5-3-2006

Development Decision-Making in St. Louis: Institutions, Incentives and Urban Development

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Development Decision-Making in St. Louis, MO

Institutions, Incentives and Urban Development

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Submitted for Requirements for Ph. D
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May 1, 2006

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Chapter 1: Institutions, Incentives and Urban Development

As a focus for local politics, urban development dominates the political landscape of contemporary St. Louis. The drive to foster the revitalization of the city has preoccupied the activities of the current mayor and his staff, and has been a dominant theme of each mayor since the 1950s. In St. Louis’ post-World War II period, development activities have included large urban renewal projects, public housing and other housing oriented to low-income residents, downtown commercial development of hotels and sports stadiums, and neighborhood revitalization efforts aimed at encouraging private investment to boost the number of middle income residents. These activities have involved civic leaders from a variety of different perspectives—from neighborhood residents seeking to foster residential stability, to regional business leaders seeking to identify how the city fits into the area’s economy.

St. Louis’s preoccupation with development politics may reflect the seriousness of its economic situation, facing its sixth consecutive decade of demographic decline and in a secondary position regionally in most economic sectors. However, it is by no means unique, both across contemporary cities and historically, reflecting the key role that development has played for the formation, maturation and continued viability of American cities. Additionally, development has been a central focus of those scholars who have studied urban affairs and governance. Unlike their European counterparts, American cities emerged as places for commerce instead of places of culture or symbols of national sovereignty. Urban governance has largely comprised the activities of local leaders to promote growth and, more recently, manage the consequences of decline. The
history of most American cities is a history of how local leaders have sought to promote their city’s natural advantages and market it for trade, industry, and new residents.

The work of St. Louis’ contemporary leadership to foster economic rejuvenation is a successor to these earlier efforts, although now expanded in scope and intensity. Current development policy-making encompasses a diverse set of activities—local public financing, eminent domain, ownership and sale of public assets. The planning and implementation of projects involves a wide range of actors—from community groups to the local chamber of commerce—and participants from both the public and private sector. The development decision-making process ranges from the rather technical decisions made by city bureaucrats, to large and politically complicated projects that involve multiple approvals from local agencies, to the policy decisions that structures how limited public financial support for development initiatives is distributed.

This study uses the example of St. Louis to identify how local leaders make decisions about development and what factors influence the type of projects that come to fruition. The thesis of the study is that St. Louis economic conditions and decentralized political structure creates a system of development decision-making that is substantially privatized. At the center of local development activity are place-based entrepreneurs who understand the local market—the constraints and opportunities provided by local neighborhood landscapes—and work to change the incentive structure for economic reinvestment. Included in this is the creation of development images for particular projects and particular markets whose implementation are both economically and politically viable. While these entrepreneurs can include local political leaders as well as members of the civic organizations, most importance is the enunciation of strategies and
vision for redevelopment that attracts private sector investors and local development entrepreneurs. The leadership of the private sector in planning and implementing development policy is the flipside of local public development institutions that are fragmented and reactive. Over time, local political leaders, particularly in the mayor’s office, have worked both to clarify the supportive role of the public sector and how it responds to private sector initiative.

This analysis starts from the perspective that St. Louis’ system of development is a function of both the diminution of the economic role of center cities due to increased regional, economic competition, particularly for residents and the businesses that attract them, and the reduction of federal aid for urban redevelopment. Intra-metropolitan competition has left St. Louis as the inner city diminished as both the region’s central focus of population and economic activity; the decline of the city’s traditional economic base has scattered the economic elite whose personal and corporate future depended upon the city. Federal aid once provided local political leaders substantial resources to plan and implement redevelopment projects; its loss, and the gradual shift of aid to incentives has made local projects even more dependent on private sector resources. At the same time, however, this form of development decision-making is significantly shaped by the city’s decentralized political structure, one that gives great incentives for local aldermen to support the private developers that work in their wards. Political decentralization meets the strategic need of developers and development investors seeking to strategic opportunities to investment in stable housing markets such as loft development, new housing projects and historic neighborhoods.
To demonstrate these claims, this analysis will look at development as a form of local policy-making and will particularly look at local decision-making around development projects shapes development outcomes. While the concept of urban regimes is a starting place for the analysis, the study looks toward neo-institutional theory as a grounding part for the analysis. The concept of institutional settings are used to convey the fact that development decision-making is contained within specific institutional contexts that define participants, the roles they play and the frameworks that they bring into their participation. In this manner, institutional settings provides a series of incentives for the participation of local actors—dictating a set of formal and routines that guides who participates in the development process, how development initiatives are prioritized, and what initiatives emerge. These institutional settings are specific to both particular markets in the city, was well as particular type of development projects. They develop historically—past initiatives shape the types of projects participants are likely to pursue in the future. Additionally, they can shift as new types of development initiatives emerge.

The use of the term “development” within this study requires some explanation. Urban development is at the same time a profession, a process and an outcome. In conventional terms, it can be defined as any set of activities taken by local people to enhance the long-term social, economic, and environmental conditions of their community. While increasingly development initiatives, particularly at the residential neighborhood level, combine both physical development and the development of the social capacity of a community, this analysis will mostly look at the physical
development initiatives and analyze the development of social capacity as it impacts the planning and implementation of development projects.

The study focused on two sets of development initiatives that occurred in the City of St. Louis beginning in the mid-1990s. First, the study analyzes redevelopment initiatives within the city’s central business district (CBD). Once the center of the region’s commercial, retail and white-collar economy, the dominance of St. Louis’ CBD has been declining since the 1950s. Even with a series of high profile projects in the 1970s and 1980s—shifting the CBD’s role to a tourist and entertainment destination—vacancy and obsolescence in the area’s building stock has continued. More recently, St. Louis’ downtown has seen increased investment in the form of hotels, sport stadiums and entertainment venues and, increasingly, loft dwellings for young professionals and other middle class residents. The redevelopment of certain prime buildings downtown has come with the increased attention of local political and civic leaders, including a highly publicized downtown planning process and the initiation of a new public/private partnership, called Downtown Now!, to oversee implementation of the plan.

Secondly, the study analyzes neighborhood development initiatives occurring in JeffVanderLou and the 5th Ward area of St. Louis, an area collectively known as the near north side. JeffVanderLou is an African American, low-income community adjacent to the city’s midtown arts district area. A historic area of African-American homeownership in the first part of the 20th century, JeffVanderLou was designated a model city area in the 1960s as population loss and housing abandonment increased. However, these interventions did not halt the social and economic decline of the community in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, the area has been the focus of a comprehensive community
development initiative in 1999 sponsored by local political leaders and funded by local foundations and corporations, leading to a number of planned activities to improve the area’s housing market and social services. The 5th Ward similarly is a majority African American community north of downtown that has seen significant economic and demographic decline over the past twenty years. Like JVL, the 5th Ward underwent a planning process in 2000, and extensive physical rebuilding before and since then, including a number of public housing reconversion projects and development of new housing subdivisions.

Towards An Institutional Approach to Development Decision-Making

In analyzing these projects, this study will deviate from the primary methods by which urban scholars have addressed local the topic of urban development. First has been the practitioner literature associated with the planning and initiation of development projects. This literature includes studies on trends in neighborhood development (Keating, Krumholtz and Star, 1996), collections focusing on current development policy issues (van Liet, 1997), stories on the successes in urban revitalization (Grogan and Proscio, 2000), evaluations of best practices in the field (Garvin, 1996) and recommendations from experts and practitioners (Suchman, 1994). These types of studies vary in their treatment of broader political considerations, but generally treat the politics and policies impacting development priorities as outside their emphasis. The technocratic bias in some of this literature reflects the fact that the development has become increasingly professionalized—both in the public and private sector—and that scholarship must inform the capacity and best practices of those who work in this sector.
More generally, however, urban scholars have used the issue of urban development as a way to explore the place of cities within the broader system of American politics. For these scholars, local case studies provide the opportunity to theorize about the effects of the American political economy and the nation’s federal system on the ability of local leaders to pursue development policies. The debate has been over the “limitations of locality”—to what extent the choices of local leaders have been constrained by the local economic and political milieu (Clarke and Gaile, 1997; Judd, 2000). Within a political economy perspective, scholars have noted how the nation’s federal political system and private market economic system might constrain the abilities of local leaders to pursue distributive policies (Peterson, 1981), and how the limitations of the power of local political officials to pursue economic development is overcome through collaborations with the local business elite (Molotch, 1976; Mollenkopf, 1983). Clarence Stone (1989: 6) has called these collaborations as “urban regimes” and has defined them “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions.” Regimes represent one way for public leaders to overcome the limitations imposed by the broader political and economic environment and to create an institutional device to “produce the capacity to govern and to bring about publicly significant results” (Stone, 1989: 9).

This analysis of development decision-making in St. Louis starts with the contribution of past scholarship—particularly regime theory—as an important building block, but will attempt to shift the grounding of the study by incorporating institutionalism as its primary frame. The broader political and economic environment
provides a base for local government activities, one that local leaders are largely unable to change. An increasingly international economy places local cities in direct competition with regions across the world, with seemingly no increase in their capacity to bargain with economic decision-makers. Additionally, for the last 30 years, local leaders have largely responded—rather than initiated—the drastic changes in the relationship between their cities and America’s federal government. On the other hand, how local cities have responded to these challenges is in part a function of factors intrinsic to the local political sphere, relating to the capacity of local governments as it developed within a specific local context. That many cities have entered a period of aggressive entrepreneurialism cannot be denied. American cities, as well as their counterparts in Europe, enter into the 21st century less as passive reflectors of national and international trends and more as “independent political actors,” engaging “in aggressive place-marketing and competition for investment” (Judd, 2000: 956).

It seems obvious that any investigation of development in major American cities would utilize a theoretical approach that combines the contributions of the broader political economy as well as the local interactions that comprise the local political ecology (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). It seems equally clear that in their activities the capacities of local actors vary and that the characteristics of local institutional arrangements depend not only on the specific interactions of elected officials and local business elite only, but other aspects of a local political culture. The starting point to understanding variation in local institutional arrangements is by the direct investigation of development decision-making and how participants view the constraints and opportunities impacting their roles.
In order to theorize about the latter in the context of St. Louis, this study will borrow from the renewed importance of institutionalism in political science and urban studies more specifically. This sort of institutional approach is implicit in the regime framework—since the 1980s the most prominent scholarship of urban development—but the application of the regime framework is ultimately limited. The concept of regime denotes the existence of deep, persistent and sustaining patterns of collaboration between local elected political leaders and local businesses in planning and implementing local development. The hierarchical model of the classical regime—a strong mayor and an organized business elite—matched the model of local political organization preferred by Progressive reformers and made popular by notable American mayors in the post war urban renewal period. Urban regime theory has created an archetype of local institutional relationships that has become progressively less applicable as a range of case studies have applied the concept to other cities. These case studies have noted the importance of other actors besides politicians and business elite (Ferman, 1996), as well as questioning the assumption that businesses have sustained interests in the affairs of local cities (Jones and Bachelor, 1993). More fundamentally, scholars have questioned the assumption that local economic interests dominate policy-making (Reese and Rosenfield, 2002) and that the development choices of local political leaders reflect less the logic of economic constraints and more the choices imposed by the political logic of representation (Swanstrom, 1989).

These studies and others have added to the typology of regimes, incorporating such factors as the role of neighborhood organizations (Ferman, 1996), the impact of progressive ideology (DeLeon, 1992) and symbolic activity generally (Henry and
Paramio-Salcines, 1999), and the role of non-local actors (Burns and Thomas, 2003). In doing so, a more nuanced picture of local regimes emerges and improves the concept as a framework as a tool for comparative analysis. However, methodologically it takes scholarship further away from the task required—a deductive, theory-building approach that starts from individual decisions within the context of specific policy processes.

Regime theory is a useful starting point because it correctly relates the form of policy-making to the participants of policy-making, and in turn to the operation of policy processes to the outputs of public policy. Its limitation is methodological and ultimately theoretical. In an application of it that over-relied on structural approaches, regime theory treats the behavior of individual actors as a function of a set of generalized community characteristics. Additionally, comparative studies have suggested that even where factors are similar, cities differ in their policy outcomes according to their local political institutions (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). In application to a successive series of case studies, regime theory becomes less theory and more a generalized framework saying increasingly little about outcomes in specific policy processes. To make meaningful conclusions about development decision-making means moving beyond the “limitations of locality” debate and, in exchange, developing a framework for understanding how the different components of the urban structure—political and economic forces, local political interest and pressure groups and the formal and informal structures of local governance—provide a context for local behavior.

In neo-institutional approaches to political science lies the intent of scholarship to place institutions—formal organizations, legislative bodies and the rules and regulations by which policy is made—as independent variables in the policy-making process. In this
view, neither the preferences of participants nor social and economic constraints can alone explain policy outcomes (March and Olsen, 1984). The term “institution” should be thought of broadly. It includes formal organizations and interest groups, political structures and institutions, bureaucratic and organization rules, and local political norms and culture. Institutions shape political behavior by defining a system for political debate and conflict and influencing what political actors view as both possible and preferable (Steinmo, 2001).

While neo-institutional approaches vary, two primary schools stand out, differing in their frame of analysis and methodological interests. “Historical” or “organizational institutionalism” incorporates those scholars who emphasize the impact of the rules and regulations of formal association and policy-making procedures and how they shape politics and policy (March and Olson, 1989; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Thelen, 1999). These scholars generally see political institutions as a primary, but not solitary factor in policy and political debates. In terms of how institutions structure individual behavior, their frame of reference includes political culture, organizational rules and formal institutions and organizations. In the urban field, scholars have looked at the influences of the formal organizations of local politics—reformed political systems versus unreformed systems, for example—on the outcomes of local policy (Clingermayer and Feiock, 1990; Reese, 1997). On the other hand, “individual institutionalism” incorporates a strong behavioral assumption in its emphasis on individual actions as responding to and generating specific institutional contexts (Moe, 1987; Ostrom, 1991). Some scholars working from this perspective are also labeled as part of “new economic institutional” approaches that explain the importance of institutional contexts on the
incentives of actors to make rational decisions in light of uncertainty and imperfect information (North, 1990).

While a deep chasm philosophically and politically can exist between these schools, there are complementarities between them, a fact recognized by both scholars of urban governance (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003) as well as those concerned with neo-institutional theory (Kato, 1996). Organizational analysis sets the framework for the analysis of individual actors. On the most simplistic level, changes in the structure of development decision-making demonstrate how local entrepreneurs not only work within existing frameworks but also act strategically to change them. One of the critical tasks of local leaders generally is to help build the capacity of local government and development partners (Judd, 2000).

**Urban Development as Local Policy Processes**

One method to synthesize the different levels of analysis—that of the policy entrepreneur on the one hand and local political culture on the other—is to analyze local decision-making as a form of a policy-making process. The context of policy process links characteristics of the local political culture, the informal and informal rules defining local action, with the characteristics of the “institutional milieu” of local organizations (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003), and the actions of policy entrepreneurs and other local participants. In one sense, development deals seem somewhat narrower than what conventionally is encompassed within a definition of public policy-making (Jenkins, 1978). Development activities comprise a narrowly technical set of processes undertaken by professionals within the context of a specific deal. These technical processes occur with the involvement of local developers, non-profit organizations, city planners, elected
officials and other civic leaders and can be related to the specifics of the deal—for example, blighting bills, community development commission hearings, or planning studies (The Development Training Institute, 1995). Other processes important to urban development, however, serve as a background to the specific deals and relate to the broader balance of power within community development politics. One example in St. Louis has been the varying weight of the mayor’s office or the Board of Aldermen in distribution of CDBG funds, a balance that has shifted over time in the struggles between the two branches of local government. The distinction between the two is, on the one hand, the formal creation and initiation of a framework for prioritizing of issues and interests in development and, on the other hand, the lower level decisions over specific policy-deals that occur in discrete organizational settings. Both involve political debate, sometimes on the micro-level of jurisdictional debates, and are related to each other in an iterative fashion.

The study will borrow from the policy process literature the concept that policy-making occurs within specific institutional contexts that reflect the participation of a distinct group of actors and a particular institutional milieu that informs their behavior (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). This study will use the somewhat broader term of “institutional setting” to designate the specific context of development decision-making. Locally, these institutional settings vary in terms of their capacity, cohesion and integration of activities, and range from highly organized, professionalized and coherent structures with clear rules and norms, to highly chaotic, fragmented processes with little consistency in the type of participants and the type of decisions made.
Within them, however, are individuals located at specific points in decision-making processes. Local participants in the decision-making process—both the individuals who pitch particular initiatives and the representatives of organized interests that support or facilitate community development strategies—are akin to the policy entrepreneurs influential in defining and formulating policy in national policy processes (Kingdon, 1995). Individual actors will behave strategically to maximize approval and implementation of development initiatives, with the characteristics of local policy processes informing and shaping their behavior.

Another useful facet of the policy process perspective is the notion of how policy communities change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Institutionalism generally has renewed the interest in historical studies of policy processes and how past processes impact contemporary decisions (Robertson, 1993). However, despite the underlining structural conditions that inform policy-making, both routinization and instability are evident in local development decision-making. The institutional structure of local policy-making both reflects and sustains stability by subscribing a set of practices and rules for participation in the decision-making. The fate of past initiatives provides clues for successful strategies in the future, as well as increases the legitimacy of a particular decision-making process. However, the status quo can be punctuated by changes as participants use the opportunities in the political environment—the political-economic environment, the emergence of new problems or solutions, or the initiation of new institutions—to change how decisions are made. Local mayors, for example, may be most able to influence this process, including creating new mechanisms for policy-making when existing processes stymie their proposals.
**Policy Processes and Political Entrepreneurs**

Urban development decision-making within the focus of a set of related processes adds a third level of analysis to the twin tracks of institutional analysis. The three levels link theoretical concerns with the critical questions addressed by scholarship and the methods of analysis that will be used in this study to address them. The first level is that focusing on the local political culture that informs development decision-making. In organizational terms, this includes local political institutions, local and regional economic development authorities, and community-level organizations and pressures groups. In St. Louis, these include both private sector groups, public agencies and, increasingly, public-private organizations. These organizations operate at all ends of the development process—from conceiving of projects, acting as gatekeepers for approval, and implementing the projects.

Also significant on this level are the constraints of local political culture. Individual actions often conform to a sense of how the system works—an illusive factor to capture, but critical in analysis. In St. Louis, development decisions are informed by the constitutionally mandated structure of St. Louis politics—the 28 member Board of Aldermen, for example, and the segregation of elected “county” offices outside the direct control of the mayor—as well as the informal practices that guide decision-making—the notion of aldermanic courtesy, for example, and the routines of public and private participation in decision-making. Overtime, these aspects have created a set of local practices that routinize local activity and inform how local leaders at various places within decision-making processes will respond to emerging challenges and opportunities. Rules and routines create networks of activities that are mutually beneficial for
participants in terms of sharing information, linking parts of the process, and creating an institutional structure for shared work. One the one hand, this work comprises the formal organizations and institutions that comprise development decision-making. Of key importance is the difference between organizations and networks, each with rules establishing the basic operating principles of the organization and the roles and responsibilities of its members (Portz, Stein and Jones, 1999). On the other hand, decision-making is sustained through networks of collaborative activity taking place at various points in the decision-making process. The existence of networks is critical for the work of public entrepreneurs “because they create efficiencies in assembling the resources necessary in production process” (Schneider and Teske, 1995: 174).

Informing the level of organizations and networks is a methodological approach that investigates the activities of local actors, their values and motivations. The bulk of the work in completing this study has been interviews with policy-makers—broadly defined—involved in community development work. The interviews have been conducted to uncover the complimentary and competing roles of these actors within the three sets of projects that have been chosen and demonstrate how they conceptualize their role in the local development.

The second level of institutional analysis focuses upon the individual actors and how they respond to restraints placed upon them. In the field of community development, participants include elected officials, local political appointees or staff members, professionals in development agencies, private sector actors, paid and volunteer members of civic associations and other civic organizations, and neighborhood activists and residents. In this sense, institutional analysis calls on a reappraisal of the
role of public entrepreneurs in the development decision-making process. A traditional view of the role of entrepreneurs emerged in the discussions of mayors in the urban renewal period, emphasizing their role in organizing and initiating public housing and slum clearance projects (Salisbury, 1964). With increased competition and federal retrenchment from urban policies, scholars point to the increased entrepreneurial activity on the part of local actors to “identify, evaluate, anticipate and even help to develop and create the markets for private producers to explore, aided by necessary by government as subsidizer or co-investor” (Eisinger, 1988: 9).

Within recent urban scholarship is a field of study that has approached local actors as public entrepreneurs and examined local contexts to the degree that they offer incentives for local actors to pursue projects and policy-making (Schneider and Teske, 1995). This literature borrows from the discussion of private sector entrepreneurs in their definition of entrepreneurs as individuals who discover market opportunities and take advantage of newly created possibilities to create profit (Casson, 1982; Schumpeter, 1934). While the nature of politics makes the concept of profits slightly more complex, in politics

“entrepreneurs exploit market opportunities and seek profits by adapting products, policies, or programs evident in one policy sphere or political jurisdiction to the domain in which they are operating or by proposing newer or more experimental programs” (Schneider and Teske, 1993: 321).

In this view, policy entrepreneurs are “embedded” in local social networks that help reduce uncertainty and create an opportunity for sustained and productive relationships within specific policy fields (Schneider and Teske, 1995). Within the development field, policy entrepreneurs promote linkages within the policy-making process and provide new solutions to development dilemmas (Goetz, 1990); in doing so, policy entrepreneurs play
a critical role in the decision-making process, particularly when decision-making is fragmented. This view of policy entrepreneurship is broader, more inclusive, and more accurate than the conception of the strong mayor in that entrepreneurs can be found at many points of the policy process (Kingdon, 1995). The defining characteristics of policy entrepreneurs, “much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hopes of a future return” (Kingdon, 1995: 122).

To these two, the level of institutional settings adds a third level of analysis, particularly in the evaluation of their ability for capacity, cohesion, and collective action. Capacity refers to both the strength of relationships between local actors as well as their programmatic ability to achieve key goals (Portz, Stein and Jones, 1999; Stone, 2001). Urban scholars have increasingly turned to this notion in their discussions of urban governance, and have especially used the term to highlight the presence of long-lasting and effective interaction between corporate leaders and elected political leaders in advancing and implementing urban initiatives (Stone, 1989). For a city like St. Louis—a city, as it will be shown, whose institutions promotes the diffusion of political power—this view of structural capacity may be less important that the political capacity of specific political leaders. Over time, incoherence within local policy processes creates a feedback loop that makes the consolidation of decision-making increasingly unlikely; policy-making incoherence becomes a component of deal making rather than a political obstacle to be overcome. Thus, while most of St. Louis’ recent mayors have advocated structural changes increasing their control over policy-making, their success has more likely depended upon their ability to work within the confines of the existing political
system to maximize their political leverage over development decision-making (Stein, 2002).

Another factor in the analysis of the institutional setting of local decision-making relates to the internal dynamics between the various decision-points involved in any community development decision. Capacity is intimately related to these sets of interrelationships, not simply their number—which is likely to multiple in complicated development deals—but whether they are cohesive and cooperative on the one hand or fragmented and competitive on the other. How well differing decision-points in the policy-making process reflects some of the institutional issues raised previously—the structure of local politics, the rules and norms guiding decision-making, and personal and formal power of local actors to bring them together.

One macro-level consideration for policy entrepreneurs is the observation that over time local policy processes within cities have become more fragmented. In the policy process literature, policy fragmentation has been noted as a part of the more general trend away from independent subsystems, as greater complexity and a greater number of interest groups increase interdependence in politics and open up political debate to greater influence (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Policy communities are less likely to monopolize issue areas, with the consequence that participants are less likely to communicate regularly with each other, understand the broader implications of their decisions or share common attitudes and outlooks (Kingdon, 1995). On the local level, policy fragmentation within cities has been the consequence of functional specialization of formal roles (Stone, 2001), the devolution of federal policy (Koschinsky and Swanstrom, 2001), and the formal organizing structure of local politics (Stein, 2002), as
well as the complexity of problems facing city leadership. In the face of this, the task of political entrepreneurship is as much initiating new institutional frameworks as it is to development new networks to link local policy processes together. In the language of local development, participants in the development process work to create new models of project activity and assist in their implementation to create some sort of capacity. Collectively over time, these activities shift the incentive structure of development politics, shifting how participants view development opportunities and constraints and achieve a plateau of stability and routinization in the local development process.

**The Importance of Development Images in Development Decision-Making**

Another feature of the policy process literature is the notion of a specific policy image informs local behavior, specifically the strong connection between specific policy images and the institutional arrangements that support their implementation (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). In a similar form, development often occurs within the context of a development image, either referring to the specifics of the initiative or a broader vision of neighborhood identity. At the same time, these development images play a methodological role in the analysis of development decision-making. One question to be ascertained from development participants is how they understand their role in development, whether they share a sense of collaboration and consensus over the goals of development policy, and how their activities come to exhibit a degree of regularity or routinization over time. In this sense, the primary input for this study is the language of development participants—gathered through interviews, review of primary project documents and secondary sources such as local reports and press.
While the constellation of local actors provides a significant context for development activities, development images are by no means uniform across any one city. Specific urban places matter in terms of how these forces interact and the impact of their activities. This significance is often unrecognized by urban scholars but immediately clear to local development practitioners; the relative costs and benefits of particular place underlie much of local conversations about development. While the overall characteristics of the city, county and region set constraints in terms of resources, markets and local capacities, there is wide variance in development opportunities and outcomes within a city like St. Louis and with other municipalities in the St. Louis region.

In the language of real estate promotion, the factor of specific place is often in a short hand way described as “location, location, location.” Location is an intangible but real notion within the real estate industry of the power of specific places in terms of attracting, retaining and growing investments. Interviews with local practitioners demonstrate that the notion of place are widely understood and recognized, and that the characteristics of specific places as they are invested with meaning by practitioners enormously impacts development processes. In methodological terms, the language of participants can treated as a set of beliefs about development opportunities and constraints. As will be demonstrated in the specific treatment of development activities, development participants can have very clear perceptions about the framework for development, and their responses to questions demonstrate unambiguous conceptions about the roles of participants in the development process and the critical decision-points within these processes. In addition, participants have a localized understanding about
development, reflecting their sense of how development opportunities shift from block to block and from neighborhood to neighborhood.

Such understandings of local conditions can be identified in a wide variety of manners—from informal and subtle messages in marketing materials to more technical and professional analyses of marketing studies and project financial statements. As an example of the first, in everyday conversations, neighborhood names can be loaded descriptors, evaluating and providing quick judgments of the economic performance of a local housing market and the quality of life of its residents. Urban marketers have joined the practices of those marketing the newer suburban subdivisions in place branding, utilizing neighborhood marketing to communicate historic housing, neighborhood amenities and other local features. Cutting across neighborhood boundaries are other features of urban markets—the current focus on loft living as one—that signify desirable aspects of contemporary living. This sort of language functions as more than just marketing slogans; they also serve as conceptual shortcuts for describing specific places, and within them specific types of development activities, and for signifying their importance and impact.

Given the importance of private market investment in contemporary community development, it is often the language of the local market that has the most value for participants in development politics. Included in this grouping are the reports created by property appraisers and marketing analysts, financial projections, and other quantitative analyses of local housing and development markets by bankers and financiers. This sort of language attempts to describe the objective economic reality involving the value of proposed projects within a particular community. The fact that third party actors under a
professional standing compile some of this information strengthens the notion that this information is privileged over other forms of informal valuation. In many urban neighborhoods, these estimates of local market strengthen frankly act as constraints on development initiatives. However, both the less formal descriptors of local markets and formal economic language for any one market can shift; indeed, overseeing the shift of these considerations is a key activity of place-based entrepreneurs.

While competing messages abound in any local context, the coherence of a particular set of descriptors within one place suggests that language can represent a shared set of assumptions about the ability of development initiatives to be successful over the long term. Put in another way, the behavior of actors responds to and reinforces a particular development image. Actors look to the presence of particular descriptors as an indication of confidence and a signal for their participation in development activities. On a formal level, the language of planning, predevelopment activities and project implementation likewise can demonstrate a shared sense of confidence. Planning documents—a common feature to the community development activities in many communities, including the three to be analyzed here—can be read both as blueprints for future projects; the maps that often accompany them visually attempt to order the physical terrain into a series of understandable component parts.

In the context of this study, these development images are an important component to the institutional setting around development decision-making for specific communities and specific types of projects. For emerging development initiatives or markets, the creation of a new development image can be a necessary condition of a new round of development activity. While competing development images abound in any
local context, the coherence of a particular set of descriptors within one place suggests that language can represent a shared set of assumptions about development initiative. Conversely, the lack of consistency signifies the lack of consensus over development goals and how individual actors participate in development politics.

**Private Sector Leadership in Development Decision-making**

The three levels of analysis suggest a set of hypotheses and key questions based upon how they relate to each other in community development decision-making. Previous research provides both a standard view as well as unanswered concerns that are crucial in this analysis. The standard view is that American federalism and political economic structure constrain the choices available to local elected leaders. Institutional devices such as urban regimes provide the local capacity for a strong mayor and organized business leadership to plan and implement development projects. Local capacity emerges in institutional settings that emphasize local executive leadership, both in the political and in the private sector. Political entrepreneurs work at the top level of these processes with local institutional structures that are both routine and established but at the same time open and flexible.

Such a view underlies the regime concept, although the level of local institutions is underspecified. The standard view also emphasizes a particular relationship between form of local political structure and local development capacity that has been substantiated in a number of studies of economic development decision-making. Local leadership capacity has been linked to the presence of strong political coalitions and strong public-private collaborations (Judd and Parkinson, 1990). The emergence of public entrepreneurs advocating pro-growth politics is associated with cities that have
full-time mayors and strong local business groups (Schneider and Teske, 1993). In general, unreformed political systems, with a strong mayor’s office and smaller city council, appear best suited to aggressively carry out development policy (Reese, 1997). Other aspects of local organization—including a professionalized and highly trained economic development bureaucracy—also facilitate initiation of development projects (Jones and Bachelor, 1993).

In the case of St. Louis, economic and political conditions fail to structure local politics to provide the mayor’s office with this level of local control. The activities of mayors in the past seem to indicate the limits of mayoral prerogative in planning and implementing local development projects. The implication is that St. Louis’ capacity will be low and policy entrepreneurship difficult to sustain and the emergence of local capacity presupposes structural political change that recasts political organization in the city and creates the incentives for the mayor to consolidate the policy-making process into an effective community development regime.

The study will attempt to show how St. Louis’ case both conforms to and provides valuable additions to the standard view. On the one hand, comparative studies have generally misconstrued the field of local development by overemphasizing structural constraints and de-emphasizing how local contexts provide incentives to policy entrepreneurs to pursue projects. More importantly, from the view of practitioners in development decision-making, development is a series of processes across a number of institutional settings involving both “peak bargaining” between political and economic elite (Jones and Bachelor, 1993) as well as routinized decisions and day to day actions by professionals and other professional actors (Reese, 1993). In this sense, regimes are both
an ideal rarely found as well as a process only marginally applicable to development activities. For cities like St. Louis, policy entrepreneurship is less an outcome of the well-oiled machine of a consolidated regime and more a necessity for any meaning-level of development. The case of development projects in St. Louis indicates how the substantial devolution and economic competition of local development economies creates local institutional structures that reinforce the substantial privatization of development decision-making, with public leadership playing a supporting and limited role.

**Power and Limitations of the Case Study Approach**

The use of the City of St. Louis as a single case study as opposed to a comparative approach means that the analysis might require some additional justification. The method has been widely used in business and public management (Taylor, 1994) and are common for a series of studies germane to this analysis—Stone’s study of Atlanta (Stone, 1989), Jones and Bachelor’s analysis of Detroit (Jones and Bachelor, 1993) and DeLeon on San Francisco’s urban regime (DeLeon, 1992). Critics of the approach pointed to three issues with the methodology. First is the suggestion that it inherently destroys the “scientific distance” implicit in more quantitative techniques. Additionally, critics have suggested that case studies lack rigor and, because they do not measure independent and dependent variables, they lead to arbitrary interpretations (Runyon, 1982; Yin, 1984). Secondly, critics have charged that case studies lack representation with respect to a larger sample of their study frame and so lack the ability to generalize findings (Smith and Robbins, 1982). Most significantly, proponents of the case study risk the danger of selecting for analysis only cases that confirm their hypothesis, imperiling the validity of their research.
While recognizing these limitations, this analysis proceeds from the point that the case study method remains a valuable tool for exploring new interpretations and suggesting new lines of inquiry. In this sense, one of the purposes of this analysis is not to create a predictive model or determining cause and effect relationships but suggest new additional factors to consider, particularly around what local factors account for the emergence of policy entrepreneurs in development decision-making. Other aspects of the research undertaken for this analysis have been included in order to improve the method and overcome its limitations. First is the use of triangulation in the collection and analysis of qualitative data (Bromley, 1986). In terms of this research, it has meant multiple sourcing of conclusions and interpretations about events and conditions—either through interviews, secondary documents or collected data. Additionally, in response to the single observation issue, scholars using case study methodology have advocated using the single case to compare the chosen hypothesis to a series of alternative theories (Campbell, 1975). In this study the selection of multiple project sites—with an analysis of a series of activities within each project area—is one attempt to test theories over a greater range of cases. While the selection of the project settings necessarily limit the application of the theoretical approach taken here, they have been selected to demonstrate the applicability—or lack of applicability—of the approach to a range of institutional settings in St. Louis.

The threat to external validity in the case study method is a more serious issue to confront. Incorporating into the research design concepts and frameworks from the general literature is one attempt to overcome this limitation. Beyond this, Stoecker suggests that modeling into case studies the methodological requirements of survey
research “leaves us worse off than when we started” (Stoecker, 1991: 93). Case study methodology is appropriate in the situations where it can best answer research questions—in the case of applied research, particularly those dealing with process. Stoecker writes that

“process is both historical and idiosyncratic, and statistical analysis is unable to capture either one of those. In fact it is the case study’s ability to capture the idiosyncrasies which make up the ‘unexplained variance’ which is the source of its strength… In fact, the non-typical case can assist us as an example of an exception to a generalization, therefore transforming and making more accurate general theories” (Stoecker, 1991: 94).”

The study will utilize interviews, public and private publications, and secondary data from local papers and publications. The interviews conducted for the analysis of local development decision-making form a particularly critical base of knowledge. While in terms of sources cited local primary and secondary sources dominate the analysis, the interviews provided a much richer base of information to analyzed development decisions. (See Appendix B for the list of subjects interviewed.) The interviews targeted key stakeholders in a variety of fields—including public officials, private developers and other development professionals in the civic sector—in a variety of institutional settings in the city, including in downtown and in the two neighborhoods studied. The interviews also provided complete timelines of development activities in each of the areas and an assessment of the relative importance of particular factors and activities in creating and sustaining development activity.

In terms of other documentation, the project relied upon local primary information on developments—including financial pro-formas and other development applications.
where available. Additionally, the project utilized on-line access to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* to assemble complete citations on key individuals, organizations and projects.

**Review of the Chapters**

Along with this introductory chapter, the first four chapters provide background to the analysis of the two project sites. Chapter 2 presents the broader political, economic and social context of St. Louis, including how it has changed in the post-war period. The chapter will summarize the constraints put upon local leaders based upon the city’s continuing economic and demographic decline, its relatively unchanging formal political structure and the intergovernmental context of both federal-city and state-city relationships. Together, these add up to a city with relatively fewer economic resources, organized around a formally weak mayor system, at a time of federal policy devolution and in a state that has not aggressively incorporated local or regional policy into its modus operandi. These forces have heightened the importance of private market forces in both the financing of development projects and in leadership roles of planning and initiating projects.

Chapter 3 uses these constraints to reflect upon two past periods of development activity in St. Louis in an attempt to demonstrate how past initiatives inform current practices. The periods chosen include St. Louis’ 1950s urban renewal period—when Mayor Raymond Tucker aggressively confronted the city’s mounting economic and physical obsolescence—and redevelopment activities in the 1970s and 1980s, when federal policy provided new opportunities for local mayors under the New Federalism initiative. Both of these periods show how the power of the mayor’s office was constrained by other local political actors and by the city’s political culture and how the
local business elite was less active and organized in redevelopment efforts than other American cities. The chapter demonstrates a basic inadequacy of the regime archetypal to St. Louis’ development activities and also provides an understanding of some of the past institutions and organizations that impacted development initiatives in the 1990s.

Chapter 4 more directly investigates the institutional setting of development decision-making in St. Louis, focusing upon the organizations and individuals that participate in development activities. They are discussed both in terms of their formal aspects and the roles and responsibilities of participants as well as the informal rules and routines that shape individual behavior. In looking at specific types of participants, contrasts are made between the existing urban literature and the practice of local participants, particularly in terms of the interaction between structural constraints and the incentives provided for participants to act as policy entrepreneurs in the process.

The next three chapters analyze development activities within the two project areas. Chapter 5 and 6 focus on development activities in the downtown area, demonstrating how the collective work of development participants created stability in the area’s development activities. Chapter 5 presents a historical perspective of downtown development and how economic decline and institutional changes in local organizations blunted the effectiveness of a post-war vision of downtown as the region’s central business district. This decline, in turn, set up the basis for a new round of downtown planning and a new vision for downtown as a residential neighborhood; the aspects of how this emerged will be discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 focuses upon neighborhood development activities in the 5th Ward area and 19th Ward area, an area generally known as the near north side. The chapter demonstrates how neighborhood
development initiatives fit within a similar framework of analysis used in the analysis of downtown development, emphasizing how participants in development decision-making creating new development images and new institutional settings to foster reinvestment. Development activities in the two neighborhoods provide contrasting views on the sorts of participants necessary for sustained development activities and how the institutional terrain of local neighborhood development impacts the type and goals of development initiatives. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the key findings from each of the chapters and suggests how institutional analysis of this sort contributes to the study of local development.
Chapter 2: St. Louis in Decline

This study’s perspective on development as a process of activity suggests that any analysis of local development decision-making require an investigation of the work of individual policy entrepreneurs. Such a perspective assumes an independence of local action that has been missing from some of the previous scholarship on urban development decision-making. Policy decisions occur within the context of a specific group of individuals, organizations and networks; the rules of the community and the organization help shape individual behavior. Development decisions include both peak bargaining over critical initiatives as well as routine, day-to-day decisions on more mundane matters. The institutional settings of development decision-making exhibit both stability as well as change as entrepreneurs utilize opportunities to reshape decision systems.

Additionally, as will be investigated in Chapter 3, previous attempts at local revitalization may hold important clues for analysis of contemporary strategies. Past initiatives and campaigns do more than just provide models for what type of projects are likely to be successfully implemented; they help create a local political culture that shapes present activities by identifying and routinizing specific decision-making processes. Through repeated activities, past processes represent social learning on the part of local institutions and actors. Over time, the actions of policy entrepreneurs will be funneled into specific strategies, and, in some general way, the choices of local actors will be constrained by the characteristics of the local decision-making environment.

However, a broader perspective is useful, because, both for the case of St. Louis and for the case of American cities generally, local choices occur within the context of
broader economic and political forces. In this sense, the thesis of this chapter is that broader political, economic and social forces have shaped the overall policy process in which development occurs in a manner that constrains the choices that local elite face. These forces have reinforced a substantially private system of planning and implementing development projects and prioritizing projects that have significant market support.

This chapter will review two sets of broader forces. First is the economic position of the city of St. Louis and the city’s significant demographic and economic transformation after the World War II. Demographic and economic trends have meant that the city enters into the 21st century after 50 years of rapid population loss and a substantial decline in the city’s economic base. Intra-metropolitan fragmentation and competition has generally heightened competition for regional resources; the decline of St. Louis as the center city of the regional has complicated the task of economic rejuvenation. In terms of specific sectors important for development, economic shifts have transformed the local banking community, consolidated local banks into national networks; as resulted, local offices have responded to national headquarters as much as the local priorities of St. Louis leaders. Additionally, regional competition has shifted the locus of the St. Louis development community far past the city borders. While much of the region’s residential developers are local, their work is increasingly found not just in St. Louis County—the region’s urban county—but in former exurban counties like St. Charles and Jefferson Counties. The preference of most regionally based housing developers has been towards the development of suburban housing subdivisions on former green-field sites, and suburban and exurban political leaders have actively courted new development, propelling the growth of these areas. Most local developers have left
the task of urban in-fill and rehabilitation to a set of smaller developers, who have
generally lacked the capacity to respond to urban redevelopment or the ability to
substantially invest in a manner that has been transformative for inner city communities.

Second has been the effect of federal policy over the post-war period, with the
federal government initiating a series of policy initiatives that local leaders have used to
transform the face of their cities. Since World War II, federal policy has shifted from a
period of more active direct intervention in the urban renewal period (1946-1963),
through a period of New Federalism in the 1970s, to a period of retrenchment and
withdrawal of federal policy instruments in the 1980s and 1990s. Also significant for the
intergovernmental system is the impact of Missouri politics in shaping the types of
powers that local leaders have in order to confront economic decline. Decline in federal
resources has shifted responsibility to local resources, which are generally not available
at the same level. State political trends, particularly a pervasive ant-urban trend, has
made the state-level resources a poor substitute. Additionally, there has been a generally
shift from grant-based funds to incentives and other tax subsidies, including TIF
financing and state and federal housing-related tax credits. In political terms, both of the
decrease in public funds and the shift to incentives has increased the importance of the
private sector in financing development projects.

Economic and Demographic Shifts and Development

As noted in Chapter 1, the factor relating to the economic status of local areas has
been a prominent part of the “political economy” literature of urban scholars (Petersen,
1981). These scholars note that the political structure of American government largely
leaves to private hands control over decisions regarding economic matters and local
leaders thus lack the political authority to control economic enterprise. Much of the activity of local elite, then, is in the encouragement of economic development, as opposed to regulatory activity to curb it or to tie development to redistributive concerns.

The fact that St. Louis has faced a dramatic economic and demographic shift over the last fifty years has a number of consequences. First, the demographic and social shifts in the composition of the city’s residents impact the types of demands made upon local leaders, impacting the political equation made by local leadership (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). The political incorporation of immigrants is a historic role of urban governments. One of the consequences of St. Louis’ emergence as a majority African American city is that the city has increasingly had to incorporate the political needs of this population into its governing policy. At the same time, this incorporation occurs at a time, unlike in the past, when the city is increasingly constrained to provide real resources to facilitate this transition.

Economic and demographic shifts also impact the city in terms of the resources that its private sector can offer in governance. Corporate leadership can be a key component of a city’s civic structure, not only representing the interests of the city in civic deliberations but also mobilizing private capital for civic improvements. The regional and national shift of corporate front offices from St. Louis impacts the presence of these sorts of resources; increasingly, business decisions are made by corporate leadership with none of the traditional allegiance that previous corporate leadership had.

At the same time, the ability of elected leaders to negotiate with local businesses will fluctuate according to the state of their local economies. While profits can be made in poor cities, in purely economic terms the rate of return for investments will be
comparatively less and thus less attractive for investors. Thus, poor and disadvantaged cities will have relatively fewer resources and will be in a weaker negotiating position, more likely to accede to the interests of local economic forces. Alternatively, those urban areas with a stronger economic base will be in a better position to influence economic development and set development priorities.

**Demographic Shifts and Decline in St. Louis**

From the perspective of 2004, the degree of population loss and demographic shifts in the city has been extraordinary.

[Insert Table 1 here.]

From 1950, the year of St. Louis’ highest population level, to 2000, the city lost 500,000 residents. Population decline occurred in all areas of the city, with some areas on the near-north side of the city losing over 75% of its population over the last thirty years. With population decline in the city came also demographic change in racial and ethnic terms.

[Insert Table 2 here.]

From 1950 to 2000, the city went from a population 82% white to a majority African American population; the city is also comparatively poorer than it was in the 1950s, with some areas facing serious economic and social distress. Population loss has had a profound effect on the physical landscape of the city, with large-scale abandonment and demolition of the building stock in some parts of the city, mostly around the downtown area and on the city’s north side. The decline in the city’s population, housing stock and business activity increased fiscal pressures on the city at a time when it had greater pressures to respond to human needs and to reverse the city’s economic decline.
Concurrent with population loss in St. Louis City has been the increasing population growth outside the city’s boundaries. St. Louis County, an urban county separated from the City of St. Louis in 1876, surpassed the city’s population in 1970 with 951,000 residents, a 35% increase over 1960. In 2000, the county had just over 1 million residents, although comparisons to the 1990 census showed that St. Louis County’s growth rate was slowing. More recent analysis has shown that parts of St. Louis County are demonstrating the same type of population loss that occurred in the city in the 1970s (Van Der Werf, 2004: B4), including job loss and a drop in the area’s household income. The center of regional population gain shifted to further ex-urban counties, including St. Charles County to the west. St. Charles County’s population increased from 213,000 in 1990 to 284,000 in 2000, a 33% increase. Although still smaller than St. Louis County, St. Charles’ strong growth rate will challenge both St. Louis City and St. Louis County’s dominance in local economic and political affairs.

**Patterns of Business Activity**

Paralleling change in St. Louis demography were changes in the city’s patterns of business activity. While the dream of St. Louis as the “Fourth City” faded as the 19th century turned into the 20th, St. Louis remained a strong economic center, with a highly diversified economic base (First National Bank, 1927: 1). As the scale of economic activities increased, segregation in types of business activities occurred, with manufacturing and commercial activities in districts primarily within the city’s boundaries and downtown St. Louis dominating both in wholesale and retail activities (Thomas, 1927: 45, 76). As important, the city as a whole dominated the region in terms of number of business establishments, over 2,600 as compared to less than 100 in St.

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1 All tables and figures are found in Appendix B at the back of the paper.
Louis County and under 500 in counties on the Illinois side (St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, 1935: 49).

Over time, this city’s dominance in business activity would fade, as significant numbers of establishments shifted to St. Louis County and St. Charles County.

[Insert Table 3 here.]

Even with boosters heralding the city as a location for business, more sanguine assessments prior to World War II noted that

“the city has not grown as rapidly as was anticipated. The expansion of commerce and industry has been insufficient to absorb even a small part of the older residential districts (City Plan Commission, 1935: 4-5).”

One post-war report picked up on this trend, concluding that even with a renewed postwar expansion of St. Louis’ economic base, “most of the new plants are choosing suburban and outer suburban locations thus pushing industrial St. Louis so far beyond its political boundaries that they are now unrecognizable to a casual observer” (St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, 1951: 3). The same report found business locations in the region had taken on a new pattern of city, suburban, and even exurban development, as suburban municipalities recognized the need for housing in closer proximity to new industrial plants, taking more land for residential uses and forcing newer facilities further out (St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, 1951: 5).

Urban renewal proposals and studies authored in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s recognized both the suburbanization occurring in the region’s commercial facilities as well as the increasing obsolescence of the city’s central business district. According to one report at the town, the problems of the downtown were
“self-evident – inadequate thoroughfares, lack of off street parking, blight and obsolescence, have encourage decentralization and brought about economic decline” (Russell Mullgardt Schwarz Van Hoefen, 1953: 5).

By the end of the 1950s, the number of business establishments in St. Louis County increased to almost parallel of those in the city, leading the city in both retail and service sector establishments. The movement of new businesses and relocated businesses from St. Louis City to St. Louis County continued through the 1960s, with the county the “fastest growing” area for expansions, relocations and new plants in 1967 and 1968 (Koepke and Weidemann, 1971: 10). For the city particularly, the trend of business expansion was “downward” (Koepke and Weidemann, 1971: 16) despite a number of tools available to encourage business redevelopment. These included federally sponsored Land Clearance for Redevelopment (LCRA) funds beginning in 1951, Chapter 353 blighting abilities in 1955 and the bonding authority through the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (PIEA) authorized in 1969. Also holding back industrial relocation in the city was the lack of availability of industrial land. Even with the tools of redevelopment and eminent domain, accumulation of industrial parcels and rezoning of formerly residential land to commercial and industrial land was difficult “recognizing both political and economic realities”; by 1970, even with the availability of cleared land in the new industrial district in the Mill Creek and Kosciusko area, the largest tract of industrial land was only 100 acres (Landsdorf, 1975: 5). While the city adopted a land banking policy through its Land Reutilization Authorities (Team Four, 1975a), a more explicit form of this policy ran up against political opposition following a highly unpopular 1974 citywide comprehensive plan.
Manufacturing continued to decline in the city, with the city losing 55,000 manufacturing jobs in the 1960s and another 27,000 in the 1970s; the percentage loss was more than double the percentage loss of total jobs in the city. Hurting the city’s ability to attract and retain businesses was an increasing perception on the part of manufacturers of the city’s inhospitable business environment. A 1975 study commissioned by the Regional Commerce and Growth Association (RCGA) found that many manufacturers in the city cited crime, urban decay and the city’s political condition and tax system as major concerns impacting their business (Taylor, 1975: 24). Such a perception also impacted the customer base for the downtown’s office and retail district, which significantly shifted to the suburbs by 1980. Between 1960 and 1976, development of commercial office space in Clayton rivaled the development of space in downtown St. Louis (Cretin, 1976: 33); a second boom in the early 1980s continued to draw tenants from downtown’s older building stock (Prost, 1982a: 3E). By 1982, even as several new Class A office buildings came on line downtown, city planners were publicly questioning whether the area could absorb significant amounts of additional office space (Community Development Agency, 1982: 37). Downtown’s historic role as the region’s retail district was threatened by the introduction of new shopping malls in the suburbs. An attempt to draw customers back to downtown with the 1985 St. Louis Centre project had initial successes, but by the early 1990s, the project was considered a failure.

Increasingly the economic future of the downtown area has been seen in tourism and entertainment. Recognized first by Mayor John Poelker (1973-1977), this emphasis led to successful redevelopments of Laclede’s Landing in the 1970s, Union Station in 1985 and, more recently, the new football stadium and convention center expansion. In
the period of downtown development analyzed here, continued expansion of this sector has included a new convention hotel adjacent to the convention center and a new baseball stadium. Despite these optimistic signs, in overall economic terms St. Louis city’s junior economic status is largely set. Business figures for the year 2000 show that the city continues to decline in all categories, with numbers of businesses stable in St. Louis County and increasing in St. Charles County.

Shifts in the Development Community: Banking and Residential Developers

A subset of economic changes impacting urban development has been sectoral change in both the local banking community and in the homebuilding industry. Consolidation and concentration of the local bank and savings and loan industry occurred throughout the 1990s, driven by bank crises, particularly in the savings and loan (S&L) industry in the late 1980s, and federal and state deregulation in the banking industry that allowed for greater out-of-state ownership. The impact of the former on local institutions hit a number of ways, from reduced bank profits and cost-cutting measures to closure of some banks by federal regulators (“Junk Bonds to Fuel S&L Bailout Debate,” 1989: 7; Gallagher, 1989: 14A; Gallagher and Carey, 1990: 1A).

Bank failures, combined with a more general economic depression in the early 1990s, reduced the availability of real estate capital, restricting the opportunities of real estate investors and developers (“Banking on Banks,” 1991: 4A; Donaldson, 1991: 8A). All in all, a dozen local S & Ls shut their doors between 1991 and 1993 (Gallagher, 1993: 1E). At the same time, bankers were advocating for deregulation of the industry that would allow for greater consolidation (Dubinsky, 1993: 47A); deregulation prompted a wave of consolidations in the industry (Lerner, 1993: 27; Gallagher, 1993: 1E). Federal
regulation of banks meant that local banks like Boatmen’s Bank and Mercantile Bank, which had been actively acquiring local banks throughout the first part of the 1990s, were candidates for purchase by out-of-state competitors (Banstetter, 1994: 1). NationsBank bought out Boatmen’s in September of 1996, which in turn merged with Bank of America in May of 1998. Mercantile purchased Mark Twain and Roosevelt, two well-known local banks, in January of 1997 and was in turn purchased by Firstar in May of 1999.

Bank consolidation dramatically reduced the number of medium banks in the St. Louis area and dramatically increased the share of business done by the top two banks in the region, Firstar and Bank of America (Gallagher, 2000: E1). Changes in the ownership of local banks reduced the long-term presence of some banks in city neighborhoods (Manning, 1997: 1). As significantly, bank mergers changed the culture of how the institutions and their officers related to the local community. Anecdotally, there is the comment that real estate lending lost its personal touch (Desloge, 1992: 45; Gallagher, 1998: A1); the importance of personal connections between bankers and their local customers declined as national companies standardized their lending products and policies. Buyouts also changed the personal relationships between bankers and the not-for-profits that depended upon their support (Tucci, 1996: 1); while the mergers were generally followed by announcements that the institutions would continue their charitable reinvestments in the area, over time the region lost a sector of middle tier managers and corporate leaders who could commit corporate resources to regional initiatives.

Like the banking industry, the local real estate industry had its share of mergers, mostly in the commercial and industrial building market (Prost, 1998d: 35). In general,
the industry remained dominated by local companies (Lerner, 1994: 1; McLaughlin, 1997b: 12A), even as some of the older, family-owned businesses were sold. The location of residential construction activity has mirrored population shifts in the region; by 1997, St. Charles County led the region with total number of building permits issues (Lenny, 1997: 12A); the level of construction doubled the population of such areas as O’Fallon, MO, over 1990 levels (Reel, 1998: 1). Throughout the 1990s, the City of St. Louis has generally been at the bottom of the list in terms of building permits issued (Kohler, 1999: 1). While increased redevelopment activity in the city and growth restrictions enacted in some of the outlying counties have equalized these numbers, much of the housing redevelopment completed in the City of St. Louis has been done by smaller developers, including Pyramid Development, a mostly south-side developer which built a number of new infill houses in the city in the late 1990s. The fact that most new construction is in-fill construction—with construction limited in scale according to the availability of vacant lots—has generally discouraged the participation of large homebuilders, although there have been recent exceptions (Editorial, 2002: B8). Another exception to this rule has been the local presence of McCormick-Baron-Salazar, a national builder of affordable housing communities headquartered in St. Louis that has played a significant role in a number of public housing reconversion projects and other affordable housing developments.

**Federal Policy and the Cities**

The economic problems of cities did not happen in a vacuum, but have been intertwined with the policy initiatives of states and the federal government. Federal policy since World War II have both benefited and hampered city revitalization efforts.
The postwar intrusion of the federal government particularly in urban areas represented a break in the nation’s 150-year history. Never directly addressed by the constitution or constitutional framers, most American cities were founded and developed in the earlier traditions of villages and townships. Because the federal government generally ignored them, state-level government more directly impacted 19th century cities. Additionally, even though early federal policy included internal improvements, Congress declined to pursue federal expenditure policies aggressively oriented towards infrastructure development, seeing it as an improper use of federal power. Both the control of localities and the pursuit of internal improvement policies were policies better left to the states. As entities chartered by states, American cities operated within the constraints of their state legislatures and state constitutions, which affected their ability to expand their political, taxing, and budgeting power (Sbragia, 1996).

Until the Great Depression, the federal government had little direct impact as cities, with a couple of exceptions. General relief offered by the Roosevelt administration during the Great Depression first brought federal aid into urban areas; in St. Louis, Mayor Bernard Dickmann (1933-1941) used this revenue as new source of political patronage and municipal services, matching $12 million in local funds with over $50 million in federal funds (Primm, 1990: 471). In this sense, postwar federal urban renewal policy represented a shift in federal policy in tenor and level of involvement. What is generally regarded as federal urban renewal legislation began with the Public Housing Act of 1937. Among other things, the Act authorized the US Housing Administration to provide up to $800 million in long-term, low-interest loans to local public housing agencies to clear so-called “blighted areas” and construct low-income
housing (United State Congress, 1937). Following World War II, a coalition of mostly northern Democrats and urban Republicans united politically to pass the 1949 Housing Act; this landmark bill empowered a new federal agency to assist in slum removal, authorize write-down subsidies in clearing and assembling urban renewal sites, and set up a $1.5 billion revolving loan fund for the production of housing units (United States Congress, 1949).

“Slum clearance and economic redevelopment were good politics” (Judd and Swanstrom, 1994: 138), and most American mayors in the immediate post-war period seized upon these new mechanisms to expand revitalization of core areas of their cities. The control of mayors over these new funds was heightened by the pattern of their implementation. Under the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, the Public Works Administration initially planned to own and operate federally owned housing. However, court rulings prohibited federal administrators from using eminent domain, and, instead, the federal government adopted the procedure of granting control of the location and development of urban renewal projects to local authorities (Robertson and Judd, 1989: 304). This “policy of remote control” meant that

“the federal government provides some powerful tools, and designed them to achieve political as well as economic change at the local level, but in the final analysis local actors were the ones who put these tools to use. Their distinctive concerns and interests had considerable impact on the shape and effect of these programs” (Mollenkopf, 1983: 139-140).

From Urban Renewal to War on Poverty

Urban renewal instituted a powerful set of local coalitions that planned and implemented major redevelopment projects. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this coalition in St. Louis included Mayor Raymond Tucker (1953-1965) and members of the
city’s business elite. Tucker and his allies cleared blighted residential districts, built
public housing and made improvements to the infrastructure of the city. Even as mayors
publicly lauded urban renewal, it could also be controversial, as Tucker’s defeat in 1965
illustrates. Through massive displacement and disruption of urban neighborhoods, urban
renewal could create enough enemies to bring the process to a halt and threaten the
political career of its proponents.

By the middle 1960s, urban renewal nationally was buffeted by the criticisms of
scholars and community activists alike, and then modified by a new set of policy
initiatives. This “War on Poverty” approach emphasized social reconstruction and
human services alongside a more humane form of physical revitalization—smaller scale,
more in-fill type projects (Johnson, 1964: n.p.). Prompted by the enormous political
capital available after the assassination of President Kennedy, these initiatives built upon
public dissatisfaction with urban renewal. Democratic officials responsible for fleshing
out the initiatives saw the requirement of “maximum feasible participation” as an
opportunity to initiate a new relationship between the federal government and community
residents and the non-profit organizations that served them (Piven and Cloward, 1993:
271). This control even initially bypassed local mayors and the local organizations that
dominated urban renewal.

In St. Louis, War on Poverty priorities initiated the establishment of the Human
Development Corporation in 1964 to coordinate activities. Even when mayors regained
control of War on Poverty spending in 1967, the newly created agency remained active
and vital in St. Louis politics. HDC and other Model City agencies became an
opportunity for employment of St. Louis’ African American middle class and a political
base of support for black political leadership (Stein, 2002: 142). Additionally, these new organizations remained institutionally segregated from the mainstream development functions within St. Louis’ government (Kerstein and Judd, 1980: 211). In this sense, the War on Poverty increased the profusion of separate agencies operating in St. Louis.

**Nixon and New Federalism**

It was in part this multiplicity of institutions—and their implicit challenge to an executive-driven development policy—that prompted urban mayors to support “New Federalist” proposals advanced by President Richard Nixon in 1974 (Wong and Petersen, 1986). Nixon’s New Federalism proposals combined greater programmatic authority over federal funding for city leaders while increasingly the level of federal support. In doing so, Nixon’s policies split the Democratic Party, with big city mayors in favor of them and social liberals in the party concerned that the shift to local control would jeopardize program priorities (Judd and Swanstrom, 1998: 225). In 1972, Nixon succeeded in implementing revenue-sharing programs for states and local governments, distributing millions to local areas with few strings attached, with the largest cities using the funds to cover ordinary city expenses. Two years later, the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 continued the trend towards programmatic devolution to the local leaders. Among other things, the act consolidated the federal categorical grants of urban renewal and the War on Poverty that cities could use broadly to spur urban development. Previous federal urban policy fostered the development of sub-recipient organizations to carry out programmatic goals; by contrast, under CDBG, funds were provided directly to city administrators who could contract with other agencies to carry out redevelopment activities. The level of CDBG funding to specific
cities depended upon the level of that city’s economic distress; CDBG required each city to submit an annual plan indicating how funds would be used to benefit low and moderate residents.

CDBG funding provided new opportunities for local leaders, including an increased pool to carry out development initiatives. Allocations of CDBG in St. Louis City increased dramatically throughout the 1970s—from $15 million in the first year of the program in 1974 to a high of $34 million in 1980.

[Insert Table 4 here.]

With increased funding and program flexibility, the initiation of New Federalism provided local leaders three key political opportunities. First, the development of this new system reshuffled the development decision-making process, with a specific goal of providing local mayors greater control over the disparate federally funded redevelopment activities (Wong and Peterson, 1986: 304; Dommel and Associates, 1982: 226). Increased local discretion brought new participants in the development process, and left it up to local mayors to manage new political pressures. Secondly, CDBG continued the general shift of redevelopment into a broader set of development activities, not just physical revitalization but also human services, community planning, and even such “routine” maintenance issues such as street repair and tree planting—infrastructure needs usually paid out of general revenue funds (Dommel and Associates, 1982: 235).

Third, although federal regulations mandated that some of the CDBG funds benefit low and moderate-income residents, this became more of a target that absolute standard. The new funds became an irresistible pot of money for local leaders across the city coping with new demands at a time of continuing population loss and economic
decline. CDBG’s flexible approaches allowed political leaders to shift local priorities to
development projects that enhanced the local tax base and generated additional revenues

**Federal Retrenchment under Reagan**

As will be detailed in Chapter 3, CDBG brought in a new period of development
politics in St. Louis, with struggles between Mayor James Conway (1977-1981) and the
Board of Aldermen over allocation of the funds. The CDBG allocation to the city
reached a high of $38 million during the first year of Vincent Schoemehl Jr.’s mayoralty
(1981-1993) and that of President Ronald Reagan’s administration, an unfortunate
occurrence for the ambitions of a young, energetic mayor who wanted to carry out
revitalization activities. After over 30 years of increasing federal support to cities,
President Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 with a determination to cut
discretionary domestic spending. Supporting this was a 1979 commission that suggested
that “it may be in the best interest of the nation to commit itself to the promotion of
locally neutral economic and political policies rather than spatially sensitive urban
policies that either explicitly and inadvertently seek to preserve cities in their historical
roles” (Presidential Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties, 1980: 2).

Reagan saw his policies as a continuation of the federal devolution that began
under Nixon’s New Federalism—with consolidation of urban-focused programs and
reduction in federal expenditures as a principal goal. Urban-oriented block grant
programs were particularly visible targets for administration reformers. This budget-
cutting philosophy meant that, by the end of the 1980s, most urban-oriented programs
were either eliminated or reduced. The only existing urban program that survived the
Reagan Administration was the CDBG program. The amount of CDBG funds was reduced in half between 1980 and 1990 (Judd and Swanstrom, 1998: 239). Other urban-oriented program, like Aid to Families with Dependent Children and the Food Stamps, also faced cuts through the 1980s, reflecting Reagan’s view that such programs promoted government dependency. The Reagan Administration budgets also sharply reduced public housing funds, both in terms of traditional public housing units and support for the Section 8 housing voucher program that was implemented in 1974. Reagan’s 1981 budget, adopted by Congress in a budget “coup” for the administration, reduced expenditures for Section 8 and public housing to almost half that of the previous year (Hays, 1995:235).

Ultimately, administration changes led cities to replace federal funds with local revenue sources, worsening budget crises and leading to reductions in programs and services (Palmer and Sawhill, 1986: 218). Compounding the program cuts were the impacts of the administration’s tax policies. Tax reforms in 1981 reduced individual and business tax levels, increased federal budget deficits, and spurred administration officials to propose additional budget cuts. Further tax changes in 1986 had the impact of reducing state and local tax rates as most states followed the federal lead and reduced tax rates as well. Legislation in 1986 also eliminated the federal historic tax credit, which had allowed investors to claim credits for reinvestment in older, historic properties, many of which were located in urban areas.

**Continuity in Urban Policy Following Reagan**

An additional impact of the Reagan Administration extends to a programmatic initiative that only became implemented in the 1990s—Empowerment Zones and
Enterprise Communities (EZ/ECs). A policy borrowed from England, EZ/ECs fit the
Administration’s emphasis on the role of the private sector in providing market solutions
to problems of urban poverty and unemployment. The goal of the policy was to provide
target tax credits and relief policies to businesses that located in distressed communities
in an environment of decreased regulatory oversight.

In part because of the predominance of Empowerment Zones in both the first
most scholars see these years as a continuation of the Reagan Administration’s emphasis
on federal devolution and program deduction. One enduring legacy of the Reagan years
is how it institutionally and ideologically reoriented the federal government’s role in
urban policy-making.

“A national government that permanently indexes its income tax revenues
will (as indexing proponents predicted) have to struggle to justify each
marginal expansion in federal functions. The restrictiveness of the federal
budget is likely to force state and local governments to retain at least their
present allocation of service and financing responsibilities, and provides a
recurring impetus toward federal devolution” (Palmer and Sawhill, 1986:
258).

The institutional capacity of the federal government to fund a more aggressive urban
policy was furthered reduced after the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Act,
revised in 1990, and budget reforms under the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(OBRA). Gramm-Rudman-Hollings placed a time table for stepped reduction in the
federal budget deficit, with a process for sequestration of spending should goals not be
reached, whereas the 1990 OBRA mandated that future increases in expenditures within
one category would have to be met with reductions in another category (Shuman, 1992:
Such guidelines made a resumption of federal urban policy, at least in terms of federal discretionary spending, unlikely even given a Democratic President in 1992.

Despite a certain consistency in the tenor and impact of federal policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s, some new urban initiatives did emerge. President George H. W. Bush (1989-1993) largely shared Reagan’s view on urban policy. His Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Jack Kemp, championed an overhaul of public housing, including the 1990 Affordable Housing Act, which allowed local housing authorities to demolish public housing complexes and replace them with privately owned units with rent-assistance certificates (Koenig, 1990c: 3A). This program includes the HOPE VI initiative and has provided St. Louis with the ability to demolish most of its publicly owned housing scattered to the north and south of downtown and replace it with privately-managed, market-rate housing projects. The Act also created a new HOME Program, which provided a new block grant for housing development and rehabilitation (Hays, 1995: 256). These HOME funds are restricted in their use towards low and very-low income housing; they have not substituted for CDBG, and their levels have gradually declined.

Bush also oversaw the successful enactment of EZ/EC legislation in the fall of 1992, some nine years after it was first proposed to Congress by Reagan. The bill designated 25 urban and 25 rural enterprise zones to be chosen on the basis of a competitive application process and allocated additional funding to finance “weed and seed” programs. Clinton renewed the enterprise zone legislation in the 1993 budget reconciliation act, adding to the zone incentives an additional $100 million of grants that could be the zones for a wide range of development options and services.
reauthorized the EZ program in 1996 legislation allowing for the designation of second round of zone communities, but the impact of the designation was muted after a Republican-controlled Congress failed to appropriate the additional spending for the winning communities. Included in that second round was the City of St. Louis, in partnership with East St. Louis and St. Louis County; following the designation, the three political jurisdictions founded a new organization, the Greater St. Louis Empowerment Zone, to oversee implementation of the region’s EZ initiative.

**Clinton and Empowerment Zones**

Contributing to continuity in urban policy after 1992 was the nature of Clinton’s governing coalition. A southern governor, Clinton won the presidency as a moderate Democrat, and generally governed the country from the center. Clinton’s major social policy initiatives emphasized more a traditional states-perspective on social policy, continuing the trend of downshifting program initiatives to the state level. Clinton’s economic and social advisors shared a “human resource policy perspective,” advocating policy improving the ability of Americans, including poor Americans, to compete in an increasingly global economy (Hays, 1995: 266). In budgetary terms, this meant funds for workforce development as opposed to the physical development projects of past approaches. Most significantly, Clinton fulfilled a campaign to “end welfare as we know it,” ending Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and replacing it with a state-level block grant with greater programmatic flexibility in designing and implementing policy.

In this sense, and despite the magnitude of Clinton’s support from urban voters, traditionally Democratic calls for renewed support for public housing and a return to an
aggressive urban policy did not fit the policy imperatives of the new Democratic president. By contrast, Clinton’s urban policy explicitly recognized the importance of private capital in the rebuilding of inner-city areas and philosophically asserted the importance of local communities in developing the sort of partnership in order to encourage private investment (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1995: 5). The New Markets Initiative, the last major policy initiative undertaken by the Clinton Administration, typifies this approach, emphasizing tax credits in order to encourage commerce and retail development in distressed communities (Associated Press, 2000: A7). Additionally, Clinton’s budgetary approaches emphasized funds for increased training and workforce development, as well as federal funding for public safety under a local law enforcement block grant; however, in most cities, CDBG continued to decline.

State Policy and St. Louis: Home Rule as Limitations and Opportunities

Clinton’s experience as a governor gave him some experience with the traditional view of American states as important intermediaries in American federalism and as potential sources for policy experimentation. In historical terms, state governments outweigh the influence of the federal government in terms of their impact on cities. The double layer of federal relations—states within the federal union, with powers specifically sorted between the two in the Constitution—also contributed to an uniquely American institutional preference against the activism of the state in the economy, including the economy of the city, that typifies the federal intrusion of the New Deal period.

“By fragmenting political conflict, the Constitution channeled state activism away from the regulation of property and toward the promotion
of private economic development. It did so by creating the world’s largest ‘free trade’ zone. The states could not prevent businesses from entering or leaving their borders. Nor did states have much latitude to enact legislation favoring in-state enterprises, in contrast to the national government’s powers even in small states (Robertson and Judd, 1989: 31).”

In this framework, with states possessing the primary need to promote economic development, a state’s willingness to promote locally based incentives will vary across time and across the nation. While state have had historically anti-urban biases, this does not negate the fact that periodically state governments have provided opportunities as well as constraints for local leaders to pursue redevelopment.

Historically, the relationship between cities and their state governments is articulated through Dillon’s Law.

“the power of the state legislature over local governments is plenary or absolute. The legislature has the power to create and to destroy them and to specify the powers and functions which they—or even must—exercise (Heeter and Mandelker, 1967: 1).”

This control emerged gradually in the 19th century as states confronted the often-misguided activism of local governments in financial matters (Sbragia, 1996). In practical terms, Dillon’s Law has meant that the powers of local governments in a whole host of redevelopment issues—from municipal borrowing to tax-increment financing—has been preceded by enabling legislation from the state level. Additionally, state requirements have shaped the political form of local government, specifying the roles and responsibilities of types of local officials and the organization of municipal government.

Secondly, home rule for local governments began as countervailing force against state intrusion in local affairs in the late 19th century. Missouri became the first state to create the opportunity for home rule in 1876 and St. Louis became Missouri’s first home
rule city that year. The line of separation between the local interest and state interest, however, has been drawn differently over time and in different states. The language of the constitution retained to this day places home rule within the context of conformity to the statute constitution and statutes and means that the state government retains control of matters of “high government prerogative” (Schmandt, 1953: 411; Westbrook, 1968: 55). In this sense, cities acting under home rule charter are not considered “sovereignties within sovereignty (Schmandt, 1948: 47), but in real and practical ways find their authority checked in significant ways. For St. Louis, this has meant state political control of significant local matters, including the police and public schools, and, in terms of development policy, that certain local capacities are subject to state authorization and control.

State Actors as Collaborative Partners

The complexities of the home rule relationship between the St. Louis and Missouri state government created both tensions as well as opportunities. Local actors both rail against the strictures of state oversight as well as use state oversight in matters of the “general welfare” as an opportunity to expand local abilities, particularly when local voters have circumscribed their powers (Schmandt, 1948: 97). In this sense, irrespective of the legal and political debates over the scope of state power, the interaction of state actors and local actors has been both competitive as well as collaborative. As a large pool of voters, local areas are an important political constituency, even if the historical legislative malapportionment of cities relegates urban priorities to the back burner.
One way this political calculation has worked out can be seen in vote totals of Democratic governors of the state, the party label obviously most closely associated with the political tendencies in St. Louis and other metropolitan areas in the state. While St. Louis (city or county) has not had a native son as governor since the 1940s, urban counties have been an important component of the victory of most recent Democratic governors. Mel Carnahan’s 1996 victory came with St. Louis City and County providing 27% of his total votes; in 2000, the city and county provided his successor Bob Holden 28% of his total vote (Secretary of State, 2004). Even though Democratic voters have been a necessary, but not sufficient component of these victories—with both candidates winning some votes out state—St. Louis’ base of Democratic votes provides the city some measure of access to the governor’s office on urban-centered policy initiatives. Additionally, the governor himself and key members of his staff can become personally involved in local development projects. Both of the previous Democratic governors assigned personnel to work in St. Louis and become important allies of the mayor when state support was needed.

The activities of Missouri state agencies in local development issues have increased proportionally with the federal devolution of urban policy and have transformed the traditional role of state government (Dewhirst, 1995: 285). State officials help direct the expenditure of state funds for local economic development activity as well as help direct the governor’s attentions to key projects, influencing the balance of power in project negotiations. In institutional terms, the relevant state department impacting local development is the Department of Economic Development, organized in 1984 as the state’s main entity to assist in job creation and redevelopment
activities in the state. The department provides grant and tax credit funds that can be important components of housing redevelopment schemes, including the Distressed Communities tax credit. The department’s St. Louis office has staff that works with local political leadership—primarily the mayor and his staff—to pinpoint redevelopment funds and assist in redevelopment projects. The state’s Department of Natural Resources also plays a role by virtue of its implementation of the state Historic Tax Credit program. The Missouri Department of Transportation also plays a significant role in regional development issues by funding for new roadways or improvements to the existing infrastructure. Also significant for redevelopment issues in St. Louis are a series of additional state boards and commissions that have regulatory control over funds, tax credits, and bonding issues. The Missouri Housing Commission, an independent body with a governing board appointed by the governor, manages the state’s share of the Federal Low-Income Tax Credit program, used by local developers to create affordable, rental housing. The Housing Commission has staff in St. Louis that promotes the department’s programs and helps applicant agencies in preparing applications and requests for funds. Additionally, the Missouri Finance Board has the ability to issue bonds that can be used to finance commercial development projects; an appointed commission approves projects upon recognition by a professional staff.

State-Sanctioned Development Tools

In some respects, state support for local development mirrors the changing nature of federal development support—from targeted discretionary spending programs to investment incentive initiatives. State tax incentives programs promote the economic considerations of the deal as much as the deal’s political importance, making private
economic actors even more important in planning and completing projects. At the most common level, state statute generally describes the basic power of local municipalities to control local economic growth through planning and zoning (Heeter and Mandelker, 1967: 1). In addition, state statute also mandates powers that have become an influential part of local control over development initiatives. These include the powers of blighting and eminent domain, the ability to create development related districts and authorities, and tax incentive powers under Tax Increment Financing (TIF) legislation and state historic tax credits. Typically, these tools do little to enhance the state’s ability to shape growth; rather, they place tools in the hands of local governments to pursue it.

Perhaps the most common development program sanctioned through state law is the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law (Missouri Revised Statute Chapter 99.230), commonly referred to as Chapter 99. First enacted in 1951, the law allowed certain Missouri communities, including the City of St. Louis, to create Land Clearance for Authorities (LCRAs) to declare property blighted, take property through eminent domain, and provide incentives, including bonding, to finance the redevelopment of the property. More commonly over time, the law allows the authority to enter into a contract with a redeveloper and pass certain of the incentives on to the developer. Since its introduction, Chapter 99 redevelopers have become the most common development tool used in local development matters, although the number of redevelopment plans accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s. The power of the redevelopment law can only be exercised after a finding by the LCRA body, ratified through the city’s legislative body; additionally, the law lays out a series of public meetings and procedural sequences prior to the approval of the redevelopment plan (Heeter and Mandelker, 1967: 61-2). However, increasingly,
Chapter 99 designation is a matter of procedure rather a substantive process, and controversy over its use, including eminent domain, is infrequent.

A related tool lies in the Urban Redevelopment Corporations Act (Revised Missouri Statute Chapter 353.010), available to Missouri home rule cities with a population greater than 350,000—St. Louis City primarily. Commonly referred to as Chapter 353, the Act was first authorized in 1943 and 1945, with local authorizing legislation in 1959 setting up the local administrative requirements to administer the law. Essentially, the act builds upon Chapter 99 authority by allowing qualified redevelopers—also known as urban redevelopment corporations—to borrow the power of eminent domain from the local authority; additionally, the redevelopment corporations can receive tax abatement of varying levels for up to 25 years as an incentive for redevelopment of the property (Community Development Agency, 1976: 1). Like Chapter 99 redevelopment, Chapter 353 comes with a sequence of procedures, including public notification, study by city planning and approval before the Board of Aldermen. While some controversy exists over its use (Johnson, 1990: 16), Chapter 353 designations have become increasingly habitual over time, including the practice of “spot-blighting” to provide individual homeowners tax abatement for their renovation and redevelopment activities.

Additional state-level tools include the Planned Industrial Expansion Act (Revised Missouri Statute 100.300), authorized in 1967 to provide local communities the authority to offer bonds to finance industrial development, and the associated Industrial Development Authority Act. State law also directs the ability of local communities to set up neighborhood improvement districts (Revised Missouri Statute 67.453), community
improvement districts (Revised Missouri Statute 67.1401) and other special taxing bodies, including tax increment financing (TIF) districts as enabled through the 1982 Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act (Revised Missouri Statute 99.800). The Act allows local government to set up TIF districts as an incentive for redevelopment projects in blighted areas. The district allows local government, and by proxy a private developer, to recapture some portion of future increased tax revenue to fund redevelopment (Casella, 1985: 1). Typically, the degree of this recapture is calculated in advance and used to float bonds covering a portion of the redevelopment costs. Like other incentive projects, TIF projects require an extensive procedure of public meetings, planning studies, and local government action. While TIFs are common in commercial retail projects—where increases in property and sales tax receipts can provide a hefty incentive—their use has become routine in certain urban residential projects, primarily downtown loft conversions.

While direct development expenditures are rare from the state level—excepting, of course, expenditures as a part of the annual budget—the state does provide a series of development-related incentives. Budgetary pressures over the last five years have largely reduced grant programs; as a consequence, the majority of these are credit programs that leverage private investment into projects by providing state tax relief. Most significant to St. Louis has been the creation of the Missouri Historic Tax Program in 1997 (Revised Missouri Statute 253.545). The credits give for profit developers a 25% state tax credit on eligible redevelopment costs on historic residential or commercial properties. Authorization of the credit followed an extensive campaign by historic preservationists and local development advocates, in part using the example of the renovation boom that
followed the enactment of a similar federal tax credit in the 1980s; the elimination of the credit in 1986 was also credited locally for stymieing redevelopment in a number of the city’s historic neighborhoods (Freeman, 1997: 1B). Another feature of the credit is its ability to be transferred, thus allowing developers to bring additional equity into the project on the construction side. While the credit brings an additional requirement, following historic preservation guidelines in the renovation of the property, its enactment has been a major boom for development in the downtown area.

The success of the historic tax credit encouraged an additional campaign to create broader tax credit eligibility to all residential redevelopment work within distressed communities. That campaign led in 1999 to the creation of the Neighborhood Preservation Act (Revised Missouri Statute 135.478). The enabling legislation created a series of levels of tax credits applicable to both renovation of existing structures and construction of new residential buildings in qualified census tracts and communities. In contrast to the historic tax credits, the legislation capped the total amount of credit available, leading state officials to create a lottery system for awarding the credits, somewhat limiting their predictability and effectiveness in development initiatives.

**Summary**

Broader political and economic trends have represented both opportunities and constraints for local leaders as they have pursued redevelopment issues. The federal policy has evolved from the emphasis on physical reconstruction under the urban renewal period, human and social programming under the War on Poverty, local flexibility in community block grants, and the devolution and diminution of federal policy in more recent years. State policy has not matched the loss of federal funding and furthered an
emphasis upon market-based incentives, as opposed to open-ended grant funding. The characteristics of these incentives emphasize the capacity of local leaders and local institutions to develop partnership with private sector developers at a time when regional economic pressures place inner-city housing and development markets at a competitive disadvantage as compared to green-field developments in rapidly growing, ex-urban communities.

In St. Louis, the general impact of these trends has heightened the reliance upon private market forces for both the financing of particular projects and for leadership in planning and implementing projects. At the same time, public leaders operate in the context of a legacy of past initiatives that continue to impact development options in the contemporary period. The next chapter in the study reviews the legacy of past development initiatives, emphasizing the urban renewal period in the 1950s, the period of New Federalism in the 1970s and the local development initiatives in the period following Reagan’s retrenchment of federal urban policy in the 1980s and 1990s.
Chapter 3: St. Louis and Urban Regimes

While the nature of St. Louis’ problems may have deepened in the 1990s, the city’s economic distress and population loss are not new predicaments for city leadership. Nor is the current emphasis on revitalization a new phenomenon either. At several critical points since the 1940s, St. Louis leaders have organized local campaigns for urban revitalization. These campaigns included massive demolition, construction of public housing and urban renewal, initiatives to attract and retain new businesses, and endeavors to stabilize the housing markets in specific neighborhoods. Viewing these campaigns provides an insight of how political, economic, and social forces have interacted with the work of local public entrepreneurs and local organizations to undertake development initiatives.

St. Louis’ revitalization experience matches that of other cities in that the federal government has been an important component of each revitalization period. In St. Louis’ immediate post-war period, the efforts of Mayor Raymond Tucker (1953-1965) to build a strong public-private coalition around urban renewal replicate those of other mayors at that time. More recently, St. Louis’ Vincent Schoemehl (1981-1993) is often included in a list of “messiah mayors” (Teaford, 1990: 258), attempting revitalization in the era of the “New Federalism,” a time of greater local discretion over a shrinking pot of federal aid. However, the characteristics of redevelopment—the projects have been implemented and the nature of the coalition promoting them—have been the product of local factors. What is unique about the St. Louis’ experience is how local leaders have responded to these opportunities and challenges. Over time, these experiences add up to a pattern of
development politics that shapes how contemporary civic actors pursue revitalization initiatives.

The thesis of this chapter is that past revitalization initiatives continue to shape contemporary redevelopment activities, both in the formal in organizations and institutions formed as a part of the redevelopment process, as well as a general culture of decision-making that emphasizes the participation of particular actors and the roles that they play. Additionally, these past experiences also demonstrate the degree of interaction between the city’s political structure and economic elite, directly addressing the question of whether St. Louis has a political regime. First developed by Clarence Stone (1989) in his study of post-war Atlanta, regime theory remains the principal focus through which scholars, and the lay public in some sense, has treated urban development, describing how public and private actors cooperate to govern cities and foster economic development. In this framework, development decision-making rests upon the important contributions of both elected politicians and the local business elite. Regimes are the persistent and lasting interactions of these two groups within specific cities. Over time—as their characteristics become more institutionalized—regimes continue because they provide a system for incentives for local actors to collaborate and to withstand political and economic challenges, including changes in the intergovernmental funding environment, local electoral change and the upturns and downturns in local economies.

Regime theory suggests the importance for a lasting public-private partnership as a precondition for urban revitalization. In this initial exploration of St. Louis’ past attempts at revitalization, the presence of a number of key factors should demonstrate the existence of a St. Louis regime. First is the existence of a strong and consolidated
organization, like Atlanta’s CAP, founded and supported by local corporations to help channel corporate support into local initiatives. St. Louis has a seemingly similar organization to CAP, Civic Progress, founded in 1952 and made up of the presidents and chief executive officers of the region’s largest corporations. In terms of political leadership, redevelopment activities promoted the role of the mayor as the chief executive of the city and as the individual responsible for coordinating interactions between public leaders and private businessmen. Additionally, a St. Louis regime should be marked by an active, engaged and lasting collaboration between corporate leadership through their organization and the political leadership of the city. This should be seen both in degree of cooperation and interaction between political leadership and the corporate leaders, as well as the development of specific organizations and initiatives by which this interaction is institutionalized. Over time, this collaborative should have an additive effect. In Atlanta, for example, the interaction between CAP and Atlanta’s political leadership has become increasingly ingrained in the city’s local political culture, and successive initiatives have built upon, rather than replaced, this essential feature of Atlanta politics.

To complete this review of St. Louis’ development history, as well as provide an initial test of some of concepts of how development policy emerges, this chapter will review two previous periods of local revitalization activity. The first is St. Louis’ urban renewal period under Mayor Tucker, a period when local officials responded to the opportunity provided by the federal aid to promote urban revitalization. This period seemingly represents the clearest example of a St. Louis regime—with Tucker promoting the participation of a newly formed Civic Progress in a number of development projects
in the downtown and near downtown. The participation of Civic Progress members and other civic leaders extended beyond urban development into a series of attempted reforms of the city’s political structure, as well as support of Tucker’s electoral campaigns.

The second period is the period of New Federalism, from the middle 1970s until the late 1980s, under Mayor John Poelker (1973-1977) and Mayor James Conway (1977-1981), as well as the first years of Mayor Vincent C. Schoemehl Jr. (1981-1993). The period represents a time of challenge for St. Louis—with rapid population loss across both decades and the political challenges of an increasingly racially diverse and poor population. Additionally, the period is defined by another radical shift in the federal relationship towards cities, with the development of the block grant program to provide greater control to mayors and then a decline in federal aid to cities under Reagan.

**Tucker as the Urban Renewal Mayor.**

Of all of St. Louis’ post-war mayors, Raymond Tucker was perhaps in the best position to create what would be recognizable as an urban regime. His personality and previous experience working with business elite to eliminate the smoke that dominated the St. Louis skyline contributed to an ability to develop close relationships with local business people and organizations (Tucker, nd). Tucker’s pre-mayoral career included a stint as Mayor Dickmann’s chief of staff, the city’s Smoke Commissioner until 1945, and until 1953 a professor of engineering at Washington University. Even during this interregnum, Tucker remained connected to St. Louis politics, chairing a committee set up by Mayor Joseph Darst (1949-1953) to propose reforms in St. Louis’ municipal charter (Stein, 2002: 103). When Darst declined to run for reelection in 1953, Tucker
announced his candidacy, and won the first of his three terms in a close race against a seasoned local politician.

Tucker’s platform in the 1953 election supported the recently formed Civic Progress group (“Tucker Calls for Aid of Citizens to Improve City,” 1953: 3A) and a 10-point plan of urban redevelopment and slum clearance (“Raymond R. Tucker, Candidate, Offers 10-Point Plan,” 1953: 3A). Civic Progress had formed following the visit by of 8 local businessmen to Pittsburgh in 1952 to investigate the work of a similar organization—the Allegheny Conference for Community Development. These organizing members represented the highest level of St. Louis’ corporate and civic community, including the former Republican mayor of St. Louis Aloys Kaufmann, Arthur Blumeyer, chairman of the St. Louis Housing Authority, David Calhoun, president of the St. Louis Union Trust Company and Wesley McAffee, president of Union Electric. As all new members were recommended by the existing membership, it became a prestige appointment for those selected. Members were required to actively participate in the group’s monthly meetings held downtown and to commit their personal and corporate funds to Civic Progress sponsored campaigns.

Mayor Darst used Civic Progress to staff his Citizen’s Finance Committee—which in January of 1953 recommended changes in the city’s political and financial structure—and after his election in 1953, Tucker strengthened the relationship between Civic Progress and the mayor’s office. Tucker became an ex-officio member of the organization and attended Civic Progress meetings to promote his civic initiatives. The meetings were held in the mayor’s office, with Tucker’s staff prepared and managing the
organization’s agenda. Civic Progress members quickly organized and assisted Tucker’s success on two fronts—shepherding successful public passage of the Plaza Bond Funds in September of 1953 and the Earnings Tax Funds in 1954. The first provided funds for the Plaza Apartments in downtown St. Louis—a project to be undertaken by the Urban Redevelopment Corporation (URC), founded by Aloys Kaufmann and 21 other prominent business leaders in March of 1950 (‘21 Men Vs. Slums,” 1950: 44).

The Earnings Tax Campaign in 1954 was initiated in order to give the City of St. Louis the ability to levy a permanent earnings tax to fund the city’s general revenue and it proved to be a more complicated campaign. First was the process of overcoming the state legislature’s opposition to the project, followed by a campaign for public approval. The effort included Civic Progress members—whose chair Powell McHaney, president of General American Life, organized the campaign—as well as some of the local unions and community leaders that had opposed Tucker’s election in 1953 (Tucker, nd).

The Plaza Bond campaign was the first in a long line of projects on which Civic Progress worked with Mayor Tucker. Others include the 1955 Bond Campaign, which, when approved by 83% of the city’s voters, authorized $110 million in funds for street and bridge improvements, parks and playgrounds, expressways, and funds for a new Mill Creek Urban Renewal Project (Dunlap, 1955: 1A). Civic Progress also worked closely on the construction of public housing undertaken by the St. Louis Housing Authority and the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA). LCRA’s first commissioner was David Kempland, a downtown real estate agent (“Geo. Kempland is Named to Land

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2Tucker’s mayoral papers held at Washington University in St. Louis, MO, contain minutes of his weekly meetings as a part of Civic Progress and detail his involvement with the organization.
Clearance Post,” 1951: 1A); later appointments would continue the pattern of cooperation and collaboration between the mayor’s office and local civic leadership.

Together, those two agencies planned, applied for funding and implemented St. Louis’ major public housing from the 1950s, including the Darst-Webbe towers on the near-south side of downtown and the Cochran and Pruitt-Igoe Towers on the near-north side of the city. By the time Pruitt-Igoe opened in 1957, St. Louis’ urban renewal agencies spent over $80 million dollars, creating a total of 6,000 new public housing units (Primm, 1990: 489). Civic Progress members also worked with Tucker and St. Louis’ urban renewal agencies on the city’s Mill Creek project, a major industrial and residential project on the western edge of downtown.

**Evaluating St. Louis Urban Renewal Experience as a Regime**

From the viewpoint of almost 50 years, and with the retrospective knowledge of some of the long-term, detrimental effects of urban renewal, it is tempting to label the public-private cooperation fostered by Raymond Tucker as an urban regime. These activities combined the efforts of an energetic mayor with a newly established business group to conduct major redevelopment of the city. As an organization of civic leaders, Civic Progress was essential to the period. Members lobbied for state highway construction, paid for studies on downtown development, sponsored the formation of numerous community initiatives, as well as directly leveraging their personal and corporate wealth into projects. In later years, Civic Progress members discussed race relations, participated in city/county merger talks, and supported reform slates for the St. Louis School Board.
However, closer examination of economic development decision-making suggests a hazier pattern. The story of the Plaza Apartments, a project designed to infuse the downtown with new middle class families, is illustrative of the sort of constraints facing St. Louis’ urban renewal actors. The September of 1953 Plaza Bonds Campaign was the second attempt to get public approval for the project. Yet, even with those funds and an additional $4.1 million provided by the federal government (Tucker, 1954), the project lagged. LCRA’s executive director, Charles Farris, at first a strong supporter of the project, later switched positions, distancing himself and soliciting additional developers for the project (Gardner, 1956: np). Failure by the city comptroller—an independently city-wide elected official—to take up needed expenditure requests also delayed the project; the comptroller also required LCRA to get detailed bids from each city department contributing to the project prior to submitting even a preliminary request for funds (Farris, 1955b: np).

By the fall of 1956, URC’s president Russ Gardner, a downtown real estate lawyer and member of Civic Progress, brought the mayor in to solve the impasse (Gardner, 1956: np), and the mayor held meetings between URC, the Federal Housing Agency and LCRA to speed up the project. However, controversy continued, with the problems leading one nationally known real estate developer to suggest that he take over the Plaza project as a part of the larger Mill Creek project (Tucker, 1957a: np). Part of the difficulty surrounding projects like the Plaza Apartments was the inability of LCRA to foster a cooperative approach to redevelopment, despite its leadership under Charles Farris, a nationally known expert. Tucker later stated that he was not satisfied with the operations of LCRA when he took office (Tucker, nd). After reviewing LCRA files,
Tucker shut down the organization’s operations; federal authorities assisted by suspending all projects in the city and placing LCRA office in receivership (Keith, 1953: np). Farris brought to St. Louis his experience working as a top administrator for the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency, where he helped author many of the urban renewal regulations (Tucker, 1953: np). After accepting the job, Farris became a significant actor in the city’s development strategies, and a key political ally of Tucker. Tucker assisted Farris by asking all of the LCRA board to resign, and then reappointing commissioners who were favorable to moving urban renewal forward, including allies on other civic campaigns and Civic Progress members (Tucker, 1954a: np).

Farris’ difficulties at LCRA demonstrate key factors of St. Louis political system that make consolidated control of development difficult. As noted in the Plaza Apartments discussion, other political leaders independent from Tucker inserted themselves into the project, holding up critical decisions. Bringing all the city agencies together to get the project rolling—including the Streets Department, the Department of Public Safety and others—was part of the “red tape” that hampered Farris autonomy (Farris, 1954b: np). Farris also had to negotiate with the city comptroller to borrow personnel from other departments of the city to work on urban renewal projects (Farris, 1955a: np).

Even within the subset of civic reformers who should have constituted the core of an urban renewal machine, dissension blunted the effectiveness of their activities. Tucker had to address the lack of coordination between the City Plan Commission and LCRA. His intercession led to a series of policy papers between the two organizations (Coibion, 1956: np; Farris, 1956: np), but the agreement was never officially instituted. The St.
Louis Housing Authority also became an independent base of political power over which various political leaders in the city—including Raymond Tucker—struggled for control. Urban renewal proponents deplored the separation of the housing authority from the City Plan Commission and the fact that the commission had to authority to review public housing plans (“What Planning Means,” 1953: 4A). The Housing Authority’s batch of jobs and low-income apartments constituted an irresistible catch for St. Louis ward leaders. Tucker was very concerned with the Authority, receiving reports early in his term of its politicization (Brown, 1956: np) and its inability to work with other city agencies (Tucker, 1954b: np). Initial plans were for Farris to become the executive director of both LCRA and the Housing Authority; however, merger of the two organizations was delayed until later in 1955. Tucker indicated in later years how, after the transfer of power, some commissioners tried to influence Farris’ operations with political considerations (Tucker, nd) and Farris attempted to stamp out political activity among Housing Authority employees.

**Tucker and the Politicians**

Most significant for the urban renewal period was the activity of the locally elected city aldermen and ward committeemen. Tucker strongly believed that as mayor he represented the best interests of all city residents, a theme he stressed during his campaigns and in his meetings with Civic Progress members. However, as the costs and casualties of urban renewal emerged—in St. Louis, urban renewal displaced thousands of families and radically changed the face of significant parts of the city’s core—the proponents of urban renewal failed to attract the support of political leaders closest to St. Louis’ neighborhoods. Like most cities at this time, St. Louis had little in the way of
neighborhood improvements besides urban renewal; a small demonstration project in two
city neighborhoods stressed the identification of code violations and provided no funds
for repairs (Division of Building and Inspection, 1957: np).

Urban renewal proponents also seemed unable to establish vehicles that provided
meaningful participation of actors from other levels of the city’s political structure. A
widely publicized post-mortem of a 1948 Redevelopment Bonds Campaign—a campaign
sponsored by the local business and civic leadership—noted that urban renewal stirred a
“silent unorganized opposition” within most of the city’s wards by raising more questions
than advocates of urban renewal could answer (“Slum, Housing Bond Election Urged
After U.S. Funds are Voted,” 1948: 1A). Farris understood the importance of building
civic support for urban renewal, and early in his administration established citizen
committees to assist in the financing and location of new housing projects. While the
commissions included religious leaders, banking officials, real estate agents, members of
the chamber of commerce and officials from the Urban League, League of Women
Voters and the AFL-CIO, it included no representation from other political leaders in the
city (Farris, 1954a: np).

While the participation of aldermen and ward committees was not sought, they
used entrance points in the city’s political structure to affect economic decision-making.
Indicative of this was the federal highway 70 project planned for the north part of the
city. Not only did aldermen block the project in the middle of the 1953 primary
campaign, they continued to stall the project even after the 1955 Bond Campaign
provided $18 million to speed up condemnation of property and construction (Tucker,
1957b: np). In another example, opponents of the Darst-Webbe public housing project
not only enlisted support in the Board of Aldermen, but also among some local leaders in
the Chamber of Commerce. Their campaign forced Tucker to respond to a formal
investigation of the project by the federal Public Housing Agency (Blumeyer, 1954: np).

Ward leaders’ opposition to Tucker hardened when he moved beyond urban
renewal activities and worked to change the structure of the St. Louis political system to
check their authority and consolidate his power. In 1956, Tucker succeeded in initiating
a campaign to rewrite the charter of the City of St. Louis. Leading the campaign for him
was a number of prominent businessmen, civic leaders, and some labor officials. Tucker
and his backers erred politically in their confrontations with local aldermen, including
failing to negotiate with the aldermen on the key point of diminishing the size of the
aldermanic board. By the time the charter amendments were finalized, they were
publicly opposed by a number of powerful local leaders, including A. S. Cervantes, a
south-side alderman would later defeat Tucker in 1965 (“New Charter Campaign
Reaches Climax,” 1957: 1A). The Board of Aldermen also hampered the chances for
passage by scheduling the election during the political “off-season” and creating a budget
problem prior to the vote that forced the mayor to make short-term cutbacks in city
services (Tucker, 1957: np). As a consequence of these machinations, the new charter
got down to massive defeat, with low-income voters and black voters strongly opposing
the changes.

Tucker’s failure at charter reform and the enmity that it caused also created
further difficulties on urban renewal projects. A 1962 bond election to fund further
projects went down to defeat after a lackluster campaign. The bond issue had the formal
endorsement of the Democratic and Republican Parties and even key African American
leaders that were convinced that urban renewal was hostile to their interests. However, campaign organizers failed to provide any funding for ward organization support (Trask, 1962: 1A). Most significantly, in Tucker’s 1965 reelection attempt, the opposition of ward leaders and the mounting criticism of urban renewal projects made for a difficult campaign. Tucker lost the support of wards that had previously supported him and failed to get the endorsement of the party committee from his own ward (“Tucker Likely to Lose Backing of Key Ward,” 1965: 8A). Campaigning for his opponent A. S. Cervantes was a trio of city politicians—including black ward leaders (“The Cervantes Campaign,” 1965: 1B). Unlike some of Tucker’s past opponents, Cervantes ran a credible campaign, including releasing policy statements on development (“Development Co-Ordinator for City Urged by Cervantes,” 1965: 1A) and campaigning against the Mill Creek project as a “wasteland” (“Business Links of Cervantes Cited in Review of His Tax Votes,” 1965: 1A). Even with some predicting that ward endorsements would not matter, Cervantes bested Tucker by over 15,000 votes (Thornton, 1965: 1A).

The experience of Raymond Tucker and Civic Progress shows how local political conditions impact the ability of mayors to independently control development activities. These conditions include the organization of city agencies and the role of aldermen and committeemen in local politics. Finally, St. Louis’ urban renewal experience provides a cautionary note on reading too much power into organizations like Civic Progress. Whatever the aspirations of its founders, it could be argued that, by 1965, Civic Progress was only one part of the city’s redevelopment process. Each of these points become increasingly important for St. Louis as the urban renewal period of the 1950s and 1960s turned into the New Federalism of the 1970s and 1980s, with federal funding for urban
areas initially leveling off and then drastically declining under the Reagan Administration.

**From Urban Renewal to New Federalism in St. Louis**

Raymond Tucker’s defeat in 1965 illustrated the perils implicit in urban development policy-making. Unless considerations were made to include local political leaders in the policy process, urban renewal could create enough enemies to bring the process to a halt and threaten the political career of its proponents. For local leaders in St. Louis, particularly mayors, the emergence of New Federalism would provide three key opportunities. First, the development of this new system reshuffled the development decision-making process, with a specific goal of providing local mayors greater control over the disparate federally funded redevelopment activities. Secondly, CDBG continued the general shift of redevelopment into a broader set of development activities, not just physical revitalization but also human services, community planning, and even such “routine” maintenance issues such as street repair and tree planting—infrastructure needs usually paid out of St. Louis’ general revenue.

Third, although federal regulations mandated that some of all CDBG funds benefit low and moderate-income residents, this became more of a target than an absolute standard. Thus, CDBG became an irresistible pot of funds for local leaders across the city coping with new demands at a time of continuing population loss and economic decline. The perilous economic conditions of St. Louis in the early 1970s assured that the development politics of the period would be contentious. With the loss of many young, middle or working class families to the suburbs, the city retained a residential based that was older, poorer, and more unskilled (City Plan Commission, 1973a: 30).
The city lost 56,800 jobs between 1969 and 1972 (City Plan Commission, 1973a: 89), and lost more than 60,000 housing units between 1950 and the early 1980s (Checkoway, 1985: 244). The changing racial makeup of the city exacerbated the tensions and meant that economic decline of the city impacted different parts of the city differently. Between 1970 and 1980, the mostly black north side of the city lost between 28 and 60 percent of its residents, far higher than the integrated and largely well off central corridor or the mostly white and middle income south side of the city (Checkoway, 1985: 244)

Local Politics under CDBG

By the 1973 mayoral election, the city’s economic decline was foremost in the public mind. Comptroller John Poelker, a protégé of Raymond Tucker and backed by the city’s business leadership, ran for the Democratic nomination on the platform of centralizing the city’s development agencies under a Community Development Agency (CDA) (Meyer, 1973: C1). Typically, funding for revitalization and state legislation guiding redevelopment policy had created a number of active agencies—the Housing Authority, LCRA, the City Plan Commission, the Municipal Business Development Commission, the Land Reutilization Authority, the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority, as well as various human service agencies. The existence of these, in Poelker’s opinion, fragmented the city’s development capacities and weakened the mayor’s ability to respond to the city’s economic decline. By contrast, CDA was to serve as an executive-led agency with the technical ability and, after the 1974 CDBG reforms, the financial control of resources to lead the city’s revitalization activities (Schmandt, Wendel and Tomey, 1983: 50-1).
The passage of the 1974 Act left cities with just a small window of opportunity to meet Round I of CDBG funding, and, through CDA, the newly elected Poelker had an unusually dominant role. Aldermen were bought into the process only formally after the application was presented to the Board (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 118). More important in this process was LCRA and the Housing Authority, who by virtue of their pre-existing power and place in the renewal process consisted an “entrenched subsystem” “whose inertia is difficult to thwart” (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 88). The expertise of officials in these two agencies in dealing with HUD allowed LCRA to push continued federal funding for certain residential and commercial projects, despite their sizeable budget surplus.

In the initial round of funding, the mayor maintained a tight control over funding priorities. However, CDBG politics quickly evolved to reflect the input of a variety of political actors (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 118). CDA’s monopoly on the process would not last long, particularly when CDBG funding nearly doubled in 1978. As the process of CDBG funding became better known, the aldermen gradually inserted themselves into the process. A September, 1977, *Post-Dispatch* study found that three south-side wards were over-represented in the first three years of CDBG funding—all three represented by powerful political families, one with ties to the CDA Board of Commissioners. The series also detailed more indelicate examples of political prerogative. CDA shifted $6 million from approved to unapproved projects in the first three years of funding, including $750,000 for landscaping projects and $838,000 for miscellaneous public works projects (Prost, et. al., 1977a: 1A), in part to satisfy aldermanic requests. One CDA commissioner described the fact of aldermanic influence as “a fact of life” that
“you have to swing with” (Prost, et. al., 1977d: 1A). As significantly, commissioners, appointed both by the mayor and board of aldermen and representing city departments, also used their position to push pet projects, specifically community centers in their neighborhoods (Prost, et. al., 1977b: 1A). Later investigations would find that major non-profit recipients of CDBG funding had strong connections to their respective aldermen and questionable track records (Joiner, 1980: 12D).

Aldermen also attempted to control the use of Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) and tax abatement procedures, two additional development procedures commonly used in redevelopment activities, often in combination with CDBG funding. The first UDAG grant received by the city linked downtown commercial development with the renovation of the Cochran public housing complex in a specific deal to placate aldermen (“Partners in Progress,” 1978: 2C). By 1978, the city had abated $63.1 million in local taxes under a variety of state mandated programs. As problems emerged in several of the projects, both the mayor’s office and the Board of Aldermen sought heightened control over their use (Sutin, 1978d: 4B; Malone and Prost, 1979: 1A; Prost, 1980b: 3A).

Debate over CDBG politics included both who should control funding and how the process of allocating funding should be organized. Proposals made in 1978 by Poelker’s successor, James Conway, to replace CDA commissioners with citizen representatives appointed by the mayor fell to aldermanic opposition (Boyd, 1978a: 1C). The Board of Aldermen worked to take away mayoral control of the process by requiring that all CDA expenditures require line item approval by both the Board of Aldermen and the Board of Estimate and Apportionment (Pearson, 1977: 4D). Later compromises
between the mayor’s office and the aldermen gave the latter greater control over housing, economic development and public works projects, with CDA maintaining control over other type of expenditures (Sutin, 1978e: B12). This compromise became long lasting; although there were attempts to change the allocation process during the Schoemehl administration, a pattern of joint authority continues today.

Mayor Conway clashed with the Board of Aldermen frequently during his one term. Previously a state senator who had sought to eliminate the city’s “county” offices, Conway routinely vetoed or sought to prohibit spending that he considered pork barreling (Boyd, 1978b: 10C; Sutin, 1978c: 4F; Mannies, 1979: 1B). The mayor and Board of Aldermen regularly blamed each other for CDA’s sluggishness in spending funds, and, in 1978 and 1979, disagreements between the two branches threatened the CDBG application and city’s budget.

Over time, local aldermen had two competing goals. First, a mostly white political leadership sought cuts to the Model City and urban renewal programs with savings redistributed throughout the city. By contrast, black political leaders sought the distribution of CDBG funds throughout black communities, rather than in just transitional neighborhoods (Collins and Zusevic, 1975: 83). In this sense, the gradual response of the development program to the competing demands placed upon it shows how CDBG politics closely reflected existing political alliances and divisions. Contrary to the intent of New Federalism legislation, the introduction of CDBG in St. Louis led not to mayoral control over development initiatives but political compromises in both control of funds and use of funds reflecting the existing structure of St. Louis politics. On the south-side, mostly white aldermen fought to move block grants into the city’s general operating
budget, fund pet projects, and keep intrusive development projects—particularly low income housing—out of their neighborhoods. Urban renewal under CDBG continued to operate in its own institutional setting, with various commercial and housing projects located in the central corridor and on the near north and near south side. In the central corridor and parts of the south side, CDBG and tax abatements became an important part of a strategy by private developers to retain higher income families and attract newcomers of equal status (Schmandt, Wendel and Tomey, 1983: 44). These activities became important part of an emerging public-private partnership that attracted national attention (Prost, 1980a: 1A) and that was lauded by CDA officials (Volland, 1980: 3A).

By contrast, development in the north part of the city was characterized by targeting of funds to the near north side area, supported by public housing advocates and a few key developers. Funding of public housing on the near north side reflected the political linkage of public housing leaders with urban renewal priorities through the UDAG process (Sutin, 1978a: 4B). While for some this linkage was a sign of progress, for others this strategy reinforced a strategy of “racial and low-income containment” (Joiner, 1978: 1B). Development in other parts of the north side was conditioned on funding from the federal Section 8 subsidy program—a program ripe with administrative and technical difficulties (Schmandt, Wendel and Tomey, 1983: 40). When this funding did not emerge, the projects were abandoned. Development on the north side was also hampered by the increasingly desolate conditions of many north side neighborhoods. As a local press study concluded in 1977, “part of the reasons for lower allocations to the North side is the apparent lack of redevelopment projects in that area of the city” (Prost, et. al., 1977d: 1A). Representing older, increasingly depopulated communities, some
north side aldermen lacked the expertise to attract development or were hostile to the developers working flourished elsewhere in the city.

**Schoemehl and Development Politics**

The notion of the multiple track strategy in CDBG spending clarifies that St. Louis development politics may be best described as a multiplicity of interests rather the dominance of one set of institutions. Both Poelker and Conway fought against that trend. In the process of those debates, however, Conway became broadly unpopular with most other local political leaders, a fact that helped Vince Schoemehl’s victory in the 1981 Democratic primary. Schoemehl’s campaign included criticism of Conway because of the closure of the city’s last automobile plant and Conway’s decision to close Homer G. Phillips Hospital, serving blacks on the north side.

Schoemehl brought to the mayor’s office an extraordinary energy as well as a consummate set of political skills. As an alderman, he was associated with a “Young Turk” faction that was challenging St. Louis’ traditional Democratic leadership (Stein, 2002: 190); their support for Schoemehl built a base of support in wards around the city. Schoemehl’s campaign included many younger volunteers who brought his name to virtually every door in the city, promoting him as a grassroots reformer. As mayor, Schoemehl surrounded himself a new set of young professionals who, while novices in their respective fields, shared their boss’ enthusiasm (Freeman, 1981e: 3B). Schoemehl’s record of activities in his first term indicated the mayor’s energy. Development activities championed by the new mayor included an industrial redevelopment fund (Freeman, 1981d: 1A), a deal for financing of the St. Louis Centre project (“Revenue Bonds to Be Issued to Help Finance Downtown Centre,” 1981: 3A) and continuing activism to break
the deadlock on the 12-year-old Gateway Mall project. Schoemehl also set up a new business assistance center to speed the process of receiving city approval (“City Sets Up Center to Aid Businesses,” 1981: 3A), and, in response to complaints from developers, modified review policies over historic standards at the city’s Heritage and Urban Design Commission (Mannies, 1981b: 3A). As a cheerleader for the city, Schoemehl regularly held town meetings (Schaeffer, 1981: 3A; Freeman, 1981a: 3A), hosted delegations of developers interested in the city (Prost, 1982c: 3A), and traveled extensively to promote the city (“Mayor, Aides Inspect Baltimore Development,” 1981: 3A). On regional issues, Schoemehl backed renewed city-county cooperation (Barrett and Mannies, 1981: 1A) and restructured city tourist efforts to coordinate them with efforts by St. Louis County (Hannon and Freeman, 1981: 1A). He began talks with County Executive Gene McNary on a joint city/county enterprise zone (Sutin, 1982a: 15A). Schoemehl also initiated an innovative sales tax proposal to create a regional economic development fund for the city and county that ultimately failed at the polls in August of 1982 (Horrigan, 1982: 1A).

Another way to evaluate the capacity that Schoemehl and his team brought to the development agencies can be seen in the amount of redevelopment activity that occurred in his three terms. In the 1970s, changes in Missouri law provided new powers to abate property taxes to encourage private market reinvestment—these include Chapter 99, 100, and 353 redevelopments; of the three, Chapter 353 redevelopments have been viewed as “central” to St. Louis’s revitalization during this period (Community Development Agency, 1989). In numerical terms, 32 plans were approved between 1960 and 1980, with 54 projects completed under the plan. The number of plans increased to 95 by 1989, with another 261 projects completed in the period, including over 100 residential
projects. Total Chapter 353 investment in the 1980-89 period reached $1.08 billion (Community Development Agency, 1989: 1). By 1987, the assessed value of commercial and residential property under all redevelopment types reached $345 million, about ¼ of the total assessed value of all property in the city, with the total amount of abated taxes reaching $250 million (Office of the Comptroller, 1987: 55).

Schoemehl’s successes during these first years are all the more remarkable given the other local challenges that emerged at the same time. Schoemehl had to contend with a crisis at the St. Louis Housing Authority, ultimately stepping in to take control over the agency after the heat failed in a number of the Authority’s buildings (Freeman, 1982a: 1A). Likewise, financial difficulties at the regional transportation agency, Bi-State, led to an emergency takeover of the agency, including appointment of former Mayor Poelker as the interim director (Sutin, 1981b: 1A). Schoemehl feuded with Aldermanic Board President Thomas Zych on a host of issues, including the city’s budget and layoffs (“Layoffs Not Certain, Zych Says,” 1981: 3A). Most significantly Schoemehl conducted a low-intensity struggle over his first year in office with the Board of Aldermen over redistricting of the city’s wards, a struggle that erupted into an outright conflict when Schoemehl threatened to lead a campaign to reduce the number of wards (Freeman, 1981c: 1A). The threat was later withdrawn and ultimately Schoemehl lost the fight.

By far the greatest challenges in Schoemehl’s first years were those relating to the Reagan Administration’s retrenchment from the post-war pattern of federal policy. The impact of federal budget cuts was dramatic; from 1981 and 1982, total federal support to the city was cut from $77 million to $49 million (Mannies, 1982: 8A). The elimination of general revenue from 1983 to 1986 took away a fund that had been used broadly to
fund local government activities; other federal cuts included the elimination in a federal urban development action grant program that had been used by the mayor’s office, to complete complicated and highly leveraged projects. Most significantly, CDBG funds declined precipitously from their high levels in the 1970’s. In Schoemehl’s first year, CDBG appropriations to the city declined from $38 million to $30 million; by 1990, CDBG allocations to the city declined another $10 million (see Table 4 above).

The impact of the Reagan Administration’s changes in federal policy towards cities was felt throughout city government—from staff layoffs at federal funded human service organizations (“HDC Will Lay off 180, Close 7 of 12 Centers,” 1982: 1C), to elimination of transportation planning grants (Curry and Goodrich, 1981: 1A), to a scale-back in public housing modernization (“Budget Cuts to Cost Agency 3,000 Jobs,” 1981: 3B), to a virtual shut-down of the city’s training agency (Freeman, 1981a: 3A). Federal budget cuts—also affected in state program funds (Ganey, 1981: 1A)—compounded serious local budget shortfalls. Local deficits meant that Schoemehl took office with the prospect of laying off 1 out of 7 city employees in his first 6 months (Schaeffer, 1981: 3A) and a budget deficit of $25 million in his administration’s second year (Sutin, 1981c: 3A). Compounding local budget problems were federal tax changes, which one study estimated would cost the city as much as $11 million in revenue over the next 6 years (Joiner, 1981: 3A).

In some small way, officials at CDA during Schoemehl’s tenure said that federal reductions were both a hindrance and help; the perception of deep budget cuts were convenient response to those seeking support for program initiatives. The perception that CDBG was diminishing provided professionals at the organization, as well as their
mayor, with a justification and shield for control over allocations. Schoemehl’s attempts to control development policy came in a number of forms—from changes to proposed changes to the CDBG process to limit aldermanic influence, to the use of mayoral office funds to fill top positions at CDA with aides loyal to the mayor (Sutin, 1981d: 6C). Despite the obvious accomplishments of Schoemehl’s team, in terms of the institutional structure of development politics, his mayoralty should be a seen as a consolidation and continuation of past trends as opposed to any radical shift from past practices. While declines in funding did increase the contentiousness in CDBG expenditures, other factors work to stabilize the process, including the mayor’s understanding of the local political process. As a candidate, Schoemehl had supported changes in the CDBG appropriation process—providing aldermen control over expenditures (Mannies, 1981a: 3A)—but this piece of campaign rhetoric was quickly thrown out in the first round of CDBG negotiations (Sutin, 1981a: 4A). More significantly, Schoemehl instituted a practice of aldermanic consultation, including the Aldermanic HUDZ Committee and the aldermen’s black caucus, early in the appropriation process (“The Mayor and the Caucus,” 1981: 2H), a practice that continues today.

“Peak Bargaining” and the Gateway Mall Project

Schoemehl demonstrated that a capable and energetic mayor could utilize the existing network of development institutions to direct development decision-making even in the face of federal budget cuts. However, the fate of other development initiatives during his administration shows how other local forces can counter the power of the mayor. Top on this list of projects is the Gateway Mall, a major deal that preoccupied development decision-making for much of the mayor’s first term. Unlike the more
routine, day-to-day decisions made over the expenditure of CDBG and other community development funds, the Gateway Mall project represented “peak bargaining” at the highest levels of development politics.

The Gateway Mall proposals stemmed from decade old plans by the City Plan Commission to create a central parkway downtown running along Market Street (City Plan Commission, 1915). The intent of the parkway, following City Beautiful planning principles of the day, was to create a linear park running across the downtown area, from 12th Street to Jefferson, and a proper vista on which the city’s major public institutions could be located. The park was implemented in pieces west of 12th Street in the 1920s and in 1950s and 1960s. These included the development of Aloe Plaza across from Union Station following a 1923 bond issue, extension of the greenway east to 12th Street upon the success of a dramatic “Progress or Decay” campaign in 1953, and development of Kiener Plaza in 1962 following a $2 million bond issue.

Plans for the construction of the Gateway Arch heightened interest in the area, and the idea of a relatively unobstructed view of the Arch began to take shape. Gradually a mall plan emerged that would create a greenway between the Old Courthouse on Broadway and the Civic Courts Building on 12th Street (Russell Mullgardt Schwartz Van Hoefen, 1953: 7; City Plan Commission, 1960a: 3). However, progress for the project stalled for financial as well as political reasons. Mayor Tucker was unsuccessful in garnering federal funds for the work, and city residents declined to approve another bond issue for the remainder of the mall in 1966. When the city developed a blighting bill for the area in 1970, it did so without any credible plan to finance the improvements and with the opposition of some building owners in the area (“Blighting Area Status for Mall Site
Endorsed,” 1970: 3A). By 1977, a special city task force debated the merits of three separate proposals, including one that modified the open mall concept preserving some office and retail space in the area (Community Development Agency, 1982: 54).

The point of the discussion of the Gateway Mall is not to develop the merits of the proposals that ultimately emerged for the area in 1982, but to use the case of the Gateway Mall to demonstrate the complicated nature of St. Louis’ development process. Certainly one of the issues was the emergence of a pro-historic preservation movement that opposed the demolition of historic properties in the mall area and to support plans by local developer Donn Lipton to preserve the three most significant buildings (Giles, 1998). Initially, LCRA received approval in 1980 to implement a plan that called for a half-mall concept, with low-rise retail development on a portion of the site reminiscent of a suburban mall. The city submitted an UDAG application to fund parts of the plan (Community Development Agency, 1982: 54).

The failure of the city to receive the grant led candidate Schoemehl to agree with his Republican rival for a review of the mall plan (Prost, 1981a: 3A). The inability of the city to garner federal support made the open mall concept unlikely, and so attention turned to a mix of a green space with retail and commercial development to finance the project. In 1981, two proposals emerged. The Gateway Mall Redevelopment Corporation (GMRC) represented primarily local businessmen who were initially open-mall enthusiast but came to support a primarily open mall concept with several new Class A office buildings on selective parts of the site. With John Poelker as its titular head, the group was run by Robert Hyland, the president of KMOX radio, Richard Ford, president of 1st National Bank, and H. Edwin Trusheim, president of the General American
Insurance Company. On the other hand, the Landmark Redevelopment Corporation (LRC) proposed a half-mall plan with extensive plantings and public amenities and redevelopment of three historic properties along 6th Street. The group was led by Donn Lipton, an owner of property in the area, and S. Lee Kling, chairman of Landmarks Bank.

That the project that emerged over the next four years differed so radically from both the open mall concept and the revised half-mall concept agreed to in 1981 is a product of both financial reality and the intervening pressures of other actors in the development process. Local public officials took varying, and shifting positions on the proposals as the two teams faced off. Schoemehl initially came out for the LRC proposal, and an aldermanic committee that approved part of the redevelopment bill in September of 1981 also supported the Lipton plan. Campaigning occurred on both sides. GMRC officials feted aldermen in March of 1982 at a downtown roast beef and chicken dinner (Freeman and Sorkin, 1982: 16A). However, an informal poll of aldermen conducted in the summer of 1982 found that a plurality of aldermen continued to support the Landmark plan, with eight, mostly African-American aldermen undecided (Freeman, 1982b: 1A).

Planning officials were split on the project; LCRA head Charles Farris opposed the Landmark plan and in July of 1981 pushed the CDA commission to approve development guidelines not favorable to preservation (Prost, 1981b: 1A). In January of 1982, the mayor asked CDA officials to announce that they were starting over and asked developers to submit proposals by April (Horrigan and Prost, 1982b: 1A). CDA’s report on the proposals in June 1982 called for a compromise between the two plans, with a vote for the LRC plan if no compromise could be worked out (Community Development
Agency, 1982: 33). CDA staff also detailed the strengths and weaknesses of both proposals. In the case of the LRC proposal, this revolved primarily how the half-mall plan would impact the aesthetics of the remaining buildings in the area. For the GMRC plan, the staff report cited a lack of specificity on key points of the plan, including the cost of acquisition of the property, the time frame for implementing the plan, and the improvements to be made to the resulting green-space. Staff also questioned economic assumptions about the demand for rehabbed and new Class A office space that the two plans detailed. While the CDA commission approved the report and recommendation, passing it on to the Board of Aldermen for approval, opposing the report was Farris and aldermanic President Thomas Zych (Prost, 1982: 1A).

Opposition to the report led to both plans being introduced into the Board of Aldermen, even while Schoemehl worked on a compromise (Freeman and Prost, 1982: 1A). Complicating the negotiations for a compromise was the work of Sorkis Webbe Jr., the 7th Ward committeeman; Webbe had been involved in the 1981 ward redistricting debate and ultimately had authored the plan that Schoemehl had opposed. His relationship with corporate leaders was complicated; during the redistricting debate, local businessmen downtown had not so quietly intimated their opposition to a plan that placed the CBD into Webbe’s 7th Ward (Freeman, 1981b: 1A). By 1982, however, Webbe was an active participant in discussions; while GMRC leaders were initially cool to Webbe’s compromise plan, in June of 1982, they agreed to support his proposal (“Lipton Will Support Mayor’s Plan for Mall,” 1982: 1A).

The emergence of a compromise position in July of 1982 backed by a new entity called the PRIDE of St. Louis Corporation came out of these discussions, with
Schoemehl directly meeting with Webbe and members of the GMRC group. The intent of the new corporation was to work out a project agreeable to both parties, but events soon worked against the participation of LRC team. Lipton withdrew from the corporation after an inside source leaked to the press that PRIDE was essentially sticking to the linear-mall concept, threatening the redevelopment of historic buildings that was essential to the LRC plan. Even after he agreed to return to the organization, Lipton representatives were turned away from PRIDE meetings (Singer, 1982: 1A), leaving him in the unenviable position of proposing compromises to his plan which the PRIDE group, now formal owners of the GMRC group, refused (Prost, 1982d: 1A); Lipton had previously lost his initial support of local labor, following a meeting between union officials and GMRC members. Even as the Board of Aldermen continued to express support for Lipton, castigating the PRIDE group for “dragging its feet” (Prost and Freeman, 1982: 3A) and stating that the board would not back a plan unless it represented a compromise (Sutin and Prost, 1982: 1A), the end result of the PRIDE process was a plan reflecting mostly the original GMRC proposal. Schoemehl himself was pleased with the compromise (Prost, 1982e: 1A); aldermanic approval of the PRIDE plan followed in October of 1982 even as the plan violated original design guidelines, including height restrictions to maintain the view of the Arch, rankling some long time Schoemehl supporters on the board (Sutin, 1982c: 1A). Key to the approval in the board was the affirmative votes of a block of African American aldermen, who received commitments from PRIDE officials of 50% minority ownership in part of the project—Gateway One, a new Class A office building at the corner of 6th Street and Walnut (Sutin, 1982b: 3A).
In truth, when the project was completed in 1984, African American interest was only 5%, a fact that members of the development team wrote off as a “financial reality” (Freeman and Prost, 1984: 3A). Downtown’s contracting office sector also limited movement on any other part of the half-mall plan; by 1990, editorial writers at the St. Louis Post-Dispatch called the plan as a “failure” (“Junk the Half-Mall Plan,” 1990a: 2B). The other buildings never materialized and, in place of one, PRIDE had placed a surface parking lot, in violation of the original design intent. By 1990, the PRIDE board was essentially inactive and owed $8.75 million in state taxes (Prost, 1990: 1D). While members such as Edwin Trusheim insisted that the Mall would get done, ultimately Schoemehl’s development officials stepped in with a complicated financing deal, providing state funding to purchase the remaining property from the PRIDE, erase PRIDE’s debts, and demolish remaining buildings to complete the green space (Lindecke, 1993: 3A).

**Whither the Regime?**

In many ways, the elements of the 1980s under Mayor Schoemehl would seem to be least conducive to urban redevelopment, with drastic federal budget cuts, a prolonged economic recession, and continued population loss and decline in the city. Despite that, throughout this period, St. Louis and the efforts of Mayor Schoemehl were held up as national models of urban revitalization (Prost, 1985), including redevelopment of much of the central corridor and parts of the south side of the city where private reinvestment was strong. However, even if the experience of Schoemehl shows how St. Louis’ mayors can succeed, his tenure also shows some of the lasting features of development decision-making that continue to impede present community development policy-making. While
the capacities of Schoemehl exceeded that of his predecessors and rivaled those of Tucker, commonalities in the structure of community development politics exist across the four decades investigated in this chapter.

First, the activities demonstrate that sustaining development initiatives from one period to the other is difficult. While there is some organizational consistency over the period, more significant is the fact that each period creates its own patterns of decision-making that often incompletely or imperfectly compete with each other in the overall process. Succeeding organizations clashed with each other—as they did in the Gateway Mall project—and the internal organization of the institutions created multiple layers for projects to pass through and for mayors to exert influence over.

Second, while the role of local businesses and businesspeople were important, the importance of their role is conditional to the project and the structures of development politics. In fact, Civic Progress as an organization never proved itself to have the local presence and power that CAP had in Atlanta or the Allegheny Conference had in Pittsburgh. The difference is something that one of the original founders of the organization, David Calhoun, recognized early in 1953.

“The success of [Pittsburgh’s] plan revolved largely around one individual, Richard Mellon, who was in the position to get support of top people in the community… One of our problems in St. Louis is that we have no Mellon. We do have many persons in leadership position, but there has been a great reluctance to accept leadership” (Baumhoff, 1953: 1A).

Tucker himself wanted Civic Progress to take a more activist role, but admitted, “when Civic Progress has had to fill the activist role, they were not too successful” (Tucker, nd). Unlike these other organizations, Civic Progress also never committed the sort of resources that would have provided for a professional staff and organization to carry out
projects (Baur, 1978: 122). This was a conscious decision of the first members of the organizations during discussions held in 1954 (Tucker, nd). It is only until the early 1980s that Civic Progress leadership first identified a set of priority areas to guide action, replacing the early system where individual members brought their own interests to define the organization’s agenda (Wagman, 1981a; Wagman, 1981b).

While business elites play key roles in development initiatives, they interact with other actors in development decision-making and are often not in the leadership of developing initiatives. This suggests that business leaders in St. Louis are neither as controlling nor as engaged as their counterparts in Atlanta. In addition, the opinions of St. Louis’ business leaders have by no means been unanimous, nor have the always agreed with the vision of such strong mayors as Raymond Tucker and Vincent C. Schoemehl Jr. Corporate leaders clashed in the early 1980s over the attempts of Anheiser Busch to gain control of the Civic Centre project, comprising both the city’s Busch Stadium and surrounding area, as well as in the Gateway Mall project. Differences over the Gateway Mall project led one supporter of the LRC plan to propose creating a new organization that represented the broader base of local businesses not included in Civic Progress meetings (Prost, 1981c: 7A). Schoemehl split with such Civic Progress members as Richard Ford, chairman of First National Bank, and other civic leaders such as Robert Hyland, general manager of KMOX Radio, on the Gateway Mall Project. His opposition to the demolition of the Cupples Warehouse area downtown earned him the enmity of Anheuser Busch, Washington University, and a host of other civic and political leaders.
Third, the lack of unity between key members of the business leadership and between business leaders and the city’s chief executive is replicated in St. Louis broader political sphere. It is clear that even when St. Louis’ mayors were best equipped, their powers to initiate and implement development projects were challenged in a political system that provides multiple access points to development policy-making. Joining the mayor in this process were the board of aldermen, specific aldermen, the President of the Board of Aldermen, the Comptroller, and numerous other semi-public officials and private actors from across the civic spectrum. While the participation of the mayor is important in each period, the mayor is by no means the only political actor. The mayor had to negotiate with other local political leaders to plan and implement projects, and these negotiations often significantly affected the outcomes. Tucker’s urban renewal regime was perhaps the strongest example that St. Louis has of an archetypal urban regime. However, even in this case, members of the Board of Aldermen and other local-elected political officials tempered Tucker’s efforts; in part, they were able to do because the city’s decentralized political structure provided them opportunity to impact development policy.

Summary

In one sense, one could conclude that—given the political structure of St. Louis and its economic decline over the last forty years—public-private collaboration is problematic in this city. The political structure of local government—and how it has been replicated in the semi-public agencies that handle development policy—means that the mayor will have to do much more negotiating and political trading than his counterparts in other American cities. The city’s declining economy and demographic
loss provides a general constraint on the city’s ability to foster revitalization. While there are examples of where policy-making has been consensual and political debate over economic development minimal, more often than not development policy-making has required the interaction of a wide variety of local actors.

On the other hand, even this brief review of St. Louis’ development history demonstrates that public-private collaboration in smaller, more constrained ways has been an important component of economic development policy-making. Beyond the high profile projects that garner most public attention, development occurs on a day-to-day basis, prompting the attention of numerous city employees, public agencies, private organizations and local entrepreneurs. Even as the “weak regime” label seems to fit St. Louis, the regime framework provides no real explanation of the development decision-making that occurs. Even if the post-war history of St. Louis leads one to predict that the local capacity of civic leaders will always remain low, this on its own does not negate the fact that civic leaders in St. Louis have been able to navigate the difficult waters of local development politics. Explaining why this occurs requires starting with a different perspective—an emphasis on what drives the participation of local actors and how the local environment constrains or provides opportunities for their collaboration. Chapter 4 will more directly investigate the institutional setting surrounding development decision-making in St. Louis, focusing upon the organizations and individuals that participate in development activities and how institutions shape the roles that participants plays in development decision-making.
Chapter 4: Local Institutions and Development Decision-Making

Chapter 3’s review of St. Louis’ development history demonstrates that past development efforts have not been as sustained as those of the archetypical regimes in such cities as Atlanta. Under the leadership of energetic and visible mayors, some efforts have succeeded and others have failed as mayors confronted organizational and institutional inertia. While Stone’s regime concept is inadequate to describe and proscribe St. Louis’ development efforts, regime theory does point out that any analysis of the outcome of policy must start with the content of local relations out of which policy emerges. Regimes as they have been typically understood by urban scholars are just one of the institutional arrangements that exist in American cities and that help overcome economic competition, federalism and local political fragmentation.

The thesis of this chapter is that local institutions have created a substantially decentralized and privatized setting for development decision-making in St. Louis. The fact that St. Louis does not have an overall regime means that development activities occur within specific institutional settings delineated by the particular characteristics of local neighborhoods, wards and development markets. Key to understanding these local institutional settings are the formal structure of local institutions that impact development decision-makings as well as informal patterns of behavior that have emerged over time. Formal organizations include citywide public sector agencies, business coalitions and groups, and not-for-profit community development corporations, among others. Within the context of broader political and economic forces, institutions operate among opportunities and constraints as local actors pursue policies and initiatives. As importantly, policy actors consciously shape institutional arrangements to maximize their
input on local actions. Policy entrepreneurs are important components of analysis and not simply shaped by their institutional context. How contemporary actors have utilized development institutions will be identified in Chapters 5 and 6 that focus on downtown development and Chapters 7 and 8 on neighborhood development.

**Multiplicity in Development Decision-Making**

Even a cursory review of the public sector’s response to local development shows that there are multiple political actors that impact local development priorities. On the public side, the existence of multiple agencies reflects periods of political competition between political actors and the successive influence of waves of federal policy. While nominally the Community Development Administration (CDA), St. Louis Development Corporation (SLDC) and the Planning and Design Agency (PDA) have the formal mandate of encouraging community and economic development in the city, they are just three of a number of institutions that could impact a development deal.

The formal development organizations include those from 50-plus years of local history—from the urban renewal era’s Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) to the contemporary Tax Increment Financing Commission (TIF). Repeated attempts to redefine what some have called “the alphabet soup of development agencies” in St. Louis have failed to stem the tendency for new organizations to exist on top of existing ones. Outside of the agencies are a variety of additional arrangements, from civic associations, not-for-profit groups and private sector actors that can be the most important players in development projects. Infused throughout their processes is the
impact of local government actors, principally in the mayor’s office, aldermen, Board of Estimate and Apportionment and other charter-mandated bureaucracies.

The formal public process for planning, approving and subsidizing deals provides opportunities for the input of a variety of actors, heightening the chance for conflict and disagreement. Rather than the jurisdiction of one actor, or one organization, or even one linear process, development in St. Louis occurs with the participation of multiple and interacting decision makers. Actors and organizations enter into these processes at different stages of the development process—from planning to implementation. The input and involvement of various actors depends on the scale of the deal, the level of financial complexity, the presence of equity partnerships and the use of the project. In this sense, the development process appears to be a series of haphazard and seemingly unrelated events, in the view of some participants an endless series of “stop/go” points.

Serial decision-making across a number of institutional settings weakens the capacity of local decision-makers and leads to development decision-making that is significantly decentralized and controlled by place-based entrepreneurs. Put another way, the local systems of development decisions provide incentives to mobilize efforts to complete projects in specific neighborhoods and specific housing markets. Accentuating these incentives is a general shift in framework that has supported contemporary development, one that has substantially privatized development decision-making and clarified the role of the public sector in supporting development project. Most broadly has been metropolitan competition for jobs and residents and the declining importance of public sector resources in financing projects. At the same time, a regional conversation about the city’s continuing decline resulted both in a shift of regional priorities and an
increased awareness among city stakeholders in the importance of attracting development initiatives.

Part of the institutional shift in development decision-making has been intentional on the part of public officials, particularly those in the mayor’s office, to retool the development agencies to improve their responses to private market requests and to make aldermen and other neighborhood stakeholders responsible for development outcomes in their communities. More substantial is the manner by which local political fragmentation forces development decision-making from citywide strategies to narrow, market-based initiatives. In this sense, local institutional capacity matches the desire for the strategic intervention of public and private capital once certain indicators emerge. In practice, aldermen and other place-based stakeholders act as entrepreneurs, seeking out alliances with development professionals to bring development to their wards. Participants in local developments understand that declining public resources and increased regional economic competition places a premium on consensus with private market actors and institutions.

Clarifying the role of public sector decision-making is the increased importance of the private market. Individuals who participate in development decision-making are more likely to view the private market as the primary basis for evaluating the suitability of development initiatives. Because of this, private market actors, including private market developers, investors and civic participants representing philanthropic resources and other sources of supplemental capital, have been accorded substantial authority in planning and initiating projects. Private market considerations and public sector resources interact to create a specific context that facilitates development initiatives.
Within an investigation of projects, both in the downtown area and in the neighborhoods, the structures that facilitate the planning and initiation of a development project—a form that is characterized here as a substantially privatized decision-making structure—show both possibilities and limitations. The reality is that a substantially privatized framework accounts for much of the successes in contemporary urban redevelopment and also many of its limitations.

**Local Constitutional Structure and Development Decision-making**

Largely absent from regime theory is an analysis of the independent influence of local institutions on local responses to urban development. Indeed, part of the story of the shifting patterns of St. Louis development history is the legacy of specific institutional arrangements—both the presence of formal agencies and organizations promoting certain development practices—as well as the broader set of political and social relationships. This factor includes the analysis of the constitutional structure of local political power as laid out in the local charter, the organization of public sector agencies and bureaus and the methods of local policy-making for development projects. For St. Louis, the city is politically fragmented, both as a city and as a part of metropolitan region, and this is reflected in the bargaining and competition for control over development priorities. Even as a function of neo-institutional theory, such a focus has commanded the attention of only a small, but growing, set of urban scholars. Formal political authority as laid out in a city’s charter creates a specific set of political institutions and political relationships that serve to “lock in” individual responses to the problems and issues facing urban communities (Sonenshein, 2004). These reactions evolve historically and continue to shape local options long after their initiation and even
in the face of subsequent changes, crises and new opportunities (Stein, 2002). In functional terms, individual political behavior is impacted by the organization and development of specific types of local actors, including, for example, the impact of modes of election on political priorities (Bledsoe and Welch, 1985; Clingermayer, 1993), and the representation of specific types of interests in the local political process (Zax, 1990; Bullock and MacManus, 1991). The form of local government also impacts the role of urban mayors and their abilities to form certain types of partnerships (Svara, 1990), how city structure impacts the ability of mayors to build governance strategies (Gissendanner, 2004) and how changes in city charters have impacted the power of mayors to solve urban problems (Mullin, Peele and Cain, 2004).

Historically, the connection between political structure and urban development has been set in the tone of Progressive politics. Progressives believed machine politics hurt the ability of local leaders to rationally respond to urban problems. Urban reform movements in the first part of the twentieth century were populated by business, professional and upper class groups who sought to expand their scope of political power and bring to local politics a broader perspective on how urban conditions impacted business growth (Hays, 1964: 215). Urban reformers specifically advocated changes in the local structure of government—primarily through changes in the city charters and state legislation—in order to diminish the power of local councils and strengthen the power of local mayors. In St. Louis, as in other cities, the urban reform movement activated middle and upper class residents, including professionals, businessmen and civic leaders, frustrated with the seemingly parochial nature of the ward-based politics.
For St. Louis, the discussion of reform and its impact on the city’s ability to pursue development is not merely a historical consideration of the Progressive reform period but a function of contemporary debates. Discussions of charter reform have been a consistent theme in the city’s experience since the Progressive period, most recently in 2004. Over the course of the 2004 charter amendment campaign, local advocates change have directly related the city’s political structure to the ability to pursue urban revitalization, arguing that the city’s “weak mayor” system fragments formal authority and diminishes the ability of political leadership to partner on development initiatives (“Beer Bust,” 2004: C2; “Amazed and Appalled,” 2004: B2). Contemporary urban reformers largely reiterated the language of their predecessors, focusing upon three main criticisms of the city’s political structure. First, they note the system’s fragmented system, with the mayor sharing with other citywide officials key budgetary and executive functions. Second, reformers note how the historical legacy of a ward-based political system has created decentralization that allows considerable control at the aldermanic and neighborhood level. Finally, reformers note that the unique status of the city as both a city and county has contributed to the persistence of a set of other locally elected offices—including a treasurer and collector of revenue—that further fragments local authority and creates a base for patronage and political influence in the city’s affairs.

Executive Authority and Local Politics

The current structure of local government is a testament to the staying power of both Progressive reforms as well as the resiliency of basic forms of local political organization. Figure 1 shows a basic organizational charter for the City of St. Louis as well as a simplified sense of the hierarchy of local political power.
The mayor serves as the primary executive for the city, elected for a four-year term in springtime, off-year election cycle. By charter, the mayor has broad control over service functions of the city government, including most of the functions that directly touch the lives of residents. Mediating and coordinating the work of the six main service agencies is the Board of Public Service, comprised of departmental chairs and a president appointed by the mayor. Outside of supervisory control of the service industries, the Board of Public Service is responsible for the all design and construction management of all public work done by the city, including construction of facilities and public streets, parks and spaces.

The mayor largely dominates local governance because of the office’s visibility and the relatively large size of the mayoral staff. While the mayor’s appointment authority is substantial, the city’s charter includes a number of provisions that check mayoral authority. Chief among these are the Board of Estimate and Apportionment (E&A), an organization unique to only several cities today. E & A’ function is little understood by local residents. Charter reformers have specifically targeted it in most reform attempts. Comprising the mayor, the elected comptroller and the elected president of the board of aldermen, E&A has authority over all budgeting and appropriation of public funds, including funds for redevelopment. In practice, E&A operates as a second legislative body in government, with approval power over almost all city expenditures, review and approval authority over the expenditures of city departments, and the power to substantially set annual city budgets. It is by virtue of their approval of these contracts that E & A members are drawn into development politics.
Like the mayor, the comptroller and board president are elected citywide for four-year terms; comptroller elections coincide with the mayoral election, whereas the aldermanic president is set in a four-year cycle in between mayoral contests on a springtime schedule. Of the three officers on E & A, the board president sits with the least authority; in tradition, it has been the mayor and comptroller who have had the most impact. It is part of the culture of the comptroller’s office, irrespective of the occupant, to serve as the guardian of the public fisc, and in rhetoric over public deals it is most often the Comptroller’s office that is most conservative. In between these two forces, the board president presents a third vote, providing the opportunity for an alliance between the comptroller and the board president to upset the fiscal priorities of the mayor.

The comptroller’s control over city finances, in E&A and in broader city debates, is enhanced because the office also oversees the city’s department of finance. The comptroller and the office’s accounting staff function as a the general auditor and accountant for the city of St. Louis, maintaining all financial records and disbursing funds as required for the city. The comptroller also has authority for bonding for city projects, subject to approval by E&A. Beyond sitting on E&A, the board president’s formal authority is generally restricted to the operations of the Board of Aldermen, where the president conducts business, makes aldermanic committee assignments and assigns legislation to committees. While the board president’s staff and power makes the office more than just the “29th” aldermen, the board president is the junior partner among the three members of E & A, with smaller staff and considerably less formal authority.

**Board of Aldermen**
St. Louis has a single legislative body, a Board of Aldermen. There is a formal system of organization on the board, including a vice president, a majority leader and an assistant majority leader, but the most significant features of board organization is seniority and chairmanship. Seniority in the board impacts committee assignments and committee chairmanship; committee assignments reflect aldermanic interests and also impact the legislative activity of aldermen. High profile committees include Housing and Urban Development, with oversight over CDBG appropriations and other redevelopment matters, and the Transportation oversees matters at the city’s airport. Standing committees have the power to subpoena witnesses and books, although most committee meetings are perfunctory. Committee meetings do function as public meetings with the opportunity for public input on legislation or matters presented. Besides aldermanic committees, there are less formal methods of aldermanic organization, including the board’s Black Aldermanic Caucus, which has organized occasionally to attempt block voting on key legislative matters.

The fact that the 28 members are elected from wards has generally created a system of de facto aldermanic courtesy over most local neighborhood matters, including legislation to benefit neighborhood development. Aldermanic courtesy means that almost no legislative activity can occur impacting a ward without the support of the alderman. Additionally, less formal methods of aldermanic influence have extended aldermanic courtesy to a range of other departments, including the service departments and the development agencies. In some departments, department representatives are designated to solicit aldermanic approval for basic maintenance issues such as stop signs, street paving and infrastructure improvements (Stein, 1991: 53, 56, 57, 60). Constituent
services in the form of city services are an important part of the aldermanic role, and
aldermen generally work closely with department representatives and with Neighborhood
Stabilization Officers in order to assure that work orders are processed and citizen
complaints are answered.

While aldermen have significant formal and informal control over ward matters,
their influence is mediated by the fact they lack staff. Aldermen, in groups of 4 and 6,
share clerical staff. While staff at the development agencies is available on development
issues, their work is generally confined to processes such as blighting studies and CDBG
spending certification. Some aldermen utilize staff at neighborhood organizations or
campaign staff in order to expand their reach; additionally, some aldermen have
relationships with development professionals who assist them in organizing development
activity. Both of these approaches are features of the neighborhood projects discussed in
Chapter 7 and 8.

St. Louis as a City/County Hybrid

Another unique feature of the city is its charter as both a city and a county
political subdivision, stemming from an 1876 divorce of the city from the county. In
practice, it has meant the continued existence of certain citywide elected county functions
and, until recently, the protection of the features of the offices by state law. County
offices include a sheriff to oversee court and correctional protection services, a circuit
clerk to supervise local court workers, a recorder of deeds to oversee real estate deed
recordings, a collector of revenue to handle personal and business tax collections, a
license collector to oversee collection of business licenses, a treasurer to handle city bank
accounts and parking, and a public administrator to handle probate estates in local court.
Elimination of the county offices has been a central part of city reform efforts, but the offices have survived. In an earlier period of the city’s history, the offices were part of a broader system of patronage positions; even where civil service reform has eliminated all of the patronage positions from mainline city departments, county office employments remain outside the purview of civil service. While the influence of the county offices over city affairs in general is diminishing, the positions are mostly held by political actors who are seasoned in local politics and whose connections to aldermen, ward organizations and other political groups in the city enhances their standing.

**Commissions and Boards, Local and State Appointed**

St. Louis’ political structure is also defined through the presence of a number of additional boards and commissions, some within the mandate of local government and some with authority from the state. This includes everything from the Excise Commission, which oversees liquor licensing in the city, to the Board of Commissioner of Tower Grove Park. The composition and powers of these boards is varied, as is their practices and actual impact on local policy. In the development field, these commissions include oversight commissions for the various development agencies. State statute mandates control over the Board of the St. Louis Police Department; even though the mayor sits as an ex-officio member of the board, the city has little formal influence over the department and must allocate local funds for the department. The state also controls the membership of the Board of Election Commissioners. The Board of the St. Louis Public Schools is also a separate state-mandated organization; the mayor lacks formal control over the local school district, although mayors relied upon other mechanisms to try to influence the district’s policy and operations.
Public Sector Agencies and Local Development

Political competition among local elected officials is reflected in the structure and outline of St. Louis’ development agencies. Table 1 shows a listing of the city’s development agencies, past and present, with their main attributes.

[Insert Table 1 here.]

Although the most relevant organizations date from the 20th century, one can also look to the 19th century for evidence how public sector responses have emerged. In the latter half of the 19th century, the task of local development was then part of the provision of local infrastructure and public services. Public contracting for things like sewer, water, roads and ports was formally organized under the Board of Public Improvements, a five member body comprising commissioners of local public functions, all appointed by the mayor (Sandweiss, 2001: 160). The creation of the bureau in the charter of 1875 was designed to formalize and professionalize the provision of local public services, including the infrastructure that encouraged and retained local development, which public and elite opinion believed that they had been lacking. Working against these attempts was St. Louis’ solution to funding public improvements, a process that was sporadic; one example of this was the financing of public roads, which required substantial levees to be agreed to by property owners affected by the improvements. This method, as well as inability of local leaders to effectively and comprehensively deal with the other sort of public nuisances that a growing city created, created a legacy of haphazard public response that effected the efforts of city leaders in the 20th century (Corbett, 1999: 107; Sandweiss, 1997: 103).
The City’s first formal planning organization, the City Planning Commission established in 1912, reflected the desire of many civic leaders to establish order, both physically and politically, over the city and its future. The Commission rose out a predecessor effort, the City Plan Association, a private organization of reformers dissatisfied with the haphazard approach of public government (Sandweiss, 2001: 204). The board of the commission included both city political leadership as well as civic leaders of stature in civic reform activities (Porter, 1990: 6); the Commission attracted similar leadership in its staff, headed by Harland Bartholomew from 1916 to 1962. Under Bartholomew’s leadership, the Commission went on to set out a vision for St. Louis that would profoundly shape the city well into the 20th century. These included the city’s first zoning plan, highway and transportation plans, a downtown plan detailing new civic buildings and a park system and residential plans detailing urban renewal and public housing sites. In the face of increasing residential blight in older neighborhoods adjacent to the downtown, Bartholomew drew up plans that became the public housing neighborhoods of Desoto-Carr Square (City Plan Commission, 1947).

Despite the breadth of their vision, Bartholomew and other civic reformers at the time did operate separate from the political context of the city. This fact, recognized by the Commission’s first leaders, frustrated the pace of implementation (Cultural Resources Office, 1996). Attempts by the City Plan Commission to strengthen zoning regulations that would place time limits on non-conforming uses faced political opposition from both neighborhood and downtown real estate interests (Porter, 1990:16). Generally, implementation of the Commission’s initiatives lagged. This was due to both the
inherent political difficulties in its recommendations as well as the requirement of 60 percent of voter approval for the use of city bonds (Sandweiss, 2001: 220).

Post-war federal urban policy provided a revolution in local public efforts in both financial and institutional terms. As has been already described, a series of urban programs instituted a pipeline of federal support of local efforts, including funds to clear blighted areas and construct low-rent public housing. Additionally, with the funds came new public institutions to plan projects, in St. Louis primarily the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) and the St. Louis Housing Authority. These institutions followed the mandate of both federal and state requirements as well as fit the need of St. Louis’s mayors to strengthen executive control over redevelopment initiatives. Established in 1951 following enabling legislation from the state, LCRA became synonymous with its long time director, Charles Farris, who was brought to St. Louis to head the newly created agency, a position he held until 1988.

Then and now, LCRA formally operates under a five-member board appointed by the mayor. In its early incarnation, these members were local businessmen and civic leaders associated with Mayor Tucker’s urban renewal priorities; however, from the 1950s to 1980, Farris dominated the agency’s actions. LCRA’s pivotal role in planning and implementing redevelopment initiatives, funded by using federal dollars, generally meant that it also dominated its sister agency, the St. Louis Housing Authority (SLHA), even though SLHA predated LCRA, having been created in 1939 under state legislation. While the Housing Authority early on built two projects—Carr Square on the near north side in 1942 and Clinton-Peabody on the near south side—the Authority’s development work mostly occurred as a result of LCRA’s activities. The link between the two was
formalized in 1955 when Farris was appointed head of both organizations. LCRA’s work also shadowed over the work of the older and established City Plan Commission, and friction occurred between Farris and Bartholomew on key questions.

Both LCRA and SLHA continue to exist today; a vestige of the City Plan Commission continued until 1974. In general terms, active periods of federal policy-making have created new public institutions to carry out development activities, with the roles and responsibilities of new institutions added on top of existing ones. The 1960s War on Poverty legislation prompted the creation of a Model City office within city government and an independent Human Development Corporation to implement initiatives, as well as numerous subcontracted agencies within community action areas. More directly in terms of urban development, 1974 federal reforms created the need for a new Community Development Agency (CDA) with the main thrust of planning and initiating the use of new community development block grant funds (CDBG), including those going to fund LCRA and the Housing Authorities activities. CDA also combined the work of the Model Cities Office and two other existing development initiatives—the Beautification Commission and the Business Development Office (Community Development Agency, 1999)—creating a business development wing and a Heritage and Urban Design commission to oversee city preservation issues.

CDA’s creation under Mayor John Poelker initially heightened the mayor’s control over this new discretionary urban development fund. However, over time, the expenditure of CDBG and work of CDA staff has exhibited the competing as well as complementary goals of the mayor’s office, the board of aldermen and other political groups within the city. In 1988, Mayor Vincent Schoemehl took advantage of Missouri’s
Chapter 353 programs to establish the Economic Development Commission to operate as a corollary to CDA; the organization was renamed the St. Louis Development Corporation in a consolidation of development agencies in 1990. As an umbrella organization, SLDC oversaw the work of not only LCRA but also the Land Reutilization Agency (LRA), a state authorized agency created in 1971 to receive and sell tax delinquent taxes; the Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (PIEA) authorized in 1967 to carry out Chapter 100 development projects; the Industrial Development Authority created in 1979 to issue tax exempt bonds to fund development projects; the St. Louis Local Development Corporation, created in 1976 to assist small business development in the city; and the St. Louis Port Authority.

Schoemehl also established new private, non-profit organizations that became critical components of neighborhood redevelopment plans. Operation Impact, created in 1983, became a major recipient of block group funds, charged with the initiative of planning and implementing rehab residential housing projects in key city neighborhoods. In 1988, Schoemehl created Operation ConServ to operate as a corollary; it utilized the services of a number of existing city departments to bring resources to 13 targeted city neighborhoods. These resources included code violation reviews, cleanups and beautification campaigns, boarding of vacant buildings, and some limited housing redevelopment activities through staff members dedicated to specific neighborhoods. Finally, in 1991, Schoemehl initiated the formation of the City of St. Louis Tax Increment Financing Commission in order to utilize this new financing approach for commercial projects in the city. Like other local authorities, the TIF Commission is headed by an independent board and staffed by SLDC.
SLDC’s status as an umbrella organization of existing redevelopment authorities has meant that the organization’s main focus has been economic development—including large institutional housing and commercial development—as opposed to CDA’s focus on residential housing. A key component of Schoemehl’s agenda was the promotion of the SLDC as the city’s chief development agency. This came about both from changes in the structure of the agency as well as staff appointments that placed agency personnel directly under the mayor’s office (Stein, 1991: 114). Further reform of the development agencies in 1999 under Mayor Clarence Harmon (1997-2001) failed to consolidate the two agencies as he had wanted, but did reinforce SLDC’s importance. These reforms also recreated a separate city planning agency, the Planning and Urban Design Agency (PDA) by pulling planning, research and heritage offices out of CDA into a new, cabinet-level agency. Harmon’s 1999 reforms also integrated Operation Impact into CDA, abolishing its position as a separate organization.

Other additions to the public development agencies have included the creation of the St. Louis Regional Empowerment Zone initiative and the City of St. Louis Affordable Housing Commission. The first came about with St. Louis’ successful designation as a federal empowerment zone in 1998, a joint application including the city, St. Louis County and East St. Louis, Illinois. While a professional staff oversees the work of the EZ, formal authority rests in a board of directors appointed by chief executive officers in the three jurisdictions; in St. Louis, representatives generally undergo an informal review by aldermen from the empowerment zone area. Empowerment zone status brought the region both a pool of funds to invest in qualified economic development projects as well as tax incentives and bond authority for project financing. The Affordable Housing...
Commission was created by city voter adoption of a local use tax in the summer of 2000. The commission operates under a professional staff under assistance of CDA and is governed by an 11-member board of directors appointed by the mayor and approved by the Board of Aldermen. The commission provides grant funding and other financing for housing projects that serve low and moderate-income residents, as well as the homeless and other populations with special housing needs.

Reorganization of the agencies has also defined fairly clear roles and responsibilities for the different agencies and the staff within them. “Ninety percent” of the work of CDA, according to one former manager, involves administration of the federal funds, with only a minor portion of the activity of the organization involved in policy decisions about where funds are to be spent. CDA includes staff responsible for allocation of federal funding and staff that monitor spending through community-based agencies. The former includes a housing staff comprising a deputy director and a series of housing analysts responsible for designing and implementing residential projects in specific areas of the city.

SLDC is more generally responsible for business and commercial development, including staff for the other agencies—LRA, LCRA, PIEA, etc. Two deputy directors oversee the real estate function—LRA primarily—and the economic development department—including redevelopment, business development and the business assistance center. Senior management at SLDC are more likely to be involved in conversations involving development priorities as well as technical negotiations on major residential, commercial and institutional projects in the city, including the HOPE VI reconversation.
projects. This sort of role was formalized more recently with the appointment of senior staff to a major projects division, a practice continued successive mayors.

**Executive Control and Reform at the Development Agencies**

Historically, reorganization and consolidation of St. Louis’ development agencies has occurred both as a function of effectively meeting new challenges and opportunities—for example, meeting the requirements of new state-level or federal program requirements—as well as part of a play on the part of St. Louis’ mayors to strengthen their control over development priorities. According to one development official, Schoemehl understood this sort of political game—starting new organizations when he wanted to bypass existing ones as well as modifying existing organizations to heighten control over their activities. The creation of the Public Development Corporation (later St. Louis Development Corporation) was one way of confronting the built-up dominance of LCRA in redevelopment activities, especially the influence of its long-time head Charles Farris, who had wanted to serve as the new agency’s first head (O’Neil, 1989a: 9D). Additionally, the establishment of Operation Impact shifted authority from CDA to the new non-profit organization, a move that led some to charge that Schoemehl was attempting to privatize neighborhood redevelopment activities (Mannies, 1989: 1C).

Successive mayors after Schoemehl followed this two-path strategy, with success and failure. Retrospectively, Schoemehl has decried the “tangled mess” of city development agencies and supported the reorganization of the agencies under Mayor Clarence Harmon in 1998 and 1999 (Schoemehl, 1998: B3). Harmon’s return to the theme of institutional reorganization came after the four years of the administration of
Freeman Bosley Jr. (1993-1997). Bosley largely ignored these sorts of discussions, preferring to work under the current system to benefit some of the neighborhoods excluded from Schoemehl’s priority areas. City development officials indicate that the Bosley Administration took a passive approach to politics of the agency, to the detriment of both staff morale and executive control of the agency. At the same time Harmon sought reorganization of the agencies, he also instituted a reorganization of the mayor’s office, creating a deputy director of development to more directly oversee development priorities (Parish, 1998h: 1B). Harmon’s ambitious reform agenda was prompted by a series of local reports that promoted structural changes to create a strong mayor system to lead the city’s redevelopment (Focus St. Louis, 1997; Mayors Advisory Committee on City Governance, 1996). However, his attempts were largely foiled by the board of aldermen, who expressed concern with the loss of civil service positions at CDA (Parish, 1999b: 6).

In contrast to both Schoemehl and Harmon, Mayor Francis Slay (2001 – present) has pursued a different path to executive control over the agencies, eschewing formal reorganization of the agencies’ structure. According to city hall officials, this strategy reflected the view of the administration that past reform attempts had taken an enormous amount of time and political capital with very little payoff. In general, Slay’s office has pursued a policy emphasizing heightened executive control over the agencies rather than formal reorganization (Prost, 2001d: B5). Slay expanded the role of the deputy mayor for development, and brought in a local development professional, Barbara Geisman, to fill it. Geisman also brought the political experience of working as a chief aide for the President of the Board of Aldermen, as well as previous experience in the Board of
Public Safety and as head of the Community Development Agency. In terms of staffing the agencies, the Slay Administration retained special projects officers at SLDC assigned to work on high-profile projects, and solicited private, foundation support to conduct national searches to find candidates for the directors of SLDC, CDA, and PDA, as well as to increase the salary of top administration officials (Schlinkmann, 2001c: B2).

As deputy mayor for development, Geisman has consolidated her control over the development agencies not only through an aggressive schedule of meetings and review of potential projects, but also through formal incorporation of the deputy mayor’s position as a member of key commission boards and agencies. According to interview sources, if a project must appear before several boards prior to implementation, mandated staff review by the head of CDA and the deputy mayor for development assures continuity of action and helps retain “institutional memory” from project to project.

“Hierarchical Coordination” and the Mayor’s Office

Much of the conflict over development priorities, and as a subset of these the design of development agencies, reflects not so much the bureaucratic inertia typical of any public agency but the multiple political influences from the city’s elected officials. Additionally, development activities are organized following the political pattern of territoriality, a pattern enforced by the city’s 28 wards. Whereas under a more rational framework development priorities might be designated citywide, ward politics remain very important, with support, funding and prioritization of specific projects a function of a ward political process.

It should be noted that over time, the activities of the mayor’s office have provided citywide coordination of development activities, and in practice, the most
capable mayors and their staff have recognized the importance of ward-level planning and implementation. This lesson is perhaps better understood by the current mayor’s office, but it is reflective of the historical struggles between the mayor’s office and the Board of Aldermen—and particularly aldermen on key legislative committees. In the past this conflict has been manifested in aldermanic opposition to reorganization plans of the development agencies. Aldermanic opposition blunted Schoemehl’s plans and all but stopped the designs of Harmon to create a single development agency. In political terms, less pervasive has been the influence of other citywide elected officials, including the Comptroller, President of the Board of Aldermen, and some of the county offices. During Schoemehl’s administration, then Comptroller Virvus Jones used his authority over city bond administration in an attempt to modify development priorities, particularly regarding minority inclusion in contracting. More recently, current Comptroller Darlene Green has been maintained a separate negotiating team on key development deals, including the new downtown Cardinal baseball stadium and the convention hotel.

In real terms, the mayor and his staff dominate other locally elected officials in control over the broadest development decisions; the role of the aldermen, Comptroller and other city-wide elected officials is key but confined to distinct parts of the development process. Put in another way, favorable input of other elected officials is a necessary but hardly sufficient in advancing development projects; minimally, both the mayor’s office and aldermen must agree to the broad outlines of a project, but it is in the mayor’s office where the capacity exists to put the pieces of a development project together. The power of aldermen and citywide elected officials is mostly reactive and prohibitory; the power of the mayor’s office is proactive and progressive.
The domination of the mayor’s office is both because of the institutional structure of local agencies as they impact development decisions and due to, in terms of one local official, “leadership and personalities.” The two are mutually reinforcing in both positive and negative ones. The historical evolution of the development agencies has developed a process of “hierarchical coordination;” in other words, systems are run from the top down in a manner over-programmed to solicit the input of key political partners, including the aldermen, where appropriate. However, such a system is only optimal with a strong leadership team at the top; lacking that, cross-purpose if not chaos ensues.

Recent changes in the operating procedures at the development agencies have accentuated this form of coordination. One example already mentioned has been the practice of placement of key mayoral staff members as board members of separately chartered commissions and agencies, such as LCRA. Development applications for city approval now include a series of staff review meetings, including one specifically with the head of relevant agencies and the deputy mayor for development. That pattern of executive review is now common for the activities of most of the significant development commissions and has generally worked to keep competing projects and priorities—at least within the confines of the development organizations—to a minimum.

Another example comes from a set of policies instituted after 2001 concerning the operations of LRA, the agency that markets and sells publicly owned property gained from tax delinquency proceedings. SLDC real estate officials, who staff LRA, are responsible for taking bids and evaluating the competency of those seeking to purchase city owned property. The process of the sale of these properties can be politically complicated. Often purchase or optioning of LRA property can be the first step in
development project. City officials have the interest in both selling property for the best possible use as well as keeping vacant property out of the hands of speculators. The interests for aldermen over the sale of property can differ from citywide development officials—for both mundane and more substantive reasons. For an alderman, the sale of a side-lot to a local homeowner is a form of constituent service, whereas for development professionals it might represent the sale of part of a larger parcel of vacant land that could be used for a redevelopment project. Most aldermen have a keen interest in LRA sales, and over time their approval of sales has become a necessary component.

Even where the structure of the development agencies could enhance the tendency of agency staff to work independently of each other and of external stakeholders to dominate agency activities, policies and procedures enhance mayoral control and mitigate structural considerations. One view of the development of mayoral control can be seen in the creation of the Affordable Housing Commission in 2001. The establishment of the commission followed after a grass-roots campaign to establish a dedicated sales tax to support the development of housing units affordable to low-income families. Mayor Slay, originally neutral on the topic, became a strong supporter of it after his 2001 primary victory. However, Slay’s support came with a political price. Aldermanic legislation creating the commission, following the vote, tax provided for a commission largely appointed by the mayor. In selecting the first group of commissioners, Slay bypassed the majority recommended by the campaign’s grass-roots advocates (Schlinkmann, 2001e: 13). Slay also clashed with housing advocates as well as some commissioners by pushing to reallocate over $5 million for general revenue, public safety purposes; the commission eventually voted to fund over $2 million in city services—
mostly for emergency shelter space and conservation district housing inspectors (Riley, 2002: B1). Key to the reallocation was the mayor’s political and personal relationships with commissioners and their staff. Slay’s staff similarly organized to blunt opposition to a November 2002 vote that reallocated the use of the tax to fund general revenue housing related expenses, including housing demolition (Moore, 2002b: 8). According to participants, Slay used key allies among local clergy organizations to convince housing advocates to support the vote. The Affordable Housing Commission functions like other development-related commissions—with periodic meetings between the commission’s staff and the mayor’s staff, including review of agenda items and proposals, and mayoral review and approval over commissioners, including the chair.

**Development and the De-emphasis of Broader Political Themes**

Heightening the likelihood of political conflict over development projects are broader citywide debates, including race and a more traditional divide between downtown business interests and ward interests. However, one of the features of the current redevelopment efforts is how city political leaders, and particularly the mayor’s office, have worked to submerge this theme in current neighborhood development policy, and to conduct neighborhood development within the context of the deal and its specific environment rather than as a subset of broader racial tensions. To do so, the Slay administration has worked to facilitate this trend, and reduce public discord over development deals generally, by targeting aldermen as “full partners” in the development process and emphasizing a process where decisions on the use of public resources are made on the basis of the deal. This emphasis shifted the focus of development politics
from political grandstanding to the requirement that aldermen, as well as local
stakeholders, participate in a process that provides incentives for private investment.

For some black politicians, Slay’s narrow victory in 2001 represented a
retrenchment in black political representation. Slay’s campaign touted the fact that three
quarters of his aldermanic staff was African-American and that he held the board’s first
retreat on race relations (Mannies, 2001a: A1). He received the personal endorsement of
a several prominent African-Americans (Tuft, 2001: C1). However, polling after his
2001 victory indicated that Slay won largely because of the city’s white voters, with only
12% of black voters supporting him (Mannies, 2001b: A1). Slay’s subsequent clashes
with Comptroller Darlene Green, the city’s second African-American comptroller and the
highest ranking African-American officeholder, intensified the perception of racial
divisions among the city’s political leadership. Green disagreed with Slay over the
course of negotiations on the new Cardinal stadium, continuing her opposition after the
plan was approved (Schlinkmann, 2002b: B2). Other issues between the two included
Green’s “Lease Back Plan” for the convention center and the terms of a proposed
development on Laclede’s Landing (Moore, 2002c: D19; Moore, 2002d: C1). In 2003,
Green accused Slay’s office of trying to unseat her (Moore, 2003b: B2) and St. Louis
Post-Dispatch editorials recommended that the two get together without staff one-on-one
and resolve the “unprofessional rift” between the two (“Where There’s Smoke…,” 2003:
30).

Looking at the Slay administration in racial terms finds similarity to the rhetoric
and political practices during the Schoemehl administration. Where citywide issues
created differences across racial lines, the positions took on a racial character. At the
same time, the perceptions that development priorities had faltered during their administrations prompted members of the Slay team to reinvigorate neighborhood development, and, particularly, try to strengthen relationships with black aldermen. Slay’s political team has also been adept at negotiating racial politics and has supported key black leaders in order to advance mutually beneficial agendas. During the 2003 aldermanic election, Slay campaigned hard for black allies (Moore, 2003a: B1). All but one did, and one city hall watcher noted that his support on the board of aldermen has gained at least two additional allies since then. Additionally, Slay’s 2005 reelection campaign brought no substantial challenge. One north side alderman, Irene Smith, campaigned on the perceived racial problems but only won about one third of the vote in the primary election. Slay won a substantially a greater percentage of black voters than he had in 2001. He also had the support of some key African-American leaders, who opted for him over Smith (Mannies, 2005: B2).

Additionally, Slay and his staff have been able to engage aldermen in development decision-making, recognizing their critical role in developing the sort of local partnerships with private market actors to initiate projects. The Slay administration has initiated a series of shifts in development decision-making that have increased the hierarchical coordination of the development agencies and the formal role of aldermen. This has included changes in the review structure at the development agencies to include aldermen in the review process and CDBG allocations and expenditures. In particular, Barbara Geisman, the deputy mayor for development, has taken on the position of being a point person for initiating discussions about development projects and acting as an
intermediary between developers, aldermen and development professionals on specific initiatives.

**Local Development and the Aldermen**

The role of the aldermen in local development remains one of the most contentious aspects of local development politics. External observers generally blame aldermen for lack of developments and give aldermen the least credit when developments are successful. As significantly, the aldermen and the mayor’s office have had varied and conflicting stances over development priorities. However, policy shifts instituted after the Slay victory in 2001 sustained a platform of mayoral/aldermanic partnerships and has allowed the mayoral staff to balance the mixture of professionalism and politics that goes into development decision-making. In the words of one top staff member, the public position of the mayor’s office is that “aldermen are our partners,” reflecting a political realism over the role that aldermen play in development decisions.

According to interviews with development officials, policy changes on the part of the current administration have recognized and institutionalized the role of the aldermen while at the same strengthening executive oversight over development processes. In terms of the LRA oversight process discussed above, the process of reviewing applications for purchase of LRA properties now formally includes both written and verbal communication with individual aldermen on proposed sales; in most cases, an application will not be acted until the aldermen has provided some input. The result is that the organization of development priorities by wards accents the incentives on the part of aldermen to act as champions on behalf of local projects. An example of how this works can be seen in the operations of the CDA housing staff. Housing analysts are
assigned to wards, which encourages geographic-based planning and implementation. Aldermen who are effective proponents of housing development can come to rely heavily upon the housing analyst to be the front person for neighborhood housing strategies. According to interviews with CDA staff, these can include directing housing activities for neighborhood non-profits, issuing request for proposals for housing redevelopment, and overseeing the use of CDBG in development projects. The decentralization of some development activities means that the most effective housing analysts work as local entrepreneurs, within the boundaries set by aldermen and senior agency executives.

Another example is the annual CDBG allocation process. CDBG allocations always have been one area where varying political officials—particularly the mayor’s office and aldermen—have clashed. While some minor squabbling occurs each year over the allocation of federal funding, in some years this disagreement draws in conflict over broader development priorities or political conflicts between the mayor’s office and members of the board. There is some measure of disagreement among city officials interviewed over the current balance of power in CDBG allocations. There is a widespread perception, even among some involved in development politics, that the city’s political system has meant that CDBG is divided into 28 equal pots, making the alderman in effect mayor over his or her own ward. This is both factually incorrect, as well as improbable given the requirements of CDBG spending. While some abuse of the funds exists, particularly in the application of CDBG as a part of infrastructure costs for market-rate housing, to a large extent most of the funds are spent in qualifying areas.

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According to one source, part of the confusion over the 28 portions comes from concessions made by Schoemehl in the last years of his administration, when a supplemental appropriation of CDBG funds was dividing into 28 parts, instead of dictated towards specific projects as would have been the normal course under Schoemehl.
This means that some parts of the city, mainly the southwest portion, receive little CDBG funds.

The balance of power in CDBG/HOME allocations has depended upon the force and skill of the mayor, the ability of aldermen on the HUDZ committee, and, most importantly, the legacy of previous allocations. Certainly mayors have differed in their approaches to the CDBG budget; according to one CDA source familiar with the workings of the process since the early 1980s, the current mayor shares with former Mayor Schoemehl a desire to be proactive in the development of the budget. By contrast, Harmon and Bosley took a relatively hands-off approach, providing greater momentum to aldermanic wishes. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, Slay’s administrative staff—in particular the deputy mayor for development and the director of CDA—have tended to follow the example of the Schoemehl administration in being proactive, but open, in drawing up initial CDBG budgets. Their orchestration of the annual CDBG plan includes meetings with the aldermen on projects. Aldermen differed in their desire to seek confrontation with the mayor over the budget. As the HUDZ committee and its membership has matured, it has replaced a leadership relatively active and involved in development issues—former HUDZ chair Martie Aboussie dates from the beginning of CDBG in the 1970s and was intensively involved in CDBG politics—with a group more acclimated to the current mayor and his development priorities.

Most significantly, the declining level of CDBG funding and the legacy of previous allocations has created a stable system in which a broad range of interests is satisfied. As HOME funds are most restrictive in their use—entirely for low-income housing—they are mostly allocated by the mayor’s office for large, affordable housing
projects. Aldermen are allowed a minimal level of funding for ward-based housing organizations, with little interference from the mayor’s office. According to one participant in CDBG allocations during the Slay administration, other politically oriented expenditures—such as funds for the public schools and other program initiatives—are similarly not questioned, in part because the politics of eliminating the appropriation outweighs the loss of the revenue for other purposes. Additionally, aldermen have access to pools of funds targeted towards business development and housing development; some of those funds are marked towards specific ward accounts or projects as agreed to by the aldermen and the mayor’s staff in the run-up to the allocation legislation. Over time, the regularity of the process has helped diminish the political rancor that accompanied CDBG allocations in the early years of the program. Slay’s deputy mayor for development and the director of CDA have tended to follow the example of the Schoemehl administration in being proactive, but open, in drawing up initial CDBG budgets. Their orchestration of the annual CDBG plan includes meetings with the aldermen on projects. The tendency is to settle upon a level of CDBG funding for specific wards, sometimes with specific commitments to projects, but often in flexible ward accounts that can be allocated to projects as project conditions emerge.

Commitments made under the CDBG negotiations take the form of specific projects as well as ward commitments in the general housing redevelopment pools. Slay administration staff have also been proactive in commitments of CDBG funds, and, increasingly, have required earlier consultation on CDBG expenditures in order to adequately shape the public sector’s response to a request for support. Most often these discussions start with the aldermen and/or private developers and senior CDA officials
and the mayor’s office. Unless they are provided clear signs from senior officials, CDA housing staff is relatively loath to provide any sort of commitments and will discourage private developers from short changing the process of executive and aldermanic review.

From the perspective of the mayor’s office, given the relative lack of CDBG and the degree of need, the emphasis is on leveraging other funds; the preference of development officials is for private developers to utilize other forms of funding—including state-level tax credits, tax increment financing and bond financing—prior to the use of CDBG. Following the general commitment of funds, CDA housing staff is responsible for managing the completion of the development documents and overseeing the disbursement of funds for projects. Some private developers, both for and not-for-profit, have indicated that the paperwork requirements for CDBG funds make their use relatively complex and difficult. The restrictions on the use of CDBG and HOME particularly make these financing tools less desirable for market-rate developers; as will be discussed on the chapters on development downtown and the neighborhoods, some developers choose not to use CDBG at all.

**Aldermanic Development Activities**

Guiding aldermanic behavior on development has been the strong incentive for aldermen to treat development activities as part of constituent services and the hallmark of a successful aldermanic legacy. Promoting development, in general, remains good politics for aldermanic, and, in this sense, the personal incentives of the aldermen have matched the strategic interests on the part of developers and development professionals to find investment opportunities within specific housing markets. Promotion of aldermanic input into redevelopment has become an important component of local efforts.
Informally, this has meant courtesy signs on development projects thanking aldermen for their support of the initiative, as well as participation by aldermen in ribbon cuttings. Aldermen promote the level of reinvestment in their ward in their campaign literature, following the widely held belief that neighborhood development is good politics.

Developers and development professionals are extremely important donors for aldermanic campaigns, especially for incumbents. For the 5th ward, whose incumbent April Ford Griffin was first elected in 1997, known developers and development professionals made 50% of the campaign contributions, or about $38,000 in 2005 (5th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005a; 5th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005b; 5th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005c; 5th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005d). For the 19th Ward, campaign contributions from developers and development professionals totaled 34% of all donations, or about $31,000 in 2005, when the incumbent alderman, Michael McMillan, faced an insignificant opponent (Jordan Chambers 19th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005a; Jordan Chambers 19th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005b; Jordan Chambers 19th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005c; Jordan Chambers 19th Ward Regular Democratic Organization, 2005d).

While these contribution patterns are not illegal, they are symptomatic of the working relationships that develop between aldermen and developers. This relationship is fostered by the requirement of aldermanic approval at multiple points in the development process, a requirement that has been strengthened under the Slay administration. These points include purchase of city-owned land, receipt of CDBG funds, blighting and TIF legislation and major zoning changes. The imprint of the
alderman is so ingrained in the approval process that the question of aldermanic support is often the first question asked about a potential project.

While aldermanic support is not sufficient to guarantee a project will get off the ground, lack of it can kill it. One example of this is a smaller north-side project that got caught in the middle of the 2001 redistricting, when the project site shifted from the 5th Ward to the 3rd Ward. Prior to the shift, 5th Ward alderman April Ford Griffin had approved the project, though declined to provide CDBG funding for it. The project had the strong support of the mayor’s office, both under Harmon and under the incoming Slay administration; Slay’s office not only honored a commitment for CDBG funds out of the mayor’s allocation, but also supported the project in receiving funds from the Affordable Housing Commission. The support of the project was both a sound development decision—the developer had the capacity to complete the project and the financing and marketing structure was deemed strong—but also a smart political decision. The initiative had the strong backing of a citywide clergy coalition that was Slay’s ally on other neighborhood redevelopment initiatives, including changes to the Affordable Housing Commission.

However, after the 2001 redistricting, aldermanic support for the project evaporated. Third Ward alderman Freeman Bosley Sr. opposed the project’s sponsorship, a local Catholic church that he perceived as hostile to his election. Church leaders and members had opposed another project in his ward, and this opposition had killed the project. Additionally, Bosley used his opposition as a negotiating tool with the mayor’s office, which had opposed the use of CDBG funding elsewhere in the ward.
Ultimately, Bosley’s opposition was only removed when the mayor committed funding to other 3rd ward projects, creating a rapprochement between the two (Berger, 2001b: A2).

Besides relationships with developers, aldermen also can develop close relationships with development professionals and other private sector partners to assist them in coordinating ward-wide development activities. These partners enhance the capacity of aldermen to respond to developer’s requests, as well as ensure that developers provide campaign support and publicity. One example is the work of Sal Martinez, who has had close political relationships with a number of aldermen. Martinez also chairs the St. Louis Housing Authority (2002-present) and was a former staff member at a number of community development corporations on the north side, including the JeffVanderLou Initiative, the chief vehicle of 19th Ward alderman Mike McMillan in his redevelopment efforts. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, these actors and organizations work across sectoral lines and thus work to expand the development incentives available.

Additionally, while the role is not typical of most neighborhood entities, some local CDCs also work as direct developers, both by themselves and in partnership with other citywide non-profit organizations, including RHCDA and the St. Louis Equity Fund.

Legislative Behavior and Development

In legislative matters, the input of the aldermen is due to their sponsorship in the Board of Aldermen of redevelopment bills, including Chapter 99 and 353 blighting bills, TIF legislation and other legislation on public financing. In these matters, aldermanic courtesy reigns. In interviews with aldermen and other development officials, respondents could recall only one time in the last ten years where the full board failed to pass a blighting bill introduced and supported by its respective alderman; this had to do
with the actions of the alderman in distributing copies of the bill and nothing to do with the merits of the ordinance. Blighting and redevelopment bills are routed through the aldermanic Housing, Urban Development and Zoning (HUDZ) Committee, which ostensibly holds public hearings on the ordinance; the hearings are generally routine, although support or opposition can emerge, with aldermanic support generally trumping all else.

While redevelopment tools are open to all aldermen, aldermen vary in the amount of redevelopment legislation introduced, even among the collection of aldermen whose wards are distressed. Some aldermen see blighting as another form of constituent service, and promote blighting locally as evidence of aldermanic response to neighborhood need. While there has been informal discussions about limitations on the used blighting—both because of the scale of blighting bills unattached to viable redevelopment initiatives and because blighting ordinances represent a potential loss of local property taxes because of their tax abatement properties—aldermen have steadfastly resisted such moves. Professional staff can control the pace and extent of the blighting bills through less formal means. Since SLDC staff does the substantive work of a blighting study, aldermen do have to negotiate with SLDC managers for staff time to conduct studies and provide some reimbursement of some of staff expense through their CDBG allocations.

In broader terms, aldermen vary in the degree of development activity they promote, mostly as a function of local neighborhood conditions. Areas with high levels of distress—large amounts of vacant housing or land—tend to attract aldermen for whom active redevelopment is a top stated priority. On the other hand, the politics of more
middle class areas of the city tend to be reflected in a housing maintenance strategy—initiatives that preserve housing values and owner-occupancy by encouraging appropriate development and discouraging unwanted uses.

Informally, aldermen play a critical role in development decisions by championing development deals, writing letters of financial and official support for projects, and steering the provision of other development-related city services, such as street and sidewalk repair and demolition of buildings. This support work can be directed at a variety of agencies at a variety of points within the development process—for purchasing land from LRA, applying for state low-income housing tax credits, utilizing CDBG or HOME funds, even soliciting private or corporate support for projects. The degree of this role depends partly on the personality of the aldermen, with some aldermen requiring a significant role in the deal and others a more hands off approach.

The personality of the alderman also defines to some degree the positive and negative relationships between him or her and other development professionals. Aldermen can act as a channel for influence at the development agencies—over, for example, the selection of consultants, the provision of public funds, or securing favorable resolution to a bureaucratic problem—and CDA directors in particular must define a way of handling these requests efficiently and in a politically sensitive manner. In general, over the long term, development officials learn to work with their respective aldermen. While most development officials interviewed had a story of excessive interference by an alderman in a development deal, most also understand that it was better to learn to work with aldermen. Experienced officials within the public agencies, particularly those on the management side, have a system for this interaction; one person interviewed described
this as a process of sorting out the real deals from the improbable projects and a method for deflecting bad deals in a manner that retained good graces with aldermen.

Aldermen also influence local development by virtue of legislative structure. Two aldermanic committees directly impact development deals, the HUDZ Committee and the Neighborhood Development Committee. Of the two, the HUDZ Committee is the most prominent; the latter only is used on vacant property where eminent domain is not necessary. It should be noted that the assignment of legislation to committees is entirely the function of the president of the Board of Aldermen; however, the tradition of past referrals weighs very heavily and it is only in the rare case with the support of a large and representative group of aldermen that the tradition of committee referrals is broken.4. The HUDZ Committee also considers all aspect of business pertaining to the development agencies as well as the annual application and disbursement of federal funds for redevelopment activities. This last responsibility raises both the committee’s importance and prestige and, in the past, has made the chair of the committee a relatively more powerful person than board members.

Besides committee assignments, alliances and other forms of legislative organizing can also impact the fate of initiatives, including those that involve development. The current mayor, both by virtue of his previous tenure on the board and the work of his legislative lobbyists, has a more or less stable majority on the board and so has been successful in seeking passage for his legislative priorities.5 On more

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4 One well known break is this tradition of referral came early in the current administration, when street funding was moved out of the Streets and Traffic Committee to the Transportation and Commerce Committee; while the referral moved the issue of street funding from the hands of one of the mayor’s opponents to a committee that was chaired by a supporter, the move was done only with the support of a large majority of both white and black aldermen.

5 This has included most of the mayor’s development initiatives, including the new Cardinal baseball stadium that had a vocal Board minority and an action citizen campaign opposed to the deal.
controversial issues—for example, the city’s 2001 redistricting legislation—aldermanic positions break down by race. Since most development legislation passes unanimously, it is typically in the preliminary salesmanship of the initiative that aldermanic alliances are used. It is not unusual in the lead-up to the development of major projects for the mayor’s office to facilitate group members with aldermen to push the project. A more formal aldermanic alliance is the Aldermanic Black Caucus, a lobbying voice for African-American aldermen. In a system where one-on-one negotiating and political territoriality has tended to outweigh alliance activities, the black caucus occasionally has emerged an effective lobbying organization, particularly when other city officers insist on their input prior to legislation being approved at the E&A level.

**Development and other Citywide Elected Officials**

Whatever their influence in other aspects of local policy-making or governance, most other citywide elected political leaders—the so-called “county” officeholders—play a minor role in development matters. The treasurer’s office can play a role in commercial development through the office’s sole ability to finance and construct public parking facilities using revenue bonds secured by parking receipts. This authority has made the treasurer a significant collaborator for a number of large residential and commercial projects. While assessment and taxation of property can more broadly impact a host of development issues and there is some evidence that the collector of revenue and license collector play a minor role in some development deals, much of the work of these offices primarily involve business and use taxes. The city’s collector of revenue does have the authority to institute legal proceedings over properties that owe back property taxes. State statute gives the collector sole responsibility for determining when such a suit is
filed, providing an informal point of access for property owners and development officials. One senior city development official recalled a number of instances when tax suits were informally averted through relationships between property owners and the collector’s office. There has only been one public instance where the collector’s office has imposed itself on one important downtown deal, insisting on payment of back taxes in opposition to a deal negotiated by the mayor’s office (Prost, 2001h: B1).

For most residential projects, the process of tax abatement is relatively standardized, involving the aldermen and development officials. On the other hand, larger deals involving tax increment financing and other forms of public subsidy bring a more complicated set of negotiations between the mayor’s office, the comptroller and sponsoring aldermen, and often approval by members of E&A. Where the issue of valuation or abatement becomes a public issue, the publicity may prompt concern that the proposed deal may be too lenient or too demanding (Nicklaus, 2004b: C1; Wagman, 2005a: A1), reflecting disagreement between city-elected officials over the deal.

Others—such as bond financing, TIF and tax abatement—require input from separate boards that increasingly provide formal support after the most significant negotiations have occurred. While the mayor’s office and proxies in SLDC/CDA are most involved in them, another point of formal approval rests in the Board of Estimate and Apportionment (E & A), and, by virtue of this, the President of the Board of Aldermen and the Comptroller can become significant political players in development politics.

Enhancing the role of E & A members is the requirement for their assent to a host of “subsidy-specific interactions,” particularly TIF financing, city bonding and other decisions regarding the use of other types of city subsidies. In practice, the majority of
items before the board pass without comment, and most of the monthly meeting of E & A is conducted in a rather perfunctory manner. This includes most neighborhood-based development projects, tax abatements, real estate sales and line item expenditures of CDBG. According to one aldermanic source familiar with E&A decisions, there has only been one high profile example in recent years of E&A members modifying a line item allocation of CDBG funds; in that case, all three members of the board voted unanimously to restore funding to an agency whose budget was cut by the sponsoring alderman.

On larger projects, friction can occur between E&A board members, historically between the mayor and the comptroller. As with the board of aldermen, broader political differences can be drawn into issues involving E&A approval. This sort of dynamic particularly characterized the relationship between Mayor Vincent Schoemehl and Comptroller Virvus Jones in the early 1990s; conflict between the two reflected problems that Schoemehl had with other black politicians. In general terms, the mayor’s office is largely in charge of developing the shape and scale of significant development projects, whereas the comptroller is responsible for overseeing the impact of the deal on public finances, including some details on public financing. The comptroller has historically had a dominant role in managing financial oversight on city deals, including hiring outside financial expertise, and overseeing city bond and tax financing. One notable example of how this conflict has played out in the past occurred when Jones held upon work on bond financing of the city’s new hockey stadium following Schoemehl’s suit over the Comptroller’s office non-payment of certain bills (O’Neil, 1992a: 3A). More recently, Mayor Slay publicly objected to the fees paid for convention center bond
refinancing, prompting an escalation of public conflict between the two and their staff (Moore, 2002c: D19).

Contemporary conflicts between the mayor’s office and the comptroller’s office involve both development deals and other political factors, both large and small (Moore, 2002d: C1; Moore, 2003a: B2). According to one interview, the competition between the two offices has led them to hire parallel but different consultant teams to assist in negotiations over large development projects. Beyond the friction, however, there appears to be a tendency in the system for the E&A members to reach a compromise in terms of process even if differences in policy remain. One example of this in progress has been the routinization of tax increment financing (TIF) over the last three years in a form that accommodates both the interests of the mayor’s office and the comptroller’s staff. Prior to 2000, TIFs were a public financing technique generally not utilized in St. Louis, although their use was widespread in commercial financing in St. Louis County. TIFs are similar to tax abatement in that they utilize changes in tax rates as an incentive to redevelopment; in this case, TIFs commit a certain level of future taxes based on the redevelopment for use in financing bonds for construction of the project. Both what to include in the TIF—in terms of both the physical property and the relevant taxes—as well as more technical requirements on the part of the developer are open to negotiation as a part of the deal.

St. Louis City’s experience with TIFs had been relatively poor in the 1990s, mainly consisting of one, largely unsuccessful commercial project. Following the election of Francis Slay in 2001, the use of the TIFs dramatically increased for commercial projects, mixed-used districts such as the Grand Center cultural district and
for single residential projects downtown. Like other forms of public subsidy, TIFs
became a site for political conflict between the relevant political offices, particularly as
the number of TIF deals and the pace of the approval process quickened. According to a
member of the mayor’s staff, initial conflict over some TIF deals has been largely
replaced by a good working relationship between the mayor and comptroller’s office.
Part of the reason for the decline of conflict has been the mutual decision by the two
offices to restrict district TIFs in favor of single project TIFs. While that has increased
the number of approvals, it has also allowed the two parties to negotiate jointly with
prospective developers over the size of the TIF.

The fact that the comptroller and the board president are E&A also gives the two
offices particular impact over routine budget and contract activities involving the
development agencies, particularly CDA. CDA contracts with the comptroller to
complete auditing functions, including auditing of subcontracted activities. Additionally,
the comptroller appoints people to a variety of the development-related commissions,
including a member to LRA’s three-person board. Representatives of the comptroller
and the board president also sit on committees formed to hire CDA consultants and
undertake other large planning activities. Much of this interaction with CDA staff and
the executive staff of the comptroller and board president is routine, in contrast to the
policy interactions between development officials and the mayor’s staff. For example,
some observers noted that the requirement for all three E&A members to sign CDA
documents, including for such simple matters as the reallocation of subcontractor funds
from one category to another is more a hassle in terms of paperwork and time than a
necessary form of check and balance. However, this oversight function does provide
both the comptroller and the board president opportunities to lobby agency officials on behalf of other stakeholders involved in the development process. Such interactions, however political their basis, is generally regarded by agency management as to be expected, and, as with the input of aldermen, most long-term staffers at the agencies develop a proficiency at dealing with and responding to the input.

The Business Sector in Urban Development Decision-Making

While popular rhetoric often follows scholarship in ascribing to business interests the dominant role in development policy-making, the case of St. Louis suggests a more complicated story. While instances of direct input can be seen, these are specific and confined to the highest level of decision-making. In terms of the day-to-day activities involved in planning and implementing development projects, the input of corporate-level organizations like Civic Progress is often absent. A more complex picture of how businesses impact development decision-making starts with several observations. First is that, while regime theorists largely focused on the conduct of CEO-dominated organizations like Civic Progress, in institutional terms, such an organization is not the only form that business influence can take. A consistent theme of corporate leaders in St. Louis over the last 20 years has been a growing dissatisfaction of a number of local businessmen with the closed membership of Civic Progress and their desire for alternative organizations to channel their input into civic matters as well as gain recognition for their contributions on civic affairs (Gillerman, 1989: 1A; Miklasz, 1993: 1D; Faust, 1993: 7). Besides Civic Progress, other organizations both compete as well as collaborate for public attention for their development priorities, including the Regional
Commerce and Growth Association, the Regional Business Council, Downtown St. Louis Partnership, and other geographically-based business associations.

Following this, for a subset of local businesses, corporate engagement in development decision-making is not simply a function of charity but intimately tied to the economic interests of the business. Corporations are obviously promoters of both economic investments in general as well as seekers of public investments that improve their bottom line, in the form of tax abatements, TIF financing and other public support. Additionally, some businesses are involved in development decision-making as a function of their core businesses. Beyond their philanthropic and charitable interests, a subset of local businesses shape urban development as a function of their primary interests in real estate and investments. These include housing and commercial developers, real estate lawyers, banks and lenders, and consultants who work on development projects.

As the interests of these professionals are significant, their influence over development politics is significantly greater than broader business coalitions. First, these actors have significant private and professional relationships with political leaders, including as sources of funding for campaign contributions. For example, among contributors to the city treasurer’s campaign contributions include contractors, lawyers and financial advisors who have a direct relationship with the office in its development activities (Committee to Elect Larry C Williams, 2004: 5-6). Contributors to the 2005 comptroller’s campaign financial contributors include numerous developers, real estate lawyers and other professional developers (Darlene Green for Comptroller, 2005: various). Slay’s prodigious campaign fundraising efforts raised $1.7 million for his 2005
re-election victory; the $300,000 raised in a one month period prior to the March primary election likewise included numerous contributions from development professionals currently working in the city (Slay for Mayor, 2005: various; Wagman, 2005b: A1).

It should be noted that none of these contributions were illegal or improper; however, it underscores the relationships that emerge between development professionals and specific political leaders, a type of relationship that is repeated on the aldermanic level, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. More fundamental is the key role that development professionals play in setting development priorities and planning and completing development projects. The way and the consequences development has become substantially privatized and the role that development professional play in planning and initiating projects will be taken up next in a case study of downtown—Chapter 5 and 6—and in two city neighborhoods—Chapter 7 and 8.

**Civic Progress and Regional Coordination**

Lacking the political or economic connections to the field, it should not be surprising that corporations are generally disinterested in urban development. This disconnection has become more pronounced as the era of local, family-owned corporations passes, replaced by fewer corporations in the region headed by executives from and tied to the region (Salisbury, 1995: 3B). Observers of local corporate philanthropy have noted the increasingly smaller number of locally owned corporations, particularly Fortune 500 corporations (Nicklaus, 2003a: C1). According to one civic leader, there is a wide spread perception that that the corporate leadership that started Civic Progress in the 1950s was of a quality and character not present in lacking in contemporary leadership. For this earlier generation of corporation leaders, not only
were their businesses located in St. Louis, but also they lived and grew up in or close to the city, and, as a consequence, they had an interest and enthusiasm for St. Louis. St. Louis’ banking community, in particular, has gone through a series of mergers over the last ten years that have tended, in the view of one former banking official, to distance managers from local community needs and shifted the bank’s community investments from local personnel with a familiarity of St. Louis to a national board with little knowledge of the city.

In this regard, one of the important roles of an organization representing local corporate leaders is that it can institutionalize the connections between its corporate members and local political processes in the form suggested by regime studies. This impact is historical and iterative. Even as the broader trends of business location impact most American metropolitan regions, regions with strong corporate organizations create a culture in which civic participation and collaboration is expected and the norm. That Civic Progress plays this role only weakly was suggested in Chapter 3’s review of St. Louis’ past experience with development initiatives. Civic Progress was most active in urban renewal initiatives and, since the 1950s, present only in the highest level of discussions on the city’s most important projects. Since that point, Civic Progress has lacked a consistent presence in the city’s revitalization efforts. This situation is as much a function of Civic Progress as of the difficulties of community improvement in the city as a whole. Leaders of the organization have consistently described Civic Progress as not an “action-oriented” organization (Mihalopoulos, 1996c: 4B; Mihalopoulos, 1998e: C1) and the organization has resisted the call for changes that would make it both more transparent as well as more activist.
The legacy of these decisions is that the organization continues to lack a strong central focus and instead at best acts an information pool and coordinating body based on the interests of its individual members. As described in Chapter 3, this operating style was a conscious choice of the organization’s founders and has resisted numerous calls by various entities over the last 50 years for a revamping (“Civic Progress,” 1991: 2B; Berger and Uhlenbook, 1997: D1; Mihalopoulos, 1998d: A1; Mihalopoulos, 1998e: C1). Reforms of the organization in the 1990s did consolidate the group’s committee structure around six key issues areas, but did not substantially change the organization’s hands-off attitude towards developing and implementing key regional initiatives.

In contrast to business groups in other cities, Civic Progress has a small staff, at the most 3 to 4, many of who serve under contract as a part of their work with other local corporations. The staff works with a relatively low profile and continues their service at the bequest of the board chair. Their function is really as much local service as it is employment. The structure of members—self-nomination by existing members, consciously kept small—accentuates the group’s narrow-focus. The group meets monthly; subcommittee meetings occur at the discretion and interest of individual members.

According to some observers, Civic Progress has been especially handicapped by its inability to fully represent the base of interests in the region, both economic and regional. The lack of African American representation led first to the development of a Civic Progress race-dialogue group in the late 1960s. However, the perception that the committee had no real power led to the resignation of most of the committee’s African American membership in 1998, following the release of a Civic Progress organization
plan that failed to substantially change the membership structure (Mihalopoulos, 1998c: A1). Civic Progress’ exclusive membership requirements have also antagonized other business leaders not recognized among the region’s top corporation (Faust, 1993: 7), and led in 1997 to an organization representing the civic engagement of smaller and middle-sized companies, the Regional Business Council (Nicklaus, 2004a: E1).

The chair of Civic Progress can provide some centralizing energy to the organization, and most enter into the position with a pledge to increase the visibility and vitality of the organization. One recent chair of the organization has emphasized the importance of developing the region’s intellectual capital, both in terms of attracting new technology companies as well as creating the places that attract and retain high tech workers (Tucci, 2003b: C5). However, even with this dynamic, the group’s operating rules mean that in practical terms its support for community initiatives come as a function of the interest of particular members. To a large degree, the commitment of Civic Progress to an initiative is a commitment of individual members. Corporate and civic officials interviewed for the study uniformly described the monthly meetings as relatively low-key affairs involving informational presentations by potential project partners, staff information and an infrequent general commitment of support. The interest of a Civic Progress member secures a place on the agenda; however, to transform that into an actual commitment requires additional meetings at the level of specific corporate offices. While this sort of process means that Civic Progress members can differ on their commitments—in the words of one person interviewed who works in corporate relations, there can be no “one no” to a proposal for support—it necessarily multiplies the numbers of interactions required to gain a level of support for initiatives.
The way Civic Progress works is recognized by most seasoned participants in urban development—decried by many who are asking for support and defended by some on the giving side—but largely misunderstood by the general public. While the range of issues that Civic Progress is involved in can be broad, its operating style means that organization’s involvement is strikingly shallow. This can be in contrast to the involvement of particular corporations, and, importantly, the CEO. St. Louis has its share of CEOs who are engaged in local affairs, including some who take leadership roles in development initiatives. Generally, successful private developers who require additional subsidies and support outside of conventional market financing develop long standing personal and professional relationships with local businessmen. These relationships influence the philanthropic thrust of corporate support and shape the developer’s interactions with Civic Progress members. However, it generally does not alter the basic operating pattern of Civic Progress as a body.

More than a Checkbook?

The manner in which Civic Progress operates means that the engagement of members on a whole range of issues competes with the widespread public opinion that the organization merely acts as the region’s checkbook. Specific business leaders blend the two roles differently—some emphasizing their role as a funder and others emphasizing their personal commitment to civic issues (Mihalopoulos, 1998c: C1). Through the organization’s political action committee, the organization has provided campaign financing for a host of local, regional and statewide initiatives, including transportation levies, parks and trails financing, and local governmental reform. In many cases, Civic Progress support is matched by contributions directly from member
corporations. For the largest corporations in the area, corporate and personal
philanthropic activities exceed the collective work undertaken under the rubric of Civic
Progress.

As one topic for consideration by Civic Progress members, urban development
competes with a host of other issues, and the interest of members in it has waxed and
waned over the 50 years of the organization’s existence. Civic Progress and its member
corporations have been consistent boosters of the region’s sports and recreation economy;
member companies provided equity investment for the city’s new baseball stadium in
(Dames, 1994: Style Plus 2), and provided logistical and financial support to move the
Los Angeles Rams to St. Louis in 1995 (Schlinkmann, 2000a: A12), as well as smaller
investments in facilities and programs across the region. Civic Progress members have
also been actively involved in education issues, with key members taking on long–term
roles in the settlement of the region’s desegregation case (Pierce, 1999a: B1), as well as
supporting changes in the city’s public schools (Wagman, 2003b: C1). Members have
been similarly engaged in public health care in the region, including a long-term
commitment to Regional Hospital, a joint city-county healthcare facility that replaced the
city’s public hospital in 1985.

**Other Business Sector Groups**

Other organizations both predate and have emerged since Civic Progress’
foundling, and some of these have impacts on development initiatives. Most of the
political impacts of these sorts of groups have been on the city’s business climate,
including the availability of development sites, the city’s tax and regulatory policies and
the assistance of the city in business development and retention. The Regional
Commerce and Growth Association is the region’s chamber of commerce; headquartered
downtown, it is an active participant in regional economic growth strategies, including
fostering public policies to support investment and growth in key policies. Whereas
RCGA represents the voice of larger business entities, a more recent addition, the
Regional Business Council, is a group oriented towards medium and small businesses.
Both organization can play small roles in development initiatives, mainly as an
opportunity for charitable and equity investment in projects. Additionally, there are
associations that represent businesses in specific geographic areas; preeminent among
them has been the Downtown St. Louis Partnership (DSTLP), a partnership of downtown
businesses and property owners founded in 1957. Throughout its history, DSTLP
functioned as the primary management organization for downtown, including sponsoring
development plans for improvements. Since 2000, the Partnership has operating a tax
supported community improvement district in the downtown core to fund safety patrols
and beautification programs. More recently, DSTLP has become a major booster of
downtown living, publishing an annual inventory of downtown residential units and
conducting housing tours as units have been brought to the market. DSTLP also has
taken primary responsibility in marketing new commercial spaces downtown to new
retailing outfits, including implementing a retail plan that has targeted downtown for a
new home furnishings district.

Extensions to Business Influence

To some degree, the weak institutional focus of Civic Progress is overcome by
informal methods of connecting businesspeople and their organizations to regional issues.
This includes the work of Civic Progress staff, consultants and other informal advisors to the group, a group of individuals with informal, varied and extensive influence across a range of fields. One prominent past member of this group, the late Al Kerth, not only spoke on behalf of Civic Progress to the media, but also was regarded as the “go-to” guy for communicating between top political leaders and business leaders and between leaders themselves. Corporate leaders also use the resources within their own businesses to help monitor local matters, although shifts in local corporate structure are making these positions less numerous than they once were. Even where businesses do not designate a member of their public relations or community relations department to interact with local policymakers, some corporate heads designate key managerial staff to represent them in key community initiatives, particularly in fund-raising and corporate communication.

This sort of informal advisory system operates both as a method of building capacity and a system of gatekeeping. Civic Progress meetings and affiliated local conversations take place out of sight of most within the region, including important actors in the development field. The necessity of knowing and accessing gatekeepers in order to access business support and resources tends to confine the general impact of the business sector among known entities and discourages innovative solutions. In practice, it means that there is relatively little direct contact with Civic Progress members, beyond the top political leadership. Even though St. Louis’ mayor no longer shapes the organization’s agenda as Mayor Tucker did in the urban renewal period, the mayor and the St. Louis County executive serve as ex-officio members of the organization, as do the county executive of St. Charles County and St. Clair County in Illinois. Besides other initiatives, Mayor Schoemehl used Civic Progress backing to supplement the salaries of key
executive staff, as has Mayor Slay in more recent years (O’Neil, 1989b: 3A; Schlinkmann, 2001a: B2).

Civic Progress has also used the development of subsidiary organizations to impact regional issues, although this practice is diminishing. This has been particularly true in development, where a number of well-known and prominent non-profit intermediary organizations have their roots in Civic Progress. In 1988, Civic Progress created the St. Louis Equity Fund, a non-profit organization initiated to receive corporate investments in state low-income housing tax credits; by the organization’s 15 year anniversary in 2003, the Equity Fund had leveraged investments to create over 2,500 units of affordable housing in over 80 projects located mainly in the City of St. Louis (Nicklaus, 2003b: C1). In 1990 and following, Civic Progress supported the creation of the Technical Assistance Corporation (TAC), an organization set up by Mayor Schoemehl to rescue troubled residential projects and take on other difficult development deal (O’Neil, 1990b: 1B; Prost, 1992a: 1D). Civic Progress and member corporations have also provided significant support to the Regional Housing Alliance (RHA), a non-profit organization founded in 1992 to assist neighborhood-based non-profits complete housing development projects (Prost, 1992b: 1A). This support for the organization has continued since the merger of TAC and RHA in 1996, creating the Regional Housing and Community Development Alliance (RHCDA), an organization that has become a significant actor in the constellation of civic organizations promoting development initiatives in the city.

Civic Organizations and Development Initiatives
While Civic Progress-funded organizations—both those directly funded by the organization and those funded by member corporations—have become some of the most important not-for-profit organizations in local development, they are not the only civic organizations active in the field. The input of civic organizations has been least understood in the regime framework (Ferman, 1996: 5), but recognized as significant actors in neighborhood renewal (Vidal, 1997: 430; Grogan and Proscio, 2000: 4). The term civic generally refers to a “third way” of organizing local behavior between the poles of public sector activity and genuinely private market activity (Salamon, 1994: 109; Bradley, 1998: 157), and in this case refers both to nonprofit community development corporations (CDCs) as well as other not-for-profit citizen groups, planning organizations and public engagements associations.

Urban CDCs not only provide services in a manner outside of both local political structures and private markets, they also assist residents develop local political identities that can help sustain local action and build local social capital (Smith, 2001; Clarke, 2001). In some American cities, CDCs access training, support and investment capital through their relationships to regional and national community development intermediary organizations, including the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the Enterprise Foundation (Liou and Stroh, 1998). While St. Louis intermediary organizations date back to the 1980’s and have received support from corporations and local business groups, observers generally regard St. Louis’ nonprofit development sector as weak and under-funded (Bogart, 2003: 15). St. Louis largely missed out on the growth in nonprofit investment that occurred in
comparable cities such as Cleveland and Baltimore (Novak and Linsalata, 1991: 1A; Peirce and Johnson, 1997c: 14).

At issue for some national nonprofit leaders was the perception that CDCs were captured by local political leaders and lacked the professional capacity to plan and implement projects. Evidence for this charge can be seen in each era of the city’s development history, from the Model Cities period to initiation of community development block grant funds (Kerstein, 1980; Joiner, 1980: 12D), and the charge remains persuasive even as public funding for nonprofit development corporations has declined. Funding and political control over CDCs has been seen both as a function of conflict between the mayor and aldermen and a function of ward-based politics. Schoemehl’s initiation of Operation Impact in 1983 coincided with the funding of new neighborhood development corporations, regarded by some observers as an attempt to dictate neighborhood development policy, to the detriment of aldermanic influence. While there have been clear examples of direct aldermanic influence over nonprofit management and governance (Fernandez, 2001: 3; “Trust—Not Slush—Fund,” 2002: B2), more important is the critical role of aldermen in directing neighborhood development policy. CDBG funds are an important source of operational support for neighborhood development organizations (City of St. Louis, 2004), and these allocations require specific agreement by respective aldermen. CDBG funds directly support only 23 organizations, most with a relatively low level of production. One of the most professional, DeSales Community Housing Corporation, produced only 12 units in 2003 (DeSales Community Housing Corporation, 2003: 2).
Even with the subset of existing CDCs, most combine housing development activities with activities more typical of a volunteer neighborhood association. In some cases, development activities occur under the rubric of a neighborhood association or through a housing development corporation affiliated with the neighborhood organization. This reflects the fact that the number of neighborhood groups in St. Louis generally dwarfs the number of development organizations actively producing housing units or otherwise completing development projects. Moreover, the tension between the two settings—between representing a local neighborhood and its residents and also gathering the technical capacity to organize and implement development projects—can often work to the detriment of development activities. For many organizations, the dual responsibilities complicate the hiring and retaining of professional staff and diminish overall development capacity.

At the same time, the fact that neighborhood organizations have responsibilities other than direct development also reflects the importance of non-development activities in the redevelopment process. These include neighborhood and project planning, public input and consent, neighborhood-cleanups, beautification and marketing and neighborhood security. In particular, the creation of a neighborhood story is perhaps the most important function of neighborhood groups, both formally through plans, press reports, web sites, and neighborhood newsletters as well as informally by representing the neighborhood in meetings, development conferences and other opportunities.

Indeed, these sorts of development images are an important, but unrecognized, part of the development process. By creating images about their neighborhood’s assets and its potential, neighborhood advocates attempt to link to city and regional civic
organizations that facilitate local decision-making and provide resources and leadership to community initiatives. These include development intermediaries like RHCDAs, whose professional staff members have played critical roles in major neighborhood redevelopment projects. Additionally, neighborhood groups attempt to place the trajectory of neighborhood development into a broader set of local and regional priorities by developing partnerships with other civic sector organizations. These include formally organized citizen groups, planning organizations, and local philanthropic organizations and informal efforts such as leadership programs, “visioning” campaigns and local collaborations (Jones, 2003: 107).

As will be indicated in the specific studies of downtown and neighborhood development, civic sector resources can be an important part of development initiatives. One of the component parts of recent city development activity has been a new round of regional agenda-setting in which civic organizations have played a key role. Starting with the Peirce Report in 1997 and continuing with the St. Louis 2004 initiative (1998-2004), regional leaders led by members of both the civic and business community have engaged in a series of conversations—some public and some in private—about the future of the region and the place of the city in it. In practical terms, these activities have shifted regional priorities and created a consensus around specific projects and initiatives. Additionally, the process reenergized the funding and supporting for key organizations to work on local issues, including development downtown and development in key neighborhoods. As these initiatives have rolled out, civic sector resources, both in terms of funds and individual and organizational energy have played a critical role in reinvestment. They have stood in at the planning and predevelopment period and,
through investments in projects, have built the interest of private market actors in
development activities. In this sense, a renewed sense of urban revitalization has led to a
renewed interest in private sector initiatives in St. Louis’ housing markets. The shape of
this development process accounts for some successes in redevelopment; however, it also
demonstrates the limitations of a substantially privatized development framework.

**Summary**

The institutional structure of St. Louis—in the political structure of local
government, the organizational patterns of local business elite and the interventions of
members of the city’s civic sector—emphasizes a form of development decision-making
that is substantially decentralized. In political terms, the city’s ward-based system has
created a tension between the desires of a strong mayor to control development decision-
making and those of aldermen to set development policy within their wards. Over time,
this tension has created a system where competent mayors set the agenda for the use of
particular incentives and rely upon the full participation of alderman to act cheerleaders
for development initiatives. One of the main tasks of public leadership, particularly the
mayor’s office, is to facilitate the “hierarchical coordination” of development
professionals working in the city’s multiple development agencies. At the same time,
aldermen have strong incentives to partner with development professionals in advance
development initiatives. In general, development is good politics, and incumbents
promote redevelopment activities as part of their platform to re-election.

In contrast to other American cities, the organizations representing St. Louis’
business leaders play a less prominent role in local affairs and development decision-
making. Much of the work of corporate leaders on development projects is done outside
of the formal authority of such organizations as Civic Progress in the long term and personal relationships between specific leaders and specific developers. Civic Progress leaders have consistently resisted a more activist role in local affairs, despite frequent calls over the years for the organization to broaden its membership base, strengthen its staff and organizational structure and take a more active role in local affairs. While corporations have supported intermediary organizations to work on development initiatives, one consequence of Civic Progress limited engagement and the city’s decentralized political structure has been the historical weakness of the area’s non-profit development organizations and the general limited and sporadic activities of other members’ of the city civic sector to reenergize redevelopment activities.

The key impact of this structure is that where development activities occur they do so with the strong interest and participation of private sector actors. In this sense, development activities in St. Louis are substantially privatized. At the same time, planning and implementing development projects requires a framework of collaboration to support private sector initiative, with specific supportive roles being played by local political officials and other stakeholders. As the next set of chapters will demonstrate, at the center of development efforts are private market actors, including local developers and financiers and their supporters elsewhere in local structures. In light of the institutional fragmentation of local decision-making, planning and implementing projects can be difficult. However, the projects investigated demonstrate how key actors mobilize to create institutional settings for decision-making that enhances the ability of developers to complete projects. For contemporary development downtown and in the
neighborhoods analyzed, elements of these institutional settings include a new vision for redevelopment and new incentives and institutions to foster redevelopment.
Chapter 5: Decline of the Central Business District

The thesis of the next two chapters is that the city’s decentralized institutional structure creates a system of development decision-making where private market actors play a central role in planning and initiating development projects. On the one hand, the city’s institutional structure suggests that the public sector blunts the ability of local mayors to control development decision-making. Even with the recognition that the powers of St. Louis’ mayor have incrementally grown, in structural terms St. Louis’ political processes is one that emphasizes collaboration and not command and control. Added to the complexities of multiple elected officials and multiple development agencies are the plethora of incentives and mandates from other levels of government. This bleak view of St. Louis’ redevelopment prospects thus suggests that the city’s institutional capacity is unfocused and not conducive to complicated redevelopment projects.

On the other hand, the review of development projects contained in the set of chapters—reviewing the trajectory of development initiatives in downtown St. Louis (Chapter 5 and 6) and in a near north side cluster of neighborhoods (Chapter 7 and 8)—shows that this view is only part of the story. Even given the complexities of most projects, development in St. Louis can achieve a form of stability. This comes about as the incentive structure for development activity shifts, routinizing collaboration between stakeholders and diminishing the risk for private market investment, in both financial terms and in terms of time and prestige. Additionally, the experiences of downtown and neighborhood development indicate that not only do private market forces dominate development decision-making, they are regarded the motor force of projects and their
priorities set the priorities for specific markets. As much as public officials and the local business elite, civic sector actors play critical roles in changing the incentive structure for investment and creating new institutional arrangements to support new investment.

The first projects reviewed are those occurring in downtown St. Louis, with an emphasis on development occurring from 1995 to 2005. This chapter will focus a review of past redevelopment efforts downtown and demonstrate how economic decline in downtown’s traditional retailing and office sector deteriorated confidence in downtown’s planning and redevelopment efforts. The next chapter will show how this declining confidence in the traditional vision of downtown set the stage for a new round of downtown planning, a new vision for downtown as a residential neighborhood and new incentives and institutions to carry out redevelopment activity. In this analysis, downtown refers to the central area of the city of St. Louis, stretching from the Mississippi River to the east, Jefferson Avenue to the West, Cole Street to the north and I-40 to the south.

[Insert Figure 2 here.]

While the area is broader than the conventional definition of the central business district—generally confined to Tucker on the west—it is the area represented as downtown in most postwar planning studies.

Although downtown has played a unique economic and symbolic role, over time these two aspects have become divergent. As the central business district, it is the location for major private investments in office buildings, civic places, and sports and entertainment facilities. Downtowns usually draw attention on the broader issues involved in urban redevelopment as opposed to the local, constituency-driven politics in
the neighborhoods. Yet, regional economic trends have diminished the economic
sectors—mainly retailing and professional, office-oriented sectors—that built the skyline
of the city over the course of the 20th century. At the same time, there is growing
recognition that many urban downtowns have achieving renewed population growth on
the basis of a emerging residential population, including downtown loft living (Gratz and

**Downtown Planning and Development in the Post-war Period**

In many ways, the renewed opportunity for downtown development that emerged
after 2000 was unanticipated in the conventional planning rhetoric that had dominated
planning in the post-war period. Increased commercial and residential competition from
the city’s suburbs and socio-demographic changes in the city had eroded downtown’s
central role in the regional economy. Downtown plans attempted to reverse the area’s
downturn by promoting large-scale public improvements in order to encourage the
construction of new office buildings, hotels, and entertainment and tourist facilities.
However, it was apparent by the 1990s that the physical separation between downtown’s
main features—particularly the separation of the Arch from the remainder of downtown
by a major interstate—and the lack of activity in the central business district as a whole
meant that downtown served more as a collection of individual assets and less as a part of
a whole.

Left out of the equation in most downtown planning initiatives, at least until the
middle 1990s, was any sort of realistic reference to a downtown residential population.
This situation put St. Louis behind other major American cities that had invested
political, civic and economic energy in downtown living and seen their downtown
population increase from 1990 to 2000. A 1998 survey of downtown residential patterns St. Louis found that the city had just over 7,000 residents with a projected population of only over 10,000 by 2010; St. Louis’s residential population was significantly smaller than such midwestern cities as Cleveland, Detroit, Minneapolis and Milwaukee (Katz, Nyugen and Lang, 1998: np). Even at this relatively low level, St. Louis’ numbers are misleading in that they do not reflect the young, urban, professional dweller most coveted by urban planners (Moulton, 1999), and include significant numbers of subsidized public housing on the fringes of downtown, including the Carr Square Apartments and Cochran Towers and Townhouses, and the mixed income areas of the O’Fallon Apartments and Columbus Square Apartments. By the 1990s, the only real concentration of market-rate housing in the downtown area was Gentry’s Landing, a group of three residential towers built on the eastern edge of downtown as a part of a larger urban renewal project in the 1960s. Indeed, because of population loss in the urban renewal and public housing areas, St. Louis’s downtown is one of the few of major American cities that lost population from 1990-2000 (Sohmer and Lang, 2001: np).

Even at its worst, downtown remained the largest employment location in the region and the location for some of the region’s most important firms. In this sense, reports of downtown’s absolute economic irrelevancy were overblown, even given the complaints among many of the region’s civic and business leadership that downtown had lost its focus (Woo, 1989: 2B; Prost, 1996a: 1B). Significantly, these reflections came after decades of major redevelopment initiatives—commercial, institutional and residential. A complete survey of these post-war investments is beyond the scope of this study; however, a sense of them, and their strategic intent for a general view of
downtown and its future, can be gathered through a review of some of the major post-war plans. These documents include formal city plans for downtown completed in 1960, 1974, 1987 and 1993 (City Plan Commission, 1960a; City Plan, 1974; Community Development Agency, 1987; St. Louis Development Commission, 1994)\(^6\). Accompanying them are various planning studies conducted for project areas in downtown and completed by both city planners and private planning and design organizations (Russell Mullgardt Schwartz Van Hoefen, 1953; City Plan Commission, 1960; John Graham and Company, 1970; Team Four Inc, 1975b; Team Four Inc., 1980; Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation, 1983; St. Louis Development Corporation, 1991-1992; among others). The plans and studies indicate the general character of downtown development and the persistence of a vision of downtown development. Also included in the analysis of planning are the redevelopment plans completed for specific projects in order for their qualification for Chapter 99/100/353 designation (Mansion House Redevelopment Corporation, 1959; City Plan Commission, 1961; City Plan Commission, 1969; City Plan Commission, 1973b; Broadway/Olive Corporation, 1980; Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority, 1990; among others). Given the importance of blighting to qualify for local tax abatement, these redevelopment plans are as important as formal plans for the development of downtown.

**Urban Renewal in the City Beautiful**

In many ways, the plans have remarkably consistent elements, reflecting long-standing goals on the part of the city’s business and government elite. These elements reflect a “City Beautiful” vision for St. Louis dating back to the first part of the 20\(^{th}\)

\(^6\) The 1987 plan was completed but not adapted by either the city’s planning agencies or by legislative body; however, the analysis uses the plan as it reflects consensual as well as competing views of St. Louis’
century, emphasizing the role of public buildings, parks, open spaces, boulevards and parkways as a catalyst for new office and residential development. From the perspective of this “public city” (St. Louis Community Development Agency, 1987: 5), post-war downtown plans echo a commitment to the Memorial Arch and the 91-acre Jefferson Memorial Park. The desire for a rejuvenated riverfront dates back to city proposals in the 1930s (City Plan Commission, 1933) and is replicated in successive plans for a riverfront-planning district (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 26; City Plan Commission, 1974: 14.) until largely completed in the late 1970s. A second aspect of the downtown’s public infrastructure is the desire for the creation of a central parkway emanating west from the Arch to the western edge of downtown at 20th Street. Both the eastern aspect of the parkway, known as the St. Louis Central Parkway in the 1950s (Russell Mullgardt Schwartz Van Hoefen, 1953: 7) and the western portion Plaza area became known as the Gateway Mall by the 1970s and are regarded by most downtown plans as the major urban element in downtown St. Louis (City Plan Commission, 1974: 19; St. Louis Community Development Agency, 1987: 15; St. Louis Development Corporation, 1994: 60).

The intention of the creation of these open areas was to spur a cluster of development initiatives around them (Russell Mullgardt Schwartz Van Hoefer, 1953: 8), and subsequent plans and initiatives reflect the presence of a multitude of developments—including hotels, office buildings and residential towers—adjacent to them. The success of this strategy was buoyed by the early redevelopment of the 3rd and 4th Street corridor facing the new Arch (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 26-7; City Plan Commission, 1974: 17), including the Mansion House development completed in 1965, the Gateway Tower in 1966 and Stouffer’s Riverfront Inn in 1966. Similarly, the downtown during this period of transition.
construction of the Gateway Mall—created over a fifty-year period—transformed downtown’s surrounding skyline. The western portion of the mall flanked a set of civic buildings on the south, a continuation of the Public Group Plan of 1919 (City Plan Commission, 1919), and Plaza Square Apartments on the north, planned and constructed in 1959 as a part of the city’s urban renewal activities. Bounded on the east side by the Old Courthouse and on the western edge by the Civil Courthouse, the Mall became surrounded a series of new glass and steel towers. These include on the south the General American Life building (1976), the Broadway Marriot Inn (1968) and the Equitable Life building (1969) and on the north the Southwestern Bell Telephone building (1990), the Boatman’s Bank building (1974), and Gateway One building (1986).

Also annunciated in post-war planning studies is a downtown stadium area on the southeastern edge of the central business district. The location of the stadium, completed in 1966, was in part selected to connect to the intersection of a number of new highways, particularly the elevated Daniel Boone Expressway, now Interstate 64 (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 28). Like the creation of the Jefferson Memorial area, the intention of the stadium was to spur redevelopment eastward, northward to the Gateway Mall and westward to Tucker; the adaptive use of Union Station, proposed in the 1974 plan, created the impetus for a South District planning area stretching from the riverfront to a new North-South Connector just west of 20th Street (City Plan Commission, 1974: 21). Accentuating this trend was the development of the Kiel Center (later Savvis Center), a new sports arena west of Tucker completed in 1994, and the introduction to downtown of light rapid transit (MetroLink) in 1993.
Redevelopment activities in both of these areas demonstrate that urban renewal activities—primarily commercial office buildings and tourist-related facilities—were built on top of downtown’s public improvements in terms of open spaces and parkways. In general, the plans largely set the context for private sector development, which took advantage of the financial incentive under tax abatement provisions under Missouri Statute 353 (City Plan Commission, 1974: 26; City Plan Commission, 1987: 6; St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 72). While some of the public improvements called for were completed in one form or another, the Gateway Mall being one example, others remained on the drawing board due to lack of funding or consensus (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 73). Included in this latter group was the plan for an Esplanade, a pedestrian-oriented, retail and entertainment district, along 10th Street west of the stadium (St. Louis Development Commission, 1987: 6). The Esplanade plan received blighting and TIF approval from the city in 1991 (St. Louis Development Corporation, 1991), but remained on the drawing board when development rights to the plan expired in 1996.

Post-war planning in other parts of the central business district—a sub-district north of Gateway Mall and east of Tucker and a second area south of the Mall and west of Tucker—similarly proposed large-scale public improvements in order to encourage private market investments in office and commercial activity, with varying degrees of success (Team Four, Inc., 1975: 15). The Core area is of particular interest to city planners throughout this period (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 22; City Plan Commission, 1974: 15; City Plan Commission, 1987: 5; St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 63), reflecting the importance that this area played in the commercial
and retail life of the city. Initial postwar plans followed the pattern of urban renewal activities, calling for large-scale public improvements in the form of open space and pedestrian only walkways. These included the creation of a public plaza at the site of the Old Post Office, pedestrian-only shopping mall along various streets and selective demolition or reworking of buildings within the area (City Plan Commission, 1960a: 22-25).

Most of these ideas were not realized, with redevelopment confined to the northeastern portion of the downtown (Larry Smith and Company, 1974: i). Most significant was the construction of the Mercantile Tower in 1974 and the Cervantes Convention Center just to the north in 1977. The 1974 downtown plan built upon these developments, calling for construction of a new three-story atrium shopping mall that linked the tower and center with two of downtown’s department stores, Stix Bauer and Fuller (later Dillard’s) and Famous Barr (City Plan Commission, 1974: 16). The convention center—later augmented by a newly named America’s Center in 1993 and an adjacent new football stadium in 1995—came to define the northern edge of downtown, with its back on Cole Street facing the Cochran public housing area. Following public protest over the proposed demolition of the Old Post Office (Committee to Save the Old Post Office, 1965), the 1974 plan shifted the area’s public center northward as a part of a new pedestrian-only walkway along Locust from 4th to Tucker Avenue.

Investments around the city’s convention center meant that the rest of the Core district lacked a broader strategic vision, outside of calls of renovation of “important” older buildings in order to preserve the area’s architectural heritage (Community Development Agency, 1987: 17). While the strategy of rehabilitation proposed in the
1980s—a time of interest in preservation prompted by federal tax credits—was a step above reconstruction strategies followed in the 1950s and 1960s (City Plan Commission, 1960: 22), it hardly amounted to a genuine plan for the district’s older buildings. An even more piecemeal approach was used in the treatment of the substantial portion of downtown located north of the Plaza Square Apartments and west of Tucker. The area is barely recognized as a part of downtown in the 1960 plan, seen mainly as an extension of the Plaza’s new residential district. This plan reserves the commercial and wholesaling activities in the northern and western portion of the area around Washington Avenue for “further study” (City Plan Commission, 1960: 34).

The 1974 downtown plan largely continued this tradition of neglect, noting that the district’s current commercial uses could be strengthened by the introduction of highway access through the North-South connector (City Plan Commission, 1974: 20). The clearest vision for the area prior to planning activities in the 1990s—which first recognized the large-scale potential for renovated loft housing along Washington Avenue—was a 1980 economic development strategy that called for public incentives to maintain the area’s wholesaling and commercial character (Team Four, Inc., 1980: vii). At that time, the district largely remained as it had been developed by the 1920’s, although demolition of properties for surface parking lots meant that about 25 percent of the area was vacant land (Team Four, Inc., 1980: 1). City plans also called for new industrial districts in the northern portion of the area along Delmar (City Plan Commission, 1974: 19; Community Development Agency, 1987: 14) and for expansion of a Civic Center adjacent to the downtown public library, including further educational

**Doubts and Debate in the 1980s**

Gradually, over the 1970s and 1980s, much of the area immediately to the north and south of the Gateway Mall saw the replacement of older, turn of the century office buildings with new glass and steel towers. The central business district portion of downtown added 82 new office and commercial buildings after 1950, expanding the amount of available office space (Office of the Assessor, 2005). Elsewhere in this core area, this sort of reconstruction did not occur, leaving downtown’s early 19th century skyline intact and leading to the sort of two-track office sector as discussed previously. One the one hand, downtown planners and their supporters in the city’s business community understood the basic trends in downtown’s changing functions (City Plan Commission, 1958: 11; City Plan Commission, 1960: 6; Community Development Agency, 1987: 2). Indeed, the practical impact of redevelopment initiatives throughout the post-war period was the reshuffling of space in the central business district, particularly the whittling away of manufacturing and wholesaling uses and a strengthening of the area’s office, governmental, and, increasingly, entertainment uses (Economic Research Associates, 1980: 72).

On the other hand, St. Louis’ best-laid plans met the reality of economic conditions in the region as well as the reality of downtown’s overall capacity. In retail terms, downtown’s prominence declined throughout the post-war period. By 1967, downtown had nearly 1.3 million square feet of retail space, with the largest decreases in the sort of convenience retail uses dependent upon pedestrian traffic (Larry Smith and
Successive city plans noted the obvious increasing vacancy of street-level retailing, including numerous vacant storefronts operating as “dead-zones” for pedestrians (City Plan Commission, 1974: 15), but at the same time contained dramatic plans for expansion of downtown retailing, both in terms of departments stores and pedestrian retail (City of St. Louis, 1988: 5).

By the 1990s, it was apparent that even the retail anchors in St. Louis Centre and Union Station were failing to adequately compete with suburban shopping malls. Given the level of public investment required to open it—a 1978 UDAG grant requested nearly $8 million in federal funding for completion of the mall—St. Louis Centre’s precipitous failure was particularly shocking. Planning studies completed before the mall’s opening predicated its success on the ability of the mall to attract visitors from outside the city and downtown area, particularly patrons who traveled downtown primarily to shop (Larry Smith and Company, 1974: 8, 16). However, just five years after the mall’s opening, mall owners were eliminating evening hours in recognition that the mall was not attracting any substantial suburban traffic; just over a third of the shoppers at the facility were downtown workers with just under 50% traveling less than 10 to 15 minutes to visit the mall (VandeWater, 1989: 12).

Additionally, St. Louis Centre suffered competition from both Union Station, opened in the same year, and the Galleria Mall, which underwent a $337.5 million expansion in 1991 (Thomson, 1991: 1E). By the early 1990s, press reports on St. Louis Centre were peppered with store closings, particularly on the first floor, where merchants complained that “the traffic was not there” to sustain business (Faust and Berger, 1992: 9C). While mall merchants hoped that the arrival of MetroLink in 1993 would revive
business, MetroLink construction on the adjacent meant that streets and sidewalks around the mall were blocked from more than two years prior to the line’s opening (Wallstin, 1991: 3A; Prost, 1995c: 1B). Court filings in 1994 over responsibility for debt on the mall showed that the facility had never broken even, was less than 80% occupied and was worth far less than the debt held on the building (Faust, 1994: 6). By 1996, with an occupancy rate of only 50%, mall owners reported that the structure was worth only $92 million of mortgages on the buildings (Faust, 1996: 1A). With the failure of a plan in the same year to replace a portion of the mall with a new convention hotel, mall owners officially gave up on the facility’s use as a retail space, and started exploring commercial and office uses for major portions of the structure (Prost 1997: 1E). None of these plans stopped two foreclosures on the mall in 2001 and 2004; the second time the property sold for just over $5 million (Prost, 2004b: C1). An initial “wait and see” attitude on the part of city planners has more recently been replaced by frustration as the lack of progress hampers a $40 million dollar restoration of the Dillard building—connected to the mall by a pedestrian bridge—into a hotel and apartment building (Van Der Werf, 2005: 1D).

The failure of St. Louis Centre caused much soul-searching on the part of the city’s development community, including the opinion that retrospectively downtown was not ready or able to sustain much retailing (Faust, 1996: 1E; “Downtown Waits, And Waits,” 1999: B6). By 2000, downtown retailing was confined mostly to tourists and visitors in such enclaves as the Union Station and Laclede’s Landing and daytime establishments catering to downtown office workers. The lack of the sort of retail establishments that traditionally catered to personal and business services downtown as
well as those that catered to tourists and visitors added to a general sense of downtown’s emptiness. The lack of after-hours pedestrian presence downtown was so noticeable that one local civic organization started a weekly campaign in 1997 to draw people downtown once a week in an attempt to convince restaurants and bars to stay open (Mihalopoulos, 1997c: 1A).

Retrospective reflection in the 1980s and 1990s also questioned the office construction strategy that dominated downtown redevelopment schemes. From a purely physical perspective, the overestimation of planners in downtown plans is obvious. City plans traditionally had worried about whether the downtown had enough buildable sites for Class A office towers (City Plan Commission, 1958: 33; City Plan Commission, 1960: 7; Community Development Agency, 1987: 9); on the other hand, many thought that downtown office space was overbuilt (Koman, 1989b: 4; Faust, 1989: 20). One consistent theme in the trajectory of downtown’s office projects was how they were scaled back over time. Perhaps the most infamous example of this sort of overestimation was the case of proposed redevelopment of the Gateway Mall under the “half mall” plan proposed in 1981. Only one of the three of buildings was built, and the redevelopment corporation went out of business in 1993 with losses of over $12 million (Grone, 1993: 1).

The St. Louis Centre project originated in a multi-unit proposal in 1973, including the enclosed mall, up to three new Class A office towers and a 500 bed hotel room to serve the convention center planned for the area (City Plan Commission, 1973b: 2; City Plan Commission, 1974: 15). While the Mercantile Tower was quickly built in 1974, the rest of the plan stalled. A competing plan for part of the area was introduced in 1979
(SBF Redevelopment Corporation, 1979) and the entire plan for the district was reintroduced in 1982 after receipt of a UDAG to fund some of the area’s improvements (Mercantile Center Redevelopment Corporation, 1982). By this point, the original developer of the enclosed mall, locally-based May Corporation, had been replaced by a national owner and operator of shopping malls, the Simon Company, and the location and number of ancillary buildings to the mall—hotels and office towers—were significantly pared down. Only one office tower, One City Centre, was built, completed in 1983, and the city would wait until the 2004 to get their convention center hotel.

While some disputed that downtown office vacancy rates were abnormally high given the overall absorption rate downtown (Sanford, 1989: 4), trends in the sector created a difficult market for owners and brokers and an opportunity for renters looking for deals in a variety of parts of the region (Faust, 1990: 27; Bryant, 1995b: 2B). New Class A office space also increased the obsolescence of existing, older buildings (Economic Research Associates, 1980: 80). Increases in the occupancy of new towers such as Metropolitan Square, constructed in 1988, came at the expense of increasing vacancy in Class B and C buildings (“Downtown Occupancy 80.1,” 1992: 14). Complicating downtown’s soft real estate market were federal tax changes in 1986 that wiped out tax deductions favoring ownership and investment in older buildings (Thomson, 1990: 1E; VandeWater 1990: 1B). By the 1990s, the state of downtown’s office real estate market was “a tale of two distinct cities” (McLaughlin, 1997a: 7A)—represented on the one hand by new, gleaming and largely occupied office towers and on the other hand by older, and increasingly obsolete, buildings built in the first half of the
20th century. Vacancies in the latter portion of the market left downtown with significant sections with few commercial occupants and little commercial activity of any kind.

Consensus and Critique in Downtown Planning

The lower expectations for downtown reconstruction met a renewed interest on the part of some civic leaders to emphasize rehabilitation and preservation of downtown’s early 20th century heritage (Committee to Save the Old Post Office, 1965; Economic Research Associates, 1980: 40-45; Toft, 1989: 3B). These views brought a new generation of civic entrepreneurs—including successful redevelopers of such reclaimed neighborhoods as Soulard, Lafayette Square and the Central West End—into direct conflict with political and business leaders who lauded the city’s redevelopment with 353 projects (Farris, 1989: 3B; Ward, 1989: 3B). Conventional proponents of downtown development saw in the expansion of Class A office space the necessity to prune the market of older buildings—thereby reducing the supply of office space, creating parking facilities for downtown visitors and reserving space for future reconstruction (Farris, 1989: 3B; Thomson, 1990: 1E; Albinson, 1993: 3B). Opposing these voices were individuals and property owners that supported preservation and historic district status (Economic Research Associates, 1980: 45) as well public and private organizations that advocated for preservation and worked to block demolition of historic buildings. Chief among these was Landmarks, Inc., a private not-for-profit group founded in 1959 to promote and preserve the city’s architectural heritage, and the city’s own Heritage and Urban Design Agency, a commission-led organization with a specific mandate to preserve historic buildings and authority to block demolition of city-recognized historic
landmarks. The latter especially provided a stumbling block for demolition of landmark status buildings in the downtown core (Tucci, 1994: 1A; McLaughlin, 1994: 5A).

While the preservation strategy was only marginally successful—downtown’s Laclede’s Landing being the largest scale example of preservation—its critique of conventional planning and development strategies added to the sense that the strategic vision for downtown was flawed. The conflict between the two goals—preservation, on the one hand, and redevelopment, on the other—is obvious in terms of the city’s downtown plans; a historic district nomination for much of the central business district proposed in 1980 found that 39% of the properties proposed for nomination are indicated in the 1974 as ones to be cleared for new development (Economic Research Associates, 1980: 94). Nomination of historic buildings brought great controversy, with many in the city’s political and business leadership opposed to district nomination and opposed to the individual nomination of their own property (Economic Research Associates, 1980: 5, 40). Because of this opposition, the district nomination plan did not take place.

A spate of rehabilitation downtown in the 1980s also spurred on proponents of preservation; in these developments, federal tax incentives served as the carrot to ownership and reinvestment. Prior to the introduction of these incentives, federal tax policy encouraged demolition of older structures and their replacement with new buildings. In 1976, however, changes in the tax code began allowing developers of historic commercial buildings to write off the cost of rehabilitation over a five-year period. In St. Louis, the changes prompted approximately $67 million in investment in historic rehabilitation, most of it in the Central West End and Laclede’s Landing (Porter, 1990:3C). A more significant incentive for preservation came with additional tax
changes in 1981 that allowed investors in historic rehabilitation projects to take a tax
credit of up to 25 percent in the cost of rehabilitation. The changes prompted an
investment of over $430 million in the restoration of historic properties in St. Louis,
including a number of commercial buildings downtown (Porter, 1990: 3C).

The elimination of federal tax incentives in 1986 sharply brought rehabilitation to
a halt, including work on key buildings downtown. One developer active in the period
reports how the loss of the incentives radically reduced his ability to complete projects.
Overall, the loss of the credits had a large impact on the number of rehabilitation projects
in the city, with the number of large rehabilitation dropping to less than 10 in 1987, down
from 190 projects in 1984 (Porter, 1990: 3C). While some small incentives remained,
their use was complicated by new Federal Park Service regulations that tightened historic
standards on interior work, an area where developers had had a freer range in the past.
The loss of the credits resumed pressure to demolish buildings downtown; in retrospect,
the level of demolition is significant. From 1975 to 1995, the core area of downtown—
Tucker Avenue east to the river, Cole Street to Highway 40—lost 300 of its 500
buildings, with 100 buildings replaced by office towers and hotels and 65 buildings by
parking lots and garages (Prost, 1996b: 6A).

Encouraging a criticism of downtown development priorities was the gradual
institutional shift in the organizations involved in downtown development away from an
urban renewal approach to an emphasis on broader development goals. The distinction
between the two approaches can be overdrawn—for example, contrary to many urbanist
critiques of urban renewal planning all city plans up to the 1970s emphasized the
importance of a pedestrian presence downtown and talked about preservation of some of
the city’s architectural and historical legacy. However, leadership of urban renewal agencies like LCRA did represent an older mentality that was often at odds with younger planners, particularly after the creation of CDA in 1974. According to several long-time observers of local development politics, LCRA head Farris was dismissive of the city’s new development mandate and chaffed under the supervision of the new agency’s control of CDBG funding.

Accompanying the shift in power within the city’s formal development agencies was a growing criticism of downtown’s business management organization, Downtown, Inc. Founded in 1958 following a study commissioned by Civic Progress members, Downtown Inc. was modeled on downtown organizations found in other American cities (Uhlenbrock, 1989: 3). Representing downtown property owners and businesses, the organization functioned as the area’s chamber of commerce and was intimately involved in the planning and initiation of development initiatives. As such, the organization’s leadership was involved in key downtown projects, both in a formal capacity as well as organizers for Chapter 353 corporations in key development areas. One telling sign of Downtown St. Louis’ place within downtown’s planning and development apparatus is the fact that, upon Charles Farris’ retirement from LCRA, he went on to work for the organization.

As a part of downtown’s leadership, the organization received criticism throughout the 1980s because of the seeming lack of progress downtown mounted (Porter, 1989: 3DZ). Compounding these difficulties were internal splits within downtown’s core leadership group, including differences of opinion over Mayor Schoemehl’s plan to save the Cupples Warehouse District (Gillerman, 1989b: 1D).
Likewise, the organization was rocked by both a financial scandal in 1996 and evidence that it was inflating downtown occupancy and workforce numbers ("A Frank Assessment of Downtown," 1996: 10B). This lead to the resignation of the group’s long-time executive director and a period of transition in the organization, including a new name, Downtown St. Louis Partnership, in 1997, and a new mission (Downtown St. Louis Partnership Inc., 1997). However, doubts about the organization’s effectiveness continued, hampering a new round of planning. Personality conflicts between the organization’s new director, Kim Kimborough, his staff and other stakeholders downtown complicated downtown planning efforts and gradually convinced planners of the need for a new organization, Downtown Now! (Berger, 1999d: A2; Manning, 1997c: 1).

The institutional shift in planning agencies and their allies among downtown’s leadership also reflected a new generation of political leadership that assumed power in the city during the 1970s and 1980s. These included younger black and white aldermen who cut their teeth in neighborhood revitalization movements and a younger mayor in Vincent Schoemehl Jr. whose election in 1981 was due to neighborhood organizing and grass-roots style politics. Schoemehl had an ambivalent attitude towards the city’s existing power structure. On the one hand, he revitalized contact between the mayor’s office and local business leaders, asking for their input on a host of city initiatives (O’Neil, 1989b: 3A). On the other hand, Schoemehl publicly clashed with the conventional view of downtown planning a number of times, Gateway Mall being one. While he eventually reversed course on the preservation of historic property in the
Gateway Mall scheme, he remained at odds with downtown interests until the end of his term.

Schoemehl’s reform of the development agencies, particularly the creation of SLDC as a mayor-led agency to coordinate the city’s efforts, accentuated the trend away from an emphasis on urban renewal. According to long-term observers, Schoemehl and LCRA head Farris disagreed over downtown priorities and Schoemehl quickly sought to further minimize Farris’ position. Schoemehl’s first head of SLDC, Christopher Grace, brought with him a new perspective on downtown development and a desire to model the city on such “renaissance” cities as San Francisco and Boston (Prost, 1989b: 3D; O’Neill and Prost, 1991: 1E). By the time of his third term, Schoemehl was publicly questioning some of downtown’s major initiatives, including the construction of new Class A office buildings and the development of the Gateway Mall (Porter, 1991: 4C). At the same time, Schoemehl had little advice on how a better form of downtown planning could emerge at a time when cities were all but ignored by the federal government and were unable to provide basic city services.

Summary

For most of the post-war period, downtown redevelopment consisted of development in office buildings, public buildings, and commercial, retail and tourist facilities. The projects benefited from both the investment advantages of Chapter 353 blighting designation, as well as public sector expenditures and support. By the 1990s, however, this strategy appeared played out and inadequate to foster recovery as economic trends depressed the area’s historic role in the region’s retail and office sector. Increasingly, downtown’s landscape reflected numerous dead zones, with numerous
underused or even abandoned buildings and little pedestrian or commercial traffic. In institutional terms, economic decline resulted in a concomitant decline in the authority and prestige of a set of local actors that had promoted this downtown strategy. On the public side, newer agencies supplanted the primary role LCRA had played in the urban renewal period; private sector organizations such as Downtown St. Louis likewise underwent a crisis in leadership, resulting in a diminution of the organization’s prestige in downtown planning and project implementation.

The next chapter shows how the decline of downtown set the stage for a new, more successful round of development activities in the 1990’s, and presents a framework of how local actors work together to foster redevelopment. Through a series of planning exercises, a broad coalition of downtown stakeholders defined a new vision for downtown radically different from the central business approach preferred in earlier decades. This vision, emphasizing a new downtown residential neighborhood, promoted the authority of new round of downtown leaders, including a new public-private partnership, Downtown Now!, to oversee implementation of a new plan. This new institutional setting for development decision-making encouraged both the activities of individual entrepreneurs in creating residential loft buildings as well as supported large-scale, lynchpin projects like the convention center hotel and the Old Post Office District.
Chapter 6: The Rise of Downtown Loft-Living

The legacy of postwar planning and development provides both constraints and opportunities for downtown leaders as they engaged in another round of planning and redevelopment in the 1990s. First and foremost was the physical and economic impact of the projects pursued, both those completed and those still outstanding. The latter comprised a list of commitments that city officials had to struggle to fulfill, including renovations to the city’s convention center, the development of convention hotel, gaming and entertainment facilities on the riverfront, and redevelopment of the area around the ballpark. Elsewhere in downtown were a series of outstanding proposals, some times at this point failed projects with ownership structures of key properties that complicated future redevelopment. The legacy of completed projects was no less difficult. Chief among them was the St. Louis Centre, by the mid-1990s largely regarded as a planning mistake, and the footprint of the Gateway Mall, which had never materialized in the entirety that planners had envisioned.

The legacy of postwar planning and development also remained in institutional terms in the stakeholder community. Conflict and a lack of consensus—replicated in personal conflicts between individuals and differing agendas among agencies—represented an obstacle that future efforts would have to overcome or at least diminish. Mayors had to overcome the institutional fragmentation of the city’s development agencies, as well as the general bureaucratic inertia in all city agencies, and facilitate consensus among the civic organizations interested in promoting a view of downtown development. In political terms, the mayor remained the key elected official, and was required to unite the disparate forces necessary to plan and complete projects. In general,
aldermen played a lesser role in downtown planning, except where conflict over projects—such as the Gateway Mall plan—spilled over debates at the board of aldermen. The central role of the mayor and his staff was a benefit where mayors exercised energy, leadership and visions—for example, during Schoemehl’s three terms—but also meant that progress lagged when mayors for political or personal reasons did not pay enough attention to downtown priorities.

In light of these constraints, it is remarkable that a host of new incentives materialized in the late 1990s—institutional as well as economic—that allowed for entrepreneurs to find new opportunities and new successes in a manner that became routinized and accepted. The thesis of this chapter is that the collaborative work of political officials, stakeholders from the city’s civic sector, and private market actors created a new institutional setting for downtown development decision-making and the creation of a series of projects that have transformed St. Louis’ downtown. This new framework created a pivotal moment for the city and for revitalization of downtown, including rehabilitation of parts of downtown’s historic core that had become quite grim. Over a series of planning exercises, downtown stakeholders created a more or less consensual view of downtown, with downtown housing and loft living as the symbol for reinvestment of resources, energy and excitement.

This new view of downtown matched a shift in the general conception of the importance, aesthetically and economically, of urban spaces, particularly the excitement garnered by a residential district downtown. Historic downtown streetscapes became prized and promoted for their ability to shape positive and exciting interactions for tourists, consumers and residents. While the arts were a starting point—many of the
“pioneers” in loft living in the 1980s were artists—the receptivity of the image of loft-living survived as developers transformed the loft district from a post-industrial arts area, to an edgy club area, to a professional residential district. In economic terms, a new set of tools encouraged investments in the existing fabric of downtown, the historic buildings that had largely been untreated by past planning efforts. Most importantly, downtown’s redevelopment was conditioned by the expansion of the capacity and interest among local civic leadership, leading to their reinvestment in the downtown planning process. In the redevelopment of downtown that emerged in the late 1990s, civic leadership played critical roles in developing interest in downtown and at key points in the process providing expertise and resources to allow entrepreneurs to continue the redevelopment process. While conflict did emerge over key projects and priorities, they have been relegated to a subset of activities and have not threatened the general tenor of redevelopment activities occurring downtown.

**Downtown Planning Again: Starts and Stops in Downtown Living**

The development of lofts corresponded to a synergy between a positive financial outlook for rehabilitation, the creation of a supportive institutional framework that supported developers, and a more or less consensual view of loft living as the hallmark of a new downtown. It should be noted that although loft living serves as a symbol of downtown’s revitalization efforts this does not mean the projects associated with them represent the largest economic investment in the downtown core. The investments in lofts downtown is far outstripped by the $270 million investment in the new convention hotel, the $646 million cost of the new baseball stadium or the projected $200 million that will spent on a new gaming and hotel complex on Laclede’s Landing. Additionally,
these other commercials projects have taken as much and probably more energy on the part of downtown stakeholders than loft developments.

However, loft living and the Washington Avenue Loft District plays a particular place in contemporary downtown development strategies, and investments in it have provided visible evidence of downtown’s comeback. The physical location of the loft provides a spine linking tourist facilities to a broader downtown streetscape. Over time, the possibility of a relatively high income residential population has created and sustained an economic market for personal and retail services that had previously eluded downtown’s managers.

While downtown housing dates back to the urban renewal period—and even earlier in vestigial forms in older industrial and commercial districts—St. Louis was a relative latecomer to the contemporary phenomenon of loft living. Lofts generally comprise the adaptive use of warehouses and commercial buildings into residential or live/work units. The practice began in the late 1970s and early 1980s in cities such as New York, initially oriented towards artists and bohemians whose residence at these urban spaces reflected their participation and consumption in an exotic urban lifestyle (Zukin, 1982; Gratz and Mintz, 2000). These converted spaces represent a novel form of urban residence: high ceilings, open floor plans, exposed brick walls, with visible mechanical workings and minimal interior finish. Since that point, lofts have become a recognized housing choice in most American cities, catering not only to young artists but also to professionals of all ages, including older “empty nesters” downsizing from a more traditional suburban house (Buchholz, 1999: T6; Prost, 2001k: C1).
The general observation that downtown housing—a new downtown neighborhood—was the symbolic draw to a rejuvenated downtown core was reinforced through planning activities conducted over the 1990’s. These included a 1994 master plan started in the last years of the Schoemehl Administration and completed after Mayor Freeman Bosley Jr. assumed the office; a planning process begun by Bosley just prior to the 1997 mayoral election and consequently aborted by his predecessor Clarence Harmon in the same year; and the Downtown Now! Planning process begun in 1997 and completed by 2000. Throughout this period, city development officials were also busy working on some of downtown’s previously stated priorities, including opening the America’s Center convention facilities in 1993 and the adjacent football stadium in 1995, as well as pursuing redevelopment opportunities on Laclede’s Landing and pinning down a site and redevelopment plan for a new convention hotel.

The 1994 plan began with a two year planning process initiated with the recognition that downtown progress had stagnated (Freeman 1992: 1C) and that the 1987 plan for downtown had failed to gain traction (Albinson, 1991: 3B). The 1987 plan came under criticism for a number of reasons; proponents of a new planning process noted that the plan had been completed by an out-of-town consultant under contract with the city’s development agency, that the plan had not covered all of the parts of downtown and had failed to cover such issues as economic planning, transportation and parking (Prost, 1992b: 3A; St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 73). In the background was the lack of progress on the most dramatic proposals—the Esplanade retail district and new downtown housing—and the lack of consensus around certain development issues, including those involving the preservation of existing buildings (Albinson, 1993: 3B).
By contrast, downtown leaders promoted this planning process as an inclusive one that would come to involve over 125 city leaders sitting on 5 committees, including urban design, infrastructure and transportation and economic development and tourism (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 74). In a manner adopted by later planning processes, the 1994 plan included three public visioning sessions to gain input for local stakeholders and residents. The plan also relied heavily on the contributions—financial as well as technical—of local economic development and planning consultants, including Richard Ward of Development Strategies Inc., an individual whose expertise in downtown and city development extended back into the late 1960s. Landmarks Association, a historic preservation organization and frequent critic of downtown development strategies, also served as a consultant on the planning process.

The 1994 plan served as a strategic vision for downtown, with broad themes and goals as well as specific action points to encourage future planning (Prost, 1994b: 1D). In general, its formulation reflected a new strategic view of downtown markedly at odds with the 1974 plan. The plan’s initial emphasis was on downtown as a place for culture, activity and excitement, a place of high quality design and historic preservation and a downtown linked to surrounding neighborhoods (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 10-13). The first and primary goal for the plan was the promotion of downtown housing, including loft housing and new townhouse housing in locations like Laclede’s Landing and near the Gateway Mall (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 19). Goals for development of the area’s downtown office supply stressed balancing new and rehabilitated office space and increasing marketing and retention of businesses in key corporate sectors (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 24). Similarly, planning
for downtown retail specifically discouraged the additional development of large-scale malls or retail centers, with a major goal to expand pedestrian-level and street front shopping (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 37, 39). Planning for tourist and convention facilities promoted the recently completed America’s Center convention center, the critical task of completing a new convention hotel, and the ability to use the history and culture of downtown and the region as a major visitor attraction (St. Louis Development Commission, 1994: 31).

**Freeman Bosley and Downtown**

Beyond the participation of leadership from the development agencies, Schoemehl, busy campaigning for the governor’s office in the last year of his mayoralty, took little visible ownership over the planning process, and the plan’s adoption after the 1993 election put it squarely as a mandate for the new Bosley administration. Downtown was a major feature of the 1993 mayoralty campaign, with most of the major candidates pledging support for downtown development (O’Neil, 1993: 3A; Prost, 1993a: 1B). Bosley’s election brought to office the city’s first African-American, and his initial focus suggested that a program for downtown would be balanced by a concern for the neighborhoods as well (Freeman, 1993: 4B; Mannies and Holleman, 1993: 3A). Bosley set out a broad neighborhood agenda, including a city-wide plan to reorient public expenditures to link new housing and investments to institutional and commercial anchors in key parts of the city (Gross, 1994a: 1B).

Civic Progress corporations supported Bosley only after his victory in the Democratic primary (Schlinkmann, 1993: 1C), and commentators suggested that a Bosley administration would bring a new set of priorities to downtown projects (Derks, 1993: 38;
Linsalata, 1993a: 1A). However, while Bosley brought in a new perspective and some new players, it did not amount to a public embrace of the broad set of projects outlined in the 1994 plan. Bosley did support downtown living, but also specifically stressed in his campaign the importance of entertainment and tourism as the key to downtown’s future. This included new gaming facilities on the city’s underutilized riverfront (Prost, 1993a: 1B), a priority he repeated throughout his term (Linsalata, 1993b: 1A; Linsalata, 1994: 1B). One of the Bosley’s administration’s first actions was to reopen the bidding process on a casino site, putting aside a recommendation made right before the 1993 election by a panel appointed by Schoemehl (Linsalata, 1993b: 1A). Bosley tied the development of a casino with broader development goals for the riverfront and the convention center area, including a new 1200 convention center hotel, parking facilities and residential development (Holleman, 1993: 1B).

While his administration successfully mastered the political process of getting a favored proposal through a new selection committee and negotiating a merger of two proposals to favor the city’s comptroller (Prost, 1994a: 1D), negotiations over the proposal stalled over the spring of 1995. The selected developer withdrew its proposal (O’Neil, 1995: 1B). A second round of proposals in 1995—scaling back radically the requirement for ancillary developments—led to a second proposal for casino facilities and approval from a new selection committee in May of 1995 (Gross, 1995a: 1A). However, the project bogged down over condemnation of land by private owners (Prost and Faust, 1996: 1B), and, with the election of a new mayor Clarence Harmon in March of 1997, the casino project was essentially shelved.
Bosley’s plans for new casino ran up against the realities of economic
development in the 1990s, decreased federal aid and a poor investment climate.
Additionally, the project suffered from the pulls and pushes of local politics as competing
developers sought access to the variety of actors involved in the decision-making,
including the mayor. While Bosley was able to steer his choice through this minefield,
the process also suffered from a perception that Bosley’s requirement for some form of
local ownership in the casino development opened it up to undue influence. Press reports
that some of the local owners were local political actors with connections to elected
officials, including the mayor (Derks, 1993b: 1), prompted repeated calls to reopen the
process (Gross, 1995: 2B). The death of the first casino proposal also set back activity to
build a new convention hotel, another priority left over from the Schoemehl
administration after financing for the project fell apart (Moore, 1993: 1; Faust, 1995: 1E).
A three-member committee chaired by Missouri Senator Thomas Eagleton began another
round of discussions on the hotel in 1996, including the possibility of public financing
However, talks with one prospective developer stalled, and early in 1997 city officials
again reopened the process (Lindecke, 1997a: 2B).

If Bosley’s casino plans unfairly opened him up to questions of cronyism—
Schoemehl’s choice for a convention hotel, for example, was a major campaign
contributor (Grone, 1991: 1)—such charges complicated the process of providing clear
leadership over development priorities. Observers suggest that Bosley’s position as the
city’s first African American mayor made him cautious to rely upon the existing, mostly
white power structure that had handled development initiatives under Schoemehl. Bosley
missed an opportunity to reshape the city’s development agencies, waiting until relatively late in his term to appoint a new chief of SLDC (O’Neil, 1997a: 6A). Indeed, there is also no public evidence that any significant attention was paid to the strategies outlined in the 1994 downtown plan, or that additional planning occurred after its adoption, a position that one downtown planner asserts also existed in private. Bosley early on angered preservation opponents, supporting the demolition of the Arcade Building in 1994 and 1996 for a surface parking lot (Prost, 1994: 1B; Prost and Tuft, 1996a: 9C), and publicly announced during his re-election campaign that he supported further demolition in the downtown core area (Prost, 1996: 6A).

By the end of his first term, Bosley faced criticism that downtown development had once again lost momentum, and downtown again became a major campaign issue in the 1997 mayoral campaign (Kee and Prost, 1997: 1A). Bosley’s defense of his record included calls for a new downtown planning process, to be led by a steering committee including key downtown business people, political leaders and stakeholders (Mihalopoulos, 1997: 12). Former police chief Clarence Harmon, Bosley’s main rival in the contest, directly questioned the mayor’s leadership on downtown, charging Bosley with ineptitude and cronyism (O’Neil, 1997b: 1A) and openly courted the support of preservationists, and supporter of small business and housing for downtown (Kee, 1997: 8D).

**The Rise of The Washington Avenue Loft District**

Harmon’s election in 1997 capitalized upon a renewed interest in downtown living, an idea that had been percolating in St. Louis since the late 1980s. St. Louis’ experience with lofts was shaped both by the economic feasibility of investing in older
commercial buildings in the downtown core as well as a growing perception of the
importance of downtown housing as a symbol of a renewed city center. The perception
of downtown housing in most city plans prior to the 1999 Downtown Now! Plan
generally regarded such housing as new urban townhouses and designated a variety of
sites as the possible location of these new communities, including adjacent to the Plaza
Square apartments and north of Laclede’s Landing (City Plan Commission, 1974: 20, 24;
Community Development Agency, 1987: 11-12). The models for this type of housing
came from the reasonable success of the Columbus Square town homes, a series of
attached residences and condos built just north of downtown in 1986, and from the
example of new row houses built in cities such as Memphis and Pittsburgh (St. Louis

While construction of many of these new housing projects never materialized, city
development officials did pursue a new housing project for the Laclede’s Landing site.
Initially proposed as part of a failed casino expansion project in 1994, the project was
revived in 1998 when city development officials reached a preliminary agreement with a
nationally known developer for construction of the units (Schlinkmann, 1998b: B1).
However, the project was delayed in 1999 while the city searched for $6 million to
support the deal (Schlinkmann, 2000b: C8), and it was set back further in 2001 when
negotiations over property acquisition bogged down, leaving the city in the hole for
another $2.6 million (Bryant, 2001: C8).

The prominence of these sorts of new housing projects in city planning as
opposed to loft development was also reflected in differences of opinion between some
downtown developers and development professionals. One planner who was involved in
the 1994 plan admitted that he was late to understand the viability of the loft phenomenon. Officials at the civic organization St. Louis 2004 and key supporters in the development field such as Richard Baron of McCormick Baron Salazar and Andrew Trivers, a downtown architect, strongly supported the goals of building new housing in order to diversify downtown’s residential population (Trivers, 1997: 3B; Stamborski, 1998: B1).

City plans prior to the 1990s included the outlines of a loft strategy even as other residential and commercial options were the primary backbone of planning objectives. Even as other city plans were calling for expanded incentives for commercial businesses on the Washington Avenue loft district (Team Four, Inc., 1980), the 1987 downtown plan advocated residential conversion of most of the commercial buildings along Washington from Tucker to 14th Street (Community Development Agency, 1987: 12). The plan captured the general interest in rehabilitation fostered by a wave of rehabilitation in the downtown core in the early and mid-1980s. As a part of this, efforts by the Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation (WARC) succeeded in rehabilitation of buildings on Washington Avenue east of Tucker, namely the Lammert building in 1986. A subsidiary of the Pantheon Corporation, which had completed large scale renovation projects in the Central West End and the Skinker DeBaliviere area, WARC produced a plan for the area in 1983 (Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation, 1983) and received city approval for the plan in 1984. The redevelopment plan emphasized reuse of historic structures, mostly for commercial and office space, capitalizing on favorable federal tax incentives that promoted reinvestment in historic structures.
At the same time, the designation of two Washington Avenue national historic
districts in 1987 created the impetus for preservation and rehabilitation of the structures
(St. Louis Development Corporation, 1987a; St. Louis Development Corporation,
1987b). The nominations, made under contract with the city, identified contributing
historic structures within the districts and designated their significance to Washington
Avenue’s historical role as a commercial and industrial center. The nomination was
followed in 1991 by a redevelopment plan for the district developed jointly by
Landmarks, SLDC and the St. Louis Chapter of the American Institute of Architects (St.
Louis Development Corporation, 1992) that was widely circulated by city development
officials to encourage interest in the district (Prost, 1992c: 1D).

Initial proposals and interest in downtown loft living emphasized a variety of
potential sites (Prost, 1989a: 14A; Prost, 1992e: 1A). However, preliminary proposals for
Washington Avenue concentrated interest in loft living downtown there, and led to an
initial profusion of plans, proposals and scattered redevelopment of property in this
general area. While the city provided a small amount of grant money for projects along
Washington Avenue (Prost, 1991b: 1D), rehabilitation was complicated by the
elimination of federal tax incentives in 1986 that had encouraged rehabilitation and
adaptive reuse in commercial structures. This loss largely shelved redevelopment plans
by the Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation, leading to a sale of the company
and its properties, including the Lammert Building, in 1989 (Koman, 1989: 1). With the
decline in the economic feasibility of preservation and the reduction in the value of
downtown property came a new generation of owners of some of the district’s most
significant properties; these owners generally had single buildings or smaller collections
of property (Sahm, 1991: 14A; Berger, 1991a: 1E; Berger, 1993: 1F; Prost, 1993b: 1B), and were part of an eclectic group of developers, residents and businesses that actively promoted the district as an area of cafes, galleries, art loft studios and inexpensive rental space (Futterman, 1991: 8; Petersen, 1992: 1).

Even with this interest, by the mid-1990s the number of residents in the district was small and almost entirely renters. The small population and turnover in commercial establishments reflected the relatively ad-hoc nature of the development effort. One of the most successful projects, ArtLofts, a 63 unit art studio project completed in 1996, utilized state low-income tax credits awarded by the Missouri Housing Development Commission and investment from Boatman’s Bank Community Development Corporation (Prost, 1995a: 17A). Most other projects were smaller and financed through less extravagant means. In promoting the district, restaurant and entertainment establishments noted the relatively cheap space, but acknowledged the lack of evening traffic (Flannery, 1993: 12). Developers also charged that the city gave little support to their efforts, and one developer rejected the city’s grant money, claiming that he could not get clear answers from the city’s development agencies on use of the funds (Prost, 1991c: 3A). Rhetoric often outstripped tangible signs of progress. Numerous projects started and then stopped—including one where the city had to repurchase from a developer who had bought city-owned property but had made no improvements (Tuft, 1996b: 1A). Additionally, city officials were forced to deal with dangerous or shoddy work (Tseng, 1999: F8).

The largest owner of property in the district, Larry Deutsch, typifies some of the characteristics of development in this period. By 1991, Deutsche owned a number of
buildings in and around Washington Avenue, mostly east of Tucker (Recorder of Deeds, 2005). In 1995, Deutsch fully controlled the Washington Avenue Redevelopment Corporation, including the development rights guaranteed under the city’s 1984 redevelopment agreement (Secretary of State, 2005). While Deutsch was lauded early as one of Washington Avenue’s pioneers (Prost, 1991a: 2D; Berger, 1990a: 1D), his on-again/off-again redevelopment plans for such buildings as the Merchandise Mart and the Bank of St. Louis building as well as attempts to demolish key downtown buildings for surface parking lots earned him the ire of both preservationists and downtown planners (Berger, 1991b: 1D). More significantly, Deutsch’s ownership of key buildings and development rights put him into conflict with city officials and other downtown stakeholders as development priorities shifted (Cole, 2003: 1). Deutsch’s 12-year battle with the city-affiliated Technical Assistance Corporation (TAC) held up redevelopment of the Bank of St. Louis building; ultimately, officials had to let Deutsch exercise his right to the building in 2004, leading to his sale of the property three months later at a significant profit (Tucci, 2004: B1; Peterson, 2004: C2). Similarly, Deutsch’s development rights over the Lennox Hotel site held up convention hotel negotiations until a state court ruled that his development corporation has relinquished his rights to the property (Bryant, 1995a: 1B). Deutsch’s ownership of the Merchandise Mart building ended only after the city agreed to pay $4.3 million for the building in 1998 (“Metrowatch,” 1998: B2).

**Harmon and the Downtown Now! Plan**

Deutsch was only one of the owners of downtown properties that city officials would have to confront as development activities peaked after 1997. The owner of the
Century/Syndicate Trust building just west of the Old Post Office ran afoul of city officials throughout the 1990s because of a lack of progress on the building; the city’s Heritage and Urban Design commission blocked demolition in 1995, leading the owner to install a 10 foot wooden fence around the building (Prost, 1995b: 1B; Mihalopoulos, 1996e: 3B). The fence became a major issue in the 1997 mayoral primary as a sign of downtown’s decline, with Harmon pledging for force the owner to move it. In part, owners of vacant buildings in the district felt that their investments should reflect the added value of property as the incentive for use of the buildings increased, particularly if the city blocked their attempts to convert their buildings to parking garages and lots. At the same time, many thought some of the owners were speculators who were holding up downtown’s progress (Schaenen, 1999: B7; Cole, 2003: 1).

The new Harmon administration’s interest in downtown development caught the wave of interest in loft living, pushing downtown development to the front of the new mayor’s agenda. While Harmon’s leadership would quickly come under question—like Bosley, he would end up a one-term mayor—Harmon’s administration put into place a number of building blocks of downtown redevelopment. Key among these was a new round of downtown planning, called Downtown Now!. Despite initial criticism, over a six-year period the process grew to a regularized method of planning and project initiation involving public officials, private development officials and downtown developers and investors. Downtown Now!’s core group oversaw development of the plan and continued to orchestrate downtown development under Harmon’s successor, Francis Slay. Downtown Now! officials served as a one-stop-shop for downtown development, including direct support for public investments in the loft district and
collaborative problem solving for specific redevelopment projects with private developers. While roadblocks occurred in the redevelopment process, reflecting both the difficulties of development and the competing priorities of political and economic stakeholders, downtown’s new leadership structure maintained key relationships across the city’s political, business and civic sector, ensuring that critical milestones have been met. Ultimately, Downtown Now! was part of a broader part of shifting the incentive structure of investment downtown, creating a stable environment whereby developers, investors and other entrepreneurs could continue to plan and implement projects, even when disagreements over priorities emerged.

Despite requests from Bosley’s planning committee to continue their work after the 1997 mayoral election, Harmon elected to put the planning process on hold. However, his initial appointments indicated his intention to keep downtown development on his agenda. Key among them was the designation of Mike Jones as his chief of staff. A former alderman in the City of St. Louis, corporate executive with Anheuser-Busch executive, Jones was well known to city politicians and business leaders and also was an early supporter of Harmon in the mayoral campaign (Manning, 1997b: 1). Jones would come to play a critical role in Harmon’s administration; he assumed a supervisory role over SLDC and CDA, and eventually became Harmon’s deputy mayor for development following the reorganization of the city’s development agencies in 1998.

Harmon also made Jones his representative on Downtown Now!. Joining Jones as co-chairs of planning process was Richard Fleming, the head of the Regional Commerce and Growth Association; John Fox Arnold, the chair of the Downtown St. Louis Partnership; Joanne LaSala, head of St. Louis 2004, and Robert Baer, CEO of
United Van Lines. Former Republican Senator and Danforth Foundation chair John Danforth replaced LaSala in December of 1997. Also added as co-chairs in May of 1998 was David Darnell, president of NationsBank Midwest; John Dubinsky, CEO of Mercantile Bank; Priscilla Hall-Ardoin, president of Southwestern Bell Missouri; Dean Wolfe, executive vice-president of May Company; and Larry Williams, treasurer of the City of St. Louis. The planning process also utilized a fifteen-member management committee comprising staff at various downtown stakeholder organizations and city agencies to manage the planning process and provide staff support. A task force of about 50 people—comprising stakeholders, residents, building owners and downtown investors—was additionally formed to act as an advisory organization for completing and approving the plan. (The task force ultimately grew to about 150 persons before the Downtown Now! Master Plan was released in June of 1999.)

At the initiation, Jones placed a six-month deadline for the planning process, stating that the goal was to create specific and doable projects to revitalize downtown. Jones also stated that planning leaders had already decided that downtown housing and jumpstarting the Washington Avenue Loft District would be top priorities for Downtown Now! (Schlinkmann, 1997a: 2B). After a series of public and private meetings, the group returned with an initial action plan in January of 1998. Recommendations sought further private investment in the downtown core and more specific times such as instituting a downtown safety and beautification corps (Downtown Now!, 1997: 6-7; Prost, 1998c: B1). The report affirmed that development downtown would be market-driven, with public investments to complement and encourage private developers. As significantly, the Downtown Now! team indicated that it would continue more specific planning,
including hiring consultants and other planning officials to conduct a second series of
meetings to flesh out plan priorities. The consultants included local firms such as Trivers
Associates, Development Strategies, and David Mason and Associates, a minority
architectural team, and the national planning and architectural firm EDAW. After
announcement of the report and follow-up planning process, NationsBank announced it
would fund half of the $950,000 cost as a part of $100 million commitment towards
downtown revival (Prost, 1998b: A1; Prost, 1998c: B1). Other contributors would
include Southwestern Bell Corporation and the Danforth Foundation.

Early Downtown Now! efforts and the emphasis on residential development
downtown were bolstered by complementary reports conducted by its partnering
organizations. A January 1998 study conducted for St. Louis 2004 by Zimmerman/Volk
Associates concluded that downtown could absorb about 500 units of new or rehabbed
residential housing downtown each year and recommended a number of potential sites for
downtown housing, including Washington Avenue (Parish, 1998c: B1). A second study
by the same firm in July of 1998 conducted for the Downtown St. Louis Partnership
completed initial feasibility estimates on various sites and called for the creation of a one-
stop center to assist in residential development (Prost, 1998f: C2).

Additional work and meetings of the consultant and leadership led to the creation
of Downtown Now!’s “First Directions” report in June of 1998, released to the public in a
series of public meetings in July and again in September. Also called the Downtown
Action Plan Phase II, the report organized short and long term objective in downtown
development around four key goals: downtown as a 24 hour urban center; downtown as
a cultural and entertainment center; downtown as an educational and technological
center; and downtown as a connected, pedestrian oriented urban place (Downtown Now!, 1998b: np). The plan divided the downtown area into subdistricts, but concentrated on providing broad planning goals and development recommendations on four main districts: Washington Avenue, the Old Post Office/CBD Core, Laclede’s Landing/Riverside North, and the Mall area (Downtown Now! 1998b: np). Another set of public meetings in December of 1998 provided initial cost estimates for projects in the four project areas (Downtown Now!, 1998c: np) and follow-up meetings in March of 1999 reviewed streetscape and urban design standards for key streets in the downtown area, including a proposal to narrow Market Street (Downtown Now!, 1999: np). Finally, after public “Studies Review” held in May of 1999 (Downtown Now!, 1999b), the Downtown Now! Master Plan was released in June (Downtown Now!, 1999c).

The Downtown Now! Master Plan reaffirmed four major themes for downtown—downtown’s residential, economic, education and cultural importance—and detailed major development districts in the downtown area, particularly the importance of the Washington Avenue Loft District and the Old Post Office District (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 6-10). The plan incorporated an open space framework plan—detailing among other things improvements to the Gateway Mall—and transportation framework plan—proposing interstate improvements to I-70 downtown leading to a Mississippi River Bridge to the north (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 11-12). Year one priority actions for the Washington Avenue Loft District included a goal for beginning major streetscape improvements to Washington Avenue west of Tucker by 2000, issuing an RFP for the Merchandise Mart, and jumpstarting three to five loft conversions in the district (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 18). The year one action plan for the Old Post Office District
called for securing ownership over critical buildings, issuing a request for proposals of revitalization for the buildings, and finalizing plans for Webster University’s use of the Old Post Office space (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 20). The plan also detailed plans for new residential communities on Laclede’s Landing in the North Riverfront area mirrored on similar townhouse developments developed in Alexandria, VA, and Milwaukee, WI (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 21).

**Financial Incentives and Downtown Development**

Downtown Now!’s implementation efforts were significantly shaped by the introduction in the fall of 1997 of state-level historic preservation tax credits, which dramatically improved the feasibility of loft projects. The idea of a state-level incentive for reinvestment in historic properties first emerged at a 1996 meeting between board members of Landmarks Association and the Downtown St. Louis Partnership. Efforts to introduce legislation began when the legislature reconvened early in 1997 (Prost, 1997a: 1B). The legislation called for a state tax credit for 25% of eligible rehabilitation costs for eligible historic properties—either qualifying properties in historic districts or properties on the National Register of Historic Places. In an attempt to cast the credit as broader than just an urban redevelopment effort, the effort was ostensibly led by a statewide coalition of preservation organizations, and rural legislators promoting the credit noted it would assist redevelopment in the state’s smaller towns (Prost, 1997b: 2C). However, Landmarks Association board member Jerry Schlichter and the organization’s director Carolyn Toft largely carried the campaign forward. Schlichter, a local lawyer, had also been involved in preservation efforts in the 1980s and had been one of the property owners who had been badly impacted by the loss of federal historic tax credits.
in 1986. RCGA also assisted the campaign by placing the proposal on its legislative agenda, lobbying for the bill in Jefferson City and also discussing the legislation with Missouri Governor Mel (Janecke, 1997: 2).

While the initiative quickly gained the support of mayoral candidate Clarence Harmon (Williams, 1997: 8A), according to those involved in the campaign for the credits, local political officials were not closely involved in the legislative efforts. The proposal was quickly taken up as a part of the session’s emphasis on state economic development. However, in the state Senate the proposal got lumped into a broader economic development proposal that combined the tax credit with other economic development proposals, including a sales tax cut and other tax credit measures, pushing the cost of the measure $70 million beyond the size that the Governor wanted. The bill survived legislative maneuvering, receiving final House approval in May (Young, 1997a: 9A), but the governor vetoed the bill in July, citing one part of the bill detailing revisions in the state’s tax increment financing program as “dangerous to our fiscal integrity” (Young, 1997b: 1A). Even with the veto, the state tax credit had attracted little opposition, and Carnahan pledged support for it in calling for a special legislative session in the fall of 1997 (Young, 1997c: 1B). This time, city officials increased their lobbying efforts in support of the legislation, appointing a former state representative to lead the lobbying for the bill (Berger, 1997: 1E). The bill won support in the Senate, and Carnahan signed the bill in September (Young, 1997d: 1C).

Passage of the credit was lauded among downtown boosters (Boyle, 1997: B7) and immediately incorporated in a number of key downtown projects, including the new convention center hotel. Since that point, virtually no project downtown has been
accomplished without the credit; all loft projects have used it, specifically the ability to syndicate the credit to bring additional financing into projects. This use created a market for the credit that a number of local banks have pursued, with several opening downtown offices to purchase and sell credits nationwide and to oversee downtown investments (Manning, 1998: 2). Downtown developers state that without the credits many downtown loft projects would have been very difficult if not impossible.

Additionally, the credits fit the model of development emerging downtown by supplementing but not replacing private investments; use of the credits rested upon the financial feasibility of the project as determined by private developers. In this sense, historic tax credits, and project-based tax-increment financing, avoided the political difficulties of the use of other public incentives available to downtown developers. Indeed, CDBG funds have been rarely used in downtown loft developments. A plan by one developer to apply for CDBG funds ran up against the opposition of developers as well as city development officials who understood the use would set a politically explosive precedent (Tucci, 1999a: 2).

On the state level, the political popularity of the historic tax credits has made it difficult to repeal, even with state budget woes and a majority Republican legislature in 2003 (“Use a Scalpel, Not an Ax,” 2003: C12; Evans, 2005c: C1). One illustration of the political successes of the credit can be seen in contrast to the other major initiative for public support for downtown projects, the use tax campaign waged in 1999 and 2000. That campaign, sponsored by Downtown Now! and St. Louis 2004, came directly from the estimated $1.5 billion cost of the downtown plan. Early proponents of the tax stated that the idea came from a best practices trip undertaken by regional leaders in 1999 to
Denver sponsored by RCGA, whose director, Richard Fleming, had been director of a similar downtown initiative there (Tucci, 1999b: 1). A December, 1999, plan proposed increasing the sales tax 4/10th percent in St. Louis City and St. Louis County to fund public improvements—sidewalks, lighting, parking, streetscape improvements and security—in the downtown area and tapped former Senators Eagleton and Danforth to lead the campaign (Tucci, 1999c: 1). The proposal required state legislative support followed by a vote of residents of the two areas. However, the idea hit early opposition, both from Republican leaders in the state house as well as county representatives (Prost, 2000a: B1; Bell Jr., 2000: B2). Both county Republicans and urban Democrats wanted to use the funds for other older, urban neighborhoods (Stern, 2000: E1; Mannies, 2000: A1). Because of this, the measure failed to get out of the state Senate in April, and backers had to admit that the plan was dead.

The use of other major incentives, like low-income housing tax credits, faced similar obstacles to widespread application downtown. First, the mayor’s office had to specifically request the credits for the project in the face of the competing need for the credits elsewhere in the city, including HOPE VI public housing conversion credits. Secondly, use of the credit evoked reactions from some downtown developers who wanted the city to emphasis the district’s market-rate housing (Prost, 2001e: C1). Ultimately, securing additional public investment in downtown—whether low income tax credits for lofts, empowerment zone bonding for the new convention center hotel, or state investment board bonds for the Old Post Office District—required broader political effort, including that activated around the Downtown Now! plan.

Downtown Now! and Local Civic Actors
In financial as well as institutional terms, historic tax credits were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for downtown development. Changing the financial calculation on loft projects is only one portion of the redevelopment of downtown; as important were the increasing capacity of downtown developers and the ability of a broader network of downtown stakeholders to support their work. One of the important components of the Downtown Now! agenda is its ability to intervene in downtown development in the face of roadblocks. Some downtown stakeholders, including some of who were members of the Downtown Now! task force, questioned the need for more planning, particularly the $1 million cost associated with the plan (Prost, 1998c: B1). Some participants in public meetings were dissatisfied with the level of detail provided to the public about plans (“Consultants Hired by City Show Their First Drafts of Ideas to Revitalize Downtown; Final Plan isn’t Ready, Project Manager Says,” 1998: B3) and about the proposed $1 billion cost of improvements (Hillig, 1998: B2); behind the scenes, discussions around project priorities led to vigorous debates and recriminations (Berger, 1998: A2; Berger, 1999a: A2). Disputes over the plan spilled out in the public during the planning process, including visible disagreements between the mayor and planners over what to do with the Gateway Mall (Schlinkmann, 1999b: B3) and disagreements with plan priorities after the release of the Master Plan (Prost, 1999c: B1). The planning process ran out of money mid-way in 1998; rewriting of key sections of the plan delayed its release until spring of 2000 (Berger, 2000: A2). Other cracks within the planning process appeared as partnering organizations jockeyed for prominence and credit claiming in the plan and its implementation (Prost, 1998f: C2; Berger, 1999b: A2; Berger, 1999e: A2). In interviews five years after the plan’s initiation, some downtown developers continued to question
the effectiveness of the Downtown Now! process and whether its implementation made much difference.

The strategic, and some would say limited, role of Downtown Now! in implementation of the master plan is a function of both the composition of the downtown’s stakeholders and the nature of development initiatives downtown. Given the competing interests, programs and priorities, some level of competition is to be expected among planning participants and downtown developers; one of the key roles in the implementation phase was to minimize conflicts. Some level of personality and organizational conflicts was only resolved with the resignation of Kim Kimbrough from the Downtown St. Louis Partnership in 2001. As importantly was the designation in October of 1999 of a principal implementing staff person, W. Thomas Reeves, former head of lending at Mercantile Bank (“Ex-Bank Official Will Lead Downtown Now,” 1999: B2). Reeves brought to the job both specific familiarity with downtown projects; he had worked with Deputy Mayor Jones in putting together the financing for the new convention center hotel (Schlinkmann, 1999e: B1) and, according to participants, had served as Mercantile’s representative on the Downtown Now! planning process, playing particularly important roles in developing options for the Old Post Office District (Berger, 1999c: A2). Reeves’ background in banking brought a new level of confidence to downtown efforts among corporate officials and actors. His presence was particularly important in building confidence among local bankers in investing in downtown loft projects; he assisted local developers in regularizing their development financing plans, creating a standardized template for loft development and marketing that template to banks, investors and other financial entities.
The primary role of Downtown Now! staff was to coordinate and utilize the activities of downtown partners, recruit and oversee the work of professionals in problem-solving activities, and remain a visible point person for downtown progress on Washington Avenue and the Old Post Office. Like the campaign for tax credits led by Landmarks, activities in support of revitalization predate Downtown Now!’s implementation phase but intensified after Reeves’ appointment. In terms of civic sector participants, critical roles were played through the mobilization of business, political, and civic leaders in a regional assessment and planning process that began with the Peirce Report process in 1996 and 1997 and continued with St. Louis 2004.

The Peirce Report—a week long series of articles in March of 1997 by urban experts Neal Peirce and Curtis Johnson appearing in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*—was a deliberate attempt on the part of RCGA leader Richard Fleming to initiate a conversation about the future of the St. Louis region. Fleming, who came to St. Louis in September of 1994, put the development of a regional consensus at the top of his agenda (Flannery, 1994: 1E). Fleming’s previous stint in Denver, where he had spearheaded a redevelopment initiative of the Lower Denver (LoDo) area made him particularly attuned to the importance to downtown development. Fleming also initiated a series of regional leadership exchange trips that took a cross section of St. Louis political, business and civic leadership to other American cities to explore how they approached revitalization and to bring those best practices to St. Louis.

Prior to the 1996 trip to Cleveland, Fleming approached Peirce and Johnson, who had conducted regional assessments in other cities (O’Neil, 1996: 1B). Peirce also participated in the Cleveland leadership trip, where participants pledged their support to a
similar undertaking in St. Louis to develop a regional assessment (Mihalopoulos, 1996a: 4B). Joining the RCGA in supporting the Peirce report initiative was the William T Kemper Foundation, the charitable arm of the local Commerce Bank, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Post-Dispatch editor Cole Campbell saw the report as a part of the newspaper’s vision of service to the region in the form of “public journalism”—an ongoing series of reporting and analysis that discussed local initiatives and assisted in local problem-solving (Peirce and Johnson, 1997a: 1B; Campbell, 1997: 1B).

Peirce and Johnson’s research in the region took all of fall and winter of 1996-97 and involved staff at RCGA and key contacts across the region. The report, published over eight days beginning on March 9, 1997, covered a number of key themes, including the area’s regional fragmentation, the declining role of corporate and civic actors, the lack of racial trust and cooperation, and St. Louis’ deficiency in terms of neighborhood-based development initiatives. The report also stressed the role of downtown as the region’s “common ground” and highlighted Denver’s downtown revitalization efforts (Peirce and Johnson, 1997b: 1A). Additionally, the two consultants called for the newly created St. Louis 2004 to take leadership in transforming St. Louis through a new round of “civic experimentation” (Peirce and Johnson, 1997d: 1B).

The Peirce Report launched a series of meetings and debates about St. Louis, (“Group Follows Report,” 1997: 9B; Desloge, 1997: 1). The report reemphasized the importance of downtown and was followed by calls to start the area’s revitalization with a focus on downtown (“Start City's Revitalization with Downtown,” 1997: 3B). By far, the most significant outcome from the report was the boost given to St. Louis 2004 as an organization to continue discussions and start the process of defining implementation
strategies (LaSala and Danforth, 1997: 3B). St. Louis 2004 had a sprawling and, some would say, overambitious agenda for the region encompassing all aspects of regional life—from community and economic development, to medical access and educational reform, to recreation and green spaces. The effort was itself the outcome of a deliberate call on the part of civic leaders; in a speech in January of 1996, Andrew Craig, outgoing president of Civic Progress and chair of Boatman’s Bank, called for a series of task forces to plan events and improvements to culminate in a celebration of the city’s 1904 World’s Fair in 2004 (Craig, 1996: 5B). The speech was written by Alfred Kerth, a public relations official at Fleishman-Hillard, and the main staff person for Civic Progress; Kerth played an influential role in promoting the concept of St. Louis 2004 before stepping back from the process in September of 1996.

Kerth’s exit from 2004 brought former Republican Senator John Danforth in as chairman of the organization and JoAnne LaSala, a senior vice president at Fleishman-Hillard, as the organization’s first director (Lindecke, 1996: 4A). A month later, Peter Sortino, a lobbyist with the mayor’s office who had experience locally, statewide and nationally, joined as vice president of governmental affairs; the staff grew to 15 members with a budget of $2.3 million. The new team retooled the effort’s public outreach, creating a series of action teams around key regional issues (Tucci, 1996: 1) and hosting a series of “visioning” sessions in December of 1996 to gather public input (Mihalopoulos, 1996f: 1D). 2004 staff presented preliminary concepts and released a comprehensive set of regional priorities in January of 1998 (Schlinkmann, 1998a: C1)

Danforth’s position at St. Louis 2004 was more than just honorific. First, he brought his name and his energy to the 2004 process and to promoting the organization
and its plan including downtown redevelopment efforts. On a personal level, Danforth quickly became a prominent player in the downtown efforts, providing funding for the effort through the Danforth Foundation, and promoting downtown redevelopment in a variety of forums (“Cheap Loans? Banks Say, ‘No Way’”, 1997: 6B; Volland, 1997: 1B; Danforth, 2001: C19). Danforth became a co-chair of the Downtown Now! plan as well as a board member for the reorganized Downtown St. Louis Partnership. Additionally, Danforth used his political connections both statewide and in Washington to lobby on behalf of downtown initiatives; Jefferson City initiatives included lobbying for special district status for downtown in 1998 (Danforth, 1998: B5), the regional tax campaign of 1999/2000 (Tucci, 1999c: 1) and a new Cardinal ballpark (Ganey, 2002: B3). Danforth also lobbied Washington for support, including funding for improvements to the loft district and new uses for the Old Post Office (Shesgreen, 1999: A5). According to observers, Danforth’s access to Washington provided the impetus for a $4 million federal appropriation sponsored by Republican Senator Kit Bond, leading to a total of $17.3 million in pedestrian and street improvements along Washington Avenue.

Also significant was the input of Peter Sortino, who took over as president of the organization in December of 1999. Sortino brought significant political contacts to the organization, particularly in the Board of Aldermen (“The Bosley Record,” 1997: 9A). Even prior to LaSala’s resignation, observers report that Sortino was the point person on downtown development; he came to serve as one of the three members of a downtown brain trust that meet weekly to discuss downtown issues and that included Reeves from Downtown Now! and, after the 2001 mayoral elections, Barbara Geisman, the deputy mayor for development.
The intervention of Danforth in downtown issues allowed him to commit the resources of the Danforth Foundation to planning and redevelopment initiatives. The Danforth Foundation, capitalized by family wealth from the Ralston-Purina Corporation, was the largest private foundation in St. Louis, with total assets of more than $400 million dollars (Tucci, 1998b: 1). The role of the foundation in St. Louis initiatives heightened after Danforth assumed chairmanship of the foundation in the spring of 1997 and the foundation announced that it was changing its mission from a nationally oriented educational foundation to a foundation focused exclusively on the St. Louis region (Editorial, 1997a: 6B; Danforth Foundation, 1997: 11). The change in the mission brought significant resources to local projects, as well as the interest of the foundation’s board and staff. In announcing the change, foundation leaders noted “a renewed sense of optimism in the region” and specifically mentioned St. Louis 2004 as a sign of willingness among St. Louis area citizens in defining and solving a number of the region’s major problems (Danforth Foundation, 1997: 12). Danforth intended the change to break the generally apathetic pattern of local philanthropy towards local needs and set a precedent for other locally based funders (Tucci, 1998a: 1).

Foundation resources would be significant for a whole host of 2004 related projects, including restoration of Forest Park, neighborhood planning in the JeffVanderLou community, and development of the region’s biotech sector. However, it was in downtown activities that the foundation’s support was most strategically applied. Even prior to this change, the foundation was a funder of start-up activities of St. Louis 2004 (Mihalopoulos, 1996c: 1D; Danforth Foundation, 1997: 43). The foundation committed $1 million annually after 1997 to the organization, the largest portion of the

Danforth Foundation resources also became integral to Downtown Now! implementation of the plan, particularly around the Old Post Office. In contrast to St. Louis 2004, the foundation consciously held its activities and the specifics of its investments in a private manner. However, comments of observers and participants in downtown development provide some clues. The clearest part of the picture has been the ongoing support of the Danforth Foundation for implementation of the Downtown Now! plan, beginning with a $1.4 million investment in for the 2000-2001 program year (Danforth Foundation, 2001: 24). The foundation also provided $1 million in support of Downtown Now! in the 2001-2002 program year (Danforth Foundation, 2002: 32), $715,000 in 2002-2003 program year (Danforth Foundation, 2003: 3), and $375,000 in the 2003-2004 program year (Danforth Foundation, 2004: 7). Downtown Now! staff indicate that the first year of funding came only after a submission of a detailed plan of activities demonstrating how the funds would be used and matched.

Additionally, the Danforth Foundation used other funds, both grants and direct contracts with the organization, to support the work of professionals in development projects as well as direct investments in downtown projects, mostly around the Old Post Office (OPO) District. Danforth funds paid $123,000 for a series of a feasibility studies on Webster University’s proposed use of the Old Post Office building as a downtown site for classes (Danforth Foundation, 1999: 31; Prost, 2000d: B1). Over the course of 2001 and 2002, foundation activities paid for a series of professionals to the OPO plan, an amount totaling just over $200,000 (Danforth Foundation, 2001: 23; Danforth
Foundation, 2002: 31). The foundation’s investments in the district culminated with the purchase of Missouri Development Finance Board tax credits after the finance board approved the development plan for the area in November of 2002. The cost of this investment was $4.3 million for the 2003-2004 period (Danforth Foundation, 2004: 7) of a projected $8 million dollar total investment. The foundation also made a $900,000 loan to the developers of the Merchandise Mart, providing the final and only cash investment in the stalled project (Danforth Foundation, 2002: 43; “Investing in Urban Miracles,” 2001: C18), and made a series of loans to Downtown Now! in 2002 totaling $785,000 to support the organization’s redevelopment efforts around the Old Post Office District (Danforth Foundation, 2002: 43).

Development professionals interviewed indicate that the prestige of the foundation became a critical component in implementation of key parts of the downtown plan, including the investment of resources to gain site control of property from speculators whose ownership of buildings has stymied past development plans. Foundation resources attracted other development professionals to the projects, including lawyers from Bryan Cave, where John Danforth practiced, and financing strategists with a history of completing difficult projects. These requests often came through other parties. For example, in his capacity as one of Danforth’s “chief of staff” for downtown, Al Kerth directly recruited real estate financing guru Steven Stogel to help resuscitate the Old Post Office project (Stogel, 2005). Downtown Now! director Reeves’ connections with officials at DESCO led to the commercial real estate development firm’s participation in the OPO project.
The support of the foundation was critical to Downtown Now!’s ability to foster investments in projects, particularly those around the Old Post Office, by acting as an incentive for additional contributions and investments by other corporations and charitable organizations. After his appointment, Reeves became the point-person for both accessing and pointing the use of these resources. One of Reeves’ principal tasks as he assumed the position was securing additional commitments to the implementation process, financial as well as in-kind resources. These resources built the capital available to Downtown Now!; the organization was able to make direct investments into the OPO District, including purchasing an adjacent building in 2000 (Berger, 2000: A2) and borrowing $10 million to support predevelopment work on the OPO project (Prost, 2002d: E1).

**Downtown’s Evolution: From Harmon to Slay**

Danforth Foundation resources and resources from other business and civic organizations interested in downtown redevelopment operated as a quasi-privatized form of public investments in key downtown projects. These sets of resources were deployed privately and in a relatively unobtrusive, behind-the-scenes manner to resolve difficult ownership issues and jump-start highly leveraged but critical projects. The funds complement other, more-explicitly public-sector resources, which also were generally overseen by the same Downtown Now! leadership team. Most visible among these were the funds dedicated to streetscape improvements undertaken along Washington Avenue. The improvements were detailed in the July 1999 Downtown Now! Master Plan, with schematics and construction documents on the first phase of the project due shortly and construction to begin in 2000. The $17.3 million project included $4 million in federal
aid committed by Senator Kit Bond during his 1998 election bid, $3 million from a
regional transportation fund, and over $10 million in federal transportation funds
managed by the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (Schlinkmann, 1999d: A1).
The plan, released in December of 1999, after a series of public planning meetings, called
for wider, tree-lined sidewalks for outdoor seating, a new public plaza adjacent to
Washington Avenue, new street signage and street lamps, and decorative paving
throughout the area (Prost, 1999d: A1).

Developers and building owners hoped that the improvements would create a
“domino effect” for private investment in the area (Schlinkmann, 1999d: A1); however,
delays in the project depressed business activity, severely restricted access in the area and
pushed the project far past its optimistic 2000 starting date. Part of the delay stemmed
from the resignation in June of 2000 of SLDC’s principal planner with expertise in
streetscape improvements (Prost, 2000f: D1). In addition, the project stalled as complex
city, state and federal requirements for the use of the funds taxed the time and resources
of the city’s Board of Public Service (Prost, 2001b: C1).

Delays in the project became a minor issue in the run-up to the 2001 mayoral
campaign and renewed persistent questions about Mayor Harmon’s leadership style. One
hundred days into his administration, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch released the first in a
series of editorials about Harmon’s leadership, calling for a return to the momentum for
change his primary victory reflected and noting that Harmon’s “rather phlegmatic
personality” may make rekindling that spark “not an easy task” (“Mayor Harmon: 100
honeymoon “appears to be over” as regional officials criticized Harmon over his lack of
leadership and vision in a failed MetroLink campaign (Tucci, 1997: 1). The report also indicated what would become a persistent criticism of Harmon’s apolitical style, that is, his seeming inability to make a decision and follow through with it.

Connected to these criticisms were changes among the city’s development officials that hampered Harmon’s administrative control. Reports of Maureen McAvey’s “abrupt” resignation in June of 1998 cited the lack of a “common goal” on city efforts, but did not specifically target Harmon (Tucci, 1998: 1). The inability to appoint a new director, and Harmon’s protracted campaign to redesign the development agencies, left downtown development effort in the lurch at a time when Downtown Now! was in the process of issuing its master plan. One public criticism called the delay in leadership “criminal” at a time when momentum and incentives existed to heighten development efforts (“City Hall Stands Still,” 1999: B2). Harmon’s appointment of a new CDA director without consultation with his top development officials led one editorial writer to suggest that administration appointments were “starting to resemble the deck chairs on the Titanic” (“Outrageous Developments,” 1999c: 32). Another editorial early in 2000 stated that “on matters large and small, Mr. Harmon has too often come up short” and that “Harmon may still end up a one-term mayor” (“The Leadership Problem,” 2000: B2).

One participant in city development matters at that time indicated that part of these public concerns about the mayor’s leadership came from the private comments of his chief aide, Michael Jones. By 1999, it was common for Jones to express exacerbation with the mayor in planning meetings with downtown stakeholders. Declining relations between the two individuals marred the ability of Jones to effectively represent Harmon
in development negotiations. These tensions came to a head in November of 2000, when a disagreement between the two came public and Harmon abruptly fired Jones. While Harmon refused to discuss the matter, others stated that the firing came after Jones privately questioned Harmon’s intention to reverse his support for the Merchandise Mart deal (Schlinkmann, 2000c: C1). Jones’ departure left the city without a permanent head of SLDC or an experienced deputy mayor for development; it also left unfinished and uncertain a host of important development initiatives, including concluding final details of the convention hotel project and completion of a couple pending downtown projects, including city assistance on loft projects.

While Harmon did recruit someone to take over Jones’ spot in the convention hotel negotiations, Jones’ dismissal heightened criticisms of Harmon as an ineffective leader at the same time the mayor began a campaign for re-election. Ultimately, the perception that Harmon’s administration was just a caretaker combined with the opposition of two strong candidates in the 2001 Democratic primary sealed Harmon’s fate. Harmon received only 5% of the vote, with Francis Slay, the current President of the Board of Alderman beating both him and former mayor Freeman Bosley Jr.

Slay’s victory in 2001 provided both a continuity to Downtown Now! efforts and reestablished strong political and administrative support to downtown efforts. In one sense, the Slay administration’s abilities are predicated on the political and civic energy invested in the past four years, particularly in the completion of the convention center hotel project. On the other hand, Slay quickly prioritized and organized his activities and brought in a management team that could reestablish city government’s supportive role in development projects. Slay wisely utilized Harmon’s leadership structure, particularly
the central role of the deputy mayor for development, appointing Barbara Geisman to the job. Geisman had experience as both an aide to a former aldermanic president and as a development professional both in the private and not-for-profit world, including development of a loft building on Washington Avenue. Geisman and Slay eschewed a lengthy and protracted battle to reorganize the development agencies. Instead, according to one downtown observer, they relied on philanthropic support to conduct national searches for new directors of SLDC, CDA and the Planning and Development Agency. This led to the designation of permanent directors of each of the development agencies, including a high profile hire of a former bank executive from Chicago as head of SLDC (Moore, 2002a: C2).

Geisman’s role downtown was to provide strong public sector leadership for advancing development projects, and observers both within the public agencies and in the broader development community credit her for her ability to manage multiple project details. While her attention to detail has brought private charges of micro-management, it has just as often brought praise in solving what seemed to insurmountable obstacles (Prost, 2001c: B1). In terms of downtown, Geisman early on indicated her support for the Downtown Now! plan and the market-driven direction that the plan proposed (Prost, 2001d: B5). She became one of three leaders who met weekly—along with Reeves and 2004’s Peter Sortino—to manage Downtown Now! implementation. Geisman is also credited by observers in creating a stable permit review process for loft development inside the city’s building division and also creating mechanisms for more effectively using TIF funds for loft projects.

Institutional Stability and the Old Post Office Project
Geisman faced conflict of interest charges over her association with the Washington Avenue project because she was a property owner and developer in the area where the improvements would be made. However, she quickly took over the role that Jones had established, assuring that Downtown Now! projects would continue to advance. The improvements that she made in securing public financing and approval for loft projects also matched the primary emphasis of downtown development: the redevelopment of loft spaces by individual developers and entrepreneurs. At the same time, Geisman walked into the continuing debate over the Old Post Office (OPO) District and the need to bring the plan to conclusion.

Downtown Now! participants viewed the Old Post Office as another critical lynchpin for downtown redevelopment, akin to the convention hotel deal, and a problem that had to be solved in order to establish a context for redevelopment of the properties around the post office. Among all the other Downtown Now! projects, the plan most tested the stability of Downtown Now!, both its vision for downtown and its ability to muster agreement and movement on downtown development. The fact that the plan emerged and moved into implementation even with the disagreement of some downtown stakeholders indicates the ability of Downtown Now! as both a planning process and a leadership to enforce consent over downtown development. Additionally, the ability to move the project forward shows the changing nature of incentives impacting downtown development; even with profound disagreements, critics of the project saw the utility of their continued participation and progress on individual projects.

Downtown Now! planners recognized early in the planning process that the Old Post Office’s historical importance did not take away from the building’s issues in terms
of adaptive reuse. Following struggles to maintain the building and stave off demolition of the structure in the 1960s, the federal government renovated the property and opened the building as government office space in 1982. By 1997, security considerations as well as the opening of more modern office space elsewhere downtown limited the effectiveness of the building (Prost, 1997e: 5B), and the federal GSA announced its intention to either sell or board up the property as surplus property (Prost, 1997d: 1A).

Compounding problems with the use of the OPO were surrounding vacant buildings, including the Paul Brown/Arcade/Wright buildings to the south and the Century/Syndicate Trust to the west.

The federal Government Services Administration (GSA) put an October of 1997, deadline for renovation proposals, the deadline was extended until the end of the year after no proposals emerged. City officials saw the proposals as preliminary in light of the Downtown Now! planning process that released its “First Directions” in January of 1997. Downtown Now!’s initial ideas on the building fit within the institutional design of the building and fed into the increased interest in the building by Webster University (Prost, 1998h: D3). Webster’s discussions with the GSA over the building became public in June of 1998 (Prost, 1998e: A7), and were prompted by Danforth Foundation funds for feasibility studies on the possible reuse.

Downtown Now!’s September, 1998, presentations on the OPO District utilized Webster University’s potential reuse for the building with three options for use of the surrounding buildings; two of the options planned demolition of parts of the Arcade/Wright building in place of a new office building, an urban square, or a combination of both (Downtown Now!, 1998b: np). Observers stated that proposed
demolition of the structures was the most controversial part of the proposals; these competing opinions led Downtown Now! planners to assemble a special team to review options for the OPO district prior to the release of the Downtown Now! Action Plan in May of 1999 (Prost, 1999b: D1). Partly as a salve, the May action plan included both plans for partial removal of the Paul Brown building to the south as well as options that maintained all existing buildings in the district (Downtown Now!, 1999b: np). The master plan released two months later also largely punted final decisions on the district’s configuration, calling for technical and feasibility studies to examine uses and final plans for buildings in the area (Downtown Now!, 1999c: 20).

The framework of the master plan for the district provided a context for further decision-making about the area, largely led by Downtown Now! implementation partners and private developers in the area. The purchase of the Paul Brown building by Pyramid Construction, a private commercial development company, largely answered questions about the probable reuse of that building (Prost, 1999e: C10); Pyramid’s announcement of an option to purchase of the adjacent Arcade/Wright building likewise took the building off the table for demolition or use as a parking facility (Prost, 2000c: C1). Additionally, the entrance of Steve Stogel, a legal and financial real estate expert, and Mark Schnuck, president of the local commercial development company DESCO, occurred as Webster’s plans for the building hit a roadblock. Initial feasibility studies on the reuse indicated that the cost of maintaining the facility would be enormous (Prost, 2000d: B1); the university’s preference of renting space and not owning the building was not the preference of GSA, which wanted a new ownership team to own, rehabilitate and manage the building.
Stogel came by invitation of the Danforth Foundation through Al Kerth in the summer of 2000; he first attended meetings at Webster University about reuse of the building in August of 2000. Schnuck was invited downtown by Reeves, who gave him a tour of the area in March of 2000 and introduced him to some of the developers working on projects. Both brought a significant amount of experience in commercial development. Stogel in particular had the reputation for completing difficult deals that no one else could close. Stogel served as vice president of the residential development firm McCormick Baron throughout much of the 1980s. In 1990, he became the principal staff member of the Technical Assistance Corporation (TAC), a private development company funded by Civic Progress to complete development projects on behalf of the city (“The Right Tack for Troubled Properties,” 1990b: 2B). TAC was responsible for rescuing multi-family residential properties that were having problems, as well as a plan to reach closure on the Gateway Mall plan (Prost, 1992a: 1D). Some of TAC’s work included negotiations over downtown buildings, including the Bank of America building and the Arcade/Wright. While Bosley initiated changes in city policies distancing TAC from the city’s development agencies in 1993, Stogel continued his work in local real estate matters through his own firm, the DFC Group, including work on behalf of the developer of the convention center hotel.

A lawyer as well as a seasoned development professional, Stogel combined the capacity to negotiate and craft development deals with the ability to ferret out institutional, private and public investments for projects. When the convention hotel deal lost its chief financing in March of 1999, it was Stogel who stepped in to put back together the multi-million dollar financing package, including over $107 million in
private financing and a projected $80 to $100 in public financing incentives (Schlinkmann, 1999c: A1). Stogel also brought to the table close political relationships with state Democrats and Democratic officeholders, including Governor Bob Holden who was elected in November of 2000 (Mannies, 1999c: B1; Manning, 2000: 1). When it became clear that Webster’s plan for the building would be insufficient to guarantee investment in the building, Stogel and Schnuck formed a partnership and initiated a second phase of planning for reuse of the building and the surrounding district (Tucci, 2000: 1).

Unlike the Downtown Now! planning process, subsequent investigations revolving around the reuse of the property were conducted largely out of public view. Initially, one of Webster’s criteria for use of the building was a resolution of the vacant Syndicate Trust and Century building, and Pyramid Construction’s failure to achieve title of the property in 2001 intensified the need for a viable district plan (Prost, 2001a: C6). The seeming lack of private developer for the Century/Syndicate Trust collided with the desire of the Stogel/Schnuck development team to identify a site for parking adjacent to the Old Post Office; the potential that the Century building would be as a site of the new garage set in place a protracted disagreement between the developers and downtown preservations (Prost, 2001j: B1).

The city’s purchase of the Century and Syndicate Trust buildings in July of 2001 removed ownership issues from the development plan and accelerated planning on the OPO District (Prost, 2001g: C8). Details of the Stogel/Schnuck OPO plan, released preliminarily in October of 2001, included turning the Century building into a parking garage, acquiring the Syndicate Trust for residential or commercial uses, and
rehabilitating the Old Post Office for commercial offices for Webster University, a relocated Missouri Court of Appeals and other retail and commercial users (Prost, 2001i: B1). The proposal to relocate court offices to the building, where they had been located decades earlier, came out of discussions between Stogel and Chief Judge James Dowd in the summer of 2001. Press reports indicated that the financial plan was largely the work of Stogel and would include a combination of state and federal tax credits as well as financing from the Missouri Development Finance Board (MDFB); local supporters of the plan, including Stogel, officials from Webster University, and Mayor Slay, traveled to Jefferson City in October of 2001 to discuss MDFB’s participation in the project (Prost, 2001i: B1).

The OPO plan, formally released in November of 2001, spelled out the replacement of the Century building by a new parking garage and the formal participation of Webster and Appeals Courts. Local preservationists allied with some of new downtown loft residents came out in opposition to the Century’s demolition (Prost, 2001j: B1). Opposition to the demolition led to a competing proposal for the Century complex on the part of two downtown developers, Loftworks LLC and McGowan Brothers Development, and an Indianapolis financing firm. City officials greeted the proposal as an “11th hour” proposal and reiterated support for the garage plan (Prost, 2002b: C1). Withdrawal of the alternative plan in March of 2002 came along with rumors that its developers had been threatened and forced to sign a letter distancing them from the proposal (Shinkle and Prost, 2004: B1). Ultimately, opposition to the OPO project culminated to a court case filed in May of 2003, with it developers charging that the case impeded the start of the project until summer of 2004 (Stogel, 2005).
However, public opposition to the project was just one of the difficulties in moving the project to the development stage. The Old Post Office’s unique historical nature—not just a national historic landmark, but a landmark with over 139 items of historic significance in the building—created a 5 month process of historic review involving not just local developers, but also officials from the National Park Service, the GSA, the National Trust for Historic Preservation and local officials from the city’s Cultural Resources Commission. Secondly, the development team had to cover an estimated $72 million dollars of the project cost for the OPO project, including the $38 million Ninth Street parking garage, with a building that had serious commercial liabilities. DESCO estimates on the project determined that the operating costs for the building would be roughly double of commercial office space elsewhere downtown and that only 50% of the building would be usable space (Stogel, 2005). Ultimately, gap financing for the project would come not just from state and federal historic tax credits, but also from federal New Market tax credits and corporate contributions to support MDFB bond financing (Prost, 2002a: C1). Stogel teamed with Reeves and Geisman in asking for corporate and philanthropic commitments (Jackson, 2002: 1). MDFB bond financing would require not just approval from the state agency, but the agency’s agreement to own the OPO as well as the garage building and lease the property back to the developers on a long term basis.

Finalizing details of the financing would take the project development team most of 2002. Withdrawal of Bi-State from the project in April meant the removal of a bus transfer station from the plan (unpopular with some downtown stakeholders) and the concomitant the loss of almost $15 million in funds and tax credits (Prost, 2002c: C1).
The project got initial approval from MDFB in July of 2002; controversy over the proposed garage and developer fees associated with the project delayed final MDFB approval until November of 2002. Even with these commitments, a final $500,000 gap in Webster’s budget threatened to pull the entire project down (Jackson, 2003: 1). The gap ballooned to over $3 million in May of 2004; Webster announced that it would be using a far smaller space in the building, and additional city and private sector commitments were required to move the project to closing (Jackson, 2004a: 1). Closing on the project in September of 2004 ended Stogel and Schnuck’s four years of planning on the project. Demolition of the Century building began in October of 2004.

**Downtown and the Loft Builders: Success and Stability**

The Old Post Office project was on one level highly symbolic of the sorts of interventions that political, economic and civic leaders made in support of downtown redevelopment. It required the intentional and careful intervention of a whole host of downtown leaders, including Reeves, Geisman, RCGA head Fleming and others, and the active professional interest of the city’s most connected and seasoned real estate professionals (Jackson, 2004b: 1). The financing of the project required an active assent from each level of government and commitments from a variety of organizations and boards, both public and private. Supporters of the project had to forcefully impose consent over the demolition of the Century and deal with the opposition of not just preservationists but also several important downtown developers. Disagreement over the project cast a long shadow over downtown development efforts and led to accusations and counter-accusations among downtown’s small community of stakeholders.
The level of commitment to the project makes it also somewhat idiosyncratic in terms of the general tenure of downtown development. The extensive predevelopment period to organize and implement the OPO project led to the frequent charge by some downtown observers that the project, as well as broader efforts by Downtown Now!, were not really critical to downtown’s resurgence. A very public appraisal of Downtown Now! efforts published in 2003 credited Downtown Now! for its marketing efforts and the work of Reeves as a “power broker” in downtown deals, but noted that some major projects—like new housing on Laclede’s Landing and the proposed lid over I-70—were not past the conceptual stage. The article also suggested that total investments in the area were only a third of the proposed amount called for in the plan and that some elements of downtown development were not mentioned in the plan at all (Nicklaus, 2003c: g1). Other downtown developers, including Richard Baron, observed that the number of lofts created to date was far fewer than the 10,000 units set by Downtown Now! planners in 2004 (Prost, 2004: B1).

Whether by design or as a function of institutional limitations, there was a symbolic distance between loft developers and OPO efforts, where Downtown Now! participants spent most of their energy. For better or worse, Downtown Now!’s implementation efforts were intended to create the structure of downtown development and not supplant the activities of individual entrepreneurs. While the parameters of the OPO project have been criticized, what is less disputable is the perception on the part of downtown stakeholders that, like the convention center hotel, the OPO district was an element of downtown development upon which other investments rested. Solving the
problem of the OPO was a part of the general task of creating the right set of incentives needed for loft projects to proceed.

This aspect of downtown’s market-driven development approach is what accounts for the general freedom provided to loft developers. The work of Downtown Now! staff and political actors like Geisman have been confined to strategic interventions to improve the ability of developers to initiate and complete projects—for example, encouraging access between developers and lenders and simplifying the process of applying for city funds. Indeed, one criticism of this approach mentioned by a downtown loft developer was that Downtown Now! has generally been hesitant to intervene in a strong manner on issues of speculative ownership and property maintenance, instead expecting that most of these issues would work out as the incentives to invest in properties improved. At the same time, however, this approach generally meets the needs of developers as the capacities of individual developers increase. In this sense, the general tenor of public input in downtown loft development has specifically eschewed the sort of “command and control” approach that has been more typical of past public-private redevelopment efforts.

With a primary reliance on private developers and entrepreneurs, loft development emerged slowly in the late 1990s. Progress occurred in starts and stops, with some developments failing under initial proposals and resumed under new ownership (Prost, 1999a: C1; Prost, 2000b: C9). Increasingly, the success of initial investments strengthened the institutional incentives, encouraging additional work and diminishing the risk. State historic tax credits have played a role in every rehabilitation project; banks such as Bank of America and US Bank have followed this emerging
market and have established units that help syndicate credits and finance loft deals (Manning, 1998: 1; Tucci, 2003a: D5). Increasingly, TIF funds have also become an important part of the financing tool.

The initial loft developers in the area were smaller residential and commercial developers known for their work in other parts of the city, mostly in South St. Louis. These included Craig Heller, whose LoftWorks company is credited by many for their steady progress in rehabilitating property adjacent to the OPO District. Heller’s Merchandise Mart Annex project predated work on the neighboring Merchandise Mart and comprised one of the first conventionally financed deals using historic tax credits (Prost, 1998g: C6). By 2000, only a score of buildings had opened as residential loft developments, although more were in planning stages. This planning paid off in 2003, with about 350 units opening that year, 350 in 2004 and 200 in 2005 (Downtown St. Louis Partnership, Inc, 2004). By the end of 2005, estimates from local developers and downtown observers were that over 500 units were in planning or under construction, including a number of larger properties along Washington Avenue that had stymied past development efforts.

Continued progress in loft developments not only boosted downtown’s population but changed the consistency of downtown’s market, residential and retail. Surveys of downtown residents after 2000 demonstrated that the new residents included not just single, young professionals—the target audience that enjoyed Washington Avenue as a nightclub district—but also older couples and baby-boomers seeking to downsize their housing requirements (Prost, 2000e: B1; Parish, 2001c: A1; Prost, 2001f: B4; Prost, 2002e: 8; Riley, 2004b: A1; Evans, 2005b: B1). New Washington Avenue residents
sometimes clashed with and transformed elements of the existing streetscape. Rising rents forced out a number of the existing businesses (Berger, 2001a: A2; Shinkle, 2001: E1). As the loft population increased, city officials worked with both Downtown Now! and the Downtown St. Louis Partnership to design a retail strategy that emphasized home furnishings, personal services and destination restaurants (Lee, 2002: C1). The rise of new businesses and new needs among the district’s residential population largely shut down the club scene that had brought Washington Avenue publicity and nightlife in the 1990s (Johnson, 2005: F1).

Continued success in loft developments has created a new story about downtown, its residents and its assets, that is manifested in promotional materials, street signage and a broader feeling about downtown’s resurgence (Crouch, 2005: B4). At the same time, the emergence of this image of downtown development has also raised tensions, particularly between some loft residents and downtown’s homeless population. Homeless advocates objected to plans to transform a local public park to a semi-privately maintained dog park (Moore, 2003c: B3; Ammann, 2003: B7). However, these complaints—the only public and sustained criticism of the Washington Avenue district—have not significantly altered private plans for investment in the area. Sales of loft buildings have continued to demonstrate the sustainability of higher sales prices (Evans, 2005d: B2) and at a number of price points, including fairly affordable units. With the increased pace of development in the traditional core of the loft district, loft developments have spread to the westward edge of downtown at a pace that has surprised even the most optimistic loft promoters (Evans, 2005a: C4). These westward edges of
the loft district have included luxury lofts with prices ranging up to $450,000 and upscale restaurants and other retail establishments (Evans, 2005f: D2).

Summary

Downtown development demonstrated the conditions under which development occurs and the roles participants play in initiating and completing projects. Economic considerations as well as the retrenchment in federal aid to cities necessitate a strong reliance upon non-public actors in developing and financing projects. The role of public officials is to coordinate the work of professionals in the development agencies in supporting projects, including sponsorship of planning activities and the use of public-sector incentives. Public sector officials, like the city’s deputy mayor for development, also work with developers and their supporters on site-specific planning for projects such as the new convention center hotel and the Old Post Office development.

The mix of development activities downtown is both consensual and competitive; planning activities emphasize a public-oriented, collaborative approach in defining a broad image and goal for initiatives. However, implementation of projects relies upon the central role of private developers and entrepreneurs and the relationships that they set up with private-sector financial sources and investors. While private developers provide the bulk of energy in developments, civic actors are important in developing local institutional capacities to support development efforts. In this sense, the development of human capacity is as important as the economic incentives. For downtown, a reenergized regional visioning campaign reoriented interest in urban redevelopment and downtown development specifically. In the downtown development that followed, civic actors were found in multiple places, including downtown oriented not-for-profit organizations, local
foundations, and other quasi-public agencies like Downtown Now!. Typically, they brought to their positions considerable experience in other sectors, including local, state and federal political experience and experiences in the private sector related to banking and redevelopment.

In downtown development efforts, civic sector entrepreneurialism often matched and preceded private sector entrepreneurialism. In part, the activities and funding of civic sector actors represents “patient capital,” in the words of one local developer, which can stand in for private capital in the interim, untested period of project development. Additionally, the presence of particular actors played a critical role in connecting philanthropic and corporate investments to development projects and attracting other professionals, raising project profile and assuring stability to the development process at a time when the perception of risk is high. On projects where the incentives don’t exist to facilitate private sector leadership, civic entrepreneurs serve as champions of projects, providing a focus for activity.

The creation and implementation of the Downtown Now! plan created a new institutional setting in which redevelopment of downtown occurred. The plan emphasized a novel, but widely accepted, vision for downtown at odds with previous strategies, one that called for the creation of downtown residential neighborhood. The planning process led to the initiation of new organization, Downtown Now!, that supported developer’s efforts, particularly around such high profile projects as the OPO district. At the same time, Downtown Now! and its supporters in the public sector provided appropriate support to the individual entrepreneurs that did the bulk of the loft redevelopments. In this sense, the institutional setting supporting reinvestment in the
city’s loft district, the Downtown Now! plan and a reinvigorated public sector system for permitting and use of incentives are matched by the economic incentives for redevelopment of loft spaces. Over time, the success of loft developments routinized development activity, increasing stability in development decision-making and further minimizing economic risk of investment in the sector. Successful completion of loft projects from 1998 onward created a new round of economic and institutional incentives that extended development activity and has sustained ancillary developments in downtown’s retail and commercial sectors.
Chapter 7: Decentralization and Neighborhood Development

Downtown development demonstrated the conditions under which development occurs and the roles participants play in initiating and completing projects. This chapter applies this framework of development decision-making to redevelopment activities in the near north side of the City of St. Louis, a low-income, primarily African American area adjacent to the city’s central corridor. The thesis of the chapter is development in the near north side demonstrates how private market actors dominant planning and initiating development projects. Similar to the story of downtown development, contemporary neighborhood developed was a presaged by a renewed regional interest in city redevelopment fostered through the St. Louis 2004 process and the development of new models of neighborhood development, particularly in the context of the development of HOPE VI projects. An important component of development strategies in these areas, public housing reconversion provides a complementary example to the development of loft living downtown; the creation of a new array of new federal incentives and the recognition of the past failure of public housing strategies was followed by an institutional shift in public housing management, creating the platform for the work of private developers in a host of HOPE VI projects.

Unlike downtown, however, neighborhood development in St. Louis occurs within the context of a decentralized political structure emphasizing the coordinating role of local stakeholders, including aldermen. While the decentralization of local politics adds a layer of institutional complexity that constrains the options available to developers and complicates the development process, it also provides powerful incentives for aldermen and developers to work together to foster investment. In this sense, while
private developers have dominated the selection of projects, their planning and their implementation, these projects required new patterns of cooperation between private developers, civic representatives and local political leaders. Additionally, the city ward-based political system means that residents can be acutely involved in local decision-making, including playing a formal role in development projects through non-profit organizations and housing associations, although their power is checked due to the dominance of non-neighborhood institutions and actors.

Despite an increased attention to neighborhood development within important civic institutions, neighborhood developers confront a broader political and economic environment of increased economic competition and decreased public sector incentives available to assist projects. Proponents of development acted strategically to take advantage of new opportunities to shape the institutions and incentives that impacted in investments in projects and routinize development decision-making that advanced their interests. Nor were civic resources necessarily a hallmark of successful strategies. 5th Ward and 19th Ward redevelopment occurred within a framework reoriented to support neighborhood initiatives loosely organized under St. Louis 2004 and the Sustainable Neighborhood Initiatives and a corollary initiative in JeffVanderLou sponsored by the Danforth Foundation. While in some areas of the 5th Ward, a renewed interest in single-family residential family—prompted by the unanticipated work of new, small-scale private developers—reenergized local housing markets, more ambitious proposals based on the preservation of the existing housing largely failed. Their backers were unable to connect them with the requisite political, economic and social incentives.
A Framework for Neighborhood Development Decision-making

Even though a similar framework of enquiry will guide the analysis of neighborhood development, there are significant political, economic and institutional differences between urban downtowns and urban neighborhoods. With neighborhood initiatives, the alderman plays a critical role in facilitating development. Additionally, neighborhood development initiatives can activate the participation of residents, including through formal neighborhood organizations and other non-profit organizations. These influences can shape the overall character of development and raise the possibility of a tension between development priorities on the one hand and the perspectives of neighborhood residents on the other. Where the story of downtown development in St. Louis emphasized the overall consensus around goals, in residential neighborhoods the costs and benefits of local development decision-making can be much more acute, because they resonate in a political environment where the investments of actors are tied to their political behavior, particularly voting.

St. Louis’ ward-based system accentuates the role of a constituent-orientation that adds additional pressure points in development decision-making. Coupled with the relatively small size of wards (about 12,000 residents), this creates a strong bond between aldermen and their neighbors. These patterns of political behavior mean that development initiatives enter an environment where local elected officials, and principally aldermen, have existing political relationships with residents and residential organizations. Even where the role of residents is not formally recognized, the electoral power of residents is one of the issues that aldermen must weigh as they pursue development options.
In many St. Louis neighborhoods, these relationships are formalized in neighborhood associations and organizations. As discussed in Chapter 4, commentators have generally regarded local CDCs as weaker than their counterparts in other cities, pointing to their relatively limited role in development production. This position fails to appreciate the other tasks that neighborhood organizations play vis-à-vis to development decision-making. While these may vary across the city, aldermen generally support a limited role for formal neighborhood organizations by funding them, attending their meetings, and seeking their input in development decisions. Even when they are not involved in the actual production of housing, neighborhood groups can be critical as a source of initial support for development deals. In some neighborhoods, this role is heightened by specific locally developed neighborhood codes and plans. Neighborhood organizations have played formative roles in developing these plans and also provide oversight to ensure that projects conform to them.

As in downtown development, neighborhood development initiatives can occur within the context of a well-defined neighborhood identity, a view that details the strengths and assets in a particular area. From the specific perspective internal to a development deal, development professionals are acutely aware of the characteristics of specific places and how they impact the viability of projects; these calculations are reflected in the technical language in the pro-formas of specific deals. As important is how the image of place impacts the project selection and viability and how neighborhood identities inform these images. By aligning local identity to projects, development professionals cue to a model of redevelopment that can be understandable to the broader community, both in economic terms as a recognizable product but also in symbolic terms.
as a form of urban reinvestment. On the most simplistic level, developments capitalize on image making in their selection of project names, in the marketing materials that they distribute and in the ways that they describe the project and potential residents. More fundamental is the interplay between developments and the local characteristics of the neighborhoods that they are located in and how developers utilize neighborhood identity in the selection, design and features of the project.

The creation of neighborhood and development identities is both a conscious project on the part of development professionals as well as an organic process involving a broader grouping of local stakeholders. In broader terms, the neighborhood redevelopment remains a powerful symbol in a city, and a region, that tends to view political identify in localized terms (East-West Gateway Coordinating Council, 2002: 61). While the institutions of neighborhood organizing have usually been weak in their actual productivity, examples of successful neighborhood development—stories like the renovation of neighborhoods like Soulard and Lafayette Square—are typically held up as models for other neighborhoods to follow. Neighborhoods codify their image in specific development codes, historic district statutes and neighborhood plans, but also in the less tangible notions of neighborhood identity that can commonly accompany local descriptions of neighborhoods.

**Neighborhood and 2004: The Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative**

In addition to specific place-based development strategies, some neighborhood development initiatives have benefited from the attention of local leaders stemming from a conversation about regional priorities that began in the mid-1990s. These included the Peirce Report in 1997 and 1998 and St. Louis 2004 activities beginning in 1998. These
conversations, largely led by members of St. Louis philanthropic, nonprofit and corporate community, clarified a general vision for neighborhood improvements and brought direction attention and resources to key development projects and to institutions that supported neighborhood redevelopment. At the same time, this extension of civic activity met up with a renewed interest in revitalization occurring in the neighborhoods, particularly those in the 19th and 5th Ward, led both by new ward leadership and reinvigorated neighborhood associations.

Neighborhoods and neighborhood redevelopment became a focus of this regional conversation early on, particularly the lack of redevelopment in some areas (Kemper, 1997: 7B). The Peirce Report mixed its calls for a “collaborative spirit” to overcome regional disunity in solving critical issues (Peirce and Johnson, 1997a: 1B) with promising examples of best practices in neighborhood redevelopment both locally and regionally (Peirce and Johnson, 1997c: 14; Peirce and Johnson, 1997e: 5B). The report decried St. Louis’ missed opportunity in attracting national housing support in the 1980s and 1990s and called the city’s community development corporation network “anemic;” at the same time, the report also commended redevelopment efforts taken by McCormick Baron and “fledgling” efforts by St. Louis Equity Fund and Regional Housing Alliance (Peirce and Johnson, 1997b: 14). The report also pointed an innovative university-community partnership between the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana and the city of East St. Louis as example of collaborative planning that involved citizens and resulted in substantial economic development projects (Peirce and Johnson, 1997d: 5B).

Significantly, the Peirce Report advanced a process of “complex harmonization” that emphasized collective action and decision-making as opposed to unrealistic
expectations that regional governance would emerge or, even, that a reenergized city
development agency would be able to foster citywide revitalization (Peirce and Johnson,
1997c: 1B). The report emphasized the significant role of St. Louis 2004 in continuing a
process of regional decision-making, calling the new organization the vehicle that could
launch a new round of civic experimentation (Peirce and Johnson, 1997c: 1B). Initial
plans by the 2004 organization released in the spring of 1998 stressed the importance of
neighborhood redevelopment (Mihalopoulos, 1998a: A1) and proposed a “Sustainable
Neighborhoods” initiative that called for improved quality of life in regional
neighborhoods, with demonstrations in a targeted list of neighborhoods to commence in

The Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative became one of St. Louis 2004’s
signature projects. The announcement of the program in December of 1998 kicked off a
series of activities in designated areas, as well as in other neighborhoods that attracted the
attention of local developers and civic leaders. Intense political lobbying about the
designation of the target communities, as well as skepticism about the motivations of
2004 leaders also followed the formal announcement of the program. Indeed, distrust
prompted 2004 officials to forgo plans to initiate a St. Louis Land Trust. Some local
leaders feared that the trust would be used to land bank land in primarily African-
American neighborhoods for white, suburban developers.

The initiative would go on to have some successes but also what some
neighborhood observers point to as obvious failures. The program kickoff included
designation of 9 clusters in the St. Louis region to receive priority attention, including
neighborhoods in city, county and both sides of the river. Generally, the areas were low-
income with higher levels of economic and community distress than the regional average. The clusters included Lemay in South County, East St. Louis, Illinois, Jennings and Wellston in North County, Walnut Park West/Walnut Park East/Mark Twain in North St. Louis, Carr Square/St. Louis Place/Old North St. Louis/Columbus Square on the near north side, Gravois Park/Benton Park West/Fox Park/McKinley-Fox in South St. Louis, Forest Park Southeast neighborhood adjacent to the Washington University Medical Center in the Central West End, and the Covenant Blu/Grand Center/Vandeventer neighborhoods in the mid-town area. Officials at 2004 tapped two local organizations to implement the project, RHCDA for physical development strategies and Area Resources for Community and Human Services (ARCHS) for social services. The intention of the initiative was for neighborhoods to create cluster leadership teams to launch coordinated planning activities, facilitated by staff from the two agencies and other organizations. This would lead to a set of priority projects that could receive additional civic sector funding. The announcement also included commitments in the amount of $751 million in loans and grants from a cross-section of local organizations and corporations to support both planning and redevelopment initiatives (Parish, 1998i: B1).

Announcement of the initiative focused regional activity on neighborhood redevelopment, leading to additional civic and philanthropic commitments in neighborhoods and a number of high profile grants for redevelopment activities. However, the $751 million commitment announced at the outset would come back to haunt the program’s implementers. Problems emerged in both the planning and implementation of projects. This difficulty reflected the difficulty of achieving consensus in clusters that crossed neighborhood boundaries and included diverse groups of residents.
and stakeholders. Some clusters quickly completed planning and moved into a project phase (Sutin, 1999: 1; Carroll, 1999: C1), but planning in others was delayed for years. Fifth Ward alderman April Ford Griffin initially asked for 5th Ward neighborhoods to be taken out of the initiative, and then chose to forgo Sustainable Neighborhood-funded planning work, instead completing a separate ward plan using a portion of her CDBG allocation. Complicating the process was a lack of clarity, even among neighborhood leaders, about how resources could be accesses. Completion of plans in some cases led to few improvements. Indeed, a number of cluster plans have sat on shelves with no implementation or follow-up past the plan’s publication.

The critical failure of the initiative was the inability to build capacity in each of the cluster neighborhoods. In this sense, designation as a Sustainable Neighborhood cluster offered opportunities that had to be matched by neighborhood conditions, including attracting outside support for development. For several neighborhoods, RHCDA was a critical link to external resources, akin to the role of Downtown Now! in downtown activities. RHCDA benefited from St. Louis 2004 funding and a series of grants from the Danforth Foundation totaling just over $600,000 from 1999 through 2004 (Danforth Foundation, 1999: 30; Danforth Foundation, 2003: 4; Danforth Foundation, 2004: 7). These funds, and other support, paid for outreach staff to work in each of the clusters. Besides designation under the Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative, RHCDA also landed the central role in a new Enterprise Foundation-funded initiative to boost the capacity of local CDC’s (Parish, 1998d: A5); the funds strengthened the connection between RHCDA and potential partners in the neighborhood redevelopment schemes. RHCDA also received funding from the Enterprise Foundation and other investors,
including local banks, to capitalize a Predevelopment Loan Fund; the organization made $4.7 million in loans from 2000 to 2004, leveraging $123 million in housing reinvestments (Regional Housing and Community Development Alliance, 2004: 10). The organization also managed a low-interest home repair loan fund funded by both public and private sources (Kelly, 2001: 5).

This support greatly expanded the organization’s capacity to sponsor redevelopment deals. From 2000 to 2004, through all of its activities, RHCDA participated in the development of over 900 units of housing, 250 units as the developer or co-developer; at the time, the organization had another 600 units in pre-production or planning stages (RHCDA, 2004: 13-14). RHCDA’s target areas for projects included three of Sustainable Neighborhood initiative clusters—Forest Park SE, Wellston, and the Old North St. Louis neighborhood in the near north side cluster. In interviews, RHCDA explained its role as. On the one hand, the experience of its staff meant that the projects they entertained had to meet normal financing, marketing and construction schedules. In planning and predevelopment activities, RHCDA staff did preliminary scans of potential projects and the costs and benefits of them, including local market characteristics. On the other hand, reflective of their role in some of the sustainable neighborhood clusters, staff was expected to push the envelope in terms of market constraints and seek to identify opportunities for redevelopment not currently served by private sector actors. In this sense, RHCDA bridges a gap in neighborhood development capacity and generally works with a local CDC in order to create neighborhood-level capacity for continuing redevelopment activities.
As in downtown development, the role of the Danforth Foundation and other civic sector organizations became critical in a range of neighborhood initiatives. Beyond the funding of RHCDA, the foundation made direct investments in specific projects, including some outside of designated target neighborhoods. Among these included a $1.5 million investment in the Garden District plan by the Missouri Botanical Garden (Bryant, 1998: C4), a neighborhood redevelopment initiative sponsored by the Missouri Botanical Garden (Tucci, 1998d: 1), and a multi-year, multi-millionaire dollar investment in the JeffVanderLou area (Danforth Foundation, 2000: 8). The foundation also used its resources, in the form of both grants and loans, to support affordable housing development undertaken by McCormick Baron in both East St. Louis and St. Louis City (Danforth Foundation, 2002: 31, 43). These investments and support were broader than the Sustainable Neighborhood target areas, reflecting that specific opportunities, and not just geography, would guide neighborhood redevelopment efforts.

**Patterns of Decline in the 5th and 19th Wards**

Like downtown, neighborhoods located in the 5th and the 19th Wards of the City of St. Louis had legacies of past activities—as well as periods of long inactivity—that shaped the most recent round of redevelopment. These neighborhoods are broadly referred to as the near north side of St. Louis. Fifth Ward neighborhoods include Carr Square/Columbus, St. Louis Place and Old North St. Louis, located just north of the central business district; the 19th Ward area of interest here contains sections of mid-town and the JeffVanderLou neighborhood to the north

[Insert Figure 3 here.]
While these areas’ complex social and demographic history once included varied ethnic populations and typically urban neighborhoods densely occupied by both residences and commercial establishments, their fate has been dramatically shaped by their urban renewal experiences and demographic and economic shifts that impacted them in the post-urban renewal period.

An extensive historical examination is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the highlights are important for how the neighborhoods faced new redevelopment opportunities in the middle and late 1990. The 5th Ward area generally includes the neighborhoods north of Cole Street—the northern boundary of the downtown central business district—to Branch Street on the north, I-70 to the east and Jefferson to the west.

[Insert Figure 4 here.]

The physical layout of the 5th Ward area has been especially impacted by urban renewal activities, including the construction of a series of housing projects on the northern edge of the downtown. These included the city’s first public housing project, Carr Square, completed in 1942, Cochran Garden in 1952, the infamous Pruitt Igoe project in 1954, and Vaughn Apartments in 1957. Other public housing projects completed after Pruitt-Igoe’s demolition in 1975 included the O’Fallon Apartments, completed in 1980, and the Columbus Square Apartments, completed in 1986. The presence of public housing has radically impacted the 5th Ward in both demographic and social terms. While the Columbus Square Apartments included a small number of market rate units and owner-occupied condos, most of the projects in the area were affordable, rental apartments, and this fact heightened the concentration of poor residents in the area. The inability of local housing authority managers to cope with the needs of this population—and the
maintenance needs of the complexes—has at various times increased the level of social
and physical distress in the community, decreasing the ability of the neighborhood to
sustain a needed level of other local services—parks, retail establishments and social
service support systems. The fact that the area is generally surrounding by industrial and
commercial establishments—increasingly moribund—heightened the physical isolation
of this part of the city even with its location just blocks from the city’s central business
district.

While the projects remain primarily racially and economically segregated, a series
of initiatives beginning with the Murphy Park neighborhood in 1996 started the process
of their replacement with newer, mixed income communities. The story of these
projects—how they were organized and who participated in them—is a significant part of
the area’s redevelopment. Outside of the public housing areas, the remaining landscape
of the 5th Ward in the 1990s has been populated with the remains of the area’s 19th
century neighborhoods. While a number of scattered site housing projects were built in
these areas—namely, three rental housing projects built in 1983 by Grace Hill Settlement
House—these neighborhoods generally missed the renovation boom that occurred in St.
Louis in the 1980s, even with the attempt of some entrepreneurs and organizations to
market the area as a historic district. A lack of investment in the area’s housing increased
the abandonment of property throughout the 1970s and 1980s; by the middle of the
1990s, when the 5th Ward generally was entering into a new round of redevelopment
activity, the area was populated with vacant and burned-out housing and vacant lots left
by housing demolition.
Public housing construction across the area hastened white flight from the area, and added to other demographic trends, exacerbated social and economic problems.

[Insert Table 6 here.]

The area lost 87% of its population from 1950 to 2000; by 1990, the area was 82% African-American, with 52% of the residents below the poverty level. The area’s population decline was particularly dramatic; from 1970 to 1980, the area lost 60% of its population, with a further 10% drop by 1990 and 30% between 1990 and 2000. By 1990, about a third of housing units in the area were vacant; from 1950 to 2000, the area lost 76% of its housing units (U.S. Census Bureau, various).

In some of the older parts of the area, resident organizations followed the neighborhood association patterns typical of local neighborhoods. In Old North St. Louis neighborhood, an older white community linked up with a group of urban renovators who moved to the area in the 1980s. They formed the Old North St. Louis Restoration Group in 1988 in order to advance the preservation and restoration of the existing housing stock. The group contrasted its agenda with that of the Grace Hill Settlement House, who had advocated demolition of older buildings and construction of affordable rental housing. The Restoration Group combined volunteer neighborhood service projects with advocacy for reinvestment in the area (“Group on North Side Plans Arson Watches,” 1981: 7A; Vodicka, 1990: 3; “Cleanup Effort Underway on Several Fronts,” 1994: 2D); along with other small organizations sprinkled across the ward, the group also worked nominally as a community development group. More significant both in institutional and political terms were tenant groups in the public housing complexes, particularly Carr Square and Cochran Gardens. Created through rent strikes and tenant organizing drives in the 1970s
and 1980s, these groups had gained a level of control over their neighborhoods and were active forces in both ward politics and in city politics generally (Todd, 1989e: 12D; “Give Tenant Ownership a Chance,” 1989: 2B).

The 19th Ward was similarly touched by patterns of investment and disinvestment in the postwar period. The area includes midtown commercial and institutional districts along Olive and Lindell, including the north-eastern edge of the Grand Center area, and the residential neighborhood of JeffVanderLou to the north of midtown, bounded by Olive/Lindell on the south, St. Louis Avenue on the north, Jefferson on east and Grand on the west.

[Insert Figure 5 here.] Like the 5th Ward, the area was once a bustling commercial and residential community, with particular historic importance to the city’s African American community. Martin Luther King Boulevard (formerly Easton Avenue) running through this middle of this area was once the site of an active neighborhood business center, including black-owned nightclubs and theaters; the residential areas just north of Easton was one of the first area of the city where African Americans were permitted to own real estate (Vashon/Jeff-Vander-Lou Initiative, 2001: 2). In the 1960s and 1970s, the area was designated a War on Poverty community, and an active neighborhood redevelopment effort led by Maclar Shepard sponsored a host of community improvement initiatives, including construction and rehabilitation of a number of affordable housing projects and some community improvement and economic development projects (“Maclar Shepard Founder and Chairman of Jeff-Vander-Lou Inc,” 2005: B7). Also significant for the area was the presence of a number of long-standing religious churches. Washington Metropolitan
Church, in the southern portion of the area in Mid-Town, actively supported the construction of the Lucas Heights village, a series of affordable and market-rate apartments built in the 1970s and 1980s (Rice, 1997: C15).

St. Alphonsus Liguori Catholic Church, located on the western edge of JVL, also has been actively involved in neighborhood events, sponsoring the construction of new single-family, for sale homes just west of the JVL neighborhood (Parish, 1999i: C3). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, church staff was also involved in organizing at the Blumeyer public housing complex, located on a site adjacent to the church (Dine, 1989: 5A; Todd, 1992: 1E; Samuel, 1996: 2B). The public housing, first opened in 1968, comprised two high-rise apartment buildings containing over 1,100 apartments and another 288 townhouse apartments adjacent to the high-rise site.

Despite these efforts, the ward, and particularly the residential communities in JeffVanderLou, has suffered from economic decline for most of the postwar period, including a significant loss of population and abandonment and demolition of residential property (see Table 6 above). Like the 5th Ward area, this decline shaped the dominant perception of the area as dilapidated and dangerous. A majority African American area since the pre-war period, the 19th Ward area has a similarly precipitous decline in its population, 87% from 1950 to 2000, with a 50% population decline in the 1970s and a 20% population decline in the 1980s. By 1990, 55% of the population lived below the poverty level. The area lost 71% of its housing units from 1950 to 2000. By 1990, one quarter of the housing units were vacant; vacancy increased to 30% of total units even as the area continued to lose housing units (U.S. Census Bureau, various).
Demographic shifts in the area’s population overwhelmed the capacity of local organizations to produce positive results and, by the middle 1990s, Shepard’s JVL organization remained in a much shrunken form. Budget cuts, both local and national, had reduced its activity; in 1995 its innovative job-training program—a partnership with Brown Shoe—closed due to economic competition (Stroud, 1995: 1C). The JVL Housing remained in a precarious state, with most units vacant and in disrepair (Parish, 2000a: C1). Also in a perilous condition was the Blumeyer housing complex. Drug sales, gang violence and crime in the area prompted police officials to back an anti-crime effort beginning in 1990 (O’Neil, 1990a: 3A).

The Failure of Public Housing and the Rise of HOPE

A significant part of neighborhood rebuilding in this near north side area has been public housing improvements, particularly a spate of HOPE VI conversions that started in the mid 1990s. While the sites are located in local neighborhoods and the resident groups are fully invested in neighborhood politics, the story of their conversion fits the pattern of changes in development decision-making that occurred downtown. The failure of past strategies led to an institutional shift in the management of public housing and the creation of a new type of public housing, with mixed-income tenants. This strategy was publicly supported by elected leaders at level of government and particularly Missouri Republican Senator Kit Bond, who championed a new source of federal funds to support the projects.

Ironically, HOPE VI conversions have made St. Louis a national example of how to revitalize publicly funded affordable housing (Morath, 2003: B2) thirty years after the city became a national example of public housing failure with the demolition of the Pruitt
Igoe project (Hebers, 1970: 1; Huxtable, 1972: D23). A more careful analysis of public housing could show how this view of public housing failure as much reflects the political posturing around public housing; one study published in 2001 found that the majority of public housing residents did not conform to negative stereotypes and that children who had spent part of their life in public housing had better outcomes than equivalent cohorts who lived elsewhere (Newman and Harkess, 2001: 22). However, by the 1980s and 1990s, there was a pervasive perception in the local press that local public housing projects were failures. Tenant complaints included a long list of outstanding repairs, including broken elevators, faulty heating systems and peeling paint and faulty management (Dine, 1989: 5A; Todd, 1989b: 1A; Todd, 1991a: 1A). An inability to provide security for the complexes, despite the various scenarios attempted by project managers, meant that drug dealing and gang violence plagued them (Bryan, 1989: 1D; Todd, 1991d: 13A; Sorkin, 1991:7A). One third of Blumeyer’s units were vacant in 1989 (Dine, 1989: 5A); ten years later, the vacancy rate was over 50% (Parish, 1998g: B4).

The vacancy rate at the Vaughn Towers reached 75% by 1989, leading the city to propose demolishing the units rather than investing any additional funds to bring more units on line (Rose and Mannies, 1989: 3A). However, competing political pressures complicated this proposal, like other reform efforts. Mayor Vincent Schoemehl’s attempts to restructure housing authority management faced opposition both locally and nationally. In 1982, Schoemehl “took over” housing authority operations after the heating systems failed for up to 2,000 public housing residents (Freeman, 1982a: 1A). However, the lack of consensus among other local political officials prevented broader restructuring of the agency. Opposing Schoemehl’s move was not only the authority’s
current management structure and prominent African-American aldermen but also Aldermanic President Thomas Zych and HUD officials (Joiner, 1982a: 1A; Singer and Domjam, 1982: 3A; Joiner, 1982c: 3A; Joiner, 1982c: 1B). In 1988, Schoemehl took advantage of local funding shortfalls to transfer all of the agency’s planning, personnel and social service delivery functions to various City Hall departments (Todd, 1989c: 4B); a year later, with another reorganization plan on hold, Schoemehl appointed two directors at CDA to continue to oversee housing authority operations (Todd, 1989d: 3A).

While Schoemehl’s political skills did foster some local victories, in other areas a lack of political consensus marred improvement projects. The inability of city officials to agree upon other scattered site locations cost the city an additional $3 million in federal funding (Schaeffer, 1982: 3A; Gillerman, 1982: 14AS) and also complicated later revitalization efforts at Vaughn and Darst-Webbe under the federal Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE) program (O’Neil, 1991b: 3A; O’Neil and Todd, 1991: 3A). First initiated in 1990, the HOPE program came about in a period of intense transformation in HUD funding priorities and the development of new relationships between federal officials, particularly HUD Secretary Jack Kemp, and public housing leaders (Linsalata, 1989: 1A; Todd, 1989c: 12D; Todd, 1989f: 18A). Kemp frequently mentioned Cochran tenant management leader Berthea Gilkey in his national addresses on public housing, and both President George H. Bush and Kemp visited both Cochran and Carr Square on national tours to promote the new program priorities (Linsalata, 1989: 1A; Todd and Hernon, 1989: 1B; Freivogel, 1990: 1B). Joining Bush administration policymakers in support for both HOPE legislation and tenant management organizations was Senator Christopher (Kit) Bond (R-MO). Bond
was instrumental in a 1990 compromise that moved HOPE legislation out of Senate committee (Koenig, 1990a: 14A); his position on the Senate Appropriations Committee uniquely placed him for a variety of programs and projects specifically allocated for St. Louis.

The HOPE initiative reenergized the role of tenant groups in local decision-making. Under a series of local reforms following a rent strike in 1969, agency officials decentralized management of public housing to tenant groups (Peterman, 1993: 162); however, only Carr Square and Cochran retained tenant management at their respective complexes after tenant management was reined in the 1980s (Monti, 1989: 42; Parish, 1998e: B1). Tenant leaders were strong supporters of HOPE priorities, including ownership of public housing by residents. HOPE I and II promoted homeownership opportunities in multifamily rental properties, HOPE III encouraged non-profits to rehabilitate single-family homes for low-income ownership, and HOPE IV was oriented towards elderly homeownership (Abt Associates, 1996: 1-1).

In backing these initiatives, administration officials like Kemp and local tenant leaders would face the opposition of powerful congressional representatives, including St. Louis Congressman William Clay (D-MO), who regarded these policy changes as a privatization plan for public housing (Mannies 1989: 1C). Clay opposed a plan under HOPE authorization passed in 1990 that authorized St. Louis’ housing authority to sell Carr Square and Cochran to tenant managers in a plan that would convert some of the units to homeownership (“Give Tenant Ownership A Chance,” 1989: 2B; “Clay Doubts Savings on Carr Complex Sale, 1989: 12A); Clay’s opposition—and a lack of state funding for the initiative—put the sale on hold until 1993, when Mayor Freeman Bosley
made it one of his major housing initiatives (Gross, 1993: 1C). Clay also intervened in other housing authority matters, including siding with an embattled agency director (“City Housing Chief Is Asked to Stay,” 1989: 5A) and involving himself in a dispute at Carr Square (Koenig, 1990d: 4B).

**From HOPE I to HOPE VI**

The HOPE I measures approved in 1990 that allowed for tenant ownership of complexes would locally as well as nationally become an “isolated experiment” (“The Mayor Gambles on Carr Square,” 1993: 10B), with mixed results. Six years after the conversion, no units were owner-occupied (Shinkle, 2002: C2) and the Carr Square Tenant Management Association was dogged by allegations of financial mismanagement (Parish, 1998b: B1). Nationally, while 231 housing agencies received grants for planning tenant conversion, the program returned only 2,300 units to tenant ownership (Rohe, 1995: 441). Following the 1992 national elections bringing a new administration to Washington, support for HOPE I initiatives declined (DeParle, 1993: A16) and funding for the program was discontinued beginning in FY 1995 (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2000: np).

Much more prominent have been the HOPE VI provisions intended to provide funding to improve severely distressed public housing. The measure was first authorized in 1992, with appropriations beginning in 1993. The initiative funded plans for the physical revitalization of public housing developments, including demolition or reconfiguration of the existing project and redevelopment of the area with additional low-income and market-rate housing (Abt Associates, 1996: ii). Rating criteria for selection in the program have included a plan for addressing both the physical aspects of the
development as well as the social and economic conditions of residents and the involvement of a broad local community—including residents, public officials, businesses and service agencies—in planning and implementing the project (Abt Associates, 1996: 1-8).

By 2003, the program had funded 446 separate grants, with a total public investment of just over $5.3 billion (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2003: 1). While federal funding renewed an incentive for investment in these types of projects, other changes in the institutional structure of decision-making regarding local public housing would accompany them. Beginning in 1994, HUD widely promoted a “HOPE VI Plus” approach that emphasized the need to leverage HUD funds with other local and state sources (Abt Associates, 1996: 5-3). The need for this leverage—and the structure of some incentives, like low income tax credits—has in practice accelerated the use of a public/private partnership in planning and completing projects, and specifically the substantial privatization of the projects in the hands of private-market developers. Each of the three official HOPE VI projects initiated in St. Louis—Darst Webbe on the south side, Blumeyer in Midtown and Cochran on the near north side—as well as the related mixed income development Murphy Park that preceded them has been accomplished by a private developer, with public agencies and officials playing a supportive role.

Concurrent with the development of the public-private approach have been a series of reforms at the St. Louis Housing Authority that has deemphasized the role of the agency in planning and implementing the projects, as well as managing the units after redevelopment. Additionally, the prominence of the private sector in redevelopment of
these projects has accompanied a shift in perspective that had promoted tenant organization involvement and ownership. While on the national level, this shift was accompanied rather forcefully with an end date in support to HOPE I initiatives, locally this shift has taken somewhat more time, and the political ramifications have been longer lasting. Finally, this new model of public housing reconversion has reshuffled the political players involved in redevelopment. On the one hand, it has required mayoral leadership for the commitment of limited local and state funding to support the initiative, particularly the city’s likely share of state-level low income tax credits. On the other, HOPE VI projects have required a greater deal of coordination between HOPE VI developers and the local politicians who support for the initiative has been critical.

**Crisis at the St. Louis Housing Authority**

Even after Schoemehl’s reforms at the agency in 1989, warning signs of dysfunctions at the St. Louis Housing Authority abounded during the mayor’s final term. In 1989, HUD threatened to freeze federal funding because the agency lacked a procedures and policy manual for contracting (Uhlenbrock, 1989: 8A), and local HUD officials publicly chastised the agency’s outgoing head for managerial inefficiency (Todd, 1989a: 1A). HUD officials regarded the agency as one of the “most troubled” in the Midwest region (Linsalata, 1990: 3A). Following a series of management crises, HUD again put the agency on notice, demanding immediate improvement on 13 standards of management skill (Todd, 1991b: 1B). The threat of HUD takeover prompted another resignation of an agency director amid allegations of “bungling” the agency’s multi-millionaire budget (“Fresh Start at Housing Authority,” 1991: 2B).
Some local politicians complained that Schoemehl’s reforms at the agency hindered rather than helped the organization’s operations; Schoemehl was criticized for holding high-level meetings with agency officials without representation from the agency director’s office (Mannies, 1991: 1C) and for the appointment of agency consultants with close political ties to the mayor (Todd, 1991c: 7A). Appointment of Schoemehl’s candidate for the directorship stalled over objections by HUD staff; HUD officials also threatened to withhold the city’s annual CDBG appropriation because of the continuing inability of the city to reach a compromise on the location of scattered site units under the Vaughn improvement program (O’Neil, 1991: 3A).

Political compromises reached in February of 1992 ended the impasse over the location of the new scattered site units (O’Neil, 1992a: 1A). However, charges of mismanagement would afflict the Housing Authority throughout the remainder of the 1990’s, leading to a series of attempts by other St. Louis mayors to recast the agency’s management. Mayor Bosley made reform at the Housing Authority one of the hallmarks of his neighborhood revitalization strategy. In January of 1994, he appointed a task force to study the agency’s operations; at the same time he asked for the resignation of four of appointed agency commissioner (Holleman, 1994a: 1E). The task force report, released in August of 1994, charged the agency with incompetence by staff and interference in agency management by the board (Todd, 1994a: 1D). The findings led to the resignation of the agency director (Prost, 1994c: 1A) and a new round of political fighting over mayoral control of the agency (Gross, 1994: 1C). The succeeding executive director resigned after less than one year on the job (Sorkin and Gross, 1995: 1B). The next director picked by Bosley and ratified by the agency board in November of 1995 (Sorkin,
1995: 1B), initially received high praises but ultimately couldn’t steer the agency in manner that satisfied either HUD or other local politicians. HUD’s 1995 rating of the agency placed St. Louis’ agency at the bottom of Missouri agencies, finding the officials had spent only ½ of the modernization dollars allocated and that it took agency staff over 200 days to prepare a vacated unit for a new tenant, almost 7 times the federal standard (Mihalopoulos, 1996: 1A).

This pattern of management changes and political conflict intensified after Bosley’s primary election defeat by Clarence Harmon in March of 1997. During the mayoral campaign, board members had released agency documents critical of Harmon’s stint as director of security for the agency and some officials at the agency had been publicly critical of Harmon’s campaign (Berger, 1997: 2D). HUD audits during the year faulted the agency for improper bidding, including unseemly political relationships between agency subcontractors and Bosley’s political allies (Tuft, 1997a: 9A), and later gave the agency its lowest rating, finding, among other items, that it now took over 400 days for the agency to prepare a vacated apartment for a new tenant (Parish, 1997d: 1A). Further financial irregularities prompted HUD to strip local executives of their ability to independently spend money (Tuft and Parish, 1997: A7); as a result, Harmon forced the resignation of the director and a majority of its appointed board (Parish, 1997f: A1).

Development of the Murphy Park, Mixed Income Model

Poor agency performance not only exacerbated political conflict over the agency; it also jeopardized St. Louis’ first HOPE VI project, slated for the Darst-Webbe project south of downtown. The Darst-Webbe project first received approval from the federal government in January of 1995, but had been delayed in both its planning and
implementation. Early in the Bosley administration, mayoral staff and agency executive staff clashed over control of the project (Berger, 1995b: 1E), and the initial plan had to be shelved when the lead developer pulled out of the deal (Berger, 1996b: 1E). After a March, 1997, date for demolition of the existing buildings passed, HUD warned that it would pull the grant designation unless the agency came up with a plan for the project within 90 days (Parish, 1997e: 11A). While local agency officials were right to complain the delay was in part due to changing HUD requirements for the project—and particularly the desire on the part of HUD officials to save the adjacent City Hospital No. 1 from demolition under the project plan. Successfully planning and implementing the plan would require not only a creative approach but also a wholesale change in the orientation of housing authority officials in how they planned projects and the sort of collaborations they would undertake to successfully complete them.

While Darst-Webbe was the city’s first official HOPE VI project under the new federal initiative, the Murphy Park project in the 5th ward area predated it and created the model for redevelopment at Darst-Webbe, Blumeyer and Cochran Gardens. By the late 1980s, housing authority officials had admitted that they had “lost the battle at Vaughn” (Todd, 1989b: 1A). Frustrated with the lack of repairs, tenants of the building sued the housing authority in 1990. The plan that emerged included both demolition of the 5 Vaughn structures and their replacement by 220 townhouses and the conversion of the adjacent Carr Square units to homeownership opportunities (Rose and Mannies, 1989: 3A).

While Congress, under the leadership of Senator Bond, ultimately approved the demolition and appropriated $36 million in a pilot program to subsidize rental apartments
both in a new project on the Vaughn site and elsewhere in the city (Koenig, 1990: 8A; Koenig and Todd, 1991: 3A), the requirement for one-to-one replacement of the demolished units stymied progress on the project. This stipulation had been one of the criteria set by tenants in their lawsuit and was vigorously opposed by some on the Board of Aldermen who had to approve the project and who deplored the effect that some subsidized, Section 8 units where having in their neighborhoods (O’Neil and Todd, 1991: 3A; Billingsley, 1991: 9W). As noted above, the delay exacerbated tensions between local and federal officials, and led to threats that the federal government would withhold not just additional public housing funding but the city’s CDBG allocation as well. Local opposition to the plan ended with a compromise solution, adopted locally in February of 1992. Federal policymakers dropped the one-to-one replacement requirement in 1995 (Abt Associates, 1996: 5-3), along with changes that allowed for greater flexibility in public housing requirements, including allowing housing agencies to rent to higher income tenants, to evict problem tenants and to include market rate units in public housing projects (Poor, 1996: 1A).

While the rule changes provided greater impetus for HOPE VI projects locally, planning for the Vaughn project would continue haphazardly during Schoemehl’s final years into the first years of the Bosley administration. Like planning for the Darst-Webbe project, planning for Vaughn got caught up in politics between the Bosley’s office and officials at the housing authority (Berger, 1995a: 2F). Demolition of the existing buildings would wait until the spring of 1995, three years after Congressional approval (Todd, 1995: 1A). Financing for the project would not be in place until February of 1996 (Berger, 1996a: 2C).
The designation of McCormick-Baron and Associates as lead developer helped move the project forward; more broadly, the firm’s assumption of the project helped reinforce its characteristic as a privately-managed, mixed-income project—a characteristic that the resulting initiative would share with other St. Louis HOPE VI projects and other HOPE VI projects across the nation. McCormack Baron, with Richard Baron as its principal, started in St. Louis in 1977, and became known for a series of quality, mixed-income housing projects, including the O’Fallon Apartments, completed in 1980 adjacent to the Vaughn site. The ability of the firm to work in these communities was enhanced by Baron’s close relationships with tenant organizers and the instrumental role he played as a young lawyer in St. Louis’ 1969 tenant strike. Baron also collaborated with the Carr Square Tenant Management Corporation in the 1996 upgrades as a part of the tenant ownership drive. By the 1990s, the firm worked nationally and was recognized as a national leader in development of affordable housing (Robins, 1986: 1; Hamilton, 1988: 17; Gallagher, 1990: 1; Edelstein, 1996: 5), and particularly in the development of relationships with Wall Street financing in the syndication of low income tax credits and other housing related investment credits.

Baron’s model capitalized upon the widespread distrust of high rise public housing towers, replacing them with two and three story townhouses oriented towards a traditional urban street grid, with brick and other architectural details to tie them to an existing urban landscape. Demolition of the Vaughn buildings included a cast of federal and local political leaders, including Senator Bond, who lauded a new “model” for affordable housing and community revitalization (Uhlenbrock, 1995: 1B). Even with the capacity of the firm, completing planning for the project and moving into implementation
of the plan meant overcoming a number of additional challenges. Federal commitments represented only $20 million of the $36 million price tag, and some locally remained skeptical about the project’s eventual success. Accessing low income tax credits would require an extraordinary commitment of the state’s annual appropriation and virtually assure that few other St. Louis projects would receive an equivalent share. Additionally, the project would require private investment outside of public financing—not just equity investment in the form of tax credit syndication, but also corporate and other charitable contributions.

Those sort of private investments were possible because of Baron’s significant contacts in the local corporate community, and would be a significant feature of Baron’s community building efforts. Baron’s efforts were widely reported locally and nationally, including specific mention and endorsement in the 1997 Peirce Report (Peirce and Johnson, 1997c: 14) and praise from national political leaders on both sides of the political spectrum (Parish, 1997a: 2B; Weiss, 1999: B1). For the first phase of Murphy Blair, Mayor Bosley joined Baron in personal appeals to Civic Progress and other corporate leaders for investment in the project (Todd, 1995: 1A). Murphy Park received an early investment from NationsBank after its purchase of Boatman’s Bank (Gallagher, 1996: 8B); by 1997, local corporations—including Anheuser Busch, Southwest Bank, Schnuck Markets, Mercantile Bank and other—had committed $2.5 million, much of it as equity investment for tax credits (Parish, 1997b: 1A). McCormack Baron also utilized corporate support in an improvement project at Jefferson School, a public elementary school adjacent to the Murphy Park site. The firm received designation from the St. Louis School Board of Education to redevelop the school, receiving the authority to not
only complete physical improvements there but also the authority to restructure the
school’s educational curriculum and have some authority over the principal and teaching
staff (Autman, 1997: 2B). Support for work at the school came through substantial
investments by Southwestern Bell Telephone and the Danforth Foundation, among others

**Institutional Changes at the Housing Authority**

Much of the work at Murphy-Blair succeeded despite political battles over the
management of housing agency and the impact of public housing on local neighborhoods.
However, subsequent changes at the agency and in the development environment in
which it operated would make future projects easier to complete. The use of low-income
tax credits created a precedent, later formalized by Mayor Slay’s development staff, that
HOPE VI projects would have priority over other local requests; the determination
largely quelled local criticism that HOPE VI projects were drawing too large of a share of
tax credits and fully committed the city behind the requests. More fundamentally,
management changes during the Harmon administration placed a series of leaders at the
agency fully committed to the HOPE VI model. According to one source who worked on
the Darst-Webbe project, Michael Jones, Harmon’s deputy mayor for development,
broached a series of compromises between agency staff and city staff at SLDC that
placed the latter fully in charge of HOPE VI planning; Harmon designated Otis Williams,
a senior official at SLDC, as lead person on the project, eliminating some of the
duplicative activity that had been occurring at the two agencies and stymieing progress
on the Darst-Webbe project specifically.
Harmon also used the management crisis at the housing authority in the winter of 1997 as an opportunity to ask for the resignation of the entire board of the agency and also the agency’s executive director, paving the way for a new management team at the agency. Harmon’s choice for the director, Tom Costello, broke tradition from previous choices; while Costello was a former director of the agency from the 1970s, he had returned to private development practice as a senior associate at McCormack-Baron (Tuft, 1997a: C9). More importantly, he fully embraced a new model of public housing management. Costello backed out-sourcing of some of the agency’s work, including planning around the Darst-Webbe (Parish, 1998a: E1); he advanced a privatization plan that called for contracting out of all housing management services (Parish, 1999a: B4). Costello also was strongly in favor of the sort of public private partnership that was being used to redevelopment Murphy Park and Darst-Webbe (Parish, 1998f: C1).

While Harmon’s board choices were not long lasting, Costello’s interim appointment—originally planned for just six months—lasted until the summer of 1999. His replacement, Cheryl Lovell, followed closely along the privatization path Costello advocated (Parish, 1999d: B1). Lovell’s previous post as director of redevelopment projects put her directly in charge of HOPE VI redevelopment, and she was a strong supporter of mixed income developments. Like Costello, Lovell saw the strengths of the agency in overall asset management, as opposed to development or housing management, a position also taken by HUD officials (Parish, 1999e: B1). Soon after her appointment, agency officials agreed to privatize management at Clinton-Peabody and LaSalle Park and to outsource all inspection operations to a private agency (Parish, 1999f: B1; Parish, 1999g: A8). Complementing Lovell’s management of the agency was renewed stability
on the board. Harmon’s picks for the board in July of 1999 included Sal Martinez, a housing development professional who had worked with a number of north side development efforts (Schlinkmann, 1999f: A6); a year later, he was appointed chair of the agency board. Like Lovell, Martinez was a strong supporter of HOPE VI developments, and, as a part of his board work, he improved the political connections of the agency to a variety of local stakeholders, including the aldermen where HOPE VI projects were located.

**HOPE VI and the Aldermen**

HOPE VI at Blumeyer, and to a lesser extent Cochran, benefited from these institutional changes and the renewed vision of public housing in the mixed income model. The announcement in 1999 that housing authority officials were considering Blumeyer for HOPE VI intensified the fear among residents about the future of their complexes (Parish, 1999: A1) and led to a series of protests at the Blumeyer site (Parish, 2001a: C2). However, protests were quickly muted, partly because of the consensus among housing authority officials and city politicians and the relationships between the local aldermen and tenant organizations (Pierce, 2001b: N1). Friendship between the authority’s board chair Sal Martinez and 19th Ward alderman Mike McMillan calmed resident fears and presented an united front after the selection of McCormack Baron as the site developer; McCormack Baron also agreed to maintain two elderly buildings and to include residents in the project planning (Parish, 2001b: D2). Like other HOPE VI projects, the Blumeyer project received strong support from Senator Bond, including an earmark for social service planning at the site (Parish, 2001d: 15).
Like Blumeyer, the HOPE VI at Cochran emerged with significant aldermanic oversight and input. The developer chosen for the project included a local architectural firm, Kennedy Associates, that had worked on both the Darst-Webbe and Blumeyer project, and that had close relationships with 5th ward alderman April Ford Griffin and to housing authority executives. While Griffin did not have veto power over the selection of the developer, she had significant representation on the selection panel and, according to one housing authority official, was notified about the selection process. After the selection, Griffin strongly backed the proposal and the development team in neighborhood meetings, including meetings where tenant representatives protested the HOPE VI. According to an official involved in the project, Griffin successfully had one of her allies to get a key position on the team that was implementing social services as a part of the project.

Aldermanic oversight of HOPE VI projects represented their interest in promoting redevelopment activities, an important message in their re-election campaigns (Munz, 2002: B1; Moore, 2004: C1). Additionally, aldermanic oversight reflected a concern that redevelopment not disrupt their electoral coalition by alienating an important constituency group—public housing tenants and tenant management groups. In the 19th Ward, relationships between Alderman McMillan and tenant organizations blunted opposition to the project; however, in the 5th Ward, the HOPE VI project exacerbated existing tensions, particularly tensions between Alderman April Ford-Griffin and a political faction centered at Carr Square and Cochran. In neighborhood meetings at this time, Griffin allies attempted to blunt the opposition by promoting the project, minority participation in it and attempting to negotiate between the two factions. However, the
fact that this opposition was so prevalent and that the project ultimately went through despite the organization of tenant management indicates the strong incentives for pursuing the project among the housing authority, project developers and local elected officials. The tension emerged in neighborhood planning processes conducted in the 5th Ward, extended to problems between the tenant management groups and the housing authority—including allegations of financial mismanagement on the part of both the Carr Square tenant management group and the Cochran tenant management group (Bryant, 2002: 21; Shinkle, 2002: C2)—and erupted full-scale when the Cochran HOPE VI was announced in September of 2002. The conflict led to a series of electoral challenges to Griffin for her aldermanic seat and Griffin’s allies in local state representative elections (Fernandes, 2001: N1; Schlinkmann, 2002: B2). Some Cochran tenants remained opposed to the project to the very end, protesting at the ribbon cutting that initiated the project (Parish, 2005: B4).

**Politic, Planning and Development in JVL**

HOPE VI projects on the near north side represent the ability of a renewed redevelopment system to sustain successful relationships between private developers and local development officials, including elected officials. A new system for planning and implementing projects provided strong incentives for the developments, even when public housing residents opposed them. These patterns of relationships were replicated in other large commercial and institutional projects, particularly those located adjacent to the area in Mid Town and downtown. 19th Ward Alderman Mike McMillan particularly proved adept at negotiating these relationships and encouraging the completion of a number of high-profile projects backed by important interests in Grand Center (Munz,
2001: B1). McMillan’s campaign pitch included the fact that since his election in 1997 more than $1 billion worth of investments had been spent or committed in the 19th Ward (Moore, 2004: C1).

At the same time, the HOPE VI experiences on the near north side reinforce the relatively privatized nature of development decision-making, a characteristic that carries over in examinations of other development initiatives in the area. Two large-scale, publicly oriented planning processes—the JVL Initiative in the 19th Ward and the Sustainable Neighborhoods Initiative in the 5th—failed to gain traction and ultimately bogged down. In the later case, physical development planning processes largely blessed existing redevelopment activities already occurring in the area, particularly the emphasis on building new housing subdivisions utilizing the area’s large amount of vacant land. These activities had a cumulative effect, drawing additional investment in the area and creating a more or less sustainable platform for additional market-rate development. The involvement of neighborhood organizations and neighborhood residents came only in very specific and very traditional forms; where neighborhood organizations remained involved in development priorities, they did so recognizing the primary place of private market forces in locating, planning, and implementing development initiatives.

Both the Sustainable Neighborhoods planning initiative and the JVL Initiative came out of the new engagement of civic leadership that emerged following the Peirce Report and St. Louis 2004 Initiative. In the latter case, planning activities linked revitalization efforts in JeffVanderLou with the powerful political and economic resources of the local Danforth Foundation. The foundation’s change of mission in 1996 focused foundation resources directly on St. Louis area issues, including neighborhood
development. Foundation staff regarded the JVL project as their version of a “comprehensive community development initiative”—one that would assess both the physical and social resources of JVL and target public and private resources to the community into meeting these needs.

The JVL Initiative also fit with school reform strategies already occurring on the near north side, specifically the McCormack Baron partnership with Jefferson School. Baron had intended the work at Jefferson School to be a first stage of additional work with other schools located in the area (Pierce, 1999b: A6); these efforts accelerated after the St. Louis Public School Board announced that it would be building a replacement school for Vashon High School, a prominent north St. Louis school with a long history in the local black community. Throughout most of the 1990s, a decision over the fate of Vashon High School was delayed as a part of court supervision of city schools from the region’s desegregation agreement, with local school officials and high school alumni supporting retention of the school (Little, 1995: 1B). Discussions on ending the court supervision and local passage of a public schools modernization bond issue in 1998 broke stalemate on the issue, providing $30 million for construction of a new Vashon facility (Carroll, 1998: C4).

According to one participant, announcement of the site of the new school—a prominent site in the JeffVanderLou neighborhood—capped a process of meetings between city officials, school officials and corporate leaders and representatives from the Danforth Foundation. The plan that eventually emerged combined a neighborhood development initiative in the form of the JeffVanderLou Initiative and a wide-ranging school improvement program, the Vashon Education Compact, focused on Vashon High
School and the nine elementary and middle schools that feed into it (Pierce, 2001a: B1).
Creating the plan utilized a unique coalition of local political, business and civic leaders.
The Danforth foundation committed at the outset $5 million for the plan and its implementation, and the public planning process utilized the leadership of Richard Baron, former Mayor Freeman Bosley Jr., and community activist Norman Seay, among others (Parish, 1999i: A1). Planning activities included about 12 neighborhood meetings in 1999 and 2000, with about 500 residents and stakeholders participating, including four main committees with over 100 members covering such topics as education, housing and infrastructure, health and human services and economic development (Vashon/JeffVanderLou Initiative, 2001: 2-4). Danforth foundation staff also worked with Richard Baron in a series of meetings with local corporate officials to line up financial support for the Vashon Education Compact and to solicit tax credit support from the State of Missouri for funding ("Rebuilding JeffVanderLou, 2001: 43); the list of supporters largely replicated the list of corporate funders who backed Baron’s Jefferson School initiative.

These two efforts placed JeffVanderLou and the 19th Ward more broadly in a central place within a wide-ranging revitalization agenda touching every aspect of the local community. The JVL Initiative plan, released about the same time as the Compact plan, included ambitious strategies on physical redevelopment of the area’s housing stock, improvement to social services and youth services, creation of retail districts, and an educational improvement strategy for both the area’s public schools under the Compact and adult and other vocational services (Vashon/JeffVanderLou Initiative, 2001). Vashon Compact plans included funds for physical retooling of schools,
particularly the elementary and middle schools selected, teacher and principal
recruitment, professional development, and after school and educational enrichment
activities for neighborhood children (Vashon Education Compact, 2002; Vashon
Education Compact, 2003). The effort established two primary organizations for
oversight of the plan and its implementation, the Vashon Compact and the
JeffVanderLou Initiative.

JVL Initiative activities did lead to some redevelopment work. During the JVL
process, Pyramid Development and Bank of America began construction of a series of
market rate, for sale homes in an area to the east of JVL (Parish, 1999j: C3). The plan
was cosponsored by St. Alphonsus’ Grand Rock Community Development Corporation,
which was funded by 19th Ward Alderman Mike McMillan and led by McMillan’s ally,
Sal Martinez. Additionally, prior to the beginning of the JVL planning process, Danforth
Foundation officials participated in meetings to determine how to revitalize the JVL
rental housing developed by Shepard’s JVL Housing Corporation in the 1960s and 1970s.
In March of 2000, the St. Louis Equity Fund announced a $7.5 million dollar renovation
of the apartments, with financing that included HUD funds, local CDBG money and state
low income funds (Parish, 2000a: C1). After completion of the JVL plan, initiative staff
worked with the local Habitat for Humanity office to build 20 new single-family homes
in the 5th Ward portion of JVL as a part of the Hope Square project. The project received
funding from the city’s Affordable Housing Commission to cover about 1/3 of the
project’s $1.8 million cost (Riley, 2003: B4). In 2006, Habitat announced a second phase
of the project with another 20 affordable homes, with funding from the State of Missouri
low-income tax credit program and the Affordable Housing Commission (“Plans for Our
2006 Build Project,” 2006: 5). However, broader residential development efforts within JVL failed to get off the ground (Tucci, 2002: C1). As one local political official acknowledged five years after the initiative’s launching, private developers remained unconvinced as to the viability of doing housing in the neighborhood. The lack of momentum frustrated some local residents, and, according to one observer, led to the resignation of one prominent board member in 2004.

Compounding the difficulty of encouraging development were weaknesses in the coalition supporting the JVL Initiative. From the outset, the two organizations—the Initiative on the one hand and the Compact on the other—operated independently of each other, with little consultation or coordination between the two organizations. While the two organizations shared some of the same board members—principally, the Danforth Foundation staffer who promoted the JVL project—staff members and the organizations operated in two very different institutional settings. The challenges to the Compact’s work were the challenges implicit in the Jefferson School model: distrust among teachers, principals and some school officials as to the ultimate goals of the mostly white, corporate and civic leaders supporting the reform package. Union opposition to the Jefferson School project scuttled plans to replace most of the school’s teachers when the improved school opened in 1998 (Weiss, 2000: A1), and union officials expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the Compact when it was announced (Pierce, 2001a: C1). While the Compact’s resources provided very useful in bringing needed repairs to the Compact school group, in some areas, including principal recruitment and professional development, the Compact made no progress, partly due to the resistance of school officials (Wagman, 2004: B1).
The work of the Compact grew more difficult when a new school board majority—in part elected through support of St. Louis corporate and civic leadership and Mayor Francis Slay (Hacker, 2002: A1; Wagman, 2003b: C1)—hired an interim superintendent and leadership in the spring and summer of 2003. Including executives of a corporate turn-around firm, the new leadership was hired because of a crisis in the school system’s finances and the abysmal bureaucratic performance of the school administration. New school officials quickly reduced school spending because of a $73 million deficit, privatized a number of services and closed schools in parts of north St. Louis that had seen significant population loss. Perceived as a “takeover” of the school system by some local African American leaders, these moves prompted a shake-up in all aspects of the school system, including Compact activities. Several of the schools closed included Compact Schools; the shakeup also included transfers of some of the Compact principals, setting back the ability of Compact leaders to influence school operations.

At Vashon High School, the activities of the system’s new managers exacerbated troubled relationships between Compact officials and school staff, particularly the school’s assistant principal and basketball couch, Floyd Irons. Irons was strongly supported by the school’s alumni and he shared the view of some that were strongly distrustful of the Compact’s motivations. Relations between the two sides soured, with accusations against Irons circulated in the local press, and Iron’s supporters charging that the Compact intended to convert the new school into a charter school that would not be available to neighborhood residents (Berger, 2003: C2; Wagman, 2003a: C1).

Similar to the experiences of the Vashon Compact, the JVL Initiative had difficulty sustaining the relationships between diverse groups of supporters, ultimately
limiting the organization’s effectiveness in bringing resources into the neighborhood. Danforth Foundation officials first erred by offering the executive directorship of the organization to an individual without first getting the support of McMillan or other members of the nascent group’s executive board. Mistrust over the hire marred the director’s tenure and ultimately resulted in the director’s abrupt removal, a move that led to public charges of cronyism against McMillan (“Competence not Cronyism,” 2002: B2) and a cooling of relations between McMillan and foundation officials. While many considered Sal Martinez, the replacement at the agency and a McMillan ally, a competent development professional, his departure from the organization in 2004 was also regarded as another political move on the part of McMillan, increasing questions about the agency’s long term viability.

**Politics, Planning and Development in the 5th Ward**

Like the JVL Initiative, planning in the 5th Ward initially received a boost from St. Louis 2004 and civic leaders associated with it. The 5th Ward had been selected as a cluster for Sustainable Neighborhood Planning activities and some activists from the area had been a part of the 2004’s planning process. Unlike the 19th Ward, however, 5th Ward Alderman April Ford Griffin remained wary of connections to the city’s emerging civic leadership. According to one participant in the Vashon planning activities, Griffin declined to pursue the new Vashon High School, acceding to McMillan’s wish to keep the school in the 19th Ward and thus closing off the opportunity of a partnership with the Danforth Foundation. More fundamentally, she was opposed to her ward’s participation in the Sustainable Neighborhoods program, initially resisting inclusion of the area until the day before the program announcement in December of 1998. Even though she
relented, Griffin instead funded her own physical development plan and put off the social service planning process until 2003, after the initial energy had waned. Ultimately, these decisions made Sustainable Neighborhoods irrelevant to the 5th Ward’s revitalization activities, although some relationships between community activities and St. Louis 2004 funded agencies did emerge.

According to one local planning official, city development officials began urging Griffin to undertake a ward planning process soon after her election in 1997. Part of the impetus for the planning process was the acknowledgement by city officials that multiple developers were interested in building new single family housing on the vacant land in the ward (Parish, 1999h: 8). Some of this activity, with varying degrees of success, preceded the planning process. Outside of the public housing areas, most large-scale redevelopment projects failed to get off the planning board. Two plans announced in 1988 to convert most of the southern part of the St. Louis Place neighborhood into a new middle-income community failed after residents protested blighting of their property (O’Neil, 1988: 1N). Equally unsuccessful was a major plan by the Bosley administration to blight most of the southern portion of the St. Louis Place neighborhood and replace it with a new golf course and market-rate, single family housing. Like the early plan, residents were strongly opposed to the project (Mihalopoulos, 1996b: 3B; Mihalopoulos, 1996d: 1B); Mayor Harmon put a “dead stop” to the project after HUD denied an $8 million grant (Mihalopoulos, 1997b: 1A). Another Bosley administration project, Betty’s Walk, a plan to build up to 23 new homes in the St. Louis Place neighborhood, stalled after one of the co-developers, an ally of Bosley, was found to have defrauded HUD (Tuft, 1996a: 1B). Ultimately, the project only completed 4 homes and the board of
aldermen rescinded development rights to the project in 1996 and 1997 (Berger, 1996c: 1E; “Board of Aldermen,” 1997: 11A). More successful was the Mullanphy Square project, developed by a small, women-owned development company that had done no prior work in the city. The project completed and sold 41 homes in 1996 and 1997 (Parish, 2000c: B1); successive phases of the project have expanded the subdivision to 100 new single-family homes across the southern portion of the St. Louis Place neighborhood.

Fifth Ward planning activities included 18 public meetings with residents in fall of 1999 and winter of 2000; the planning activities looked at specific sub-districts in each of the 5th Ward neighborhoods, as well as the location of new industrial, commercial, retail and other institutional districts in the ward. An original draft of the plan included renewed calls for a golf course (Parish, 2000b: B1). However, it was dropped in the final plan due to resident concerns (Britt, 2000: B2) and, according to one planning officials, after city officials convinced planners and Alderman Griffin that its funding was not feasible. Resident reaction to the plan also modified the plan’s call for the immediate demolition of dangerously dilapidated buildings, instead creating a list of structures whose fate would be determined by future discussions. Elements of the plan included strong support for continued development of new single-family housing, projecting a need for about 400 new, market-rate single-family homes over the next five years (Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 5-1). The plan also supported the development of retail along North Florissant and North Tucker, two major north-south thoroughfares in the area, in concert with a proposed MetroLink line running through the ward (Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 6-4) and other commercial and
industrial sites elsewhere. The team largely punted immediate decisions over the proposed golf course site, calling for future planning and public input over the mostly vacant area (Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 6-5).

**Private Developers and Development-Decision-Making**

While the final draft of the plan was submitted to city planning officials for their approval in the fall of 2000, requested changes to the plan delayed final submission to the City Planning Commission until December of 2001, with approval of the plan in March of 2002. The delay reduced the effectiveness of the plan and continued the impression that the plan mostly ratified existing development priorities. Bolstering this notion was the fact that the final plan included no significant studies of the Cochran public housing site, leaving planning for the area to ongoing HOPE VI planning. After approval of the plan, other implementation largely passed by without significant action. A series of not-for-profit organization planned to oversee residential redevelopment of the neighborhood (Schwetye Architects Consultant Team, 2001: 20-1) were never created; nor did the phasing recommended by the plan prove to be authoritative in dictating the location of new projects.

The point is that not that the work of the JVL Initiative and 5th Ward plan were wastes of energy; more importantly, the plans were irrelevant to the main tasks at hand. The reasons why these two initiatives did not directly result in development activities are complex. They include political differences between planning participants, the institutional weaknesses both of existing organizations, public and private sector, and the area’s economic deficiencies in terms of development potential. Market studies conducted in the area indicate that housing developers in both the 5th and 19th Wards
faced significant economic constraints, despite the success of housing developers elsewhere on the north side. An estimate completed as part of the JVL Initiative concluded that the JVL area could absorb no more than 10 for sale, single family houses per year with maximum sales prices of about $140,000, with a significantly stronger market for rental units and elderly housing (Applied Real Estate Analysis, 2000: 4-5). A 5th Ward analysis completed two years later found more or less the same conditions, recommending a total absorption of about 40 units over a four year period, with the largest model priced at $186,000 (Development Strategies, 2002: 1).

According to one local developer, the key success of the 5th Ward plan was that it reemphasized the facts on the ground—that the area was becoming a main site for new housing development—and thereby accentuating the area’s image as a leader in new housing development. In that sense, it did not attempt to interfere with the existing relationships and incentives already operative for a small set of developers working in the area. These developers gradually extended the market for new single-family housing, working within existing economic constraints and gradually expanding them as projects succeeded.

[Insert Figure 6 here.]

This development work started with the Mullanphy Square project in 1996; homes in the first phase of the project sold for $90,000, with no direct city subsidy, and the second phase, begun in 2003, started at $145,000 (Development Strategies, 2002: 14). A second team renewed work on the Betty’s Walk project in 2003, with houses selling for $161,000 (Office of the Assessor, 2005). A St. Louis Place Estate project began a few blocks away in 2004; also had single-family houses starting at $161,000, with some
sales prices over $200,000 (Riley, 2004a: B1). A North Market Place project also began in 2004, with base models priced between $145,000 and $180,000 (Riley, 2004: B1). A second phase of the project, begun in 2005, included the rehabilitation of a number of historic buildings as rental housing. Additional development in the ward included Sullivan Place, a new $5 million senior building, built by Pyramid Development in the northern part of the St. Louis Place neighborhood in 2004; the project also included plans for a series of single family homes adjacent to the project site. These developments relied not only the economic incentives for investment but also strong political relationships with Alderman Griffin for support for developments in the form of favorable recommendations in the purchase of LRA land, blighting ordinances and redevelopment legislation.

While very little development after the JVL plan occurred inside the neighborhood, development occurred elsewhere in the 19th Ward, as private developers saw new opportunities. Most unanticipated was the expansion of downtown’s loft district and commercial redevelopment towards the Midtown Grand Center Art District. Projects included a series of planned loft projects and other commercial renovations of buildings as a part of a “microburst” of activity along Olive and Locust Avenue (Evans, 2005e: 35; Evans, 2006: C1). As in the 5th Ward, this development relied upon the minimal assent of 19th Ward Alderman McMillan in terms of redevelopment legislation, blighting ordinances, and TIF district support.

**Civic Involvement and Neighborhood Groups**

Like residents of the area’s public housing, residents elsewhere in the area played important roles in public planning processes. Residents and neighborhood organizations
participated in planning meetings; in the 5th Ward effort, professional planners working with both efforts directly solicited the input of neighborhood groups and broke the planning process into neighborhood task forces that make specific recommendations for their neighborhoods. The input of residents was particularly instructive in defeating renewed plans for a golf course in the St. Louis Place neighborhood and for recommendations of immediate demolition for some of the area’s historic properties. However, this input did not translate into a substantial role for neighborhood residents in the implementation of projects, or for neighborhood non-profits to take the leadership role in projects. Private developers, in alliance with local aldermen, created a system of incentives for continuing investment in the area. The projects that resulted defined the area as a significant one for the construction of new housing subdivisions.

In a significant respect, the input of residents in the 5th Ward development functioned in a form traditional to local neighborhood groups and organizations. The decentralized nature of city’s politics emphasizes a closeness of elected officials and their constituents; additionally, city officials recognize the legitimate role of neighborhood residents to comment on proposed developments. Surpassing this traditional reactionary role is a standard few neighborhood organizations reach. In development work, more traditionally neighborhood groups help market their communities, build publicity around their area’s assets and help hinder development seen as inimical to their neighborhood’s identity or best interests.

Going beyond this traditional role requires an investment in resources that is not typical of most local groups and, in the case of the near north side, creating relationship between neighborhood leaders and external organizations and civic leaders. In the case
of the JVL Initiative discussed above, this meant a relationship with the Danforth Foundation. While ultimately the relationship was difficult to sustain in political or personal terms, the connection brought JVL officials into contact with a broader set of resources to plan neighborhood improvements and implement key projects. In the 5th Ward, one example of how these relationships were developed related to the work of the Old North St. Louis Restoration Group.

During the 1990s and 2000s, the 5th Ward had a number of active neighborhood organizations. For example, the Greater Pruitt Igoe Neighborhood Association and its affiliated Pruitt Igoe Development Corporation advocated against the golf course plan and advanced a series of development projects throughout the 1990s and 2000s. However, by the time of the 5th Ward planning process the Old North St. Louis Restoration Group (ONSLRG) was the most active organization operating in the area. The group started in 1981 over residents’ concerns about the continuing demolition of the area’s housing stock (“Group on North Side Plans Arson Watches,” 1981: 7A); like restoration groups in other historic city neighborhoods, ONSLRG stressed preservation of existing buildings and advocacy for historic district status. The group successfully lobbied for nomination of the bulk of the neighborhood as a national historic district in 1984 (Landmarks Association, 1983); while adoption of the district as a local historic district was held up by Alderman April Ford Griffin, the status did provide for heightened scrutiny under local planning ordinances, particularly review of demolition and new construction in the neighborhood.

Throughout most of the 1980s and the first part of the 1990s, the organization operated as a volunteer-based organization, conducting house tours, neighborhood clean-
ups and other informal activities to encourage preservation of the buildings. The group also operated as a counterpoint to the activities of the much more prominent Grace Hill settlement house, which some restoration group members viewed as contributing to continuing demolition in the neighborhood. Members of the group, particularly its board of directors, combined neighborhood self-help principles with lobby and advocacy for the neighborhood in a manner traditional to many St. Louis neighborhood groups. Much of this activism took a reactive and responsive form towards proposals seen by board members’ as hostile to the area’s interests. According to board members and former staff members, this activity included lobbying against a group home for young mothers, working to shut down various illegal tow lots and outside storage facilities, and participating in planning meetings to restrict the impact of new highway interchanges on the neighborhood. Board members represented the neighborhood interests on a number of official and semi-official planning efforts, including the St. Louis 2004 efforts. Most prominently, the group monitored hearings before the city’s Heritage and Urban Design Agency (later Cultural Resources Office) in order to prohibit further demolition of the neighborhood’s 19th century housing stock, actively testifying against demolition, sometimes opposed by other residents and local businesses and stakeholders. Because most of the group’s activities were passive in terms of their interaction with the local housing market, ultimately these strategies proved inadequate to stem demolition in the area, even though they did attract a few new rehabbers to the area. By 1996, informal neighborhood estimates were that the area had lost 2/3rds of its original housing stock through arson, abandonment or demolition.
A series of partnerships between the organization and external stakeholders beginning in the mid 1990s and continuing in 2000s gradually transformed the organization’s activities and transformed the organization into a more active real estate promoter. The practical consequence of these partnerships is that they expanded the type of development activity that occurred in the neighborhood and created an image of the neighborhood’s future that mixed historic housing with new infill housing. First, the group successfully lobbied for grant funding under the city’s CDBG program; funding first started in 1994 and continued for the next 12 years, allowing the group to hire at least one professional staff member and open a neighborhood office. The group supplemented the funding with a number of other grants, including grant funding from the State of Missouri in 1998 and 1999 to fund property acquisition, basic rehabilitation activities and neighborhood planning (Mannies, 1999b: B3). The grant expanded the group’s staff—with staff specifically oriented towards housing development—and allowed the group to purchase key buildings on which to start rehabilitation. At the same time, the group began informal planning in the neighborhood in order to build local consensus around strategies. These included a charette held in the neighborhood in 1998 staffed by volunteers from local architectural firms (Jaffe, 1998: D1) and a series of meetings with officials from Grace Hill in 1998 and 1999 (Freeman, 1998: C1); according to neighborhood leaders, the latter meetings particularly sealed a long standing rift between the two organizations, creating an united front for initial discussions about redevelopment in the area.

Most significant for the neighborhood’s redevelopment initiatives was an alliance formed between the neighborhood group and Regional Housing and Community
Development Alliance (RHCDA), which brought more seasoned not-for-profit housing developers to the neighborhood. According to neighborhood leaders, the relationship started gradually—with the neighborhood selected as part of RHCDA’s technical assistance program in 1998, to joint planning activities for new housing started in 2000, to an official collaboration between the two organizations to redevelop a portion of the neighborhood beginning in 2003. RHCDA’s support for the organization meant technical assistance funding providing for continuous in house staffing at the ONSL office on housing development and also leveraged additional dollars for redevelopment activities, including pass through funding provided to RHCDA by the Enterprise Foundation. Additionally, RHCDA staff operated as problem solving around complex financing issues involved in the group’s joint project, North Market Place, initiated in 2004 and 2005. This assistance was essential, as the project incorporated aspects not included in other new housing plans in the area, including an affordability set-aside, rehabilitation of existing historic buildings in the project area and architectural details intending to blend the new buildings with the existing streetscape. Each of the aspects required additional funding outside of conventional bank financing; ultimately, RCHDA staff would help the organization access not only construction financing from Bank of America, but also historic tax credits, CDBG funding from both Alderman April Ford Griffin and the mayor’s office, grant funding from the Danforth Foundation and the Greater St. Louis Empowerment Zone and the Affordable Housing Commission, and bond financing from the Missouri Housing Development Commission.
Summary

As result of renewed regional interest in neighborhood development, stakeholders and entrepreneurs in the 5th and 19th Ward competed for the attention of private and civic actors and organizations. In order to attract outside attention and support, local leaders attempted to redefine the image of their neighborhood, promote its assets, reorient the incentives that had discouraged development and form partnerships with actors from the private sector. At the same time, the overall system of development decision-making privileged participants from the private sector. In this sense, in pursing redevelopment, neighborhood leaders confronted a conflict largely absent in downtown redevelopment, the fact that very real and present differences exist between existing stakeholders in neighborhoods, complicating development decision-making and local governance at the neighborhood level generally.

One of the signs of the success for boosters of these neighborhoods comes the fact the even though the level of distress in this north side area was great, by the end of the 1990’s there were strong incentives to reinvest in the area. In doing so, developers, aldermen, and neighborhood groups overcame the negative impact of disinvestment and the widely held view that past projects, particularly in the field of affordable and public housing, had been abject failures. Redevelopment occurred with the creation of new images for these neighborhoods and new institutional settings for supporting reinvestment. For HOPE VI projects, the new model of mixed-income communities matched institutional changes at the housing authority that emphasized collaboration with private developers to tear down and redevelop the city’s publicly owned housing stock and new incentives from the federal government to fund the work. Neighborhood
redevelopment activities benefited from a new view of the assets of these communities—
in the 5th Ward most specifically, the view that the area’s vacant land could be
transformed into a series of new residential subdivisions.

The case of the ONSL Restoration Group offers a case of a neighborhood
organization was relatively successful in playing an active role in development activities.
While the story of the ONSL Restoration Group is unique for the 5th Ward, it is not
unique for St. Louis and probably even less rare for redevelopment activities in other
American cities. For the neighborhood, the involvement of the group broadened the type
of projects pursued, and the participation of RHCDA brought additional resources into
the neighborhoods that were largely unavailable to other neighborhood groups in the
ward. However, the RHCDA relationship also quickened an evolution in the group’s
outlook and operating philosophy. Increased staffing transformed a volunteer
organization closely run and operated by a key group of families into an organization run
by professional staff, with key assistance from other experts, particularly in the more
arcane matters of development financing.

This transformation had implications both for the priorities of the organization as
well as its activities in representing neighborhood residents. While neighborhood
residents continued a pattern of informal advocacy and lobbying, this was often done
outside of the technical work of the neighborhood staff and sometimes without their
support. The necessary political relationships required to jumpstart development
initiatives naturally made professional staff less willing to take aggressive stands on
behalf of certain issues and more willing to seek compromises for a longer term goal.
Additionally, while the redevelopment activities that emerged in Old North St. Louis
have been broader than some of the surrounding areas—the inclusion of rehabilitation of existing housing in the North Market Project is relatively rare—the general requirement that the development fit a specific conception of market-driven development meant a somewhat different approach to redevelopment than that advocated by the passionate preservationists who made up the group’s initial membership through the 1990’s. At the same time, the allegiance to development as the organization’s primary mission meant that other types of strategies that did not easily fit into the market-driven development approach, like the need for grant-based assistance for the area’s low-income homeowners, would be difficult to fund and implement.

The group’s participation in redevelopment and the implication of these choices on its strategies and priorities underscores the limitations of development decision-making. Even if development in ONSL expanded the sort of strategies being implemented, ultimately the strategy transformed the organization and its most active members from neighborhood activists to neighborhood developers. In doing so, the characteristics of the organization became more aligned with the priorities of development decision-making—and the impetus towards the development of new subdivisions—than the other way around. In this sense, the development activities of the organization demonstrate that it is relatively rare for the preferences of neighborhood organizations to differ much from typical housing-preservation strategies that emphasize middle-class owner-occupancy. While the emergence of regional housing intermediaries has facilitated the productivity of nonprofit CDC’s—and expanded the type of projects being completed—in general civic sector resources have tended to enforce the prominence of private sector developers. Thus, the case of the near north side
demonstrates that, despite the renewed interest in neighborhood revitalization by a new round of civic leaders, their activities did not significantly alter the prioritization or purpose of development activities.
Chapter 8: Institutional Settings and Development Decision-making

With an investigation of the activities of development participants and the impact of local settings on their behavior, this case study of St. Louis has found patterns of development decision-making that are consistent across a variety of development subsystems. Both downtown projects as well as redevelopment initiatives within specific neighborhoods can be represented by their location within an identified development market as well as a specific institutional setting relating to development decision-making. While across the city these institutional settings share a number of same inputs in terms of participants, incentives and public processes, they are independent and specific to the context. The ability of developers to successful replicate projects, sustain investment and create successful markets depends in part of the clarity of these settings and the incentives that they provide for developers to pursue projects. In the case of downtown development, renewed redevelopment around loft development became institutionalized in the Downtown Now! organization. The organization created a supportive public-private framework for supporting loft developers, including accessing economic incentives such as TIF funds. Additionally, Downtown Now! mobilized broad range of support for such lynchpin projects such as the Old Post Office.

A part of creating new institutional settings for development decision-making are promoting a new view on development that can replaced older, often failed models of development. Indeed, the process of developing a new identity is an important task of actors who are seeking to ignite investment around physical development. For downtown, the perception of the failure of more conventional strategies of redevelopment within the central business district—downtown retailing and the office sector—led to the
development of a view of downtown as an upscale residential neighborhood. For HOPE VI projects, the model of new, mixed income communities spurred the redevelopment of failed public housing. Residential redevelopment in the 5th Ward built upon the success of new subdivisions that presented themselves as distinctly different from the surrounding urban fabric.

**Private and Public Participation in Development Decision-making**

The analysis of downtown projects and neighborhood projects suggests that private-sector development officials play a privileged role in planning and implementing projects and that their role is encouraged and recognized by city officials and city plans. Over time, development professionals within the mayor’s office and the development agencies have sought to transform the development agencies to adequately respond to the requests of developers at specific points in the development process. At the same time, members of the civic sector also play an important role, particularly at the early point in the redevelopment process. Both downtown development and neighborhood development benefited enormously from a renewed regional interest in redevelopment initiated by the St. Louis 2004 process. Key stakeholders also played a significant role in marshalling support for specific projects and signaling to other civic and corporate funders of the viability of the initiative. Civic sector resources from such organizations as the Danforth Foundation represented a form of “patient capital” in the predevelopment process, providing initial support for planning and implementation efforts prior to more traditional private sector financing.

Development professionals also work to change the characteristics of the institutional setting shaping decision-making, including altering the mandate activities of
public authorities over development projects, creating new incentives or shifting existing incentives towards specific types of projects, and building support for new initiatives in the broader civic or corporate sector. Over time, the institutional framework for development in St. Louis has reflected the sort of broad political and economic trends that have heightened the importance of the private market in urban development. Thus, in St. Louis, the model of development is a modified form of public-private partnership; there clearly is a role for the public sector in development decision-making; however, that role is subservient to private market forces.

**Decentralization and Development**

As significant for development decision-making in St. Louis is the link between specific initiatives and local elected politicians. The structure of local politics informs development decision-making in a manner unanticipated by the scholarly literature. The planning and initiation of development projects requires strong and capable mayors, and their staffs, who are able to enforce prompt response of the public sector to development initiatives and oversee the more or less rational use of limited public resources. At the same time, there are mutually beneficial relationships between developers and ward-based political leadership. A system that requires active ward representation in the development process benefits both the mayor and the aldermen. On the one hand, it limits liability of the mayor’s office for all development decisions and takes seriously the desire of some aldermen to be active partners. When done right redevelopment can be good politics and help strengthen the incumbent’s appeal for re-election.

These sort of local relationships between development professionals and aldermen were seen in the neighborhood projects in the 5th and 19th Ward. Despite the importance
of other types of actors in the process of redevelopment—participation in planning processes, working on neighborhood management issues and marketing the neighborhoods for attention and investment—the overall system of development decision-making privileged participants from the private sector. In this sense, even with the fact that development decisions are often made at the ward level, neighborhood residents and their organizations play important but limited roles in development decision-making. The norms of the community are most likely to be institutionalized in the specific images relating to neighborhood identity, and most neighborhood groups and residents work in traditional manners in order to protect the perceived interests of their communities. However, this places residents and their organizations in a relatively reactive role. Even where neighborhood organizations remained opposed to projects—for example, in the case of some downtown residents who opposed the Old Post Office project and public housing residents concerned about the impact of HOPE VI projects—these concerns will generally not be adequate to stem the activities of a renewed private-public interest in completing the project.

The case of the ONSLRG demonstrates that the role of neighborhood organizations in redevelopment is relatively small and dependent upon strong relationships with other civic organizations that link them with other resources. While the organization has succeeded in initiating physical development projects, this has only been possible with the outside assistance of a very capable partner and the projects have generally only marginally broadened the over-all emphasis of new construction in the area. The relatively limited role of neighborhood residents and organizations like ONSLRG in the development process raises the possibility of political tensions between
the priorities of neighborhood residents and private developers and that private
development may not be able to adequately meet the needs of neighborhood residents,
particularly the poorest residents in the area.

**Neo-Institutionalism and Urban Development**

While the reliance on local characteristics limits the application of some of the
key findings, the study does have some degree of replication to other cities and
metropolitan areas. By focusing on the local institutional setting for urban development,
the study identifies that even relatively “weak regime” cities like St. Louis can develop
the incentives for stable and repeated decision-making; this is a conclusion that is
unanticipated by either the political-economic framework, where local behavior is
unappreciated, or regime studies, which sees local collaboration as a function of a
relatively small set of participants. In this sense, St. Louis’ experiences suggest that
urban regime theory, which has dominated urban theory since its introduction, is not
adequate to understanding development decision-making and in application to urban
development may miss some of the factors critical for initiating and sustaining
development decision-making. Regime theory presents a relatively static view of
decision-making processes that have a relatively small set of participants, with well-
defined roles; in the view of most regimes theorists, regimes are conceptualized as more
or less equivalent across the urban space. In the case of St. Louis, this framework
underestimates the importance of other types of actors—particularly civic actors who
often are the most important stakeholder at the front end of the development process—as
well as the factor of local political institutions in structuring development decision-
making.
By contrast, neo-institutionalism provides a more flexible framework for understanding development decision-making and urban development generally. In this study, neo-institutionalist theory has been employed to conceptualize development decision-making within the context of institutional settings comprising planning and implementation activities in specific local markets. In the case of St. Louis, public officials play specific, supportive role in encouraging the emergence of development initiatives; however, development planning and implementation largely takes place in decentralized decision-making structures where the activities of place-based entrepreneurs—particularly from the private sector—are key. While these institutional settings share general characteristics citywide—for example, in the allocation of CDBG and other public resources—in other aspects they are specific to local, neighborhood-level characteristics. In this sense, the framework of institutional settings accounts for the emergence of development initiatives in weak markets—where local entrepreneurs engage in activities to define, promote and institutionalize incentives for redevelopment—as well as markets where the incentive structure for local developments are stable.
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Appendix A: List of Interviewees

Stephen Acree
Executive Director
Regional Housing and Community Development Alliance
Former Director
Community Development Agency
City of St. Louis

Bruce Anderson
Former President
Danforth Foundation

Richard Baron
President and CEO
McCormack, Baron and Salazar

Kathy Brown
Vice President for Community Relations
Enterprise Rent-a-Car
Former Director
Community Development Agency
City of St. Louis

Charles Bryson
Deputy Mayor for Neighborhood Development
City of St. Louis

John Burse
Associate
Mackey Mitchell and Associates
Board President
Old North St. Louis Restoration Group

William Carson
Executive Director
Vashon Education Compact

Father Rich Creason
Former President
Congregations Allied for Community Improvement

David Dodson
Director of Development
Regional Housing and Community Development Alliance
Richard Fleming  
President and CEO  
Regional Commerce and Growth Association

Barbara Geisman  
Deputy Mayor for Development  
City of St. Louis

Dan Grandione  
Executive Director  
Metropolitan Communities United

Charles Kindleberger  
Former Director of Research  
City of St. Louis

Chris Krehmeyer  
Executive Director  
Beyond Housing/Neighborhood Housing Services of St. Louis

Sal Martinez  
Chairman  
St. Louis Housing Authority  
Former Executive Director  
JeffVanderLou Initiative

Alderman Mike McMillan  
19th Ward Alderman  
City of St. Louis

Margie Newman  
Downtown Resident  
City of St. Louis

Matt O’Leary  
Vice President  
Pyramid Development

Thomas Pickel  
Executive Director  
DeSales Housing Corporation

W. Thomas Reeves  
Executive Director  
Downtown Now!  
Former Director Lending
Mercantile Bank

Sister Diane Roche
Former Executive Director
Old North St. Louis Restoration Group

Don Roe
Director of Planning
City of St. Louis

Tim Schoemehl
Former Real Estate Manager
St. Louis Development Corporation
City of St. Louis

Jerry Schlichter
Attorney at Law
Bogard & Denton

Bill Seiden
Business Development Officer
St. Louis Development Corporation
City of St. Louis

President Jim Shrewsbury
President, Board of Aldermen
City of St. Louis

Kathy Sorkin
Director of Development
St. Louis Equity Fund

Kathleen Strout
Program Manager
Price Cooper Waterhouse

Joanne Vatcha
Housing Analyst
City of St. Louis

Richard Ward
Principal
Development Strategies

Laura Barlow Winter
Former Program Officer
Danforth Foundation
Former Vice President
Regional Commerce and Growth Association

Kathryn Woodard
Neighborhood Stabilization Officer
City of St. Louis
Former Director
Old North St. Louis Restoration Group
Appendix B: List of Tables and Figures

Table 1: Population of City of St. Louis, St. Louis County, St. Charles County, 1900 - 2000

Table 2: Racial Makeup of the City of St. Louis, 1950 - 2000

Table 3: Business Establishments in City of St. Louis, St. Louis County, St. Charles County, 1900 - 2000

Table 4: CDBG Funding, City of St. Louis, 1974 - 2005

Table 5: Public Development Organizations in the City of St. Louis

Figure 1: Organizational Chart of the City of St. Louis

Figure 2: Map of Downtown Area

Figure 3: Map of Near North Side Area, 5th Ward and 19th Ward

Figure 4: Map of 5th Ward with Significant Features


Figure 5: Map of 19th Ward with Significant Features

Figure 6: Map of 5th Ward Projects, 1995 – 2000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>City of St. Louis</th>
<th>St. Louis County</th>
<th>St. Charles County</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>% Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>687,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>773,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>821,000</td>
<td>212,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>816,000</td>
<td>274,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>856,000</td>
<td>406,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>703,000</td>
<td>53,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>622,000</td>
<td>951,000</td>
<td>93,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>453,000</td>
<td>974,000</td>
<td>144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>397,000</td>
<td>993,000</td>
<td>213,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>348,000</td>
<td>1,016,000</td>
<td>284,000</td>
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Source: U.S. Census, 1900 - 2000
Table 2: Racial Make-up of the City of St. Louis
1950 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>White Population</th>
<th>% White</th>
<th>Black Population</th>
<th>% Black</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>856,000</td>
<td>702,348</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>153,766</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>534,004</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>214,377</td>
<td>29%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>622,000</td>
<td>365,620</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>254,268</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>453,000</td>
<td>242,576</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>206,386</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>397,000</td>
<td>202,085</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>188,408</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>348,000</td>
<td>152,666</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>178,266</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: County Employment Patterns, 1930 - 1990
City of St. Louis, St. Louis County and St. Charles County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>782</td>
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<td>Mining</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>192</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>27,653</td>
<td>13,903</td>
<td>15,347</td>
<td>10,228</td>
<td>7,360</td>
<td>5,853</td>
<td>6,343</td>
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<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>142,220</td>
<td>111,045</td>
<td>131,987</td>
<td>114,815</td>
<td>64,350</td>
<td>37,460</td>
<td>24,393</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>71,551</td>
<td>15,925</td>
<td>19,352</td>
<td>10,838</td>
<td>12,014</td>
<td>7,466</td>
<td>6,735</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>56,975</td>
<td>58,501</td>
<td>39,887</td>
<td>33,015</td>
<td>25,066</td>
<td>27,233</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>St. Louis County</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>6,476</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>3,615</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>2,608</td>
<td>3,598</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>631</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8,622</td>
<td>6,854</td>
<td>11,307</td>
<td>15,402</td>
<td>19,554</td>
<td>22,071</td>
<td>23,096</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>21,883</td>
<td>26,824</td>
<td>49,616</td>
<td>96,051</td>
<td>106,072</td>
<td>106,870</td>
<td>95,164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>14,049</td>
<td>5,948</td>
<td>8,511</td>
<td>13,057</td>
<td>26,852</td>
<td>26,830</td>
<td>28,621</td>
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<td>Retail</td>
<td>15,659</td>
<td>28,092</td>
<td>49,305</td>
<td>94,640</td>
<td>137,994</td>
<td>170,024</td>
<td>112,434</td>
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<td>Services</td>
<td>19,645</td>
<td>24,084</td>
<td>28,092</td>
<td>49,305</td>
<td>94,640</td>
<td>137,994</td>
<td>170,024</td>
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<td>Communications</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>2,774</td>
<td>4,287</td>
<td>5,956</td>
<td>9,406</td>
<td>11,620</td>
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<td>Transportation</td>
<td>5,417</td>
<td>6,939</td>
<td>11,506</td>
<td>16,781</td>
<td>21,251</td>
<td>28,829</td>
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<td>Financial/Real Estate</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td>5,633</td>
<td>8,267</td>
<td>15,532</td>
<td>22,979</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>6,893</td>
<td>10,937</td>
<td>19,222</td>
<td>20,218</td>
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<td><strong>St. Charles County</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>3,226</td>
<td>3,057</td>
<td>2,357</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>1,188</td>
<td>1,367</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
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<td>549</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>4,334</td>
<td>7,506</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2,362</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>3,692</td>
<td>7,220</td>
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<td>19,931</td>
<td>26,336</td>
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<tr>
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<td>970</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>1,382</td>
<td>3,116</td>
<td>5,419</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>1,426</td>
<td>2,467</td>
<td>5,456</td>
<td>11,294</td>
<td>20,034</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>6,637</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>30,779</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>677</td>
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<td>2,752</td>
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<td>Transportation</td>
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<td>526</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>4,226</td>
<td>7,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial/Real Estate</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>3,193</td>
<td>6,873</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>2,171</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>9,308</td>
<td>9,110</td>
<td>11,629</td>
<td>18,359</td>
<td>34,811</td>
<td>66,875</td>
<td>112,393</td>
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*Source: US Census, 1930 - 1990*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>$15 million</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$27 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$24 million</td>
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*Source: Office of the Comptroller*
<table>
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<th>Year Established</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>City Plan Commission</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>City planning agency. Merged into CDA in 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>St. Louis Housing Authority</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Constructs, manages and repairs housing projects, to assist in determination of local blight and how to ameliorate blight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Prepares and recommend redevelopment and urban renewal plans and to contract to carry out such plans. Part of SLDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Planned Industrial Expansion Authority</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Assists in Chapter 100 development projects, including certifying tax exemptions and assisting in property acquisition. Part of SLDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Industrial Development Authority</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Issues tax exempt revenue bonds to finance large-scale industrial, multi-family housing, and non-profit development projects. Part of SLDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Land Reutilization Agency (LRA)</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Receives title to tax delinquent property, markets and sells property for redevelopment. Managed by SLDC staff as part of umbrella organization since 1990, overseen by three member commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Community Development Agency</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Established to receive federal funds under CDBG program. Coordinates expenditure of funds and work of additional agencies. Currently exists as Community Development Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>St. Louis Local Development Corporation</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Provides grants and loans to local businesses for expansion and startup. Overseen by a commission and staffed by SLDC employees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Heritage and Urban Design Commission</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Reviews development activities within historic districts, approves plans and permits. Cultural Resources Office of Planning and Urban Design.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Tax Increment Financing Commission</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Approves all tax increment financing projects. Part of SLDC, overseen by commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Operation Impact</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Receives and uses CDBG and other funding to complete housing development activities. Now part of CDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Economic Development Corporation (EDC)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Formed to consolidate activities of 6 independently chartered economic development organizations-LCRA, LRA, PIEA, SLLDC, Port Authority, IDA. Changed to St. Louis Development Corporation in 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>St. Louis Development Corporation (SLDC)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Renamed from EDC with strengthened oversight of CDA and federal funding for development, residential and commercial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>St. Louis Regional Empowerment Zone</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Oversees use of federal grant and tax incentives for variety of community development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Planning and Urban Design Agency (PDA)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Consolidated planning, urban design and research activities at CDA and Heritage into one agency with cabinet status. Overseen by a Planning Commission. Undertakes all responsibilities done by predecessor units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Community Development Administration</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Predecessor agency to Community Development Agency.</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Affordable Housing Commission</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Oversees providing grants and loans for low income and transition housing using funds collected through a special city use tax.</td>
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</table>

Source: Various
Figure 1: City of St. Louis Organizational Chart

Government of the City of St. Louis, Missouri

Source: City of St. Louis Community Information Network
Figure 3: Map of Near North Side Area
City of St. Louis

Source: Office of the Assessor, City of St. Louis
Table 6: Neighborhood Change, 1950 - 2005
5th Ward and 19th Ward Census Tracts

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<td>39%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Same House 5 Years</td>
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<td>45%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>47%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>97%</td>
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<td>55%</td>
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Source: Bureau of the Census, 1950-2000; Claritas, Inc. 2005