capital Funds ^{1/}	1.41	0.707109
Field Officers	1.41	0.710547
Annual Operational Outlays	1.40	0.712492
Professional Staff	1.25	0.799798
Technical Staff	1.17	0.852542
Mean VIF	1.33	
^{1/} May or may not be released annually.		

These are all very interesting results because intuitively one would expect to find the presence of autocorrelation among independent variables, which in this case are assumed to depend on each other to achieve a common goal. But these results indicate the opposite. In a way this confirms earlier observations from the regression analysis that each of these variables has the potential to contribute to forest degradation with or without any interference from other factors. From a policy interventionist point of view, this is good because it makes it possible and easier to deal with one aspect at a time and see if that intervention yields the desired goals.

Although these results flout the entrenched beliefs in FD that hold field staff as a group directly responsible for program implementation, or at least have a stronger influence on what happens in the field than their superiors, it is reasonable to appreciate this line of reasoning because strictly speaking these are the officers who do the actual policy implementation, which by implication also means their degree of

involvement dictates program success or failure. In this context, their failure to prevent any activities that lead to forest degradation, (even as unexpected outcome), naturally speaks to their inability to do their job – whether this is due to inadequate numbers or a question of technical and other skills.

However, what this traditional reasoning overlooks is the fact that field officers are as [in]effective as their superiors are. Their performance depends on and reflects the managerial guidance (instructions and other forms of support) they receive from their supervisors. And this is where blame shifts from them to their superiors. It is the managers who develop the plans of action, source funding and other resources, including appointment of staff for various activities. In other words, managers dictate what is to be done, when, why and by whom.

Therefore, it makes sense that forest degradation is a problem tied to senior and middle managers because in reality this is the first layer of human capacity. Not only do these managers interpret and break down government policy into achievable objectives (or at least are supposed to!), they actually set the [strategic] agenda and are responsible for how other resources are organized and utilized to achieve those policy goals. Therefore, when managerial capacity is weak or lacking, as this case study seems to suggest, it is not unusual to experience performance problems, the kind this analysis has just identified. In terms of policy intervention, what this means is that increasing the number of field staff

and the level of funding will not necessarily solve the problems FD is facing until the managerial problem is addressed.

These results raise a very interesting observation and an important lesson, one that the international development community may wish to pay close attention to. In general, when the development community talks about capacity building in most cases that means having to provide some form of training to improve the technical skills of the target group. To many people, capacity building has become synonymous to technical training. Yet, as this case study has demonstrated, technical skills may not always be the problem. For instance, all the forest officers in managerial positions have more than the minimum professional qualifications needed to be appointed to those positions, an indication that in this case technical knowledge on forest management is not the problem. What is lacking are managerial skills, which are quite different from the technical knowledge in forestry.

As a lesson, what this means is that increasing the number of field staff (i.e. taking FD's argument at its face value) or for that matter sending these forestry managers for further training to increase their technical skills in forestry would be a waste of such resources. Such interventions would not solve the problem at hand as it would be addressing the wrong place altogether. As this study has shown start with assessment of existing capacities to find out where the problem

resides before any intervention on capacity building is recommended and implemented.

The other weakness FD suffers from is lack of visionary leadership and a head of department that is simply politically disconnected. As a management team, senior forest managers have lamentably failed to keep reinventing and reinvigorating the department so it can respond to the changing circumstances and capture the opportunities that have come with such changes. This is an area previous managers were really good at. Not only did they connect the department to the President's office, but they also were highly creative in designing programs that appealed to the public at different levels which encouraged their participation in forestry activities. These included but not limited to educational, civic and social clubs, radio and TV programs, corporate promotional programs, etc. The most famous were the radio, TV and corporate promotional programs⁴³⁸ where people were enticed to participate because there was always something to be won. But also some of these programs conveyed the information about forestry in a comical way. So they offered a lot of fun.

The other issue relates to the global dimensions about forest conservation. The fact that Zambia is a signatory to so many international conventions and treaties dealing with biodiversity

⁴³⁸ One such popular programs was the Forestry "Kambeba" Radio program that aired every Saturday morning, strategically placed at a time slot when most people were not in hurry compared to the typical Monday through Friday routines.

conservation, a genuine response to global interest and demands for forest conservation and environmental management, gives FD unlimited opportunities to still craft and maintain a reasonable, if not, respectable prominence in the national policy arena. The growth of the environmental movement, starting with the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment to the Earth Summit through to the present UN millennium goals targets are all open avenues through which FD can and should use to market itself to attract government attention. Government's commitment to embrace international obligations on themes such as sustainable development, forest conservation, integrated natural resource management, biodiversity conservation or climate change, areas where FD has no major rival, are open doors that FD can and should exploit. Yet, all these openings or opportunities remain untapped.

The point being made here is that organizations are like living organisms, they perform well when they are kept dynamic e.g. by change of mission, or constant injection of new ideas and doing things differently.⁴³⁹ Although their (Donald Kettle and others, 1996) focus is the American Federal government, their menu for building "a government that works" is quite applicable to other organizations too.⁴⁴⁰ The Director of Forestry has yet to learn how to play this game and win. Being

⁴³⁹ See, Donald Kettle, Patricia Ingraham, *et.al.*, *Civil Service Reform: Making Government that Works* (Brookings Institution Press), 1996; Patricia Ingraham, *Government Performance: Why Management Matters* (Johns Hopkins Press), 2003:15

⁴⁴⁰ Kettl, et. al., 1996:4

politically savvy will definitely be a required virtue. Fortunately, one can easily learn from what previous heads of the department did to keep the department securely connected to the political power house, right in the President's office.⁴⁴¹ Not only did FD manage to have the Republican President officiate at most of these annual events, as in 1988 when the President Kaunda was again the Guest of Honor for the National Tree Planting Day (December 15th),⁴⁴² but they were also able to tap into the authority of his office to involve the general public as well as the corporate community. To illustrate this point I'm tempted to lift a lengthy text.

“In response to the concern by H.E. the President at the rate of deforestation, the Rt. Hon. Prime Minister issued instructions to ZIMCO and two other Ministries to carry out the following:

- a) ZIMCO to plant the same number as there were people in Zambia. During the year alone ZIMCO was expected to plant 2.4 million trees.
- b) Ministries of Higher Education and General Education and Culture, to ensure that in future each child planted a tree.

Within the same year, H.E. the President issued another directive that the Copperbelt Province should plant at least two million trees during the year.”⁴⁴³

⁴⁴¹ Check out FD Annual Reports for 1965 to 1988. In particular, refer to FD Annual Report for 1988 to see how close the President's Office was to FD.

⁴⁴² FD, Annual Report for 1988, p.1

⁴⁴³ FD Annual Report for 1988, p.22

Because of the enormous amount of work and cost involved in raising such a large quantity of seedlings the department used the political machinery to involve all sections of society. In addition, the program was adjusted as follows:

- a) “Each Primary and Secondary School to plant at least one hundred trees each
- b) Each institution of Higher Learning to plant at least five hundred trees each.
- c) ZIMCO to provide K50,000 for fuelwood plantation at Kamaila and a further K50,000 for distribution of seedlings to planting sites throughout the country.”⁴⁴⁴

Clearly, these efforts demonstrate not only the creativity but more importantly how politically savvy previous forest managers were. Against the backdrop of a modest budget, the department was able to tap into the parastatal coffers to implement programs it would have not been able to execute. Working around government’s rigid rules, these managers were able to create their own “flexibility” in doing government work. They valued “performance” over “protection” and “adaptation” over “compliance”.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴⁴ FD Annual Report for 1988, p.23

⁴⁴⁵ Kettl e.t.al. *Civil Service Reform*, 1996:23

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that while FD's long held belief that insufficient field staff and poor funding have been two of its biggest obstacles to effective forest management may have some threads of truth, the real problem lies with managerial capacity and not the general work force. I have demonstrated that the department operated quite effectively on a lean structure and modest budget mainly because its managers recognized the strength of the social capital that existed outside the FD. For as long as the department was collaborating with the larger society, especially the Chiefs and politicians, its strength was secured. When these relations were broken so did the department's strength, it simply evaporated. What lessons does this bring to the table?

First is that, no organization operates in a vacuum. The strength of any organization also lies in the network of its collaborators, clients, etc. Second, when assessing an organization's performance be weary to run to conclusions before doing an in depth assessment of its institutional capacity. It is quite possible to arrive at wrong conclusions as FD managers did in this case study. Trends (as in the direction of change of some parameters) may not tell the whole story. It is important to establish the *degree* of impact each variable has on the dependent variable. This would help in targeting the intervention appropriately. Third, considering that FD does not own the land set aside as PFAs but only assumes a "care taker's" role, alienating the Chiefs (and their

subjects) from being part of the management team, and acting as if the department the absolute owner is among some of the worst blunders forest managers committed over the years. The department needs the blessings of the property owner to succeed in whatever it intends to do. It is ironic to see the state (represented by FD) wanting to assume and maintain absolute in an era when all roads are headed towards democratization – the idea of decentralization and the devolution of power to the people. While government is usually in a privileged position to exercise its authority and power over its territory, it is unrealistic to ignore the fact that government legitimacy and good governance are only possible when people are involved and feel part of a system.

And finally, the disconnection from the political power house cannot be over-emphasized. Administration and governance, defined here as the “general exercise of authority,”⁴⁴⁶ go hand in hand. And because politics shapes public policy, maintaining close relations to the policy makers and, in this case, recognizing the local Chiefs’ role in all this should come as a natural response to forest managers. In the larger context, there are also “global and local arrangements, formal structures, informal norms and practices and spontaneous and intentional systems of control” that impact public administration and need to be equally recognized.⁴⁴⁷ Thus, when these political dimensions are overlooked,

⁴⁴⁶ Patricia Ingraham and Laurence E. Lynn (eds.), *The Art of Governance: Analyzing Management and Administration* (Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C.), 2004:4

⁴⁴⁷ Ingraham and Lynn (eds.), *The Art of Governance*, 2004:4

“ownership” by citizens and “control” by government bureaucrats will always become sources of controversy. The solution to all is obvious – let the people in.

Chapter 5

Forest Management Issues in Zambia

External Factors

Up until this point our discussion has concentrated on understanding the internal aspects of institutional capacity and how these have contributed to forest degradation. In this chapter it is appropriate that we turn our attention to the larger environment to see how external factors may have contributed to forest degradation i.e. their possible corresponding impact on forest degradation in conjunction with or independent of the internal capacity dimensions.

Recall that the regression analysis explained only 67% of the variation, suggesting that there are other factors contributing to forest loss. These factors have been identified as relating to the political economy, population growth, policy reforms, land tenure and jurisdictional boundaries, and political expedience. These issues were indirectly referred to (and sometimes briefly discussed) in the foregoing chapters. However, for purposes of clarity, they deserve further treatment and this is what this Chapter tries to do.

Political Economy dynamics

Zambia's over-dependence on copper as its main export commodity has been its largest weakness, but in forestry terms this can be construed as having been FD's biggest strength in the sense that forestry gained its prominence on the national agenda mostly because of its connection to the copper mines as a source of wood for energy and construction works. Because of this marriage between the copper economy and forestry it was impossible to ignore forestry. Thus, forestry was perceived as a twin pillar in the national economy.

Copper dependence (which accounts for 90% of national earnings)⁴⁴⁸ is a weakness because any price change in copper or the production quotas has always sent Zambia's economy crawling on its knees, with unprecedented ripple effects in all other sectors that depend on copper revenues for their existence. Copper being the largest national income source, it is not an overstatement to say that support to forestry programs suffered partly due to a decline in revenues from copper and partly because of Zambia's involvement in the political liberation movement in the region, a political campaign that deviated local resources to regional obligations. These developments, which by the way coincided with (or some would say), accelerated Zambia's entry into a structural adjustment program, became a source of weakness locally by

⁴⁴⁸ CSO, *Zambia in Figures*, 2000; *Living Conditions*, 2004

reducing financial support to the national programs vis-à-vis, forestry. How did this play out?

When copper prices plunged on the world market in early to mid 1970s, which incidentally coincided with the oil crisis, government revenues followed in tandem. This meant a reduced national income (revenues) to be shared among the different agencies. With a country in a state of emergency (politically and militarily), naturally priority was given to national security; the idea that the government should be ready and able to contain any attack from the neighboring regimes that were in a state of conflict with respective liberation movements that were demanding and fighting for political freedom for their people. Because Zambia hosted some of these freedom fighters, there was no room for pretense that the country could not be attacked. As matter of fact Zambia was hit several times by South Africa and Zimbabwe to force it to withdraw its support to the freedom fighters from these nations. But Zambia never did. Instead, the government even decided to introduce a 20 months mandatory military training for Grade 12 school leavers, called the National Service Military and Agricultural Training program. Trainees from National Service were anticipated to act as a buffer to the regular army. While the program was meant to enhance national security, it certainly drew some resources away from other sectors such as forestry.

In response to the dwindling copper revenues, government was forced to look at alternative means to cushion the short fall, that is, the development of forestry, agriculture and tourism industries as part of a broad policy on “product diversification” away from copper dependence and “export oriented growth.”⁴⁴⁹ Important as this policy was, and even though the Zambian government went almost immediately into full gear to promote this alternative policy, I would say this realization came rather a little too late. At this time government revenues to support this policy initiative were clearly lacking. As a result, this policy did not fully take off. What one sees are bandage interventions that only deepened dependence on donor funds.

As one retired forestry official explained, government support to forestry started to decline from early 1980s. But by the end of that decade the situation had become so bad the department was basically sustained by donor funds. Donor support accounted for almost 50% of the budget.⁴⁵⁰ These budgetary constrained also compelled government to cancel employing part-time and seasonal forestry workers. And since most of these workers were employed from the local communities, this development blew off the only jobs available to these people. Add this to the idea that over the years FD had systematically moved from community involvement to forest policing, mostly relying on the part-time

⁴⁴⁹ GRZ, *New Economic Recovery Programme – Fourth National Development Plan 1989-1993. Vol. I and II, Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP)*, 1989:9-10; *Economic Report – 1977 to 2000*, Lusaka

⁴⁵⁰ Aaron Sugar Banda, Retired Deputy CCF (former Chief Forest Extension Officer), *personal communication*, 2007. See also Appendix 4 and 5.

local employees, the abolition of such positions created a huge vacuum. Worse still there was a deep sense of resentment in those communities who felt let down by their government. And this crack has never been mended to date.

And of course the department has not been insulated from political decisions that government made at national level. As is evident that politicians, in any government, play a significant role in charting the direction of the nation whether this is in advanced democracies (capitalists like the USA, UK Japan or Germany and others) or emerging ones. Zambia's participation in the liberation struggle in the southern African region definitely came with a human, infrastructure and financial cost. Of particular concern here is the financial drain. Funding that was meant for domestic use was used to counter unfriendly regimes and support the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Like many other national programs at that moment, most forestry activities suffered too. In addition to this, the adherence to the IMF conditions that Zambia should pay 5% of its GDP for external debt meant that little money was left for internal programs.

Although the department was highly successful with other programs (e.g. in research, forest extension and the industrial plantations project) the 'divorce' between forestry and copper mining brought new challenges on board. When forestry lost its privileged position on the national political grid, this meant less political attention

than was accorded earlier when the agency (or the sector as a whole) was perceived as holding the national economy. Following the decline in revenues and coupled with increased demand on its estates due to population growth, suddenly the department could not cope with the new reality. I return to the population issue later. For now let's look at the policy choices and their effects.

Policy Reforms

In my introductory remarks to this Chapter, I alluded to the fact forestry was once a high profile sector because the forest managers at the time were politically savvy. Not only did they develop and maintain close ties with the upper echelon of the political power house, but they were also able to convince the policy makers on the importance of forestry in the national economy, in particular its relationship with the copper industry as a source of wood energy. In addition, forestry was also portrayed as a very important partner in the manufacturing, construction, communication, and transportation industries, and of course not forgetting its strategic position as a common man's safety net from the cradle to the grave! In short, forest managers of the day marketed forestry to the politicians in such a way that whichever angle of the economy those policy makers looked at, they saw forestry as a twin pillar in the industrial development process of the nation. This made the

politicians to appreciate the department's role and supported its programs accordingly.

I have also alluded to some of the policy choices that the Zambian government embraced over different time slots, two of which have special relevance to this study are Zambia's involvement (as a frontline state) in the liberation movements of the Southern African region. The other and most dominant economic policy choice, which has ran its course for over three decades since 1980s has been the structural adjustment program (SAP). As mentioned earlier, for all the good intentions that SAP envisioned to deliver, the program delivered none. Instead, the program created mayhem, directly but mostly indirectly for the forestry sector.

The first and possibly the biggest blow to FD came when the copper mines switched from wood energy to electricity⁴⁵¹ and coal. When this happened, somehow forestry lost its economic recognition and became just another sector. However, despite this change timber is still widely used for support work in all the mines.⁴⁵² Therefore, forestry is just as important as it has always been. In fact, its role in the other sectors has remained the same. Unfortunately, subsequent heads of the department have not been able continue highlighting these connections and to restore the department's image and prominence to earlier times.

⁴⁵¹ They switched to electricity because it was cheaper and more reliable. At that time Zambia had surplus electric power. The scenario has changed now. Since the Fall of 2007, Zambia is experiencing a short of electric power such that load shading has become a common practice. Priority is given to the industries, copper mines being among the privileged group.

⁴⁵² Dennis Musaba, Geologist for Kalulushi & Chibuluma Copper Mines, *personal communication 2007*

The question is why? Various challenges have played a role but most, if not all, of them loop back to lack of managerial capacity and creativity.

First, the policy reforms induced by the structural adjustment program (SAP) had a disastrous impact on the forest resources in the sense that SAP introduced and accelerated a reduction in government structure and its changes spending behavior. These reductions in the department's labor force and financial support ultimately affected its operational capacity too. I discuss these issues in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.

Second, as mentioned earlier, the decay in the cordial relationships that previously existed between FD and the Chiefs (and by extension their subjects) ultimately eroded FD's strength in regard to forest management. Unfortunately, FD has done little to rectify the situation. Since mid-1990s FD has seriously contemplated the introduction of community-based joint forest management (JFM),⁴⁵³ a concept that encourages local community involvement in forest management, as part of a larger strategy aimed at devolution of power to the local communities. However, because government had systematically dismantled and destroyed the local structures through which these communities organized themselves to manage their forests, the JFM concept has not generated much enthusiasm. The proposal to implement JFM has been on paper since 2000 and the department has not prepared a Statutory Instrument to give the JFM concept a legal backing.

⁴⁵³ See: National Forestry Policy of 1998:15

As Lynch and Alcorn (1994) point out, this Zambian scenario clearly confirms their argument that historically states have been known to alienate local communities from the decision making table. States ignore customary property rights and “assume the rights over the forests, particularly for revenue generation,” including the right to decide who can and when to harvest the resource, payment of royalties, and rights to all non-timber products.⁴⁵⁴ These tendencies do not help in building healthy relations between government agencies and the communities. As a result, communities may take the law in their own hands, as the Zambian case illustrates on forest encroachment.

While the motive for JFM looks genuine on the surface the problems underneath are quite mammoth. First, JFM suffers from lack of a legal backing and therefore it is hard to envision how it is going to operate, let alone motivate the public to embrace it. Second, this strategy resembles a cut and run initiative as government only intends to give technical support and leave the communities to do the rest. There is a feeling that it is unrealistic to expect the communities to manage their forests without giving them a ‘proper’ head start.

These concerns are real and cut across nations and continents. Community-based forest resource management has been tried in various

⁴⁵⁴ Lynch and Alcorn, “Tenurial Rights and Community-based Conservation,” 1994:378-381

countries with varying degrees of success and failure.⁴⁵⁵ This is because “public land or other public resources belong to no one in particular but to everyone in general.” And this “ambiguous official status acts as a magnet that pulls” various resource users – charcoal burners, loggers, landless farmers, etc. – on-to public forest lands.⁴⁵⁶ Hence, to participate in community-based conservation initiatives, communities want to be assured of security of tenure, access, and ownership rights; benefit sharing; and the existence of legal recourse mechanisms.⁴⁵⁷ None of these conditions have been provided yet in the Zambian case.

The proposed JFM is unlikely to be a solution in and by itself. Much more needs to be done before FD can wash its hands on forest management. Without a legal backing JFM is non-functional.⁴⁵⁸ Possibly when the long-awaited Forestry Commission is formed it may push for revision of forest law and policy.

One strategy (within the SAP ambit) that deserves special mention here is the product diversification policy I mentioned earlier which encouraged more private investors to enter into forestry. Under this policy forestry equipment, which qualified under the agricultural grouping, was exempt from import tax and customs duty. This exemption, coupled with the increase in demand for indigenous timber in

⁴⁵⁵ Various scholars have written on this topic. See for instance, David Western, *et al.*, (eds.), *Natural Connections*, 1994

⁴⁵⁶ Lynch and Alcorn, 1994:379

⁴⁵⁷ Lynch and Alcorn, 1994:378-381

⁴⁵⁸ National Forestry Policy 1998:20-24

South Africa and some Asian countries, attracted more companies to engage in forest business. Thus, natural forests became a center of activity. But instead of being a positive development, unfortunately this turned on its heels, and became a run away train. Due to inadequate capacity of the FD to monitor that influx of saw-millers, the forests simply became a target of over-exploitation, requiring more and better management strategies and skills. In the absence of forestry personnel to monitor all these activities, FD has continued to rely on the integrity of its clients.

As with the abolition of part-time and seasonal workers employment, again local communities found themselves on losing side. Due to absence of supporting infrastructure (electric power, good roads, and communication facilities) near the forests, commercial saw millers set up their plants in urban areas and subcontracted their operations to several pit sawyers who produced timber cants, which were later reprocessed at mills in town. For those engaged in processing indigenous timber, 63.7% are pit-sawyers and only 36% are commercial sawmills.⁴⁵⁹ Pit-sawyers typically belong to the cottage industry, and employ no more than five people. The point I'm trying to make is that these arrangements in which commercial millers are in town and pit-sawyers are in the rural areas completely defeats government's intentions of wanting to create jobs in the rural areas because bigger plants employ more people. Also

⁴⁵⁹ Makano Rosemary, *The Effect of Structural Adjustment Program on Forest Management in Zambia*, (MA. Thesis, University of Missouri-St. Louis), 2001:31

one can't even start to compare job conditions and benefits between the two! Commercial sawmills will certainly offer more decent conditions. Notice here that nowhere in its official statements / complaints has FD ever raised the absence of infrastructure to support commercial activities in rural areas as a constraint to the development of forest industries. Yet, this is an issue that urgently requires government's attention if the sector is to become a viable source of employment in the rural areas and possibly beyond. If this is not a sign of managerial incompetence, then what else can it be?

Other weaknesses relate to the conditions governing timber concession licenses. The forest regulation stipulates the minimum volume or number of trees that a concessionaire (or pit-sawyer) should extract per year (supposed to be monitored monthly) instead of the maximum. This prescription not only gave an opportunity but clearly encouraged the licensee to over-exploit the forests. In other words, FD put up a perfect recipe for deforestation. Since FD doesn't have a corresponding capacity to monitor these operations, the forests have been open for abuse. Therefore, rather than placing a blame card on central government for its market liberalization policy, espoused under the SAP, forestry managers should shallow their share of the blame by being so naïve and generous in their concession licenses. They literally opened up these forests for over-exploitation.

Forest Fees versus Free Access

Loosely connected to user rights is the moral issue of government's responsibility and obligation to do what is right in the public interest. The forest fees exemption for subsistence use was conceived from this moral standing, including the low pricing of forest products. The FD has raised its concerns over the fee exemption citing the complications it brings in their line of duty: that it is very difficult, in most cases, to distinguish between those accessing the forest resources for home consumption and for commercial use. FD's argument on how government loses revenues in this manner has not convinced lawmakers to strike out the provision. Instead, lawmakers have always voted against it arguing that forests are nature's provision that has generously been handed over from generation to generation, and therefore people should have free access to the resources their ancestors have tirelessly worked to preserve. Since the local people have preserved these forests from time immemorial, lawmakers find it reasonable to allow free access for subsistence consumption as a pay back for the local people's labor.

Obviously, for anyone who follows political debates these arguments should ring a familiar cord. All politics being local (and in most cases also personal), the last thing any elected official would do is to go against representing the interests of their constituents, even though such a move might be in the national interest. Because politics is all about pleasing your local constituent first, which protects one's votes

and guarantees re-election, so far no members of parliament have been bold enough to support burning their fingers on an issue such as this one. Protecting their votes is a game politicians know best, and this loophole gives them a great platform to show that they have kept their word to keep the interests of their constituents guaranteed. In any case such loopholes not only benefit the common person but more so these same people who make the laws.

Because of the central position forests occupy in supplying the essentials for a regular person's daily survival, especially in rural areas, and coupled with the entrenched perceptions of forests being a free gift from nature it is most likely that eliminating free access for home use will remain an uphill battle in Parliament.

While both the free access and low prices are good for the consumer, what this has done is to encourage over-exploitation of the forest resources. And the fact that these forests are considered as common property, where in this case the invisible hand of the manager is not even present, the tragedy of the commons has taken over. Hence, in the absence of meaningful oversight from the department, this had resulted in forest over-exploitation, which had now led to forest degradation.

On the commercial side, particularly with regard to timber extraction, there is also another bad loophole in the forest regulations. The license specifies the minimum quantity a licensee should process per

year and not the maximum. Yet even though the department has absolute powers and is entirely at liberty to make changes to its regulations any time it sees fit, this provision is still on the books to date. Therefore, when the department complains about over-exploitation, one wonders who should be blamed for that: is it the resource user or the department itself which has not changed its regulations? People (as individuals or groups) always look for avenues to maximize their profits and utility motives. The current arrangement of free access for subsistence consumption provides a perfect situation to achieve all that!


Land Tenure and Jurisdiction

At independence in 1964, Zambia inherited two types of land tenure systems based on the English Law. One system was that of formal title registration, administered under the Crown Land, which later became State Land. The other was the customary law that applied to the Native Reserves, Native Trust Land and Barotseland (now called Western Province). In terms of land distribution, Trust Land covers the largest portion. Out of Zambia's total landmass, 57.7% (43.3 million ha) is Trust Land, 36.2% (27.2 million ha) Reserve land, and 6% (4.5 million ha) is State land,⁴⁶⁰ which is mainly found along the line of rail (**Figure 5.1**).

⁴⁶⁰ M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in Ng'andwe, A. (ed.), *Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia*, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45

Land tenure defines ownership and access rights, including a system of management. In Zambia, land ownership is segmented between central and local government, who together own 6%, and the traditional rulers who control 94% of the land (**Figure 5.1**).

Figure 5.1: Distribution of Land by Land Tenure System, Zambia.



Source: D.J. Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights" in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), *Zambia in Maps*, 1971:49

Generally speaking the Zambian way of life is pretty much a communal affair,⁴⁶¹ and nowhere is this more pronounced than in land

⁴⁶¹ Scott D. Taylor, *Cultures and Customs of Zambia*, 2006

tenure arrangements. The Chiefs own the bulk of the land which they distribute to their subjects depending on need. Families “own” the land in perpetuity, provided they do not leave such lands unutilized for a long time, at which time the Chief resumes ownership rights, or other members of that community may go to the Chief to request such land to be assigned to them.

Thus, in the Chiefs’ areas, land ownership is not a complicated process. A person simply goes to the local Chief to get a piece of land and that becomes family property that would be passed on from one generation to another as long as one maintains presence in that area. In communities that rear livestock such as in Central, Eastern, Southern and Western Provinces, it is not uncommon for the Chiefs to set aside communal grazing lands. Yet, despite this communal ownership arrangement, land has generally been well managed and hardly suffered from the so called ‘*tragedy of the commons*’. This is because land has always been considered a community heritage to be worked in such a way that it provides for both the present and future generations. Also the political philosophy of humanism,⁴⁶² espoused by the Kaunda administration, further entrenched these values.

⁴⁶² In all its stripes and shapes, humanism was a disguised form of socialism; very much geared towards to common property ownership and creating a classless society. Whether this is good or bad is another question beyond the scope of this study. For details, refer to Kenneth Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and Its Implementation, Part I* (Lusaka, 1967); *Humanism in Zambia: A Guide to its Implementation, Part II* (Lusaka, 1974).

The issue of who has jurisdiction over what land has briefly been dealt with. In this section I want to highlight how land tenure and ownership rights (rather than administrative or stewardship powers *per se*) influence the “assigned” powers of a manager such as those of the FD. By land tenure I mean the formal and informal laws/rules that assign access rights to land – for use and or ownership. It includes not only the relationships between people and land but also the social relationships between people. Why should land tenure be part of this discussion? What relevance does it have here?

As I pointed out earlier, this issue is important even in a study such as this one which is dealing with institutional capacity because those with tenure rights will usually have more power over the property in question and this gives them a certain social status in comparison with those without those rights. What this means is that “tenure determines who can (and can’t) do what with the property in question and under which circumstances they can (and can’t) do it.”⁴⁶³ Therefore, knowing who has control over what land, how the FD gets the land for reservations, and the different policies that deal with land issues, etc. makes it easier to appreciate the challenges as well as the opportunities available to Forestry Department. This is especially important in view of the fact that FD does not own any land (as in buying it), but gets it free

⁴⁶³ Owen J. Lynch and Janis B. Alcorn, “Tenurial Rights and Community-Based Conservation,” in: David Western, et. al., (eds.) *Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-based Conservation*, (Island Press: Washington D.C.), 1994:373

from respective landowners (e.g. the traditional Chiefs or central government) on the understanding that such lands are going to be managed on behalf of the people for a specific purpose, e.g. protection of a water catchment area. In other words, the land is on “loan” to the FD. These institutionalized land ownership arrangements cannot be ignored and will not go away anytime soon, especially that they are protected under the law.⁴⁶⁴ In fact, this is part of the reason why local communities are able to assert themselves as they do because that land essentially belongs to them and all they are doing is to exercise their rights hoping to get back their land. Land tenure, ownership and access rights are issues where various policy battles have been waged. A brief history will be appropriate here.

Crown land (apparently the most fertile land) was reserved for white settlers who were also permitted to hold freehold or leasehold title, while native land was for the native Africans.⁴⁶⁵ To protect the natives from losing their land, the British colonial government did not allow non-natives or charitable organizations to own land in Native and Trust lands for more than 5 years and 33 years, respectively. Since the natives did not go into commercial farming at the rate and scale the white settlers

⁴⁶⁴ M. P. Mvunga, *The Colonial Foundations of Zambia's Land Tenure System*, (NecZam: Lusaka), 1980; M.P. Mvunga, *Land Law and Policy in Zambia*, (Mambo Press: Institute for African Studies, *Zambian Papers No.17*), 1982; M.C. Zulu, "Land Policy and Administration including systems of land allocation in Zambia", in Ng'andwe, A. (ed.), *Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia*, (Centre for Continuing Education: UNZA, Lusaka), 1993:41-45

⁴⁶⁵ D.J. Siddle, "Colonial Land Rights," in: Hywel D. Davies (ed.), *Zambia in Maps*, University of London Press, Ltd, 1971:48-49; M. P. Mvunga, *The Colonial Foundations of Zambia's Land Tenure System*, (NecZam: Lusaka), 1980

did, this somehow explains why more land are found in trust lands, and by extension forest estates too. However, since independence, government has made several modifications to the statutes governing land ownership, both during the First (1964-73) and Second (1973-1991) Republics under the UNIP government, led by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda as well as under President Frederick Chiluba's government.

Since title to land was not permitted in customary lands and neither could that land be sold, this essentially meant land in these areas were valueless. The natives wanted this and other sections of the law that were perceived to hinder development in their areas changed.

The first of these 'solutions' came out of a 1967 Land Commission, which among other things, recommended that land had value and, therefore, can be bought or rented regardless of where it is located to secure one's right to use it.⁴⁶⁶ Title to land should also be given to those people on customary land so they too could have secure rights to land. Finally, the Commission vested all land in the Republican President, to be held in trust for the Zambian people.⁴⁶⁷

Sadly, the 1967 Land Commission Report was not made available to the public so the Commission's recommendations were not formally accepted or rejected. Instead, government conveniently only popularized the clause that vested all land in the President. Other recommendations such as the one that gave value to land were tactfully ignored until 1991

⁴⁶⁶ GRZ, *Report of the Land Commission*, Lusaka, August 1967:165

⁴⁶⁷ GRZ, *Report of the Land Commission*, 1967:112, 161

when the MMD government inscribed it into law. Thus, concerns on land laws continued, especially the need to redistribute to Zambians land held by absentee landlords on State land.

Later, after the 1969 referendum, *The Lands Acquisition Act of 1970* was passed and authorized land redistribution. Government could buy such lands in cash or in kind by giving the affected landlord an alternative piece of land.⁴⁶⁸ This Act gave the President so much power he could “compulsorily acquire any property of any description.”⁴⁶⁹

In pursuit of his humanist philosophy, a disguised form of socialism, President Kaunda argued against sale of land pointing out that since land is never bought under the African tradition, it must remain the property of the state.⁴⁷⁰ And this stance was further consolidated under the UNIP administration where all existing free hold titles were converted to leasehold titles of up to 99 years and that government would monitor and facilitate land acquisition only in the “national interest.” To that effect all land was vested in the President, to be held in trust on behalf of the Zambian people.⁴⁷¹ In a way, it is possible to speculate that this is what led government to conserve as much land in customary lands areas as possible, as exemplified in the number of forest estates found in these areas.⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁸ GRZ, *Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296*, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970:6-7

⁴⁶⁹ GRZ, *Land Acquisition Act, CAP 296*, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1970:4

⁴⁷⁰ K.D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and the Guide to its Implementation, Part I*, (Zambia Information Services: Lusaka), 1968

⁴⁷¹ UNIP, *National Policies for the Next Decade*, (Zambia Information Services: Lusaka), 1973:36-37

⁴⁷² See FD Annual Report for 1988:3-4.

After toying with several options between permitting titles to land in Chiefs' areas (customary lands) and getting some portions of State Land to redistribute to the people in areas where land shortage became a problem (e.g. in Southern Province), these initiatives were allowed after many years of negotiations.⁴⁷³ But the proposal to introduce a land tax payable by all land users including peasants was rejected by the UNIP government.⁴⁷⁴

Of all the changes that have occurred over the years, the most monumental came in 1991 when finally land had value; land could now be sold whether or not there was permanent infrastructures on it.⁴⁷⁵ In particular, the *National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia* also recommended that land be re-classified into two categories: State land and Customary land rather than the previous four; and that landowners on State land would have a 99 years lease with automatic renewal, while those in Customary land would be granted specific durations based on the purpose for which the land is needed.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷³ GRZ, *Land Conversion of Titles Act*, 1975:6; GRZ, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters in the Southern Province*, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1982:18; GRZ, *Procedure on Land Alienation: Land Circular No. 1*, (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources: Lusaka) 1985a:3

⁴⁷⁴ GRZ, *Government Paper No. 2 of 1985: Summary of the Main Recommendations and Government Reactions on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters in the Southern Province*, (Government Printer: Lusaka), 1985b:16-17

⁴⁷⁵ MMD, *Movement for Multi-party Democracy Manifesto 1991-1996*, (MMD Campaign Committee: Lusaka), 1991:7

⁴⁷⁶ A. Ng'andwe (ed.), "Resolutions of the Conference," in: *Report of the National Conference on Land Policy and Legal Reform in the Third Republic of Zambia, July 19-23* (The University of Zambia: Center for Continuing Education, Lusaka), 1993:203.

While the afore mentioned land reforms opened up customary lands to attract investment, the restriction to 99 years lease title fails to take into consideration the long maturity period of forestry crops. In this respect, land laws in Zambia do not encourage private forest ownership because renewal of title to land is not guaranteed after the 99 years lease. Consequently, the country attracts forest extraction instead of long-term investment; whereby investors would be keen to establish or manage their own forest estates as is the case, for instance, in Scandinavian and other western countries.

A few things deserve special mention. First, the Chiefs have more land than central government, and these lands are communally owned and still administered under customary laws of inheritance. The Chiefs decide who can or cannot be given land, and what may or may not be done in their areas. And this has been their power base. But this tenure system also raises several concerns: how secure are communal property rights? Do (or what type of) tenure incentives exist to promote sustainable management of the land resources? How equitable are the redistribution arrangements? When a person or group of people occupy a piece of land without the Chief's permission are they squatters or do their tenure rights come into play since they belong to that community? At what point does free access become a problem for another person in a communally owned land? As Lynch and Alcorn have argued with respect to community-based conservation efforts, these questions can be

addressed by assessing the state's performance (in this case represented by FD) and the existing relationships between the Chiefs and government.⁴⁷⁷

As Powell and DiMaggio (1991) explain, institutionalized arrangements tend to have long staying power, are easily reproduced and people often do not even look at other alternatives because they regard the prevailing arrangements as sufficiently appropriate.⁴⁷⁸ This is so true in the Zambian situation where communal land ownership and tenure arrangements have remained unchanged for so many years despite the bashings from pro-capitalist and free market lovers who advocate otherwise.

However, given what is happening now, it should not come as a surprise to conceptualize the problem of forest degradation as a product of the tragedy of the commons precisely because that is what it looks like now, though not in the sense of the people maximizing utility from the same piece of land but in the sense of individuals (or a group of families) competing to [illegally] allocate themselves a piece of land that they aspire to own before others get it. Somehow it resembles what happened during the scramble for Africa, except this time the "sharing" is at local level, with central government being perceived as an intruder, a common enemy. The phenomenon is more pronounced for forests near

⁴⁷⁷ Lynch and Alcorn, "Tenurial Rights and Community-based Conservation," in: David Western, *et al.*, (eds.), *Natural Connections*, 1994:378-381

⁴⁷⁸ Water Powell and Paul DiMaggio, *the New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago), 1991:11

metropolitan areas than it is in the rural areas, which again underscores the fact that people still have more respect for the Chiefs' authority than they do for central government. In other words, traditional "state" has more staying power than the contemporary state, rather than vice versa.

Part of these reactions arise from an underlying frustration due government's failure to deliver on its promises of creating jobs through forestry, and partly because of the collapse of the economy that sent thousands of unemployed people on the streets. Consequently, people have invaded the forests as the only way they can claim them back. But speaking from experience, I strongly believe that it is unlikely that these lands will be in bad shape once they become private property.

For the unemployed masses, forests provided the easiest avenue where one could extract some form of livelihood without having to worry about any financial investment. For instance, all one needs is an axe and the energy to stroll into the nearest forest to get some wood (or make charcoal) for sale. And sometimes, no equipment is needed – just a basket would do, and someone would come back with a host of products to sell – mushrooms, fruits, vegetables, etc. Those who are skilled enough can also trap unsuspecting wildlife using ropes crafted from tree barks!

Getting back to the tragedy of the commons, I envision this to be a temporary phenomenon, meant only to force government to give up those

forests as has happened before.⁴⁷⁹ Of course the people who are illegally taking over some or parts of the forests are motivated by utility and opportunity cost motives to the extent that this would lead to eventual land ownership. Everyone is trying to maximize his or her utility from forests, which ultimately is leading to forest over-exploitation. The fact that the forest manager, FD, is perpetually absent made these communal lands vulnerable. In the absence of a manager to provide some leadership and control over these estates due to labor and financial constraints (as the department claims), this opened up the forests to unrestricted accesses.

Since people did not see anyone to be directly responsible for these forests, and armed with the knowledge that these forests have been common property from time immemorial, the natural tendency is for anyone to claim ownership. Hence, these forests became open to unrestricted access. Consequently, there is no control over what should be extracted, when or how much. At first people went in only to help themselves to the forest products, exercising their access and usufruct rights. Later they realized they can actually establish their ownership rights too, the best way they know how: to settle there. Bear in mind that even when land is communal the owner/manager (the Chief) regulates access and ownership. With FD having abrogated its responsibilities as a

⁴⁷⁹ Davy Siame, "Forest Resource Management and Drought", in: IUCN, *The Environmental Impact of the 1991-1992 Drought on Zambia*, 1997:73-74; Felix Njovu, *et. al.*, *Key Threats and Opportunities for the Conservation of Biodiversity*, 2004

manager of PFAs, the local Chiefs could do nothing as they were tied up in the contractual arrangement that released such lands to FD. As a result, this created a managerial vacuum, one which the people have exploited to their advantage. Ironically, the Chiefs never blame government as having failed them. Instead, they always point to population growth as the reason why their subjects have been invading the forests.

The other dimension relates to the changes in the land laws. Up until 1991 land in Zambia had no value: it could not be sold on its own regardless of whether it was in State land or customary lands. Even on State Land where land ownership through title deeds was permitted land could not be sold on its own unless there was some form of permanent infrastructure⁴⁸⁰ (e.g. buildings) on it. And because formal title to land was not allowed in customary lands (Trust Land and Reserve Land) that fell under the Chiefs' jurisdictions this not only reinforced the idea that land was valueless and therefore useless but also promoted land ownership insecurity.

Of course the whole idea was to keep land as a communal property, to be accessed through the Chiefs' permission, and it worked fairly well. As a result, there was no motivation to own land individually. But all this changed in 1991 when land gained value under the new law.

⁴⁸⁰ Permanent infrastructures are defined as those whose main structure are built from bricks, stone or any materials deemed to have an enduring life span. Buildings comprising timber as the main structural components are deemed to be temporary structures and would therefore disqualify any such land from being sold.

People can now have title to land in customary lands (up to 99 years renewable leases), although such land can only be accessed through the Chiefs' approval.

These developments have ignited a huge surge for individual property ownership. Thus, forest encroachment can be explained in terms of individuals wanting to be early birds to catch the best worms. Because land can now be sold in its own right, provided one has title to it (which is also now allowed in Chiefs areas provided the Chief consents to that), this has spurred a new wave of entrepreneurship geared towards accumulating land as an asset that can be sold later. Ironically, as far as forest encroachment is concerned, this is only happening in the PFAs, the land perceived as belonging to government, and not in open forests still under the Chiefs' jurisdiction.

What does this tell us? Simply that people still have respect for the Chiefs' authority and appreciate that such lands are for their future inheritance. On the other hand, because FD has become an 'absentee landlord' its estates have rendered themselves fallible to occupation by anyone. And all this speaks to the idea of lack of managerial skills. At its current level of capacity, it is unlikely that FD would be able to provide the kind of penetration required to instill that sense of its presence. It is this weak penetration that has, for the most part, led to the current problems. And penetration here does not in any suggest unilateralism but the adoption of arrangements that promote and rely on inclusion of

other key players to get things done. At the end of the day the big question is always, how useful was that government intervention for the intended target group?

A good yardstick is to assess government interventions against their benefits to society. In other words, how far has the state penetrated society to solve the problems it was supposed to address? But if the state fails or unevenly penetrates society, “local enclaves” may arise to provide expression of “private” identities.⁴⁸¹ The public has taken over the forest estates precisely because its government has failed them. For instance, there are no jobs created in the rural areas where the resource is situated. Instead, even the few job opportunities that have been created by the timber companies are located in urban areas where these companies have set up camp.

What can be learned from all this? First, the department lost touch with real world. Whereas the previous arrangement permitted involvement of the Chiefs and their subjects in forest management, which included the recognition of group rights and access to these resources, FD management decided to take a unilateral approach in which it exerted itself as the only authority, ignoring the fact that Chiefs still remained the real authority since land never really changes hands to become the department’s property. Forest department cannot sell the land it manages. Therefore, what the forestry managers ought to do is to

⁴⁸¹ Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, 2005:7

tap into the Chiefs' authority by re-activating previous relations it had with these Chiefs. This is a model that has worked on wildlife management.⁴⁸² It is hard to find any reason why it would not work in a related field like forestry.

The issue at stake here is how can FD remobilize this social capital? And what expectations do these communities have about their government? Although people are known to be driven by short-term self-interests, given the right incentives and conditions, collective interests and action is likely to replace individual self-interests.⁴⁸³ After all communities are always sustained through collective action.

As observed earlier, it is clear from available evidence that FD's capacity on forest management has not resided in the number of its staff, their technical know-how nor the amount of funds at its disposal – though this is genuinely helpful. Rather its biggest asset has always been the unfettered cooperation that the department received from the Chiefs and their subjects. The moment the local communities withdrew from that partnership, all hell broke loose, and the effect of this withdrawal is evident everywhere. What lessons does this case study provide?

First, under a communal land tenure/ownership arrangement such as the one in Zambia, the bureaucracy clearly has no total control over the land resources. The Chiefs, as custodians of their community's property, have an upper hand. Therefore, community cooperation is

⁴⁸² Refer to the ADMADE Program in Zambia, which has been a great success.

⁴⁸³ Galaskiewicz, *Making Corporate Actors Accountable*, 1991:293

needed [again] if any meaningful improvement on forest management is to be achieved. Reintroducing and strengthening these ties is the best way forward.

Thus, government's proposal to introduce joint forest management (JFM)⁴⁸⁴ that would include the local people in forest management, and currently being tried through some community-based natural resource management programs (CBNRMP), is certainly a welcome gesture. However, this too is not likely to yield any positive outcomes if government is seen as trying to wash its hands by passing on the forest management responsibility to the local communities after the forests have been destroyed. What the people need is genuine leadership and government commitment to show that this will be a cooperative undertaking between government and the people. And of course local communities are interested in seeing tangible benefits accrue to them. Communities want and must regain security of tenure and access for them to feel comfortable to participate in such programs.

JFM is being viewed in certain circles as government's acceptance of failure to manage the forest resources. Thus, if not handled properly, government's withdrawal via CBNRMP as part of a power devolution strategy may create a leadership vacuum, which may hurt rather than benefit the very people it wants to empower. Devolution of power through

⁴⁸⁴ JFM has been in existence but informally. The new proposal wants to legalize these partnerships so that the public has legal protection especially as it relates to sharing revenues and other benefits. See the FD, *National Forest Policy*, 1999.

CBNRMP should be done gradually to prevent the rich and powerful from taking advantage of the situation.

At a time when poverty and health are of primary concern to a common person, it will be folly for government to institute measures that overlook these important obligations. This includes signing up blindly up for some international treaties that have minimal impact on the local communities just some organizations are willing to finance some so called capacity building / community empowerment initiatives. Unless such commitments translate into some tangible benefits to the local communities it will be a long shot to win the cooperation of the local people.

Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that Chiefs have more control over how land is utilized than the contemporary state, a feature that arises from the formation of the classic versus the modern state. In our case study, the modern state draws its power and legitimacy from the classical state (spread across the different Chieftoms) which is quite strong. It would not be surprising if a similar situation obtains in other African states whose formation shares similar characteristics with the contemporary state called Zambia. The issue that arises here is that this power layering of “states” within a state can become a source of weakness or conflict. May be this could explain why modern African states continue on the path of underdevelopment because strictly

speaking the contemporary state does not seem to have total control over its land. This is another area development practitioners should pay attention to, the first being why it is important to assess IC before implementing any interventions.

Population Growth

Zambia's population has changed substantially from 3.4 million (1964)⁴⁸⁵ to 11.7 million (2007),⁴⁸⁶ and with it has come corresponding challenges and opportunities. For instance, population growth has meant increased demand for agricultural land and human settlements. Also the need for wood energy, timber and other land use activities has moved in the same direction. These pressures have challenged FD's capacity to deal with them trying to keep its forest estates intact. But with a department that has been acting as an absentee landlord, the pressure for its forests has exceeded its capacity. As a result most of its forests have been compromised.

The conflict between having land for human settlements and keeping it for biodiversity conservation is one that the department has not handled very well in recent years mainly because FD has estranged the local people from being partners in forest conservation. But as Anna Lawrence has pointed out, foresters should adapt to changing social expectations by adopting new ways of managing: sharing knowledge and

⁴⁸⁵ George Kay, *A Social Geography of Zambia* 1967:47-48

⁴⁸⁶ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html>. Accessed: June 10, 2008.

responsibilities on forest management, not only among themselves but more importantly with resource users. In other words, forest managers should re-adopt approaches in which they see resource users as partners rather than as a problem, or a group whose only responsibility is to extract the forest resources.

I say re-adopt because these partnerships were previously in existence, not only in forestry but also for fisheries and water management. Chiefs had their own systems and gave specific responsibilities to their subjects e.g. on forestry, fisheries, and water management. And nowhere was this as elaborate as in Barotseland (Western Province), among the Lozi. But the system broke down (or at least was weakened) when FD took over the forests. A similar situation also occurred in Luapula Province over the fishery resources.⁴⁸⁷

In business circles, population growth is always looked at as a positive development – that is to say a potential market worth nurturing. So why is it a problem to FD? Isn't this a potential market for forest products too? It defeats my reasoning why FD does not look at population growth in this context. In any case the wealth of any nation starts with its people, the human capital! What makes a difference for population being a problem or an asset is how it is harnessed. And China

⁴⁸⁷ For details refer to the Fisheries Act, Cap 200 of 1994 and Statutory Instrument No. 198 of 1986. These statutes introduced a Fish Ban from December 1st to February 28th each year as if the local communities were not observing these restrictions already. The result was resentment from Luapula fishermen because other areas e.g. Western Province were not covered under this law. Yet Western Province has fishing areas too. But instead, government allowed the Litunga, the local Chief, to continue using his traditional authority to enforce the Fishing Ban in his area.

offers an excellent example in this respect! Strictly speaking, as a sector supposed to create job opportunities, population growth should be treated as an asset, both as a source of labor and as a market. FD is supposed to device strategies that harness the opportunity that comes with this growth rather than seeing it as a problem. Until foresters come to this realization, people will forever be a problem rather than an asset.

In fact, even though population is orchestrated as problematic, strictly speaking this is happening on a localized scale, with forests near urban areas being at greater risk.⁴⁸⁸ It is a problem that local politicians tend to exploit for political expedience – to convey to central government the idea that due to population increase more land is needed both for human settlements and agricultural purposes. Yet underlying this supposedly noble purpose is their agenda of political appeasement to their constituents. With a population density at 13 people per square kilometer (with Lusaka, the capital city, and the most densely populated town standing at 64 people per square kilometer),⁴⁸⁹ Zambia is still nowhere near to having a problem of land shortage. I come back to these dimension when I discuss political expedience.

Political Expedience

Land in Zambia conveys both a sense of identity and of power. Land is distributed according to ethno-linguistic lines, and ownership

⁴⁸⁸ Felix Njovu, 2004

⁴⁸⁹ CSO, *Living Conditions*, 2004c:1

follows this pattern. By virtue of belonging to a particular ethno-linguistic group (identify), one can own land through natural inheritance. As a nation that is predominantly agrarian (over 80% of the population in Zambia depend on subsistence farming for their livelihoods), land has been and continues to be a wealth generating avenue. As a result, it remains the “most valued form of property” to a common person.⁴⁹⁰ It is a resource that has permanence many other resources don’t have, at least one can own it in perpetuity as long as one maintain ties to a particular ethno-linguistic group.

Land is also a symbol of power in that those closer to the Chiefs (and in the case of State Land those with the power of the pen) have more influence over who owns the land and for what purposes. For a long time land has also provided political power too. Local politicians, usually claiming to speak on behalf of the people, tend to derive and drive their personal agendas based on how they are going to deal with land issues in their constituencies – either in terms of creating jobs or as advocates for getting back the protected forest areas from central government to cater for the local needs. In most cases the latter has resonated with the people and subsequently has secured votes for such politicians. Consequently, when they take office, such politicians have not been helpful in forest management.

⁴⁹⁰ Bina Agarwal, *Are We Not Peasants?* (Population Council Inc.: NY), 2002:2

In order to preserve their legislative status, mainly for political expedience, some local politicians have encouraged their constituencies to illegally access the forest resources or simply settle in the protected forests. Either way, this has led to forest degradation. Secondly, politicians have offered little support for forest reforms in the country, a position I construe as being content with the status quo. These politicians prefer maintaining the current loopholes in the law because they benefit from that. Initially people had respect for the law. But since embracing democratic politics, some Members of Parliament have encouraged people in their constituents to access the forest resources freely, defending the practice as one of the benefits of freedom. In their view, the classification of forests as government property means that this was public property, which meant that people could do as they pleased anytime. Obviously, the idea of having a manager in charge of that resource is completely ignored.

Thus, what we see here is identity politics at play, which is also confirming the idea that institutions matter.⁴⁹¹ They matter because institutions (as organizations or rules) both provide an avenue for expressing one's concerns, which in this case are manifested in tactics of fighting to retrieve what these communities rightfully perceive as their property. But the means adopted are counter-productive both for the respective communities or the nation.

⁴⁹¹ Deborah Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America*, 2005:5-8

On another level, it can also be argued that because the Zambian societies are so communally oriented an individual hardly exists. Local communities (including their elected officials) do not see themselves in individual terms but always as part of a community, although I should add that this is slowly changing in urban areas where ethno-linguistic lines have become blurred.

However, from the stand point of identity politics, members of parliament (as policy makers) are unlikely to stand alongside with the Forestry Department on public policy unless they are convinced that the department's interventions are going to bring benefits to their community not only to a selected few, as most public interventions tend to be based on a trickle down effects. What this means is that both the public and their members of parliament (MPs) are unlikely to debate issues from an objective position other than from a regional or communal, and usually, a normative position. Such orientations leave the FD in the cold because MPs will always lean towards protecting their constituent interests. Therefore, it may be an uphill climb to reach common ground. And this is where forest managers need to exercise their political skills by finding allies in the political arena long before the department submits any policy reforms. Support from the respective local communities and their elected officials, is what will ensure sound forest management. It is the single most capacity FD can count on if it has to succeed in its mission.

As Ingraham, *et. al.* (2003) point out public managers have multiple roles and operate at different levels, two main ones being the bureaucratic and the political levels. Achieving a balance between the two is a skill every public manager looking for success of their organization has to learn.⁴⁹² Sadly, the department is critically handicapped in this area. Compared to the previous administrators, the current Director of Forestry does not even have anything resembling a strategy. During and before B.O.M. Chiyabwe's time as head of the department (i.e. 1986 and earlier), the department had a lot of extension programs designed to draw the attention of policy makers and the public at large to forestry. Currently, despite the department's focus having shifted towards provision of extension services, there's hardly any extension program in place! How ironic! Given that the department has not developed any strategy to achieve its primary mandate, what does that tell us about its managers? If this is not a managerial problem, what is it?

For example, the department doesn't have to finance all its programs. With a bit of creativity the department could solve some, if not all, of the so-called problems being faced. Some extension services (e.g. radio and TV programs) can be self-financing if these managers could tap into the corporate world who can underwrite these extension programs for the benefit of both parties. No one in the department even thinks on

⁴⁹² Patricia Ingraham, *et. al.*, *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 2003.

these lines! It was apparent during the personal interviews with some of the senior and middle managers that they all think within the box: government is supposed to finance all their programs. But in light of limited resources, creating public-private partnerships is not an option but the only way the department should go.

Another aspect worth mentioning here, which also drew away the national resources to other activities relates to Zambia's involvement in the liberation movements in the region. Whether this was a good thing to do or not is beside the point. The fact is that Zambia's involvement in regional politics, especially to the degree this was pursued, undeniably deviated a good portion of the national resources that could have gone into building capacity in respective agencies. In hindsight, though the sacrifice was too costly to the Zambian people, the country did the right thing to host and create the necessary leadership that brought political harmony to the region. Except for the Angolan case and recent political instability in Zimbabwe, for the most part Southern Africa has been relatively peaceful and stable – certainly a plus for the Kaunda administration that pursued that unpopular policy at the time.

But how do these relate to the problem of deforestation? The diversion of resources to fund liberation movements deprived the local agencies of needed funds for development. However, despite these difficult times those managers were so creative they developed bilateral relationships and accessed grants that were used for research, training,

and development of other forestry and forest-based activities. In addition to the industrial plantation project, the department established some of the best research plots and genetic materials for indigenous and plantation forests.

Several things come into play here: there is visionary leadership from head of department and unwavering creativity among managers who were also able to communicate effectively to the lower ranks on what needed to be done. They developed a strong team spirit that kept everyone well informed. Also there is the issue of incentives offered primarily through staff development but also other benefits such as personal to holder vehicles,⁴⁹³ free accommodation and water⁴⁹⁴ that were part of the conditions of service. All these things point to management style and managerial skills. Certainly, there is a lack of vision and leadership qualities at Director's level. The head of the department is not providing the necessary leadership that would set the department in the right direction. For instance, communication is so bad for the most part the staff do not know what they are supposed to be doing. Organizational goals are not clearly spelled out and neither are staff roles properly explained to help them know how they fit into the larger picture.

⁴⁹³ This applied only to senior managers but middle and junior managers who were in charge of a forest station or section also informally enjoyed similar privileges.

⁴⁹⁴ Government provided free institutional housing to all forestry personnel. Except those who lived in town (under local municipal jurisdiction) government also absorbed the bill for water, telephone and transportation for the personnel who lived in forest stations.

For instance, 62% of the managers surveyed in this study *think* that FD has strategic goals. But 58% don't know what those strategic goals are! This is amazing! How can the department achieve anything if its managers don't know what they are supposed to work towards? When it comes to developing the annual work plans, again a gloomy picture emerges. Over half (51%) of the managers said they are not involved in developing the department's work plans, 42% don't know if FD has any work plans, and 40% don't even know who develops these work plans, if there are any at all!

In terms of program implementation i.e. knowing what role these managers are supposed to play in pursuing the department's mission or goals, only 32% of the forest managers (all levels) knew their role, while 22% hardly knew anything at all. The majority (46%) only knew sometimes, and it is hard to tell how often they knew. Overall, 89% confirmed that FD has problems implementing its plans because these managers have no idea what they are supposed to do.

This is clearly a serious problem. If the managers who are supposed to guide others are as ignorant regarding the department's goals and their role in pursuing the same as this study just revealed, how will the rest of the staff know? Because of this information black out there is a deep sense of frustration across the ranks to an extent where most forest managers are just waiting for the creation of the Forestry

Commission so they could get their separation benefits and take early retirement.

Refugees, Forests and National Security

Zambia has been one of the most stable and peaceful nation in the southern African region a feature that has made the country a safe haven for people displaced from political conflicts in neighboring countries, including those from Central and East Africa. It is therefore befitting to highlight the important role the Zambian government has played in accommodating refugees, and the impact this has had on forests as well as the national budget which has to be shared to cater for refugee too.

The influx of refugees into Zambia has been a constant occurrence dating back to early 1960s when the first freedom fighter groups engaged their governments into political and military campaigns. Since that time, even as a young nation, Zambia has continued to host refugees not only from its neighbors⁴⁹⁵ but even from countries further north in East and Central Africa.⁴⁹⁶ For instance, in 2005 Zambia hosted over 260,000 refugees, the highest number in the whole world. By 2007 this figure had dropped to 197,539, which excludes “42,250 Congolese refugees (and unspecified number from Angola) who were offered voluntary repatriation

⁴⁹⁵ For instance, refugees came from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

⁴⁹⁶ This includes refugees from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Congo, Congo DR (formerly Zaire), Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.

in November 2006".⁴⁹⁷ If previous experience is anything to go by, most of these people are likely to return possibly in the next two years. The current refugee population of 197,539 includes: 90,000 from unspecified neighboring countries (2006); 42,565 (Angola), 60,874 (Congo DR), and 4,100 (Rwanda) (2007).⁴⁹⁸ But what relevance do refugees have to the subject at hand? Two dimensions they bring to the table: their impact on forests and issues related to national security.

As a land locked country surrounded by eight neighbors, securing its borders, most of which have corridors of forests is an issue not only left to the national security wings, but one in which foresters also play an active role. The latter are usually the ones who notice whether there are movements of people from other countries, who then alert the security wings to take appropriate action. Therefore, when there is a lack of presence in monitoring these forests (whether by the foresters or local communities), this compromises national security.

Second, the influx of refugees into means that government has to find places where to settle these people to give them a decent shot at life, even though it may not be the same level where they came from. In most cases this means getting some pieces of land where to build refugee camps. As can be expected the natural choice is to get from government lands, although there are cases where Chiefs have been asked to donate part of their land. Also these camps provide basic infrastructure such

⁴⁹⁷ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html>. Accessed: June 10, 2008.

⁴⁹⁸ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/za.html>. *ibid.*

that the facilities do not include the luxuries of modern life style. Refugees are predominantly forest-dependent for their energy needs. Therefore, depending on how long these would stay in an area, extensive damage often occurs to the nearby forests. In this respect, refugees do contribute to deforestation.

The Value of the Forests in Poverty Alleviation

It would be unreasonable if this discussion only shows what is causing forest degradation without putting a human face to the topic. By this I mean, so what if the forests are dwindling? Why should people care if forests are declining? What are wider implications? There are various reasons, and here is why.

First, if well managed, forests contain the natural “capital” that can contribute magnificently to Zambia’s economic development. This has been proved by the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) who, by the way, have been the major financiers of forestry programs in Zambia. In Finland, forestry alone contributed 5.6% to Finland’s national GDP in 2006.⁴⁹⁹ Between 1982 and 2005 Scandinavian

⁴⁹⁹ For details visit:

[http://www.forest.fi/smyforest/foresteng.nsf/allbyid/B870982E61D16328C22573D30026D674/\\$file/G028_eng_08.pdf](http://www.forest.fi/smyforest/foresteng.nsf/allbyid/B870982E61D16328C22573D30026D674/$file/G028_eng_08.pdf) . And for more documents and statistics refer to this website: <http://www.forest.fi/smyforest/foresteng.nsf/allbyid/438DBC6361C9EB75C2256F34004154D8?Opendocument#Graphics%3A> . Accessed: May 28, 2008.

countries have given Zambia over US\$331.7 million in bilateral grants for forestry programs.⁵⁰⁰

As mentioned earlier, over 80% of the Zambian population is dependent on indigenous forests for agriculture, food, building materials, wood energy, and other forest products for sale, all of which cushion their subsistence living. And this situation applies to other countries too, especially in the Third World.⁵⁰¹ As a bank of mostly renewable resources its potential to supply these could stay on in perpetuity. Thus, even as the world has set for itself the millennium goals, forests can certainly play an important role, especially in reducing poverty.

Yet, even with such an indisputable reality, the link between forests and their role in poverty alleviation is clearly missing; at least the Zambian foresters have not highlighted this in a way that makes sense to policy makers. This is partly because of an over-stretched emphasis on timber, which leaves out a host of other useful products, and partly because a lot of the activity happens in the informal sector.

The first problem relates to how forests are valued. Foresters only see timber in their forests; hardly pay any attention to other equally important products such fruits, herbal medicines, etc. It is inconceivable at this time in the history of forestry in Zambia that there are no monetary statistics (not even speculations) on the value of forests. Yet,

⁵⁰⁰ The actual figure is US\$331,719,309.00, based on information in Appendix 4. See Appendix 4 for specific projects that have been financed by these three Scandinavian countries.

⁵⁰¹ Edward B. Barbier, *Natural Resources and Economic Development* (Cambridge University Press: NY), 2005.

forests serve as the only secure bank, especially for the rural areas. Forests make it possible for these folks at least to get some level of decent subsistence survival, stopping them from falling into abject poverty.

Foresters must learn to quantify in monetary terms not only timber but also the other forest products, and show how these products could (and do) help alleviate poverty. For instance, indigenous forests are a great source of food and medicines, which by the way, are classified as minor forests products and there are statistics on them whether in value or quantity extracted. Yet, food is the most sought after commodity. And forests provide this all year ranging from mushrooms and vegetables to fruits and game meat (animals and birds). The way forests are valued in Zambia leaves much to be desired. These professionals count what does not count, at least to the common person, which includes this author. The wealth and value of these goes far beyond timber and it time this is reflected.

The current boom in honey production that has clearly been enhanced by the beekeeping project under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) is a good testimony on how forests can alleviate poverty at household level without having to use “trickle down” calculations, as most foreign-propelled programs tend to emphasize. In fact, the ZMK12 billion loan (equiv. US\$2.99 million) from the African Development Bank (AfDB) for beekeeping activities in North-Western and

Central Province underscores the importance of forests in alleviating poverty at household level.⁵⁰² At least government is waking up to this realization that organic honey is a product that would be well received on the international market. If well coordinated this is an industry that can pull a lot of subsistent farmers out of poverty. And of course there are numerous other resources from the natural forests such as mushrooms and fruits, obtained free, but whose value runs in millions, or possibly billions, of dollars.

One classical example is Amanita Zambia, a company that amassed its wealth exporting *Amanita zambiana*, an organic mushroom from Zambia's indigenous forests. The Masuku wine from the fruits of *Uapaca* tree species (Masuku) that was produced by Tip-top Company⁵⁰³ in Kitwe, is another. The other example is the *Sclerocarrya birrea* (Marula)⁵⁰⁴ fruits that are used in the production of the Amarula cream (**Figure 5.2**). The Amarula cream, produced in South Africa, is exported worldwide but these fruits also come from Zambia's natural forests, the Marula trees.

⁵⁰² For details on this see the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, web article of May 22, 2007 at [---](#)

⁵⁰³ Sadly, Tip-Top Company was closed in 1992 in exchange for a franchise from the Coca-cola Company. As can be expected the company's closure had a terrible effect on the peasants who used to supply the masuku fruits to Tip-Top Company.

⁵⁰⁴ As of now the Marula has defied domestication, it grows only in the wild and has been found useful for man and wildlife. For more information about the marula tree (*Sclerocarrya birrea*) see, http://www.amarula.co.za/za/learn/amarula_roots/ .

Figure 5.2: The Marula Fruits and the Amarula Cream (Liqueur).

a) The Marula tree



b) Marula Fruits



c) Amarula Cream



d) Amarula Cream on rocks



Therefore, as we have seen before the inadequacy in capacity goes beyond numbers. The problem is lack of managerial skills; the leadership acumen, propelled by being visionary and pro-active rather than reactive, are important ingredients for effective management.⁵⁰⁵ The department lacks leadership that is supposed to shepherd the organization in a productive direction, one where its staff understand the department's goals and their role in achieving the same. It also lacks a shared vision. If any vision exists only the Director of Forestry knows it.

For instance, according to the survey findings 88% of forestry managers surveyed *think* FD has a mission statement, but 38% of them do not even know what the department's mission statement is. With respect to planning, 62% *think* the department has a strategic plan, yet 58% have no idea what the department's strategic goals are. And finally, 51% said they are not involved in any form of planning, if any planning is done at all.

From a management point of view, this is a perfect recipe for disaster because these are the managers who are supposed to lead others in their respective provinces and or sections, and yet have no idea about what they are supposed to do. Without any information to pass on to their junior staff, a lack of shared vision has permeated throughout the department creating a terrible sense of disillusionment and staff morale has dipped rock bottom. This tendency or preference for a top

⁵⁰⁵ Ingraham, , *et. al.*, *Government Performance*, 2003:3

down centralized decision-making style has unfortunately strangled the department. It will certainly require a visionary leader and a manager to bring the forestry staff back on board. For now we can only hope that this will not take forever before that change happens.

Conclusion

Picking up our discussion from Chapter 5 and continuing the argument in this Chapter, I have tried to further demonstrate that forest degradation is directly linked to FD's weak institutional capacity that has stronger roots in the internal than the external factors. Although some external factors are at play, they are the kind that can be contained if FD had good leadership. As Chapter 5 has demonstrated the major weakness is not necessarily the inadequacy of field staff (as in *quantity* or the *number*), the problem lies in lack of managerial capacity – the inability to plan, organize, direct, supervise, coordinate, inspire and simply manage the personnel and other resources.⁵⁰⁶ Senior managers lack the managerial skills even to link the department to the larger world where it can tap into other people's capacities. Unlike previous managers who valued and tapped into the social capital that exists outside the FD (e.g. the Chiefs, in other government agencies, the corporate world and even the international community) sadly, the current management team is oblivious to this reality. Right now the department needs to implement

⁵⁰⁶ See for instance, Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration*, 1937

a series of reforms to bring the department back on course: one of this is that the department should renew its relations with the local Chiefs. This is where the department's strength resides. And then it should work on bringing in new partners such as the corporate world. The department's success lies in working collaboratively with the larger community rather continuing to pursue a unilateralism type of management.

External factors have had their own share of contribution too. But as our analysis shows this is a smaller portion (33%) compared to 67% that internal factors accounted for. Therefore, it is quite possible that if the internal problems are resolved, some of the external factors would be taken care of too. For instance, issues related to political expedience and population pressure can be easily handled if FD's capacity is improved.

Chapter 6

Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities

Throughout this discussion it has become more and more clear that contrary to FD's official position (which now qualifies as a popularized myth) that inadequate field staff and financial resources are largely responsible for the poor state of forests in Zambia, the results from this study show that this is not entirely true. Rather the problem lies with a different set of factors: the managers themselves. There is very little connection, if any, to the other two factors (financial and field staff) that the department has always orchestrated. The biggest handicap FD suffers from is managerial incompetence. The department lacks visionary leadership, one that would provide guidance to the lower ranks to steer them towards a common purpose. Indeed, this might come as a surprise to most forest officers and others who have come to the same conclusion as FD has done all these years. This is because their analyses have relied on simply observing the direction of change (the trends) without subjecting such observations to further statistical scrutiny, as this study did, to at least establish the degree of impact from various factors at play.

As this study had made it abundantly clear, organizations are created for a particular purpose. They have a life of their own as reflected in their mission, vision, objectives, strategies and goals.⁵⁰⁷ Yet as we have also seen, these are later shaped or modified by the preferences of the staff that get hired as well as the people outside who interact with that organization. And the strongest impact comes from an organization's managers who set the agenda on what should and will not be done.

As various management and organizational theorists have argued, managerial capability is an essential input if an organization is to be effective in its mission.⁵⁰⁸ Availability of the factors of production is a necessary but not sufficient condition for good performance. An organization may have all the factors of production but the lack of managerial skills to utilize these resources can render them meaningless. Yet even with meager resources good managers are able to explore other means and propel an organization to greater heights. And this is exactly what has transpired in FD over the years. With meager resources, but under good leadership, the department excelled so well it was a "star agency". But under poor leadership, despite some improvements in the *number* and *quality* of personnel, the department recessed into a non-performer and ceased to be a star kid on the block. Needless to say

⁵⁰⁷ Oliver Williams, 1991:327

⁵⁰⁸ See for instance, Herbert Simon, "Human Nature in Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 79:293-304.

unless the FD gets its act together in managerial leadership, no improvements can be expected elsewhere anytime soon.

The challenge at hand is how can this capacity be developed? What level should be dealt with first? A repeat of the PSRP should be avoided. To this effect, the recommendations offered by David Frederickson and James Perry (1998), which addresses how to implement change,⁵⁰⁹ seems appropriate in this situation.

The first step they recommend is “unfreezing,” which entails loosening long held “attitudes and self-perception of organizational actors.”⁵¹⁰ In their view, one should avoid structural adjustments, as the major strategies for change, because these do not usually “engage the deeply ingrained images and perceptions” of the organization’s culture.⁵¹¹ Instead, Frederickson and Perry argue that the best tactics to institute organizational change are those that will ameliorate the “natural human desire to hold on to existing attitudes, perspectives and activities,” whose natural response is usually anxiety, feelings of loss of something familiar and predictable, uncertainty, and loss of identity.⁵¹² To institute and nurture organizational change for improved performance, Frederickson and Perry offer a series of recommendations, which can summarized as follows:

⁵⁰⁹ David Frederickson and James Perry, “Overcoming Employee Resistance to Change,” in: Patricia W. Ingraham, et. al., *Transforming Government*, (Jossey-Bass Publishers), 1998:125-146

⁵¹⁰ Frederickson and Perry, 1998:129

⁵¹¹ Frederickson and Perry, 1998:129-130

⁵¹² Frederickson and Perry, 1998:130

The first step is to reduce the resistance by teaching employees to let go. For instance, given the level of their technical and professional qualifications, forestry staff would rightfully claim that they are well trained and know their business. For this reason, it may not be easy for them to accept that they are incompetent – that they lack managerial skills. Therefore, the first challenge is insure that all employees are well informed so they understand how the proposed change would improve the status quo.

The second strategy is to cultivate and get the support of career civil servants (and I add the politicians too). Political and administrative actors are both important ingredients. Both groups bring a different kind of durability to the reform effort which neither career bureaucrats nor elected officials can provide alone.

Third, diffuse the concerns of those who would resist. Do not bypass resisters as this may just mobilize them into a stronger force. Ignoring resistance is not a good strategy; it may just delay or obstruct looking at other alterative options that resisters may offer.⁵¹³

In terms of nurturing change, again Frederickson and Perry recommend several strategies, one of which to involve all employees to participate and own the change process.⁵¹⁴ Sometimes good ideas are fail to be adopted simply because the people supposed to be affected are not involved to own the process. This is where the SAP and PSRP both failed.

⁵¹³ Frederickson and Perry, 1998:130-134

⁵¹⁴ More strategies are offered from 134

And the current management style utilizes a similar approach whereby the Director of Forestry does not share information with the other managers such that one third of the forest managers have no clue regarding their role in working towards the department's strategic goals.

Besides the above internal constraints, the external environment has also generated its own set of challenges and opportunities, most of which could be minimized or completely eliminated if the managerial capacity existed. Thus, the real challenge here is how to improve FD's managerial capacity, and I dare say, this should be the focus for anyone interested in improving the department's performance.

Because capacity development is both an objective and an approach,⁵¹⁵ linking capacities to performance outcomes is the best way to know if, in fact, those are the key capacities needed to create positive change. Therefore, whether capacity building is taken as an objective or an approach is immaterial. The real issue lies in determining what capacities are required to improve performance.

The easiest and fastest way to improve FD's performance would be to overhaul the top so that a new leader can take over and must be given specific targets to achieve. Until FD managers learn to re-invent the way they do business by adjusting to changing circumstances, i.e. doing business differently and embracing new ways of doing things, the current situation will continue.

⁵¹⁵ Khalid Malik, "Capacity for Development," in: Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, et. al., *Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems*, 2002:27.

CHALLENGES

A closer look at the obstacles facing the Forestry Department indicates that the origins of the current challenges are self-inflicted, rooted in lack of administrative and managerial skills. The main challenges FD needs to pay attention to are captured below.

Managerial Leadership

As the findings elucidate, and without running the risk of being repetitive, the lack of managerial leadership to provide strategic direction to the workforce has led to various problems. The department has cultivated an ideal ground for a frustrated, disoriented and de-motivated labor force. Teamwork is clearly absent, and the management team has failed to harnesses the technical skills in its staff, which clearly is a waste of investment from previous years in human resource development.

Poor planning, and mostly the lack of it, has led to the absence of forest management plans which are essential operational tools. Consequently this has hampered the work of the department. There is no guide as to what forestry personnel are supposed to work towards both in the short and long term. Although Nutt (1971) and other organizational theorists argue in favor of availability and adequacy of tangible productive resources (human, capital, technology and an enabling environment) as being necessary for the effective functioning of

an organization I would add that this equation is incomplete in the absence of managerial qualities. As we have discovered throughout this study, managerial capacity matters; it serves as the fuel and glue that drives and binds other factors of production to work in unison.

Indeed, the effectiveness of an organization is measured by the quantity and quality of its output. Conversely, the caliber of the input determines the output, or to put it more plainly 'the means justifies the end'. Since the department's mission is to manage the forest resource, the quantity and the quality of the forest (as a final product) is a good measure of its performance. And this is where its managers have failed lamentably.


Quality of Staff and Their Placement

Closely related to the first challenge is the quality of staff. Numbers alone don't count much, quality, and in particular, quality of skills matters most. In terms of professional qualifications and experience (defined as years worked in forest operations), the department has higher qualified personnel compared to 1970s and earlier, a time when FD had less qualified staff but ironically a time when performance was also at its best.

Looking at the current staff appointments, it is evident that the department has adequately trained staff to carry out its mandate. Although there is no one with a doctorate degree in forestry in the

department, those with master’s degrees in their respective fields are adequately equipped to provide the necessary professional guidance needed. And the lower ranks are equally adequately qualified for their level. In fact, the spread and emphasis of professional specialization reflects the department’s previous mandate, weighted heavily towards forest management (**Figure 6.1**). I say previous because since 1997 restructuring the department’s emphasis has shifted towards provision of extension services.

Figure 6.1: Forest Managers’ Field of Specialization.



Currently, for each manager’s position, the incumbent has a higher qualification than the minimum required. In other words, FD has

personnel that is well schooled in their professional field but lack the skills to lead. It is this lack of managerial acumen, not technical competence, which is a problem. Consequently, the quality of output from these technical staff does not reflect their professional competence.

A person who has mastered a set of skills or trade will have the ability to solve the problems and can be trusted to provide the right answer to those problems.⁵¹⁶ In other words, a trained person can bring an enormous difference to an organization because of their technical knowledge on a matter. And of course what makes the different is how and whether one puts those skills to work. Looking at the curriculum for forestry training both local and abroad and for all levels of staff, the department has skills to provide technical expertise in forestry planning, management and research. What is needed is to harness these skills. In this case, therefore, the challenge is to find that leadership. For this reason, anybody wanting to improve FD's performance should not waste resources on improving technical knowledge *per se* but should focus on managerial and political skills, including the skills to analyze public policy.

Misalignment of the Department's Functions

A comparison of the organizational structure of the Forestry Department before and after 1997 has helped us appreciate how the

⁵¹⁶ Herbert Simon *et, al.*, *Public Administration*, (Knopf: New York) 1950, Chapter 24: p546

department operated then and now. All along the primary function of the department has been forest protection and this mission and vision permeated throughout the organization down to the district level. The headquarters, home of the chief executive and departmental heads, took its rightful position as a policy guidance conduit to Provincial Heads and later to district offices. This arrangement was also duplicated in specialized divisions such as Forest Research, Beekeeping and the Industrial Plantations Divisions. Note that among these three specialized divisions only Beekeeping had district offices dotted around the country, the other two did not have much representation in the districts as the structure was more centralized. Forest research depended on Provincial and District Heads.

With a shift of emphasis from forest management to forest extension so came another challenge. First, the majority of personnel spread out in the provinces are trained in forest management not forest extension. Second, because forest extension was a support field to other sections of the department training emphasis was placed on the other fields. Therefore, the biggest down side of this strategic realignment is that it has literally translated into staff misplacement. People are holding positions for which they are ill-trained.

Among the people surveyed, 47% had experience in forest management while only 26% did some forest extension work. In terms of training, 40% were trained in forest management, 20% in forest

extension and 10% in forest research. Such an imbalance in technical training and experience should not be ignored, people do well in what they have been trained for. In short, this may explain, to some extent, why the department is at a standstill.

Table 6.1: Field of Specialization and Experience.

Field of Specialization	Response Rate (%)
Forest Management	40
Forest Extension	20
Forest Research	10
Apiculture (Beekeeping)	6
Agricultural Extension	8
Agro-forestry	2
Natural Resource Management	3
Human Resource Management	5
Other	6
Field Experience	
Forest Management	47
Forest Extension	26
Forest Research	4
Beekeeping	13
Other	10

Following the new National Forestry Policy of 2000, it is understandable that the realignment of the department's mission is geared towards embracing local communities through joint forest management (JFM) approaches. However, the way JFM is portrayed is not clear at all, even among forest managers themselves. For some it

means cultivating public-private partnerships to manage these forest resources. For others it means FD will be releasing its forest management responsibilities to the resource users and simply become a facilitator by providing extension services. This is already problematic. If the managers do not know what they will be implementing it raises concerns about its success. Probably the same dilemma exists on the other side that will be courted to enter into this arrangement. FD needs to spell out clearly what JFM will entail. As one scholar at the University of Zambia put it,

“it’s all well and good to advocate for and embrace joint forest management. But don’t you think government is passing the buck here? How can it surrender the forests to the local communities after destroying the structures and mechanisms through which these people managed those resources?The way I see it, it would be honorable for government to simply say we have failed please take over, rather than hide in fancy concepts like JFM.”⁵¹⁷

To a certain extent this pretty much sums up the general feeling even among forestry staff too who do not know what role they will play under JFM arrangements. Will it be hands off and let the people decide the fate of their forests? Or will FD still be in the driving seat but simply ask the people to participate? Currently, the law does not specify how this arrangement will work. It appears only time will tell.

⁵¹⁷ Courtesy of an anonymous contributor, UNZA, *personal communication*, August 2005

Management Style and Strategic Planning

Any organization, be it private, public or indeed not-for-profit needs a leader and a plan to achieve its objectives. Strategic planning is a prerequisite to organizational performance. It is so critical to the organization that its absence reflects the quality of management. Miller (1998) insists that organizational leadership (the soft issues) is the foundation on which successful institutions are built. He further argues that most employees would significantly improve productivity if they were better managed, and the result would not only be better financial performance but also would meet most of the items on the score-card.⁵¹⁸

Various management and organizational experts agree that a 'high performance organization' does not happen by chance, but something that management makes a deliberate effort to design, one that will motivate people to produce results that will sustain the organization. The emphasis is on *man-management* or 'intellectual capital'. According to them characteristics of high performing organizations include: availability of strategic planning, vision, employee involvement in decision making processes and good compensation. Peter Drucker (1998) also agrees saying it is the responsibility of management to educate their subordinates about the goals and directions of the organization.⁵¹⁹ Only then is it possible to cultivate team work and a sense of collective

⁵¹⁸ Alex Miller, *Strategic Management* (Irwin McGraw-Hill, New York; New York), 1998:23-24

⁵¹⁹ Peter Drucker, *Managing Challenges for the 21st Century* (Harper Collins, New York), 1998:20.

purpose. Given what is going in our case study this is clearly an area of concern.

The problem starts at excluding some managers as part of the management team. They are not involved in the core activities over which they bear total responsibility in terms of policy/program implementation. While one would expect that all the managers to be involved in planning and all technical staff to know about existence of the department's strategic plan since this is a document that they are supposed to implement in their respective sections, sadly most of the managers had no idea if such a document exists. For example, 58% of the managers surveyed don't know if the department has any plans; 51% said they are not involved in any form of planning, while 36% are involved sometimes.

When asked differently about who develops the work plans? An interesting scenario unfolds: 5% think the Planning and Information Department (PID), a sister department to FD within the same Ministry, does this on behalf of FD, 10% thought the Director and the two Chiefs at FD headquarters (Forest Extension and Forest Research) do this job, 36% think it is all the senior staff in the department (including personnel from the provinces), while an overwhelming 49% said they do not know! And as someone scribbled, "I don't know and I don't care".⁵²⁰

When asked whether FD had any work plans that field staff could use to guide their field operations, there was a 50-50 split between those

⁵²⁰ Forest Dept personnel, anonymous respondents, September 2005)

who knew and those who did not. But they were also quick to point out that these plans, if they exist, are not implemented at all due to various problems ranging from lack of resources to facilitate action to total ignorance among these forest managers. They have no idea about what they are supposed to do annually or in the long term.

In forest management it is a standard practice to have a work plan. This is a document that details what needs to be done in each forest estate. The absence of work plans in FD is responsible for lack of coordination and by extension low morale in the workforce, now resulting in the unwillingness to enforce forestry code of conduct. Workers become motivated to implement a plan they know something about, especially one they have helped to develop. When staff participate in planning it gives them a sense of ownership of the process and the ensuring plans.

Miller (1998) advises that lack of involvement by people close to the problem areas increases friction between executives and the rest of the people who are supposed to implement strategies to solve such problems.⁵²¹ It is evident from our case study that because some managers in the FD are not involvement in planning, they lack the knowledge and experience in this critical area of management. As a result they don't understand the direction and aims of the department. Since they don't know where they are going, any road is leading

⁵²¹ Miller, *Strategic Management*, 1998:318

anywhere. This lack of strategic planning has provided a fertile ground for crisis management in the FD.

With over 7.5 million hectares of PFAs⁵²² to manage as FD claims, and given the different types of forests to be managed,⁵²³ forest planning is a tool that needs no further advocacy. Not only does alienating some managers in the planning process (who by the way are the policy implementers) demoralize them, it also creates a fertile ground for belligerence. And this is where good leadership comes in. The department needs to harness the technical capacities of its staff through participatory planning and through that provide visionary leadership. Good management and visionary leadership are so critical to any organization that if and when they are absent, one can expect organized chaos! Conversely, sound management practices yield high performance organizations.

For the most part, senior managers at FD headquarters have tended to be reactive in dealing with challenges and opportunities that have arisen. There is over-reliance on crisis management or damage control type of management. This kind of management style has not only robbed FD of its best chances to capture wide opportunities out here but has clearly made the department more reactive instead of being pro-

⁵²² This is an old figure that has no resemblance to reality on the ground. The extent of PFAs is far less than the official figures thrown around. See Appendix 5 to this dissertation.

⁵²³ Emanuel N. Chidumayo, *Miombo Ecology and Management: An Introduction*, (Intermediate Technology Publication), 1997:1-6; MENR, *Zambia Forest Action Plan*, (GRZ: Lusaka), 1996:27-31; A.C.R. Edmonds, *The Vegetation Map of Zambia* (Forest Department: Ndola, Zambia), 1976.

active. Management style, as a part of organizational culture, is critical to the success of the organization. Employing best practices in management, whether in business, public or non-profit, is critical to the survival of an organization. Managers are supposed to develop key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure the direction the organization is going and to create and maintain management systems that will enhance performance. Furthermore, self-assessment through quarterly reviews and planning sessions, prompt and resolute decision-making, and ensuring that employees are adequately motivated are three important keys to management. It is unlikely that any leadership that does not provide these platforms will succeed in managing a successful organization.

The important distinction for successful organizations is not sociological or economic in nature or context. Rather it is the leadership style that provides direction, creates structure and distributes power. Sadly, not a lot of organizations are blessed with this leadership acumen. Most organizations are over-managed and under led, which underscores the importance of good leadership. As noted earlier in Chapter 2, organizational performance will depend on the blend between administration, management and leadership.

Arising from personal interviews, it appears the problem dates back to late 1980s and that the situation completely deteriorated in the 1990s and beyond when there was a total collapse of participatory

planning. The staff point out that in spite of forestry being an outdoor activity, in comparison to previous administration, senior managers from mid 1980s to date, have largely been office-bound, rarely visiting the field offices to acquaint themselves with what was on the ground. Previous heads of the department (the Chief Conservator of Forests) believed in and cultivated teamwork across all sections of the department not only through participatory planning but regularly visited the provinces and specialized units to appreciate what they were doing and solve whatever problems they were encountering. This motivated the staff on the ground. But for the “new crop of administrators”, as they were referred to, they are reactive to operational problems, and only conduct field visits to ‘put out fires’ or for personal financial gain – i.e. they undertake field trips for purposes of getting subsistence allowances. This obviously is a pathetic way of running the department and the staff in the field are least amused by it.

To make matters worse, the Director has developed an affinity for clientelism and cronyism. For instance, there is a tendency of assigning junior officers (without their immediate supervisors’ knowledge) the responsibilities supposed to be undertaken by senior officers, supposedly in exchange for some favors. Naturally, this has been causing friction between junior officers and their supervisors who cannot wait to exercise their powers over the former. And since junior officers cannot instruct

their supervisors what to do, whatever they have been assigned hardly gets done!

In conclusion, any credible manager interested in positive and progressive results would agree that this is not the best management style! The question is: how can FD expect its officers to function effectively if: 1) they are not involved in the planning process? 2) They do not know what programs they are supposed to implement, let alone why? And 3) They do not receive feedback on their performance because even during the evaluation process these people are not included? This a challenge FD ought to address immediately.

Decision Making Process and Staff Motivation

The decision making process came out as being an exclusively closed door affair. According to the survey results, although 'management meetings' are held occasionally, they are for window dressing only. The Director of Forestry wields so much power there is no collective decision making although collective responsibility is expected from the management team. In most cases, the Director makes unilateral decisions affecting the general workforce, usually outside the scope of the existing regulations and, without any consideration to the repercussions. This corruption of power (defined as the abuse of power for personal gain), which is meant to intimidate forestry personnel into submission to the Director's wishes, has set the department on a wrong part.

For instance, in recent years, staff transfers are so frequent – some people have moved twice in a year – there is hardly time to even start developing their strategies. Worse still some people are transferred to [better] places where they cannot function because their skills sets do not match the functions of that office. Forest employees are so demotivated they have no reason to work except wait for their pay checks. And yes, they can also see the benefits of favoritism and consequences of decent objective views. As a result, this has enhanced ‘boot licking,’ and cronyism. Although not an accepted standard, this practice is well documented as a vehicle through which some people push their way up the professional career ladder. Because there is a perceived benefit accruing to both the junior officers being favored and the senior officer expecting a return favor, slowly the clientelism⁵²⁴ is becoming entrenched.

As a person in a position of power, the Director is known to apply sanctions to those outside the circle and has withdrawn benefits from people with dissenting views; instituted unnecessary transfers, and only offers scholarships to cronies. Personal relationships or the lack of it between the Director and other managers has clouded the performance of the FD.

⁵²⁴ For a good treatment of this topic see Krisdankorn Klinkesorn, *Clientelism and Instability: The Case of the Thai Highway Police* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Missouri-St Louis), 2004:12-13, and Chapter 1.

People are fearful of offering any constructive criticism because as long as the idea does not please the director it is construed as being personally against the incumbent. Hence, good ideas are not offered or have not been used for fear of retribution. In other words, the department actually does not lack the capacity to deliver, the capacity is available but it is latent. This oppression of talent has manifested itself in poor performance. On the other hand, those in good relationship with the Director have been favored for training, performance evaluation and other fringe benefits. But because such relationships are typically for manipulative reasons, the duration has normally been short term, which adds to the frustration when one falls out of favor and suffers the consequences. Unlike, in the case of the Thai Highway Police where the patron-client relationship last for a life time, the FD version is a revolving door system in which those fall from grace (with the Director) are almost immediately replaced by others.

According to the respondents, the department cannot increase its performance in its present form. It requires a major surgery to re-energize the motionless technical capacity. Maybe the long-awaited transformation of the department into a Forest Commission will bring in fresh blood and ideas that would invigorate the workforce once again! For now, poor leadership and personnel morale are two challenges the department must address.

Communication and Transport

In addition to lack of planning, communication and transportation infrastructure are a real challenge to the department. As an entity whose offices are represented in over 54 districts across the country, and most of them in very remote places the absence of communication facilities is not a matter that can simply be glossed over. If the department is slow in responding to certain issues, part of it is due to lack of communication facilities, which impede real time responses. But, notwithstanding this challenge, the executive has also created another layer of problem by not preserving the chain of command, the span of control and the channel of communication. As mentioned earlier because of patronage (favoritism and victimization) certain information, even of an operational nature is not shared with all the employees. It is not uncommon for the Director to by-pass the head of a section to directly assign junior officers duties typically supposed to be undertaken by their supervisors, thus undermining the authority of the latter. As a result, this has been creating friction between heads of sections or provinces and their juniors.

In certain cases promotions and demotions have been done without following the right procedures. For instance, in some provinces there were two people for the position of a Provincial Extension Officer position instead of one that the organization structure allows. This arose because the Director appointed new people to those positions without Cabinet Office approval to do so. According to government regulations

only Cabinet Office has the mandate to promote or demote someone at that level. The Director can only recommend, which was not done.

As if the communication challenge is not enough, FD also suffers from lack of transport. A quick survey revealed that on average there was one working vehicle per province, typically stationed at the provincial office.

As result, foresters are hardly in the field where their services are required, and therefore over de-forestation, irregular reporting about the activities in the forest under uncollected revenue. Although attributed to SAP, which facilitated reduction of government funding to the department, this problem is largely due to the lack of managerial capacity to anticipate the impact of such policies and failure to formulate mitigation strategies. How have other agencies excelled yet they also operated under the same environment? It was difficult to get a sense of why the department has not popularized motor cycles (and even bicycles) to enable its staff get out more often in the field. This is an area that requires further research.

Revenue Collection Mechanism

Seemingly as an offshoot of poor management, revenue collection is still an area of concern. Due to lack of physical presence in the field there been an increase in illegal logging, agricultural activities and settlements in natural forests. These un-supervised operations have not

only robbed the department of revenue, but also heightened corruption in the issuance of licenses. For instance, it has been estimated that the department is collecting no more than 20% of revenue, mainly because the department is relying on self-reporting by resource users.

At a different level the problem also relates to the value attached to the forest resources. In particular, logging companies have taken advantage of poor management and pay a minimal fee to harvest timber in perpetuity. Even for high value timber like Teak (Mukusi) which fetches no less than \$500 per cubic meter on the international market, the loggers buy for as low as \$75 per cubic meter, representing only 15% of the value. As Fynn (2004)⁵²⁵ and others⁵²⁶ before then have recommended, revamping the revenue system and valuing the forest resources correctly is an issue that cannot be over-emphasized.

The Public Sector Reform Program

Organizations are created for a particular purpose: to produce and deliver goods or services to meet the expectations of their clients. In order to remain viable an organization needs to respond to the changing business needs of the enterprise and the environment in which it operates. Typically its structure would reflect areas of specialization and

⁵²⁵ Fynn, *Appraisal of Zambia's Forest Sector Commercial Systems*, 2004.

⁵²⁶ Fynn's work was financed from a grant proposal this author wrote which specifically recommended that some systematic study be undertaken to find out the best ways to improve and strengthen the forest revenue collection mechanisms.

implicitly the services to be provided.⁵²⁷ Prior to 1997 restructuring, FD's structure was built on this principle, and the inter-dependence of its various units called for cooperation and helped in capacity being built over time.

In particular, staff rotation afforded the opportunity to gain experience and knowledge from other forest areas and operations of the department that has since been lost through restructuring. As Chandler explains, change needs to be well planned. "Strategic growth results from the awareness of opportunities and needs..." because a new structure "requires a new or at least a re-fashioned structure if the enlarged enterprise is to be operated efficiently."⁵²⁸ Unless strategy shapes the structure inefficiency would be the end result. This is so true for FD's new structure which was not influenced by opportunities or strategy but by external forces that forced the government to adhere to SAP prescriptions.

Government bureaus hardly had any control over the process of the PSRP. As one senior official at Cabinet Office put it, "Government restructuring is a process we had no control over because we had only one option: to do it.We were just told [by the World Bank] to reduce government size or face consequences of losing our privileges to access

⁵²⁷ Szilagysl et al 1987:547

⁵²⁸ Chandler A.D., *Strategy and Structure* (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press), 1962:15

their loans.with our national budget deeply dependent on World Bank loans, there was no other option but to abide.”⁵²⁹

This development has created a few complications for Forestry Department. First, the department has suffered from an abrupt loss of institutional memory. The process dissipated the department’s highly experienced and qualified staff who were given early retirement. Second, because of the abrupt manner in which the PSRP was implemented the inexperienced staff found themselves in a vacuum with no one to mentor them, having just suddenly lost the professional memory of the department.

Also the atmosphere during the re-structuring of the department did not leave much time for operational transitioning. Animosity and frustration characterized those that were leaving while excitement, hope and fear engulfed those that remained. In the process, those retired had no motivation to hand-over operational briefs. For new hires from outside forestry circles, this was quite a daunting experience – they literally had to start from nowhere.

As a first bureau to undergo this exercise, uncertainty and low morale bred disillusion. It was sad to see that sometimes “change is painful”⁵³⁰. There is a deep sense of frustration within the department arising from the fact that the department lost its best employees just because they had no political connections. In particular, some

⁵²⁹ Cabinet Official at MDD, *personal communication*, 2005.

⁵³⁰ Chandler, *Strategy and Structure*, 1962:15

respondents bemoaned the fact that the department was short-changed at director level where there were more and better qualified personnel than the incumbent.

The proposal to transform FD into a new entity, the Forest Commission, has not only cast new strategic demands and operational issues for the department to consider, but at individual level this has re-activated fears, anxiety and job insecurity. Again forestry employees have to go through the process of adjustment and healing. Whether well planned or not, organizational change gives rise to instability, upheaval and uncertainty. It brings about new bosses, and increases different stakes of office politics. “The redistribution of power shakes the informal organization. Anxiety warps individual behavior.”⁵³¹ And this is exactly what is happening in FD. Although looking forward to the new organization, there is general discontentment that it is taking too long. Consequently, that is affecting their morale and professional development plans. Some think senior management is delaying the process for fear of losing jobs, control and power. But others are optimistic that the new organization will bring about professionalism, generate and allocate more resources to forest management, increase their capacity, improve communication, as well as reach out to other stakeholders.

⁵³¹ Nadler, *Champions of Change*, 1998:91

In change management, cosmetic changes rarely bring a major impact on an organization. For a full impact, it is necessary to address multiple related components of the organization. In the case of FD, changing the top management may not necessarily result in the 'magic bullet' if the conditions of service, work culture, or even staff attitudes are not addressed.

What is required, therefore, is a major surgery, an overhaul of the entire organization that will address the systems and work culture. Although Miller (1998) suggests that when senior management is dissatisfied with the present, they initiate change.⁵³² In the case of FD, the desire for institutional change is stronger in middle management and lower positions, i.e. staff who are frustrated with the current management style and lack of resources to perform their duties. In terms of company politics, if such a change were to be granted, there is fertile ground for its success. Employees are ready for it, and may quite possibly embrace.

The PSRP, the most recent organizational change experienced by forestry staff, lacked support at the micro level because it was initiated and implemented by the central government, not FD. As Miller (1998) points out even though initiators of organizational change may remain committed to it, the success of any change strategy remains with the *handlers* of implementation (the people that are involved in the day-to-

⁵³² Miller, *Strategic Management*, 1998:317:322

day operations of the company).⁵³³ In this case, neither the handlers nor the politicians were committed to the new structure, and that is why that change created a frustrated labor force, manifested in their inertia. And due to lack of other resources, FD has office foresters instead of forest officers (being office bound instead of being in the field to supervise forest operations). Therefore, the challenge is: is FD ready for another make over?

OPPORTUNITIES

Although there is so much damage to the forests, not all is completely lost. There is a possibility to redeem this situation if the department can take a major surgery of realigning its management style rather than a band aid strategy. Power to administer the department must be shared across the ranks. It ought to diffuse away from the Director to give every employee a sense of belonging and responsibility both over the failures and successes of the department. Although public employees are rarely blamed and, or punished as individuals for failures of their organizations there is room to implement this through annual reviews that should monitor and identify each employee's contribution to the department's goals, and tie this to whether that employee deserves to receive the annual benefits. There are several opportunities for the department to get back on track.

⁵³³ Miller, *Strategic Management*, 1998:317:322

- 1.0 Harness the existing but apparently inert technical capital in the department and make it productive.
- 2.0 Develop private-public partnerships for forest management by having the private sector to underwrite certain programs. This has been done before and it worked fairly well.
- 3.0 Institute necessary legal provisions that will support a pragmatic and vigorous implementation of JFM strategy.
- 4.0 Commercialization of the department (e.g. into a Forest Commission) will provide accountability and increase performance.
- 5.0 Tap into the international goodwill to help with other technical challenges such as forest inventory where the department has no financial capacity to undertake.
- 6.0 The global interest in environmental management and bio-diversity conservation is an opportunity the department should fully embrace and utilize.

International Conventions and Treaties

From a global perspective, the heightened interest and realization of the dangers associated with environmental damage,⁵³⁴ also helped to bring the importance of forests to the fore. The global debate initiated at

⁵³⁴ Refer to the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, June 20-26, 1972 that helped push environmental concerns to the world arena. An online Conference declaration can be accessed from UNEP at:
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentID=97&ArticleID=1503>

the 1972 Stockholm Conference that urged governments to manage the human environment in a manner that provides for the present without compromising benefits for future generations made the Zambian government pay special attention to not only forests but to natural resource conservation in general. The development of a *National Conservation Strategy* (NCS), which developed what is considered as the first broad-based policy on the environment, is a case in point. Prior to this there were only stand-alone sector policies. But the NCS promulgated a holistic view and in a way set the agenda for later collaborative works among sectors that deal with natural resources.

However, this global commitment is one large opportunity that FD has not fully exploited. There is a lot that can be achieved in FD partnered with other local and international organizations committed to environmental management.

International obligations found under various Treaties and Conventions to which the government of Zambia is a Party have generally helped in the country's conservation efforts. This is a positive development, one that needs to be strengthened. With financial help through some of these agreements (e.g. the Convention on Biodiversity Conservation, Climate Change, etc.), FD can undertake some activities that government may not have the capacity to finance. As the world has come to appreciate, environmental problems have no respect for national boundaries. Therefore, FD should live up to its mandate of managing its

estates in a way that the present generation does not outstrip the benefits for the next.

Laws and Regulations

All the issues discussed above can be summed up under one heading: national statutes on forestry. One of the things the foregoing discussion has done is to highlight the fact that while much of the challenges the department faces are managerial in context, it also underscores the idea that simply making some changes to the prevailing statutes on forestry could help ameliorate most of the problems. But this is only possible if the forest managers are able to identify where the problems lie and to develop the strategies so that appropriate interventions could be implemented. And since law making is a political contest, these forest managers will require sound political skills and tenacity to attract supporters and build alliances across a broad spectrum of society. In its current disposition the department is far out of range. Foresters need to get out of the forests and start talking to the politicians.

THE WAY FORWARD

- 1.0 There is need to undertake a thorough human resource needs and skills mix assessment. As this research has found out not

every forester can be a good manager. A change at Director level is certainly inevitable.

- 2.0 Developing short and long term strategies to chart a new course of action for the department must be a mandatory output requiring the participation of all managers, not just a select few.
- 3.0 Revisit the licensing mechanisms to ensure revenue is captured in a transparency and accountable fashion.
- 4.0 Design a benefit-sharing model with District Councils and local Chiefs so that these too share the benefit(s) of managing local forests. At the moment all revenue goes to central government.
- 5.0 Harmonize the roles of other natural resources management entities like ZAWA, Departments of Energy, Agriculture and Lands to develop a comprehensive plan for the management of bio-diversity.
- 6.0 Integrate forest-based industries in the national planning portfolio as an alternative avenue for job creation and source of livelihood.
- 7.0 Develop specific strategies to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In other words, interpret and relate the department's activities to the MDGs.

Conclusion

As the foregoing discussion illustrates FD has indeed undergone some major metamorphosis – both in its structure and emphasis in its functions. The growth in its estates stands out as one area of success. But their decline also speaks volumes in how the department's leadership changed from professional excellence to mediocrity. Indeed, external factors such as policy shifts and population growth placed a different set of responsibility on the FD, both of which needed better equipped and visionary staff to deal with these challenges and translate them into opportunities. Sadly, the department is yet to find its feet and be as effective again.

Forest [mis]management in Zambia is clearly having its toll on the local communities who are heavily dependent on these resources. Though no direct effects have been quantified, indirectly the connection between environmental damage, poverty, and disease and the resultant vicious circle of problems this yields and sustains is well understood. Therefore, when people try to migrate from these vices of land degradation, disease, and poverty, in search of better economic opportunities, usually that movement tends to create conflict over access rights in the new area(s).

For instance, one of the underlying causes to the conflict in Darfur, Sudan is precisely land degradation, which made different ethnic groups

to start fighting over land that could sustain their livelihood.⁵³⁵ Zambia has a choice to avoid this from arising by taking care of its land now. And because environmental problems extend beyond national boundaries, any such problems could affect other people thousands of miles away. For instance, when conflict and possibly wars break out, the global community is drawn in and pays the price in one way or another. Worse still most of these effects will only be known long after the forests are gone. This is where our concern arises. What should be done to halt forest degradation in Zambia? The short answer is that there is need to build institutional capacity in FD, particularly managerial competence. As this study has shown, managerial capacity matters. And it matters for at least two reasons: first, it is what enforces the rules and second, it affects and influences the outcomes!

⁵³⁵ For a detailed treatment of this issue, see Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Ghadiagala, *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.), 2006.

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APPENDICES

Zambia National Forest Policy, 1965⁵³⁶

1. To carry out in each district forest surveys to determine the forest resources for each district, the forest areas needed to be managed for land protection and for local and industrial supplies of forest produce, and the forest plantations which are needed, so that the forest estate required can be put under Government control.
2. To carry out all necessary research work on the ecology, protection, management, and restocking of indigenous forest areas; on the establishment, protection and management of plantations and on the protective role of forests.
3. To carry out all necessary research on the exploitation of indigenous and plantation timbers, on the properties, seasoning, saw-milling, preservation and working qualities of these timbers, and, in co-operation with other interested organisations, to carry out necessary research and development work on timber engineering and on supplies for wood-based industries.
4. To provide tree seed for the Republic's plantations by the establishment of seed stands and seed orchards, and by collection and purchase.
5. To place under government control sufficient forest areas in each district to supply the forest produce required for people's homes, farms and local industries, and to provide for the proper management of these forest areas.

⁵³⁶ This is an abbreviated version, and can be found in any Forestry Department *Annual Report*.

6. To place under government control land for forest plantations needed to provide forest produce for people's homes, farms and local industries in districts where indigenous forest areas are unable to meet local needs, and to establish and manage these plantations.
7. To place under government control and to manage those forest areas needed to supply the Republic's industries with their requirements of timber and, where possible, to supply timber for export.
8. To place under government control land for forest plantations needed to supply the Republic's industries with their requirements of timber, and to establish and manage these plantations.
9. To make arrangements for the cutting and marketing of indigenous and plantation timber.
10. To supply indigenous and plantation timber for industrial and local needs at an economic price.
11. To place under government control, and to manage forest areas needed for protect the land against floods, erosion and desiccation and to maintain the flow of rivers.
12. To integrate the Republic's forest areas and plantation in a wise system of land use, and to co-operate with other organisations in the development and protection of the Republic's natural resources.

13. To provide an extension service in bee-keeping and in the production of beeswax and honey based on research and development work on bee-keeping under *Zambian* conditions.
14. To advise and encourage local authorities, interested organisations and private persons in the practice of sound forestry.
15. To spread among the people of Zambia an understanding of forestry.
16. To provide opportunities for technical training for those engaged in forest work.

United National Independence Party Forestry Policy, 1974-1984.⁵³⁷

In accordance with the policy of industrialization, the Party will work for self-sufficiency in timber and forestry products. To this end, the Party will:

1. Take more effective measures in forest and fauna conservation by the reinforcement of the existing measures against indiscriminate cutting of trees and burning of forests;
2. Take measures to control charcoal burning and the chitemene system;
3. Encourage the replanting of new forests to meet Zambia's requirements of timber and forestry products, using labour intensive methods to the largest extent possible; and

⁵³⁷ These UNIP policy statements were included for the first time in the Forestry Department Annual Report for 1976 as part of government policy on forestry (see FD, 1980:16).

4. Establish local industries for the manufacture and processing of timber and forestry products to increase employment for the local populations.

Source: FD Annual Report, 1986

PERSONAL OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE

Part I: Respondent's Service History

1. How long have you worked for the Forestry Department?

- Less than 5 years
- 5-15years
- 16-25 years
- Over 25 years

2. Which sections of the department have you worked in and for how long?

(Please check all that applies).

	Period (in Years)
<input type="checkbox"/> Forest Management	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> a) Forestry Dept. Headquarters	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> b) Provincial HQ	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> c) Districts	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Forest Extension	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> a) Forestry Dept. Headquarters	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> b) Provincial HQ	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> c) Districts	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Forest Research	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> a) Forest Research Headquarters	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> b) Silviculture and Tree Genetics	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> c) Seed Store	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Forest Products Research	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> a) Major Forest Products	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> b) Minor Forest Products	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> c) Utilization	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Beekeeping	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> a) Extension	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> b) Production	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Zambia Forestry College	_____
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Please Specify) _____	_____

3. What positions have you held since you joined the department?

4. What is your current position? _____

5. What are your current responsibilities?

6. Which division of the department are you working in now?

- Forest Management
- Extension
- Forest Research
- Forest Products Research
- Beekeeping
- Other (please specify) _____

7. How many people do you supervise; those that directly report to you?

- 1-5
- 6-15
- 16-30
- Over 30 people

8. What educational training level have you attained? (Check only the highest attained).

- Ph.D.
- M.Phil.
- Master's Degree
- Graduate Certificate
- Bachelor's Degree
- Forestry Diploma
- Forestry Certificate
- Other (Please specify) _____

9. What is your field of specialization? _____

10. Gender of Respondent?

- Male
- Female

11. Your age group (Please select one that applies).

- Less than 20 years
- 20-29 years
- 30-39 years
- 40-49 years
- 50 and above

Part II: The Structural Adjustment Program.

1. Do you know anything about the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)?

- Yes
- No

2. When was the SAP introduced in Zambia?

- 1973
- 1983
- 1985
- Sometime in the 1990s
- I don't know

3. Why did the Zambian govt. decide to implement SAP? What was the program supposed to achieve? **(check only 3 that apply).**

- Deal with inflation problems.
- Sell (privatize) parastatal companies.
- Reduce size of government through employee lay offs.
- Become more accountable on public finance management.
- Develop other sectors in addition to copper mining.
- Promote private investment in non-copper producing sectors.
- Increase exports from agriculture, forestry, and tourism.
- Liberalize the domestic market by removing govt. controls on trade and commerce.
- Other (p/se specify) _____

4. What are the **three sectors** the Zambian government selected as primary targets to implement the SAP?

- Health
- Education
- Labor
- Mining
- Agriculture
- Forestry
- Tourism
- Financial institutions (e.g. Bank of Zambia)
- All of the above
- Other (p/se specify) _____

5. Was the Forestry Department supposed to implement the SAP?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure
- I don't know

6. In your opinion, has Forestry Department implemented the SAP?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

6.1 If yes, how has the department implemented the SAP?

6.2 If “no”, why do you think so?

7. Does the department have plans/strategies to implement the SAP?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

7.1 If yes, what goals / outcomes are these plans supposed to achieve? (list as many as you know).

7.2 If no, why do you think so?

8. What is the status on the department’s achievement of the SAP goals you just mentioned in your previous response? (list all that you mentioned).

<u>Goal</u>	<u>Status (please check one)</u>
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> fully achieved <input type="checkbox"/> partially achieved <input type="checkbox"/> not achieved <input type="checkbox"/> not implemented
_____	<input type="checkbox"/> fully achieved <input type="checkbox"/> partially achieved <input type="checkbox"/> not achieved <input type="checkbox"/> not implemented

Questionnaire

APPENDIX 2

- fully achieved
- partially achieved
- not achieved
- not implemented

- fully achieved
- partially achieved
- not achieved
- not implemented

- fully achieved
- partially achieved
- not achieved
- not implemented

- fully achieved
- partially achieved
- not achieved
- not implemented

- fully achieved
- partially achieved
- not achieved
- not implemented

9.1 When you compare the department's performance *before* and *during* the SAP, how did the department perform *before* the structural adjustment period?

- Better
- Worse
- No difference
- I don't know

Why do you think so?

9.2 How has the department performed *during* the structural adjustment period?

- Better
- Worse
- No difference
- I don't know

Why do you think so?

10. Is there anything that should be done to improve the situation?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

11. What exactly should be done to improve the department's performance?

12. How is the status of the forest resources now compared to the period before the SAP?

- Better
- Worse (degraded and over-exploited)
- About the same (no difference)
- I don't know

(Please explain why you think so).

13.1 How were the working relationships between the department and forest resource users *before* the SAP?

- Better
- Worse
- No difference
- I don't know

(Explain why you think so).

13.2 How are the working relationships now between the department and forest resource users *after* the SAP?

- Better
- Worse
- No difference
- I don't know

(Explain why you think so).

14. Which groups are involved in developing the Forestry Policy in Zambia?

- Timber producers
- Local communities living around the forests
- Traditional leaders (Chiefs)
- Government bureaucrats
- Politicians
- NGOs dealing with environmental issues
- Charcoal producers
- Beekeepers
- Other (p/se specify) _____

15. Starting with “1” as the most influential group, rank the groups you just identified in the previous question to indicate their influence on forestry policy.

- Timber producers
- Local communities living around the forests
- Traditional leaders (Chiefs)
- Government bureaucrats
- Politicians
- NGOs dealing with environmental issues
- Charcoal producers
- Beekeepers
- Other (p/se specify) _____

16.1 How were the working relationships between the department and the policy makers *before* SAP?

- Very Good
- Fair
- No difference
- Poor
- I don't know

Why you think so?

16.2 How were the working relationships between the department and the policy makers *after* SAP?

- Very Good
- Fair
- No difference
- Poor
- I don't know

Why you think so?

17. Comparing the time *before* and *after* SAP, would you say the department now has:

- more resources
- fewer resources
- about the same
- I don't know

(Please list the resources you have in mind).

<hr/>	<hr/>
<hr/>	<hr/>
<hr/>	<hr/>
<hr/>	<hr/>
<hr/>	<hr/>

18. Does the station where you are working now have enough of these resources?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

19.1 Which of these resources do you think the department needs more of in order to improve its performance?

<hr/>	<hr/>
<hr/>	<hr/>
<hr/>	<hr/>
<hr/>	<hr/>

19.2 Which resources do you think the department should reduce in order to improve its performance?

20. Do forestry staff carry out their field operations as scheduled all year round?

- Yes
- No
- Not sure
- I don't know

(Give reasons for your response).

21. In comparison with agriculture and tourism sectors, what would you say about the support that Forestry Dept. receives from policy makers and politicians for having its programs financed?

- Always receives 1st priority).
- Always receives lowest priority).
- Falls somewhere in between.
- I don't know

Part III: Administrative Practices

1. Does the Forestry Department have a mission statement?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

(If you checked "No" or "I don't know," skip the next question).

2. What is the department's mission statement?

3. Does the department set strategic goals?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

4. What are the department's current strategic goals? (List as many as you know).

5. Has the department developed the plans to achieve its strategic goals?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

6. How often does the department develop these plan(s)?

- Weekly
- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Every Six Months
- Yearly
- Other (Please specify). _____

7. Does the department have such plan(s) now?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

8. Which people are involved in developing the department's goals and plan(s) to achieve its strategic goals?

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

9. Are you involved in the process of developing the department's plans and setting its goals?

- Always
- Sometimes
- Never

10. How would you rate the process of developing the department's plans?

- Very useful
- Useful
- Somehow useful
- Not useful (waste of time)

11. Do you know what the department's strategic goals are?

- Yes
- No

12. Are you aware of your role in achieving the department's strategic goals?

- Always
- Sometimes
- Never

13. Has the department implemented its plans?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

13.1 If yes, how?

13.2 If not, please explain why.

14.1 Does the department experience any problems implementing its plans?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

14.2 If yes, what are these problems? (list as many as you know).

15. How do these problems affect the department's performance?

16. Do you know of any other means that help the department to implement its plans and achieve its goals?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

16.1 If yes, what are they?

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

17. Does the department measure / evaluate its performance?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

18. Approximately how often does the department evaluate/measure its performance?

- Weekly
- Monthly
- Quarterly
- Every Six Months
- Yearly
- Other (Please specify). _____

19. How does the department evaluate its performance?

- Employs consultants to do the work
- Convenes meetings for Heads of Divisions
- Planning Unit analyzes reports from the Divisions
- I don't know

20. Are you involved in the process of measuring/evaluating the department's performance?

- Always
- Sometimes
- Never

21. Does this process need improvement or should it be left as it is?

- Need improvement
- Leave it as it is

Mr. Obote Shakachite	Chief Extension Officer Forestry Department HQ (now the Managing Director for ZAFFICO)
Dr. Kenneth Nkhowani	Director Natural Resources Dept, MTENR
Mr. Davy Siame	Chief Planner Natural Resources Dept, MTENR
Mr. Thomson Musonda	Principal Planner Planning & Information Dept, MTENR
Ms. Chiseche M. Mutale	Chief Planner Planning & Information Dept, MTENR
Mr. Lubinda Aongola	Director Planning & Information Dept, MTENR
Mr. Jack Mukosha	GIS Specialist Forestry Department, NW Province (Temporarily working at FD HQ)
Ms. Elizabeth Ndhlovu	Forest Sector Advisor The Finnish Embassy, Lusaka
Ms. Wilma Viljamaa	Senior Counsellor The Finnish Embassy, Lusaka
Mr. Moses Chakanga	Forest Management Specialist, Namibia (on short-term consultancy with the Finnish Embassy, Lusaka)
Mr. Jose S. Simuyi	Head of Budget Information Systems Ministry of Finance & National Planning
Ms. Veronica Mwiiche	Director MDD, Cabinet Office, Lusaka
Mr. Bernard J. Kampansa	Public Policy Specialist PAC, Cabinet Office, Lusaka
Ms. Rilla Hansali	Assistant Director Technical Services, Cabinet Office, Lusaka
Mr. Benjamin Bota	Acting Director Recruitment & Placements, Cabinet Office
Ms. Zeles Zulu	Director Dept. of Local Government Administration

Mr. Maxwell Phiri	Coordinator, PFAP Forestry Dept., Lusaka
Mr. Aaron Sugar Banda	Forestry Extension Specialist [Retired] Chief Extension Officer, Ndola
Mr. D.M. Tombo	Principal Extension Officer FD, Northern Province
Mr. Kenneth Kambeu	Principal Extension Officer FD, Lusaka Province
Mr. B.M. Chomba	Principal Extension Officer FD, Central Province
Mr. Charles Taulo	Principal Extension Officer FD, Southern Province
Mr. John Mulombwa	Principal Extension Officer FD, Copperbelt Province
Mr. Fanwell Sikasamba	Principal Extension Officer FD, North-Western Province
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Dr. Fred Mutesa	Lecturer, Development Studies University of Zambia, Lusaka
Mr. Victor K. Kazembe	Country Representative Plant Resources of Tropical Africa (PROTA) (also Chairman, Commonwealth Forest Association – Zambia Branch)
Dr. Erick Chisanga	General Manager, ZAFFICO (on sabbatical from Copperbelt University)
Mr. Felix Njovu	Lecturer Copperbelt University, Kitwe

Externally-Funded Forest Sector Investments by Project.			
A. Multilateral Projects			
PROJECT	FINANCIER	US\$	YEAR
Industrial Forestry	World Bank	34,600,000	1969-1993
Fuelwood Plantations	IDRC	156,000	(1982- ?)
Food Assistance to Forestry	WFP	1,830,000	1984-1990
Forestry Training Programme	IDA	1,500,000	1985-1989
Wood Energy Consumption Resource Survey	UNDP	392,000	1985-1986
Intra Regional Co-operation in Development of Plantation Forest Industry	UNDP	3,248,000	1988-1991
Action Programme to Combat Deforestation	UNDP	316,000	1989-1991
Forestry Industry Investment Promotion	FAO	160,000	1994-1995
Forest Resource Conservation Study	EU	336,000	1994-1995
Zambia Forestry Action Programme	UNDP/Netherlands	893,860	1995-1997
Forest Support Programme (support to the Establishment of ZFC)	EU		2002-2004
Forest Resource Management Project	DED (German Development Services)	1,690,000	2002-2008
Forest Resource Management Project	IFAD	12,633,000	2002-2008
Forest Resource Management Project	IRISH AID	123,366	2002-2008
	Total	57,878,226	
B. Bilateral Projects			
PROJECT	FINANCIER	US\$	YEAR
Dry Forestry	CIDA	130,000	? (1980-81)
Chinyunyu Forestry Project	NORAD	48,000	? 1982-
Forestry Education and Training	FINNIDA		1983-1992
Forestry Education and Training	FINNIDA	810,000	1985-1990
Forest and Forest Products Research	FINNIDA	714,000	1985-1989
Kafubu Sawmill I & II	FINNIDA	8,570,000	1985-1992
Formulation of a Community Forestry Strategy	SIDA	500,142	1986-1989
Soil Conservation and Agroforestry	SIDA	508,000	? 1986-
Forestry and Sawmill	NORAD	788,000	1988-1992
Improvement and Strengthening of Forestry Colleges in the SADC Region	FINNIDA	23,051,000	1989-1992
Kafubu Frame Sawmill	FINNIDA	5,692,000	1989-1993
Forestry Department Training	ODA	675,000	1989-1995
Special Fund for Forestry Sector	FINNIDA	5,716,000	1990-1994
Kafubu Sawmill: Reservation for Harvesting and Transport Import	FINNIDA	2,860,000	1990-1992
Production of Agroforestry Manuals (Eastern, Southern & Northern Zambia)	SIDA	8,000	? (1991-92)

GRZ Funding to Forestry Capital Projects, 1994=100 (ZMK '000).			
Year	National Level	Provincial Level	Total Allocation
1980-1984	984830769	2975438462	3960269231
1985-1989	1283492644	512536552	1796029195
1990-1993	290819669	113464695	404284365
1994-1997	0	0	0
1998-2001	0	0	0
2002-2005	0	0	0

Source: MENR, Zambia Forestry Action Programme, Vol. II

Change in PFAs, Annual Allocations and Forestry Personnel, 1962-2005.

Year	PFAs (million ha.)		Operational Funds (ZMK, million)	Capital Funds (ZMK, million)	Forestry Department Personnel ¹				Total Staff	Revenue (ZMK, million)
	Currently Reported	Projection ²			Professional	Technical	Field Staff	Admin		
1962	5,000,000	5.00	4071.5	499.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1071.1
1963	5,041,525	5.04	4278.3	622.5	"	"	"	"	"	1271.5
1964	5,229,167	5.23	4919.9	1349.7	"	"	"	"	"	1395.0
1965	5,236,267	5.24	5416.3	1720.5	"	"	"	"	"	1520.9
1966	5,346,067	5.35	5825.6	1967.5	"	"	"	"	"	1784.2
1967	5,590,192	5.59	7363.6	4502.1	"	"	"	"	"	1788.3
1968	5,618,342	5.62	24011.7	3983.8	"	"	"	"	"	2333.9
1969	5,710,484	5.71	34707.3	2446.9	"	"	"	"	"	3840.0
1970	5,805,609	5.81	3048.1	5474.7	33	66	350	145	594	1244.7
1971	6,889,000	6.89	5951.7	2722.9	36	179	287	109	522	2123.3
1972	6,419,100	6.42	3911.7	222.3	33	166	280	119	598	2364.6
1973	7,054,600	7.05	2393.5	813.2	33	103	284	132	552	2368.9
1974	7,130,600	7.13	3000.1	842.7	26	84	284	132	552	2789.7
1975	7,189,480	7.16	1080.0	893.9	36	53	214	145	448	4375.1
1976	7,423,902	7.33	1000.0	706.7	28	82	267	145	522	4112.3
1977	7,496,343	7.42	1071.4	432.8	26	114	374	144	658	4285.1
1978	7,496,343	7.50	1412.5	1249.9	37	118	367	135	657	3670.8
1979	7,841,425	7.67	1277.8	6797.9	37	150	326	142	655	3358.3
1980	7,601,400	7.60	830.0	764.0	41	190	222	132	585	3181.3
1981	7,635,000	7.64	863.6	1394.5	50	213	333	92	688	4192.7
1982	7,635,000	7.64	175.0	1253.3	47	244	353	161	805	4958.9
1983	7,605,500	7.61	453.3	2010.0	40	82	372	82	576	717.7
1984	7,462,149	7.46	105.6	480.6	40	81	365	80	566	576.8
1985	7,378,305	7.38	77.8	3.0	38	97	365	80	580	478.3
1986	7,405,500	7.41	295.2	794.0	35	113	3132	63	3343	587.5
1987	7,435,835	7.44	169.4	409.8	29	117	1410	58	1614	254.3
1988	7,425,454	7.43	272.3	0.0	21	108	1303	55	1487	561.2
1989	7,375,533	7.38	426.2	1404.3	21	128	1303	55	1507	492.9
1990	7,375,533	7.38	145.3	0.0	19	152	1288	55	1514	250.9
1991	7,375,533	7.38	83.6	351.4	23	142	1273	62	1500	364.6
1992	7,361,406	7.36	6.4	154.9	23	130	1249	62	1464	97.4
1993	7,233,884	7.23	6.0	0.1	28	130	1247	54	1459	93.3
1994	7,233,884	7.10	7.1	0.0	28	128	1188	50	1394	95.3
1995	7,233,884	6.49	5.7	0.0	17	112	1120	64	1313	436.1
1996	7,199,802	6.49	4.4	10.4	21	124	1064	63	1272	327.8

Appendix 5 (cont'd)										
Year	PFAs (million ha.)		Operational Funds (ZMK, million)	Capital Funds (ZMK, million)	Forestry Department Personnel ¹				Total Staff	Revenue (ZMK, million)
	Currently Reported	Projection ²			Professional	Technical	Field Staff	Admin		
1997	7,176,273	6.46	5.0	30.5	26	115	695	47	883	265.1
1998	7,107,256	6.43	4.0	0.0	26	115	695	47	883	284.4
1999	7,103,099	6.37	6.0	362.3	26	115	695	47	883	416.1
2000	7,103,099	6.36	4.4	57.0	41	539	478	60	883	399.8
2001	7,103,099	5.62	83.3	327.6	44	434	273	135	886	342.5
2002	7,103,099	5.16	231.4	305.6	22	439	384	82	927	202.3
2003	7,103,099	5.16	135.5	0.0	23	417	374	76	890	221.0
2004	7,103,099	5.16	1136.9	0.0	23	418	374	76	891	111.2
2005	7,103,099	5.16	950.5	0.0	23	418	374	76	891	102.0

¹ No data available for 1962 to 1969.

² Projected status, adjustment based on reports from the Provinces. This figure may be possibly lower.

