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Abstract

This study examines women's political representation in pre-election (candidate nomination), election, and post-election (legislative activities) stages in South Korea. First, I examined factors contributing to electing women to the National Assembly in the eight national legislative elections since democratization in 1987. I conducted statistical analysis to examine how a candidate's political experience, major party nomination, incumbency, and districts' party loyalty affect the candidate's electoral victory and how each influences women and men differently. I also interviewed candidates, candidate aspirants, elected legislators, legislative staffers, scholars and activists on their personal experiences with major party nomination and election campaigns.

Second, I analyzed how legislators' gender, partisanship, ideology, and gender stereotypes interact in shaping lawmakers' legislative priorities. Using digital archives, I tracked who proposed women-friendly bills in the previous four Assemblies (2000-2016) and analyzed how invisible factors such as electoral rules, the culture of parliaments, party affiliation, and their seat types affect lawmakers' legislative agendas and productivity, using both statistical analysis and interview analysis.

This research contributes to the literature on gender and politics. There is very little known about the effectiveness of gender quotas on women's political representation in the South Korean context. By identifying promotional or inhibitive factors leading to the election of more women to the national legislature, the findings propose policy measures that appear more effective in tackling the issue of women's underrepresentation in politics. Based on original data in Korean language, this research also provides valuable resources for comparative studies in the future.

Chapter 1. Introduction: Holistic View of Gender and Political Representation in the National Legislature

Statement of the Problem

This research examines women's political representation in post-democratized South Korea at the pre-election, election and the post-election stages. Since the first female national legislator Dr. Young-shin Yim took her seat in 1949, the increase in the number of women in the National Assembly of South Korea has been glacial. As of March 2017, 17 percent of the South Korean national legislators are women, which is still well below the January 2017 world the average of 23.2 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). The average proportion of women in Asia's national parliaments in lower and upper houses is 19.3 percent in the same period (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016).

Women are still numerical minorities in the National Assembly of South Korea in spite of adopting voluntary party gender quotas for Single Member District seats (SMDs) and a 50 percent legislative quota for seats elected through Proportional Representation (PR) since 2004. Moreover, existing literature suggests that the electoral system is one of the most influential determinants of how many political minorities are elected. Countries with PR systems tend to have higher share of women in legislatures compared to those with SMD, majority/plurality rules (Rule 1987, 1994; Salmond 2006; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Studlar and McAllister 2002; Tremblay 2006). South Korea is an economically developed and democratic country which features proportional representation and gender quotas, the two institutional factors which existing literature points out as strong predictor of women's political integration. Then what explains persistent gender imbalance in the National Assembly of South Korea?

Theories and Research Questions

Evaluating Effectiveness of Gender Quotas

Currently, a 50 percent legislative quota for PR candidates is in effect in Korea. Major

political parties in Korea have adopted voluntary party gender quotas for SMD candidates as

well, even though they fail to nominate as many women as they pledge to. Sometimes, major

political parties nominate women candidates to "winnable" districts – "strategic nomination"

is what the parties call these cases – to increase the possibilities of more districts electing

women. These measures are not without contention, and frequently the parties cancel these

nomination plans after facing fierce opposition by other male party members.

In spite of strong opposition within and outside parties, how has South Korea

successfully adopted a legislative gender quota for PR? There are four theories to explain

why countries adopt gender quotas. These theories are not mutually exclusive but related in

various ways. First, women's groups demand gender quotas as an effective tool to promote

women's political representation. Possible actors include women's organizations inside

political parties, women's movements in civil society, international women's groups, or even

individual women close to politically powerful men (Bruhn 2003; Kittilson 2006 cited in

Krook 2009, 9).

Second, political elites strategically adopt gender quotas when they compete for

political support with other parties, especially in many Western European parties (Krook and

O'Brien 2010, 261). When a party is struggling with losing popularity, it may adopt gender

quotas to appeal to women voters, thus to expand its potential support base. The same can

be the case for political leaders concerning fallible legitimacy of the regime. Thus, the

motivation behind adopting gender quotas by political leaders is not necessarily their passion

for empowering women, but their interests in accomplishing other political goals (Krook 2009, 10).

Third, the mandate of the international norm of promoting women's political representation influences embracing gender quotas worldwide (Paxton and Hughes 2006). After the UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, developing countries adopted gender quotas (Chen 2010, 13). At the Conference, all 189 member states unanimously signed the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and pledged to take measures to ensure women's equal access and full participation in decision-making bodies and leadership positions (Krook 2006).

Fourth, the domestic crises or democratic transition can open a window of opportunity for adopting gender quotas. Using the cases of Afghanistan and Rwanda for a comparative analysis, Mona Tajali argued that women's movement and international actors are organized and prepared to take advantage of post-conflict reconstruction period which offers "a clean slate" to push for women's presence in politics (Tajali 2013, 262). Related to the third theory of international influence, developing countries are more receptive to international norms or demands for policies on social justice, in part to ameliorate ethnic or tribal conflict (Tajali 2013, 270).

Interestingly, most controversies over gender quotas in South Korea are brewing in relation to SMD candidacies rather than PR candidate list, which partly explains why adopting legislative gender quotas was possible only for PR seats. In spite of continuing effort by activists and legislators with strong feminist agenda, quotas for SMD seats have not been adopted yet in South Korea. According to Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo (2012), the successful *implementation* of gender quotas is contingent upon other political institutions such as electoral systems, but it seems that even the possibility of *adopting* gender quotas is related

to the type of electoral system. Due to its mixed electoral system, South Korea makes a good case for comparison with different electoral tiers (district and national) presentation of opportunities and barriers when adopting and implementing gender quotas.

The effects and party dynamics surrounding gender quotas in South Korea have not adequately examined in an empirical, systematic manner. The heated controversies over gender quotas and reasons for or against quotas are not unique to South Korea, but similar concerns are raised in other countries. One way to assess the impact of gender quota is to explore to what extent the measures empower and strengthen minorities' political competitiveness. Existing literature notes that being incumbents and having previous political experience gives a significant advantage to women running for office (Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003; Studlar and McAllister 1991). In South Korea, the women candidates who won the election in the 17th legislative election had either competed in districts with a strong affinity to their own parties, or districts where they were incumbents, supporting findings in the existing literature.

Political experience not only increases one's prospects for being elected, but also even being nominated (Hwang 2006; W.-H. Kim and Kim 2004). Some studies expect a positive influence of serving as PR members for women candidates. Ki-young Shin (2014) argued that gender quotas in PR has a "spillover effect," whereby "women elected via proportional representation quotas are later nominated and re-elected to single-member district seats for which parties do not apply quotas" (Shin 2014, 80). However, Shin did not examine how many PR women could successfully secure SMD seats for the following term.

According to the electoral law, PR members cannot serve more than one term as PR members, and they need to compete for SMD seats if they want to continue their political career. The fact that the majority of women legislators are elected through the PR system

and gender quotas are applicable only to PR seats. How much positive impact, if any, would serving as PR members bring to women for their bids for SMD seats is an important question to answer. Otherwise, gender quotas will be a mere one-time opportunity for recruiting minorities with very little lasting effect of empowering them. Do male PR members enjoy the same level of "competitiveness boost," in SMD elections like their female counterparts? If there are differences in the effect of PR incumbency by gender, what does that imply? South Korea's mixed electoral system provides a good case study to examine the potential spillover effects of gender quotas in the form of strengthening women's electoral competitiveness through the experiences they gained serving as PR members.

Political Parties, Candidate Nomination, and Elections

The existing literature has focused on women, voters, and political elites to examine the reasons for women's numerical underrepresentation in legislatures (Niven 2006). However, studies have demonstrated time and again that the first two are not critical reasons for women's low level of political participation and numerical representation. Studies based on Western European and North American cases show that once their names are placed on ballots, there is little evidence that voters are biased against women candidates, but political parties are biased against women candidates and affect their nomination outcomes as gatekeepers.

Women are less likely to consider running for office than men are, and women need encouragement and recruitment efforts from political party elites to decide to run for office. However, women are less frequently approached by political recruiters than men (Fox and Lawless 2010; Sanbonmatsu, Carroll, and Walsh 2009). Party-level factors such as party's

organization, nomination process, ideologies, and women's participation in parties affect women's representation in industrialized democracies (Caul 1999). Women's involvement in the party leadership and gender composition of party gatekeepers influence nomination outcomes for women (Cheng and Tavits 2011; Kunovich and Paxton 2005), which implies parties' leverage in electoral outcomes for political minorities. Parties not only decide who should run but where to run: women are more likely to be encouraged to drop out of a state legislative race than men are, especially in districts where partisan support for their party is strong (Niven 2006). Even successful implementation of gender quotas are contingent upon political parties' compliance with the provisions, thus enforcement measures are needed to change the way parties operate in the recruitment practices (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2008). Some studies focusing on South Korean elections also found the similar dynamics of candidate nomination by political parties, and the possibility that women are at a disadvantage in this pre-election process (Kim 2012; Yoo 2012; Yoon 2012).

Following the literature, this research examines how and to what extent political parties influence nomination and electoral outcomes in South Korean legislative elections, especially for women. The role of political parties in electoral outcomes can be even more critical in the South Korean context, where party mandates are strong and parties' organizations are centralized. The candidate nomination process in South Korea is conducted by each party's nomination committees at the national level and they assign candidates to districts; even though candidates apply for specific districts' candidacy, it is not guaranteed that their preferences are reflected in the final district assignment (there are no residency requirements to run in a specific district). The candidate selection and district assignment is largely dependent on discretion and assessment of the nomination committee of each political party. Not surprisingly, bribery charges against major political party elites

during and after the nomination period make news headlines every election cycle, nullifying some electoral outcomes when found guilty.

The core questions related to the nomination and the election stage are: what factors explain women's continued numerical underrepresentation in the Korean National Assembly? Is the level of support for a candidate in a district determined by personal candidate factors, such as political experiences or the educational level? Or, does the level of support vary, depending on other political factors such as winning nominations from major parties or running in a district with strong party support to the candidate's party? Are women and men candidates affected differently by these variables? Does a candidate's sex affect voters' decisions on election day? Are women candidates systematically placed in the less winnable districts by the political parties?

Gender, Party, and Legislative Activities

What do women deliver when they are elected? Do women and men legislators have distinctive legislative priorities? Is the gender identity of a lawmaker a strong predictor of one's legislative behavior? If legislators' policy priorities are indeed gendered, how does legislators' partisanship and pressure from districts interact with these gendered policy interests? Regarding factors affecting lawmakers' legislative priorities, the existing literature presents two competing models, namely the descriptive representation model and the constituency model. The descriptive representation model stresses the importance of legislators' unique experiences in determining one's legislative behaviors. Thus it argues that factors such as gender and race affect the legislative behaviors (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007).

Similarly, studies have provided empirical evidence that many women legislators do feel an obligation to represent women constituents and prioritize women-friendly agendas in their legislative portfolios, and having more women in legislatures leads to more policy responsiveness to women (Bratton and Ray 2002; Caiazza 2004; S. Carroll 2000; Childs 2002; Crowley 2004; J. Dolan 1998; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Saint-Germain 1989; Schulze 2013; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Swers 2013; Tamerius 1995; S. Thomas and Welch 1991). According to this model, therefore, the gender identity of a legislator is a meaningful indicator of one's legislative priorities, and electing more women to the legislature will lead to more women-friendly laws proposed, if not passed.

However, this model cannot explain why some men legislators support and propose bills on issues traditionally associated with women's rights. Moreover, not all women legislators seem to identify themselves as "women's representatives" and focus exclusively on women-friendly issues in their legislative agendas. Even though the gender identity of a legislator is the most powerful factor in influencing the sponsorship of women's issue measures, legislators' age and districts' characteristics as well as legislative committee membership affect the total number of women-friendly bills introduced by each member (Barnello and Bratton 2007).

Different from the descriptive representation model, the constituency model argues that lawmakers prioritize their legislative portfolios considering the prospects of re-election, thus variables such as preferences of districts they represent or their parties' issue concerns determine their legislative behaviors (S. Carroll 2000; Grey 2006). However, women lawmakers' actual legislative outcomes do not always match their stated interests in women's issues, because other factors such as electoral rules, the culture of parliaments, and party affiliation influence legislative process (Celis et al. 2008; Childs and Krook 2006). Similarly,

Karen Celis and her coauthors (2008) stress differences between women and the contribution of men in putting forward women-friendly policies(Celis et al. 2008).

From these insights, some researchers have examined how factors such as race or gender interact with partisanship and interests in re-election (Swers 2013). Also, voters assume that women candidates are better at handling "feminine issues" such as social security, welfare, or education, while male candidates are expected to be better at handling "masculine" issues such as crime, economic growth, security, or foreign affairs. In terms of political ideology, liberal parties are assumed to be more capable of handling these "feminine" issues, while conservative parties are considered to be apt to address "masculine" issue areas (Genovese 2013; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003; Sanbonmatsu 2002, 23; Swers 2013; Murray 2010). These gender stereotypes interact with party stereotypes and affect voters' evaluation of political candidates, not only in legislative elections but also in executive elections, and legislators are aware of these stereotypes.

How legislators won their seats can also influence their legislative behaviors (Goetz 2002; Rich 2012). The PR members and SMD members might have different interests even before getting elected, which might explain the different legislative foci after they are elected. Or, PR women might feel obligations to represent women because they are "beneficiaries" of gender quotas, or conversely the PR women may seek not to focus on women's issues in order to avoid stigma (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012).

Based on the existing literature, I examined how legislators' gender identity, perceived gendered stereotypes on issue competencies, party issue ownership, legislative committee membership, and the seat type interact to determine legislative behaviors, especially related to women-friendly bills.

Research Design: Sequential Multi-Method Approach

To answer the research questions, I took a two-phase, sequential multi-method approach. I began with a statistical analysis to test theories and concepts on the role of gender and political parties in the candidate nomination, election, and legislative activities. This was followed by qualitative research in the form of elite interviews, participant observation, and analysis of public documents such as newspaper articles and the bills proposed to the National Assembly. Through the qualitative analysis, I examined the relationship between the variables identified by the statistical analysis and flesh out the statistical findings (Creswell 2003, 15–16). Qualitative analysis helps to understand how actors in the events make sense of the situation and their experiences, and how these understandings influence their behaviors (Maxwell 2005, 22). More importantly, qualitative research following the statistical analysis revealed "how x plays a role in causing y, what *the process* is that connects x and y" (Maxwell 2005, 23).

Using multi-method research design was a reasonable methodological decision which can maximize my research strengths. As a native Korean who was born and raised in the county of research, until completing the master's level training, I have capabilities to make use of original resources in Korean language and to communicate effectively with potential participants in face-to-face interviews and/or focus group interviews. Also, I am familiar with the Korean culture and have personal connections with people who currently or formerly served or worked in the National Assembly and major political parties, as well as relevant research and academic institutions located in South Korea. These people helped me tremendously with establishing network with interviewees and locating resources, and this snowballed to recruit more interviewees.

All the relevant data on candidates' background such as incumbency status, previous

political experiences, sex, and party affiliation are available at the National Election

Commission Online Database (Korean National Election Commission 2016). The list of

candidates in each district, the vote shares of each candidate and the outcomes of the 13th –

20th National Assembly elections are also available in the same database.

Significance of the Study

This research contributes to the literature on politics and gender, as well as providing policy

insights as to increase political representation of political minorities. The existing literature

argues that the most critical factor in numerical underrepresentation of women is not voters

nor low political ambition of women, but political party elites' discriminative nomination

practices. I tested these theories on the South Korean context and my findings generally

support the existing theory.

This in-depth case provides a better understanding of both the formal and informal

rules and the dynamics in the Korean case (on the importance of examining informal

institutions, see Helmke and Levitsky 2004), but also whether these institutional

arrangements yield its desirable/intended effects of promoting minorities' political inclusion.

The process of adopting voluntary party gender quotas was contentious, which has resulted

in changes to parties' rules on gender quotas with every election cycle. Attempts to adopt

affirmative measures to nominate more women candidates in the nomination process have

faced fierce objections from male party members (Hangyoreh Shinmun 2012a; Jeong 2012).

Also, political parties' compliance with the gender quotas provisions is critical for the gender

quotas to have intended impacts of increasing descriptive representation of women. Existing

studies, including those on South Korea, have demonstrated that political parties are

unwilling to recruit women to SMD seats, but more likely to compromise to promote women in PR seats (Jiso Yoon and Shin 2015).

This study delves even deeper, by providing quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence, to demonstrate that the district assignment and nomination patterns of the major parties and the informal rules of political parties' nomination process results in imposing challenges for women aspirants. By identifying factors which either promote or obstruct the election of more women to the national legislature, this study examines how successful gender quota has been in achieving its original goal of political empowerment of women, since its adoption in 2004.

This case study reaches the broader scholarly audience by providing a rich analysis of a country for which original data is very limited. This study is unique in scope, as it examines all the candidates in the previous eight elections since the country's democratization. Existing studies on South Korean national legislative elections analyzed one or two election cycles, not the all eight elections since democratization.

Lastly, the findings of this study will provide insights to those interested in passing gender equality policies and laws. What is needed to promote women's substantive representation? Will electing more women to the National Assembly guarantee the proposal and passage of more women friendly bills? Or does the influence of parties dictate the contents of bills proposed? Or, regardless of one's gender, do legislators' life experiences matter in forming legislators' legislative priorities? Or, does the pressure from districts or interest groups exert the most important influence? The findings of this research will provide to those interested in the advancement of women friendly bills strategies of how, when and where to approach to get their agendas passed.

The Roadmap of the Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I test the existing theories on factors affecting women's political representation using South Korea as a case study, where political parties are centralized and the mixed electoral system is used.[1] Based on the statistical and interview analyses, I argue that gender quotas serve as a stepping stone to start one's political career, especially for women, but the majority of PR members experience political career termination and interruption after serving four years as PR legislators.

In Chapter 3, I discuss what explains this career interruption and termination for PR members based on the interviews with the former and current legislators and their staffers. The interviewees' responses show high costs involved with establishing and maintaining local networks, and masculine way of local networking undermines the potential power women's movement can play in empowering women. The unique culture of the National Assembly and major parties which consider SMD members to be more prestigious position than the PR members, and the political parties' informal practice to place former PR members to run in less winnable seats greatly contribute to the majority of PR members' career termination. This undermines the effectiveness of gender quotas in making long-term changes in the gender composition in the Assembly. This qualitative analysis fleshes out the statistical findings I examine in Chapter 2.

In Chapter 4, I examine variables contributing to promoting women's substantive representation, or policy responsiveness. Women legislators in South Korea have been as

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[1] As of 2017, 246 members are directly elected by voters in SMDs and 54 are selected through PR system using closed party-lists. The two-vote system -- voters cast one vote to the candidate of their preference and the other to the political party they support -- has been in effect since the 17th legislative election of 2004.

active as men legislators in terms of the number of bills they author, and the passage rate of

bills written by women is only slightly lower than of men (Minjeoung Kim 2011, 121–27).

However, women and men legislators have focused their legislative activities on different

policy areas. Women legislators tend to propose bills related to public health, welfare, social

security, and human rights, while men legislators focus their legislative portfolios on issues

related to economic growth, environment, welfare, and the public administration reform

(Minjeoung Kim 2011, 207). A closer look at the bills sponsorship activities presents an

interesting picture. As Barnello and Bratton (2007) argued, "women are not uniformly

destined to focus on women's issues, and men are not uniformly uninterested in these

issues" (Barnello and Bratton 2007, 452). My own tracking of bill sponsorship activities in

the 16th and the 18th Assemblies shows that the legislators who proposed the highest number

of women friendly bills were male SMD members. This observation raises the core questions

of this chapter: Which factors influence women's policy responsiveness? More specifically,

do perceived gender issue competencies and party issue ownership interact and affect

lawmakers' legislative portfolios? Who proposed women-friendly bills and why do they push

these agendas in the national assembly?

Chapter 2. The Leaky Pipeline and Sacrificial Lambs: Candidate Nomination and District Assignment in the National Legislative Elections, 1988-2016

Introduction

Gender equality has not grown in South Korea apace with the overall economic growth of the last three decades. As one measure of this, the *Economist*'s annual Glass-Ceiling Index rated South Korea 25.6 points out of 100 in 2015. This rating, which reflects equality in education, labor-force participation, politics, and business, is around 30 points lower than the United States, 35 points lower than the OECD average, and almost 55 points lower than Finland (the highest scoring nation in the world; *Economist* 2015). The gender composition of the National Assembly reflects this poor progress. Since the first female national legislator, Dr. Young-shin Yim, took her seat in 1949, the increase in the number of women in the National Assembly has been glacial, currently 17 percent and never surpassing 20 percent, much less reaching the world average of 22.7 percent as of July 2016 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). The average proportion of women in Asia's national parliaments in lower and upper houses is 19.3 percent in the same period (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016).

How does South Korea measure up with its democratic neighbors? The share of women members in Japanese lower house is 9.5 percent, and 15.7 percent of the upper house members are women (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). The Legislative Yuan in Taiwan, another democratic neighbor of South Korea, is represented by 33 percent of women legislators, which is much higher than the other two countries (The International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2016a). The level of political representation of women in Japan and South Korea is puzzling, as it does not seem to correspond to the countries' levels of economic development or gender equality in other sectors in these societies. According to

a global ranking of the Gross Domestic Product in 2015 by *Global Finance*, Taiwan is the 19th

richest country in the globe, followed by Japan, which is the 28th richest, and South Korea

the 29th (Pasquali 2016). On the contrary, Japan was ranked 101st overall out of 145 countries

in the Gender Gap Index in the World Economic Forum's *The Global Gender Gap Report*

2015, 88th in gender parity in economic participation and opportunity, 84th in gender parity in

educational attainment, and 104th in terms of women's political empowerment (World

Economic Forum 2015, 9). South Korea was placed 115th in the overall index, 125th in

economic participation and opportunity, 102nd in educational attainment, and 86th in terms of

political empowerment (World Economic Forum 2015, 9).[2]

Even though these three East Asian countries are economically developed and

democratized, the level of women's political representation varies. What explains this

disparity? One might point to electoral institutions to explain this variation. Existing

literature suggests that the electoral system is one of the most influential determinants of

how many political minorities are elected. Countries with the PR system tend to have higher

share of women in legislatures compared to those with the SMD system (Rule 1987, 1994;

Salmond 2006; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Studlar and McAllister 2002; Tremblay

2006).

However, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have mixed electoral systems, where

district-tier seats are elected through the plurality voting system, while the other officials are

elected through the PR system. Japan's Shugiin has 480 members, 300 of whom are elected

in the SMDs through plurality votes, and 180 members are through the closed-list PR system

(The International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2016b). Out of 113 total seats of the

Legislative Yuan of Taiwan, 34 are elected through the party list PR votes, and the others are

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[2] Data on Taiwan are not available.

chosen to represent the SMD seats (The International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2016a). South Korea has had a two-tier mixed electoral system (parallel system), with a district tier (SMD) and a nationwide closed-list PR. Since 2004, a 50 percent gender quota is applied to 54 PR seats out of 300 total legislative positions.[3]

Japan does not have gender quotas for their legislative elections, whereas South Korea and Taiwan reserve 50 percent of the PR seats for women, which may explain Japan's low level of women's representation. In spite of the gender quotas, however, women's share of national legislative seats in South Korea is lower than the Asian average. That is not the case with Taiwan. What can explain the puzzle of South Korea's numerical underrepresentation of women in politics? Some empirical data including the World Values Surveys show that South Korean citizens still have persistent gender-stereotypical attitudes more so than Taiwanese. In 2010, 43.9 percent of South Korean respondents believed that men make better political leaders, while only 34.5 percent of Taiwanese respondents agreed with the statement in 2012 (World Values Survey 2015).[4] The same survey shows that 41.9 percent of South Korean respondents agreed that men make better business executive leaders, when only 25.5 percent of Taiwanese thought so (World Values Survey 2015).[5]

However, this current study shows that the candidate's gender is not a significant inhibiting factor of electoral victories for women, and the voters do not discriminate against female candidates. Rather, the analysis reveals that the practices of the political parties in candidate nomination and district assignments (especially for PR members), and the unique

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[3] One SMD seat was added to the existing 299 seats in 2012; the number of PR seats is reduced to 47 in 2016. A more detailed discussion of the quotas is presented in the following section.

[4] The WVS data show only 27.6 percent Japanese respondents agree with the statement; interestingly, however, 35 percent of the respondents marked "Don't Know," a surprisingly high rate compared to 5.7 percent in Taiwan and 0.2 percent in South Korea.

[5] Again, a relatively low percentage of Japanese respondents (24.7 percent) agreed with the statement but 32.6 percent of the respondents chose "Don't Know."

culture of the mixed electoral system, which favors the SMD members to the PR members, limits the spillover effect of gender quotas to the electoral victory in the district seats. Even though previous studies argue that former and current PR legislators are more likely to be successful in their bids in SMD seats (Shin 2014), this current study shows that an empowering effect of gender quota for PR tiers is limited to the candidate selection stage, as serving as PR members do not significantly increase the probabilities of winning district seats in the following election cycle. In spite of seemingly favorable political institutions of the mixed electoral system and gender quotas, informal and formal rules governing the practices of candidate nomination, elections, and workings of the parties and the Assembly pose invisible barriers to women. This contributes to career interruptions/termination of PR women, limiting the potential positive effects of gender quotas and the mixed system on promoting women's numerical representation in the National Assembly.

Improving the gender parity of the elected offices is important because having more women in legislatures leads to policies that are responsive to women's issues (Bratton and Ray 2002; Caiazza 2004; Childs 2002; Crowley 2004; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Schulze 2013; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Swers 2013). Moreover, as Rainbow Murray argues, "male overrepresentation itself compromises meritocracy and constrains the substantive representation of men as well as women" (Murray 2014, 1). Historically, moreover, the increase in South Korean women legislators has resulted in diversifying legislative committee assignments for the female members, which, in turn, led to women's input in the legislative process in a wider variety of sectors (W.-H. Kim 2011, 42–43). Finally, citizens in countries with high levels of women's political representation show higher levels of satisfaction with the ways in which their democracies operate and believe that their elections reflect the voters' views (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007;

Karp and Banducci 2008; Wolak 2014). Karp and Banducci (2008) demonstrated that both men and women in countries with high level of women's political representation evince higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their own country and agree elections reflect the view of voters (Karp and Banducci 2008). Even though Karp and Banducci do not discuss the specific case of Korea, their results show that Korean women are less likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works in their own country and less likely to believe that parties and leaders reflect their views, compared to their male counterparts (Karp and Banducci 2008). Thus having answers to these questions is important.

This study's findings suggest that the spillover effect is smaller than expected. It shows that experience serving as PR members or as local legislators has no significant effect on electoral success for SMD seats. The small share of PR seats in the national legislature and the centralized party nomination process reveal the limitations of the PR system and gender quotas as tools to support the empowerment of women, which many scholars have hailed as a fast-track remedy to address women's underrepresentation in legislatures. This study suggests that in South Korea, other factors including major parties' nomination and running in the candidate's party stronghold correlate more strongly with electoral success and could produce greater gender parity in the legislature. This implies that "leveling the playing field" through these two measures leaves women as electorally competitive as male candidates, but that their parties continue to fail to nominate them in stronghold districts.

The first part of this chapter outlines South Korea's electoral system. The second addresses the findings of existing literature on the issue of electing women to the legislatures. Based on the extant literature, I propose research hypotheses, and then report the data and

the statistical method I utilized to test the hypotheses. The last section discusses findings on the effects of factors related to the district assignment process and the elections.

Background: Gender Quotas of South Korea

Until the 17th legislative election in 2004, the PR seats were distributed among the parties according to the proportion of votes a party had won through all of its candidates. In 2001, the Constitutional Court ruled this process unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court ruled that counting a vote twice, one as a support for a district candidate and again for a party for PR election, does not accurately reflect the intention of the voters who support either a party or a candidate. It was determined that such voters have no means to express their support for these separate entities. In addition, votes cast for independent district candidates could not be counted for party preferences, and as a result, the votes for independent candidates were not counted in the PR election. Lastly, the system disproportionately favored major parties and discriminated against minor or new parties. It prevented minor or new parties from getting seats because these minority parties generally attracted little support for their district candidates (National Law Information Center 2001).

Following the Court's ruling, the National Assembly passed a new election law mandating a two-ballot system in 2004. The same law stipulates a mandatory 50 percent gender quota, applicable to 54 PR seats out of 299 total legislative positions (one SMD seat was added in 2012). The measure mandates a zipper system, alternating women and men in the closed party list. The ruling *Saenuri* Party and the main opposition Democratic Party place women candidates in the odd number positions (Korean National Election Commission 2015; see Shin 2014 and Yoon and Shin 2015 for detailed discussions on the gender quotas adoption in South Korea and the role of women's movements in the process).

The gender quotas for PR seats showed an immediate effect: the number of PR women legislators increased from 11 in the 2000 National Assembly election to 29 in the 2004 National Assembly election. Out of the 178 women who have been elected to the National Assembly from 2004 to 2016, 109 of them have been elected to PR seats. Political party rules stipulate that PR members cannot serve in this capacity for more than one term, however. Those who were once elected and served at the PR tier should subsequently seek election as SMD members if they desire to continue their legislative careers. However, the share of SMD women remained lower than 10 percent of the total SMD seats until it rose above that percentage point in 2016 (see Table 2.1.).

Table 2.1. The Share of Women Legislators in the National Assemblies, 1948-2016

Assembly	Total	Women (%w)	SMD seats	Women SMD (%w)	PR seats	Women PR (%w)
1st (1948)	200	1 (0.5%)				
2nd (1950)	210	2 (0.9%)				
3rd (1954)	203	1 (0.5%)				
4th (1958)	233	1 (1.3%)				
5th (1960)	233	1 (0.4%)				
6th (1963)	175	2 (1.1%)	131	1 (0.7%)	44	1 (2.3%)
7th (1967)	175	3 (1.7%)	131	1 (0.7%)	44	2 (4.5%)
8th (1971)	204	5 (2.5%)	153	0 (0%)	51	5 (9.8%)
9th (1973)	219	13 (5.5%)	146	2 (1.4%)	73	10 (13.7%)
10th (1978)	231	8 (3.5%)	154	1 (0.6%)	77	7 (9.1%)
11th (1981)	276	9 (3.3%)	184	1 (0.5%)	92	8 (8.7%)
12th (1985)	276	8 (2.9%)	184	2 (1.1%)	92	6 (6.5%)
13th (1988)	299	6 (2%)	224	0 (0%)	75	6 (8%)
14th (1992)	299	8 (2.7%)	237	1 (0.4%)	62	7 (11.3%)
15th (1996)	299	11 (3.7%)	253	3 (1.2%)	46	8 (17.4%)
16th (2000)	273	16 (5.9%)	227	5 (2.2%)	46	11 (23.9%)
17th (2004)	299	39 (13%)	243	10 (4.1%)	56	29 (51.8%)
18th (2008)	299	41 (13.7%)	245	14 (5.7%)	54	27 (50%)
19th (2012)	300	47 (15.7%)	246	19 (7.7%)	54	28 (51.9%)
20th (2016)	300	51 (17%)	253	26 (10.2%)	47	25 (53.2%)

Source: Kim 2012, 124 and NEC database

The two major parties have adopted 30 percent "voluntary" candidate party quotas for SMDs, but they have not been proactive in nominating women (Jiso Yoon and Shin 2015).

The conservative *Saenuri* Party, which secured 154 seats out of 300 seats in the 19th

legislative election and 122 seats in the 20th election, pledged that 30 percent of its SMD

candidates would be women before the election but ended up nominating a group of

candidates that was only 7 percent women in the 19th and 6.5 percent in the 20th election.

The central-left Democratic Party, which secured 127 out of 300 seats in the 19th elections

and 123 seats in the 20th elections (and its faction created another party, the People Party,

and earned 175 seats), also nominated only 15 percent of its SMD-nominated candidates

with women in the 19th election, and 10.7 percent in the 20th election (Kim 2012, 60).

Table 2.2. Number of Primary Candidates, Nominated, and the Elected for the National Assembly Elections, 2008-2016

	Men			Women		
	Applied	Nominated	Elected	Applied	Nominated	Elected
Saenuri						
18th	1110	227 (20.45%)	121 (53.30%)	50	18 (36%)	10 (55.56%)
19th	905	214 (23.65%)	123 (57.48%)	67	16 (23.88%)	4 (25%)
20th	744	231 (31.05%)	98 (42.42%)	78	16 (20.51%)	6 (37.5%)
Democratic						
18th	465	182 (39.14%)	51 (28.02%)	21	15 (71.43%)	4 (26.67%)
19th	665	188 (28.27%)	93 (49.47%)	48	21 (43.75%)	13 (61.90%)
20th	334	209 (62.57%)	93 (44.50%)	35	25 (71.43%)	17 (68%)

Source: Hangyoreh Shinmun 2008, 2012b; Korean National Election Commission 2016; Kyonghyang Shinmun 2012; The Seoul Post 2008; Women News 2016.

Lee and Shin (2016) attribute the limited impact of the voluntary party quotas to a

low level of party institutionalization, which promotes clientelism as well as the centralized

party organization (Hyunji Lee and Shin 2016). Women's success rates vary according to

party lines, both in the nomination process and the election stage (Table 2.2.). The women

of the conservative *Saenuri* Party are less likely to be nominated and elected than their male counterparts in the 2012 and the 2016 elections. The Democratic women have shown a higher level of success rate in the last two elections, and this is true of both the candidate selection and the election stages.

However, far fewer women applied for the candidate nomination as compared to men in both major parties. The *Saenuri* Party accepted 1160 applications for candidate nominations in 2008, and only 50 of them were women. In the end, 18 women were nominated by the party.[6] Among these individuals, 10 women won district elections. In 2012, 972 applicants for the district elections included only 67 female applicants; 16 of them won nominations and 4 won elections (Korean National Election Commission 2016). In the 2016 election, 78 out of 822 applicants are women, 16 women secured the nomination, and 6 won the election (Table 2.2.).

Similarly, 21 women applied for candidate nomination in 2008 to the central-left Democratic Party. Among them and others, 15 women won nominations and four eventually won the elections. In the following election, 48 out of 713 applicants were women, 21 women won nominations, and 13 were eventually elected (Korean National Election Commission 2016). In the 2016 election, 35 women were among 369 applicants, 25 won the party's nomination and 17 finally won the district elections (Table 2.2.).

Comparing the progress rate by gender (from the application to nomination, and from nomination to election, Table 2.2.), women's success rate is not significantly lower than that of men, and even higher than men's in each stage. This means women are as

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[6] This number includes those who did not apply to be nominated, but were recruited and nominated by the party elites for strategic reasons.

competitive as men in the nomination and election stage, but only few throw their hats into the ring (similar to Lawless and Fox 2010). Also, it could mean only women who are "qualified" and have good shots at winning come forward.

Theories of Women's Political Representation and Hypothesis

District Assignment: Party Loyalty and Incumbent Advantage

Running in a district with strong partisan support for a candidate's party is as important as winning a major party's nomination, and both incumbency and prior political experience give candidates significant advantages (Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003; Palmer and Simon 2006; Schwindt-Bayer 2005; Studlar and McAllister 1991). In this research, I examine two aspects of district assignments: running as incumbents of the district or in open seats, and the level of party support of the district.

The effect of incumbency advantage on voting decisions is stronger than sharing gender identity with the candidate: although women voters feel close to female candidates, they ultimately make voting decisions on the basis of incumbency or political experience as well as party affiliation of the candidates (Dolan 2008, 87). Each party's candidate nomination process and the party's organization affect nomination outcomes, both in terms of whether women win nominations as well as where they run (Lovenduski 1993; Luhiste 2015). The bias of the party elite and ensuing discriminatory district assignments for women are more critical than voters' bias in determining the electoral outcomes (Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012).

Many women candidates worldwide are political novices when they run for office. As a result, few of them enjoy an incumbency advantage; even worse, they often run as

challengers against the districts' incumbents rather than vying for open seats (Bernstein 1986, Burrell 1992, Niven 2006). What makes the election more difficult for women is that those who fought hard to secure a major party's nomination often end up running as challengers against the districts' incumbents. Robert A. Bernstein's research on U.S. House races from 1974 to 1984 finds that the number of women candidates tripled but they were less likely to win primaries for open seats, thus eventually only a few women were elected (Bernstein 1986; also Burrell 1992).

Studies based on the European countries and Canada showed that women candidates usually run in districts where the level of support for their parties is low, making them the "sacrificial lambs" (Luhiste 2015; Thomas and Bodet 2013). Even when women run as incumbents, a study on Canadian elections finds, only 21 percent of women competed in their own party's strongholds, whereas 79 percent male incumbents ran in their party's strongholds (M. Thomas and Bodet 2013). Nevertheless, when women are placed to run as incumbents or to be elected for open seats, women are more likely to win than men (Fox and Oxley 2003).

Studies focusing on South Korean elections find similar dynamics of candidate nomination by political parties and suggest that women are at a disadvantage in this pre-election process (Chin 2004; Kim 2012; Yoo 2012; Yoon 2012). Incumbents are more likely to be exposed to media coverage, and their participation in their districts creates a close rapport with local voters (Hwang 1998). However, South Korean voters prioritize political experience and incumbency of candidates over their gender. One survey finds, 35.4 percent of respondents said they voted for the women candidates because the candidates had already served in the same district. Conversely, 32.4 percent of the respondents stated that the most

salient reason for not supporting female candidates was their lack of political experience (Kim, Kim, and Kim 2002, 42).

However, few studies of Korea have tested the effect of district assignment on electoral outcomes empirically, and this study fills this gap. Existing studies of South Korean elections have used "regional cleavage" as a proxy to gauge party loyalty of a district, assuming that all the districts in a province share the same party loyalty. However, this coding scheme has limitations: even districts in the same city or the same province display mixed party preferences. Based on the two ballot system used since 2004, this study uses party ballot results at the district level to gauge a district's party loyalty.

Based on the existing literature, I hypothesize the following:

- H1: The association of running in a party stronghold and winning an SMD election is equally strong and positive as the association between winning a major party's nomination and an electoral victory.

- H2: Female candidates are likely to be assigned to run for less winnable seats.

Previous Political Experience: Spillover Effect of PR and Local Political Experience

Having political experience is just as important as winning a nomination from a major party in determining electoral outcomes, and it also increases the chances of getting a nomination (Hwang 2006; Kim and Kim 2012; Seo 2004). In contrast with the "sacrificial lamb" model, which focuses on discriminatory candidate assignment and nomination practices, the proponents of the "pipeline model" argue that the low level of women's political representation results from a limited pool of qualified candidates (Stambough and O'Regan 2007). The latter model posits that as more and more women attain political experience at

the lower level of political offices, more female candidates will be elected to the higher-level offices.

However, the existing literature draws different conclusions on women's level of political experience prior to running for office. In the U.S. state legislative races, women candidates are more qualified than their male counterparts (Carroll 2009); Rainbow Murray showed, however, that French women on average had less political experience, but "men are still being selected in higher numbers than women when they have no experience at all or very little…the majority of deputies with little or no prior experience in politics are male" (Murray 2012, 35).

Echoing the pipeline model, O'Brien and Rickne (2016) demonstrate that quotas increase the pool of female party members who are perceived as qualified for party leadership positions (O'Brien and Rickne 2016). Some studies show that gender quotas have a positive effect on promoting women's political representation over time. Gender quotas for PR seats in South Korea have a spillover effect on electing women to SMD seats and "a prolonged impact on women's sustainable representation" (Shin 2014, 80) because former and current PR legislators are more likely to be successful in their bids for SMD seats. Davidson-Schmich also suggests a spillover effect of PR gender quotas to SMD elections in South Korea, based on her examination of the 2013 Bundestag election in Germany, another country with the mixed electoral system. Her study, however, has not empirically tested the assumption (Davidson-Schmich 2014).

When reviewing the South Korean candidates' background, however, it becomes evident that PR women were not highly successful in their SMD bids. Shin's work (2014) establishes a spillover effect on candidate nomination, but not on electoral results. I reviewed the success rate of PR women on their SMD bids, and found only 33 PR women

ran for the 17th Assembly elections in 2004, including those who succeeded when their

predecessors could not finish their terms. According to the roster of the national legislators,

only five women legislators out of fourteen who were elected to the 18th Assembly (2008)

served as PR members in the 17th Assembly (National Assembly of the Republic of Korea

2012, 2014). In the 20th elections in 2016, only three out of 26 women who won the 20th

SMD elections were the PR members of the 19th Assembly. As this current study shows,

only 25 percent of the women elected in the eight elections since 1988 (that is, 19 out of 76

women elected) have had previous PR experience. Contrary to the existing literature,

therefore, I hypothesize that the magnitude of the spillover effect of PR gender quotas on

the electoral success at the national level is weaker than expected. This hypothesis supports

the sacrificial lamb model, rather than the pipeline model. As per Timothy Rich (2012),

South Korea (as well as Japan and Taiwan) has an invisible hierarchy between SMD and PR

members, with the former deemed more prestigious and more legitimate because SMDs are

directly elected by the voters (Rich 2012). Also, PR members are implicitly discouraged from

applying for leadership positions in the Assembly and discriminated against in legislative

committee assignment (Kim, Lee, and Jo 2014).

My analysis also examines the effect of local political experience on winning the

national SMD elections, another test for the pipeline model. Gender quotas for local elected

offices have encouraged political parties to nominate more women for local elections, and

the pool of candidates has broadened as the number of qualified candidates increased. Since

the enactment of mandatory gender quotas for local elections in 2010, the number of

women candidates nominated and elected for local offices at the province, city, and county

level has increased. In 2006, 298 women won party nominations and as many as 483 female

candidates did in 2010 (Jo and Park 2011, 14). In 2006, 3026 men and 142 women were

elected to legislative offices, in comparison to 2863 men and 329 women in 2010 (Korean National Election Commission 2016). Given these broad trends, I expect the expanded pool of women who have local political experience to increase the number of female candidates running for the national-level elections. If the spillover effect emerges, then serving at the local level may increase women's electoral competitiveness in national legislative elections.

- H3: Serving as PR members does not significantly increase the predicted probabilities of winning SMD elections.

- H4: Serving at the local political offices increases the predicted probabilities of winning SMD elections.

Effect of Candidate's Gender and Gender Stereotypes on Electoral Outcomes

Existing literature provides empirical evidence that a candidate's gender shapes how voters perceive candidates. Voters use the candidate's gender to infer his or her ideological orientations or competent issue areas (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000). Extant studies offer contrasting diagnoses of how voters' gendered perceptions translate into their voting decisions. Some scholars argue that gender stereotypes work in women candidates' favor (Black and Erickson 2003) and female candidates' strategic emphasis on women's issues during their campaigns contributes to their electoral success (Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003). Some have demonstrated a gender affinity effect – women voters are more likely to vote for women candidates, sometimes even crossing the party line (Simon and Hoyt 2008). On average, however, voters are less likely to vote for women and use higher standards when assessing women's qualifications (Barbara Lee Family Foundation 2012),

assuming that women are less viable (Carlin and Winfrey 2009; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000; Kropf and Boiney 2001).

Other empirical studies show that gender is not the most influential factor in voters' minds (Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). Even when voters link women and men with different attributes and strengths or weaknesses, this judgment may not translate into choosing male candidates over female ones (Alexander and Anderson 1993; McElroy and Marsh 2010). Female candidates' party affiliation determines electoral outcomes to a far greater extent than gender stereotypes do (Dolan 2013). The effect of gender in elections is context-specific, depending on factors such as the political background of the opponent and the salient policy issues dominating the debates of the specific political campaign (Sanbonmatsu 2002).

Political party gatekeepers are unwilling to nominate women and place them in winnable districts (Cheng and Tavits 2011; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012; Niven 1998, 2006), which is more critical than voter's bias against women or gender gap in political ambition. While gender stereotypes affect the candidate nomination stage adversely, once a woman is nominated, her likelihood of success is as high as men, controlling for other factors (Fox and Oxley 2003). Other district-level factors, such as major parties' nomination, incumbency status and open-seat races and running in a district with a high level of party loyalty to his or her party are more consequential to the electoral victory than the candidates' gender. Based on the literature, I test the following hypothesis:

- H5: Being a woman does not significantly decrease the probability of losing an election.

Data and Research Design

I test my hypotheses through the two stages of statistical analysis. First, I analyze the background of all candidates who ran for district elections from 1988 to 2016 to see if a gender gap exists in candidates' political experience, the political parties' candidate nomination, and district assignment patterns. Data used for this descriptive analysis includes the electoral outcomes of the district elections, the candidates' political experience prior to the elections, educational level, and age. This data has been collected from the National Election Commission of South Korea and national legislators' roster on the Republic of Korean Parliamentary database (Korean National Election Commission 2016; Republic of Korea Parliamentarian Society 2015). The data set includes 8629 candidates. I compared women's and men's party affiliations (major party candidate, minor party candidate, independents), the type of the competition (incumbent, challenger, open-seat), and the level of party loyalty of the district. All of these factors were compared along the gender line.

In the second stage of analysis, I compare the impact of the districts' characteristics and the candidates' political experience on whether the candidates won or lost the elections, using two logistic regression models. In both of the models, I examined the effects of the following factors: running with a major party nomination, running as an incumbent of the district, an open seat race, the status of a former or current PR member, and the status of a former or current local politician. For this statistical analysis, I narrowed the scope down to the top two contenders of the district elections, since coding one of the control variables, *male advantage*, requires confining the analysis to the top two contenders. In total, 3854 candidates' electoral outcomes from the 13th to the 20th elections (1988 – 2016) were included in the first model.

The majority of individuals who became top two candidates (82 percent) were affiliated with the major parties (measured by a dummy *major party*). Thirty-one percent of the candidates ran as the incumbents of a district who sought reelection (a dummy variable *incumbent*), while 34 percent of the candidates competed in the districts where the incumbent was not running (*open-seat*). Approximately eight percent of the top two candidates' highest level of political experience was at the local level, either in an elected or appointed office, as measured by a dummy variable *former or current local politician*. Approximately five percent of the candidates' highest level of political office assumed is a national PR seat (*former or current PR member*). Those who have both PR and SMD experience were coded as having SMD experience (Table 2.3).

For the second logistic model, I added a dummy variable, running in his or her *party's stronghold*, which is measured by the relative share of two major parties' PR votes in the district. The current study uses these party ballot results at the district level to assess a district's party loyalty.[7] Since the first competition using the two-ballot system took place during the 2004 election, this model can only be applied to the candidates who ranked the top two of each district from the $17^{th} - 20^{th}$ elections (2004 – 2016). When the share of PR

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[7] Previous studies have used "regional cleavage" as a proxy to assess the level of party loyalty of a district, assuming that all the districts in a province share the same level of party loyalty. However, even districts in the same city or in the same province show mixed party preferences, therefore the PR vote share is a better measure of party preference.

votes cast for the Democratic Party in a district is over 20 percentage point higher than that of the *Saenuri* Party, the district is pro-Democratic, and vice versa. The Democratic candidates running in the pro-Democratic districts and the *Saenuri* candidates running in the pro-*Saenuri* districts are considered to run in "favorable districts." Approximately a quarter of the top two candidates run in their party's strongholds (measured by a dummy variable *party's stronghold*).

I included two control variables in the model. Based on Fréchette, Maniquet and Morelli (2008), I generated a category variable, *male advantage*, indicating the opponent's gender running in the same district. A male candidate competing against a female contender is assigned the value of 1, while a female candidate running against a male candidate or a candidate running against the same sex contender is assigned the value of zero. Thirty-eight percent of the candidates were coded as having the male advantage. Another control variable measures a candidate's sex (a dummy variable *female*). Only four percent of the 3854 candidates were female. The female and the male advantage variables have a low level of correlation (the value of correlation r is approximately .4).

Table 2.3. Summary of Explanatory Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	Note
Winner	3854	0.50	0.50	0	1	1: Winner of the district election, 0: Otherwise
Major party	3854	0.82	0.38	0	1	1: Major party candidate; 0: Minor party or independent candidate
Incumbent	3854	0.31	0.46	0	1	1: Running as a SMD incumbent of the district; 0: Otherwise
Open seat	3854	0.34	0.47	0	1	1: Running in a district where the incumbent does not seek reelection; 0: Otherwise
Former or current local politician	3854	0.08	0.28	0	1	1: Formerly or currently holding local legislative or executive offices at the timing of elections, excluding those who were elected to the Assembly seats after serving in a local office; 0: Otherwise
Former or current PR member	3854	0.05	0.21	0	1	1: Former or current PR member at the timing of elections, excluding those who have SMD experience after PR serving as PR; 0: Otherwise
Party's Stronghold	1970	0.26	0.44	0	1	1: Running in his/her party's stronghold 0: Otherwise
Female	3854	0.04	0.21	0	1	1: Female, 0: Male
Male advantage	3854	0.38	0.19	0	1	1: Male candidate running against female candidate; 0: Otherwise

Findings and Discussions

Descriptive Statistics: Gender Gap in Candidates' Personal Background and District Assignment

Table 2.4. presents a summary of the candidates' personal backgrounds, as well as the pattern of district assignments and candidate nomination of the 8629 candidates and 1978 legislators in the 13th – 20th Assembly elections. Through these eight legislative elections, 1852 men and 76 women won the SMD contests, which do not count by-elections. Male candidates were more likely to run as major party candidates and as independents than women were. Among these major party candidates, only approximately four percent or 178

candidates were women. About 20 percent of all candidates ran as independent candidates, and only 51 women have done so since 1988.

However, among the 1928 legislators who won the elections, the gender gap in party affiliations is not statistically significant. Regardless of gender, those with major party affiliations were likely to win (1706 out of 1928 winners, or 51 percent). Winning as minor party candidates or independents was uncommon, especially for women: only three women won with a minor party ticket and one woman did as an independent (Table 2.4.). My analysis suggests that when it comes to winning an SMD election, the gender of the candidate is less important than being a major party candidate.

Table 2.4. Gender Gaps in Candidates' and Legislators' Backgrounds

	All candidates (1988-2016)				SMD winner (1988-2016)			
	Total	Men	Women	Statistical significance of differences (M-W)*	Total	Men	Women	Statistical significance of differences (M-W)*
	8629	8185	444		1928	1852	76	
Nomination Type								
Major party	4383	4205	178	4.64	1706	1634	72	-1.74
Minor party	2593	2378	215	-8.71	125	122	3	0.92
Independent	1653	1602	51	4.22	97	96	1	1.51
Political Experience								
Former and current SMD	1850	1797	53	5.02	983	949	34	1.11
Former and current PR	238	193	45	-9.8	81	62	19	-9.43
Local political office	668	627	41	-1.21	134	134	0	2.43
District Characteristics								
Incumbent	1301	1258	43	3.26	816	788	28	0.98
Challenger	4360	4110	250	-2.50	458	438	20	-0.53
Open seat	2967	2816	151	0.17	654	626	28	-0.55
Party stronghold (counting only 2004-2016)	631/4111	591/3756	40/355	2.23	390/986	362	28	-0.28
Personal Characteristics								
Average age (s.d.)	50.32 (9.15)	50.56 (8.99)	45.79 (10.69)	10.76	53.35 (7.29)	53.40 (7.30)	52.33 (7.19)	1.25
Educational attainment** (s.d.)	2.36 (0.62)	2.36 (0.63)	2.30 (0.60)	2.07	2.49 (0.54)	2.49 (0.54)	2.54 (0.55)	-0.76

*Two-tailed t-test of men-women, reporting a p value.

**Regarding the highest degree obtained, those with post-graduate degree is 3, college graduate/some college is 2, high school diploma is 1, and less than high school is coded as 0.

Candidates' political experience prior to running for the national elections shows gender gaps (Table 2.4.). About 21.44 percent of all candidates (1850 out of 8629 candidates) had SMD experience at the time of their SMD bid. The share of male candidates with previous SMD experience (1797 out of 8185 candidates, or 24 percent) is higher than that of female candidates (53 out of 444 candidates, or 12 percent), a statistically significant

difference. On the other hand, only approximately three percent of all candidates had served or were serving as PR members (238 out of 8629 candidates) at the time of election, which is partly due to the fact that less than 20 percent of all available legislative seats are PR seats. The numbers suggest that women candidates used PR experience as a stepping-stone to the SMD candidacy more frequently than male candidates did: less than three percent of all male candidates (193 out of 8185 men) had served as PR members, while ten percent of women candidates (45 out of 444 women) were former and current PR members. The difference is substantively and statistically significant. This finding supports Shin's (2014) argument that a gender quota for PR seats has a spillover effect on the number of women chosen as SMD candidates.

When analyzing electoral victories, however, it becomes evident that the effect of PR experience on elections is limited. In the examination of all SMD winners in all eight elections, four percent of the winners had experience in PR seats (81 out of 1928). Approximately 25 percent of women who won district elections had PR experience (19 out of 76 female winners), while only three percent of male SMD legislators had it (62 out of 1852 male winners, Table 2.4). In the last four elections, when the gender quotas were in effect, 25 percent of all female SMD winners (18 out of 68) were former or current PR members, while as many as 75 percent of women could win without PR experience (50 out of 68). In contrast, 51 percent of the winners between 1988 and 2016 have had SMD experience (983 out of 1928 winners). A higher percentage of male legislators versus female legislators had SMD experience, yet the difference between the groups is not statistically significant.

Comparing the candidates' success rate by gender, 53 percent of male candidates with SMD experience won an election (949 out of 1797 male candidates), and approximately

64 percent of women candidates with SMD experience won (34 out of 53 female candidates). Only approximately seven percent of the winners have served in local offices (134 out of 1928 winners). None of the elected women whose highest level of political experience was at the local level won an SMD bid. This suggests that SMD experience boosts electability regardless of gender. In summary, although PR experience can lead to SMD *candidacy* for women, SMD experience creates a greater likelihood to score an electoral victory in an SMD bid than PR experience or local political experience.

Similarly, the pattern of electoral success in district assignments reveals a gender gap. The majority of all 8629 candidates were challengers running against the incumbents of the districts (4360 out of 8629 candidates), while 15 percent of the candidates were incumbents seeking reelection in their own districts (1301 out of 8629 candidates). Thirty-four percent of the candidates competed for open seats. Fifteen percent of all male candidates (1258 out of 8185) and approximately ten percent of the female candidates (43 out of 444) were assigned to run as incumbents seeking reelection in their own districts, showing a statistically significant difference. Women were more likely to run as challengers than men: 56 percent and 50 percent respectively, also a statistically significant difference. However, the success rate for women incumbents is as high as that of men: 65 percent of female incumbents won the election (28 out of 43), and 63 percent of the male incumbents won the election (788 out of 1258). The difference is substantively and statistically not significant. These findings suggest that with favorable district assignments, women are as electorally competitive as men.

Another aspect of district assignment, a district's party loyalty, underscores the importance of political parties' gatekeeping roles in determining electoral outcomes. As articulated in the previous section, the data for this variable have only become available after

the electoral law reform in 2004. Merely 11 percent of women candidates in these last four

elections ran in their party's strongholds (40 out of 355 women candidates), as compared to

16 percent of men (591 out of 3756), which is a statistically significant difference. Comparing

the success rate, 70 percent of women candidates running in their stronghold won the

election (28 out of 40 female candidates) and 61 percent of men running in their stronghold

won the election (362 winners out of 591 candidates), and that difference is not statistically

significant. The analysis of the data demonstrates, once again, that a candidate's gender is

less consequential in electoral outcomes than the strategic district assignment by the political

parties (Table 2.4.).

Age and educational levels are similar for male and female candidates (Table 2.4.).

Women are about five years younger than male candidates on average, but no gender age gap

surfaces among the elected SMD members (52.33 for women and 53.4 for men). In general,

the male candidates' educational level is slightly higher than women's (i.e., higher than a

bachelor's degree for both genders), and elected women's overall educational attainment is

slightly higher than men's, but with a negligible difference. Given the approximate parity in

the candidates' educational level, I did not include this variable in the logistic regression

models constructed in the second stage of analysis.

To sum up, gender gaps surface in the political and personal backgrounds of the

candidates in the previous eight elections, which explains the low level of women's

representation in the National Assembly. Compared to men, women candidates have been

less likely to serve as SMD members. PR experience was a more popular pathway to SMD

candidacies for women, in part because there were more PR women than SMD women. Yet

the likelihood of getting elected with PR experience is lower than running with prior SMD

experience. Both major parties nominated few women. When nominating, they assigned

female candidates to districts where they were less likely to win and/or as challengers running against the districts' incumbents. A vicious cycle is in place for women's political recruitment. The probability of electoral victories for women has been small because of existing patterns of major parties' nomination. In turn, when women lost, their electoral defeats were likely to make political parties more cautious about nominating female candidates in the future.

Findings from Logistic Analysis

After analyzing the descriptive statistics of the candidates' personal backgrounds and the characteristics of the districts from which they seek election, I ran two logistic models to examine the magnitude and direction of each factor's influence, controlling for other variables. For the regression analysis, I included only the top two contenders in each district, because one of the key factors, inter-gender competition ("*male advantage*"), requires confining the analysis to the top two contenders. In addition, the district election reflects the dominant two-party system, which usually makes only one or two candidates viable for the position. Thus, the various regressors' influence on the 3854 candidates' electoral outcomes from the 13th to the 20th elections is analyzed using the first model. The second model includes a variable of running in the party's stronghold (or a favorable district), which is measured by the share of each party's PR votes in a district. Because this two-vote system has only been implemented since the 17th election, I ran the second model including the "*favorable district*" variable on the 1970 top-two contenders in the 17th – 20th elections.

Table 2.5. The Impact of District-Related and Personal Factors on Electoral Success

DV: Winning in the SMD Election	13th -20th Elections			17th -20th Elections		
	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	Estimate	S.E.	p-value
Major Party Candidate	0.69*	0.09	7.45	0.60*	0.15	3.97
Incumbent	1.4*	0.09	15.98	1.69*	0.13	12.99
Open Seat	0.63*	0.08	7.81	0.73*	0.12	6.08
PR experience	0.16	0.16	0.99	0.36	0.27	1.35
Local experience	0.02	0.12	0.16	0.13	0.16	0.81
Running in Stronghold				1.26*	0.13	10.12
Female	-0.21	0.17	-1.25	-0.11	0.20	-0.54
Male Advantage	0.16	0.18	0.89	0.10	0.21	0.50
Intercept	-1.22*	0.10	-12.66	-1.62*	0.16	-10.07
N	3854			1970		
Log likelihood	-2479.6			-1161.93		
Pseudo R^2	0.07			0.15		

Notes: Estimates are logistic regression coefficients. * Significant at p<0.05

Figure 2.1. The Impact of District-Related and Personal Factors on Electoral Success

The findings in Table 2.5. and Figure 2.1. demonstrate the crucial role political parties play in the electoral victory. Table 2.5. compares the results of the first and the second models. The first model, which includes all eight SMD elections, shows that running as an incumbent has a statistically significant and positive correlation with the predicted probabilities of winning the district election, as compared to when running as a challenger. Running with a major party's ticket and running in a district where incumbents do not seek reelection also have positive correlations to the electoral victory (Table 2.5. and Figure 2.1.).

The second regression model shows that the largest positive impact on the electoral victories over the course of the last four elections relates to running as an incumbent of the district. The second most positive factor was running in a candidate's own party stronghold,

which reinforces the importance of strategic district assignments (Table 2.5.). Two other

matters also increase the predicted probability of winning the district election: running for

open seats and securing a major party's nomination (Table 2.5.). However, serving as a PR

member or at the local office does not have substantive and statistically positive effect on

winning the electoral bid for the district seats. The two controlling variables, the candidate's

sex and the opponent's sex, are in the expected direction but not statistically significant

(Table 2.5.).[8]

This supports Murray, Krook and Opello's (2012) findings that candidate assignment

is more important than the candidate's gender in the electoral outcomes. The major reason

for women's numerical underrepresentation is not voters' bias against women but the party

elite's bias. The small share of PR seats in the Korean legislature and the centralized party

nomination process should limit the positive effect of PR system and the gender quotas on

increasing the share of women elected, which many scholars have hailed as a fast-track

remedy to address women's underrepresentation in legislatures. Second, according to Rich

(2012), the South Korean Assembly's mixed system creates an invisible hierarchy of SMD

and PR members, in which the former deemed more prestigious and more legitimate, as the

SMD members are directly elected by the voters (Rich 2012). In addition, PR members are

implicitly discouraged from applying for leadership positions in the Assembly and

discriminated against in legislative committee assignment (Kim, Lee and Jo 2014).

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[8] I also tested several interaction terms, but they are not statistically significant and including the interaction terms lower the model fit, so I did not include them in the final analysis.

Table 2.6. Predicted Probabilities of Winning the District Elections, Top Two Candidates, 17th-20th Elections

Predicted Probability of Winning the District Election (95% CI)

	Major party		Incumbent		Open seat		Party Stronghold	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Male	.38	.53	.38	.77	.45	.63	.43	.73
	(.32, .45)	(.50, .56)	(.34, .41)	(.73, .80)	(.42, .48)	(.59, .67)	(.40 .46)	(.68, .77)
Female	.36	.50	.35	.75	.42	.60	.40	.70
	(.25, .46)	(.41, .60)	(.26, .44)	(.67, .82)	(.33, .52)	(.51, .70)	(.31, .49)	(.61, .79)

Notes: All the other variables are held at their means.

In order to interpret the regression result in a more intuitive way, I compared the effects of candidate assignments on the electoral outcomes by gender (Table 2.6.). The effect of the four independent variables show little gender difference. Running as incumbents and running in one's party stronghold correlated with more than 70 probabilities of winning the election for both men and women. However, one should note that the 95 percent confidence interval is wider for women candidates than men. The probability of winning the election as a female incumbent is between .67 and .82, while a male incumbent's probability is between .73 and .80. In terms of party stronghold, we can be 95 percent confident that the predicted probability as a female running in her party stronghold winning the election is between .61 and .79, which is high but in a wider range of prediction compared to men's .68 and .77.

Women running as major party candidates, and women running for open seats also show wider range of confidence interval compared to their male counterparts. Female major party candidates' probabilities of winning the SMD election is between .41 and .60, which is less than half of the winning chances; female candidates running in the open seat

competition also have a wider range of confidence interval, even though the average probability is almost identical to men's .63.

Conclusion

The empirical evidence that this study examines points to a need for South Korean political parties to take more direct measures to increase women's representation in the National Assembly. My analysis suggests that the gender of the candidate is less important than being a major party candidate or running in a favorable district. In particular, serving as an SMD member is the surest path to electoral victory for women, and the parties should encourage women to be more successful in their SMD bids. The expected spillover effect of serving as a PR member or in local political offices is weaker than assumed, and this weakness points to the importance of the SMD path. And yet, candidates' PR memberships do not translate well into electoral victories for SMD seats, which account for more than 80 percent of all Assembly seats. Political actors have compromised with women who demanded more representation by passing gender quotas for PR seats and local legislative offices. However, taking the high stakes and prestige of the SMD membership into consideration, major parties have been unwilling to take bolder measures to recruit women in politics.

This analysis demonstrates that there is no detour to SMD seats for female candidates. To increase women's representation in the national legislature, major parties should nominate more women candidates and assign them to parties' strongholds, rather than position them to run as challengers. Evidence suggests that women's gender is not a liability in elections. This analysis raises a couple of new questions, however. First of all, the current gender quotas are applicable only to the PR seats, and the political parties do not allow PR members to serve more than two terms as PR members. The analysis shows that

neither having served as a PR member nor having local political experience significantly correlates with electoral victory in the district elections. This questions the lasting impact of gender quotas in the mixed system, and the issue of career interruption/termination of women national legislators, who have four years of experience only to leave the National Assembly.

Second, women are more likely to run as challengers, and run in less favorable seats. Why? Attributing this to political party elites' bias is simple enough, but what are the dynamics within the parties and the Assembly? To explain the reasons of this limited spillover effect of gender quotas and the practices of district assignment and nomination process of major parties which put women at a disadvantage, I conducted the interviews in South Korea, who are engaged in and have observed the inner working of the parties and the electoral politics of the country. The following chapter discusses the findings from this qualitative analysis.

Chapter 3. Career Interruption and Termination of PR Members: Qualitative Analysis

Introduction

In Chapter 2, I argue that gender quotas helped increase the number of women in the National Assembly, but the women have a hard time continuing their political careers once their term as a PR member is over. The graph in Figure 3.1. shows the leaking pipeline issue for both women and men. In 2004, there were about 30 PR women members and among them 5 women ran for SMD seats and 2 eventually won the election. In the same year, about half of PR men ran for SMD seats and two won the election. The pattern is similar: less than half of PR members run for the SMD elections by the end of their PR term, and less than half of them win the election. However, this pattern differed for women PR members in 2016. What explains this career interruption and termination for PR members?

Figure 3.1. The Numbers of PR Members, PR Members Seeking Election in the District Election, and PR Members Elected to the District Seats

Data Source: National Election Commission 2016

To answer this question, I conducted in-depth interviews with 28 people over 2.5 months in Seoul, South Korea in the summer of 2015. Even though I do not make a claim that the sample of this study is representative (Richard F. Fenno (1978) also acknowledges a similar sample issue), the interviewees in this study have diverse backgrounds: 10 men and 18 women; four former PR members and one current SMD member; two primary candidates who did not win major parties' nominations, seven party staffers, nine legislative staffers, four scholars, one activist; the ruling and the main opposition party members, as well as minor party members; and the age of the interviewees ranged from mid-20s to the mid-60s.

Table 3.1. List of Interviewees

ID#	Date	Last Name, First Name	Party	Gender	Position
1	6/15/15	anonymous	Democratic Party	M	Legislative staffer
2	6/17/15	anonymous	*Saenuri*	M	Senior staff for the Office of the chairperson of the National Assembly at the timing of the interview; ran for SMD primaries but did not win the bid
3	6/18/15	anonymous	Democratic Party	M	Researcher; former legislative staffer for a male Democratic SMD member
4	6/18/15	anonymous	Democratic Party	M	Legislative staffer; formerly national legislative campaign staff
5	6/15/15	anonymous	Formerly Democratic Party, currently *Saenuri*	M	Legislative staffer
6	6/22/15	anonymous	anonymous	M	Current government official; formerly secretary of the Presidential Office
7	6/24/15	anonymous	Democratic Party	M	Legislative staffer of a second-term PR-turned-SMD female member
8	6/24/15	Shin, Mi-kyung	*Saenuri*	W	Head of *Saenuri* Party's Women's Bureau
9	6/26/15	Kim, Kyung-mi		W	Researcher
10	6/29/15	Lee, Seung-jin	*Saenuri*	W	Current senior researcher for *Saenuri*'s Security and Public Administration Committee; Former head of *Saenuri* Party's Women's Bureau

11	6/29/15	anonymous	*Saenuri*	M	Legislative staffer for PR, 1st term, female member
12	7/2/15	anonymous	*Saenuri*	M	Legislative staffer for a PR, 1st term, female member; formerly a staff for a first-term PR male representative
13	7/2/15	anonymous	*Saenuri*	W	Legislative staffer for an anonymous legislator (PR, 1st term, female); formerly a staffer for a male SMD member
14	7/7/15	Shin, Myung	Democratic Party	W	Former PR member (1st term)
15	7/8/15	anonymous	Democratic Party	W	Former PR member (1st term)
16	7/10/15	Oh, Yoo-seok	n/a	W	Researcher
17	7/13/15	Kim, Hye-sung	*Saenuri*	W	Former PR member (1st term)
18	7/16/15	Kim, Sung-min	Democratic Party	W	Researcher for the Democratic Party's Women and Family Committee
19	7/16/15	anonymous	Democratic Party	M	Current SMD member (2nd term)
20	7/16/15	[Participant Observation] Press conference by the women's organization on proposing SMD gender quotas; E-Room Center in Yoido, Seoul.			
21	7/17/15	Jeong, Choon-saeng	Democratic Party	W	Head of Democratic Party's Women's Bureau
22	7/21/15	anonymous	A third party (anonymous)	W	Party staffer
23	7/21/15	Lee, Jung-Mi	Justice Party	W	Vice chair of the party
24	7/21/15	anonymous	Justice Party	W	Researcher for the Justice Party's Women and Family Committee
25	7/22/15	anonymous	n/a	W	Activist
26	7/23/15	anonymous	Democratic Party	W	Former PR member (1st term), former vice minister in the 1990s
27	7/24/15	[Participant Observation] Colloquium on Revising Political Affairs Law to Promote Women's Political Representation, National Assembly Seminar Room			
28	7/27/15	Sohn, Soo-jo	*Saenuri*	W	Candidate for a SMD election in 2012 (Busan Sasang district)
29	7/28/15	anonymous	n/a	W	Researcher (Professor)
30	7/31/15	Kim, Mi-kyung	n/a	W	Researcher (Professor)

The interviews revealed three themes to explain why the majority of PR members experience career interruption and termination. First, PR members' main focus and expected role is writing bills and representing specific interest groups (such as labor unions, women's

organizations, professional associations) so the lack of a geographically defined support base undermines the prospects of transitioning from PR posts to district-tier seats. The major political parties expect PR members to focus on writing bills rather than establishing local networks, because the parties appointed them for their policy expertise. In addition, since most of the PR members are newcomers to the Assembly, they spend the first one to two years learning formal and informal rules of the game. The PR members I interviewed expressed frustration that local activities and political mobilization are a totally different set of actions than their legislative activities in the National Assembly [Interviewee #1 and #5]. [9] During their legislative term, PR members are busy drafting bills, and by the time they need to decide if they want to continue to pursue their political career, the favorable districts with high level of support for their parties are likely to have been claimed by other candidates [Interviewee #13].

Second, due to unique culture of the National Assembly and political parties which deem SMD members more prestigious than PR members, the latter experience invisible hierarchies between the tiers. For example, the legal donation cap for PR members is only half of that of SMD members, and PR members' "second-class citizen" status in the Assembly and in the parties discourages them from getting national and local party leadership positions. This leadership experience counts positively in the nomination process and also increases their name recognition and visibility. In addition, assuming the national party leadership positions and the local party's precinct committee leadership positions as PR members is unlikely, due to the informal rules that prioritize seniority and SMD members.

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[9] I will use [#Interviewee Number] throughout the chapter when referring to the interviewees, instead of using their names. See Table 3.1. for the list of the interviewees.

These party leadership positions provide access to the resources that enable a candidate to establish personal support networks.

Thus, PR members' struggles to emerge as party organization leaders negatively influence their successful bids in the SMD elections. One interviewee pointed out that the lack of powerful women leaders in both parties poses barriers for female politicians to advance their career, suggesting the pipeline problem. Major parties reserve one deputy party head position for women, and one of the two speakers of the party goes to a woman [Interviewee #13]. Nonetheless, women party members rarely assume "powerful" committees' leadership roles, such as budget, personnel, and planning committees [Interviewees #1, #8, #13, #15, #22]. This pattern is dissimilar to what O'Brien and Rickne (2016) find on the Swedish Social Democratic Party, where the gender quotas expanded the pool of women who were perceived to be fit for party leadership positions.

Third, the informal practice of disadvantageous candidate district assignments, which supports the "sacrificial lamb" theory, hurts PR members' probabilities of winning the SMD election. When the PR members express a willingness to run for the upcoming SMD elections, party leaders expect them to run in unfavorable districts, even though it is not mandated by the party's rules. Because the PR members have already benefitted from the party's appointment and, in essence, won a "bloodless" battle, they are expected to make a sacrifice by running in a district where they are unlikely to win. This practice is based on the hope of adding another seat for the party [Interviewees #2, #7, #8, #10, #21, but #1 disagreed].

Through my interview analysis, I argue that PR seats present a mixed bag for women's political empowerment in the South Korean political system. On the one hand, PR seats and gender quotas have enabled women's entry into politics. Adopting and

implementing gender quotas in 2004 had an immediate effect in increasing the share of women in the National Assembly. Compared to 2000, when only 11 women were elected, 29 women were elected through the 2004 election. However, this increase came mostly from the PR seats. Among 178 women who were elected between 2004 and 2014, 109 women or 61 percent of them served as PR members. On the other hand, the share of SMD members is less than 10 percent until 2016, and the increase has plateaued since 2004: 13 percent in 2004, 13.7 percent in 2008, 15.7 percent in 2012 and 17 percent in 2016. In addition, the PR members have little institutional support to become local and national party leaders which is a stepping stone to increase one's visibility and national recognition. Limited access to this support hinders contacting local constituencies frequently, or establishing rapport with the local population (Tremblay 2006). Given the South Korean parties' rule that politicians cannot serve more than one term as PR members, women's expertise in specific issue areas and lack of geographically defined support base hurt their potential as a district representative. Women's expertise in specific issue areas hurts their career because they are pigeonholed as representatives of a specific group or an issue area (labor union, women's movement, education) rather than broad, general representatives who can represent diverse body of constituents. Lack of geographically defined support base for women and the single member district system at the district level also undermine the electoral competitiveness, as discussed by Jo Freeman:

> Our [U.S.] legislative bodies are based on representation by geographic district, not identity, interests or ideology. The single member district favors candidates who represent a majority, not a minority, or voters in a district, or at least a majority of the voters in the dominant party's primary. Ethnic groups could organize and elect one of their own when they were geographically concentrated – and even when each

new group took decades to crack the barriers of existing party leadership. Women

are geographically dispersed, making it hard to mobilize the majority necessary to be

elected (Freeman 2000, 233).

In the following section, I analyze how money, implicit institutional bias against PR and

women members, and masculine norms of socializing interact with these three themes.

Findings from Qualitative Analysis

Theme 1. The Role of Money in Campaigns and Politics

A Democratic politician of California Jesse M. Unruh once stated "money is the mother's

milk of politics" (Uhlig 1987). Interviewees cited that money was one of the major

challenges they faced when considering to run and while they were running their campaigns.

Money is required to maintain local support networks. In South Korea, it is customary to

contribute money to events like weddings, funerals, and office launching, but elected and

appointed officials are not allowed to make this contribution. Still many people expect their

politician "friends" or "acquaintances" to contribute to show off their connections or simply

to get benefits [Interviewee #26]. When interacting with the local constituents or local party

members, legislators end up picking up the bills to treat meals and gifts to the voters and

other actors in the district even though it is prohibited by law. Sometimes their friends pay

on behalf of the politicians to save them from legal troubles [Interviewee #26].

Maintaining a local network is expensive, and the politicians are often expected to

contribute money to local events. Therefore, having independent financial resources is one

of the factors political parties implicitly consider when they appoint local party leaders:

> I think the party nominated Rep. Sohn [the interviewee's boss] as a local
>
> party leader because the party thought she was independently wealthy as she

had her own private business. Party leaders know it is expensive to maintain

local network, including paychecks for the office staff and maintaining local

office space. Also the former district legislator was also a woman so the place

is women-friendly [Interviewee #11].

In another interview with a weekly magazine, Interviewee #26 mentioned that money

is critical in politics because conducting legislative research, getting legal advice, conducting

public opinion surveys, and holding consortium to get advice from experts is expensive.

Even though the National Assembly provides research service on legislative issues, the

research service sometimes misses the deadline or their research products do not meet the

intended direction of the research. In order to produce research products tailored to a

specific goal, legislators need to spend extra money to hire private research help. She

advocated for more political funds available to the legislators which will improve the

legislative activities but she emphasized the contribution and the flow of the money should

be more transparent (Sook-I Lee 2009).

If money is critical in maintaining networks and being successful in political careers,

limited access to money can explain why some are less successful than others, also a gender

gap in political success. One way to glean the gender gap in personal wealth is to see

legislators' reported income and property. In 2014 and 2015, all top ten legislators in terms

of the amount of reported personal wealth were men; three out of the bottom 10 legislators

were women (Minho Kim 2015; Newsis 2014). On average, South Korean women's labor

participation rate is 50.2 percent in 2016, and men's labor participation rate is 71.1 percent

(Statistics Korea 2016a); among them, 41 percent of women workers are temporary workers

(including seasonal workers and part time workers) whereas only 26.4 percent of men are

(Statistics Korea 2016b). These figures are not a perfect indicator to show a gender gap in wealth in the country. Moreover, politicians are generally political and economic elites thus these aggregate statistics on the whole population cannot be used to show women politicians are under-resourced than their male counterparts. However, this is one way to illustrate why women are less likely to engage in politics than men.

How is the political contribution distributed by the party affiliation, gender, seniority, and the seat type? How accurate are the interviewee's claims that PR members and women face challenges in raising money? Table 3.2. was created based on the data provided by the Center for Freedom of Information and Transparency (2012, 2014). Overall, the *Saenuri* members raised more than other party members, but there is a gender gap within the party (Table 3.2.). Men, in both major parties, raise more funds than their female colleagues, but the Democratic women raise more than the *Saenuri* women. The minor party women raised more than their male counterparts, but it is due to an outlier, Rep. Sang-jeong Shim of the Justice Party who was ranked the 10th in the total contribution amount. Studies based on the U.S. cases found that women raise as much as men (Adams and Schreiber 2011), even though Democratic women have an advantage over the Republican women (Crespin and Deitz 2010). This gender parity in campaign finance does not apply to the South Korean context, however.

On average, SMD members raised about twice more than the PR members did between 2012 and 2014, partly because the contribution cap for PR members is only a half of that of SMD members: SMD members can raise up to KRW150,000,000 (or USD150K) on the non-election year and KRW300,000,000 (or USD300K) on the years with the national election; PR members can raise up to KRW150,000,000 on both election and non-election year (Korea Ministry of Government Legislation 2017). Interestingly, the seniority of the

members does not correspond to the average amount of contribution the members raised.

Overall, the 3rd term legislators raised the most, KRW188, 332, and the 4th term women

raised the highest amount of contribution.

Table 3.2. Political Contribution by Party, Seat Type, and Seniority, 2012-2014

		M+W	Men	Women	Diff (M-W)
Total (2012-2014)	Num. Obs	895	758	137	
	Amount (in 1000KRW) Avg. (s.d.)	149,182 (79,023)	155,752 (79,180)	112,836 (67,681)	42,916
Party	*Saenuri*	467	412	55	
		154,704 (82,051)	162,990 (81,199)	92,633 (58,891)	70,357
	Democratic	381	311	70	
		146,609 (74,921)	151,415 (75,982)	125,258 (66,396)	26,157
	Minor	34	22	12	
		112,621 (76,763)	116,977 (68,682)	132,969 (92,150)	-15,992
Seat Type	SMD	738	678	60	
		163,312 (77,541)	163,913 (78,567)	156,523 (65,004)	7,390
	PR	157	80	77	
		82,763 (44,688)	86,583 (41,981)	78,794 (47,286)	7,789
Terms in Office (mean=1.95)	1	441	343	98	
		117,863 (64,461)	124,590 (64,567)	94,318 (58,565)	30,272
	2	210	185	25	
		179,692 (79,952)	182,921 (81,146)	155,799 (67,153)	27,122
	3	150	143	7	
		188,332 (74,694)	189,850 (74,755)	157,315 (71,510)	32,535
	4	55	52	3	
		186,921 (78,952)	184,418 (79,328)	230,303 (69,615)	-45,885
	5	26	22	4	
		153,579 (83,394)	157,492 (89,032)	132,053 (41683)	25,439
	6	9	9	0	
		95,190 (82,704)	95,190 (82,704)		95,190
	7	4	4	0	
		106,335 (131,128)	106,335 (131,128)		106,335
SMD, First term		291	263	28	
		136,770 (65,554)	136,151 (65,842)	142,584 (63,647)	-6,433
PR, First term		150	80	70	
		81,183 (43,057)	86,583 (41,981)	75,012 (43,739)	11,571

Data Source: Korea Ministry of Government Legislation 2017

Figures 3.2. and 3.3. shows the distribution of the contribution amount for all male and female legislators between 2012 and 2014. The majority of both men and women raised around KRW150,000,000, and more than 50 male legislators raised around KRW300,000,000 which is the maximum amount they could raise. On the other hand, more than 80 female legislators raised below the average.

Figure 2.2. The Amount of Donations to Male Legislators, 2012-2014

Figure 3.3. The Amount of Donations to Female Legislators, 2012-2014

The only female legislator on the Top 10 list is Rep. Sangjeong Shim (Table 3.3.), and Rep. Eunhee Kwon from Daegu raised the second largest sum of money. She ranked the 47th and raised KRW4,360,000 less than Rep. Shim did. Park Geun-hye, who served five terms before being elected as the president, raised KRW175,541,000 which is the highest among PR members, followed by the Democratic Party's Rep. Gi-sik Kim who raised KRW162,109,000 and Rep. Myung-sook Han (female, Democratic, 3rd term) who accumulated KRW158,161,000 (Center for Freedom of Information and Transparency 2012, 2014). According to an interviewee in this study, not many women stick it out in the local politics, as it is costly to maintain organized support networks. Many of them quit before making it to the next election. Even those with a strong network wish to move to more

favorable and more winnable districts when opportunities arise. Many of the local party leaders bear the involved cost out of their pocket to maintain the networks [Interviewee #8].

Table 3.3. Top 10 Legislators in Political Contribution Raised

Rank	Province	District	Name	Party	Amount (in 1000 KRW)	Year	Sex	Term
1	South Jolla	Mokpo	Park, Jiwon	Democratic	317,737	2012	m	3
2	North Jolla	Jeong-eup	Yoo, Sungyup	Democratic	317,495	2012	m	2
3	Gwangju	Gwangsan 1	Kim, Donghul	Democratic	311,227	2012	m	3
4	North Gyongsang	Goonwi Uisung Cheongsong	Kim, Jaewon	*Saenuri*	310,660	2014	m	2
5	South Gyongsang	Jinju 2	Kim, Jaekyong	*Saenuri*	309,972	2012	m	3
6	Busan	Namgu 1	Kim, Joenghoon	*Saenuri*	309,404	2012	m	3
7	Gwangju	Gwangsan 2	Lee, Yongsup	Democratic	308,920	2012	m	2
8	North Gyongsang	Pohang Namgu2	Park, Myungjae	*Saenuri*	308,030	2014	m	1
9	Gyonggi	Yeoju Yangpyong Gapyong	Jeong, Byunggook	*Saenuri*	306,013	2012	m	4
10	Gyonggi	GoyangDukyang 1	Shim, Sangjeong	Justice	304,236	2014	f	2

Data: Author's analysis based on Korea Ministry of Government Legislation 2017

As there are so many variations in the individual-level data with high standard deviation, a couple of outliers can skew the distribution of the data. Following Murray (2012), I categorized the legislators into five groups by the amount of political contribution they raised (quintile). 0-20% means the bottom 20% in terms of the amount; 80-100% category is the top 20% legislators. I examined the distribution by sex, seat type, seniority, and political party affiliation. Table 3.4. shows the result.

Table 3.4. Distribution of Political Contribution, 2012-2014

		0-20% (bottom 20%)	21%-40%	41%-60%	61%-80%	81%-100% (top 20%)	Row Total
Sex	Female	42	36	29	21	9	137
		(31%)	(26%)	(21%)	(15%)	(7%)	(100%)
	Male	137	143	150	158	170	758
		(18%)	(19%)	(20%)	(21%)	(22%)	(100%)
Seat	PR	73	53	22	9	0	157
		(46%)	(34%)	(14%)	(6%)	(0%)	(100%)
	SMD	106	126	157	170	179	738
		(14%)	(17%)	(21%)	(23%)	(24%)	(100%)
Term	1	130	113	90	78	30	441
		(29%)	(26%)	(20%)	(18%)	(7%)	(100%)
	2	23	28	37	55	67	210
		(11%)	(13%)	(18%)	(26%)	(32%)	(100%)
	3	11	17	36	31	55	150
		(7%)	(11%)	(24%)	(21%)	(37%)	(100%)
	4	2	12	13	9	19	55
		(4%)	(22%)	(24%)	(16%)	(35%)	(100%)
	5	5	7	3	5	6	26
		(19%)	(27%)	(12%)	(19%)	(23%)	(100%)
	6	5	2	0	1	1	9
		(56%)	(22%)	(0%)	(11%)	(11%)	(100%)
	7	3	0	0	0	1	4
		(75%)	(0%)	(0%)	(0%)	(25%)	(100%)
Party	Democratic	73	81	69	93	65	381
		(19%)	(21%)	(18%)	(24%)	(17%)	(100%)
	Saenuri	88	90	103	75	111	467
		(19%)	(19%)	(22%)	(16%)	(24%)	(100%)
	Minority	12	5	6	8	3	34
		(35%)	(15%)	(18%)	(24%)	(9%)	(100%)
	Independent	6	3	1	3	0	13
		(46%)	(23%)	(7%)	(23%)	(0%)	(100%)

Data: Author's analysis based on Korea Ministry of Government Legislation 2017

Compared by sex, men are similarly distributed in the amount of contributions they receive; about 22 percent of the male legislators are ranked at the top 20 percent in terms of the political contributions received, and 18 percent of the male legislators are ranked in the bottom 20 percent. On the other hand, about 31 percent of the female legislators are located in the bottom 20 percent of contributions raised, and only 7 percent of the female legislators are ranked in the top 20 percent.

Again, the difference in the contribution cap for PR members and SMD members partly explains why there are no PR members who ranked in the top 20 percent. Compared to those who do not have seats, PR members do have some advantages as members of the

Assembly, in that PR members can open a local office space. Those who are not elected to office and wait for the next election are not allowed to open and maintain a local office and cannot get any contributions [Interviewee #28], which is critical to organize one's own local network. Interviewee #28 held a local party leadership position, which gives her access to the local political actors. However, she could not have an office space and the leadership position was unpaid, nor could she legally raise contributions [Interviewee #28]. Considering this campaign finance disparity, women's comparable electoral success rate, especially that of the Democratic women (Table 2.2.), is more impressive.

Interviewees said novice politicians have a hard time raising contributions. First time legislators with low level of name recognition and weak network have a hard time raising up to the contribution limit. One of the legislators who served multiple terms in a district in Seoul said if a person becomes well-known, they, then, had no difficulties in raising money up to the legal limitations ("just open a bank account and the contribution floods in"), yet, this same person struggled as a first-term legislator. Rep. Myung-soon Kang said male legislators maintain a culture of supporting each other and unite as a group with the people who share the same local or alumni network, but women do not have a similar kind of support network (Soon-I Lee et al. 2009).

Interestingly, however, the contribution data in Table 3.4. show that the seniority in the Assembly does not correlate with the amount of contributions legislators raise. About 30 percent of the first time legislators are ranked in the bottom 20 percent on the list and only 7 percent on the top 20 percent. More than half of the second-term legislators made it to the top 40 percent of the list. On the other hand, those who serve more than 5 terms are ranked at the bottom, in terms of the amount of political contributions they raised. In relation to party affiliations, the availability of the two major party legislators' campaign funds is pretty

similar but the independent legislators tend to raise less than the major party members, and no one was ranked in the top 20 percent category. Eleven minority party members, out of 34 in total, did raise quite a large sum of money.

Maintaining a local network and preparing for the next election as a non-elected official is even more costly and challenging than as an incumbent legislator. Progressive third parties are more active in nominating women candidates, but they have a hard time maintaining the network due to the low prospects of getting elected in the majoritarian/plurality voting system. Many women with the minor party affiliation found it difficult to remain in local politics, especially since the likelihood of winning the election is very slim in the current majoritarian voting system. Even after the electoral defeat, in order to maintain the local network to run again in four years one needs to be independently wealthy and well-connected. It is harder to maintain that resources for women than men. So a lot of women in the district quit before running again in the next election [Interviewee #23]. Another member from the same third party shared an observation on why it is expensive to be in politics:

> I do not know exactly, but I heard that you need to be on the right line, not to be stingy with buying meals, bringing presents, sponsoring events…people usually do not bring an exorbitantly high amount of money as it will be easy to trace and be reported…One of acquaintances of mine who works for a National Assembly member from the Democratic Party once told me that [his/her] legislator does not do that, only looks at the person's qualification [when selecting people as a staff or recommending people for positions]. This implies that everyone else does [Interviewee #22].

These interviews show the role of money in politics, from more legitimate and legal use of money for legislative activities to more underground activities which legislators are expected to perform due to political culture and to maintain personal networks. PR members have a harder time raising contributions due to legal limits and also due to less privilege their position confers compared to their SMD peers, which will be discussed in the next section. Women are less well-connected and overall raise fewer contributions than their male counterparts. Being short on political funding, PR members, women, and third party candidates face challenges to be competitive in the political arena.

Theme 2. Invisible Hierarchy between SMD and PR Members in the Assembly and in the Parties

The most prominent political cleavage of South Korea is based on the geographic regions. The *Saenuri* Party enjoys high level of support from the Southeast part of the country (the *Gyongsang* Province), the Democratic Party has a strong support base on the Southwest region of the *Jolla* Province, and the metropolitan Seoul area is considered a "swing" region. The two major political parties appeal to voters by focusing on this regional cleavage rather than the issue or interest group based mobilization, commonly seen in the PR system. The mixed system in this heavily region-based political climate renders PR members a unique status in the Assembly – they are considered "second-class" members in the national legislature and the party [Interviewee #3]. These differences in perceived prestige between tiers in the mixed system are also observed in Japan and Taiwan: Timothy Rich (2012) wrote that some Japanese legislators he interviewed described "using Olympics imagery, interviews with legislators in Japan identified district legislators as 'gold medalists' with the party list and

dual-listed candidates who lose in the district but saved on the list (so called 'zombie legislators') relegated to silver and bronze respectively" (Rich 2012, 3).

Women can initially enter the Assembly through the gender quotas as PR members, but major parties' nomination rules limit PR members from serving more than one term in the PR seats, besides exceptional cases such as being a party leader around the election campaigning season such as Rep. Geun-Hye Park of the *Saenuri* Party (who was later elected to the presidency), Rep. Myung-sook Han and Rep. Jong-In Kim of the Democratic Party. In order for the PR members to continue their political career, they need to win district-tier elections and become SMD members. However, establishing their own local support network as a PR member, which will be a strong predictor of their success in the SMD bid, is challenging for a couple of reasons, including the money factor examined in the previous section.

The formal and informal political institutions are mandated by rules and culture which favor masculine mode of interaction and networking. Due to this implicit institutional bias, women have a harder time being a part of the existing political network. Interviewees pointed out the limited access to resources such as local and national party leadership positions, strong societal network (high school and university alumni networks), and the practice of discriminatory district assignment for PR members, which contribute to PR members, and specifically women's, low likelihood of success.

2.1 Access to the National and Party Leadership Position

Some interviewees pointed out that lack of powerful women party leaders poses a pipeline problem in the political party for women politicians' careers. Major parties reserve one deputy party head position for women, and one of the two spokesperson positions goes to a

woman [Interviewee #12]   but women party members rarely assume "powerful"

committees' leadership roles, such as the budget, personnel, and planning committees

[Interviewees #8, #12, #15, #22]. One of the first steps candidate aspirants usually take is to

apply for a precinct committee leadership position – a springboard to get nominated for the

SMD candidacy – as it opens up access to the local networks and secures name recognition

and privilege, but PR women rarely get the position (W.-H. Kim, Lee, and Kim 2012; P.

Yoon 2015). The selection process of a precinct committee person involves both public

opinion polls in the precinct to gauge the level of name recognition and local mobilization,

as well as the screening by the national party committee through reviewing their résumé and

the interviews. Therefore, having high visibility and name recognition at the national level

alone cannot guarantee a local leadership position (P. Yoon 2015).

Precincts usually have already established networks around the district's SMD

incumbent, so it is challenging for newcomers to create an alternative support group;

aligning with a new person would have consequences for the people in the local political

scene so the local political actors are usually cautious about changing their loyalty. The SMD

member has a power to nominate candidates for the local elections of the same precinct, so

there is a strong hierarchical, patron-client relationship between the incumbent national

assembly member and the local elected officials, such as city councilperson or local

legislative members. They volunteer for the local party activities and events and support the

SMD incumbent. They also help election campaigns of the National Assembly member if

he/she runs for reelections.

They are not only at the giving-end, though; the local members sometimes request

financial support for their retreats (which is not actually legal) to the incumbent or those

who are trying to establish their own network. If they refuse, the local groups retaliate by

hurting their reputation or spreading rumors [Interviewee #26]. As the local political scene is constructed around the National Assembly incumbent, a newcomer has a hard time getting into the network; sometimes a newcomer faces a hostile interaction with the local stakeholders who want to protect their turf [Interviewees #8, #28]. It is common for major parties to nominate candidates who lack a local support base for the national legislative election due to their unique contribution to the political party's campaign strategy, such as to attract young voters or other minorities. Subsequently, those who have strong local base who did not get a nomination due the outside newcomers (or the "parachutes" from the central party) leave the party and run as independents. They also make it difficult for the new appointed person to mobilize the local party networks [Interviewee #2 and Rep. Young-Gyo Seo during the participant observation #27].

One of the interviewees' story illustrates this complicated local dynamic. As a woman in her 20s running for a national seat, Interviewee #28 attracted a lot of media attention at the national level. She got a nomination from the *Saenuri* Party, which utilized her image as a novelty to appeal to younger voters who do not usually support the conservative party. Even then-party head, now impeached President Geun-Hye Park, supported her candidacy and canvassed with her in the precinct she was running. She is an example of a candidate who has national-level name recognition and the support from the national party but who lacks a local base. The party used her to fight the image of a party for dominantly old, male supporters. The party appointed her to leadership positions after the election to promote the new images of the party.

During the interview, she shared several occasions she was challenged by the local political machine. When she attended local events during the campaign season to meet voters – to give her "the cold shoulder" and embarrass her – the event organizers close to

her contender did not prepare a seat for her on the stage. Some local politicians mocked her, saying a "baby" like her should go home and "eat snacks," which is a phrase used to mock adults due to its association with kids. After she had been defeated by the opposition party candidate, the national party nominated her as the present party leader, which ignited a strong opposition from the local party members [Interviewee #28]. In the meeting to discuss the agenda to appoint Ms. Sohn to be the next local party chair, about 7 out of 10 local party leaders did not attend the meeting to show their disagreement with the decision. Most of the absentees were anti-President Geun-Hye Park's faction members who were close to Mr. Je-won Jang, the main competitor against Ms. Sohn (Impeter News 2012). Her competitor was resentful that the party nominated Ms. Sohn as the local party chairpersonship, so he wrote to the national party to challenge the decision [Interviewee #28].

> Even during the national election campaign, the former legislator Mr. Je-Won Jang's supporters did not help my campaigns [even though she was nominated by the party] and I had to organize local networks from scratch and started from the beginning. Local politicians and key players did not help anyone until the election was over, because they were afraid to be in the wrong group and afraid of the backlash after the election in case they did not help the "right" person…Mr. Jang owns two universities in the district and everything on the university campus is related to the Board…from catering service to even installing vending machines on campus, many people in the district are contractors of the universities. If Mr. Jang knows that someone with a contract on campus is helping my campaign, he terminates the

contract. When I picked competent people to work for my campaign, he

overbid and took the people to his camp [Interviewee #28].

The local electorates do not appreciate the strategic nomination by the national party

organization (more in Chapter 5), as they question what the candidate has contributed to the

local community. Also, the existing local party networks gets disrupted due to this conflict

between the new group and the existing group [Interviewees #8 and #10]. The political

parties are well aware of these conflicts and make strategic decisions when nominating

candidates without strong local support base, which is not always successful.

Even though a PR member has national-level name recognition for his/her

contribution in their own field, they do not always enjoy a high-level visibility among the

voters or a strong support network among the local political stakeholders. The PR members

I interviewed expressed their frustration that local activities and political mobilization is a

totally different game than their legislative activities in *Yoido*, the part of Seoul where the

National Assembly is located [Interviewees #1 and #13]. During their legislative term, PR

members are busy drafting bills; by the time they need to decide if they want to continue to

pursue their political career, the favorable districts with high level of support for their parties

are likely to have been claimed by other potential candidates already [Interviewee #12].

Usually female PR members are recruited for their experience and expertise

in law, journalism, medicine, welfare, or women's movement…on the local

level, however, network formed around the alumni association, marital or

familial ties, or regional ties are stronger…if you are not a member of

women's associations, the Korea Green Mother, or if you do not live in the

area or have kids, your appeal to the voters is weak. During the 18th election

campaign, she [the interviewee's boss] faced a lot of limitations in the district,

even though she started the district activities in 2005…when Rep. Kim

visited local events, aldermen and councilmen initially treated her like an

outcast; it was imperative to make them to be on her side. She could not

ignore or disdain them but respect and take good care of them to have a

synergy effect. Make sure to assign "your" people to be in every stage of

decision-making process [Interviewee #7].

In order to win nominations in the district, the candidate-hopefuls need not only personal

networks with key players but also should be able to mobilize a large number of voters

which are usually done by "buying votes" for the primaries, which is not legal but a prevalent

practice:

Securing party members who can be your supporters is critical in organizing

local networks. Mr. Jang owns a couple of universities in the city, so he visits

college classrooms and ask the students to raise their hands if they live in the

district. And then he hands in the party membership forms and the money

worth 6 months of membership dues – if you pay 2000KRW for 6 months,

you become a loyal party member. So he hands out 20000KRW. It is very

common to "buy" party members this way [Interviewee #28].

I also work on promoting party membership in my district. Some people may

criticize this as privatizing political parties or corruption, but I think it has

positive elements in that this practice expands the support base and the party

membership…I need to recruit them by the end of July so they can maintain

their membership for 6 months and be eligible to participate in the

primaries…some local players approach the candidate hopefuls and ask for a

favor in return for them helping the people mobilize the potential party

members [Interviewee #2].

As 30 percent of the nomination consideration is based on the public

opinion polls on the local party members, currently those who are planning

to run for the legislative elections are working on finding local constituents

who would join the party and vote for them during the primaries. The

monthly membership fee is not a lot – 2000KRW – so it is common to

"buy" the party members…persuade them to fill out the membership form

and pay the dues on behalf of them [Interviewee #11].

Having a prior connection to the district is critical to win the local leadership position

and/or the candidate nomination. If one does not have an apparent "connection", such as

alumni networks, the district being her or her family's hometown, having a business there, he

or she needs to make one years ahead of the election season [Interviewee #19]. Holding

local party leadership positions is critical in forming one's support group which is

instrumental in winning a nomination and an election, and also the experience increases

one's reputation in the local and the national political scene. Thus, women and PR members'

limited success in winning local party leadership undermines their prospects in continuing

political career once their PR terms are over.

2.2 "The Sacrificial Lamb" – District Assignment Practices for PR Members Seeking SMD Elections

When the PR members express their willingness to run for the upcoming SMD elections, the party leaders expect them to run in unfavorable districts. As the PR members have already benefitted from the party's appointment and won the "bloodless battle," the logic goes, the PR members should sacrifice themselves and run in the unlikely district to bring one more seat for the party Interviewee #2, #7, #8, #10, #21, but #1 disagreed]. A female PR member's experience, whose legislative staff I interviewed, illustrates that this is an especially tough challenge to surmount for female PR members. She assumed a local party leadership position, an enormous feat for a PR member. Nevertheless, after serving as the local committee leader for a year, she announced that she would not run for SMD elections, citing health issues.

In reality, as her staffer told me, the district was not favorable to her party and she did not see the possibility of winning the election, in spite of expending resources and time on securing a local support network. She initiated an effort to build a local base as a PR member and the party made an unusual step to nominate the PR woman to a local leadership position. Yet it was clear to her that a victory was unlikely. Before coming to the Assembly, she was independently wealthy, thanks to her business success; still, maintaining the local network proved costly [Interviewee #11]. This discriminatory party's nomination practice supports the "sacrificial lamb" theory, which argues that women are less likely to win the elections than men because political parties nominate women candidates to districts with little chance of winning or to districts where popular incumbents run for reelection, thus "satisfying a desire to demonstrate diversity to the public while saving more winnable seats for male candidates" (K. A. Dolan 2004, 41).

Theme 3. The Culture of Heavy Drinking

Interestingly, numerous interviewees mentioned the importance of networking through alcohol [#2, #5, #7, #10, #19, #22]. The culture of high volume alcohol consumption and the critical role alcohol plays in the social setting is one of the factors contributing to the male-oriented political network and "old boys' club." This is not unique to Korea – Jo Freeman discusses how American parties in the early 1900s developed from "social clubs in the nineteenth-century saloon" and for women political party members, "alcohol would not be the glue that held them together" thus created alternative party organizations (Freeman 2000, 153–54).

> Despite Prohibition, it would take many years to separate politics from male social rituals, in particular that of alcohol consumption. In the 1940s, Katherine St. George was told she could not become chairman of the Orange County (N.Y.) Republican Party because she "won't be able to go into the saloons with the boys." As late as 1970 a Chicago alderman told two female political scientists that women were handicapped as members of the City Council because so much of its business was discussed in bars, often at night. In his mind politics and the saloon were both part of the male domain (Freeman 2000, 160).

Interviewees agreed that women have a hard time being a part of this network, due to gendered norms on social activities and drinking. In general, women do not feel comfortable staying outside of home until late hours and drinking with men, as women are more likely to have responsibilities at home. More importantly, drinking until late at night with men can harm the women's reputation (and sometimes marriage), as people question their modesty and decency as "respectable" women, both married and unmarried. If the person is not

married, she is even more susceptible to badmouthing than married women. Much networking and decision-making is done in informal settings, which usually involves alcohol, and women are excluded from this masculine culture. Not only the late-night drinking, but the other common local mobilization activities, such as local hiking groups, retreats, and alumni networks, are dominated by male members [Interviewee #2].

[How did you get a nomination for a district where you do not have any connection? It is not your hometown, you did not go to school there or you had business in the district] I knew the district would be separated in two and a new district would be created. So I was getting ready to run for nomination. I met Rep. *** in a private setting a couple of times, and socialized with journalists and the alderman of the area. I bought a lot of drinks multiple times to them, and asked to give me a position as a legal advisor of the district to the aldermen. [Don't you think this kind of nomination process and the networking is gendered? I do not think a single woman like me can call people and offer drinks]. Yes, people will think you are crazy. [How about a married woman?] even crazier…among men, drinking together is a strong bonding experience [Interviewee #19].

Even though you may not like to drink, the situation dictates that you drink with people pretty frequently whenever and wherever you go…it is hard to decline the offer or not to drink when all the others drink…when you meet and talk with reporters, you go drink at a bar, not going to a fancy steakhouse, you know? In that aspect, as you mentioned earlier, men do have an advantage in meeting people with various background and socialize…also

when a woman is too opinionated, vocal, or ambitious, people do not like

her…I have seen many instances like that [Interviewee #5].

Women may face difficulties in recruiting supporters because hiking clubs or

alumni network are the major route to recruit and maintain supports in the

district…Establishing and maintaining network is physically demanding…the

majority of the people socialize and drink until late at night and establish a

rapport with the voters and other party members through it. For men it is

less challenging to stay out until late and to hang out with people until the

wee hours but not so much as a woman [Interviewee #2].

Men organize and attend drinking gathering often to be close to each

other…also as there are a lot of male-only informal groups they go to

commercial sexual establishments to rub shoulders. Even though this is less

common than in the past, I am not sure if at the local level people completely

stopped doing it. I guess some still do it tacitly…through these activities men

develop strong bonding while women are excluded from it…so it is not easy

for women to be a part of the network. Party members had similar concerns

when we were the Democratic Labor Party [Interviewee #22].

Also, a female interviewee shared her experience with unwanted touching and being forced

to stay until the whole party was over:

When you meet the local constituents, you should get used to "physical

intimacy" – I literally mean physical. That means women will encounter

unwanted touching. Even if you are a national legislator, the local senior

people do not care. Regardless of your physical attractiveness…some people

even ask you to hug them…and you cannot avoid or run away from it. Some

come and shake hands and very naturally come and hug me, unexpectedly. In

that case you cannot escape from it because they are voters…There are many

unpleasant things happening in those gatherings. For example, people urge

you to drink more or touch you, or not letting you go home when it is really

late…asking me why I have not married or if they may contact me later for

meeting or something like that…but you need to just laugh away, and still

need to be firm. It is not easy [Interviewee #22].

These interviewees show that socializing and establishing a network – through drinking,

buying votes and fighting unfavorable treatment by the local establishment – follow a

challenging unwritten rule women have to navigate in the political arena. Through these

exclusively male social circles and drinking occasions, favors are exchanged and the sense of

community is formed. The gendered norms which sexualize women and discourage them

from being "too active" in these activities, prevent women from gaining social and political

capital to be successful in their political careers.

Theme 4. Opportunities for Women in the District – "Positive" Stereotypes of Women

Many interviewees confirmed the national and local politics is a gendered place, and women

in general experience lack of access to power, resources, or networks. However, "positive"

gender stereotypes work in favor of women and some play their strengths to gain support

from the voters, and some women use a more "feminine" leadership style and emphasize

their policy interests in traditionally feminine issue areas.

Men "do politics" through drinking, eating and socializing, while women spend their time studying policies to draft bills, and preparing for the committee meetings. Some men joke that they need to propose a bill to limit time female PR legislators can spend on studying! As men do not study the bills as much as women do, they ended up following women's arguments during the Legislative Committee meetings [Interviewee #26].

Men are busy meeting and drinking with people. They need to brag and think more about how they are perceived by others, they need to follow and meet "powerful" people…while men go out meeting party leaders and "hotshots", I spend time meeting dozens of constituents in my district, especially "mothers". That is a better use of time and more meaningful [Interviewee #27, Rep. Young-Gyo Seo].

I was ignored a lot in my district because I am young and I am a woman. Some even told me "go and eat snacks [which is similar to "go drink more mom's milk]". It was very challenging to participate in the local political scene as it revolves around old men's network. I was bullied and left out. However, citizens in the district found me relatable and approachable. They treated me as they do their daughters and gave me advice when they are not happy with how things are going on in politics. I think that is an advantage of being a young woman [Interviewee #28].

As women are more approachable and amiable in general, so it works for women's favor when they interact with senior citizens in the local districts [Interviewee #11].

When it comes to building local networks, men do have advantages in establishing networks in the masculine setting. However, women have strengths when interacting with senior citizens. When they meet seniors they massage their shoulders and foot [which is a gesture of love and caring in the Korean context, usually done by children to their parents or grandparents] and these gestures are well-taken and touch their heart; some of the elderly say "even my own kids to not treat me well like this". Of course the majority of the networking is done in a masculine way but women also have some advantages [Interviewee #13].

These interviews support the existing literature that maintains some gender stereotypes positively affect women's political success in elections (Black and Erickson 2003; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003). Some women can successfully establish a strong rapport with the voters and "run as a woman" (K. A. Dolan 2005, 31) by playing positive gender-based stereotypes and emphasizing issue areas such as education, poverty, and welfare, in which women are deemed to be more competent. Nevertheless, local party leaders and key players are almost all men, which makes it hard for women to have access to these positions [Interviewee #8]. Some newcomers to the local political scene experience difficulty being accepted by the existing establishment who does not want to let these women establish their own support network, as reviewed in the previous section.

Conclusion

Interviews with the former and current legislators and their staffers provide insights into career interruptions and terminations of PR members, especially women, in spite of

having prior political experience as incumbent National Assembly members. The interviewees' responses show the high cost involved with establishing and maintaining local networks, and how the masculine way of local networking undermines the potential power the women's movement can play in empowering women.

The major political parties expect PR members to focus on writing bills rather than establishing local networks, because the parties appointed them for their policy expertise. In addition, assuming the national party leadership positions and the local party's precinct committee leadership positions as PR members is unlikely, due to the informal rules that prioritize seniority and SMD members. This pattern is dissimilar to what O'Brien and Rickne (2016) find on the Swedish Social Democratic Party, where the gender quotas expanded the pool of women who were perceived to be fit for party leadership positions.

This qualitative analysis fleshes out the statistical findings I examine in Chapter 2. One of the major findings from the quantitative analysis is the gender of the candidate is less important than being a major party candidate or running in a favorable district. Second, candidates' PR memberships do not translate well into electoral victories for SMD seats, and third, women experience unfavorable district assignments and usually run as challengers against the incumbent. The interviews analyzed in this chapter show the incredible barriers PR members and female politicians have to surmount to survive the local politics and win a nomination. Therefore, it is not surprising that once these women win the nomination after overcoming all the troubles, their success rate is as high as men's, as I demonstrate in Chapter 2. The limited access to financial resources and leadership positions, overtly discriminatory district assignment practice for PR members, and the emphasis on drafting bills without geographically defined support group can explain why the majority of PR members experience political career interruption and termination after their terms are over.

Chapter 4. Who Represents Women's Interests? Women-Friendly Bill Sponsorship in the South Korean National Assembly, 2000-2016

Introduction

In the previous chapters, I examine reasons for numerical underrepresentation of women in the National Assembly, focusing on the candidate nomination and the election stages. Once women are elected, however, what do they actually deliver? Does the gender of legislators influence their legislative activities? In this chapter, I assess the relationship between the descriptive and substantive representation of women. I analyze the national lawmakers' legislative activities, focusing on their women-friendly bill (WFB) sponsorship activities. Who proposed WFB and why did they push these agendas in the National Assembly? Does gender affect one's policy priorities, controlling for other factors? As the number of female legislators increases, do we see more cooperation among them or less? I answered these questions using statistical analysis and interviews with former and current legislators, activists, scholars, and political party members.

During my field work in July 2015, one of the interviewees told me that 144 women's organizations were planning a press conference to demand mandated 30 percent candidate gender quotas for the district-tier, National Assembly elections in the following year.[10] On July 16th around 11:00 am, I arrived at E-Room Center, a vocational training facility run by the Korean Disabled People's Institute, where the press conference was scheduled. The center was in a five-minute's walking distance from the National Assembly building. The seminar room was in the basement of the Center; I found a seat and looked around. There were 12 people sitting in the audience, but I could not if they were journalists

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[10] This is listed as #20 in the interviewee list in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1.).

or the staffers from the organizations represented. The conference was started by calling the names of the 13 representatives from the 12 organizations present; even though 114 organizations signed the statement, not all of the organizations sent a representative to the press conference.

The head of the Korean Women's Association United, Ms. Geum-Ok Kim, was the first presenter. She opened her brief presentation by commenting on the poor attendance at the press conference which indicated how indifferent the political parties and the national legislators were to the issue of women's political representation. Also, she continued, this was a sign that the women's movement was fragmented, which made the political establishment not consider women's movement as a serious negotiation partner. She was pessimistic that any changes they proposed would be adopted before the upcoming elections.

The second presenter, Dr. Eunjoo Kim from the Center for Korean Women and Politics, argued that the women's organizations needed to focus on expanding the number of PR seats in the Assembly in order to increase the number of female legislators. The current gender quotas are only applicable to PR seats, and it is unlikely for the political parties to adopt effective gender quotas for the SMD contest. Thus, increasing the number of PR seats will be the only viable option to elect more women to the national legislature. The last presenter, Ms. Mi-kyung Ko from the Korea Women's Hot Line, argued for adopting the mandatory 30 percent candidate gender quotas for the district-tier elections, with sanctions for non-compliance. She also suggested that strategic, top-down nomination process should be adopted to nominate more women candidates, as primaries disadvantage women. The press conference ended in 20 minutes.

The press conference did not attract a sizeable crowd, even though it was a short five-minute walk from the National Assembly and close to the two major parties' headquarters. No political party members nor the current legislators attended the conference. After the event, I came back to the National Assembly building to meet two interviewees [#18 and #19]. I asked them why there were no reporters from the major news media, nor any party members and the national legislators – the target of these women's organizations messages. Their response was firm and similar: the political establishment does not care about women's organizations.

The interviewees expressed deep disappointment with the women's organizations. What happened to the women's movement? The 2004 legislative elections were a watershed for the history of South Korean women's political participation. It was the first legislative election in which the mandatory 50 percent gender quotas for the PR seats were in effect. Women's organizations such as the "Women's Alliance for the 17th General Election" (*sip-chil-dae chongsuneul wihan yeosung yeondae*), which is composed of 32 women's organizations, played a critical role in the process of adopting the quotas. They also contributed to amending the Political Fund Act to mandate that 10 percent of the government subsidies to political parties should be spent on parties' efforts and programs to support women's political engagement (W.-H. Kim 2008; Korea Women Parliamentarians Network 2013; Y.-I. Lee 2015). The major party leadership, however, shared with me their frustration and disillusionment with the women's movement. According to them, the former activists who were elected to the PR positions through the gender quotas did not work closely with the political party's women's bureau nor strongly advocate for advancing women's representation in the parties or in the Assembly. The interviewees argued that the women who entered the political arena through gender quotas have not made a difference; "what

have the PR women done for women?" The interviewees asked me. Some of other interviewees also echoed similar negative evaluations on women legislators throughout the fieldwork. When I raised the question of women's contribution to the Assembly or interviewees' views on female legislators, negative assessments were returned. Are these evaluations fair?

Some female legislators intentionally distance themselves from feminist issues including measures to nominate and elect more women: in order to be an "insider," some women want to appear as more "serious" and "objective" legislators, not as a narrowly defined "female legislators." This causes hostilities among female legislators, as some feel "betrayed" by their female peers. Also, the interviews reveal that there are at least three divisions among different groups of women: 1) between women's movements and women's bureaus in major political parties (and minor parties are neglected), 2) among female legislators, and 3) among women's movements by their ideological orientation. I argue that women's status as a political minority hinders realizing women's substantive representation through the collective action among women and men sharing the cause of women's political empowerment.

Theories on Substantive Representation

Meaning of Substantive Representation

Do female legislators stand up and act for women? Does electing more women to the legislature lead to more women-friendly policies proposed? A longstanding and highly contested debate about the impact of women's presence in politics is critical, as the justification of political empowerment of women is partly dependent on the answer to these

questions. Hanna Pitkin's *The Concept of Representation* (1967) is one of the earliest attempts to explore the meaning of representation. Pitkin discussed four views on representation: formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation, and substantive representation. Pitkin's discussion of representation has provided a conceptual framework for subsequent studies, which applied, expanded, and challenged each view on representation. More importantly, various analyses have tried to find a relationship between these four aspects of representation, especially how an increased level of descriptive representation of women promotes their substantive representation.

Descriptive representation implies that "the composition of representative institutions should mirror the composition of the represented in important respects" (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, 408). Descriptive representatives are "individuals who in their own backgrounds mirror some of the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of belonging to the group" (Mansbridge 1999, 628). They are considered to represent the represented not only because of their "visible characteristics" which define their group [e.g. gender or race/ethnicity] but also because of their [assumed] "shared experiences" (Mansbridge 1999, 629). The descriptive representatives are expected to bring in the collective opinion of their groups, therefore, the legislative can reflect the opinion of the entire electorate (Pitkin 1967).

The substantive view of representation had not been explicitly discussed before Hanna Pitkin (1967). Different from the other three views on representation, substantive representation theorists pay attention to what a representative does for the represented (Pitkin 1967). According to Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler (2005), "the most common interpretation is that substantive representation refers to policy responsiveness or the extent to which representatives enact laws and implement policies that are responsive to

the needs or demands of citizens" (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005, 409). Only can this substantive view provide criteria to assess if one is a good or bad representative; a criterion which is missing in the other views of representation (Pitkin 1967).

The most often studied view of representation is arguably descriptive representation and its effect on substantive representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Challenging Pitkin's argument that descriptive representation does not guarantee the representatives to act for the represented (Pitkin 1967), a number of studies have provided empirical evidence that many female legislators do feel an obligation to represent women constituents and prioritize women-friendly agendas in their legislative portfolios, and having more women in legislatures leads to more policy responsiveness to women (Bratton and Ray 2002; Caiazza 2004; S. Carroll 2000; Childs 2002; Crowley 2004; J. Dolan 1998; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2008; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Saint-Germain 1989; Schulze 2013; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Swers 2013; Tamerius 1995; S. Thomas and Welch 1991).

Descriptive Model and Constituency Model

How do the representatives understand what the represented want? In other words, how can we measure substantive representation? Regarding factors affecting lawmakers' legislative priorities, existing literature presents two competing models, namely the descriptive representation model and the constituency model. The descriptive representation model stresses the importance of legislators' experiences in determining one's legislative behaviors, thus factors such as gender and race affect the legislative behaviors (Bratton and Haynie 1999). In measuring substantive representation, existing studies have operationalized the concept in various ways: measures such as bill initiation and passage related to women, families, and children (Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003; S. Thomas 1991), roll-call voting

records on women's issues bills (Swers 1998), and spending in areas related to women (Schulze 2013; Towns 2003).

However measured, studies have demonstrated that women's descriptive representation is related to higher level of women's substantive representation. Studies based in the U.S. show that legislators' gender is a strong predictor of supporting women-friendly policies in the House of Representatives. This gender difference in bill sponsorship activities still remains even after controlling the factor of district and political party affiliation (Bratton and Haynie 1999). Similarly, women are more likely to introduce WFB to the floor than their male predecessors who are from the same party representing the same district during the 104th – 107th U.S. House of Representatives, even after for controlling party affiliation and the voters' opinions on the gender issues in his/her districts (Gerrity, Osborn, and Mendez 2007).

Empirical studies have shown that many female legislators do feel obligated to represent women constituents and prioritize women-friendly agendas in their legislative portfolios, and having more women in legislatures leads to more policy responsiveness to women. Even conservative female legislators in the UK and Australia take more liberal stances on "morality politics" issues such as reproductive rights and same-sex marriage (Plumb 2016). According to this model, therefore, the gender identity of a legislator is a meaningful indicator of one's legislative priorities, and electing more women to the legislature will lead to more women-friendly laws proposed (if not passed). Female House members sponsored more social welfare and feminist issue bills compared to their male predecessors or successors of their districts, which provides a strong support for the descriptive representation over the constituency model (MacDonald and O'Brien 2011).

Childs and Krook (2012) examined mandate effects and label effects to analyze how women's path to election (through quotas vs. non quotas) adds to or influences the pressure they may experience in representing women as representatives. Mandate effect refers to citizens' and legislators' expectation that women who were elected after the gender quotas would promote women's interests more so than the women elected prior to the quotas. Label effect means that gender quotas stigmatize the legislators who were elected when the gender quotas are in effect, as they were perceived to have been elected more through quotas rather than merits (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012, 11). Analyzing the female legislators affiliated with the Labor Party of United Kingdom, they concluded that female legislators gradually overcome the initial label effect as they accumulate experience, and the stigma of being quota women wanes, thus empowering them to act on behalf of women (Childs and Krook 2012).

The descriptive model, however, cannot explain why some male legislators support and propose bills on issues traditionally associated with women's rights. Moreover, not all female legislators identify themselves as "women's representatives" nor focus exclusively on women-friendly issues in their legislative agendas; other factors such as legislators' age, districts' characteristics, and legislative committee membership affect the total number of WFB introduced by each member (Barnello and Bratton 2007; Bratton and Haynie 1999). Moreover, even when women legislators state their interests in proposing gender-equality bills, electoral rules, the culture of parliaments, and party affiliation make it hard for female legislators follow their stated interests in promoting women's interests. Childs and Krook (2006) argue that the number of women in national legislatures is a weak predictor of women-friendly policy outcomes. Rather, presence of active individual policy entrepreneurs who have interests in making women-friendly policy gains can be a better predictor of

women's substantive representation (Childs and Krook 2006). Having the sufficient number of female legislators with feminist leanings and working in a supportive environment for gender-parity ideas facilitate female legislators to push WFB (Grey 2006).

Legislators' seat type and electoral systems also influence legislative activities: legislators elected to the multi-member districts are more active in promoting women's issues than SMD members. This can be explained by the SMD members' need to manage districts, therefore they want to appeal to a broader range of voters instead of presenting themselves to be an advocate of narrowly-defined "women's issues" (Clark and Caro 2013). Moreover, "women" is not a homogenous group, therefore differences between women (Brown 2014; Celis et al. 2008) and "non-left, non-feminist and male MP's role in women's substantive representation" should be also considered (Celis and Erzeel 2015, 45).

The constituency model, however, hypothesizes that lawmakers consider the prospects of re-election, thus variables such as preferences of districts they represent or their parties' issue concerns determine their legislative behaviors. Susan Carroll (2000) argued that female legislators' personal support for women-friendly policies could not always affect their legislative activities, due to the differences between the ideological orientation of their districts and that of their own. Congresswomen whose districts do not share the same ideological views on certain women-related issues, "very clearly experienced a 'tug and pull' between their own preferences and those of their district" (S. Carroll 2000, 9).

Gender Stereotypes

From these insights, some researchers have examined how factors such as race or gender interact with party affiliation, and how party's reputation and association with strengths or weaknesses in certain issues mediate female legislators' capacities to work to push women-

related policy agenda. Also, voters assume that female candidates are better at handling "feminine issues" such as social security, welfare, or education, while male candidates are expected to be better at handling "masculine" issues such as crime, economic growth, security, or foreign affairs. In terms of political ideology, liberal parties are assumed to be more capable of handling these "feminine" issues, while conservative parties are considered to be apt to address "masculine" issue areas (Genovese 2013; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes 2003; Murray 2010b; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Swers 2013). These gender stereotypes interact with party stereotypes and affect voters' evaluation of political candidates, not only in legislative elections but also in executive elections, and legislators are aware of these gendered expectations from the voters.

For example, Miguel's study shows that Brazilian female legislators are less successful in their legislative initiatives than their male colleagues, and women tend to focus on social justice issues when men do on the economy and infrastructure (Miguel 2012). In the U.S., the Republican women do not gain as much as Democratic women when focusing on women's issues due to the party's general stance on women-related issues. On the other hand, the Republican Party's reputation as being strong on the national defense issues can ameliorate female legislators' perceived weakness in this "masculine" areas, thus benefitting the Republican women when they act on these issues (Swers 2013). Some studies focusing on the South Korean case have supported the claim that women and male legislators have different policy priorities. Female legislators have expressed their interests in issues related to women, family, and welfare (W.-H. Kim, Lee, and Kim 2007), and are more active in proposing bills on welfare, human rights, education, and women's issue areas than men (W.-H. Kim 2011; Korean Women's Development Institute 2013). Even at the local level, more and more bills on welfare and women's issues were introduced as a share of women in the

legislature increased from the 2.2 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2006 (W.-H. Kim, Yang, and Jeong 2009).

Status in the Assembly

Politics is a hierarchical space, as representatives "may differ in terms of prestige, influence, and ability to legislate successfully" (Miguel 2012, 104), which makes a difference in legislators' productivity, such as bill passage records. Miguel argued "women still face barriers in reaching high-status positions in the field of politics, and their effectiveness is therefore limited" (Miguel 2012, 104). However, the legislators' prestige and social capital is distributed not only along the gender line but also by the path to office. Examining Ugandan women MPs, Goetz (2002) suggest that the paths to power can influence substantive representation. Ugandan female legislators elected to the reserved seats bypass direct elections and selected by a patronage system. Thus their effectiveness in promoting a gender-equity agenda was low as "they [the women MPs] have not institutionalized a presence for themselves as legitimate" (Goetz 2002, 573).

Similarly, a study on three East Asian countries' mixed electoral system and its impact on legislators' behaviors shows how legislators won their seats can influence their legislative behaviors. According to Rich (2012), an invisible hierarchy exists between single member district members (SMD) and proportional representation (PR) members in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The SMD members are regarded to be more prestigious than PR members, as they are chosen directly by the voters unlike PR members who are elected through closed party lists. This grants SMD members more legitimacy in their legislative activities (Rich 2012). Hierarchy between SMD and PR members in Korea, however, seems to make a difference in terms of the bill passage rate rather than the number of bills

sponsored. In the 17th Assembly, PR members introduced 26 percent of total bills when the share of PR members is only 19 percent of the total seats. However, SMD members fared better than their PR peers in terms of the bill passage rate (Lee 2009).

Analyzing the bills initiated by legislators in the 16th and the 17th Assemblies of Korea, Min-jeong Kim also found that PR and SMD members had different issue foci (M. Kim 2011), even though she did not elaborate on the reasons or the patterns. However, the PR members and SMD members might have different policy interests even before getting elected, because PR candidates tend to be selected from professional and vocational associations. Or, PR women may feel obligations to represent women because they are "beneficiaries" of gender quotas, or conversely the PR women may seek not to focus on women's issues in order to avoid stigma (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). During my interview, only few identify themselves as legislators working to stand up for women's issues, and they emphasized that gender is not a strong factor in their legislative activities: Rep. Myung Shin and Rep. Hunjoo Min seemed to be the only one; the others avoided emphasizing their gender, such as Interviewee #26 and Rep. Kwon Eun-hee of the Democratic Party, whose staffers declined my interview request as, they argued, she was not elected because she was a woman.

Interestingly, the district factor has a meager impact on South Korean lawmakers' legislative activities. Interviewing legislators and their congressional staffs in the 17th Assembly, Jang-Su Kim (2006) argued that legislators perceive initiating bills to be ineffectual to their electoral prospects in the following election cycle. As very few people pay close attention to what kind of bills their district representatives introduce (J.-S. Kim 2006), the SMD members instead focus their resources on organizing and attracting support from their districts and assuming leadership positions in parties or legislature (Lee 2009).

Regardless of the contents of the bills, a party's relationship with the executive office influences the number of bills introduced by each legislator. In South Korea, the ruling party members have a communication channel with the executive office, or the party-government council, through which they express some of their legislative agendas. On the other hand, Assembly members from the opposition parties lack this direct access for them to negotiate with the government. Therefore, the members from the opposition party tend to propose the higher number of bills to the legislature compared to their counterparts in the ruling party (Kim 2006, Lee 2009 and the interview with #3). During the 17th Assembly, for example, members from the ruling party proposed 43.3 percent of all the bills while 56.7 percent of the bills were introduced by the legislators from the opposition parties (Lee 2009).

Comparing French deputies by age, profession, and experience, no gender gap surfaced in contributions to plenary sessions, the number of questions asked, or contributions to committees (Murray 2012). Women are as active and involved as men in the legislature. However, she acknowledges other factors including seniority, prior experience in the National Assembly affect the level of involvement and the types of activities the deputies undertake (Murray 2012):

> those who have been in the National Assembly longer are less likely to ask
> high numbers of questions. This may be because asking questions is a
> relatively simple task that does not require much seniority, while those with
> more experience may be more involved in demanding tasks, such as
> authoring reports and bills (Murray 2012, 37).

In South Korea, seniority has a negative relationship with the number of bills legislators sponsor, unlike in the United States. As most of PR members are the newcomers to the

Assembly, the factor of seniority may partly explain the productivity gaps between PR and SMD members (Lee 2009). In sum, the existing literature present two competing theories explaining which factors influence legislative activities: the descriptive representation model and the constituency model. This current study tests which theory better explains how and when women's interests are represented.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The current study is to compare the strengths of the descriptive representative model and the constituency model in explaining who proposes WFB. I examine how strong an effect gender is on the legislators' activities, to answer the consequences of promoting women to the position, and if having more gender diversity in the Assembly leads to more legislative activities related to women. I also explore how individual-level factors such as gender, party affiliation, committee membership, seat type, and seniority affect legislators' women-related bill sponsorship activities. Different from some of the previous studies, I examined not only the female legislators' legislative activities but focused on all the legislators to see who claim and advance women's substantive representation (following Celis et al. 2008).

I conducted three sets of analysis to assess the effects of various factors on women-related bill sponsorship activities. First, I examined women's WFB legislative activities. I compared PR women's legislative activities to SMD women's, to see the effect of seat type controlling for the effect of legislators' gender. And then, I tracked the female legislators' legislative activities who served more than one term, first as a PR member and then later as an SMD member[11], another way to control for the effect of gender and other personal

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[11] One female legislator, Rep. Myung-sook Han, served three terms, first as a PR then as an SMD and lastly as a PR. Serving more than one term as a PR is unusual, but she was the leader of her party and placed her name on the party PR candidate slate – which is an exception.

characteristics and see the effect of the seat type. Second, I compared male and female SMD members who were elected from the same district, to control the effect of district factor and check the effect of the legislators' gender. If the constituency model holds – which reveals the effect of constituents' preferences in forming legislators – there will be no significant differences in women and men from the same district in terms of the number of WFB. If legislators' gender identity is a significant factor, as the descriptive model argues, then I will see a gender gap in legislative portfolio. The first comparison is to compare the effect of the seat type on the women-related bill sponsorship activities, whereas the second analysis compares the effect of the gender while controlling for the district factors, as both men and women emerged from the same district. Lastly, I ran a statistical model including all the legislators who were elected between 2000 and 2016 to assess the effect of each variable controlling for the effects of other variables.

I hypothesize that female legislators are more likely to propose WFB than men are, and legislators from liberal parties are more likely to support WFB than those from conservative parties (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 2013), based on the constituency model. Comparing legislative activities of male and female legislators who are elected from the same districts in the different time, thus controlling the effect of district, I hypothesize that the female members are still more likely to propose WFB than their male predecessors or successors who emerge from the same district. I also expect that the PR members will be more active in promoting women's issue bills than their SMD counterparts. Political parties recruited the PR members to appeal to a wide range of voters, thus the PR women in general are expected to have stronger interests in women's issues than SMD members. As some studies focusing on South Korea demonstrated, PR members on average propose the higher number of bills than SMD members. The influence of the seat type on the legislative

behavior is analyzed as well. Lastly, being a member of either the Health, Welfare, and Family legislative committee or the Gender Equality legislative committee will increase the likelihood of proposing WFB.

H1 - PR members are more likely to propose WFB than SMD members.

H2 - Men with the Democratic Party or the Labor Party affiliation are more likely to propose WFB than women from the *Saenuri* or Freedom Advancement Party.

H3 - Members of the opposition parties are more likely to propose bills (but not necessarily WFB).

H4 - The number of terms a legislator serves has a positive correlation with the likelihood of proposing WFB.

Data, Variables, and Research Methods

I examined legislative activities of all members of the National Assembly, including those elected through by-elections, from the 16th to 19th Assemblies (2000-2016). I analyzed 1289 members' legislative activities from June 2000 to May 2012. From February 1998 to late February 2008 (when president starts his/her term), the center-left Democratic Party sent two presidents to the presidential office. Thus, during the 16th and the 17th Assemblies, legislators from the Democratic Party are marked as members of the ruling party. From late February of 2008 to February of 2013, the president was from the Grand National Party (currently the *Saenuri* Party), thus the members from this party who served in the 18th and the 19th Assemblies are coded as the ruling party members.

I reviewed the entire bill proposals uploaded on the Bill Tracking Database offered by the Korean National Assembly (The National Assembly Information System n.d.). I read

through the titles of the bills, the rationale for the proposal, and the main features of the

bills. I chose bills related to the following eight categories: 1) pregnancies, childbirth,

childcare, and maternity and paternity leave; 2) participation in decision making bodies and

political empowerment of women; 3) women's labor participation and unemployment, and

women's entrepreneurship; 4) domestic violence, sexual harassment and sexual violence; 5)

human trafficking and prostitution; 6) gender sensitivity budgeting and raising awareness

(gender budgeting, changing sexist customs and legal terms); 7) protecting minorities (lost

children, girls, immigrant women, women in fisheries and agriculture, etc.); 8) others

(organizing new administrative bodies in charge of gender equality issues, etc.).

These categories are selected based on the reports by the Gender Equality and

Family Committee of the National Assembly on assessment of the Convention on the

Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) published in 2011

(W.-H. Kim et al. 2011). I also modified categories to fit the bills I reviewed. In classifying

the bills, some bills could have been included in more than one category. In that case, I read

the features and motivation for the bill proposal and picked the category which best

describes and characterizes the bill. I also included bills aiming to address gender inequality

disadvantaging men, such as encompassing the subjects of victims of sexual harassment and

violence from only women to include both men and women, adopting paternity leave

policies, or expanding government benefits for single mothers to single fathers. However, I

excluded bills constraining women's rights. Even though some researchers argue against pre-

selecting issues for studying substantive representation (Celis 2013; Celis and Childs 2012), I

decided to use the CEDAW guideline as a proxy to WFB, as it is a guideline against which

the National Assembly's Gender Equality Committee evaluates its performance in gender

equality.

Data

I analyzed all the legislators' bill sponsorship record, not only women's. The total number of

bills sponsored by legislators has increased over the years, not only the bills related to women

(Table 4.1.). Legislators in the 16th Assembly introduced 1,890 bills; 6,106 in the 17th, and

11,564 bills during the 18th Assembly, and 15806 during the 19th Assembly. This shows the

shift of influence from the executive branch to the legislative branch, and its gain in more

checks and balances against the presidency and bureaucracy (Korean Women's Development

Institute 2013).

I sorted out women's issue bills, excluding the ones proposed by the same person but

to the different committees. The total number of 1029 women's issues bills proposed

between 2000 and 2016 were subject to the final analysis. The total of 1289 legislators were

included in the analysis, which encompass all the members elected between 2000 and 2016. I

referred to three volumes of *Kuk-Hoi Sa* (the Reference of the National Assembly History)

published by the National Assembly to obtain the list of legislators (National Assembly of

the Republic of Korea 2012, 2014). For the 19th Assembly, I complemented National

Assembly database with news article search to find out the committee assignment.

Statistical Model - Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM)

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the number of women's issue bills a legislator proposed in each

four-year legislative session. The average number of WFB a legislator proposed in each

legislative session is 0.8 (s.d. 2.02). Seventy percent of the legislators, or 901 members, did

not propose any WFBs, and 200 legislators (15.5 percent) proposed one bill. Two legislators

initiated 20 WFBs in one session, which is the highest number of bills proposed by a legislator. In the 16th Assembly, the total of 57 women's issue bills were proposed by 34 members, and 93 percent of men (271 out of 293) and 43 percent of women (10 out of 23) did not propose any WFBs. In the 17th Assembly, 313 WFB were proposed by 101 members, but 72.3 percent of men (203 out of 279) and 17 percent of women (8 out of 43) never proposed WFBs. In the 18th Assembly, 258 WFB were proposed by 132 legislators: 65.7 percent of men (188 out of 285) and 23.9 percent of women (11 women out of 45) never proposed women friendly bills. In the 19th Assembly, 297 WFB were proposed by 111 members, and 21 women out of 53 and 190 men out of 269 have never proposed WFBs (Table 4.1.).

This shows that the number of men and women proposing WFB increases over time; however, the share of WFBs to the total number of bills proposed to the Assembly has not increased significantly, except for a bump on the 17th Assembly. Between 2004 and 2008, which coincide with the progressive presidency, more than 80 percent of women legislators proposed at least one WFB. During this session, the absolute number and the share of WFB is the highest among the four sessions reviewed.

Table 4.1. The Number of WFB Proposed to the National Assembly, 2000-2016

Session	Total number of WFB/total number of bills proposed (%)	Male legislators with 0 WFB/total number of male legislators (%)	Female legislators with 0 WFB/total number of female legislators (%)
16th (2000-2004)	57/1890 (3%)	271/293 (92%)	10/23 (43%)
17th (2004-2008)	313/6106 (5%)	203/279 (73%)	8/43 (19%)
18th (2008-2012)	258/11564 (2%)	188/285 (66%)	11/45 (24%)
19th (2012-2016)	297/15806 (2%)	190/269 (71%)	21/53(40%)

Independent Variables

The independent variables are 1) the sex of a legislator; 2) liberal party affiliation; 3) the seat type (PR vs. SMD); 4) a dummy variable for the membership in either the Health or the Gender Equality committee; 5) the seniority; and 6) liberal party affiliation. All the data on these variables are available in the National Election Commission database (Korean National Election Commission 2016). To examine the effect of each variable on the number of women's issue bills, I analyzed the data using the Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM), a type of count models. The data had over-dispersion, thus NBRM is a better choice than the Poisson Regression Model (NRM) (Long and Freese 2006). Even though 901 observations, or 70 percent, of the observations are 0s, diagnostic tests show NBRM is a better choice over the zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression model for all four Assembly cycles.

As seen in Table 4.2., women comprise of 13 percent of the national legislators served between 2000 and 2016, and 20 percent of the legislators are PR members. About 43 percent of the elected were affiliated with liberal parties, including 525 members from the Democratic Party and 28 members from the Democratic Labor Party; 650 members from the conservative *Saenuri* Party (even though its name has changed frequently) and 39 members from more conservative Freedom Forward Party. Thirty-three members are affiliated with other minor parties, and 14 members are independent members with no party affiliation. About 20 percent of the legislators (249 out of 1289) have served on the Women, Family and Welfare legislative committee. During each four-year term, membership assignments are officially done twice: once in the first year and a shuffle in the 3rd year. Not all legislators stay in the same committee throughout; some leave and some join different committees during the term. To simplify the analysis, I counted legislators as a member of a committee, regardless of length of tenure.

The legislators serve 1.89 terms on average. Around 52 percent of them were the first term legislators, 24 percent of them were the second-term legislators, and 14 percent serving the third term, with the longest serving legislator with 9 terms. But, those who serve multiple terms between 2000 and 2016 are counted more than once. For example, a person who served for the first time in 2000 and reelected in 2004 will be counted as a first-time legislator in the 16th and a second-term legislator in the 17th Assembly (Table 4.2.)

Table 4.2. Summary of the Variables (16th - 19th Assemblies)

Variable	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Legislative Session	1289	17.51	1.11	16	19
Female	1289	0.13	0.33	0	1
PR	1289	0.2	0.4	0	1
Liberal Party	1289	0.43	0.5	0	1
Women, Family, and Welfare Committee	1289	0.19	0.39	0	1
Number of Term	1289	1.89	1.2	1	9
Number of WFB	1289	0.8	2.02	0	20
Ruling Party Member	1289	0.51	0.5	0	1
Opposition Party Member	1289	0.49	0.5	0	1
Party	*Saenuri* Party: 650, Dem: 525, Labor: 28, Freedom Forward: 39, Other minor parties: 33, Independent: 14				

Findings and Discussions

Overall Trend

As the number of female legislators increased, they became more actively involved in the legislative activities. From the 1st Assembly to the 11th Assembly, only one or two women proposed bills in each Assembly. In the 15th Assembly, however, 10 out of 12 female legislators (83 percent) initiated bills, and 18 out of 21 women (88 percent) did in the 16th Assembly (Korean Women's Development Institute 2013), and women and men do not have

a statistically significant differences in the total number of bills they sponsor (Lee 2009). Even though still small in number, female legislators have been more and more active in their legislative activities. During the first half of the 16th Assembly, male legislators sponsored 691 bills (93 percent of total) while women did only 51 bills (7 percent). In the first half of the 17th Assembly, however, men sponsored 2484 (79 percent of total) bills and women did 666 bills (21%). During the first half of the 18th Assembly, men proposed 5,050 bills (83 percent) and women initiated 1,005 bills (17 percent) (W.-H. Kim 2011).

As the number of female legislators increased, the legislative committee membership of the female legislators diversified. During the 16th Assembly, five standing legislative committees did not have a single female member; during the 18th Assembly, however, all the committees had at least one female legislator. This enabled female legislators' input in more diverse issues and in decision-making bodies (W.-H. Kim 2011).

First, I reviewed who proposed women's issue bills in each Assembly cycle. More than 70 percent of the legislators did not propose any WFB (Figure 4.1.), which moves the mean and distribution of the data hard to analyze. Therefore, I only included those who proposed at least one women's issue bills in plotting the box plots (Figure 4.3.). As the plots below show, the average number of women's issue bills in the 16th Assembly is lower than that of the later three sessions, when the share of women is the lowest among the four; however, the total number of bills proposed during the session is the lowest among the four sessions examined, and the share of WFB to the total number of bills proposed is even slightly higher than the 18th and the 19th Assemblies.

Figure 4.1. The Number of WFB by Legislators, 2000-2016

Women are on average more active in proposing WFB. Only 30 percent of women never

proposed any WFB whereas more than 70 percent of men did not. Also, the person with the

highest number of WFB proposed is a woman, and the average number of WFB per person

is higher among women than by men (Figure 4.2.).

Figure 4.2. The Number of WFB by Legislators by Gender, 2000-2016

Figure 4.3. Boxplots of the Number of WFBs Proposed by Each Legislator

Table 4.3. Top Two Legislators with the Highest Number of WFB Proposed

| Legislative Session	1st Ranked Legislator	2nd Ranked Legislator
16th Session (2000-2004)	(B)* Rep. Hong-shin Kim (Male, PR, *Saenuri*) Rep. Jeong-sook Kim (Female, PR, *Saenuri*)	(A) Rep. Kyung-cheon Kim (Female, SMD, Democratic)
17th Session (2004-2008)	(D) Rep. Kye-kyung Lee (Female, PR, *Saenuri*)	(C) Rep. Myung-ok Ahn (Female, PR, *Saenuri*)
18th Session (2008-2012)	(F) Rep. Choon-jin Kim (Male, SMD, Democratic)	(E) Rep. Sang-hee Kim (Female, PR, Democratic) Rep. Young-hee Choi (Female, PR, Democratic)
19th Session (2012-2016)	(H) Rep. In-soon Nam (Female, PR, Democratic)	(G) Rep. Seung-hee Yoo (Female, SMD, Democratic)

*(A), (B), etc. represents the letters in Figure 4.3.

Interestingly, the two legislators who proposed five WFBs in the 16th Assembly, thus the most active proponents of women's issues, were PR members from the conservative *Saenuri* Party. A female SMD member from the Democratic Party ranked 3rd in the number of women-friendly bill sponsorship in that cycle. During the 17th Assembly, the top four legislators who proposed the highest number of women's issue bills were women, and among them three were affiliated with the conservative party. Interestingly, the legislator who proposed the highest number of women friendly bills in the 18th Assembly was a male Democratic SMD legislator. In the 19th Assembly the top two legislators who were the most active proponents of women's bills are from the Democratic Party, one an SMD and the other PR members. This implies that ideological leanings of parties are a weak predictor of women-friendly legislative activities of lawmakers, and women's issue is not a clear partisan issue. Also, even though PR members tend to be more active than SMD members in women-friendly bill sponsorship, there are some SMD policy entrepreneurs who do not share the expected characteristics of women-friendly legislators (Table 4.3.).

Reviewing the backgrounds of these top eight legislators who proposed the highest

number of WFBs, their legislative activities are not surprising. All six female legislators

already had strong credentials in women's movement and were leaders of women's

movement before becoming the legislators. For example, Rep. Kyung-cheon Kim ((A) in

Figure 4.3.) was the head of the YWCA; Rep. Jeong-sook Kim (B) was the director of the

Korean Girl Scouts and the president of the KNCW. Rep. Myung-ok Ahn was a

gynecologist and Rep. Kye-kyung Lee was the founder of the Women News, the first

feminist newspaper in Korea. Rep. Seung-hee Yoo was the former head of Women's Bureau

of the Democratic Party. Two male legislators, Rep. Hong-shin Kim and Rep. Choon-jin

Kim were well-known figures in the liberal circle.[12] Therefore, legislators' career and

commitment before joining the Assembly can be a strong predictor of their legislative

portfolio (Figure 4.3.).

Next, I reviewed the kind of bills proposed in each legislative session (Table 4.4.).

Overall, bills related to childbirth, childcare, and maternity/paternity leaves were the most

frequently proposed (28 percent), followed by bills addressing domestic and sexual violence

(23 percent). Notably, most of women's issue bills were on domestic and sexual violence in

the 18th Assembly (34.82 percent). This may, in part, be due to sexual violence against young

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[12] Rep. Kyung-cheon Kim http://www.siminsori.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=75310
Rep. Hong-shin Kim http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/553876.html
Rep. Jeong-sook Kim http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/06/03/2015060300119.html;
http://news.donga.com/ISSUE/Vote2016/News?m=view&date=19980817&gid=7369824
Rep. Myung-ok Ahn http://www.sisamediin.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=5123
Rep. Kye-kyung Lee http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000127334
Rep. Sanghee Kim http://cleankim.kr/intro/story.asp
Rep. Young-Hee Choi http://weekly.donga.com/List/3/all/11/85076/1
Rep. Choon-jin Kim http://www.weeklypeople.net/view.do?seq=7702
Rep. Insoon Nam http://nisoon.co.kr/profile
Rep. Seung-hee Yoo http://www.yoush.org/page/yooseunghee/

girls being reported during these years, shaking the whole nation.[13] The increase in legislative activities on violence against women can be attributed to the Assembly's response to the strong public opinion demanding actions to address these issues. To deal with the recidivism of sex offenders against young girls, the adoption of electronic waterproof ankle bands and chemical castration was hotly debated, which resulted in the increased number of bills related to this issue category.

Table 4.4. Number of WFBs by Category and the Legislative Session

Category	16th	17th	18th	19th	Total
Pregnancy, childbirth, childcare, maternity/paternity leave (including after adoption)	22	105	104	59	290
Participation in decision making bodies (political representation)	1	14	17	39	71
Labor participation, unemployment	0	12	20	19	51
Domestic violence, sexual harassment and violence	6	48	125	59	238
Human trafficking, prostitution	5	19	22	13	59
Gender sensitivity (gender budgeting, changing sexist terms in laws and practices, etc.)	9	59	30	35	133
Protecting minorities (women in agriculture and fisheries, incarcerated women, single parent, immigrants, young girls, women with disabilities, young girls, missing kids)	11	57	39	52	159
Others	3	3	2	20	28
Total	57	317	359	296	1029

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[13] One of the most well-reported (and the most severe) cases, perpetrated by Jo Doo-soon to a 8 year-old girl in 2008, was made into a film "Sowon" (which means "Hope" in Korean) in 2013. In 2012, a film "Don't Cry Mommy" was premiered in Korea and was highly watched and talked about.

First Analysis: SMD Women vs. PR Women

Next, I compared the number of WFBs initiated by each legislator by gender, party ideology, and the seat type (Table 4.5.). On average, conservative women proposed a slightly higher number of WFBs than liberal women, but the difference is not statistically significant. For men, seat type and party affiliation do not influence the number of WFBs. Men do not show difference in the number of WFBs they propose by the seat type and party affiliation. For example, liberal men proposed 0.49 WFBs on average while conservative men did 0.39. PR men proposed 0.47 WFBs and SMD mem did 0.43 (Table 4.5.). PR women proposed significantly more WFB than SMD women, but the difference is not statistically significant. Women are more active in proposing WFB than their male counterparts sharing the same characteristics such as party affiliation or the seat type. For example, liberal women proposed 2.88 WFB on average while liberal men did only 0.49 bills. However, there is one male legislator with liberal party affiliation who proposed 14 WFBs. As discussed earlier, this implies that there are policy entrepreneurs in WFB sponsorship activities and some outliers skew the distribution of the observations. In addition, the effect of gender on the legislative outcomes is stronger than other factors. Against the research hypothesis, liberal or conservative party affiliation is not strongly correlated with the number of WFBs initiated by each legislator.

Table 4.5. Party Affiliation, Seat Type, Gender and Women-Friendly Bill Initiation

Category	Mean	S.D	Min	Max
Liberal Women (n=85)	2.88	4.05	0	20
Conservative Women (n=79)	3.75	4.21	0	20
Liberal Men (n=468)	0.49	1.28	0	14
Conservative Men (n=657)	0.39	0.90	0	8
PR Women (n=112)	3.74	4.37	0	20
SMD Women (n=52)	2.35	3.46	0	17
PR Men (n=139)	0.47	1.04	0	5
SMD Men (n=986)	0.43	1.08	0	14

To further examine the effect of the seat type on the legislative activities, I compared the number of WFBs among the female legislators who are elected to their SMD seats after serving as a PR (Table 4.6.). The findings are mixed. Twenty-three women have served more than one term between 2000 and 2016: six women served only as SMD, one woman served two terms as a PR member,[14] and 16 women have served in both tiers, first as PR and then as SMD. Eight women who served for both tiers proposed fewer WFB when they became SMD members compared to their PR term; 7 women proposed more WFB as an SMD member. One person proposed the same number. Among those who have served only in the SMD seat, only one person (Rep. Hee-Jung Kim) proposed more bills in her second term SMD, Rep. Hee-Sun Kim propositioned 2 bills in both terms, and others never proposed any WFB at all. This suggests that the effect of the seat type is mixed. PR women who benefitted from the gender quotas are not necessarily proactive in their WFB activities. This

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[14] Rep. Young-Sun Song served two terms as a PR member. She was a PR member of the *Saenuri* Party in 2004. Before the 2008 election, she was nominated by the Pro-Park Party's PR candidate was elected.

finding does not support the constituency theory, as the effect of having a group of local constituents or not does not influence their WFB activities; SMD women do not seem to be affected by their local constituents' preference of gender issues, or PR women who entered the politics through the gender quotas are not necessarily more active in promoting gender issues than SMD members.

Table 4.6. WFBs by Women Legislators Serving More than Two Terms

Name (Last, First)	Legislative Session	Seat Type	Number of WFBs	Difference
Choo, MiAe	16	SMD	0	0
	18	SMD	0	
	19	SMD	0	
Han, MyungSook	16	PR	2	0
	17	SMD	2	
	19	PR	0	
Jeon, JaeHee	16	PR	1	1
	17	SMD	2	
	18	SMD	0	
Jeon, YeoOck	17	PR	1	1
	18	SMD	2	
Jin, SooHee	17	PR	6	-4
	18	SMD	2	
Jo, BaeSook	16	PR	3	1
	17	SMD	4	
Jung, MiGyung	18	SMD	0	0
	19	SMD	0	
Kim, EulDong	18	PR	2	-1
	19	SMD	1	
Kim, HeeJung	17	SMD	2	7
	19	SMD	9	
Kim, HeeSun	16	SMD	2	0
	17	SMD	2	
Kim, HyunMi	17	PR	5	-5
	19	SMD	0	
Kim, SangHee	18	PR	13	-2
	19	SMD	11	
Kim, YoungJoo	17	PR	1	-1

	19	SMD	0	
Kim, YoungSun	16	PR	0	2
	17	SMD	2	
	18	SMD	5	
Lee, HyeHoon	17	SMD	0	0
	18	SMD		
Lee, MiGyung	16	PR	3	-2
	17	SMD	1	
	18	SMD	1	
	19	SMD	0	
Na, GyungWon	17	PR	4	-3
	18	SMD	1	
	19	SMD	1	
Park, GeunHye	16	SMD	0	0
	17	SMD	0	
	18	SMD	0	
	19	SMD	0	
Park, SoonJa	17	PR	3	4
	18	SMD	7	
Park, YoungSun	17	PR	1	1
	18	SMD	2	
	19	SMD	1	
Sim, SangJung	17	PR	3	-2
	19	SMD	1	
Song, YoungSun	17	PR	1	0
	18	PR	1	
Yoo, SeungHee	17	PR	7	10
	19	SMD	17	

Second Analysis: Men and Women SMD Members from the Same District

Another way to examine the constituency theory and the descriptive theory is to compare

the number of WFBs proposed by men and women who were elected in the same district –

there are 28 districts which elected both men and women between 2000 and 2016. Some

districts elected more than two women; some elected women first and then men; and some

districts elected women after they had male legislators. Among these 28 districts, 19 districts

saw more WFBs proposed by the women than by men, and 3 districts saw male legislators proposed more WFBs than their female predecessor or successors. Men and women in the six districts proposed the same number of WFBs (Table 4.7.). This suggests the gender of the legislators is a strong predictor of active WFB sponsorship, even controlling for the effect of districts' constituency factor, thus supporting descriptive representation model over the constituency model.

Table 4.7. WFBs Proposed by Men and Women Elected from the Same District

District Name	2000-2004 Gender, Number	2004-2008 Gender, Number	2008-2012 Gender, Number	2012-2016 Gender, Number	Difference
Gwangmyung	male, 0	female, 2	same female, 0	female, 3	+
GyonggiGwangju	male, 0	female, 2	male, 0		+
GyonggiBucheon			male, 0	female, 11	+
GoyangDeokyang			male, 0	female, 1	+
GoyangIlsan1	male, 0	female, 2	male, 0	female, 0	+
GoyangIlsan2	male, 0	female, 2	male, 0	female, 0	+
GwangjuGwangsan2			male, 0	female, 0	0
GwangjuDonggu	female, 4	male, 0			+
GwangjuSeogu			male, 2	female, 2	0
DaeguDalseong			female, 0	male, 0	0
DaeguBookgu1			male, 0	female, 0	0
BusanYeonje	male, 0	female, 2			+
SeoulGuro	female, 0	male, 0	female, 2		+
SeoulDobong1			male, 9	female, 1	-
SeoulDongdaemun`	female, 2	female, 2	male, 0		+
SeoulSeocho	male, 0	female, 0			0
SeoulSungdong1		male, 0	female, 2	male, 0	+
SeoulSungbook1			male, 0	female, 17	+
SeoulSongpa1		male, 2	female, 2	female, 6	+
SeoulSongpa2	female, 1	male, 0			+
SeoulSongpa3			male, 0	female, 1	+
SeoulYongdeungpo1		female, 0	female, 2	female, 0	
SeoulEunpyong1	male, 0	female, 1			+
SeoulJoonggu		male, 2	female, 1	male, 0	-
SeoulJoonglang1			male, 1	female, 6	+
SungnamJoongwon			male, 6	female, 1	-
SoowonGwonsun		male, 0	female, 0		0
AnsanDanwon2		male, 0	female, 7	male, 1	+
JunbookIksan2	male, 0	female, 4	same female 6	female 4	+

Third Analysis: Statistical Analysis

Lastly, I conducted a regression analysis. The main findings of statistical analysis are presented in Table 4.8. Consistent with the other sets of comparisons, the regression models show that being a woman has the biggest positive impact on increasing the number of women friendly bills sponsored by legislators. Membership in the legislative committees on the women, family, and welfare also proves consequential to increase the number of WFB initiated by legislators. Being a member of opposition party increases the number of women's issue bills introduced by legislators, even though the coefficient is smaller than that of being a woman or a member of women, family, or welfare committee. Against the hypotheses suggested at the start of this study, being a PR member does not have statistically significant impact on the women-friendly legislative outcomes, and none of variables demonstrated any interaction effect with gender. Thus the interaction terms were dropped in the final analysis.

Table 4.8. Regression Analysis of the Effects of Selected Independent Variables on

Women's Issues Bill Sponsorship Activities, 2000-2016

DV: WFB Count	2000-2004 (s.e.)	2004-2008 (s.e.)	2008-2012 (s.e.)	2012-2016 (s.e.)
Women, Family, and Welfare Committee	1.26* (0.40)	1.18* (0.21)	0.83* (0.21)	1.57* (0.24)
Female	2.06* (0.54)	1.36* (0.28)	1.26* (0.29)	1.13* (0.26)
PR	0.10 (0.45)	0.13 (0.27)	0.10 (0.28)	-0.22 (0.28)
Opposition Party	-1.07* (0.44)	-0.49* (0.19)	-0.03 (0.19)	0.62* (0.20)
Number of Term	-0.34 (0.20)	-0.35* (0.13)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.20 (0.10)
(Intercept)	-1.65* (0.45)	-0.28 (0.26)	-0.45 (0.24)	-0.91* (0.26)
/lnalpha	0.67 (0.45)	-0.02 (0.24)	0.28 (0.19)	0.18 (0.22)
alpha	1.96 (0.88)	0.98 (0.23)	1.33 (0.25)	1.20 (0.26)
N	315	322	330	322
LR chi2 (5)	46.31	120.94	81.00	106.87
log L	-122.58	-344.30	-411.55	-341.63

Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significance at $p<0.05$

Based on legislative activities of all 1289 lawmakers in the 16th – 19th National Assemblies of South Korea, this quantitative analysis supports the existing theories finding a positive relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation. After controlling for other variables influencing the legislative outcomes, being a woman is a strong predictor of increasing WFB sponsorship activities. However, one's committee

membership and the status of one's party in the government are also influential to determine

one's legislative activities related to women-friendly issues. The number of bills introduced to

the National Assembly, of course, is not an exhaustive measure of women's substantive

representation. Examining how many bills ended up being actual policies is also critical.

Some research has demonstrated that in regard to the success rate of bill proposals, PR

members are less fruitful in passing their bills compared to their SMD colleagues in Korea.

As Karen Beckwith (2014) argues, however, not all policy attempts translate into

policy outcomes due to a myriad of factors such as "political opportunity structure and

configuration of party power within, for example, a legislature" (Beckwith 2014, 33).

Analyzing policy attempts allows the researchers to capture "a difference between *representing*

interests and *securing* interests" (Beckwith 2014, 33; *italics* in the original). As the analysis in

this paper has demonstrated, PR members are one of those who are most active in

proposing bills. Whatever the reasons for the low passage rate of bills by PR members may

be partly personal factors as well as institutional and cultural reasons. If most of women's

issues bills introduced by PR members do not result in actual policy changes for women, it is

hard to argue that women's issues are effectively represented in the lawmaking bodies. Some

argue assuming leadership positions in the National Assembly helps their proposals passed

(Yeollin jeongchi yeosung euiwon network 2005, 16); therefore, female legislators should be

more actively involved in the workings of the Assembly.

Moreover, examining diverse venues and actors of policy-making process is critical

to have a more holistic understanding on women's substantive representation. Won and

Park's study on the policy process of adopting anti-prostitution law in South Korea stressed

that various actors including not only the legislators but feminist activists, president's

initiative, cabinet members, bureaucrats, government officials and media cooperated to get

anti-prostitution policies adopted (Won and Park 2006). S. Laurel Weldon also found that women's movements and women's governmental agencies are more effective venues than female legislators to successfully address violence against women (Weldon 2002). In spite of these limitations, this quantitative analysis has tested the applicability of theories on the relationship between women's descriptive representation and substantive representation. Why, then, do some political actors not acknowledge female legislators' contribution? Why are PR legislators not more active than their SMD colleagues in promoting WFBs? The qualitative analysis in the following section sheds light on this question.

Qualitative Analysis: Lack of Cooperation among Women – the Righteous Women or Queen Bees?

Interviewees I met during my fieldwork shared frustrations over the lack of cooperation among women, disagreement among women's organizations, and lack of coordination between the women's movement and the political parties/the National Assembly. All of these undermine the progress in empowering women politically[15] and make it difficult for women's demand to be taken seriously by the establishment, thus presents constraints to secure women's interests in the political parties and the legislature.

The interviewees said the cooperation among female legislators is generally low. There is a partisan difference in the perception; the interviewees of the *Saenuri* party said the female legislators of the *Saenuri* party were less active in mentoring other female members than the Democratic women. On the other hand, when I asked the Democratic women the same question, they expressed dissatisfaction with the level of mentoring among the female members:

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[15] The notes on the methodology can be found in Chapter 3.

Usually, the female members of my party [the *Saenuri*] rarely spend time on

mentoring junior members or the next generation women leaders. For one,

there is no female legislators from *Saenuri* with high seniority…When talking

to female legislators on the individual basis, they said their hands were too

full to take care of other female legislators. There have been movements like

the Women's Network for Clean Politics (*malgeun jeongchi yeosung network*)

before the 2004 legislative elections, but the feminist activists were

disappointed at the female legislators who were elected. The women

legislators were not as active in promoting women's interests as the

movement wished. Therefore, these movements and initiatives are not as

active as in 2004 anymore [Interviewee #8].

The interviewee attributed the low level of cooperation among women to female legislators' "disappointing" performance in pursuing women-related policy agenda, which turned off feminists who helped them to get elected. Also, the interviewee criticized that the elected women tried to avoid being labeled as a woman legislator or acknowledging the gender quotas contributing to their election.

Comraderies among the *Saenuri* women are very weak, as they have strong

sense of eliticism and entitlement. The female legislators think they are where

they are because of their own merit, not because of women's movement or

quotas. They do not think they owe to the women's movement for their

success, even though their entry to politics is indebted to the 50 percent PR

gender quotas. They do not think they were elected "as women" or elected

"for women", so they do not actively advocate for women's issues

[Interviewee #8].

Some women distance themselves from women's agenda. [However], men

consider these women to be "rational and reasonable," as they are not

"biased," demanding, [nor] difficult. When other women bring the issue of

women's interests or political empowerment, these women say they are sick

of hearing about them! Because these women have strong comraderies with

other male legislators, they act like "reasonable" and say "we should not talk

about women's issues." These women argue that competitive men lose their

opportunities due to the demand to recruit more women. There are many

female legislators acting like this during the 19th assembly session. However,

you know, when the next election approaches, I am sure these women will

turn to the Women's Bureau and ask them to support their candidacy

[Interviewee #21].

However, Interviewees #8 and #21 alluded that these female legislators navigate hostile

environment which makes cooperation among women difficult. They are numerical

minorities; thus they do not have a strong bargaining power even when they participate in

the decision making process.

When it comes to the candidate nomination committee, the party rules

require to nominate 30 percent of the committee members as women.

However, these women committee members do not have a strong voice in

the nomination process nor they usually agree on many issues. When a

female committee member raises a point on women-related issues, other

female members do not support her opinion. More than anything else, they

are numerical minorities in the committee and feel overwhelmed among

other male committee members. Women committee members show lower

level of cooperation, and people say things like "women are their worst

enemies." [Interviewee #8]

To promote mentoring and collective action among female legislators, Korea Women

Parliamentarian Network was established on May 27, 2013. Former and current legislators

are eligible to join the Network and they need to pay annual membership dues of

KRW100,000. The goal of the Network is to promote political representation of women

both in terms of increasing the number and also empowering them to make a real policy

difference. One of the biggest challenges of the Network, however, is to encourage

participation from the former and current legislators – the incumbent female legislators all

say women do not come together and cooperate. An interviewee said that former legislators

who do not hold office are better at networking and gathering; the incumbents are too busy

"surviving" their term:

> [When I pointed out that many of the interviewees were not aware of the
>
> Korea Women Parliamentarian Network] Of course they do not know.
>
> People are not interested in the group, and the budget of the organization is
>
> limited. We would like to work on many projects, but we have a limited
>
> budget. We have only one paid staff and rely on voluntary work by
>
> researchers. It is difficult to encourage former and current legislators to
>
> participate…Few months ago, the Network launched a research project
>
> tracing female legislators' career trajectory and their paths to the Assembly,
>
> to find a pattern in their political success. We sent survey questionnaires to
>
> the legislators but the response rate was disappointingly low. The members

were worried about their privacy and there were low incentives for
participating in the survey. Legislators were not interested in the project, and
did not want to talk about their career. Also, the survey questions were in-
depth, but they did not want to spend too much time answering the
questions [Interviewee #14].

Even though women are excluded from the inner circle and do not benefit from nepotism,
some women are skillful at networking. Some interviewees viewed these women negatively:

The party organizations do not take women's organization or movement
seriously [as they are not a strong voting block or strong mobilization group].
Also women's organizations do not make a strong demand to the political
parties or the Assembly to demand better representation. The party
leadership does not need to worry about a backlash even when they ignore
the demand from women's movement. Also, having a successful female
political leader is important but we have not seen any role models. It is
important to identify key players and stay in good terms, but women are not
as successful [not because they do not try but the way networking is done is
masculine, and it is hard to overcome already existing structure]. However
some women are good at it, and we call them "sunflowers" [because they
face wherever the "sun" is] [Interviewee #19].

The coordination and cooperation between the parties and Assembly and the
women's movements have been eroded over time. Interviewee #25 said the cooperation
between the movement and the parties were stronger before the 18th Assembly. However,

the 18th Assembly showed high level of partisan polarization and hostility, and it affected the relationship among female legislators, and the legislators and the feminist movement.

This lack of cooperation and distancing themselves from the other women could be understood as the Queen Bee syndrome (Derks, Ellemers, et al. 2011; Derks, Van Laar, et al. 2011). "Queen Bees" are "senior women in masculine organizational cultures who have fulfilled their career aspirations by dissociating themselves from their gender while simultaneously contributing to the gender stereotyping of other women" (Derks, Ellemers, et al. 2011, 519). Queen Bee phenomenon is an outcome, not the cause of, the gender discrimination in the workplace, and a survival mechanism some minorities use who are working in a hostile environment to their identities. Interviewees often describe other female legislators' behaviors who do not cooperate or groom other women; they evaluate these behaviors negatively which even further undermines the prospects of cooperation and reinforces the hostile environment against women.

> On the surface, PR female members get along but they are jealous of each other. My legislator was one of the first PR members who gained local leadership position and other female PR members were very jealous of her. Once she resigned from the post other PR members changed their attitude and get along. [Are you aware of a network among previous and incumbent female members?] I cannot think of any [Interviewee #11].

> The 18th Assembly has particularly a lot of conflicts and gridlock in the Assembly. The female legislators of the Democratic Party occupied the chairperson seat in the Assembly, and there were fierce fistfights in the Assembly when the contentious bills were reviewed. Due to the potential

accusation of sexual harassment in case male legislators touch female

legislators, the major parties asked their female legislators to physically

occupy the chairperson's seat and grabbed the gavel so male legislators have

a hard time interfering them. These women even practiced this! So when

Rep. Yeonhee Choi was fighting over the gavel and the seat, male legislators

who could not touch her body, fearing accusation of sexual harassment and

unwanted touch, came to her and flipped her fingers [Interviewee #26].

However, these narratives unknowingly blame women for not meeting two undue

expectations and overlook structural sexism. First, women are expected to support each

other and second, those who do not support others and pursue their own success are seen as

hostile and unfriendly (Derks, Ellemers, et al. 2011, 521).

Some women do help other women, nevertheless. A study based on senior

policewomen showed that women with high level of gender identification[16] are motivated to

support other women and provide opportunities for others' career advancement.

Interviewee #26 said she felt an obligation not to drop the ball, as she feared her mistakes

can hinder other women's advancement. She had supported other junior women and

recruited women whenever opportunities arise. She recommended and recruited other

female politicians, such as Rep. Eun-Hye Yoo (the vice spokesperson of the Democratic

Party) and Rep. Hyun-mi Kim. When the interviewee #26 recruited these other women, she

emphasized how important it is to pay it forward by working hard and actively recruiting

other women [Interviewee #26]. However, when women push for a gender balance in the

---

[16] Gender identification is measured by survey questions such as "At work, being a woman is important to me," "I currently feel connected to other women at work," "At work, I feel part of the group of women," and "I identify with other women at work"(Derks, Van Laar, et al. 2011, 1245).

election using their leadership status in their party, they experience a lot of pushback from

male party members:

> As you know, it is challenging to raise the issue of gender quotas in the party.
>
> We should be more strategic...in fact during the 19th legislative election, Rep.
>
> Myung-sook Han (then president of the party) and Rep. Mi-kyung Lee
>
> worked hard to nominate more women but they were fiercely attacked by
>
> many male legislators and experienced a backlash after that. So good leaders
>
> suffer from these attacks…not because Rep. Han was a bad leader but those
>
> men who did not get nominations under her chairpersonship attacked
>
> her…so factors like this make it very challenging for the political parties to
>
> have strong initiatives on gender quotas [Interviewee #27, Rep. Young-Gyo
>
> Seo].

The lack of cooperation is seen not only at the individual level. The tension between the

KNCW and the KWCU was palpable in the discussion. There are conflicts among different

groups with different ideological leanings, strategies, visions, and also personal conflicts.

One of the former PR legislators shot directly at the chair of the conservative KNCW:

> I would like to ask President Geum-sook Choi of the KNCW…the
>
> experience has shown us that the bloody fights by the women's groups were
>
> fruitful only when the groups banded together in spite of their ideological
>
> differences. If the KNCW chooses to take a different path and do not
>
> cooperate with other groups and therefore undermine the effectiveness of
>
> the movement, I am afraid the KNCW would be subject to the criticism

when we do not accomplish the 30 percent candidate gender quotas for

SMD seats [Interviewee #27, Former Rep. Hye-sung Kim].

On receiving this criticism, Choi replied:

We [the KNCW] would like to use our energy on only one issue: mandating a

30 percent candidate nomination for SMD election. There were many ideas

and suggestions by the women's organizations but we are strategically only

focusing on the one issue. You need to trust us. If we bring up multiple

issues, those men will make excuses, oh well too many issues and they are

confusing, and they will tune out. So we are just focusing on the single issue

[Interviewee #27, Geum-sook Choi].

After the colloquium, I interviewed an activist who is a leader of a more progressive

women's organization, focusing on political empowerment of women. When asked the

relationship between the two big women's organizations, the conservative KNCW and the

liberal KWCU, she echoed what I observed during the colloquium:

Yes, that is true, the KNCW is not a part of the initiative [to demand the 30

percent mandatory SMD candidate quotas]…the KNCW decided not to join

the Alliance. The liberal KWCU is an umbrella organization consists of 144

women's organizations, including us and the Korea Women's Political

Caucus [*hankuk yeosung jungchi yonmang*], and the others are affiliated with the

KNCW…when the women's organizations discussed and demanded a 50

percent gender quotas for PR seats in 2003, we had a common goal in spite

of ideological differences between the KNCW and the KWCU…This time

we see many conflicts between these two umbrella groups unlike in 2004

[Interviewee #25].

The interviewee #25 also observed that as the women's movement accomplished

institutional changes through adopting gender quotas, the movement now has weaker

driving force or a common goal under which different groups with different ideologies can

unite:

I think the agenda of promoting more women legislators was clearer and

stronger in the 17th and the 18th Assemblies, but not anymore...the female

legislators who entered the politics through the newly institutionalized gender

quotas felt the sense of responsibility -- they entered politics through quotas

– but that sense of indebtedness has pretty much gone now. Also the gender

quota itself is very controversial so female legislators are not willing to admit

they were elected through gender quotas [Interviewee #25].

These interviews explain why women legislators are not evaluated positively, even though

their legislative records show that women legislators more actively promoted WFBs than

their male colleagues. Due to the less prestigious status in the Assembly as PR members, the

majority of women legislators are perceived to lack substantial power in the decision making

process and were perceived to be compliant of the party leadership. Once elected, women

prioritize "surviving" the male-dominated and hostile political arena as a numerical minority,

thus cannot focus on mentoring or recruiting other women. As explained in the existing

literature on the queen bee syndrome, many women legislators distance themselves from the

feminist agenda which disappoint the women's movement outside of the institutionalized

politics. After successfully lobbied for gender quotas, the women's movement organizations

fragmented along the ideological line; the conservative groups and the liberal organizations

cannot effectively push the political parties and the National Assembly to nominate more women candidates. This undermines the possibility to promote cooperation among women, the elected women and the movement, and various women's organizations.

Conclusion

This chapter addresses the question of who represents women's interests in the Assembly and what do women deliver once they are elected to the National Assembly. In the analysis of the legislative activities between 2000 and 2016, I argue women are indeed more active in proposing women-related bills, contrary to the sentiments shared by interviewees for this research. Qualitative analysis used in this chapter shows that women legislators are perceived negatively; specifically, for being less active in promoting women's issues in the Assembly. Moreover, the legislators are perceived as busier attending to their survival as legislators rather than promoting other women's advancement. The level of support for women legislators has waned as the feminist activists were disappointed at the legislators for not living up to their expectations; this lack of support by the women's movement for the elected women makes the political environment more hostile for the female legislators, which in turn encourages women to be less active in helping other women or cooperating with each other. These behaviors and perceptions of women legislators fit into the queen bee syndrome, which is documented by the existing literature.

Chapter 5. Conclusions

Overview of the Main Findings

What explains women's continuing underrepresentation in South Korean legislative office, in spite of rapid economic growth and implementation of gender quotas? This study used South Korea as a case study to test existing theories. In Chapter 2, I examined reasons behind women's numerical representation in the National Assembly of South Korea, focusing on the election stage. Findings from the statistical analysis suggest that the gender of the candidate is less important than being a major party candidate or running in a favorable district. In particular, serving as an SMD member is the surest path to electoral victory for women, and the parties should encourage women to be more successful in their SMD bids. The expected spillover effect of serving as a PR member or in local political offices is weaker than assumed, and this weakness points to the importance of the SMD path. And yet, candidates' PR memberships do not translate well into electoral victories for SMD seats, which account for more than 80 percent of all Assembly seats. Political actors have compromised with women who demanded more representation by passing gender quotas for PR seats and local legislative offices, not for SMD seats. However, taking the high stakes and prestige of the SMD membership into consideration, major parties have been unwilling to take bolder measures to recruit women in politics.

Evidence in Chapter 2 suggests that women's gender is not a liability in elections. However, this information does not answer the question of why the majority of PR members are not successful at their SMD bids in spite of four years of political experience at the national level. In Chapter 3, I analyzed interviews with the former and current legislators and their staffers to provide insights into career interruptions and terminations of PR

members, especially women. The interviewees' responses show the high cost involved with establishing and maintaining local networks, and how the masculine way of local networking undermines the potential power the women's movement can play in empowering women. The limited access to financial resources and leadership positions, overtly discriminatory district assignment practice for PR members, and the emphasis on drafting bills without geographically defined support group can explain why the majority of PR members experience political career interruption and termination after their terms are over.

In Chapter 4, I focused on substantive representation for women. Who represents women's interests in the National Assembly and what do women deliver once they are elected? I analyzed the legislative activities between 2000 and 2016 and found that women legislators were indeed more active in proposing women-related bills than male legislators, contrary to the sentiments shared by interviewees for this research. Qualitative analysis used in this chapter shows that women legislators are perceived negatively as they were identified as being less active in promoting women's issues in the Assembly. The level of support for women legislators has waned as the feminist activists were disappointed at the legislators for not living up to their expectations; this lack of support by the women's movement for the elected women makes the political environment more hostile for female legislators.

Based on these findings, what should be done to promote numerical and substantive representation of women in South Korea? It is clear that strategies need to be formulated on how to nominate and elect more women, and, in turn, how to assure that more women-friendly policies are proposed. In addition, the promotion of gender balance in the elected office needs to be effectively addressed.

Policy Implications – Evidence from Survey Experiments

Before the 2016 national legislative elections, the candidate nomination method was at the center of the two major parties' agenda in South Korea. The ruling *Saenuri* Party leadership proposed increased reliance on primaries to select candidates, rather than top-down candidate nomination which is a predominant method of candidate nomination in South Korea. Then party leader Rep. Moo-Sung Kim argued that the candidate nomination process decided by closed-door meetings by a handful of committee members is undemocratic. He argued the party should heed more to the dues-paying party members to get involved in the candidate nomination process, in a way to democratize the party and to make the process more transparent. On the surface, it sounds democratic and ideal, but the resistance to the move was very strong, especially among women party members. Instead, women party members argued that the party should nominate women through uncontested, strategic nomination by the leadership in districts with high level of support for the party.

During my fieldwork, some participants raised concerns about the primaries and its impact on nominating women. In regards to *Saenuri* party's attempt to adopt open primaries, Interviewee #28 agreed that opening up the candidate selection process to the voters is a right direction to take. In the short term, however, it puts younger politicians at disadvantage so she prefers strategic nomination to recruit the younger generation. Why?

> In primaries, turnout is lower than that of the national legislative elections, which is around 50-60 percent. In order to promote participation in the primaries and get support, candidate-hopefuls provide transportation to polling places for the voters whom they would like to mobilize. The candidate hopefuls catch taxi cabs for the voters and pay the fare to and from the polling places for the voters. They even go to the hospitals and ask

the patients to come to the polling place in their patient gowns! Voters for

the primaries do not choose candidates based on their policy proposals; they

vote for people who they have heard of, who paid for their cab fare, and who

bought them meals and drinks. In the situation like this, the primaries are for

those who are better organized and better financed. People buy votes. Even

though I agree with the party leader [Rep. Moo-Sung Kim of the *Saenuri*

Party] that open primaries are the future direction to democratize the party,

the society is not ready to run the system in a transparent manner

[Interviewee #28].

Interviewee #28 is not the only one arguing that primaries are disadvantageous for female

candidates and political newcomers. Focusing on the main research question of this project

(Which nomination method is more advantageous for women in securing voters' support –

top-down party nominations or bottom-up primaries?) existing studies show that political

parties' candidate nomination process and parties' organizations have an impact on the

nomination outcomes for women. Primaries are generally thought to be favorable to

candidates with high visibility, name recognition, social and financial resources (De Luca,

Jones, and Tula 2002; Poiré 2002), and thus often unfavorable to political newcomers and

minorities, including women.

In order to compare how the nomination method affects voters' perception of the

candidate and their evaluation of the electoral competitiveness, I designed a survey

experiment.[17] My coauthor and I designed a survey questionnaire asking participants'

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[17] This data was originally collected as a part of a project I am currently working on with a coauthor. Even though using the same data set, the other work focuses on the split voting and this current work focuses on the level of support based on candidates' gender and nomination paths. The initial findings are presented in the following paper: Timothy Rich and Young-Im Lee. 2016.
"Assessing Strategic Voting through Survey Experiments." Presented at the International Studies Association –

demographic information and political ideology and party affiliation. An online research

company in Korea, Macromill Embrain, recruited 600 participants and conducted the survey

on March 7-10, 2016. They were recruited from all 16 regions of South Korea except for Jeju

Island, but mostly from Seoul and Gyonggi Province (65 percent of the total participants).

The sample has higher share of self-identified liberals than conservatives. Fifty-one percent

of the participants supported the Democratic Party and 20 percent of the respondents

supported the conservative *Saenuri* Party. Even though the sample is unrepresentative, it still

provides unique insights as to how voters perceive candidates' electoral competitiveness

based on the candidate's gender and nomination paths.

Before answering the experimental questions, 55 percent of the respondents said

they did not know candidates' paths to nomination running in their districts, and 39 percent

said they knew some candidates' nomination paths. When asked about preferred method of

candidate nomination, 62 percent of the respondents said they had no preference; 25 percent

preferred primaries and 13 percent preferred strategic party nomination. This shows that

overall the voters are not keen on knowing how the candidates are nominated, and the

nomination paths are not an often-used information shortcut when making decisions in

actual election setting.

However, a series of hypothetical National Assembly district elections reveal that

when the voters know the nomination paths of candidates, they assess the viability of

candidates differently by gender and nomination paths. The experiment is set up this way.

There are three hypothetical candidates running in the respondent's district, ranked based on

their ideological proximity to the respondent: Candidate A is 90 percent similar, Candidate B

Midwest Conference, St. Louis, Missouri. I got permission from the coauthor to use this data for this chapter;
the Institutional Research Board at the University of Missouri-St. Louis approved the use of the data for this
dissertation.

is 60 percent similar, and Candidate C is only 30 percent similar to the respondent's political

ideology. In this setting, a rational voter should vote for Candidate A as the candidate is

likely to represent the respondent's interests most closely if elected. And then, the

respondents are presented with four sequential public opinion polls, showing that the level

of support for Candidate A is decreasing in each poll (Table 5.1.). The poll is originally

designed to gauge the level of strategic voting by candidates' gender and paths to

nomination. However, some of the findings from this projects are relevant to this current

research.

Table 5.1. Polling Results as Shown to the Survey Respondents

|	Poll 1	Poll 2	Poll 3	Poll 4
Candidate A	35%	30%	25%	21%
Candidate B	33%	35%	36%	37%
Candidate C	32%	35%	39%	42%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Then I devised six different prompts where the candidates' gender and nomination paths

vary. In this chapter, I limit the discussion on the four prompts which are relevant to the

current project.

- Prompt 1: All male candidates, all chosen via primaries.

- Prompt 3: Candidate A is female, Candidates B and C male, A is via nomination and
  B and C are primaries.

- Prompt 4: Candidate A is female, Candidates B and C male, A is chosen by primaries
  and B and C by party nomination.

- Prompt 6: Candidate A is female, Candidates B and C male, all by nomination.

Table 5.2. Summary of the Experimental Prompts

Prompt	Candidate A	Candidate B	Candidate C
1	M-PR	M-PR	M-PR
3	F-Nom	M-PR	M-PR
4	F-PR	M-Nom	M-Nom
6	F-Nom	M-Nom	M-Nom

M (male), F (female), Nom (nominated by the party), PR (selected through primary)

Note: Dots represent Candidate A; diamonds Candidate B and squares Candidate C

Figure 5.1. Level of Support for Each Candidate by Randomization

Figure 5.1. presents the level of support for three candidates in each prompt.

Overall, Prompts 1, 4, and 6 show a similar pattern, even though the gap between A and B

varies in each prompt. In Prompts 1 and 4, Candidate A get 80 percent of support.

Candidate A is a male in Prompt 1 and a female in Prompt 4 but won primaries in both

scenario. This shows when controlling for the nomination type, the candidate's gender does

not make a different in the base level of support. Similarly, in Prompts 3 and 6, when Candidate A won the nomination by the party leadership, the level of support is lower than Prompt 1 and 4 when candidate won primaries. Therefore, the nomination type is more important than the gender of the candidate.

When the poll number slips for A in Poll 2, some respondents defect from Candidate A choose B instead, but more so in Prompt 1 than in Prompt 4. In Prompt 4, the female candidate is running against two males who were nominated by the party leadership whereas all three candidates in Prompt 1 won primaries. So when a primary winning candidate is running against party-nominated candidates, he or she can retain still high level of support even when the poll numbers slip.

In Prompt 3, the starting level of support for A, a party-nominated female running against primary-winning males, is lower than the level of support for A in other prompts. Prompt 6 shows about 70 percent of the respondents supported Candidate A when her poll number is strong and running against other males who were also nominated by the party. Interestingly, these two party-nominated women suffer loss of support when their poll numbers decline, but more dramatically when she is running against other males who won the primaries, thus previously "proving" their electoral competitiveness. In Prompt 3, a primary-winning male outperforms party-nominated female when the poll number indicates he is ahead of the female candidate by 5 percentage points in the poll. In Prompt 6, a party-nominated female is still ahead of a party-nominated male, even though the poll numbers suggest the man is slightly ahead of the woman.

What do these findings suggest on the policy of candidate nomination and election for women? First, when women prove their electoral competitiveness through primaries and previous electoral victory (as shown in Chapter 2), they are as successful as men in securing

support. Second, even though some activists and women's movement demand strategic nomination for women (as illustrated in Chapter 3), voters do not respond favorably to candidates who were chosen by party leadership. When a woman was nominated by a party, the base-line support level is lower than a woman who won primaries (Prompts 3 and 4); when a man won primaries (Candidate B), he is more likely to attract defectors from Candidate A when his poll numbers favor him, than he is nominated by the party (Prompts 3 and 6).

Based on this data, my recommendation is for parties to support female candidate hopefuls and ensure success in winning primaries. This will signal to the voters that these female candidates have "what it takes" to be competitive in elections, rather than the message that they are "unqualified" beneficiaries of affirmative action. However, this is a "chicken and egg" problem. Chapter 3 illustrates how challenging it is to navigate the national and local politics as an outsider. When competing against an incumbent who already has a strong local support network, women and PR members find it challenging to establish their own alternative support network. In order to be successful in primaries, however, one needs a strong support network. Considering these insurmountable challenges, the women's movement requires strategic nomination by the party leadership to promote women's candidacy.

However, this study argues that these party-chosen women will not be as successful as primary-winning women in securing high level of support, as voters are more likely to reject these nominated women when the situation is volatile. Thus, I argue that political parties and the civil society should focus more on training and grooming potential female candidate hopefuls and help them establish their own local support base, instead of nominating women with only weak connections imminent to an election. Related to the

findings in Chapters 2 and 3, political parties' allowing PR nomination only once results in the experienced national legislators' career termination. This "term limit" might be intended to reach out to an untapped talent pool and supply "fresh blood" instead of appointing again those who are already in the system. However, if the parties do not support the PR women to be competitive in the district tiers, they are wasting a pool of experienced and qualified women politicians.

Significance of the Study and Limitations

      This research contributes to the literature on politics and gender, as well as providing policy insights on how to increase political representation of political minorities. The existing literature argues that the most critical player in numerical underrepresentation of women are not voters or low political ambition of women, but political party elites' discriminative nomination practices. I tested these theories on the South Korean context. This work contributes to the scholarly discussion on gender quotas by introducing a less-discussed case of South to English-speaking scholars and by providing an analysis of the country utilizing original data. This study is by no means the first one addressing the South Korean case in English: Lee and Shin (2016), Shin (2014), and Yoon and Shin (2015) all provide rich context of the adoption and implementation of gender quotas, and discuss the reasons why the political parties do not comply with the provisions using qualitative analysis on the impact of gender quotas. However, the current study complements the previous studies on Korea's gender quotas adoption and implementation by testing the theories using a large-N quantitative analysis.

      Moreover, there is relatively little empirical research testing the pipeline theory. This study casts doubt on the validity of the pipeline problem, and tests political parties'

unwillingness to recruit women using both a large- N statistical analysis and interviews with the political actors, which support and strengthen the findings from the quantitative analysis.

In addition, this study is unique in scope as it examines all the candidates in the previous eight elections since the country's democratization, including the most recent legislative elections in April of 2016. Existing studies on South Korean national legislative elections analyzed one or two election cycles, not all eight elections since democratization. The study's findings are timely and up-to-date as well, considering the 20th elections were only one year prior to the timing of this writing.

The empirical evidence that this study examines points to an urgent need for South Korean political parties to take more direct measures to increase women's representation in the National Assembly. The current study is one of the few endeavors to empirically, both qualitatively and quantitatively, test the spillover effect of gender quotas in the mixed system and the sacrificial lamb theory. In addition, the invisible hierarchy between PR and SMD members in the mixed legislature of South Korea is addressed, along with the political parties' candidate nomination practices in applying the mandated gender quotas (a term limit). These political culture and institutions have not been widely discussed and they influence the effectiveness of gender quotas in promoting gender parity in the legislature over time.

However, this study is not without limitations. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the level of women's political participation in three East Asian democracies vary, in spite of similar level of economic performance and similar electoral system. Based on this in-depth case study on South Korea, the future research should be a comparative study of gender in legislative politics, possibly one encompassing South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Also, future research can examine how and whether each candidate's nomination type affected their

performance in the actual elections, to expand the current study based on the survey

experiments.

Appendix A. Notes on Qualitative Method[18]

Describing his research method as "soaking and poking," Richard Fenno wrote "someone doing this kind of research is quite likely to have no crystallized idea of what he or she is looking for or what questions to ask when he or she starts" (Fenno 1978, 250).[19] This sentence aptly describes my own fieldwork experience. While writing a dissertation research proposal in 2014, I wrote sample interview questions as a part of application package to the Institutional Research Board to get approval to conduct fieldwork. About a year later, I went to Seoul to conduct fieldwork.

My first interviewee was a senior legislative staffer who had more than 20 years of political campaign experience and work experience in the National Assembly. Trying my best to conceal my nerves as a first-time interviewer, I started to read out loud the questions I wrote during the IRB application process. He looked at me quietly for a minute, without saying anything. Then he slowly spoke, firmly but with a dismissing undertone, that the questions were too generic and too general to gather insightful response from politicians. Politicians are "animals," he informed me, and they instantly tell the depth of the interviewer and decide if they would like to engage in a deep conversation with the person. He did not answer any of my "generic" questions and told me to go back to the drawing board.

I quickly learned, with surging sense of humility and embarrassment, that asking the same set of questions to all the interviewees was not the best approach. From my second interview, I spent one to two days before each interview reading almost everything in print and online about the interviewee before the actual meeting. I pored over books, news

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[18] The style of this appendix is influenced by Brown, Nadia E. 2014. *Sisters in the Statehouse: Black Women & Legislative Decision Making.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

[19] Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.

articles, and magazines; I looked up data on their bill sponsorship activities. Based on the information, I tailored the interview questions for each interviewee. I implicitly showed that I did my homework through my highly personalized interview questions. I was taken more seriously and also could minimize spending time checking information which could have been collected myself elsewhere. It was lucky that my first interviewee was extremely direct and straightforward. It was difficult to swallow at first but it helped me to be more effective and efficient in the subsequent interviews.

I chose to use interviews for a couple of reasons. As a research on gender issues, I think it is important to listen to people and understand the political process from their perspectives. As an outsider of the National Assembly or party politics, I had to talk to people in order to understand how political processes actually work. There is only so much I could learn about politics through printed materials or the media reports. Politics is constantly under scrutiny by the media but also a lot of aspects in politics is not open to the outsiders. I wanted to learn how the insiders actually to politics. Second, I wanted to flesh out the statistical findings on the election process – to explain "why" political parties are still unwilling to nominate women even though the numbers say women are as competitive as men in election, and "why" the majority of the PR members experience career termination and could not capitalize their four years' of experience as a national legislator.

Conducting interviews is also a way to play to my personal merits/strengths as a researcher. Luckily, I knew people who knew politicians and activists through my personal networks. I was born, raised, and educated in Seoul until my mid-20s. Some students and alumni from my alma mater in Seoul worked for the National Assembly and various political parties. My professors in Korea knew former and current legislators and they connected me with the legislators and legislative staffers. My other local linchpins – my friends and alumni

network from my alma mater – listened to the overview of my research and contacted

people they thought would be relevant to my research. They explained to the potential

interviewees my personal and educational background and suggested they sit for an

interview. After a couple of initial interviews, it snowballed and my interviewees introduced

me to other interviewees. Thus having this social capital was critical in conducting the

interviews. I tried a couple of times sending out letters "cold turkey," but I was not lucky

with these attempts.

Fenno (1978) discusses how the legislators' perceptions of academics influence his

interaction with the interviewees. Overall, I think my status as a Ph.D. candidate in the

United States gave me some credentials as an interviewer. Those who have Ph.D. themselves

or working on their degree were more favorable to talk to me. They were supportive and

told me they understood what it is like to write a dissertation. Those more into practical over

academic experience sometimes expressed their uneasiness (and sometimes disdain) about

those they considered unexperienced academics who do not know the "real" politics. Some

interviewees who are critical about the U.S. hegemony and who have strong national pride

expressed a bit of uncomfortable sentiment about me, a student studying in the United

States, due to South Korea's dependent relationship with the "big brother" America.

As the main research focus was gender in politics, the interviewees' opinions on the

issue also influenced the mode of the interviewees' interaction with me. Some interviewees

were distant and careful and very formal in addressing me. Even though I was not "Dr. Lee"

yet, some felt uncomfortable addressing me by my first name or addressing my name at all

and insisted that they would call me "Dr. Lee" to make the conversation formal. Those who

have feminist identity were very welcoming and friendly and showed a sense of comradery.

Some men who were uncomfortable with the issue of gender and politics were at times

dismissive and authoritative and argued that the issue of gender is irrelevant in Korean politics.

Most of the interviewees preferred to meet in the afternoon. Usually I did two interviews per day, one at 2pm and the other at 4pm. Some interviewees asked for the interview questions in advance and were very careful during the interview. I made sure that I would not use parts of the conversation they shared "off the record," I also kept the confidentiality of the interviewees. I asked them how they would like to be referred to in my writing, if they were comfortable using their real names then I named them as such. If they wanted to be only identified with their party affiliation and position, I made that reference. For the first couple of interviews, I asked for permission to record the interviews and recorded only when the interviewee agreed. The majority of the interviewees did not want to be recorded, fearing their remarks could be misunderstood, so later in the fieldwork I did not even bother to ask. Instead I took copious notes during the interview; right after the interviews, I tried to write down as much as I could remember. I transcribed the 9 interviews I did record. Each interview lasted as short as 50 minutes to as long as 3 hours and 30 minutes.

Overall, my cultural heritage and social capital – my previous education in South Korea and connection to political actors – made me more approachable to the interviewees. As a native Korean speaker, moreover, I could read the nuances and non-verbal cues during the interview and could ask in-depth question on complex issues without relying on other mediators such as interpreters or translators. My language skills also enabled me to read and analyze the original data: the majority of data (news articles, magazines, and bills) are written in Korean. Therefore, I think using mixed method for this current research was an appropriate approach.

Appendix B. Tentative Face-to-Face Interview Questions

As written in Appendix A, I did not closely follow these interview questions after the first interview. However, I tailored the following questions based on the background of the interviewees. Some of the questions were inspired by Kira Sanbonmatsu, Susan J. Carroll, and Debbie Walsh. 2009. *Poised to Run: Women's Pathway to the State Legislature.* New Brunswick, NJ.

With candidates and candidate dropouts who have gone through major parties' nomination process

1) Have you ever seriously considered running for office before someone had suggested? Was it totally your idea to run? If someone suggested that you should run, who was it? (i.e. Party officials, NGOs, legislators, friends, family, etc.) Who was the most critical actor to make that decision?

2) Why did you decide to run for office?

3) Who discouraged you the most, if any? What were their reasons?

4) FOR SMD CANDIDATES -- Which district did you originally apply for nomination? Were you assigned to the one you applied? If yes, why had you preferred that district to others, and how had you appealed to the nomination committee that you were a suitable candidate for that district? If you were assigned to another district, what were the reasons for the decision? In your opinion, how did the district assignment affect the electoral outcomes?

5) FOR PR CANDIDATES – How did you become a PR candidate? Had anyone approached you to become the PR candidate, or did you nominate yourself? What was your number in the party list, and how was the party list made? Did

you feel any expectations (service, financial, etc.) during and after the election from the party, as you "benefitted" from the party for your nomination/election?

6) Have you been involved in women's committee in your party? Have you ever participated in the movement or debates on nominating more women, or party gender quotas? If you have, why? If not, why not?

7) In your opinion, what are the major reasons for women's under-nomination? Is it a problem that your party should address? What do you think of the debates and conflicts surrounding party gender quotas?

8) What will be legitimate and effective ways to nominate more women candidates? How can women candidates appeal to voters?

9) Are there any other things you want me to consider?

With those who have served in nomination committees or involved in nomination process in the major parties

1) How were you involved in the nomination process? How were you recruited?

2) What were the criteria the committee had considered when assessing candidate hopefuls? What were different considerations in assessing PR and SMD candidates?

3) What were the main disagreements among committee members in the nomination decision-making process? Were there any differences in foci between young and senior members? Party machinery and eternal reviewers? Women and Men committee members?

4) If there were two candidates similarly qualified, which criteria did you use to determine the nomination results?

5) What kind of data/evidence was used to determine "winnable districts"? Did you rely on previous election results?

6) How did the committee decide that it was strategically sound to nominate women? What kind of women did you look for? Where were they usually assigned?

7) How did parties get potential candidate lists for PR candidates? And how were PR candidates ranked? Who did get priorities?

8) How did the committee handle any objections or complaints about the nomination results?

Election campaigns

1) What was the process of your election campaign? Whom did you approach to learn to organize the campaign when you ran for the first time? Please explain.

2) How much support did you get from your family? How did they contribute to your campaign?

3) Who was your main target for your campaign? How did you try to appeal to them?

4) What was the reaction from voters in your district when you were canvassing? Were there any differences between men and women voters? Younger generation and older generation? Where did you visit? What were your strategies?

5) Were there any groups of people who approached you with certain policy agendas? Who were they and what were their demands / issues?

6) (If the person is a multiple term member) In your previous ** years of service in the National Assembly, have you observed any changes in the culture of the Assembly?

Do you think the presence of more women legislators changed the culture or the norm of the Assembly in any ways?

7) In your opinion, why are there few women in the national assembly? Do you think it is a problem?

8) In your opinion, what are some of the measures to elect more women to the National Assembly? How can women candidates improve their competitiveness in campaigns?

9) Are there any other things you want me to consider?

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