12-20-2017

Homicide and the World Religions

Allen Shamow
as972@mail.umsl.edu

Homicide and the World Religions

Allen Shamow
M.S.W., Social Work, Washington University in St. Louis, 2008
B.A. Psychology, Kalamazoo College, 2006

A Dissertation Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri-St. Louis
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology and Criminal Justice

May
2018

Advisory Committee

Richard Rosenfeld, Ph.D.
Chairperson

Janet Lauritsen, Ph.D.

Michael Campbell, Ph.D.

Susanne Karstedt, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Cross-national studies seeking to explain the variation in rates of homicide have examined a multitude of factors including religion, but fewer studies have examined how religion may influence homicide through a societyôs institutional structure. Social institutions include entities such as the economy, the family, the political structure, and educational system; and these institutions serve as guides for human action and behavior. Through its emphasis on values, religion may influence the interests and legitimize the functioning within societal institutions. In the present study, I examine how the major world religions of Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism may be associated with homicide through various cultural and institutional mechanisms. These mechanisms include individualism, secularization, religious pluralism, economic dominance, and social welfare. Higher levels of individualism may contribute to higher rates of homicide by reducing societal bonds and spurring secularization which results in the attenuated ability of religion to promote pro-social behavior. Higher rates of homicide may also occur as the competing value structures associated with religious pluralism legitimize a differentiated institutional structure whereby economic conditions dominate and weaken the socialization capacities of non-economic institutions. Non-economic institutions may be strengthened through an increase in social welfare which may also curb the deleterious effects of the individualism emanating from religion. While all of the major world religions are assessed in terms of their relationship with these mechanisms, particular attention is given to Protestantism due to its individualistic focus and pluralistic religious landscape. A measure of atheism is included in the present study along with a global measure of religious pluralism to assess whether it is the major world religions or some other entity related to religion that may be linked to homicide. Results from this study suggest that neither the major world religions nor atheism or religious pluralism is significantly associated with cross-national rates of homicide directly or through any of the proposed mechanisms. These findings suggest that future studies attempting to explain the variation in cross-national homicide rates should consider alternative institutional mechanisms as well as the growth of secularization across societies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. CRIME, RELIGION, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Researchers have highlighted numerous factors which may explain the differences in rates of homicide cross-nationally. Nivette (2011) suggests that some of the leading explanations for the variation in cross-national rates of homicide include a countryôs distribution of wealth, its level of ethnic diversity, human development, and whether a nation is Latin in origin. Lower homicide rates tend to be found in countries having more economic growth, stronger democracies, and higher income levels (LaFree, 2005; Neumayer, 2003), while increases in homicide have been linked to higher levels of income inequality (Jacobs & Richardson, 2008; Lee & Bankston, 1999; Messner, 1980). Economic discrimination as an ascribed form of inequality has also been linked to higher rates of homicide at the national level (Karstedt, 2003; Messner, 1989). Economic discrimination refers to the denial of economic resources based on an individualôs racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics (Messner, 1989). Aside from inequality, variation in cross-national rates of homicide has been attributed to poverty measured through infant mortality rates (Messner, Raffalovich, & Sutton, 2010; Pridemore, 2008; 2011).

One factor that may inhibit homicide within a nation is social welfare. Messner (2003) notes that several studies have found a link between social welfare policies and lower homicide rates at the cross-national level. In particular, social support measured through governmental expenditures on health and education has been shown to be associated with a reduction in homicide (Pratt & Godsey, 2002; 2003). Several studies have also found that the positive relationship between income inequality and homicide is weakened in countries with stronger social welfare policies (Messner, Raffalovich, & Shrock, 2002; Pratt & Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000). These studies examining the

role of social welfare also highlight the potential impact of a nationôs political structure on its homicide rate. Nations with higher levels of political legitimacy in terms of their level of legality, justification of their values, and consent of their constituents have displayed lower homicide levels (Nivette & Eisner, 2013). Research has also shown that the exercise of coercive control from a nationôs political structure in the form of high levels of imprisonment may also lead to lower rates of homicide (Nadanovsky & Cunha-Cruz, 2009). Other potential correlates of homicide include alcohol (Rossow, 2001) and corn consumption (Mawson & Jacobs, 1978), which reduces an individualôs serotonin levels and may lead to higher levels of aggressive behavior.

Attempts to explain the variation in rates of homicide cross-nationally have also focused on the composition of a societyôs inhabitants. Social and cultural heterogeneity across societies have been assessed linguistically, ethnically, racially, and religiously. Research shows that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with higher rates of homicide (Altheimer, 2008) while linguistic heterogeneity tends to reduce homicide levels (Hansmann, 1982). Studies also show that religious heterogeneity does not display a significant association with homicide at the national level (Chon, 2012; Cole & Gramajo, 2009). Even though there is not much support for religious heterogeneity as a predictor of cross-national rates of homicide, other measures of religion have been shown to be associated with homicide at the national level. In a study of forty-three nations Jensen (2006) finds that measures of religious benevolence are associated with lower homicide rates, while measures of religious malevolence are associated with an increase in rates of homicide. Religious benevolence is measured through membership and participation in religious organizations, while religious malevolence is assessed through intense religious

beliefs and viewing individuals as either good or evil (Jensen & Akers, 2003; Jensen, 2006).

Studies have also looked at the impact of specific religions on rates of homicide at the national level. In a study that looks at homicide in developing nations, Neapolitan (1997) finds that the proportion Christian displays a positive association with homicide while the proportion Muslim exhibits a negative relationship with homicide. Lester (1996) also highlights the low homicide levels in predominantly Muslim countries. Although Christianity is positively linked to higher homicide rates in developing nations (Neapolitan, 1997), Messner (1982) does not find any association between Protestantism and homicide at the multivariate level in his cross-national study. Besides Islam, Antonaccio and Tittle (2007) find that the interaction between eastern religions and their composite measure of capitalism is associated with a decline in homicide rates cross-nationally. Their measure of capitalism is comprised of social security taxes as a percent of revenue, the GINI index, union density, and private health expenditures as a percent of total health spending (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2007).

While several studies at the cross-national level have examined the direct link between various religions and homicide, there have been fewer studies that have incorporated the role of social institutions into this potential relationship. In the present study I look to expand upon previous cross-national research by examining how the major world religions may impact homicide levels through their relationship with the functioning of a societyôs institutional structure. This study incorporates the family and political institutions into the potential association between the major world religions and homicide. I give particular attention to the relationship between Protestantism, social

institutions, and homicide. Yet, I also incorporate the other major world religions to assess whether the potential connections stemming from Protestantism are distinct to it or may be generalized to religion more broadly. Aside from Protestantism, I also examine Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. These seven religions represent the major world religions since each one of them can claim at least 75% of a nationôs residents as adherents (Lewer & Van den Berg, 2007). Before outlining the order for the rest of the paper, it is necessary to discuss the concept of social institutions and their potential linkages with religion.

Social institutions are defined as the regulatory norms which guide individual behavior and action (North, 1990; Parsons, 1990). In order for social institutions to effectively guide individual behavior, social norms must be supported by moral legitimacy (Wuthnow et al., 1984; Bellah et al., 1991; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2004). This moral legitimacy that reinforces institutional norms stems from the ultimate common values which are found within a societyôs cultural sphere (Bellah et al., 1991). Religion may be linked to social institutions due to its close association with morality (Durkheim, 1915; Parsons, 1951; Bellah, 1973) and its representation of ultimate common values (Vernon, 1962; Yinger, 1970). However, when religion does not display a close link with morality and does not promote collective or common values, a societyôs institutional structure cannot function properly and may contribute to higher rates of homicide. In the present study the major world religions vary in terms of their ability to promote collective values and furnish social institutions with the morality necessary to guide their normative functioning. While most of the major world religions emphasize collective sentiments, others such as Protestantism may foster a highly secularized (Parsons, 1964a) and

fragmented social environment through its individualistic focus. When religion is not able to imbue institutional norms with a certain measure of morality, higher rates of homicide will occur as the dominance of the economy weakens the normative functioning of the other non-economic institutions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).

The order for the rest of the paper is as follows. In chapter 2 I discuss how individualism fosters a highly secularized social environment which promotes a pluralistic religious landscape. This type of religious landscape becomes reflected in institutional differentiation whereby a free market economy dominates the institutional structure. Chapter 2 also highlights the duality of individualism as both a crime facilitating and crime inhibiting mechanism. In line with this idea, chapter 2 also examines the long-term decline in homicide since the Middle Ages, and how the individualism promoted by Protestantism may have contributed to this decline. There is also a discussion in chapter 2 of the role of social welfare in reducing homicide rates given religionôs ability to facilitate the dominance of a free market over a societyôs institutional structure. Each of the other major world religions is assessed in terms of their potential association with the concepts of individualism, secularization, religious pluralism, economic dominance, and social welfare. Chapter 3 discusses the data and methods used in the study. Within chapter 3 I also include a discussion of how structural equation models are specified and selected for the present study. In chapter 4 I discuss the results of the study and how each of the major religions is not associated with homicide directly or through the proposed mechanisms. Chapter 5 concludes the study and discusses the findings, the role of religion in society, and implications for future cross-national studies of homicide.

CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN SOCIAL LIFE

In this section I examine the potential mechanisms that may impact the relationship between the major world religions and rates of homicide cross-nationally. These mechanisms include individualism, secularization, religious pluralism, economic dominance, and social welfare. Each of the major world religions varies in terms of the manner and the degree to which they may be associated with these proposed mechanisms. It is clear that these religions historically have undergone transformations due to varying societal responses to them, but the link between these religions and the proposed mechanisms is based on their doctrinal foundations. A focus on the doctrinal foundations of the major world religions may not seem particularly relevant in a study examining contemporary homicide rates. Yet, it is these core principles of the major world religions which shape the mechanisms that are hypothesized to link these religions with homicide. For example, Protestantism which was founded through its detachment from the Catholic Church has cultivated an individualistic environment free from any ecclesiastical authority. Thus, without an understanding of the foundations of the major world religions it becomes difficult to discern the type of relationships they will have with the mechanisms hypothesized to facilitate or inhibit contemporary rates of homicide.

Social welfare may interact with Protestantism to influence lower rates of homicide cross-nationally, while the other concepts may facilitate the association between Protestantism and higher homicide levels. With varying levels of association between the other major world religions and these mechanisms, it is possible that the other world religions may facilitate, inhibit, or not influence homicide at all. Protestantism, unlike the other major world religions, has as its historical base the

concept of separation which necessitates the need for social welfare to offset its potential crime facilitating divisiveness. To begin this examination of the relationship between religion and homicide, I first look at the concept of individualism which served as the impetus for the formation of Protestantism.

AN INDIVIDUALISTIC OUTLOOK

At first glance it would appear that societies with higher levels of individualism would have higher crime levels due to the promotion of self-interest and the disregard for the idea of society as a collective. However, Durkheim (1900) would suggest the opposite that individualism should be associated with lower crime levels, particularly violent crime. It is moral individualism according to Durkheim (1900) which leads to lower rates of homicide within and across societies. Moral or cooperative individualism is based on obligation, respect, and sympathy with an emphasis on solidarity and sacrifice for the betterment of others (Messner, 1982; Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008; Thome, 2007). This type of individualism described by Durkheim (1900) lacked any semblance of egoism, selfishness or utilitarian motive (Chriss, 1993). Under moral individualism greater worth is attributed to the individual (Durkheim, 1973), and in turn homicide becomes less common with this increased value associated with each human being (Durkheim, 1900). There has been mixed support regarding the relationship between moral individualism and lower homicide rates. Messner (1982) using Protestantism as a measure of moral individualism does not find it to be significantly associated with homicide, while Huang (1995) conceptualizing moral individualism as personal dignity and individual rights finds it to be associated with lower homicide rates.

Moral individualism has been identified as a leading explanation for the long-term

decline in homicide since the Middle Ages (Eisner, 2003a). In Europe this decline since the Middle Ages has occurred over an 800 year period (Eisner, 2001; 2003a; Gurr, 1989). In Western Europe homicide rates declined from around 1500 to the middle of the 20th century (Eisner, 2003a). Homicide rates in the late Middle Ages were between 20 and 40 per 100,000, and in the mid 20th century these rates were between 0.5 and 1 (Eisner, 2001). Protestantism may be linked to this decline due to its emphasis on duty, methodical conduct, and an inner-directedness which promotes an ethic of self-discipline (Eisner, 2003a). Higher levels of social discipline and self-control stemming from Protestantism were fostered beginning in Europe from the middle of the 16th century (van Dülmen, 1993; 1996; Weber, 1920). It may be that homicide rates in Europe began to decline in the 16th and 17th centuries as the discipline from Protestantism worked in tandem with the emphasis on justice from the state and the supervision of community residents (Spierenburg, 2004). Roth (2009) discusses how the solidarity cultivated by Protestantism has combined with an increase in trust in the government to lead to a decline in homicide in Western Europe and the U.S over the past 400 years.

Between the 17th and 19th centuries homicide declined in Europe in predominantly Protestant and Catholic countries (Muchembled, 2008). Muchembled (2008) explains that the Protestant ethic focusing on duty and methodical conduct is similar to the Catholic emphasis on individual guilt and collective honor. Rather than solely attributing the homicide decline in Europe to the growth of Protestantism, Muchembled (2008) suggests that it was the combination of religious, cultural, and political factors which weakened the focus on defending oneôs honor. Both Protestants and Catholics in Europe made efforts to supervise and instill a sense of civility in young men who were

particularly susceptible to engaging in violent behavior (Muchembled, 2008). Moral individualism stemming from Protestantism placed greater value on human life in Europe during the long-term decline in homicide, but this value on human life also became a hallmark of Catholic countries (Muchembled, 2008).

From 1960 through the early 1990s there has been a rise in the rates of homicide in Europe and the U.S. (Eisner, 2001; 2003b; Spierenburg; 2012). Eisner (2008) estimates that homicide rates increased somewhere between 100 and 150% from 1960 through the early 1990s in Europe. Factors that may have contributed to the rise in homicide in Europe and the U.S. beginning in the mid 20th century include the preponderance of market and consumer individualism, lower levels of self-control, and a lack of informal social control (Thome, 2001). Fukuyama (1999) notes that in the U.S. and Europe since the mid 20th century there has been more disruption within the family due to a higher proportion of single parent births, divorces, and fewer cohabitating parents. With higher levels of family disruption, violence may become a more likely outcome as children experience weakened socialization as they approach adolescence and young adulthood. Homicide rates have declined or stabilized in Europe and the U.S. since the mid 90ôs (Fukuyama, 1999; Spierenburg, 2012), but the increase in homicide in the 20th century took place as levels of individualism were also on the rise (Eisner, 2008; Fukuyama, 1999).

Morality becomes difficult to implement in environments characterized by a high degree of individualism due to the emphasis on individual choice (Wuthnow et al., 1984). With individuals having more freedom and options, self-interest begins to increase (Wuthnow, 1991) and a sense of interdependency is lost (DeTocqueville, 1835;

Durkheim, 1969; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). Morality requires that individuals become attached to something other than themselves (Durkheim, 1973); otherwise morality will be replaced by egoism within society (Lukes, 1973). Egoism or more specifically egoistic individualism serves as the antithesis of moral individualism since it fosters self-interest without a concern for others (Giddens, 1971). Durkheim (1973) was concerned about the spread of egoistic or excessive individualism (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008); because he knew it would attenuate social connections and lead to the fragmentation of society (Durkheim, 1893). This lack of societal cohesion led Durkheim (1893) to suggest that the presence of religion is not easily found in environments characterized by excessive levels of individualism. When religion is absent from society it is replaced by egoistic individualism (Weber, 1958), and the preponderance of this type of individualism often times leads to higher levels of crime and violence (Kornhauser, 1978; Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008).

Protestantism has promoted individualism since the Reformation in the 16th century. When Martin Luther separated from the Catholic Church and its sacraments, Protestants were granted a certain measure of freedom and autonomy in their faith (Parsons, 1964a; Bellah, 1973). One manner in which this individualized focus became evident was through the increased attention directed toward the written word. No longer did individuals require the mediations of the Church and its sacraments to gain Godôs salvation, but rather they could attain salvation through their own efforts interpreting scripture (Yinger, 1970; Peck, 1993). While this individualistic focus within Protestantism has granted individuals more control over their relationship with God, it has also impeded the promotion of moral behavior (Pickering, 1984). Protestantism is

not able to promote morality due to the manner in which it has cultivated individualism. By reducing the social role of the Church as an entity that brings human beings together and shifting the focus toward the individual, Protestantism has made itself susceptible to the propagation of egoistic or excessive individualism. Religion has the capacity to aid the development of moral individualism, but Durkheim (1915) acknowledges the limitations imposed against religion without a strong church presence.

Despite the fact that Catholicism promotes collective behavior through the enactment of group rituals in the form of the sacraments (Greeley, 1989; Vernon, 1962), it still values individualism. Novak (1993) explains that from 1891 to 1991 Papal social thought focused on themes such as personal responsibility, creative subjectivity, and the dignity of the person. However, Catholicism for the most part has displayed its opposition toward excessive individualism. Catholic social teaching in the late 19th century opposed liberal individualism and through the Subsidiary principle hoped to bridge the divide between the individual and the state by promoting intermediary familial and associational communities (Nanini, 2011). Through the Church, Catholics view themselves as a community of believers united under the idea of a parish (Fichter, 1957). The Catholic Church itself serves as an intermediary between the individual and God (Vernon, 1962; Woodhead, 2009), whereby religious beliefs and practices intended to honor God may be enacted in communion with others. It is these connections associated with religious symbols, communal worship, and the idea of a collective religious identity (Cohen et al., 2005) that permit Catholicism to stave off the egoistic tendencies that are often associated with a high degree of individualism.

Through its communitarian focus Orthodox Christianity does not contribute to the

growth of excessive individualism (Makrides, 2005). Tradition is a central component of Orthodox Christianity, and this tradition is based on the Church which serves as a unifying body (Agadjanian & Rousselet, 2005). In fact, this emphasis on tradition which is tied to the Church has caused the Orthodox Church in Russia to view excessive individualism and freedom as indicating the absence of real religion (Agadjanian & Rousselet, 2005). Like the Russian Orthodox Church, the Orthodox Church in Romania values the idea of community and cannot support the proliferation of individualism and freedom within religion (Flora & Szilagyi, 2005) that may result in higher levels of egoism.

Individualism within Judaism may be traced back to the Old Testament (Berger, 1967; Sombart, 1913). While individualism does exist within Judaism, it is shaped and guided by the community and an emphasis on tradition (Goodman, 1996; Williams, 2015). In Rabbinic Judaism both independence and interdependence are stressed, and collectivism and individualism are fundamentally linked with one another (Sampson, 2000). Judaism does not permit unrestrained or egoistic individualism but rather a type of moral individualism predicated upon a consideration of others. Concepts of collective liability and brotherhood for the Jewish people (Sklare, 1957; Weber, 1952; Williams, 2015) shape their communal quest for salvation (Troeltsch, 1969; Weber, 1915). Due to their social and political exile and persecution, the Jewish people have attempted to maintain a sense of collective solidarity as a way to affirm their covenant with God as his chosen people (Abraham, 1988; Morris, 1996).

Individualism is present within Islam, but its growth is stymied by an adherence to tradition (Little, Sachedina, & Kelsay, 1996). Choice and religious liberty in terms of

how individuals interpret and understand traditional Islamic teaching (Little, Sachedina, & Kelsay, 1996) capture the extent to which individualism manifests itself within Islam. For the most part a sense of community takes precedence over any excessive emphasis on individualism within Islam. In fact, it is suggested that the low rates of homicide in Islamic nations are due to the Islamic focus on community and informal social controls (Neapolitan, 1997; Neumayer, 2003). Rights within Islam are not bestowed upon individuals but rather the community of believers (Badie, 1986; Maila, 1991), and Islam encourages individuals to work hard so that the community may reap the benefits of their toil (Ali & Al-Owaihan, 2008). Even the Islamic prophet, Muhammad, laid forth a certain mandate when he stated that the Islamic people needed to be unified in all aspects of life including politics, education, economics, and even at the cultural level (Rodinson, 1966).

Like Protestantism, Hinduism promotes individualism by removing many of the mediations that may link the individual with God in their quest for salvation (Gupta et al., 2002; Sinha, 1998; Weber, 1958). Yet, Hinduism does not permit the growth of egoistic or excessive individualism since it still places substantial emphasis on collectivism and group behavior (Stark, 2005; Weber, 1958). Within Hinduism individual rights and the idea of personality are not given high priority (Bennion, 1992). Rather, Hinduism is based on social connections, and it is these connections which provide adherents of Hinduism with their religious identity (Cohen & Hill, 2007).

Individualism is evident within Buddhism as the pursuit of meaning and purpose in life becomes an individualistic endeavor (Cantwell & Kawanami, 2009; Whelan, 2008). Despite the autonomy that Buddhism grants to its adherents, at its core Buddhism

is concerned with the idea of community. Individual freedoms and liberties that are a part of Buddhism can only be truly realized when they are accompanied by a sense of social responsibility (Thurman, 1996). This consideration of others in oneôs life pursuits makes the individualism within Buddhism have more of a moralistic rather than egoistic character. Individuals are only able to attain true freedom, peace, and happiness within Buddhism when they contribute to the development of society through their own self-renunciation (Bennion, 1992).

In this section individualism has been examined as facilitating (Kornhauser, 1978) and inhibiting (Durkheim, 1900) criminal behavior. In contrast to moral individualism, egoistic or excessive individualism will reduce the level of solidarity within societies since it is based on the pursuit of self-interest (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008). With fewer societal bonds higher rates of crime and violence will occur in environments marked by egoistic individualism (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008). Lower levels of societal cohesion stemming from egoistic individualism also provide evidence of the attenuated social influence of religion. This weakened influence of religion over society may be attributed to the process of secularization, which Protestantism has unintentionally facilitated by shifting its focus from the collective to the individual (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1986; Berger, 1967; Tawney, 1926).

A SECULARIZED SOCIETY

Protestantism has aided the secularization process by removing many of the religious mediations such as the Church that link the individual with God (Berger, 1967). These mediations are intended to make individuals consider matters outside of their own wants and desires. Secularization is defined as the weakened influence of religion at the

cultural and institutional levels of a society (Berger, 1967). Protestant emphasis on excessive individualism has incited the secularization process since the influence of religion is contingent on its ability to promote collective behavior. In secularized environments religion is not absent, but rather religion no longer has the ability to legitimize the manner in which societies function (Wuthnow et al., 1984). In effect, the secularization process has not only weakened the role of religion as a formative force within society but has relegated it to the private lives of individuals (Berger, 1967). Higher levels of crime and violence will occur in secularized environments as the plausibility of religious values is attenuated, and these religious values cannot spur the morality necessary to reinforce institutional norms (Glock, 1969).

Catholicism has been able to halt the secularization process. In particular, Catholicism has made a concerted effort to maintain a role in public life. Two manifestations of the secularization process include the separation of Church and state and the removal of ecclesiastical authorities from the educational institution. In the field of education within the U.S., Catholics have advocated for parochial elementary schools within all parishes (Herberg, 1955; Williams, 2015). Also, Catholicism has traditionally opposed the separation of Church and state. Perhaps the strongest evidence of Catholicismôs ability to stave off the secularization process stems from its sacraments. These sacraments serve as rituals that permit individuals to display their faith through collective behavior (Parsons, 1964a). Sacraments are enacted within the Church which serves as a unified body. These sacraments reduce the chance of secularization by reinforcing the mission of religion to connect individuals through the operation of religious values at the group level.

Orthodox Christianity has been more receptive to the secularization process than Roman Catholicism (Woodhead, 2009). Woodhead (2009) explains that Roman Catholicism opposes the separation of Church and state by granting the Church power over the state. Orthodox Christianity, on the other hand, sees the Church and state blended together with the final authority belonging to the state. However, the Orthodox Church in Greece through its ties to the state has actually attempted to halt the secularization process (Kokosalakis, 1996). Ultimately, Dobrijevic (2006) explains that through their affiliation with the state the eastern Orthodox communities have been able to stave off secularization by focusing on spiritual and mystical values. This promotion of otherworldly values has permitted the Orthodox Church to maintain its public influence.

An emphasis on freedom within Judaism has made it less resistant to the secularization process. This support of freedom has impelled adherents of Judaism to encourage the separation of Church and state in the United States (Herberg, 1955). Judaism may also facilitate the secularization process through its lack of spirituality and connection to the gospel of progress (Whelan, 2008). Also, a rationalistic approach to life under Judaism may weaken its ability as a religion to cultivate any supernatural or otherworldly considerations at the cultural or institutional levels. Yet, the historical foundations of Judaism have caused it to be more of an inhibitor rather than a facilitator of the secularization process. In particular the foundation of the state of Israel is based on a religious ideology unlike other nation states that are born out of secularized ideologies (Swatos, 1996). Also, through their exile from Israel, adherents of Judaism have focused on the collective due to their alienation from the political community (Parsons, 1964a).

This emphasis on solidarity within Judaism has aided its preservation and development as a world religion.

Even with its rationalistic tendencies, Islam does not incite the secularization process. For example, Islam does not view the separation of religion and state as feasible for normative functioning (Selengut, 2009). In Muslim countries there is a fusion between Islam and politics, which inhibits secularization at the institutional level. This bond between Islam and politics also hinders the privatization of religion at the cultural level which often times occurs in countries with liberal democracies (Lewis, 1988; Tibi, 1990). As a response to the secularization of the West, fundamentalist movements have arisen in both Islam and Hinduism (Madan, 1997). Hinduism has also been able to stave off secularization through its emphasis on spiritual rather than rationalistic values (Smith, 1963). Also, in countries like India high levels of devotion to Hinduism make it less likely to lose its influence in the public sphere of that country (Van der Veer, 2001; Van der Veer & Lehmann, 1999).

Buddhismôs susceptibility to the secularization process is particularly evident in the West. There Buddhism emphasizes more worldly ethics and rationalism which weakens the public role of religion but is done primarily to attract more western adherents (Obadia, 2011). However, Buddhism in its true form does not facilitate the secularization process. Buddhism through its emphasis on contemplation and meditation does not permit the material conditions of a secularized society to dominate the minds of individuals (Cantwell & Kawanami, 2009; Parboteeah, 2009). In fact, Buddhism also impedes the development of secularization through its promotion of the idea of self-renunciation (Weber, 1958). For the Buddhist true happiness can only be achieved when

oneôs self is de-emphasized and a sense of society is cultivated, which is line with the purpose of religion more broadly.

When secularization takes place religion can no longer provide individuals with a sense of meaning or cultivate a feeling of interdependency within society (Fenn, 2009). In highly secularized societies freedom becomes a prominent theme and the idea of choice becomes emphasized particularly in religious matters (Fenn, 2009). This emphasis on individual choice occurs as the secularization process renders religion powerless as an authoritative force (Turner, 2011). Secularization tends to promote a pluralistic religious landscape due to the plausibility of religion as an authoritative entity being called into question (Berger, 1967). This lack of credibility surrounding religion causes individuals to seek out guidance from new and different types of religious sources (Berger, 1967; Turner, 2011). Due to its association with the secularization process, high levels of religious pluralism may be found within the religion of Protestantism (Berger, 1967).

A PLURALISTIC WORLD

Protestantism through its various denominations and sects displays a high degree of religious pluralism. Religious pluralism is defined as the toleration and coexistence of various religious groups (Wuthnow et al., 1984; Johnstone, 1992), where these groups engage in free competition for adherents (Berger, 1967). Religious diversity on the other hand is simply the presence of different religions in the same environment. Divisions within Protestantism have existed since the Reformation (Berger, 1967; Wuthnow, 1988), even though it was not the intention of Protestant reformers to create a religiously plural environment (MacCulloch, 2003). Through the Reformation individuals were granted the

freedom to structure religion to fit their interests, which ultimately led to these religious divisions. While the religious pluralism emanating from Protestantism and that of the presence of many different religions including Protestantism may be linked to a secularized environment, there is one key difference. An outgrowth of various denominations and sects within Protestantism is fueled by the highly individualistic focus that has its roots in the Reformation. Religious pluralism that includes Protestantism as one of its religions may be due to the absence of a dominant religion or may be a manifestation of the value of democratic virtue within that environment (Lubarsky, 2005).

Religious pluralism poses a challenge within societies, because individuals become exposed to and confronted with divergent messages stemming from these competing value structures (Wuthnow, 1991; 2005). Individuals are not supported by a stable value structure in religiously plural environments, and the presence of competing value structures weakens the plausibility of religion as a formative force within society (Berger, 1967). When religion is fragmented it can no longer unite individuals under a common value system (Merton, 1957; Yinger, 1970). Without some sort of unification, higher rates of crime and violence will occur as competing values structures create an unstable social environment plagued by moral and ethical concerns (Talmon, 1969; Wilson, 1969; Budd, 1973).

Unlike Protestantism, religious pluralism is absent from Catholicism. Catholicism does not promote the toleration of different religious groups and denominations that are in competition with each other for adherents in the same manner as Protestantism (Herberg, 1955; Yinger, 1957). Like Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity

is not considered religiously plural. Given its emphasis on the authority and tradition of the Church, Orthodox Christianity has not fostered an environment conducive to the existence of various religious groups in the same manner as other religions (Makrides, 2005). Eastern Orthodoxy has taken a stance against the formation of religious sects (Volkov, 2005). In particular, the Russian Orthodox Church has advocated for legislation to limit the growth of religious pluralism stemming from Protestantism and the Reformation (Agadjanian & Rousselet, 2005; Fenn, 2009). This connection between the Orthodox Church and the state is also evident in Greece where pluralism and the privatization of religion are generally opposed due to public indifference being the societal response towards these conditions (Kokosalakis, 1996).

Protestant sects were said to have taken their inspiration to form from the ancient Hebrews of the Old Testament (Wax, 1960), and in the mid to late 19th century Judaism, particularly in America, was divided into Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox movements (Marmorstein, 1957; Williams, 2015). Yet, Orthodox Judaism opposes religious pluralism due to its emphasis on authority and tradition (Kunin, 2009). Judaism, historically, has been concerned with fostering a sense of unity and does not condone the formation of different religious groups. Judaism, like Christianity, is considered an Abrahamic religion tracing its origin back to the tribal patriarch. Islam is also part of the Abrahamic religions and like Judaism and certain forms of Christianity; it too can display a certain measure of religious pluralism. In Islam smaller sects were permitted to form (Little, Sachedina, & Kelsay, 1996; Rodinson, 1966; Ruzgar, 2005) primarily due to the appeal of different Muslim leaders rather than doctrinal differences (Bulliet, 1996). Unlike Protestantism, religious pluralism in Islam can be accounted for

by an absence of a central religious authority rather than any innovation in scriptural interpretation stemming from the promotion of individualism (Casanova, 2001).

Religious pluralism exists in Hinduism as it is often seen as a collection of sects rather than a religion (Long, 2005; Smith, 1963). In countries like India where Hinduism is the dominant religion, the state is not completely separated from religion despite the presence of religious pluralism (Madan, 1997). This highlights how the pluralism within Hinduism differs from the pluralism where Protestantism is prominent, which is an environment where the religious and political spheres are distinct from one another. Even though pluralism is a part of Hinduism, many traditions within the religion actually oppose its growth (Long, 2005). As an offshoot of Hinduism, Buddhism has similar tendencies towards religious pluralism as its predecessor. Buddhism is considered doctrinally pluralistic and has various strands with the Tibetan, MahŪyŪna, and VajrayŪna Buddhists (Cantwell & Kawanami, 2009; Hayes, 1991). However, Hayes (1991) would suggest that Buddhism lacks a true spirit of religious pluralism. MahŪyŪna Buddhism moves away from the idea of pluralism with its sole focus on achieving nirvana, or the ultimate release from oneôs self rather than active involvement in the formation and coexistence of different religious groups (Hayes, 1991).

At face value it would appear that religious pluralism aids the growth and development of society by supporting sentiments of peace and harmony. Yet, societal models of religious pluralism may have a different effect on a societyôs institutional structure. If one ascribes to the idea that religion legitimizes the functioning of social institutions (Budd, 1973; Warner, 1973), then religious pluralism within a societyôs cultural sphere may become reflected in institutional differentiation within a societyôs

social structure (Berger, 1967). Institutional differentiation occurs as the profit motive of a free market economy differentiates it from the other non-economic institutions (Parsons, 1964b; 1966; Troeltsch, 1969). In particular, the family institution is not based on the same utilitarian drives which govern a free market economy (Parsons, 1951; Rosenfeld & Messner, 1995). Interdependencies are reduced among institutions when they are differentiated (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007), and a lack of institutional integration will eventually lead to weakened institutional functioning (Schneider, 1970). Higher crime levels will be a result as a weakened institutional order cannot effectively socialize individuals (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). Due to its high level of religious pluralism, Protestantism may facilitate institutional differentiation (Eisenstadt, 1969; Parsons, 1969; Wuthnow et al., 1984) and unintentionally permit a free market economy to dominate a societyôs institutional structure.

AN ECONOMY UNLEASHED

A free market economy is able to dominate the other social institutions by devaluing them, penetrating them, and forcing them to accommodate to it (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). Devaluation occurs as learning within the educational system lacks any inherent quality and is done solely to gain a job (Merton, 1957; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2008). Economic norms are also able to penetrate the other institutions as grades become like wages within the educational system, and more women adopt the ñbreadwinnerò rather than ñhomemakerò role within the family institution (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). Non-economic institutions such as the family also accommodate to a free market economy when family time is reduced due to parents working multiple jobs and non-conventional hours. Accommodation also

occurs within the political structure with political campaigns being dictated by private donations and contributions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). A dominant free market economy will contribute to higher rates of crime and violence by weakening the socialization and social control capacities of institutions such as the family and educational system (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). One factor which may inhibit or even offset the crime-facilitating effects of a dominant free market economy is a societyôs social welfare practices.

Several studies have shown that social welfare may weaken the link between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of crime (Hannon & Defronzo, 1998; Pratt & Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000). Measures of social welfare may be associated with lower crime levels by strengthening non-economic institutions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2006). Two ways that social welfare may be assessed are through social support coming from the state or social altruism arising from communities (Pratt & Cullen, 2005). Social support is defined as the instrumental or expressive provisions stemming from either public or private sources (Cullen, 1994; Pratt & Godsey, 2003), whereas social altruism is realized through the provisions which are provided by individuals residing within communities (Chamlin & Cochran, 1997). Not only do measures of social welfare weaken the link between economic dominance and higher rates of crime, but a direct association has been found between higher levels of social welfare and lower rates of homicide (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Pratt & Godsey, 2002). One area of research which has not garnered as much attention is whether social welfare may condition the relationship between Protestantism and lower rates of homicide. If social welfare conditions the link between economic inequality and lower

rates of homicide (Savolainen, 2000), perhaps it may have a similar effect on Protestantism. Given the potential association between Protestantism and the free market (Weber, 1904-1905), it would appear plausible that social welfare through its collective focus might offset the divisiveness stemming from Protestant pluralism.

Non-economic institutions cannot function properly in environments marked by a high degree of religious pluralism, because institutional norms are not reinforced by a unified and solitary value structure (Berger & Luckmann, 1969; Parsons, 1966; 1982). Societal norms lack stability and are less appealing to individuals when they are guided by multiple value structures (Parsons, 1982). Since they are the product of human beings and constantly changing, social institutions require the legitimacy from a stable force such as religion in order to function properly (Berger, 1967). Religious legitimacy may grant child-bearing practices within the family institution a certain divine creativity and bestow a certain divine authority upon the power of the political institution (Berger, 1967; Eisenstadt, 1973). However, a religion such as Protestantism that is structurally differentiated cannot uniformly legitimize a societyôs institutional structure by ensuring that economic norms do not take precedence over non-economic norms (Berger, 1967). It is not only the structure of Protestantism which legitimizes the dominance of a free market economy, but the values and virtues which underlie the religion.

In his seminal yet contentious work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber (1904-1905) attempts to draw a parallel between the value orientations underlying Protestantism and the development of modern day capitalism. Weber (1904-1905) is not suggesting that Protestantism caused capitalism, but rather that the value orientations which underlie Protestantism are in line with the tenets of a free

market economy (Fischoff, 1959). Through the Reformation Protestants did not intend to encourage capitalism (Gerth & Mills, 1964; Hill, 1973), but the emphasis on individualism and dedication to oneôs calling were in line with the development of a free market economy (Weber, 1904-1905). A key starting point for Weber (1904-1905) in his attempt to draw a link between Protestantism and capitalism is the Protestant promotion of individualism.

Protestant emphasis on personal pursuits of salvation developed in tandem with the individualistic focus of a free market economy (Peck, 1993). This shift from the Church to the individual following the Reformation permitted individuals to work towards attaining salvation in areas other than religion. With the focus being on the individual, Protestants advocated for a certain ascetic or highly disciplined approach in oneôs worldly endeavors as a means to attain Godôs salvation (Schneider, 1970; Hill, 1973). Weber (1959) took notice of this highly disciplined approach to life emphasized by Protestants, and he links this approach to the rationalism and methodical behavior required for the development of modern day capitalism (Gerth & Mills, 1964; Yinger, 1970). This systematic or highly disciplined approach also converted oneôs involvement in a free market economy into a vocation intended to honor and glorify God (Weber, 1964). To overcome the temptations associated with acquiring wealth through oneôs involvement in a free market economy, Weber (1904-1905) explains how Protestants justified this result of their labor through the doctrine of Predestination.

Under the doctrine of Predestination Protestants could feel that by gaining material wealth through their work, they were serving a higher purpose (Vernon, 1962). Weber (1904-1905) discusses how the doctrine characterizes individuals as either blessed

or damned in the eyes of God. Those who are able to attain wealth are viewed as blessed or one of Godôs chosen elect (Weber, 1904-1905). Material wealth acquisition was no longer seen as an end in itself (Weber, 1964), and religious justification could now be applied to the capitalist drive for profit (Weber, 1969). However, at some point Protestant values and virtues could not restrain the temptations stimulated by the accrual of material wealth (Hyma, 1959; Bell, 1973). This Protestant promotion of individualism and the freedom it engenders may create an environment where morals are replaced by worldly desires (DeTocqueville, 1835; Bell, 1973). While Protestantism attempts to link Godôs salvation with the attainment of material wealth, it is difficult to reconcile religious virtue with the wants and desires stimulated by this wealth (Yinger, 1970). Weber (1904-1905) did not suggest that Protestantism would be linked to higher crime levels through its justification of material wealth acquisition (Nelson, 1973). He did, however, believe that over time this justification would undermine the Protestant mission of working to glorify God (Vernon, 1962; Schneider, 1970). Given the fact that material wealth may override institutional norms (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997), it is my contention that Protestantism contributes to higher rates of crime and violence by legitimizing the dominance of a free market economy.

Capitalism existed prior to the Reformation and it could be found in Catholic monasteries in 9th century Europe (Fenn, 2009; Stark, 2005). In the 11th and 12th centuries Catholic monasteries began to provide credit and lend at interest after amassing great wealth by transforming subsistence agriculture into a cash economy through the selling of crops (Facchini, 2010; Stark, 2005). Even though Catholic theologians before and after the Reformation were more open to a free market economy than their

contemporaries, Catholicism has cautioned against the potential deleterious effects of unrestrained capitalism. Pope John Paul II acknowledged the capacity of capitalism to promote human knowledge, creativity, and innovation. However, to prevent economic dominance he warned that a free market economy must be counter-balanced by the protection of human rights and the influence of moral and cultural institutions (Novak, 1993). Other aspects of Catholicism highlight its lack of compatibility with a free market economy. Unlike Protestantism, Catholicism does not maintain the idea that economic success is a sign of Godôs approval (Mentzer, 1988). Within the New Testament Catholics are guided by the theme of indifference to worldly matters (Weber, 1993). Also, the Catholic approach to salvation which relies on the supernatural contrasts with the rationalism that is required within the free market (Weber, 1904-1905).

A Catholic social ethic in the 20th century (Face, 1969; Novak, 1993) and during the medieval period (Fanfani, 1935; Nanini, 2011; Stark, 2005) was focused on the ideas of charity, social justice, responsibility, and character rather than the growth of a free market economy. Societal growth according to Catholicism is not defined by economic advancement, and Catholics believed that the state should have the capability to intervene in economic activities that might create debilitating social inequalities (Fanfani, 1935; Greeley, 1989). Between 1960 and 1990 Catholic countries displayed higher social security expenditure levels than non-Catholic nations (Castles, 1994). In fact, many Catholic nations have become Christian Democratic welfare states that support just wages for employees and social insurance schemes to be provided by employers (Esping-Anderson & Van Kersbergen, 1992).

A free market economy was not fully endorsed by the Christian Orthodox Church,

but the Church was somewhat receptive to it at the very least. Due to the association between a free market and democratic values, the Orthodox Church can accommodate itself to this type of economic system (Kokosalakis, 1996). For the most part though, capitalism developed later in countries where the Orthodox Church is dominant compared to Western Europe (Dobrijevic, 2006). This is due to Weberôs (1978) claim that Orthodox Christianity is not structured for the pursuit of wealth due to its mystical nature and concern for matters not of this world. Through its association with mysticism (Weber, 1978) and its communitarian focus, Orthodox Christianity does not support the rational and individualistic approach required for a free market economy (Makrides, 2005). Also, a heavy emphasis on tradition within the Orthodox Church hinders its ability to promote an innovative spirit necessary for the free market (Kokosalakis, 1996; Makrides, 2005). A free market economy could never develop in Orthodox countries like it did in much of Protestant western Europe due to the fact that the Orthodox Church never legitimized economic activity and success as a sign of Godôs grace (Buss, 1989a; Dobrijevic, 2006).

Jewish involvement in a free market economy has historically been linked to their exclusion from the political sphere (Muller, 2010). Judaism has an orientation directed toward matters of this world (Troeltsch, 1969; Weber, 1904-1905; 1952), and adherents of Judaism in the Middle Ages were engaged in commercial capitalism with their banking, money-lending, and investment practices (Weber, 1958). Within Judaism, initiative and economic freedom are highly valued, but an individualôs chances of salvation are not predicated upon their economic performance (Goodman, 1996). Weber (1904-1905) explains that Judaism made it possible for the individual to achieve Godôs

blessing through the study of religious law and not solely through activity in a free market economy. Unlike Puritanism, Judaism did not have a distinct economic ethic or the idea of predestination since salvation was a collective phenomenon for the Jewish people (Weber, 1904-1905; 1993). Also, due to their status as pariah people, or those with little political power, adherents of Judaism could not be the forerunners for the manufacturing and industrial production characteristic of modern capitalism (Bennion, 1992; Buss, 1989b; Weber, 1993). Rather than promoting the competitive individualism necessary for modern capitalism, Judaism emphasizes an ethic of solidarity and charity (Sombart, 1913; Weber, 1952; 1993). Judaism has historically been linked to the welfare state (Lenski, 1963) and has been an ardent supporter of social justice (Morris, 1996).

Like Puritanism, Islam has an active and this-worldly ethic which facilitates engagement in a free market economy (Turner, 1974a; 1992). Turner (1974b) notes that capitalism under Islam was driven by individualism, an achievement orientation, and a division of labor which weakened morality levels in areas like Mecca during the Middle Ages. However, an association between Islam and capitalism is not supported due to the type of political structure found in many Islamic societies. Foreign troops in many Islamic countries established patrimonial bureaucracies which hindered the growth of capitalism, rational law, and cities in these areas (Turner, 1974b; 1992). Under patrimonial rule, Islamic rulers replaced rational law with arbitrariness and permitted their troops to take control of the property within cities (Turner, 1974b; 1992). These efforts to move away from rationalism and the individual accumulation of capital assets impeded the ability of Islam to facilitate the industrialization characteristic of modern capitalism (Turner, 1974b). Restrictions were also placed on the ability to amass great

wealth under Islam with taxation on wealth and income enforced to help those less fortunate and to preserve the public good (Hefner, 2008).

Hinduism is a religion that is not particularly conducive to the development of a free market economy. Contemplation rather than active involvement in the world is the focus of Hinduism (Bennion, 1992; Elder, 1996; Yinger, 1957). Through its disengagement from the world, Hinduism cannot promote the rationalism required for the development of a free market economy (Gellner, 1996). Any semblance of capitalism in India during the Middle Ages according to Weber (1958) occurred through the influence of outsiders such as the English since Hinduism was primarily based on tradition and ritual. This emphasis on ritual highlights the spiritual and supernatural emphasis within Hinduism which creates an impediment toward seeking Godôs favor through any methodical or rationalized economic ethic (Long, 2005). Hinduism also has a pragmatic view of oneôs vocation, seeing it solely as a means to sustain oneôs self rather than attaching any higher religious meaning to it (Weber, 1993).

Certain aspects of Buddhism are conducive to the development of a free market economy. Buddhism values hard work and individual initiative (Parboteeah, 2009), and the Buddhist monastic orders in Japan value technological innovation, reinvestment of profits, a disciplined work ethic, and an emphasis on saving oneôs earnings (Fenn, 2009; Obadia, 2011). On the other hand, there are more aspects of Buddhism which highlight how it in fact does not shape a free market economy. Contrary to other research, Bennion (1992) explains that Buddhism offers no divine favor upon individuals who attain economic success. Instead of rationalized economic conduct, Buddhism promotes contemplation and meditation as ways to attain salvation (Bennion, 1992; Weber, 1958).

A lack of action is promoted by Buddhism in order to temper an individualôs wants and desires including those related to material wealth (Weber, 1958). Buddhism also opposes capitalism due to the lack of morality that arises from the consumerism, individualism, and highly competitive pursuit of wealth in the free market (Obadia, 2011). Rather than encourage the pursuit of economic success, Buddhism focuses on social justice and charitable giving with oneôs wealth (Pryor, 1990; Whelan, 2008).

CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Individualism: In the present study I examine both egoistic and moral individualism. Egoistic or excessive individualism is characterized by a lack of attachments to others (Durkheim, 1897; Stark & Bainbridge, 1996) and is based on self-interest with individual wants and desires being the focal point (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1986; DeTocqueville, 1835; Pickering, 1984). It is the expectation that the Protestant promotion of individualism will eventually lead to more of the egoistic or excessive type which may facilitate higher rates of homicide (Kornhauser, 1978; Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008). Moral or cooperative individualism, on the other hand, involves compassion for others and a mutual respect between individuals that cultivates a sense of social solidarity (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008). Durkheim (1900) suggests that through its civilizing quality, moral individualism may be linked with lower homicide rates. One line of thought is that Protestantism promotes moral rather than egoistic individualism (Eisner, 2003a; Messner, 1982).

Secularization: Secularization refers to the process whereby religion loses its influence at both the cultural and institutional levels of society (Berger, 1967; Budd, 1973; Fenn, 2009). This process may vary across countries (Davie & Woodhead, 2009)

and between different religions (Turner, 1974b). While secularism refers to sentiments in opposition of religion, secularization is the actual or practical realization of this opposition within different segments of society (Davie & Woodhead, 2009). Under secularization religious beliefs and values can no longer supply individuals and institutions with meaning and legitimacy (Turner, 1974b; 1992). Religion becomes relegated to the private sphere of society through the secularization process (Turner, 2011). One of the reasons the secularization process has been able to take shape and religion has shifted to the private sphere is the rationalization of religion (Fenn, 2009; Makrides, 2005). With more rationalism, religion loses its sacred character as rituals intended to foster collective solidarity are de-emphasized and replaced with more individualistic practices (Berger, 1967; Turner, 1974b). Due to its highly rationalistic and individualistic approach to exhibiting oneôs faith, Protestantism has been viewed as a religion that may serve as a catalyst for the secularization process.

Religious Pluralism: Religious pluralism refers to the tolerance and acceptance of other religions besides oneôs own, and the belief that these other religions provide a certain measure of truth and value for those who adhere to them (Long, 2005; Williams, 2015). With religious pluralism there is religious diversity or the presence of different religions in the same environment, but religious diversity does not necessarily imply that there is religious pluralism. Ideas related to the development of religious pluralism include freedom (Stark, 2005), individual choice (Bellah et al., 1985), and equality (Lubarsky, 2005). Despite appearing to represent pro-social aspects of society, there are divergent viewpoints concerning the social outcomes related to religious pluralism. Davie and Woodhead (2009) explain that from a rational choice perspective, religious

pluralism facilitates the growth of religion and strengthens its influence across societies. On the other hand, other research has suggested that higher levels of religious pluralism indicate a weakened ability of religion to operate as an influential force within society (Berger, 1967). Durkheim (1915) extended this idea even further and suggested that religious pluralism was tied to a lack of societal cohesion. In line with this idea, Protestantism with its high level of religious pluralism may contribute to higher homicide rates by disrupting the social bonds within societies.

Economic Dominance: Economic dominance occurs when a societyôs free market economy penetrates, devalues, and forces the other non-economic institutions to make accommodations to it (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007). A dominant free market economy creates an unbalanced institutional structure (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001) where non-economic institutions cannot function normally and impart adequate levels of social control (Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997). Higher levels of crime and violence occur due to the weakened functioning of non-economic institutions coupled with an anomic or deregulated social environment stemming from the dominance of a free market economy (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001). In particular, Messner and Rosenfeld (2004) suggest that economic dominance will be linked to more individualistic and predatory crimes such as homicide. Higher levels of egoistic or disintegrative individualism have been identified as facilitating the dominance of a free market economy (Messner, Thome, & Rosenfeld, 2008), but this may be a somewhat incomplete picture. It may be that Protestant individualism becomes egoistic and in turn creates a highly secularized environment where religion becomes a matter of choice reflected in higher levels of religious pluralism. More religious pluralism legitimizes and becomes reflected in a differentiated

institutional structure that permits the free market to exert its dominance.

Social Welfare: In the present study social welfare is assessed at the public and private levels. Public measures of social welfare may include governmental expenditures on matters such as health and education. Social welfare measured from a nationôs political system has been linked with lower rates of homicide (Pratt & Godsey, 2002) and has attenuated the link between higher inequality levels and an increase in national homicide rates (Pratt & Godsey, 2003). Social welfare at the private level refers to the contributions of individuals to aid other members of society that is distinct from the contributions from entities such as the government (Chamlin & Cochran, 1997). Forms of social welfare at the private level may include helping others in some manner or donating oneôs time and or money to charities. Within the U.S., social welfare assessed at the private level has been found to be associated with lower violent and property crime levels (Chamlin & Cochran, 1997). Public measures of social welfare condition the association between economic dominance and lower rates of homicide (Savolainen, 2000), but there have been fewer studies that examine how private measures may impact this relationship. In the present study, the integrative capacity of social welfare may elicit the humanitarian aspects of Protestantism that create an environment conducive to lower rates of homicide.

SUMMARY

In figure 1 on page 40 the relationship between Protestantism and homicide is examined in several ways. Before discussing the various ways Protestantism may be linked to homicide, a disclaimer must be rendered regarding the nature of this association. This study does not contend that there is anything inherently criminogenic within individuals who adhere to Protestantism. Nor does this study suggest that

individuals who adhere to Protestantism are more homicidal than others. Rather, this study is concerned with how Protestantism through its structure and values creates an environment that is conducive to the commission of homicide. Protestantism as a world religion does not aim to contribute to higher rates of homicide, but the manifestation of the structure of Protestantism and its values within society has transformed them into mechanisms that may facilitate homicide. In effect, this process is similar to Mertonôs paradox of social action where the realization of values eventually leads to their abandonment (Schneider, 1970). With higher levels of Protestantism there may also be a higher likelihood of more Protestant homicide offenders, but higher levels of Protestantism may also create an environment that increases the likelihood of homicide offenders irrespective of their religious affiliation.

In figure 1 below a direct relationship exists between Protestantism and homicide with higher levels of Protestantism being associated with higher rates of homicide. Protestantism is also linked to higher rates of homicide indirectly through its promotion of a highly individualistic and secularized social environment. There is also a conditioning effect in the figure with Protestantism facilitating the relationship between dominant economic conditions and homicide. Given the connection between Protestantism and a free market economy (Weber, 1904-1905) one might surmise that a direct relationship between Protestantism and economic dominance would be included in the theoretical model. A lack of a direct relationship between Protestantism and economic dominance is further magnified by the fact that a direct relationship is drawn between Protestantism and both individualism and secularization in the model. Yet, there are a couple of reasons for not including a direct relationship between Protestantism and

Figure 1. Theoretical Model



economic dominance in the theoretical model. Prior cross-national research has identified the ability of social welfare to inhibit homicide and to weaken the positive relationship between economic dominance and homicide (Pratt & Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000). Based off this prior work, the present study seeks to examine whether Protestantism which is anticipated to facilitate homicide might condition the positive relationship between economic dominance and homicide.

Aside from prior work looking at the relationship between economic dominance and homicide, a lack of a direct relationship between Protestantism and economic dominance is due to the contention surrounding some of Weberôs (1904-1905) claims. Critics have levied a litany of objections concerning the connection Weber (1904-1905)

attempts to make between Protestantism and the development of modern capitalism. Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner (1986) suggest that Weber (1904-1905) was not clear in outlining how individual motives and attitudes mediate the relationship between religious doctrines and economic practices. Aside from Weberôs (1904-1905) lack of clarity other research has pointed to the fact that the attributes of Protestantism which Weber (1904-1905) claims facilitate the development of modern capitalism may have actually existed before the formation of Protestantism. Delacroix and Nielsen (2001) note that aspects of modern capitalism such as individual enterprise, commercial profit, and speculation actually existed in the 12th century in Italian city-states. Critics have also called into question the accuracy of some of Weberôs (1904-1905) claims. Several researchers have pointed out that the idea that economic success is a sign of Godôs blessing did not come from the leader of Calvinism, John Calvin, but rather is attributed to the Calvinist leader, Richard Baxter, 150 years after Calvin (Fullerton, 1959; Hudson, 1959; Johnstone, 1992).

Even with the inconsistencies that have been identified with Weberôs (1904-1905) thesis, researchers have pointed to other factors which may account for the rise of modern capitalism. Rather than religious beliefs and values giving rise to modern capitalism, Fanfani (1984) claims that changes and advancements within the economy are responsible for the rise of modern capitalism. Fanfani (1984) also suggests like Eisenstadt (1969) and Robertson (1959) that the aspects of Protestantism which Weber (1904-1905) claims are conducive to the development of modern capitalism could actually be found within Catholicism in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries. In terms of considering the role of other religions, Sombart (1959) even suggests that Judaism rather than Puritanism might have aided the development of modern capitalism through its

cultivation of a spirit of enterprise and speculation. Due to the many criticisms of Weberôs (1904-1905) thesis, its relevancy as an explanation for the rise of modern capitalism has waned over time. Even contemporary survey research at the individual and national levels has not identified Protestants as having more pro-market attitudes or beliefs compared to other religious groups (Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2011).

Despite the considerable amount of objection to Weberôs (1904-1905) thesis, its value for the present study is based on the approach one may take in understanding Weberôs (1904-1905) rationale. Rather than viewing Weberôs (1904-1905) work as an attempt to identify Protestantism as the cause of the rise of modern capitalism, it is important to consider the idea of elective affinity. In his attempt to link Protestantism with modern capitalism Weber (1904-1905) was basing this connection off the idea of elective affinity where individuals select out certain aspects of religion that fit with their economic interests (Hansen, 1973; Hill, 1973). Through the idea of elective affinity, Weber (1904-1905) was simply attempting to highlight the congruence between various principles of Protestantism and economic motivations. Thus, capitalism did not arise out of Protestantism but rather Protestant beliefs and values were able to condition the development of modern capitalism (Tawney, 1959). Weber (1904-1905) was suggesting that Protestantism might be conducive to the growth of the free market. This idea of Protestantism being conducive to rather than responsible for economic dominance is consistent with Bergerôs (1967) discussion of religion legitimizing but not necessarily promoting the functioning of social institutions. In terms of legitimization, this would suggest that Protestantism might validate economic dominance and in turn amplify its relationship with cross-national rates of homicide.

Thus, Protestantism does not directly promote economic dominance in its relationship with homicide but rather supports economic dominance and concomitantly incites its positive relationship with homicide. It is for these reasons that Protestantism serves to condition the relationship between economic dominance and homicide rather than being directly linked to economic dominance in a mediation model. Also in the theoretical model above, social welfare interacts with Protestantism to produce a decline in homicide. Protestantism through its values orientations may foster a social environment that is conducive to homicide, but social welfare may be a means to offset the crime facilitating capacities of these values. Figure 1 above does not include direct, indirect, or conditional effects of the other major world religions on the rates of homicide cross-nationally.

A direct positive relationship between Protestantism and homicide in figure 1 on page 40 stems from the high degree of religious pluralism that is found within Protestantism. Pluralism emanating from Protestantism is more likely to be linked to higher rates of homicide than the pluralism comprised of the different world religions. This is due to the fact that unlike the pluralism based on different world religions, the pluralism within Protestantism is rooted in both individualism and the secularization process. Unlike Protestantism, religious pluralism is not a defining characteristic of Roman Catholicism or Orthodox Christianity. Orthodox Judaism opposes religious pluralism due to its emphasis on authority and tradition (Kunin, 2009). In Islam religious pluralism exists with various sects, but Islamic pluralism is based on adherence to different spiritual leaders rather than actual differences in scriptural doctrine (Bulliet, 1996; Casanova, 2001). Complete acceptance of religious pluralism does not exist in

Hinduism (Long, 2005). Religious pluralism which exists in Hinduism differs from that of Protestantism since the state exerts a strong influence over religion in countries like India (Madan, 1997). Even though religious pluralism exists in Buddhism, the focus within Buddhism is on matters outside of this world (Hayes, 1991). For the other major world religions besides Protestantism, religious pluralism either does not exist or is not fully supported to the same degree as it is within Protestantism.

Protestantism is linked to higher rates of homicide cross-nationally through its promotion of individualism which may become egoistic or excessive. There may be variation in the level of individualism across different Protestant denominations (MacCulloch, 2003). Yet, in the present study Protestantism is viewed as cultivating individualism due to the shift in focus from the Church to the individual through the Reformation. Each of the major world religions has some level or degree of individualism (Durkheim, 1915). For example, the practice of confessing oneôs sins within Catholicism may have reinforced the idea of the morality of individual (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1986). In light of this, Catholicism is still able to hinder the spread of individualism as the Church serves as an intermediary in the relationship between the individual and God (Vernon, 1962; Woodhead, 2009). This emphasis on the Church within Catholicism reinforces the idea of group membership and impedes the ability of Catholicism to influence homicide levels through the promotion of individualism. Like Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity de-emphasizes individualism in favor of a communitarian focus (Makrides, 2005).

For Judaism, the Old Testament discusses individualism and freedom in action (Berger, 1967) stemming from the historical persecution of the Jewish people in lands

such as Egypt (Goodman, 1996). While individualism is present within Judaism, this type of individualism is shaped by the community context which is a central focus for the Jewish people (Goodman, 1996; Williams, 2015). Islam attempts to preserve its unity by granting rights not to individuals but rather to its community of believers (Badie, 1986; Maila, 1991). Individualism is also not fully endorsed within Hinduism since oneôs religious identity within Hinduism is defined through their social connections with others (Cohen & Hill, 2007). A certain level of individualism exists within Buddhism due to the fact that its adherents must rely on themselves for their own salvation rather than Godôs saving grace (Thurman, 1996). Yet, in Buddhism special attention is directed toward each individual so that he or she may work to promote an environment of selflessness that will translate into an ethic of brotherly love (Weber, 1958; 1993).

In figure 1 on page 40 Protestantism is linked to higher rates of homicide through its promotion of a highly secularized social environment. In contrast to Protestantism, Catholicism with its sacraments or group rituals has managed to eschew the secularization process by reinforcing religionôs goal of promoting collective sentiments (Parsons, 1964a). Orthodox Christianity has also hindered the secularization process by promoting mystical and spiritual values through its alliance with the state in many eastern European countries (Dobrijevic, 2006). One religion that may facilitate the secularization process to a greater degree than other religions is Judaism. Among the 15 million Jewish people around the world many have become more secular by moving away from traditional religious authoritarian structures in favor of more individualistic approaches to religion (Kunin, 2009). At the cultural level, secularization is evident within Judaism as modern Jewish individuals tend to score low on measures of religious belief and practice

(Beit-Hallahmi, 2007). From an institutional perspective, Herberg (1955) notes how in the U.S. Judaism has ushered in the secularization process through their support of the separation of Church and state. In the early 21st century within the U.S. Williams (2015) explains Jewish involvement in the secularization process by describing an internal struggle within Judaism. Williams (2015) suggests that the link between Judaism and secularization is based on the fact that the mission of Judaism to resolve societal injustices must be accomplished without the hindrance of any religious heritage or ethnic identity.

Due to the history of oppression against the Jewish people, modern Judaism has become involved in secularized movements to facilitate social justice. Involvement in these movements has permitted adherents of Judaism to promote values of equality and justice without having their religious heritage create any social divisions. In effect, Judaism aims to improve society without imposing its religious identity like its oppressors throughout history. This promotion of social justice through secularized movements may also be seen as a means for adherents of Judaism to fulfill the prophetic mission within the religion (Williams, 2015). Despite being linked to secularization, Judaism has also attempted to impede this process by focusing on themes of solidarity and brotherhood following the Jewish exile from Israel (Parsons, 1964a). Thus, even with its link to the secularization process Judaism still reinforces the core principle of religion to act as a unifying and collective entity through its promotion of an inclusive society. It would appear unlikely that Judaism would be linked to higher rates of homicide through its promotion of the secularization process since fostering a sense of community remains an integral part of Judaism.

Contemporary research would suggest that Israel is a highly secularized nation (Zuckerman, 2009) given that seventy-five percent of its citizens claim to be ñnot religiousò (Dashefsky et al., 2003). Yet, the secularization process within modern Israel has not been fully embraced due to the fact that Israel as a nation-state is founded upon a religious rather than secular ideology (Swatos, 1996). With a religious ideology as its foundation, sentiments of nationalism within Israel cannot be fully detached from a religious identity centered upon Judaism. Further evidence of the lack of complete acceptance of the secularization process within Israel is seen in the high degree of religious pluralism within the country particularly among non-orthodox movements (Kunin, 2009). This highlights how citizens of Israel are receptive to the modern process of secularization and have attempted to interweave aspects of it with traditional conceptions of religion. Secularization has also not been able to take shape within Islam due to the fact that Islam has aligned itself with a societyôs political structure to ensure its continued influence within the public sphere (Selengut, 2009). For Hinduism its spiritual rather than rational nature makes it less susceptible to secularization (Smith, 1963). Like Hinduism, Buddhism is able to avoid becoming secularized by moving away from rationalistic tendencies and instead emphasizing spirituality and otherworldly matters (Weber, 1993).

Through its interaction with the dominance of a free market economy, Protestantism may contribute to higher rates of homicide. However, higher levels of social welfare may foster a negative relationship between Protestantism and homicide. Through its emphasis on the sacraments and their supernatural character, Catholicism lacks the rationalism necessary for the growth of a free market economy (Buss, 2000;

Cohen, 1980). Also, charity and social justice serve as primary tenets of Catholicism (Face, 1969; Novak, 1993). Capitalism is also not legitimized by Orthodox Christianity, since this religion is highly mystical and emphasizes communitarianism over any competitive individualism (Weber, 1978). Like Orthodox Christianity, Judaism does not support the competitive individualism necessary for the development of a free market economy and instead emphasizes an ethic of social solidarity and charity (Sombart, 1913; Weber, 1952; 1993).

Robertson (1933) suggests that the rational capitalism displayed by western European Christians may have been influenced by Muslim Arabs and Syrians who began to acquire business shares through capital investments. Even with these financial practices, the structure of Islam did not permit its adherents to have active and prominent roles within the modern free market. A concern for all of its adherents renders Islam incapable of legitimizing the institutional dominance of a free market economy that may create extensive financial disparities and lead to an increase in the rates of homicide. An ability to amass great wealth through oneôs involvement in the free market does not exist within Islam, but rather taxes are imposed on oneôs wealth to ensure that those less fortunate are granted financial support (Hefner, 2008). For Hinduism, its focus on spirituality and contemplation limit its ability to furnish the rationalism necessary for the functioning of a free market economy (Bennion, 1992; Elder, 1996; Yinger, 1957). Like Hinduism, Buddhism is also characterized by contemplation and meditation rather than rational conduct. Through its contemplative focus Buddhism also encourages charity and social justice within societies (Pryor, 1990; Whelan, 2008).

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.) Are higher levels of any of the major world religions within a country associated with higher rates of homicide? Religions like Protestantism that display a high level of religious pluralism may promote weakened bonds to conventional values through their competing value structures (Wuthnow, 2005).

2.) Are higher levels of Protestantism within a country associated with higher levels of individualism? Protestantism promotes a sense of individualism due to the fact that it makes the individual solely responsible for the understanding and implementation of their faith in the hope of gaining Godôs favor.

3.) Does individualism mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide? Individualism may link Protestantism with homicide by attenuating the bonds between societyôs members, which in turn reduce the stakes in conformity and increase the possibility of violent crimes such as homicide.

4.) Are higher levels of Protestantism within a country associated with higher levels of secularization? Protestantism has cultivated a secularized social environment by removing many of the sacraments that serve as mediations linking the individual with God (Berger, 1967).

5.) Does secularization mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide? Secularization may link Protestantism with homicide by inhibiting the promotion of morality which causes societies to become unstable (Berger, 1967) and without effective restraints over individual behavior.

6.) Do higher levels of Protestantism condition the relationship between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide? Pluralism within Protestantism will become reflected in a differentiated institutional structure (Parsons, 1964a) which is tilted

in favor of a free market economy. This dominant position of the free market economy will facilitate homicide by weakening the socialization capabilities of the other social institutions (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007).

7.) Do higher levels of social welfare condition the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and lower rates of homicide? Social welfare through its inclusive focus may curtail some of the excessive individualism (Wuthnow, 1991) stemming from Protestantism. When excessive or egoistic individualism subsides, the moral individualism within Protestantism may be able to contribute to lower rates of homicide (Eisner, 2003).

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In the present study religious and other social data have been collected on eighty-six countries from three waves of the World Values Survey (WVS). Survey years in the analysis include 1995, 2000, and 2005. Countries are chosen as the unit of analysis since concepts such as economic dominance require an examination of the institutional balance of power at the national level (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001). The WVS is a nationally representative survey in ninety-seven societies which began in 1981 covering a variety of topics including religion, political participation, environmental protection, and work motivations (WVS, 2008). Face to face interviews with individuals ranging in age from eighteen to eighty-five are conducted by local field organizations under the supervision of academic researchers. Random probability samples are attempted when possible through the use of voting stations, population registers, census units, and statistical regions (WVS, 2008). Samples range in size from 500 to 3,500 respondents.

WVS researchers employ quota sampling in their multi-stage sampling design where no fewer than thirty primary sampling units are randomly selected within each country (WVS, 2008). After the selection of primary sampling units, random sampling is also used for the selection of smaller clusters within these units. With quota sampling strong efforts are made to interview first contacts, which may explain the high response rates for the countries in the sample. Response rates vary by country, but for the years, 1995, 2000, and 2005 the average response rate for countries in the current study is 73% (WVS, 2014). For the countries in the sample, response rates ranged from a high of 100% in Indonesia to a low of 15% in Tanzania. A principal investigator must fill out country specific information along with a questionnaire related to their survey methods

before accessing data from the surveys. Internal consistency checks are also conducted between the sampling design and the outcome data to ensure reliability in the survey (WVS, 2014).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

In the present study the dependent variable is the homicide rate per 100,000 population, and it comes from the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime Statistics. Homicide is defined by the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime Statistics as intentional homicide or unlawful death purposefully inflicted on one individual by another. To limit the effect of yearly fluctuations on the homicide rate, multi-year averages are taken over the study period 1995-2005 and for 2006 and 2007 in cases where there were missing data. Limitations with the use of the homicide rate as a sole measure of violent crime have been noted in prior research (Felson, Berg, & Rogers, 2014). However, homicide is selected as the outcome measure in this study due to its definitional consistency (Kick & LaFree, 1985) and reliability in terms of its measurement (Rosenfeld, 2009; LaFree, 1999; Gartner, 1990).

WORLD RELIGIONS

Durkheim (1897) has acknowledged the challenges in attempting to measure moral or cultural phenomena such as religion. Measurement of the major world religions and Protestantism in particular has been based on the fact that individualism is a focal point of the present study. Individualism has a main role in facilitating the development of the secularization process, religious pluralism, and the dominance of a free market economy. In fact, Durkheim (1897) has suggested that religions may be distinguished from one another based on their relationship with the concept of individualism. This

perspective coupled with the fact that Protestantism promotes individualism (Durkheim, 1897), factors into the selection of the measures used to capture the major world religions. In particular, in the present study Protestantism is measured in the WVS through the proportion responding Protestant to the question asking respondents if they belong to a religious denomination and if so which one? Prior research has also measured Protestantism through the proportion of the population claiming Protestant affiliation (Messner, 1982; Taylor & Hudson, 1972).

In an effort to ensure that the ability of religion to facilitate higher rates of homicide is not solely attributed to Protestantism; I have gathered data on the other major world religions. From the WVS, I have gathered data on the proportion Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian Orthodox. These well-known religions were included in an effort to determine whether they may also contain values which are conducive to homicide. If these other religions are shown to be associated with higher rates of homicide, then perhaps there may be some facet of organized religion which facilitates criminal behavior. I also include the proportion atheist, or those who do not believe in God, from the World Values Survey. With the proportion atheist included, I am able to compare the effect on homicide of those who adhere to the major religions with those who lack religious sentiment.

INDIVIDUALISM

In the present study egoistic individualism is measured through the proportion responding ñneed to be very carefulò in response to the WVS question asking whether ñmost people can be trusted or one must be very careful in dealing with people?ò This measure involving a lack of trust in others may be representative of egoistic

individualism since it captures the lack of social solidarity characteristic of this type of individualism (Bellah et al., 1985; Messner, Thome, Rosenfeld, 2008). A lack of trust in others may also illustrate egoistic or excessive individualism by highlighting an environment marked by weak social bonds between individuals (Hirschi, 1969). As the antithesis of egoistic individualism, moral individualism is assessed with a measure that has been shown to be associated with lower homicide rates at the national level (Karstedt, 2001). This alternative measure of individualism that is used in supplementary analyses comes from Hofstede (1980) who assessed the attitudes of employees at IBM in 39 countries in the late 60ôs and early 70ôs. Through these surveys Hofstede (1980) developed an individualism/collectivism dimension with the individualism component dealing with concern for oneôs self and close family members. In terms of the collectivism dimension, it represents having in-group beliefs and being protected by oneôs in-group.

Hofstedeôs (1984) individualism/collectivism dimension measures high quality of life from an individualistic perspective through individual success, achievement, and self-actualization. Quality of life from a collectivistic perspective on the other hand is grounded within family and group dynamics. Individualistic goals from the IBM surveys focus on oneôs time, freedom, and personal challenges and abilities (Hofstede, 2001). Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism may be used as a measure of moral individualism since it distinguishes respect for universal human rights from bonds based on kinship or ethnic ties (Karstedt, 1999). This measure of individualism from Hofstede (1980) is in line with Durkheimôs (1893) conception of moral individualism which focuses on the dignity and the value of each individual. Higher scores on this dimension

indicate a higher level of individualism with values ranging from 0 to 100 (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Hofstede (1980) uses matched and representative samples in his survey about culture with similar individuals from managerial and non-managerial positions across different countries. Individualism and collectivism are measured as opposite poles of one dimension since Hofstede (1980) used societies rather than individuals as his unit of analysis. This is due to the fact that unlike individuals, societies do not vary in terms of their values and can only be either individualistic or collectivistic but not both (Hofstede et al., 2010). While it is true that different subgroups within a society may hold differing or conflicting values, Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism uses aggregate responses to characterize nations as either individualistic or collectivistic. Since nations and not individuals are the unit of analysis (Hofstede et al., 2010), Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism is examined as one dimension for the purpose of examining similarities and differences between societal cultures. Countries are characterized as individualistic if the average of the individual responses correlates more strongly with individualistic work goals (Hofstede et al., 2010).

In results not shown I attempted to examine the bivariate relationship between the proportion who believe that individuals need to be careful rather than trusting of others and Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism. This was done to ensure that each measure was a suitable proxy for their respective form of individualism. As anticipated there is a significant negative correlation between Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism and the lack of trust measure from the WVS (r = -.363, p < .01). This lends some credence to the idea that egoistic individualism serves as the antithesis of

moral individualism (Durkheim, 1973) and illustrates how each measure represents opposing forms of individualism. Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism and the egoistic measure of individualism from the WVS were also assessed with measures of family individualism from the WVS in an effort to discern their differential effects.

Lack of trust in others was negatively correlated with the belief that children should be taught independence. Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism was positively correlated with those that approve of a woman wanting to have a child as a single parent. These concepts focusing on independence and single parenthood may illustrate measures of family individualism since they highlight the value placed upon autonomy and freedom of choice. One family individualism measure that highlights the differential effects and distinguishing forms of these types of individualism is the proportion that disagree that a child needs a mother and father to grow up happily. Hofstedeôs measure was positively correlated with this measure ($r = .380$, $p < .01$), while lack of trust from the WVS displayed a negative correlation with this measure ($r = -.188$, $p < .10$). Positive correlations between Hofstedeôs measure and these measures of family individualism illustrate the value and the potential of the individual which is the focus of moral individualism (Durkheim, 1973). Lack of trust in others appears suitable as a proxy measure of egoistic individualism since it may represent the antithesis of moral individualism. These negative correlations with measures of family individualism highlight how the lack of trust measure opposes the value of personal initiative and the inherent quality of the individual characteristic of moral individualism (Durkheim, 1973).

SECULARIZATION

In the present analysis secularization as a latent construct is comprised of four

measures from the WVS. These measures are reverse coded and they include the proportion who state that religion is very important in their lives; the proportion who state that they attend religious service more than once a week or once a week; the proportion who state that God is very important in their lives; and the proportion who consider themselves to be a religious person. These measures may provide an indication of the level of secularization and link Protestantism with higher rates of homicide by weakening the ability of religious values to incite moral behavior. Measurement parameters for the secularization process are presented in Appendix C. Fit indices display good model fit. All indicators of secularization are statistically significant with suitable factor loadings. There is high internal reliability for our latent construct of secularization (standardized Ŭ = .94), which permits the use of these indicators to assess the impact of secularization with Protestantism and homicide cross-nationally.

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

In the current study Protestantism serves as a measure of religious pluralism due to the numerous denominations and sects which have arisen from it. To ensure that Protestantism is representative of religious pluralism and not simply religious diversity, I have examined whether it is correlated with measures tapping into the ideas of tolerance and acceptance from the Varieties of Democracy dataset. From the Varieties of Democracy dataset I examine the potential association between Protestantism and whether a country has religious freedom; whether a nationôs government represses religious organizations; and whether religious organizations are consulted by policymakers regarding policies relevant to them (Coppedge et al., 2017). In models not shown Protestantism is positively correlated with countries that protect religious freedom

($r = .356$, $p < .01$) and do not repress religious organizations ($r = .229$, $p < .05$). This suggests that Protestantism is not simply representative of a diverse religious landscape but displays the tolerance and acceptance characteristic of religious pluralism.

A religiously plural environment has been established through Protestantism due to the freedom and flexibility it has granted its adherents (MacCulloch, 2003). Religious pluralism assessed through Protestantism may facilitate higher rates of homicide by fostering a differentiated value structure which cannot influence individual behavior in a pro-social manner (Wuthnow et al., 1984). I also create a religious pluralism index for each country in the present study which is similar to the religious diversity index from the Pew Research Center on religion and public life (Cooperman, Hackett, & Ritchey, 2014). Each of the seven major world religions in the present study and the proportion atheist are included in the index. Again, to ensure that this index is actually representative of religious pluralism and not simply religious diversity, I examined its relationship with the measures from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al., 2017). This index is positively correlated with countries that protect religious freedom ($r = .268$, $p < .05$) which supports its use as a measure of religious pluralism.

This religious pluralism index is similar to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which measures market concentration, but the religious pluralism index scores are inverted where higher scores indicate a more diverse religious landscape (Cooperman et al., 2014). Scores for the religious pluralism index are averaged over the years 1995, 2000, and 2005. These scores are calculated by first squaring and then summing the percentage of adherents of each of the religions and those who are atheist within a country. Then, scores are inverted by subtracting the sum of the squared percentages from 10,000 which

represents no pluralism. This value is then divided by 875 to get a number that is on or near a 0 to 10 scale (Cooperman et al., 2014). The value of 875 is used to get a scale value since equal distribution of groups among the seven major world religions and those who are atheist would equal 8,750 (10000-1250) while no religious pluralism would obviously equal zero (10,000-10,000).

ECONOMIC DOMINANCE

Income inequality, as a measure of economic dominance, has been shown to be a strong predictor of higher homicide rates at various units of analysis (Krahn, Hartnagel, & Gartrell, 1986; Kovandzic, Vieraitis, & Yiesley, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003). Income inequality measured as the Gini coefficient of household income comes from the World Bank and is averaged over the three years in the study. However, economic inequality measured as the Gini coefficient of household income has been shown to be an unreliable measure when examined at the cross-national level (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993; Vieraitis, 2000). Therefore, economic inequality will also be examined as a ratio of the richest to the poorest 20% of citizens within a nation. Data on economic inequality measured as this ratio is gathered from the World Bank. Due to the inconsistencies associated with economic inequality measured as the Gini coefficient at the cross-national level, I have also measured economic dominance through the infant mortality rate for each country in the sample. Pridemore (2008; 2011) contends that the infant mortality rate as a measure of poverty is a better predictor of cross-national rates of homicide than measures of economic inequality. As an alternative measure of economic dominance, an index of economic discrimination from the Minorities at Risk data file (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997) is also included in the present study as a control measure.

SOCIAL WELFARE

To measure social welfare at the public level I have gathered data on government expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP (Pratt & Godsey, 2002) from the World Bank. At the private level, I have gathered data from the WVS that may be representative of social altruism within societies. Chamlin and Cochran (1997) define social altruism as ñthe willingness of communities to commit scarce resources to the aid and comfort of their members, distinct from the beneficence of the stateò (pg. 204). To gauge the effect of social altruism on the relationship between religion and homicide, I gather data on the proportion that are active members in charitable or other humanitarian organizations from the WVS for the years in the study.

CONTROLS

Control measures from the WVS include the proportion who are an active member in a Church or religious organization, and the proportion who rarely or never think about the meaning of life. From a social control perspective this measure pertaining to the meaning of life may be linked to homicide by illustrating a lack of societal investment and long-term planning (Hirschi, 1969). Other control measures include the stability of a nationôs government (Roth, 2009) which comes from the State of the World Atlas, and a dummy variable indicating whether a nation is Latin in origin or not. Latin nations are particularly salient for the present study due to the fact that traditionally they have been viewed as predominantly Catholic countries. Yet, Stark (2005) contends that there has been marked growth in terms of the influence of Protestantism and its values in these countries.

From the WVS the proportion single with children is also included in the present

study as a control measure. In the WVS the proportion single with children is based on individual responses within each country which is different from other sources that have calculated single with children based on family or household composition (e.g., Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development, 2016). In the WVS, the proportion single with children is distinguished from those who are married, cohabitating, divorced, separated, or widowed with children. Single with children may be representative of economic disadvantage due to the preponderance of single parent families in environments characterized by high unemployment and poverty levels (Bane, 1986; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Wilson (2012) suggests that within the U.S. higher levels of unemployment and lower incomes among urban minority men have made them less attractive as potential marriage partners for women. Efforts by men to find and maintain employment along with whether employment was in the legitimate economy were also factors that influenced the likelihood of low income single mothers entering into marriage according to Edin (2000). These factors highlight how single-parenthood may be representative of the challenges and constraints associated with economic conditions. Single with children is also included in the present study due to the fact that prior research has found it to be linked to higher rates of homicide (Pridemore & Kim, 2007; Stickley & Pridemore, 2006).

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

At the bivariate level, Pearson correlation will be used to assess the relationship between the variables of interest in the analysis. Multivariate models in the current study will be assessed under the assumptions of structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM has been selected since it permits the examination of both direct and indirect effects on the

outcome measure. A built in method to handle missing data also exists within SEM. Missing data for each of the variables included in the analyses can be found in the descriptives table on page sixty-six in chapter 4.

In SEM I use the maximum likelihood missing values option or full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method to estimate models with missing data. This method assumes normality in the multivariate models (Wothke, 1998) and that the missing values are missing at random or missing completely at random (Medeiros, 2016). Missing completely at random refers to missing values of a variable not being associated with other variables or other missing values of that same variable (Rubin, 1976). Missing at random on the other hand refers to missing values of a variable which may be associated with other variables but are not associated with other missing values of the same variable (Rubin, 1976). Under the FIML method, casewise log- likelihoods are used to deal with missing data (Little et al., 2014). Casewise log-likelihoods permit models to be estimated by using the mean and variance values of observed data that are not missing cases to account for data that is missing values (Enders, 2006; Little et al., 2014; Wothke 1998). With FIML missing values are not imputed, and this method yields only one set of results since it relies on the same model (Enders, 2006; Medeiros, 2016). Advantages of the FIML method include parameter estimates and standard errors that are derived from observed data, and estimates that are fairly precise due to the fact that data with missing values is not removed from the models (Enders, 2006).

SEM combines a multi-faceted approach which incorporates an examination of how constructs are connected and an identification of the direction of significant relationships (Schreiber et al., 2006). With SEM exogenous variables are treated like

independent variables and endogenous variables like dependent variables. An advantage of SEM is that it provides both exploratory factor analysis and multiple regression. This dual function of SEM is evident in the present study where a latent variable such as secularization is specified in both measurement and structural models. In the measurement model the relationship of the measured variables on their latent construct is examined, while the structural model looks at the relationship between latent and observed variables (Ullman & Bentler, 2003). This structural model of SEM permits the examination of direct, indirect, and total effects, or those without the presence of a mediator. An indirect effect is the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable through a mediating variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Total effect is the summation of the direct and indirect effects. While direct and indirect relationships can be examined with SEM, statistical interactions that represent potential conditioning relationships will be assessed with generalized structural equation modeling.

With a sample of only eighty-six countries, a more relaxed measure of statistical significance will be used in the analysis. In a two-tailed test, statistical significance will be reported if the *p*-value of an estimate is .10 or smaller (Savolainen, 2000). Diagnostic tests on preliminary models reveal the presence of heteroskedasticity, or unequal variance in the residuals of the models. To deal with the issue of heteroskedasticity, the dependent variable, homicide, is logged in the present analysis. Models are weighted by the log of the respondents in each country due to the variability in sampling error associated with the different number of respondents across countries. All results are based on the weighted data (with similar results in the unweighted analyses). Many of the variables are averaged over the three years in the study and standardized to have a common metric

for interpretability.

MODEL SPECIFICATION

To assess the research questions presented in chapter 2 it is necessary to take a step by step approach for the specification of the multivariate models. With at most eighty-six observations in any model, a sufficient amount of degrees of freedom does not exist to assess each research question with all of the variables of interest in a sole model. In the present study I examine each of the major world religions, atheism, and the global measure of religious pluralism separately. Every model for each religious group contains a different mechanism that may influence the relationship between each religious group and homicide.

With each religious group, I estimated a baseline model that only contains measures of interest pertaining to each research question. If the baseline model yielded significant findings I began to add other predictors to the model which are theoretically linked to homicide and follow the order of the discussion in chapter 2. For example, when significant findings were present in the baseline model, I first added the proportion single with children as a measure of individualism. If significant results remained I then added the latent construct of secularization to the model, and this was potentially followed in order by measures of economic dominance, social welfare, and other measures which serve as controls. Additional measures were added to the baseline model based on the predictive power of the variables of interest. In terms of the models that are presented in this study, I have selected the models that are specified in a manner that reveals the robustness of the results.

CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

Univariate statistics display the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, and percent missing of each variable in table 1 below. Across the eighty-six countries included in the analysis the average homicide rate for these countries is around 9 per 100,000. Homicide shows substantial variability cross-nationally ranging from a rate under one to nearly 79 per 100,000. On average thirteen percent of a nationôs population identify themselves as Protestant. Protestantism like all the other major world religions in the study is not present in several countries in the analysis as evidenced by the zero minimum value. Norway is the country with the largest Protestant population in the study at eighty-eight percent. Catholics represent the largest religious group among the countries in the analysis with an average of twenty-nine percent of a nationôs population identifying themselves as Catholic. Perhaps unsurprisingly Italy has the largest Catholic population of the countries in the sample at ninety-nine percent with Rome being the home of the Vatican.

Of the three Christian groups in the study, Orthodox Christianity appears to be the smallest with an average of eleven percent of a nationôs population identifying themselves as Orthodox Christian. Orthodox Christianity is most prominent in Moldova with eighty-eight percent of its population identifying with the religion. Of the major world religions Judaism appears to be the smallest globally with an average of one percent of a nationôs population identifying as Jewish. Islam is the second largest world religion among the countries in the sample with an average of twenty percent of a nationôs population identifying themselves as Muslim. In terms of the Indian religions, Hinduism and Buddhism on average are relatively small (2% and 4%) compared to the

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Missing Percent
Homicide	86	9.38	13.66	0.53	78.66	
Protestantism	86	0.13	0.19	0	0.88	
Catholicism	86	0.29	0.32	0	0.99	
Orthodox	86	0.11	0.24	0	0.88	
Judaism	86	0.01	0.09	0	0.85	
Islam	86	0.20	0.32	0	0.98	
Hinduism	86	0.02	0.09	0	0.77	
Buddhism	86	0.04	0.14	0	0.97	
Religious Pluralism	86	5.88	2.70	0.64	10.67	
Atheism	80	0.05	0.06	0.001	0.29	7
Lack of Trust	86	0.73	0.14	0.3	0.96	
Individualism*	69	40.68	23.29	6	91	
Secularization	#	#	#	#	#	
Religion very Important	85	0.69	0.25	0.15	1	1
Importance of God	85	0.73	0.23	0.27	0.99	1
Religious Service Attendance	84	0.33	0.26	0.03	0.94	2
Religious Person	84	0.68	0.19	0.18	0.98	2
Economic Inequality	83	37.79	8.59	23.07	59.80	3
Economic Inequality Ratio	82	8.24	5.04	3.40	29.60	5
Infant Mortality	84	28.29	28.18	3	113	2
Economic Discrimination	72	1.35	1.28	0	4	16
Health Benefits	83	5.38	2.93	0	12.40	3
Charity	80	0.09	0.06	0.003	0.25	7
Single w/ kids	80	0.03	0.03	0.001	0.13	7
Religious Member.	80	0.20	0.19	0.01	0.76	7
Life Meaning	85	0.18	0.08	0.02	0.37	1
New Govt.	86	0.41	0.49	0	1	
Latin Nation	86	0.14	0.35	0	1	

Variables in original metrics

*Individualism measure assessed with smaller data set

# indicates latent variable

other major world religions. Hinduism figures prominently in India comprising seventy-seven percent of its residents as adherents, while Buddhism claims ninety-seven percent of the residents of Thailand as adherents. While Buddhism is most prominent

within Thailand, this country is also the least religiously pluralistic country in the sample. Vietnam, on the other hand, is the most religiously plural country in the study. On average five percent of a nationôs residents identify themselves as atheist or those not believing in the existence of God. South Korea displays the highest percentage of atheists at twenty-nine percent, while Bangladesh has the lowest percentage of atheists among its residents at less than 1 percent.

In terms of the mechanisms that may link Protestantism and the other major world religions with homicide, the average percent of those who believe that individuals must be careful rather than trusting of others is high at seventy-three percent. Overall, it appears that for many the willingness to trust others is resisted at the cross-national level. There is considerable variation in the country scores pertaining to Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism. With a score of ninety-one the United States displays the highest level of moral individualism in terms of an emphasis on individual success and self-actualization. Guatemala, on the other hand, with a score of 6 displays the lowest level of moral individualism of any country in the sample. An examination of the measures of economic dominance from table 1 above reveals larger variation related to the infant mortality rate among the countries than either measure of economic inequality. Sweden displays the lowest infant mortality rate at 3 per 100,000 while Mali has the highest infant mortality rate at 113 per 100,000.

In table 1 above, the average for expenditures on health is around 5 percent of the gross domestic product for countries in the sample. Also, on average 9 percent of a nationôs population is a member in a charitable or voluntary organization. This measure of private social welfare is found most prominently in New Zealand with twenty-five

percent of its residents being involved in these organizations. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, displays the lowest membership in these types of organizations at less than 1 percent.

In terms of the control measures, it would appear that the average percent of those who are single with children for the sample of countries is relatively low at just 3 percent. In fact, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development presents an average percent of single parent households for a subset of thirty nations in my sample in the year 2011 at around 7 (OECD, 2016). Despite the differences in the number of nations and the year for which these estimates are calculated, there is potentially an alternative explanation for the disparity between these values. In the OECD the single parent households are those that are living alone with children distinguished from those who are married or cohabitating with children (OECD, 2016). It is possible though that the OECD data includes those who are divorced, separated, or widowed in the calculation of those who are single with children. In my estimation I exclude those who are divorced, separated, or widowed and only tabulate the proportion who state that they are single with 1 or more child. This may explain why my number for the average percent of those who are single with children appears to be underestimated in relation to the number reported from the OECD data. It also important to consider the fact that the OECD calculates single with children based on household type whereas the WVS calculates this measure based on interviews with individuals. With an understanding of the distribution of many of the variables of interest at the univariate level, potential associations between these variables are highlighted at the bivariate level.

At the bivariate level correlations between the variables are included in table 2

Table 2. Correlation Matrix

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
1 Homicide	1.000													
2 Protestantism	.0773	1.000												
3 Catholicism	.1374	.1338	1.000											
4 Orthodox	.1123	-.1839	-.2872**	1.000										
5 Judaism	-.0239	.0563	-.0662	.1657	1.000									
6 Islam	-.1326	-.2577**	-.4296****	-.0668	-.0926	1.000								
7 Hinduism	-.1039	.2031*	.0438	-.3503***	.2035*	-.0423	1.000							
8 Buddhism	-.1142	.2555**	-.0595	-.1786	.0626	-.3497***	.3848****	1.000						
9 Religious Pluralism	.1479	.3587***	-.1862*	.0591	-.0228	-.1995*	.0228	.2220**	1.000					
10 Atheism	-.5295****	.1589	.0275	.0525	.0984	-.3453***	.1452	.2849**	.2415**	1.000				
11 Lack of Trust	.5321****	-.1250	.3136***	.0458	-.0469	.1484	-.0184	-.1831*	-.0351	-.4659****	1.000			
12 Secularization	-.4827****	.0282	-.0578	.2115*	.0610	-.4440****	.0182	.3310***	.1781	.8247****	-.5589****	1.000		
13 Religion very Important	.4512****	-.1423	-.0411	-.1793	-.0998	.4718****	-.0541	-.3205***	-.2294**	-.8396****	.5036****	-.9661****	1.000	
14 Importance of God	.4525****	-.1031	.0474	-.2125*	-.0440	.4334****	-.0066	-.2969***	-.1879*	-.7998****	.5053****	-.9601****	.9635****	1.000
15 Religious Service Attendance	.4841****	.1794	.0860	-.3399***	-.1417	.3547***	-.0204	-.2131*	-.0415	-.7209****	.4732****	-.8834****	.8009****	.7793****
16 Religious Person	.4252****	-.0451	.1524	-.0541	.0442	.3624***	-.0038	-.4362****	-.2067*	-.7081****	.5862****	-.8939****	.8118****	.8085****
17 Economic Inequality	.5967****	.0875	.2405**	-.3256***	-.1531	-.0663	.1672	.0709	.0972	-.4479****	.5418****	-.5083****	.5153****	.5580****
18 Economic Inequality Ratio	.6144****	.1361	.2994***	-.2551**	-.0656	-.1626	.1386	.0871	.1025	-.3839****	.5285****	-.4407****	.4485****	.5037****
19 Infant Mortality	.5958****	-.0915	-.2264**	-.1162	-.1377	.3741***	-.0975	-.2622**	-.0215	-.6802****	.4091****	-.7124****	.6943****	.6591****
20 Economic Discrimination	.1071	-.0895	.1615	-.2059	-.0482	-.0557	.0133	-.0581	-.0056	-.0090	-.0336	.0985	-.0696	-.0547
21 Health Benefits	-.3455***	.1626	.2809**	.1102	.2314**	-.3754***	-.0504	.1028	-.0269	.5291****	-.3203***	.6060****	-.6407****	-.6397****
22 Charity	.0875	.4327****	.1222	-.4120****	.1762	.0025	.2310**	.1045	.0505	-.1151	-.1932*	-.1773	.1039	.1573
23 Single w/ kids	.4652****	.4672****	.3082***	.0092	.0840	-.1598	.1098	-.1383	.1891*	-.0599	.3072***	-.1871*	.0890	.1271
24 Religious Member.	.3851****	.5396****	.2571**	-.3568***	.0833	-.1053	.2310**	.1059	.1298	-.3366***	.1630	-.4591****	.3661****	.4191****
25 Life Meaning	-.4265****	.0336	.0700	.0864	-.0248	-.2081*	.1199	.1940*	-.0809	.6010****	-.4150****	.5838****	-.5741****	-.5714****
26 New Govt.	.2216**	-.2860**	-.1248	.4867****	-.0098	.1484	-.2141**	-.1944*	-.0407	-.2248**	.2174**	-.0750	.0760	.0165
27 Latin Nation	.4492****	.0262	.4872****	-.2328*	-.0520	-.4378****	-.0364	.0394	.0170	-.1565	.2743**	-.2027*	.2070*	.2987***

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Table 2 Cont. Correlation Matrix

Variable	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)
15 Religious Service Attendance	1.000												
16 Religious Person	.6870****	1.000											
17 Economic Inequality	.4703****	.3538***	1.000										
18 Economic Inequality Ratio	.3825****	.3175***	.9567****	1.000									
19 Infant Mortality	.6951****	.6282****	.4854****	.3773****	1.000								
20 Economic Discrimination	-.0253	-.2121*	.1963	.1816	-.0537	1.000							
21 Health Benefits	-.5106****	-.4377****	-.4390****	-.3141***	-.7194****	.0337	1.000						
22 Charity	.3417***	.0692	.0813	.1561	.0404	.1314	.0452	1.000					
23 Single w/ kids	.2634**	.2195*	.3003***	.4002****	-.0171	.1078	.2846**	.3457***	1.000				
24 Religious Member.	.6230****	.2950***	.3931****	.4032****	.2062*	.0319	-.1139	.6678****	.5151****	1.000			
25 Life Meaning	-.5522****	-.4855****	-.2943***	-.2307**	-.4910****	.0972	.4715****	-.1002	.0133	-.2529**	1.000		
26 New Govt.	-.0001	.1945*	-.1031	-.1635	.1846*	-.1352	-.1235	-.2904***	-.0632	-.1822	-.0094	1.000	
27 Latin Nation	.1495	.1125	.6280****	.6831****	.0989	.4590****	-.0700	.1712	.3884****	.2906***	-.0267	-.1970*	1.000

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

above. Bivariate correlations reveal that Protestantism does not display a significant association with homicide. Neither the major world religions nor the measure of religious pluralism displays a significant association with homicide, but the proportion atheist is associated with lower rates of homicide (r = -.530, p < .001). Atheism may be correlated with lower rates of homicide since it serves as the antithesis of religious passion which has been linked to higher rates of homicide (Jensen, 2006). Any partial correlation between atheism and homicide will be revealed in the multivariate analysis. As anticipated due to its representation of egoistic individualism, the proportion who believe individuals should be careful rather than trusting of others displays a significant positive association with homicide (r = .532, p < .001). Contrary to what has been hypothesized, secularization displays a significant negative association with homicide (r = -.483, p < .001). This would not support the assertion that Protestantism is linked to higher rates of homicide through its promotion of the secularization process.

Both measures of income inequality along with the infant mortality rate display strong positive correlations with homicide. In terms of social welfare, at the bivariate level it would appear that public measures of welfare may be more salient as correlates of homicide. Government expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP is negatively associated with homicide (r = -.346, p < .01), while the proportion who are members in charitable or voluntary organizations is not linked to homicide. These measures of economic dominance and social welfare are linked to homicide at the bivariate level, but their consistency as predictors of homicide will be revealed in the presence of other covariates at the multivariate level.

In table 2 above Protestantism displays differential relationships with some of the

other major world religions. Protestantism is negatively correlated with Islam (r = -.258, p < .10) but is positively correlated with both Hinduism and Buddhism. These differential effects may be based on the promotion of freedom and individual autonomy found in religions like Protestantism, Hinduism, and Buddhism (Berger, 1967) but not within Islam. This emphasis on freedom and individual choice may also explain the positive correlation between Protestantism and the global measure of religious pluralism (r = .359, p < .01). In terms of the control measures that may facilitate higher rates of homicide, the proportion single with children is positively correlated with Protestantism. Bivariate scatter plots of Protestantism and several of the mechanisms that may link it to homicide can be found in Appendix D, pgs. 127-134. Contrary to expectations Protestantism is positively correlated with measures of social welfare, particularly those of the private type.

Catholicism displays significant negative correlations with a few religious groups at the bivariate level. In table 2 above Catholicism is negatively correlated with religious pluralism (r = -.186, p < .10) and both Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In terms of its relationship with religious pluralism, Catholicism by focusing on one unified and authoritative Church diverges from the Protestant promotion of a pluralistic religious landscape (Herberg, 1955). Unlike Protestantism, Catholicism is positively correlated with the egoistic individualism measure represented through the lack of trust (r = .314, p < .01). Through its structure Catholicism may de-emphasize the value of the individual while promoting the merits of the Church (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1986; Williams, 2015). Catholicism is correlated with the three primary measures of economic dominance, but unlike with inequality it displays a significant negative correlation with

the infant mortality rate. Like Protestantism, Catholicism is positively correlated with the proportion single with children ($r = .308$, $p < .01$) which serves as a control measure. Potential indirect and conditioning effects involving Catholicism and measures of individualism and economic dominance will be highlighted at the multivariate level.

Orthodox Christianity displays a significant negative correlation with Hinduism ($r = -.350$, $p < .01$) in table 2 above. Unlike Protestantism and Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity is positively correlated with the measure of secularization which may be due to its close association with the state in many eastern European countries (Woodhead, 2009). In terms of economic dominance, Orthodox Christianity is negatively correlated with both inequality measures but also displays a significant negative correlation with membership in charitable organizations. Due to its emphasis on mysticism Orthodox Christianity may not serve as a catalyst for worldly activities.

Other Abrahamic religions such as Judaism and Islam display contrasting findings in table 2 above. Judaism is positively correlated with Hinduism ($r = .204$, $p < .10$) and also positively correlated with government expenditures on health. This finding related to health underscores the importance placed on social welfare by Judaism (Sombart, 1913; Weber, 1993). On the other hand, Islam is negatively correlated with government expenditures on health. With less emphasis on social support perhaps it is not surprising that Islam is positively correlated with the infant mortality rate ($r = .374$, $p < .01$). In like manner, Islam is negatively correlated with secularization but displays a positive correlation with several measures that tap into the intensity of religious belief and involvement. Islam is also negatively correlated with Buddhism, religious pluralism, and atheism in table 2.

As an offshoot of Hinduism, it is not surprising that Buddhism is positively correlated with its predecessor ($r = .385$, $p < .001$). Hinduism does not correlate with many factors in the present study, but it is positively correlated with membership in charitable organizations. Buddhism, on the other hand, displays somewhat unexpected findings at the bivariate level. In particular, Buddhism is positively correlated with the global measure of religious pluralism but also displays significant positive correlations with atheism and secularization. A positive correlation between Buddhism and secularization may be due in part to the formerôs link to the rationalism characteristic of western culture (Obadia, 2011). Buddhism is negatively correlated with the lack of trust measure which serves as a proxy for egoistic individualism. It may be that the negative association between Buddhism and egoistic individualism is based on the social individualism Buddhism cultivates through its promotion of selflessness (Thurman, 1996). Buddhism is also negatively correlated with several measures of religious intensity or passion and the infant mortality rate.

Atheism and the global measure of religious pluralism are positively correlated with each other ($r = .242$, $p < .05$) which may highlight the role of choice in religious matters. A strong negative correlation in terms of effect size exists between atheism and the lack of trust measure ($r = -.466$, $p < .001$). This may reflect how atheism shifts the focus from God and religious concerns to cultivating relationships within the secular world. Both atheism and the global measure of religious pluralism are negatively correlated with some of the religious intensity or passion measures, which potentially contradicts Starkôs (2005) claim that religious pluralism enhances religious commitment. Aside from their relationship with measures of religious passion, atheism and the global

measure of religious pluralism diverge in their relationships with other factors. Atheism displays a significant positive correlation with government expenditures on health, while religious pluralism is positively correlated with the proportion single with children. Analyses at the multivariate level will reveal whether religious pluralism or atheism display any potential relationships with the mechanisms hypothesized to influence rates of homicide cross-nationally.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

To begin the presentation of the results from the multivariate models I first examine the research questions in the present study solely focusing on Protestantism. In table 3 below there are 8 models that examine Protestantism in relation to the 7 research questions and an additional model that examines the relationship between Protestantism and homicide with the measure of moral individualism. In model 1 of table 3 I examine whether higher levels of Protestantism are directly associated with higher rates of homicide or higher levels of egoistic individualism. Model 1 also permits the examination of whether the lack of trust measure mediates the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide. Results from model 1 suggest that with the inclusion of secularization and measures of economic dominance, Protestantism is not directly associated with homicide with and without the presence of the lack of trust measure in the model. In model 1 Protestantism is not associated with lack of trust as a measure of egoistic individualism, and this measure of individualism does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide. Despite not linking Protestantism with higher rates of homicide in model 1, the lack of trust measure is still a relevant predictor of homicide. In fact, when

Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Protestantism on Homicide Rates: Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3	Model 4
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total		
Protestantism	.059	-.020	.039	.081	-.033	.048	.024	-.020
	(.043)	(.016)	(.047)	(.054)	(.029)	(.057)	(.082)	(.085)
Lack of Trust	2.23***	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.701)							
Secularization	.185	2.23***	.131	.471****	ð	1.00f	ð	ð
	(.135)	(.701)	(.961)	(.096)				
Economic Inequality	.047***	.017***	.064****	ð	ð	ð	.580****	ð
	(.015)	(.006)	(.014)				(.075)	
Economic Inequality Ratio	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.609****
								(.069)
Infant Mortality	.562****	.059	.621****	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.148)	(.036)	(.150)					
Prot x Econ Ineq.	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.088	ð
							(.083)	
Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.110
								(.087)
Adjusted R^2		.543			.224		.354	.383
N		86			86		78	77
G^2		ð			30.97 (p < .001)		ð	ð
G^2/df		ð			3.87		ð	ð
RMSEA		ð			.183		ð	ð
CFI		ð			.948		ð	ð

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter or fit statistic not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Only model 2 not saturated.

Protestantism, the index of secularization, the Gini index, and the infant mortality rate are held at their sample means, the predicted homicide rate in countries where the lack of trust measure is one standard deviation above the sample mean is fifty percent higher than in countries where the lack of trust measure is one standard deviation below the mean (11.4 vs. 7.6 per 100,000 population).

Table 3 Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Protestantism on Homicide Rates: Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8		
				Direct	Indirect	Total
Protestantism	-.121	-.193*	.069	-.111	-.033	-.144*
	(.108)	(.106)	(.116)	(.069)	(.026)	(.075)
Secularization	ð	ð	ð	-.025*	-.017****	-.042****
				(.013)	(.005)	(.012)
Infant Mortality	.587****	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.079)					
Health Benefits	ð	-.548****	ð	ð	ð	ð
		(.069)				
Charity	ð	ð	.069	ð	ð	ð
			(.112)			
Individualism	ð	ð	ð	-.017****	ð	ð
				(.005)		
Single w/ kids	.485****	.692****	ð	.593****	-.036	.557****
	(.116)	(.105)		(.106)	(.042)	(.112)
Prot x Mortality	.058	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.094)					
Prot x Health	ð	-.034	ð	ð	ð	ð
		(.078)				
Prot x Charity	ð	ð	-.121	ð	ð	ð
			(.096)			
Adjusted R^2	.561	.474	-.014		.507	
N	75	74	77		69	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

In model 2 of table 3 I examine whether higher levels of Protestantism are associated with higher levels of secularization, and if secularization mediates the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide. Even before the addition of any covariates, non-significant findings are present in model 2. Higher levels of Protestantism are not associated with higher levels of secularization, and

secularization does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide. Fit indices present contradictory support regarding whether overall model fit is satisfactory in model 2. From one perspective, good model fit is indicated by the fact that the comparative fit index (CFI) is above .90, but evidence of poor model fit is seen with the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) being above .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). An inability to include more variables due to a sample size under 100 and the inclusion of secularization as a latent variable may contribute to the RMSEA indicating poor model fit in model 2. Models 1 and 2 of table 3 are represented in figures 2 and 3 below. Figures 2 and 3 provide a visual representation of the path diagrams in the structural equation models as they highlight the direct and indirect relationships between Protestantism, egoistic individualism, secularization, and homicide.

In models 3, 4, and 5 of table 3 I examine whether higher levels of Protestantism condition the relationship between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide. Model 3 includes the Gini index as a measure of economic dominance, and without the inclusion of any covariates higher levels of Protestantism do not condition the relationship between higher levels of the Gini index and higher rates of homicide. A similar finding is found in model 4 with economic dominance being measured through the economic inequality measure as a ratio of the richest to the poorest 20% of a nationôs residents. Again, without any covariates in model 4, higher levels of Protestantism do not condition the relationship between the economic inequality ratio measure and higher rates of homicide. In model 5, the infant mortality rate as a measure of poverty rather than a measure of economic inequality is used to capture the dominance of the economy.

Figure 2: Structural Equation Model of the Relationship between Protestantism and Homicide Rates: Direct & Indirect Effects w/ Egoistic Individualism



Note: Nonsignificant paths to lack of trust and homicide are not shown. Correlations between exogenous variables are also not included.

ñnsò indicates a nonsignificant coefficient.
*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Figure 3: Structural Equation Model of the Relationship between Protestantism and Homicide Rates: Direct & Indirect Effects w/ Secularization



Note: Secularization is a latent construct measured by the indicators religion very important, religious service attendance, importance of God, and religious person. Nonsignificant paths to secularization and homicide are not shown. Correlations between exogenous variables are also not included.

ñnsò indicates a nonsignificant coefficient.
*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

However, controlling for the proportion single with children, higher levels of Protestantism do not condition the relationship between the infant mortality rate and higher rates of homicide cross-nationally. In model 5 with infant mortality as a measure of economic dominance the amount of variance in the rates of homicide that is explained is considerably higher than models 3 and 4 with measures of economic inequality. This may lend some support to Pridemoreôs (2008; 2011) claim that the infant mortality rate as a measure of poverty should be included in cross-national studies of homicide, but the inclusion of the proportion single with children in model 5 may also explain the difference in the adjusted r-squared.

Models 6 and 7 of table 3 examine the final research question of whether higher levels of social welfare condition the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and lower rates of homicide. Model 6 includes expenditures on health as a public measure of social welfare, and membership in a voluntary or charitable organization is included as a private measure of social welfare in model 7. Neither measure of social welfare serves to condition a significant negative relationship between Protestantism and homicide. Model 7 with charitable membership does not include any covariates, while the proportion single with children is included in model 6 which may explain the disparity in the amount of variance explained in these models. In model 8 of table 3 I examine the relationship between Protestantism and homicide with Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism. This measure of individualism is anticipated to link Protestantism with lower rather than higher rates of homicide. Yet, controlling for the proportion single with children and secularization there are no significant findings related to the measures of interest in model 8. Higher levels of Protestantism are not associated

with higher levels of Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of individualism, and this measure of individualism does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and lower rates of homicide.

In table 4 below I examine the research questions in the present study with Catholicism. This study attempts to identify a direct relationship between any of the

Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Catholicism on Homicide Rates: Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3	Model 4
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total		
Catholicism	.190	.210	.400	.575	-.015	.559	-.096	-.045
	(.284)	(.127)	(.271)	(.387)	(.179)	(.425)	(.077)	(.078)
Lack of Trust	1.50**	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.759)							
Secularization	.00001****	1.50**	.989	.454****	ð	1.00f	ð	ð
	(.000001)	(.759)	(.874)	(.091)				
Economic Inequality	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.502****	ð
							(.099)	
Economic Inequality Ratio	1.00****	.127**	1.13****	ð	ð	ð	ð	.591****
	(.225)	(.062)	(.212)					(.103)
Infant Mortality	.722****	.062	.785****	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.132)	(.045)	(.124)					
Health Benefits	.068	-.007	.061	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.042)	(.010)	(.041)					
Single w/ kids	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.327****	ð
							(.087)	
Cath x Econ Ineq.	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.067	ð
							(.080)	
Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.070
								(.081)
Adjusted R^2		.576			.227		.446	.360
N		86			86		78	82
G^2		ð			20.12 (p < .01)		ð	ð
G^2/df		ð			2.52		ð	ð
RMSEA		ð			.133		ð	ð
CFI		ð			.972		ð	ð

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter or fit statistic not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Only model 2 not saturated.

Table 4 Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Catholicism on Homicide Rates: Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8		
				Direct	Indirect	Total
Catholicism	.073	.054	.093	.145	-.131	.015
	(.100)	(.097)	(.113)	(.395)	(.224)	(.438)
Economic Inequality	.167	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.114)					
Infant Mortality	.500****	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.101)					
Economic Discrimination	.044	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.083)					
Health Benefits	ð	-.566****	ð	ð	ð	ð
		(.073)				
Charity	ð	ð	.099	ð	ð	ð
			(.107)			
Individualism	ð	ð	ð	-.025****	ð	ð
				(.005)		
Single w/ kids	.387****	.618****	ð	.532****	-.074	.457****
	(.097)	(.095)		(.100)	(.056)	(.107)
Cath x Mortality	.139	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.096)					
Cath x Health	ð	.035	ð	ð	ð	ð
		(.079)				
Cath x Charity	ð	ð	.124	ð	ð	ð
			(.141)			
Adjusted R^2	.567	.452	-.016		.397	
N	65	77	80		69	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

major world religions and homicide, and it looks at potential mechanisms that may link Protestantism and homicide. Yet, it remains worthwhile to examine how the other major world religions such as Catholicism may be linked to the mechanisms that facilitate or inhibit rates of homicide. In model 1 of table 4 I examine whether Catholicism is directly associated with homicide, and whether higher levels of Catholicism are associated with a

higher proportion of those who believe individuals must be careful rather than trusting of others. Model 1 also reveals whether the lack of trust measure mediates the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide. With secularization, measures of economic dominance, and expenditures on health included in model 1, higher levels of Catholicism are not associated with higher rates of homicide with or without the inclusion of the lack of trust measure. Also, in model 1 higher levels of Catholicism are not associated with a higher proportion of those who believe individuals must be careful rather than trusting of others, and this measure of egoistic individualism does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide.

In model 2 of table 4 I examine whether higher levels of Catholicism are associated with higher levels of secularization, and if secularization mediates the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide. In similar fashion to Protestantism, non-significant findings related to secularization are found in model 2 before it is necessary to include any covariates in the model. Higher levels of Catholicism are not associated with higher levels of secularization, and secularization does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide. In models 3, 4, and 5 of table 4 I examine whether Catholicism conditions the relationship between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide. In model 3 controlling for the proportion single with children, Catholicism does not condition the relationship between the Gini index and higher rates of homicide. No other measures aside from those in the interaction term are included in model 4, and Catholicism does not condition the relationship between higher levels of the economic

inequality ratio measure and higher rates of homicide. Measures of economic dominance along with the proportion single with children are controlled for in model 5, but the results remain the same. Higher levels of Catholicism do not condition the relationship between the infant mortality rate and higher rates of homicide.

In the final 3 models of table 4 I examine whether higher levels of Catholicism are associated with lower rates of homicide in nations with more social welfare, and whether Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism mediates the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and higher rates of homicide. In model 6, controlling for the proportion single with children, expenditures on health does not condition the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and lower rates of homicide. Without any additional covariates in model 7 of table 4, charitable membership as a private measure of social welfare does not condition a significant negative relationship between Catholicism and homicide. In model 8 controlling for the proportion single with children, higher levels of Catholicism are not associated with higher levels of Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism. Hofstedeôs (1980) measure also does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Catholicism and lower rates of homicide. Of note in model 8 is that the proportion single with children displays a stronger relationship with homicide in terms of the magnitude of its parameter estimate (ϐ = .532, $p < .001$) compared to that of Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism (ϐ = - .025, $p < .001$). Yet, both measures while representing different constructs appear salient as explanatory factors for the variation in cross-national rates of homicide.

In table 5 below I examine the possible link between Islam and homicide

Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Islam on Homicide Rates: Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3	Model 4
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total		
Islam	-.038	.014	-.025	-.082	.064	-.019	-0.039	-.001
	(.038)	(.011)	(.039)	(.056)	(.040)	(.035)	(.087)	(.086)
Lack of Trust	1.45**	ð	ð					
	(.739)							
Secularization	ð	ð	ð	.248*	ð	1.00f	ð	ð
				(.143)				
Economic Inequality	.053***	.014*	.067****	ð	ð	ð	.529****	ð
	(.017)	(.008)	(.014)				(.097)	
Economic Inequality Ratio	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	.541****
								(.097)
Charity	ð	ð	ð	-2.04	-.842	-2.88*	ð	ð
				(1.54)	(.651)	(1.59)		
Single w/ kids	.201***	.039	.239***	.309****	-.028	.282***	ð	ð
	(.076)	(.025)	(.080)	(.085)	(.024)	(.084)		
Religious Member.	.101	-.019	.081	.061	.116	.177	ð	ð
	(.105)	(.019)	(.105)	(.133)	(.078)	(.111)		
Life Meaning	ð	ð	ð	-4.55****	-1.37*	-5.93****	ð	ð
				(1.15)	(.774)	(.991)		
New Govt.	.664***	.097	.761****	.650***	.049	.699****	ð	ð
	(.206)	(.062)	(.184)	(.189)	(.054)	(.186)		
Latin Nation	.139	-.001	.138	.683*	.446	1.13****	ð	ð
	(.383)	(.076)	(.384)	(.409)	(.275)	(.290)		
Islam x Econ Ineq.	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	-.145	ð
							(.111)	
Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð	-.145
								(.105)
Adjusted R^2		.542			.573		.347	.368
N		86			86		83	82
G^2		ð			89.99 (p < .001)		ð	ð
G^2/df		ð			3.46		ð	ð
RMSEA		ð			.169		ð	ð
CFI		ð			.896		ð	ð

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter or fit statistic not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Only model 2 not saturated.

and the mechanisms which may influence this potential relationship. In model 1 of table 5 I examine whether higher levels of Islam are directly associated with higher rates of

Table 5 Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates & Generalized Structural Equation Models of the Influence of Islam on Homicide Rates: Direct, Indirect, & Conditioning Effects

	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8		
				Direct	Indirect	Total
Islam	-.255***	-.146	-.078	-.045	.039	-.006
	(.080)	(.096)	(.099)	(.043)	(.031)	(.055)
Secularization	1.00f	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
Economic Inequality	.149	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.090)					
Infant Mortality	.658****	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.080)					
Health Benefits	ð	-.593****	ð	ð	ð	ð
		(.079)				
Charity	ð	ð	.083	ð	ð	ð
			(.104)			
Individualism	ð	ð	ð	-.026****	ð	ð
				(.004)		
Single w/ kids	.331****	.587****	ð	.522****	-.067	.455****
	(.066)	(.084)		(.095)	(.053)	(.103)
Islam x Mortality	-.130	ð	ð	ð	ð	ð
	(.088)					
Islam x Health	ð	.030	ð	ð	ð	ð
		(.097)				
Islam x Charity	ð	ð	.148	ð	ð	ð
			(.091)			
Adjusted R^2	.655	.467	.001		.459	
N	86	77	80		69	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

f = fixed coefficient.

homicide, and whether higher levels of Islam are linked with a higher proportion of those who believe individuals must be careful rather than trusting of others. Model 1 also examines if the lack of trust measure mediates the relationship between higher levels of Islam and higher rates of homicide. With the Gini index, the proportion single with

children, and several other control measures included in model 1; higher levels of Islam are not significantly associated with higher rates of homicide. Model 1 also reveals that Islam is not significantly associated with the lack of trust measure, and this measure of egoistic individualism does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Islam and higher rates of homicide. Model 2 of table 5 examines whether higher levels of Islam are associated with higher levels of secularization, and whether secularization mediates the relationship between higher levels of Islam and higher rates of homicide. With the proportion single with children, charitable membership, and several other control measures included in model 2; Islam is not linked with secularization. Secularization also does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of Islam and higher rates of homicide in model 2. Despite the inclusion of the private measure of social welfare and various control measures, poor model fit is reported from the CFI and RMSEA statistics in model 2.

In model 2 of table 5 one of the control measures, the proportion who are an active member in a church or religious organization, impacts the relationship between Islam, secularization, and homicide. Also, this religious measure operates to influence the relationship between Islam, the lack of trust measure, and homicide in model 1 of table 5. Aside from its role as a control measure in the above table, measures of religious involvement, practice, or belief may have a more prominent role as predictors of homicide through their association with the major world religions. Given the link between religious passion or intensity and homicide (Jensen, 2006), it may be that Protestantism conditions the relationship between higher levels of religiosity and higher rates of homicide. I examine whether Protestantism, the other major world religions,

atheism, and the global measure of religious pluralism condition the positive relationship between religious intensity and homicide (see Appendix E, pgs. 135-144). Results suggest that neither Protestantism nor any of the other religious groups conditions the relationship between any of the religious intensity measures and homicide. It may be that the relationship between Protestantism or any of the other religious groups and measures of religious intensity only serves to reinforce religious objectives.

Models 3, 4, and 5 of table 5 examine whether Islam conditions the relationship between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide. In models 3 and 4 without the inclusion of any additional covariates, Islam does not condition the relationship between either measure of economic inequality and higher rates of homicide. In model 5, Islam also does not condition the positive relationship between the infant mortality rate and homicide after the Gini index, secularization, and the proportion single with children have been included in the model. Models 6 and 7 examine whether social welfare conditions the relationship between higher levels of Islam and lower rates of homicide. In model 6 controlling for the single with children measure, expenditures on health do not condition a significant negative relationship between Islam and homicide. Without the presence of any control measures, charitable membership as a private measure of social welfare also does not condition this potential relationship in model 7. In the final model of table 5, I examine whether Islam is associated with Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism, and whether this measure mediates the relationship between Islam and homicide. In the presence of the proportion single with children, Islam is not significantly associated with Hofstedeôs (1980) measure in model 8. Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism also does not mediate the relationship

between higher levels of Islam and lower rates of homicide.

Results involving Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, atheism, and the global measure of religious pluralism are not presented here due to the fact that each religion or group did not display any significant effects with homicide. Also, in most of the models involving these groups, the inclusion of additional covariates as controls was not necessary. Like Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam; higher levels of the other religions, atheism, and religious pluralism are not associated with higher rates of homicide. These other religions and groups are not associated with the lack of trust measure, and this measure of egoistic individualism does not mediate the relationship between higher levels of any of these groups and higher rates of homicide. Also, these religions and groups besides Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam were not found to be associated with higher levels of secularization, and secularization did not mediate the positive relationship between these groups and homicide. None of the religions or groups conditioned the positive relationship between any of the economic dominance measures and rates of homicide cross-nationally. Neither the public nor the private measure of social welfare conditioned the relationship between higher levels of any of the religions or groups and lower rates of homicide. Also, these religions and groups besides Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam were not linked with Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism, and this measure of individualism did not mediate the relationship between higher levels of any of the groups and lower rates of homicide.

As a way to assess the robust nature of the findings, I conducted an influential case analysis where models were examined without 7 country outliers (see Appendices H-O, pgs.147-239). In the influential case analysis added variable or partial regression

plots are included that highlight the effect of each religion on homicide holding all other religions constant. In the added variable plots (see Appendix F, pg. 145) it is difficult to discern the outliers in the analysis. Outliers are more clearly distinguishable in the leverage versus squared residual plot (see Appendix G, pg. 146). In the leverage versus squared residual plot one can see that Israel, Norway, Thailand, El Salvador, South Africa, Colombia, and Zambia are outliers. Israel, Norway, and Thailand have high leverage values which indicates that if a regression line was fitted on the data plot these country values would influence the line. El Salvador, South Africa, Colombia, and Zambia display high residual values, which indicate that they would be further from a fitted regression line. As evidenced in Appendices (H-O), results do not change with each of the country outliers removed separately or collectively from the analyses.

Overall, results suggest that neither Protestantism nor any of the major world religions is associated with the variation in cross-national rates of homicide. Higher levels of pluralism within Protestantism do not facilitate higher rates of homicide, and mechanisms such as individualism and the secularization process do not link any of the world religions and homicide. In terms of the interaction effects, Protestantism does not condition a positive relationship between the dominance of a free market economy and homicide, and social welfare does not condition a negative relationship between Protestantism and homicide. Homicide levels are also not influenced by the interplay between any of the other world religions, economic dominance, or social welfare. Even with the removal of country outliers, none of the major world religions are linked with homicide through any of the proposed mechanisms. These findings raise questions regarding what factor or factors may link religion and homicide. Yet, this study more

broadly raises the issue of religionôs role within contemporary society.

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

In the present study the focus was on examining the relationship between the major world religions and rates of homicide cross-nationally. In particular, I was interested in whether higher levels of any of the major world religions would be associated with higher rates of homicide. This study also attempted to identify the mechanisms that may influence the relationship between Protestantism and homicide. I also examined whether egoistic individualism or the secularization process might mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide. This study also attempted to assess whether Protestantism conditions the relationship between dominant economic conditions and higher rates of homicide, and whether social welfare might condition the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and lower rates of homicide. Results from this study suggest that none of the major world religions are significantly associated with homicide cross-nationally. Neither egoistic individualism nor the secularization process mediates the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide. Also, Protestantism did not condition the relationship between dominant economic conditions and homicide, and social welfare did not serve to condition the negative relationship between Protestantism and homicide.

Based off of the findings and some of the fit statistics such as the adjusted r-squared values, the fit of the models in this study might be characterized as modest to average at best. A small sample size in the present study certainly poses some challenges, but there may be more substantive explanations for the lack of significant findings. A lack of association between any of the major world religions, religious

pluralism, or atheism and the rate of homicide cross-nationally requires a deeper inspection of these religions and groups. As the largest of the major world religions, it might be expected that Catholicism (Pew, 2011) may contribute somehow to higher rates of homicide cross-nationally. It is also rather surprising that Catholicism is not linked to higher rates of homicide given the fact that it is positively correlated with the lack of trust measure, measures of economic dominance, and Latin nations at the bivariate level. Despite being linked to factors at the bivariate level that may facilitate higher rates of homicide, there are aspects of Catholicism which render it less likely to stimulate homicide at the cross-national level. In particular, the individualism promoted by Catholicism is not unbound and is in fact curbed by the idea of one unified Church (Fichter, 1957). This facet of Catholicism coupled with its sacraments which reinforce group membership through collective ritualized practices (Vernon, 1962) make it less likely to facilitate homicide. Contemporary Catholicism for the most part has been a proponent of a free market economy (Dobrijevic, 2006). Yet, it has also attempted to thwart the debilitating effects that may arise from the free market through its efforts promoting social welfare cross-nationally (Castles, 1994; Esping-Anderson & Van Kersbergen, 1992).

Results at the bivariate level may also shed some light on why some of the other major world religions are not linked to higher rates of homicide cross-nationally. A lack of association between Orthodox Christianity and higher rates of homicide might be due to the fact that this religion is not correlated with some of the mechanisms that have traditionally been viewed as fostering higher rates of homicide. These mechanisms include, egoistic or disintegrative individualism, poverty, and income based inequalities.

Even though contemporary Judaism has become more secularized, social justice has continued to be a focal point of Judaism (Williams, 2015). This emphasis on social justice is evident with the positive correlation between Judaism and social welfare at the bivariate level. Adaptations to the secularization process have not impeded the ability of Judaism to reinforce the mission of religion to promote more collectivism. Due to its relationships at the bivariate level one might surmise that Islam would be linked with higher rates of homicide. At the bivariate level, Islam is positively correlated with the infant mortality rate as a measure of poverty ($r = .374$, $p < .01$) and several of the measures tapping into religious intensity which have been linked to higher rates of homicide (Jensen, 2006). While Islam does promote active engagement in the free market (Turner, 1992) which could lend itself to higher poverty levels, Islam does not permit unrestrained financial gain that would disrupt the common good (Hefner, 2008). Religious intensity stemming from Islam also does not result in homicidal behavior since this religious fervor is held in check through an emphasis on solidarity coupled with informal social controls (Neapolitan, 1997; Neumayer, 2003).

In terms of the non-Abrahamic religions, Hinduism and Buddhism do not correlate at the bivariate level with factors that may contribute to higher rates of homicide. Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism is positively correlated with the lack of trust measure, and Buddhism is negatively correlated with the infant mortality rate ($r = -.262$, $p < .05$). Another reason for the lack of a significant association between higher levels of Hinduism and higher rates of homicide is that Hinduism is positively correlated with the private measure of social welfare at the bivariate level. A positive relationship between the global measure of religious pluralism and homicide was not anticipated, and this

expectation was confirmed at the multivariate level. At the bivariate level the measure of religious pluralism is negatively correlated with measures tapping into religious intensity or passion which have been linked to higher rates of homicide (Jensen, 2006). Aside from this negative correlation, the global measure of religious pluralism implies a certain amount of accepted coexistence. On the other hand, the pluralism emanating from Protestantism has as its foundation more of an individualistic influence. Based on the bivariate results it should come as no surprise that higher levels of atheism are not associated with higher rates of homicide at the multivariate level. Atheism displays a significant negative correlation with measures of religious intensity and economic dominance, while being positively correlated with the public measure of social welfare.

A lack of association between Protestantism as a measure of religious pluralism and higher rates of homicide may illustrate the hypothesized link between religious pluralism and higher levels of religiosity (Stark, 2005). This diffusion of religiosity may also explain why Protestantism was not linked to homicide through an association with the secularization process. Collective sentiments stemming from the growth of religious pluralism may also shed light on why Protestantism did not facilitate homicide through an association with higher levels of egoistic individualism. A lack of consensus among prior research concerning the link between Protestantism and a free market economy (Fanfani, 1935; Johnstone, 1992; Sombart, 1959) may also explain why Protestantism does not legitimize a free market economy and condition its relationship with homicide. This lack of connection between Protestantism and a free market economy highlights further support of contemporary research which has suggested that Protestants do not display any unique pro-market values or outlook compared to other religious groups

(Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2011). A positive relationship between Protestantism and measures of social welfare at the bivariate level may explain why social welfare does not exert any external or conditional influence on the potential relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and lower rates of homicide at the multivariate level. In effect, social welfare may not be required to elicit the moral individualism within Protestantism if the inclusive societal focus characteristic of social welfare may also be a focal point of Protestantism. Since neither Protestantism nor any of the major world religions is directly or indirectly linked to homicide, this study lends credence to the claim that it is human interests rather than cultural values stemming from religion that determine behavior (Kornhauser, 1978). Modest to average model fit may be due to the examination of homicide with religions that do not influence this type of violent crime coupled with the inclusion of social factors which display or have displayed a strong link with homicide in prior research.

It is worth taking note of the time period under examination in the present study. This study looks at homicide rates in the late 20th and early 21st centuries where rates of homicide were declining or beginning to display some stability. In the time period prior to this study, homicide had been on the rise since the early 60ôs in both the U.S. and Europe (Eisner, 2001; 2003a; Spierenburg; 2012). Yet, the social role of religion has diminished since the 1960ôs in terms of lower church attendance rates, fewer priests per population, less participation of young people, and overall less knowledge of the different faiths (Bruce, 2002; Davie, 2000). Given these factors, perhaps it is not surprising that neither Protestantism nor any of the other world religions facilitates homicide in the present study. For many of the world religions, their public role has declined in two eras

where homicide was both on the rise and the decline. A diminished social role of religion may also be due to the growth of religious pluralism within many countries. Stark (2005) contends that religious pluralism is actually beneficial for societies since it enhances religious commitment and involvement. However, given the lack of association between various religions and homicide in the present study, it is more likely that the growth of religious pluralism in the second half of the 20th century not only attenuated religionôs role within the public sphere but also paved the way for the secularization process (Berger, 1967).

As societies become more secularized this raises questions about the modern social role of religion. In particular, in the western world where Christianity tends to predominate, secularization is evident with the influence of religion over societal institutions becoming attenuated over time (Sampson, 2000; Selengut, 2009). Religion has become differentiated from the other institutions (Casanova, 1994), and this has led to the separation of Church and state in countries like the U.S. (Bellah et al., 1985). This weakened influence of religion over a societyôs institutional structure has even led Turner (2011) to claim that within the modern world economic conditions shape religious matters and not vice versa. Secularization at the institutional level has occurred within the modern western world, but this has yielded different results in terms of the level of religious involvement and participation when one compares Europe and the U.S. (Davie & Woodhead, 2009). Within the U.S. institutional differentiation has not deterred religious involvement and participation (Cannell, 2010). Yet, in Europe the weakened influence of religion over the institutional sphere has led to a decline in church attendance, church membership, and belief in God (Davis & Robinson, 1999; Halman &

Draulens, 2006). A secularized environment not only inhibits the ability of religion to influence behaviors such as homicide, but it also contributes to the growth of atheism (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012) as religion begins to lose its social plausibility (Berger, 1967).

Atheism is particularly salient in the present study because unlike the major world religions, it displays a significant negative correlation with homicide at the bivariate level (r = -.530, p < .001). This finding is consistent with prior research that has found higher homicide rates in countries where belief in God is more prevalent (Jensen 2006; Paul 2005; Fajnzylber et al. 2002). One of the reasons why atheism may be linked with lower homicide rates is the fact that it reflects the opposite of the intensity of religious beliefs which have been linked to higher rates of homicide (Jensen, 2006). Another reason for the negative correlation between atheism and homicide may be due to the fact that atheism displays a strong positive correlation with secularization at the bivariate level (r = .825, p < .001). Given this positive correlation, nations with secular democracies tend to score higher on measures of societal well-being (Kamenev, 2006; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Zuckerman, 2008) and have lower rates of violent crime (Paul, 2005). This link between atheism and the secularization process may also explain the crime inhibiting effect of atheism given the fact that secular nations tend to promote more political and civic liberties among their citizens (Nationmaster, 2009). Zuckerman (2009) estimates that there are between 500 and 750 million atheists around the world, and research suggests that the number of atheists in countries like the U.S. is on the rise (Cannell, 2010; Kosmin and Keysar 2009; Paul 2009). With the growth of atheism, religion will not become absent within society but instead will adopt a more

individualistic character to sustain itself.

Over time individualism within societies will begin to influence and shape religious life (Durkheim, 1915). Durkheim (1897) suggests that the individualistic influence over religion will foster a religion of humanity that will contribute to lower rates of homicide over time. This religion of humanity is a form of moral individualism focused on the liberty and the rights of individuals with a focus on social justice (Durkheim, 1906). Moral individualism has been linked to lower rates of homicide (DiCristina, 2004; Huang, 1995) by promoting a highly civilized environment (Durkheim, 1900) characterized by respect, freedom, and honor (DiCristina, 2004). In the present study Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism is found to be associated with lower rates of homicide. In results not shown Hofstedeôs (1980) measure is positively correlated with secularization and atheism ($r = .429$, $p < .001$) but still reinforces the collective mission of religion by promoting social capital within societies (Allik & Realo, 2004). Hofstedeôs (1980) measure illustrates how the religion of humanity may be a form of constitutive individualism found within communities and institutions (Bellah et al., 1985) that shape pro-social behavior (Bond, 2004). Prior research has associated Protestantism with moral individualism (Eisner, 2003b; Messner, 1982), but in the present study Protestantism may also be linked with a form of individualism that is of the egoistic or excessive type.

In the present study neither form of individualism nor the secularization process mediates the relationship between Protestantism or any of the major world religions and homicide. Before I ran structural equation models to examine potential mediation effects, I ran ordinary least squares models to identify any possible indirect relationships. In

results not shown Protestantism was found to be indirectly linked with higher rates of homicide through its association with the proportion single with children. Even though there was not a mediating effect, it is still worth taking a closer look at this indirect relationship. My expectation was that egoistic individualism or secularization would mediate the relationship between higher levels of Protestantism and higher rates of homicide, but it is unlikely that being single with children represents these mediating mechanisms. Poor economic conditions, lack of trust, and fear of domestic violence have been cited as reasons for lower marriage rates (Edin, 2000), which suggests that being single with children may illustrate levels of economic disadvantage or family disruption.

In the present study the single with children measure is positively correlated with homicide at the bivariate level ($r = .465$, $p < .001$) and positively associated with homicide at the multivariate level. This link between the single with children measure and homicide may be due to the weakened social bond (Hirschi, 1969) between parent and child stemming from the challenges of balancing home and work life by the single parent. If being single with children is representative of economic disadvantage or family disruption then the question becomes what aspect of Protestantism may trigger these conditions. Individualism has been a well-documented value orientation of Protestantism (Buss, 2000; Herberg, 1955; Turner, 2011), but it is unlikely that the link between Protestantism and the proportion single with children involves egoistic individualism. Rather, it may be that the relationship between Protestantism and the proportion single with children is based on their connection to moral individualism. In results not shown Protestantism is positively correlated with Hofstedeôs (1980) measure of moral individualism ($r = .403$, $p < .001$), and Hofstedeôs (1980) measure is positively correlated

with some of the same measures that highlight the value of the individual as the single with children measure. For example, in results not shown both Hofstedeôs (1980) measure and the single with children measure are positively correlated with the proportion that do not believe a child needs a mother and father to grow up happily and the proportion that approve of a woman wanting to have a child as a single parent. These measures highlight the value and the rights of the individual which are the foundations of moral individualism (Lukes, 1973).

Yet, if the link between Protestantism and the single with children measure is based on their connection to moral individualism, it would appear unlikely that either measure would contribute to higher rates of homicide. To understand how Protestantism may be indirectly linked with homicide through its association with the proportion single with children, it is necessary to recognize some of the contingencies associated with moral individualism. Prior research has noted that moral individualism is only associated with lower rates of homicide at the national level when inequality levels are low and wealth is high (Karstedt, 2001, Messner, 1982). Also, and perhaps even more salient as an explanation for why Protestantism and the proportion single with children may be linked with higher rates of homicide is Durkheimôs (1893) discussion of moral individualism. Durkheim (1893) suggests that moral individualism represented through the contractual relations of organic solidarity can only be preserved when they are supported by the non-contractual relations of mechanical solidarity. In essence, without the support of traditional and less individualized religion within society Durkheim (1893) believes that a religion of humanity will not be sufficient to promote social solidarity. This is one potential explanation for the indirect relationship between Protestantism, the

proportion single with children, and homicide. Yet, further research is needed to not only understand the relationship between family dynamics and homicide but also to identify what factors may help shed light on the relationship between religion and homicide cross-nationally.

Even though none of the major world religions and Protestantism in particular was linked to higher rates of homicide, religion still may play a vital role in explaining the variation in cross-national rates of homicide. It may be that the major world religions such as Protestantism are significantly linked to homicide through their relationship with specific religious beliefs. In terms of these beliefs, one study found that belief in heaven was associated with higher homicide rates while belief in hell was linked to lower homicide rates cross-nationally (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012). These effects related to belief in heaven and belief in hell remain controlling for some of the major world religions, the Gini index, and measures tapping into religious intensity or passion (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012). A higher proportion of individuals believe in heaven rather than hell and as this gap increases the rate of crime tends to increase in predominantly Roman Catholic and non-Catholic Christian countries (Shariff, Rhemtulla, 2012). Belief in heaven may facilitate higher rates of homicide by making individuals feel less concerned about the consequences of their actions in the afterlife, while belief in hell may contribute to lower rates of homicide by restraining behavior through the fear of punishment in the afterlife (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012). Given these results, future research might be well served to examine whether belief in heaven or hell mediates the relationship between the major world religions and rates of homicide cross-nationally. Future research might also examine whether any of the major world religions conditions the differential effects that

belief in heaven and belief in hell display on cross-national rates of homicide.

Not only does this study raise questions about the influence of religion on variation in cross-national rates of homicide, but it has also more broadly highlighted the issue of what exactly may account for higher homicide rates. Prior research has identified economic inequality as a leading correlate of higher rates of homicide (Jacobs & Richardson, 2008; Lee & Bankston, 1999; Messner, 1980). In the present study, both measures of economic inequality are positively linked with homicide, but questions remain regarding the consistency of these measures within different model specifications. Other measures such as the proportion who believe that individuals must be careful rather than trusting of others, Hofstedeôs (1980) individualism measure, and social welfare assessed as health benefits also do not display consistent effects under various model specifications. There are several factors which are not included in the present study which may be promising as explanations for the cross-national variation in rates of homicide. Factors that future studies would be wise to examine include drug market activity (Blumstein, 1995), incarceration (Fukuyama, 1999), and perceptions of government (Roth, 2009). This study also suggests that economic conditions which are thought to be linked to homicide (Pridemore, 2011) may actually be more suited to explain changes in property crime levels. In results not shown, the finding that Protestantism is indirectly linked with higher rates of homicide through its effect on the single with children measure suggests more research is needed to identify how the family institution may impact violent crime levels.

In an examination of thirty-four cross-national studies of homicide Lafree (1999) identifies three dominant perspectives that seek to explain the variation in cross-national

rates of homicide. Modernization or social disorganization theory which stems from the work of Durkheim (1893) views homicide as the result of an absence of social controls as the environmental landscape changes from agricultural to urban. An economic stress perspective highlights how poverty and inequality levels may contribute to higher rates of homicide through its influence on compositional changes within a societyôs population (Bursik, 1988). Situational perspectives such as routine activities (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Cohen, Felson, & Land, 1980) point to an increase in criminal opportunities as individuals spend more time away from their homes. In my estimation these perspectives can be blended to identify what may account for the variation in cross-national rates of homicide. In models not shown I looked at the effect of time spent working per week on homicide and did not find any significant effects, but I think a more salient measure might be time spent at home by parents and both teenagers and adolescents. Time spent at home for parents may be dictated by economic stresses, and for young people time spent at home may not only reduce opportunities for violent behavior but also highlight the type of relationship between the parent and the child. Just as religious beliefs may impel or restrain behavior (Shariff & Rhemtulla, 2012); time spent at home may indicate the nature of familial bonds and their likelihood of facilitating or inhibiting violent behaviors such as homicide.

It would appear that this study provides more questions than answers. This study may be viewed as a stepping stone or a potential building block for future research examining the potential link between religion and crime. Through its value structure and influence on a societyôs institutional structure, Protestantism was viewed as a potential contributor to the higher rates of homicide cross-nationally. None of the other major

world religions were thought to be linked with homicide due to their partial rather than full association with the mechanisms that might produce or deter homicide. Protestantism has been the focus of this study primarily due to its foundation which distinguishes it from many of the other world religions. A shift in focus from the Church to the individual under Protestantism was thought to be the catalyst for higher rates of homicide cross-nationally. This thought stems from the idea that shifting the emphasis from the Church to the individual attenuates the traditional conception of religion as a force that serves to unite individuals (DeTocqueville, 1835; Durkheim, 1897; Wuthnow, 2005). Findings from this study suggest that more research is needed to delineate the factor or factors which account for the variation in cross-national homicide rates. Future research examining the relationship between the major world religions and cross-national rates of homicide would be well served to consider both the foundational principles of these religions and the historical transformations that have shaped their evolution.

REFERENCES

Abercrombie, N., Hill, S., & Turner, B. S. (1986). *Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Abraham, G. (1988). Max Weber on ñJewish rationalismò and the Jewish question. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 1*, 358-391.

Agadjanian, A., & Rousselet, K. (2005). Globalization and Identity Discourse in Russian Orthodoxy. In V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian, & J. Pankhurst (Eds.). *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 29-57). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Ali, A. J., & Al-Owaihan, A. (2008). Islamic worth ethic: A critical review. *Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal*, *15*, 5-19.

Allik, J., & Realo, A. (2004). Individualism-collectivism and social capital. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *35*, 29-49.

Altheimer, I. (2008). Social support, ethnic heterogeneity, and homicide: A cross-national approach. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 36*, 103-114.

Antonaccio, O., & Tittle, C. R. (2007). A cross-national test of Bongerôs theory of criminality and economic conditions. *Criminology, 45*, 925-958.

Badie, B. (1986). *Culture et politique.* Paris: Economica.

Bane, M. J. (1986). "Household composition and poverty." In Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't, eds. Sheldon Danziger and Daniel Weinberg, 209-231. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderatorï mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 51*, 1173-1182.

Beit-Hallahmi, B. (2007). óAtheists: A Psychological Profile.ôpp. 300ï 17 in The Cambrdige Companion to Atheism, edited by Michael Martin. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Bell, D. (1973). *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Bellah, R. N. (1967) Civil religion in America. *Daedalus, 96*, 1-21.

Bellah, R. N. (Ed.). (1973). *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., Tipton, S. M. 1985 (1996). *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Updated ed. With a new introduction). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., Tipton, S. M. (1991). *The Good Society*. 1st ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

Bennion, L. L. (1992). The business ethic of the world religions and the spirit of capitalism. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 6*, 39-73.

Berger, P. L. (1967). *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1969). Sociology of Religion and Sociology of Knowledge. In N. Birnbaum & G. Lenzer (Eds.). *Sociology and Religion: A Book of Readings* (pp. 410-417). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Blumstein, A. (1995). Youth violence, guns, and the illicit-drug industry. *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86*, 10-36.
Bond, M. H. (2004). Culture and aggressionð From context to coercion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *8*, 62-78.
Bruce, S. (2002). *God is Dead. Secularisation in the West*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Budd, S. (1973). *Sociologists and Religion*. London: Collier-Macmillan Publishers.
Bulliet, R. W. (1996). The individual in Islamic society. In I. Bloom, J. P. Martin, & W. L. Proudfoot (Eds.), *Religious Diversity and Human Rights* (pp. 175-191). New York: Columbia University Press.
Bursik, R. J. (1988). Social disorganization and theories of crime and delinquency: Problems and prospects. *Criminology*, *26*(4), 519-552.
Buss, A. (1989a). The economic ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part I. *International Sociology, 4*, 235-258.
Buss, A. (1989b). The economic ethics of Russian-Orthodox Christianity: Part II-Russian old believers and sects. *International Sociology, 4*, 447-472.
Buss, A. (2000). The evolution of western individualism. *Religion, 30*, 1-25.
Cannell, F. (2010). The anthropology of secularism. *Annual review of Anthropology*, *39*, 85-100.
Cantwell, C., & Kawanami, H. (2009). Buddhism. In L. Woodhead, H. Kawanami, & C. Partridge (Eds.). *Religions in the Modern World* (2nd ed.). (pp. 67-102). New York, NY: Routledge.
Casanova, J. (1994). *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Casanova, J. (2001). Civil society and religion: Retrospective reflections on Catholicism and prospective reflections on Islam. *Social Research, 68*, 1041-1080.
Castles, F. G. (1994). On religion and public policy: Does Catholicism make a difference? *European Journal of Political Research, 25*, 19-40.
Chamlin, M. B., & Cochran, J. K. (1997). Social altruism and crime. *Criminology, 35*, 203-228.
Chon, D. S. (2012). The impact of population heterogeneity and income inequality on homicide rates: A cross-national assessment. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 56*, 730-748.
Chriss, J. J. (1993). Durkheimôs cult of the individual as civil religion: Its appropriation by Erving Goffman. *Sociological Spectrum, 13*, 251-175.
Cohen, J. (1980). Rational capitalism in Renaissance Italy. *American Journal of Sociology, 85*, 1340-1355.
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American sociological review*, 588-608.
Cohen, L. E., Felson, M., & Land, K. C. (1980). Property crime rates in the United States: A macrodynamic analysis, 1947-1977; with ex ante forecasts for the mid-1980s. *American journal of Sociology*, *86*(1), 90-118.
Cohen, A. B., Hall, D. E., Koenig, H. G., & Meador, K. (2005). Social versus individual motivation: Implications for normative definitions of religious orientation. *Personality & Social Psychology Review, 9*, 48ï 61.

Cohen, A. B., & Hill, P. C. (2007). Religion as culture: Religious individualism and collectivism among American Catholics, Jews, and Protestants. *Journal of Personality, 75*, 709-742.

Cole, J. H., & Gramajo, A. M. (2009). Homicide rates in a cross-section of countries: Evidence and interpretations. *Population and Development Review, 35*, 749-776.

Cooperman, A., Hackett, C., & Ritchey, K. (2014). Global religious diversity. Retrieved from Pew Research Center: http://www.pewforum.org/2014/04/04/globalreligious-diversity/

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, E. S., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C. H., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Mechkova, V., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Saxer, L., Seim, B., Sigman, R., & Staton, J. (2017). ñV-Dem Codebook v7.1.ò Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Cullen, F. T. (1994). Social support as an organizing concept for criminology: Presidential address to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. *Justice Quarterly, 11*, 527-559.

Dashefsky, A., Lazerwitz, B., & Tabory, E. (2003). óA Journey of the óStraight Wayô or the óRoundabout Pathô: Jewish Identity in the United States and Israel.ô pp. 240ï 60, in Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, edited by Michele Dillon, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Davie, G. (2000). *Religion in Modern Europe. A Memory Mutates*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davie, G., & Woodhead, L. (2009). Secularization and secularism. *Religions in the modern world: Traditions and transformations*, *2*, 523-534.

Davis, N. J., & Robinson, R. V. (1999). Their brothers' keepers? Orthodox religionists, modernists, and economic justice in Europe. *American Journal of Sociology*, *104*, 1631-1665.

Delacroix, J., & Nielsen, F. (2001). The beloved myth: Protestantism and the rise of industrial capitalism in nineteenth-century Europe. *Social Forces, 80*, 509-553.

De Tocqueville, A. 1835 (2000). *Democracy in America*. H. C. Mansfield & D. Winthrop, (Eds.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

DiCristina, B. (2004). Durkheimôs theory of homicide and the confusion of the empirical literature. *Theoretical Criminology*, *8*, 57-91.

Dobrijevic, I. (2006) The orthodox spirit and the ethic of capitalism: A case study on Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian Orthodox Church. *Serbian Studies: Journal of the North American Society for Serbian Studies, 20*, 1ï 13.

Dülmen, R. van. (1993). óFormierung der europäischen Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeitô, in R. van Dülmen, ed., Gesellschaft der frühen Neuzeit: Kulturelles Handeln und sozialer Prozess: Beiträge zur historischen Kulturforschung, 16ï 61. Wien: Böhlau.

Dülmen, R. van. (1996). óNorbert Elias und der Prozess der Zivilisation; Die Zivilisationstheorie im Lichte der historischen Forschungô, in K. S. Rehberg, ed., Norbert Elias und die Menschenwissenschaften; Studien zur Entstehung und Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes, 264ï 274. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

Durkheim, E. 1893 (1984). *The division of labor in society.* (W. D. Halls, Trans.). New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc.

Durkheim, E. 1897 (1951). *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. G. Simpson, (Ed.). J.A. Spaulding & G. Simpson, (Trans.). New York: Free Press.
Durkheim, E. 1900 (1958). *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. (Cornelia Brookfield, Trans.). Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Durkheim, E. (1906). Le divorce par consentement mutuel. *Revue bleue, 44*, 549-554.
Durkheim, E. 1915 (1965). *The elementary forms of the religious life*. (J. W. Swain, Trans.). New York: The Free Press.
Durkheim, E. (1969). The Social Foundations of Religion. In R. Robertson (Ed.). *Sociology of Religion* (pp. 42-54). Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books.
Durkheim, E. (1973). *On Morality and Society*. R. N. Bellah (Ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Edin, K. (2000). What do low-income single mothers say about marriage? *Social Problems*, *47*, 112-133.
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1969). The Protestant Ethic Thesis. In R. Robertson (Ed.). *Sociology of Religion* (pp. 297-320). Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books.
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1973). The Implications of Weberôs Sociology of Religion for Understanding Processes of Change in Contemporary Non-European Societies and Civilizations. In C. Y. Glock & P. E. Hammond (Eds.), *Beyond the Classics? Essays in the Scientific Study of Religion* (pp. 131-155). New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Eisner, M. (2001). Modernization, self-control and lethal violence: The long-term dynamics of European homicide rates in theoretical perspective. *British Journal of Criminology, 41*, 618-638.
Eisner, M. (2003a). Long-term historical trends in violent crime. *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 30*, 83-142.
Eisner, M. (2003b). The long-term development of violence: Empirical findings and theoretical approaches to interpretation. In W. Heitmayer & J. Hagan (Eds.), *International Handbook of Violence Research* (pp. 41-59). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Eisner, M. (2008). Modernity strikes back? A historical perspective on the latest increase in interpersonal violence (1960-1990). *International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2*, 288-316.
Elder, J. W. (1996). Hindu perspectives on the individual and the collectivity. In I. Bloom, J. P. Martin, & W. L. Proudfoot (Eds.), *Religious Diversity and Human Rights* (pp. 54-86). New York: Columbia University Press.
Enders, C. K. (2006). Analyzing structural equation models with missing data. In G. R. Hancock & R. O. Mueller (Eds.), *Structural Equation Modeling: A Second Course* (pp. 313-342). Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.
Esping-Andersen, G., & Van Kersbergen, K. (1992). Contemporary research on social democracy. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *18*(1), 187-208.
Facchini, F. (2010). Religion, law, and development: Islam and Christianity-Why is it in Occident and not in the Orient that man invented the institutions of freedom? *European Journal of Law and Economics, 29*, 103-129.
Face, R. D. (1969). Symon de Gualterio: A brief portrait of a thirteenth century man of affairs. pp. 75-94 in *Economy, Society, and Government in Medieval Italy*, (Eds.) D. Herlihy, R. S. Lopez, & V. Slessarev. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.

Fajnzylber, O., Lederman, D., & Loatza, N. (2002). ôInequality and Violent Crime.ô *Journal of Law and Economics*, *XLV*: 1ï 40.
Fanfani, A. 1935 (1984). *Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism*. Sheed & Ward, (Trans.) Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Felson, R. B., Berg, M. T., & Rogers, M. L. (2014). Bring a gun to a gunfight: Armed adversaries and violence across nations. *Social Science Research, 47*, 79-90.
Fenn, R. K. (2009). *Key Thinkers in the Sociology of Religion*. New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Fichter, J. H. (1957). The marginal Catholic: An institutional approach. In J. M. Yinger (Ed.), *Religion, Society, and the Individual: An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion* (pp. 423-433). New York: The Macmillan Company.
Fischoff, E. (1959). The History of a Controversy. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism And Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and its Critics* (pp. 107-114). Boston: D.C. Heath & Company.
Flora, G., & Szilagyi, G. (2005). Church, Identity, Politics: Ecclesiastical Functions and Expectations toward Churches in Post-1989 Romania. In V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian, & J. Pankhurst (Eds.). *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 109-143). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Fukuyama, F. (1999). *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*. London: Profile Books.
Fullerton, K. (1959). Calvinism and Capitalism: An Explanation of the Weber Thesis. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (pp. 6-20). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.
Gartner, R. (1990). The victims of homicide: A temporal and cross-national comparison. *American Sociological Review, 55*, 92-106.
Gellner, D. N. (1996). Max Weber, capitalism and the religion of India. In R. H. Roberts (Ed.), *Religion and the Transformations of capitalism: Comparative Approaches* (pp. 21-46). New York: Columbia University Press.
Gerth, H. & Mills, C. W. (1964). *Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc.
Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2012). Reminders of secular authority reduce believersô distrust of atheists. *Psychological science*, *23*, 483-491.
Giddens, A. (1971). Durkheim's political sociology. *Sociological Review, 19*, 477-519.
ñGlobal Christianity ï A Report on the Size and Distribution of the Worldôs Christian Population, 2011.ò Pew Research Center, Washington, D. C. (October 19, 2017). http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/global-christianity-exec/
Glock, C. E. (1969). The Religious Revival in America. In N. Birnbaum & G. Lenzer (Eds.). *Sociology and Religion: A Book of Readings* (pp. 397-409). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Goodman, L. E. (1996). The individual and the community in the normative traditions of Judaism. In I. Bloom, J. P. Martin, & W. L. Proudfoot (Eds.), *Religious Diversity and Human Rights* (pp. 15-53). New York: Columbia University Press.
Greeley, A. (1989). Protestant and Catholic: Is the analogical imagination extinct? *American Sociological Review, 54*, 485-502.
Gupta, V., Surie, G., Jabvidan, M., & Chhokar, J. (2002). South Asia cluster: Where the old meets the new? *Journal of World Business, 37*, 16ï 27.

Gurr, T. R. (1989). Historical trends in violent crime: Europe and the United States. In T. R. Gurr (Ed.), *Violence in America: The History of Crime* (Vol. 1, pp. 21-54). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Halman, L., & Draulans, V. (2006). How secular is Europe?. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *57*, 263-288.

Hannon, L., & DeFronzo, J. (1998). The truly disadvantaged, public assistance, and crime. *Social Problems, 45*, 383ï 392.

Hansen, N. M. (1973). Sources of economic rationality. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism, Capitalism, and Social Science: The Weber Thesis Controversy (2nd ed.)* (pp. 137-149). Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.

Hansmann, H. B. (1982). Population heterogeneity and the sociogenesis of homicide. *Social Forces, 61*, 206-224.

Hayes, R. P. (1991). Gotama Buddha and religious pluralism. *Journal of Religious Pluralism, 1*, 65-96.

Hayward, R. D., & Kemmelmeier, M. (2011). Weber revisited: a cross-national analysis of religiosity, religious culture, and economic attitudes. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *42*, 1406-1420.

Hefner, R. W. (2008). Ambivalent embrace: Islamic economics and global capitalism. In J. B. Imber (Ed.). *Markets, Morals, & Religion*. (pp. 141-155). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Herberg, W. (1955). *Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press (reprinted 1983).

Hill, M. (1973). *A Sociology of Religion*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Hirschi, T. (1969). *Causes of Delinquency*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Hofstede, G. (1984). The cultural relativity of the quality of life concept. *The Academy of Management Review, 9*, 389-398.

Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations across Nations.* 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival.* 3rd ed. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Hsieh, C. C., & Pugh, M. D. (1993). Poverty, income inequality, and violent crime: A meta-analysis. *Criminal Justice Review, 18*, 182-202.

Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling, 6*, 1ï 55.

Huang, W. S. Wilson. (1995). A cross-national analysis on the effect of moral individualism on murder rates. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 39*, 63-75.

Hudson, W. S. (1959). Puritanism and the Spirit of Capitalism. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (pp. 56-61). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.

Hyma, A. (1959). The Economic Views of the Protestant Reformers. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (pp. 94-106). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.

Jacobs, D., & Richardson, A. M. (2008). Economic inequality and homicide in the developed nations from 1975 to 1995. *Homicide Studies, 12*, 28-45.

Jensen, G. F. (2006). Religious cosmologies and homicide rates among nations. *Journal of Religion and Society, 8*, 1-14.

Jensen, G. F., & Akers, R. L. (2003). Taking Social Learning Global: Micro-macro Transitions in Criminological Theory. In R. L. Akers & G. F. Jensen (eds.). *Social Learning Theory and the Explanation of Crime: A Guide for the New Century. Advances in Criminological Theory,* (vol. 11) (pp. 9-39). New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Johnstone, R. L. (1992). *Religion in Society: A Sociology of Religion*. 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Kamenev, M. (2006). ôRating Countries for the Happiness Factor.ôBusiness Week, Oct.11http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/oct2006/gb20061011_072596.htm (last accessed 25 August 2009).

Karstedt, S. (1999). Social transformation and crime: A crisis of deregulation. In *The rule of law after communism. Problems and prospects in East-Central Europe*, ed. M. Krygier and A. Czarnota. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.

Karstedt, S. (2001). Comparing cultures, comparing crime: Challenges, prospects and Problems for a global criminology. *Crime, Law, & Social Change, 36*, 285-308.

Karstedt, S. (2003). Legacies of a culture of inequality: The Janus face of crime in post-communist countries. *Crime, Law & Social Change, 40*, 295-320.

Kick, E. L., & Lafree, G. D. (1985). Development and the social context of murder. *Comparative Social Research, 8*, 37-58.

Kokosalakis, N. (1996). "Orthodoxie grecque, modernité et politique." *Identités religieuses en Europe, Paris, La Découverte*: 131-151.

Kornhauser, R. R. (1978). *Social Sources of Delinquency: An Appraisal of Analytic Models*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kosmin, B. & Keysar, A. (2009). America Religious Identification Survey, Summary Report. Hartford, CT: Trinity College. Available at http://www.americanreligionsurvey-aris.org/ (last accessed: 23 June 2009).

Kovandzic, T. V., Vieraitis, L. M., & Yeisley, M. R. (1998). The structural covariates of urban homicide: Reassessing the impact of income inequality and poverty in the post-Reagan era. *Criminology, 36*, 569-600.

Krahn, H., Hartnagel, T.F., & Gartrell, J.W. (1986). Income inequality and homicide rates: Cross-national data and criminological theories. *Criminology, 24*, 269-295.

Kunin, S. D. (2009). Judaism. In L. Woodhead, H. Kawanami, & C. Partridge (Eds.). *Religions in the Modern World* (2nd ed.). (pp. 173-203). New York, NY: Routledge.

Lafree, G. (1999). Declining violent crime rates in the 1990s: Predicting crime booms and busts. *Annual Review of Sociology, 25*, 145-168.

Lafree, G. (2005). Evidence for elite convergence in cross-national homicide victimization trends, 1956 to 2000. *The Sociological Quarterly, 46,* 191-211.

Lee, M. R., & Bankston, W. B. (1999). Political structure, economic inequality, and homicide: a cross-national analysis. *Deviant Behavior, 20*, 27-55.
Lenski, G. (1963). *The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life*. (Rev. Ed.). Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Lester, D. (1996). *Patterns of Suicide and Homicide in the World*. Commack, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Lewer, J. J., & Van den Berg, H. (2007). Estimating the institutional and network effects of religious cultures on international trade. *Kyklos, 60*, 255-277.
Lewis, B. (1988). *Le langage politique de l'Islam*. Paris: Gallimard.
Little, T. D., Jorgensen, T. D., Lang, K. M., Moore, E. W. G. (2014). On the joys of missing data. *Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 39*, 151-162.
Little, D., Sachedina, A., Kelsay, J. (1996). Human rights and the worldôs religions: Christianity, Islam, and religious liberty. In I. Bloom, J. P. Martin, & W. L. Proudfoot (Eds.), *Religious Diversity and Human Rights* (pp. 213-239). New York: Columbia University Press.
Long, J. D. (2005). ñClaiming the Buddha for Hinduism: Swami Vivekananda and the Rediscovery of Buddhism in India.ò In The Cyclonic Swami: Vivekananda in the West, ed. S. Sengupta and M. Paranjape, 113-20. New Delhi: Samvad India Foundation.
Lubarsky, S. (2005). Deep Religious Pluralism and Contemporary Jewish Thought. *Deep Religious Pluralism*, 111-129.
Lukes, S. (1973). *Individualism: Key Concepts in the Social Sciences*. London, UK: Harper & Row.
MacCulloch, D. (2003). *Reformation: Europe's House Divided, 1490-1700*. London: Penguin Books.
Madan, T.N. (1997). *Modern Myths, Locked Minds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maila, J. (1991). Les droits de lõHomme sont-ils impensables dans le monde arabe?. *Les Cahiers del'Orient*, 176ï 197.
Makrides, V. N. (2005). Orthodox Christianity, Rationalization, Modernization: A Reassessment. In V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian, & J. Pankhurst (Eds.). *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 179-209). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.
Marmorstein, E. (1957). Israel: Its role in civilization. *International Affairs, 33*, 245.
Maume, M. O., & Lee, M. R. (2003). Social institutions and violence: A sub-national test of institutional-anomie theory. *Criminology, 41*, 1137ï 1172.
Mawson, A. R., & Jacobs, K. W. (1978). Corn consumption, tryptophan, and cross-national homicide rates. *Orthomolecular Psychiatry, 7*, 227-230.
Medeiros, R. (2016). Handling missing data in Stata: Imputation and likelihood-based approaches. 2016 Swiss Stata Users Group meeting. StataCorp LP.
Mentzer, M. S. (1988). Religion and achievement motivation in the United States: A structural analysis. *Sociological Focus, 21*, 307-316.
Merton, R. K. (1957). *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Rev. ed. United States of America: The Free Press of Glencoe.
Messner, S. F. (1980). Income inequality and murder rates: Some cross-national findings. *Comparative Social Research, 3*, 185-198.

Messner, S. F. (1982). Societal development, social equality, and homicide: A cross-national test of a Durkheimian model. *Social Forces, 61*, 225-240.
Messner, S. F. (1989). Economic discrimination and societal homicide rates: Further evidence on the cost of inequality. *American Sociological Review, 54*, 597-611.
Messner, S. (2003). Understanding cross-national variation in criminal violence. In W. Heitmeyer & J. Hagan (Eds.), *International Handbook of Violence Research* (pp. 701-716). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Messner, S. F., Raffalovich, L. E., & Shrock, P. (2002). Reassessing the cross-national relationship between income inequality and homicide rates: Implications of data quality control in the measurement of income distribution. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 18*, 377-395.
Messner, S. F., Raffalovich, L. E., & Sutton, G. M. (2010). Poverty, infant mortality, and homicide rates in cross-national perspective: Assessments of criterion and construct validity. *Criminology, 48*, 509-537.
Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (1997). Political restraint of the market and levels of homicide: A cross-national application of Institutional-Anomie Theory. *Social Forces, 75*, 1393ï 1416.
Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (2001). An Institutional-Anomie Theory of Crime. In R. Paternoster and R. Bachman (Eds.). *Explaining Criminals and Crime* (pp. 151-160). Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (2004). ñInstitutionalizingò Criminological Theory. In J. McCord (Ed.). *Beyond Empiricism: Institutions and Intentions in the Study of Crime, Advances in Criminological Theory* (vol. 13) (pp. 83-107). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (2006). The Present and Future of Institutional-Anomie Theory. In F. T. Cullen, J. P. Wright, & K. R. Blevins (Eds.). *Taking Stock: The Status of Criminological Theory, Advances in Criminological Theory* (vol. 15) (pp. 127-149). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Messner, S. F., & Rosenfeld, R. (2007). *Crime and the American dream*. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth.
Messner, S. F., Thome, H., & Rosenfeld, R. (2008). Institutions, anomie, and violent crime: Clarifying and elaborating institutional-anomie theory. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 2*, 163-181.
Morris, P. (1996). Judaism and capitalism. In R. H. Roberts (Ed.), *Religion and the Transformations of capitalism: Comparative Approaches* (pp. 88-120). New York: Columbia University Press.
Muchembled, R. 2008 (2012). *A History of Violence: From the End of the Middle Ages to the Present*. (Jean Birrell, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Muller, J. Z. (2010). *Capitalism and the Jews.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nadanovsky, P., & Cunha-Cruz, J. (2009). The relative contribution of income inequality and imprisonment to the variation in homicide rates among developed (OECD), South and Central American countries. *Social Science & Medicine, 69*, 1343-1350.
Nanini, R. (2011). A Catholic Alternative to Globalization? The *Compagnia Delle Opere* as a Mediator between Small and Medium Enterprises and Catholic Social Teaching. *Research in Economic Anthropology* 31: 47-76.

Nationmaster. (2009). ôDemocracy Statistics: Civil and Political Liberties.ô Available at http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/dem_civ_and_pol_lib-democracy-civil-and-political-liberties (last accessed 22 June 2009).
Neapolitan, J. L. (1997). Homicides in developing nations: Results of research using a large and representative sample. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 41*, 358-374.
Nelson, B. (1973). Weberôs Protestant Ethic: Its Origins, Wanderings, and Foreseeable Futures. In C. Y. Glock & P. E. Hammond (Eds.), *Beyond the Classics? Essays in the Scientific Study of Religion* (pp. 71-130). New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Neumayer, E. (2003). Good policy can lower violent crime: Evidence from a cross-national panel of homicide rates, 1980-97. *Journal of Peace Research, 40*, 619-640.
Nivette, A. E. (2011). Cross-national predictors of crime: A meta-analysis. *Homicide Studies, 15*, 103-131.
Nivette, A. E., & Eisner, M. (2013). Do legitimate polities have fewer homicides? A cross-national analysis. *Homicide Studies, 17*, 3-26.
Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Novak, M. (1993). *The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. New York: The Free Press.
Obadia, L. (2011). Is Buddhism like a Hamburger? Buddhism and the Market Economy in a Globalized World. *Research in Economic Anthropology* 31: 99-122.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2016), SF1.1: Family size and household composition, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/els/family/SF_1_1_Family_size_and_composition.pdf.
Parboteeah, K. P. (2009). Religious groups and work values: A focus on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam. *International Journal of Cross-Cultural Management, 9*, 51-67.
Parsons, T. (1951). *The Social System*. New York: Free Press.
Parsons, T. (1964a). Christianity and Modern Industrial Society. In L. Schneider (Ed.). *Religion, Culture and Society: A Reader in the Sociology of Religion* (pp. 273-298). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Parsons, T. (1964b). *Social Structure and Personality*. New York: Free Press.
Parsons, T. (1966). *Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*. A. Inkeles, (Ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Parsons, T. (1969). Family and Church as ñBoundaryò Structures. In N. Birnbaum & G. Lenzer (Eds.). *Sociology and Religion: A Book of Readings* (pp. 423-429). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Parsons, T. (1982). *On Institutions and Social Evolution*. L. H. Mayhew, (Ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Parsons, T. (1990) [1934]. Prolegomena to a theory of social institutions. *American Sociological Review, 55*: 319-333.

Paul, G. (2005). óCross-National Correlations of Quantifiable Societal Health with Popular Religiosity and Secularism in the Prosperous Democracies.ô *Journal of Religion and Society, 7*: 1ï 17.
Paul, G. (2009). óIs the Baylor Religion Study Reliable?: An Analysis From the Council for Secular Humanism.ô Available at http://ga1.org/center_for_inquiry/notice-description.tcl?newsletter_id=11076763.
Peck, J. (1993). *The Gods of Televangelism: The Crisis of Meaning and the Appeal of Religious Television*. Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, Inc.
Pickering, W. S. F. (1984). *Durkheim's Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Pratt, T. C., & Cullen, F. T. (2005). Assessing macro-level predictors and theories of crime: A meta-analysis. *Crime and Justice, 32*, 373-450.
Pratt, T. C., & Godsey, T. W. (2002). Social support and homicide: A cross-national test of an emerging criminological theory. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 30*, 589-601.
Pratt, T. C., & Godsey, T. W. (2003). Social support, inequality, and homicide: A cross-national test of an integrated theoretical model. *Criminology, 41*, 611-643.
Pridemore, W. A. (2008). A methodological addition to the cross-national empirical literature on social structure and homicide: A first test of the poverty-homicide thesis. *Criminology, 46*, 133-154.
Pridemore, W. A. (2011). Poverty matters: A reassessment of the inequality-homicide relationship in cross-national studies. *British Journal of Criminology, 51*, 739-772.
Pridemore, W. A., & Kim, S. W. (2007). Socioeconomic change and homicide in a transitional society. *The Sociological Quarterly*, *48*, 229-251.
Pryor, F. L. (1990). A Buddhist economic system-in principle. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 49*, 339-349.
Robertson, H. M. 1933 (1973). *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism: A Criticism of Max Weber and His School*. Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley Publishers.
Robertson, H. M. (1959). Criticism of Max Weber and his school. In R.W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (pp. 65-86). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.
Rodinson, M. 1966 (1974). *Islam and Capitalism*. (Brian Pearce, Trans.). London: Allen Lane, A Division of Penguin Books Ltd.
Rosenfeld, R. (2009). Crime is the problem: Homicide, acquisitive crime, and economic conditions. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 25*, 287-306.
Rosenfeld, R., & Messner, S. F. (1995). Crime and the American Dream: An Institutional Analysis. In F. Adler & W.S. Laufer (Eds.). *The Legacy of Anomie Theory: Advances in Criminological Theory* (vol. 6) (pp. 159ï 182). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Rosenfeld, R., & Messner, S. F. (1997). Markets, Morality, and an Institutional-Anomie Theory of Crime. In N. Passas & R. Agnew (Eds.), *The Future of Anomie Theory* (pp. 207-224). Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Rosenfeld, R., & Messner, S. F. (2008). Self Control, Anomie, and Social Institutions. In E. Goode (ed.) *Out of Control: Assessing the General Theory of Crime* (pp. 90-101). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Rossow, I. (2001). Alcohol and homicide: A cross-cultural comparison of the relationship in 14 European countries. *Addiction, 96*, 77-92.
Roth, R. (2009). *American Homicide*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rubin D B. (1976). Inference and missing data. *Biometrika*, *63*, 581-592.
Ruzgar, M. (2005). Islam and Deep Religious Pluralism. In D. R. Griffin (Ed.). *Deep Religious Pluralism* (1st ed.) (pp. 158-177). Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
Sampson, E. E. (2000). Reinterpreting individualism and collectivism: Their religious roots and monologic versus dialogic person-other relationship. *American Psychologist, 55*, 1425-1432.
Sampson, R. J. & Wilson, W. J. (1995). Toward a theory of race, crime, and urban inequality. In Crime and Inequality. J. Hagan & R.D. Peterson, Eds.: 37ï 54. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Savolainen, J. (2000). Inequality, welfare state, and homicide: Further support for the institutional anomie theory. *Criminology, 38*, 1021-1042.
Schneider, L. (1970). *Sociological Approach to Religion*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Schreiber, J. B., Nora, A., Stage, F. K., Barlow, E. A., & King, J. (2006). Reporting structural equation modeling and confirmatory factor analysis results: A review. *The Journal of Educational Research, 99*, 323ï 337.
Selengut, C. (2009). Religion and violence. In L. Woodhead, H. Kawanami, & C. Partridge (Eds.). *Religions in the Modern World* (2nd ed.). (pp. 449-470). New York, NY: Routledge.
Shariff, A. F., & Rhemtulla, M. (2012). Divergent effects of beliefs in heaven and hell on national crime rates. *PLoS One*, *7*(6), e39048.
Sinha, D. (1998). Basic Indian values and behavior dispositions in the context of national development: An appraisal, in D.Sinha and H. Kao (eds) *Social Values and Development*, pp. 29ï 55. New Delhi: Sage.
Sklare, M. (1957). The function of ethnic churches: Judaism in the United States. In J. M. Yinger (Ed.), *Religion, Society, and the Individual: An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion* (pp. 458-463). New York: The Macmillan Company.
Smith, D. E. (1963). *India as a Secular State*. Bombay: Oxford University Press.
Sombart, W. 1913 (1969). *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*. New York, NY: Burt Franklin.
Sombart, W. (1959). Role of religion in the formation of the capitalist spirit. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (pp. 29-38). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.
Spierenburg, P. (2004). Social control and history: An introduction. In H. Roodenburg & P. Spierenburg (Eds.), *Social Control In Europe, 1500-1800* (Vol 1., pp. 1-24). Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press.
Spierenburg, P. (2012). Long-term historical trends of homicide in Europe. In M. C. A. Liem & W. A. Pridemore (Eds.). *Handbook of European Homicide Research* (pp. 25-38). New York, NY: Springer.
Stark, R. (2005). *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success*. New York: Random House.
Stark, R., & Bainbridge, W. S. (1996). *A theory of religion*. Rutgers Univ Press.

Stickley, A., & Pridemore, W. A. (2006). The socialï structural correlates of homicide in late-Tsarist Russia. *British Journal of Criminology*, *47*, 80-99.

Swatos, Jr., W. H. (1996). Islam and capitalism. In R. H. Roberts (Ed.), *Religion and the Transformations of capitalism: Comparative Approaches* (pp. 47-62). New York: Columbia University Press.

Talmon, Y. (1969). Pursuit of the Millenium: The Relation between Religious and Social Change. In N. Birnbaum & G. Lenzer (Eds.). *Sociology and Religion: A Book of Readings* (pp. 238-254). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Tawney, R. H. (1926). *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (Vol. 23). Transaction publishers.

Tawney, R. H. (1959). Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (pp. 39-55). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.

Taylor, C. L., & Hudson, M. C. (1972). World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Thome, H. (2007). Explaining the long-term trend in violent crime: A heuristic scheme and some methodological considerations. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 1*, 185-202.

Thurman, R. A. F. (1996). Human rights and human responsibilities: Buddhist views on individualism and altruism. In I. Bloom, J. P. Martin, & W. L. Proudfoot (Eds.), *Religious Diversity and Human Rights* (pp. 87-113). New York: Columbia University Press.

Tibi, B. (1990). *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry*. (2nd ed.). Transl. M. F. Sluglett, P. Sluglett. New York: Saint Martin's Press.

Troeltsch, E. (1969). Religion, economics, and society. In N. Birnbaum & G. Lenzer (Eds.), *Sociology and Religion: A Book of Readings* (pp. 197-204). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Turner, B. S. (1974a). Islam, capitalism, and the Weber theses. *The British Journal of Sociology, 25*, 230-243.

Turner, B. S. (1974b). *Weber and Islam: A Critical Study*. London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Turner, B. S. (1992). *Max Weber: From History to Modernity*. London & New York: Routledge.

Turner, B. S. (2011). *Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularisation and the State*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ullman, J. B., & Bentler, P. M. (2003). *Structural equation modeling*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Van der Veer, P. (2001). *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Van der Veer, P., & Lehmann, H. (Eds). (1999). *Nation and Religion: perspectives on Europe and Asia.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Vernon, G. M. (1962). *Sociology of Religion*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

Vieraitis, L. M. (2000). Income inequality, poverty, and violent crime: A review of the empirical evidence. *Social Pathology, 6*, 24-45.

Volkov, D. (2005). Living Eastern Orthodox Religion in the United States. In V. Roudometof, A. Agadjanian, & J. Pankhurst (Eds.). *Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 224-244). Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.

Warner, R. S. (1973). Weberôs sociology of nonwestern religions. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism, Capitalism, and Social Science: The Weber Thesis Controversy (2nd ed.)* (pp. 32-52). Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.

Wax, M. (1960). Ancient Judaism and the Protestant ethic. *American Journal of Sociology, 65*, 449-455.

Weber, M. 1904-1905 (2009). *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. R. Swedberg, (Ed.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Weber, M. (1915). Major features of world religions. In R. Robertson (Ed.), *Sociology of Religion: Selected Readings* (pp. 19-41). Great Britain: Penguin Books.

Weber, M. 1920 (1964). *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism.* (H. H. Gerth, Ed. & Trans.). Intro by C. K. Yang. New York: Free Press.

Weber, M. (1952). *Ancient Judaism*. (H. H. Gerth & D. Martindale, Eds. & Trans.). New York, NY: The Free Press. (Original work published 1917).

Weber, M. (1958). *The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism*. (H. H. Gerth & D. Martindale, Eds. & Trans.). New York: Free Press.

Weber, M. (1959). Author Defines His Purpose. In R. W. Green (Ed.). *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics* (pp. 94-106). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.

Weber, M. (1964). Asceticism and the Spirit of Capitalism. In L. Schneider (Ed.). *Religion, Culture and Society: A Reader in the Sociology of Religion* (pp. 299-311). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Weber, M. (1969). State and Hierocracy. In N. Birnbaum & G. Lenzer (Eds.). *Sociology and Religion: A Book of Readings* (pp. 322-334). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weber, M. (1993). *The Sociology of Religion*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Whelan, C. (2008). Mitch Kapor and the roots of enlightened economics. In J. B. Imber (Ed.). *Markets, Morals, & Religion*. (pp. 221-230). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Williams, P. W. (2015). *America's Religions: From their Origins to the 21st Century* (4th ed.).

Wilson, B. R. (1969). Religion in Secular Society. In R. Robertson (Ed.). *Sociology of Religion* (pp. 152-164). Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books.

Wilson, W. J. (2012). *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Woodhead, L. (2009). Christianity. In L. Woodhead, H. Kawanami, & C. Partridge (Eds.). *Religions in the Modern World* (2nd ed.). (pp. 205-235). New York, NY: Routledge.

World Values Association Survey. (2008). ñWorld Values Survey.ò Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.

World Values Association Survey. (2014). ñWorld Values Survey.ò (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer (WVS, data archive). ASEP/JDS: Madrid, Spain.

Wothke, W. (1998). Longitudinal and multi-group modeling with missing data. In T. D. Little, K. U. Schnabel, and J. Baumert (Eds.). *Modeling Longitudinal and Multiple Group Data: Practical Issues, Applied Approaches and Specific Examples.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers.

Wuthnow, R. (1988). *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (1991). *Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Wuthnow, R. (2005). *America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Wuthnow, R., Hunter, J. D., Bergesen, A., & Kurzweil, E. (1984). *Cultural Analysis: The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas*. Boston, Massachusetts: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Yinger, J. M. (1957). A Critique of Weberôs Thesis. In J. M. Yinger (Ed.). *Religion, Society, and the Individual: An Introduction to the Sociology of Religion* (pp. 529-541). New York: The MacMillan Company.

Yinger, J. M. (1970). *The Scientific Study of Religion*. London: The Macmillan Company.

Zuckerman, P. (2008). *Society Without God: What the Least Religious Nations can Tell Us about Contentment*. New York, NY: New York University Press.

Zuckerman, P. (2009). Atheism, secularity, and well-being: How the findings of social science counter negative stereotypes and assumptions. *Sociology Compass*, *3*, 949-971.

Appendix A: Sample of Nations (N=86)

Nation	Nation
Albania	Lithuania
Andorra	Macedonia
Argentina	Malaysia
Armenia	Mali
Australia	Mexico
Azerbaijan	Moldova
Bangladesh	Montenegro
Belarus	Morocco
Bosnia	Netherlands
Brazil	New Zealand
Bulgaria	Nigeria
Burkina Faso	Norway
Canada	Pakistan
Chile	Peru
China	Philippines
Colombia	Poland
Croatia	Puerto Rico
Cyprus	Romania
Czech Republic	Russia
Dominican Republic	Rwanda
Egypt	Saudi Arabia
El Salvador	Serbia
Estonia	Singapore
Ethiopia	Slovakia
Finland	Slovenia
France	South Africa
Georgia	South Korea
Germany	Spain
Ghana	Sweden
Great Britain	Switzerland
Guatemala	Taiwan
Hong Kong	Tanzania
Hungary	Thailand
India	Trinidad
Indonesia	Turkey
Iran	Uganda
Iraq	Ukraine
Israel	Uruguay

Italy	USA
Japan	Venezuela
Jordan	Vietnam
Kyrgyzstan	Zambia
Latvia	Zimbabwe

Appendix B: World Value Survey Items

1. Protestantism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion responding ñProtestantò)
2. Catholicism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion responding ñCatholicò)
3. Orthodox: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion responding ñOrthodoxò)
4. Judaism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion responding ñJewishò)
5. Islam: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion responding ñMuslimò)
6. Hinduism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion responding ñHinduò)
7. Buddhism: Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? (Proportion responding ñBuddhistò)
8. Atheism: Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you areé (Proportion responding ñA convinced atheistò)
9. Religious Pluralism: Scores based on percentage of adherents to Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Atheism. Measure calculated in similar manner to religious diversity index from the Pew Research Center.
10. Trust: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (Proportion responding ñNeed to be very carefulò)
11. Secularization: Comprised of variables, How important is religion in your life (Proportion responding ñVery Importantò), Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days? (Proportion responding ñOnce a weekò or ñMore than once a weekò), How important is God in your life? (Proportion responding ñvery importantò), and Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are a religious person, not a religious person, an atheist? (Proportion responding ña religious personò). All of the variables comprising this measure are reverse-coded to illustrate the secularization process.
12. Charity: Could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization? (Proportion responding ñActive member of humanitarian or charitable organization)
13. Single with Kids: Comprised of variables, are you currently? (Proportion responding ñSingleò) & have you had any children? (Proportion responding ñOne or more childrenò). Responses to the question ñare you currently?ò include ñmarried,ò ñliving together as married,ò ñdivorced,ò ñseparated,ò ñwidowed,ò and ñsingle.ò
14. (Religious Membership) Religious Member.: Are you an active member, inactive member, or not a member of a church or religious organization? (Proportion responding ñactive memberò)

15. Life Meaning: How often, if at all, do you think about the meaning and purpose of life? (Proportion responding ñrarelyò or ñneverò)

Appendix C: Measurement Parameter Estimates for Secularization

Latent Construct	Observed Variable	Metric Slope	Validity Coefficient
Secularization	Religion very Important‌ں	1.00f	.966****
	Importance of God	.911****	.960****
		(.033)	
	Religious Service Attendance	.865****	.883****
		(.083)	
	Religious Person	.659****	.894****
		(.062)	
N	86		
G^2	1.03, 2 d.f., (p = .598)		
RMSEA	.000		
CFI	1.00		

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

‌ںMarker variable for latent construct.

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses. Model includes error correlations between the indicators of Religion very Important and Importance of God and Religion very important and Religious Service Attendance.

Appendix D. Protestantism and Lack of Trust Scatterplot



Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Hofstedeôs Individualism Measure Scatterplot



Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Gini Index Scatterplot



Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Economic Inequality Ratio Scatterplot

Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Infant Mortality Rate Scatterplot



Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Health Expenditures Scatterplot



Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Charitable Organization Membership Scatterplot



Appendix D Cont. Protestantism and Single with Children Scatterplot



Appendix E. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of Religion

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.122	Protestantism	.064	Protestantism	.040	Hinduism	-.056	Protestantism	.068
	(.086)		(.089)		(.084)		(.078)		(.085)
Religion very Important	.528****	Religion very Important	.515****	Religion very Important	.527****	Religion very Important	.579****	Religion very Important	.511****
	(.091)		(.095)		(.085)		(.089)		(.097)
Prot x Religion Import.	.259***	Prot x Religion Import.	.311***	Prot x Religion Import.	.269***	Hinduism x Religion Import.	.110	Prot x Religion Import.	.240***
	(.096)		(.093)		(.089)		(.072)		(.087)
Catholicism	.195*	Catholicism	.136	Catholicism	-.014	Catholicism	-.055	Buddhism	-.055
	(.107)		(.099)		(.108)		(.125)		(.087)
Cath x Religion Import.	.322***	Cath x Religion Import.	.346****	Cath x Religion Import.	.212*	Cath x Religion Import.	.158	Buddhism x Religion Import.	-.001
	(.094)		(.096)		(.109)		(.112)		(.069)
Orthodox	.193*	Judaism	.016	Islam	-.156	Islam	-.237*	Islam	-.197*
	(.102)		(.081)		(.109)		(.123)		(.109)
Orthodox x Religion Import.	-.150	Judaism x Religion Import.	.101	Islam x Religion Import.	-.232*	Islam x Religion Import.	-.315***	Islam x Religion Import.	-.293***
	(.108)		(.081)		(.124)		(.118)		(.107)
Adjusted R^2	.470	Adjusted R^2	.431	Adjusted R^2	.467	Adjusted R^2	.391	Adjusted R^2	.434
N	80	*N*	80	*N*	80	*N*	85	*N*	80

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of Religion

Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Protestantism	.055	Protestantism	.128	Protestantism	-.111	Protestantism	-.113
	(.087)		(.084)		(.102)		(.111)
Religion very Important	.551****	Religion very Important	.156	Religion very Important	.291**	Religion very Important	-.071
	(.087)		(.179)		(.114)		(.115)
Prot x Religion Import.	.260***	Prot x Religion Import.	.276***	Prot x Religion Import.	.189**	Prot x Religion Import.	.125
	(.089)		(.088)		(.085)		(.082)
Religious Pluralism	.082	Atheism	-.412***	Single w/ kids	.284***	Single w/ kids	.356***
	(.105)		(.136)		(.107)		(.114)
Pluralism x Religion Import.	-.122	Atheism x Religion Import.	.114	Economic Inequality	.296***	Economic Inequality	.307***
	(.083)		(.089)		(.103)		(.094)
Islam	-.182*	Islam	-.087	Islam	-.067	Infant Mortality	.453****
	(.103)		(.101)		(.108)		(.117)
Islam x Religion Import.	-.322***	Islam x Religion Import.	-.281***	Islam x Religion Import.	-.103	Individual Responsibility	.029
	(.105)		(.102)		(.107)		(.086)
Adjusted R^2	.453	Adjusted R^2	.528	Adjusted R^2	.533	Adjusted R^2	.607
N	80	*N*	78	*N*	75	*N*	74

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of God

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5
Protestantism	.147*	Protestantism	.086	Protestantism	.059	Protestantism	.098	Buddhism	.045
	(.085)		(.084)		(.083)		(.084)		(.092)
Importance of God	.511****	Importance of God	.471****	Importance of God	.479****	Importance of God	.467****	Importance of God	.462****
	(.082)		(.085)		(.081)		(.081)		(.085)
Prot x God Important	.258***	Prot x God Important	.334****	Prot x God Important	.301****	Prot x God Important	.329****	Buddhism x God Important	.185**
	(.088)		(.081)		(.082)		(.082)		(.074)
Catholicism	.133	Catholicism	.080	Catholicism	-.038	Catholicism	.084	Catholicism	.086
	(.111)		(.103)		(.115)		(.101)		(.102)
Cath x God Important	.251***	Cath x God Important	.270***	Cath x God Important	.176*	Cath x God Important	.276***	Cath x God Important	.317****
	(.091)		(.091)		(.104)		(.088)		(.091)
Orthodox	.204**	Judaism	-.007	Islam	-.143	Hinduism	-.112	Hinduism	-.118
	(.102)		(.083)		(.115)		(.081)		(.086)
Orthodox x God Important	-.132	Judaism x God Important	.089	Islam x God Important	-.149	Hinduism x God Important	.155**	Hinduism x God Important	.107
	(.104)		(.073)		(.126)		(.070)		(.080)
Adjusted R^2	.435	Adjusted R^2	.394	Adjusted R^2	.410	Adjusted R^2	.420	Adjusted R^2	.290
N	80	*N*	80	*N*	80	*N*	80	*N*	85

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Importance of God

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10
Buddhism	-.032	Religious Pluralism	.032	Atheism	-.377***	Single w/ kids	.321***	Single w/ kids	.352***
	(.102)		(.115)		(.142)		(.115)		(.114)
Importance of God	.416****	Importance of God	.448****	Importance of God	.157	Importance of God	.211**	Importance of God	-.105
	(.082)		(.087)		(.153)		(.100)		(.111)
Buddhism x God Important	.139	Pluralism x God Important	.041	Atheism x God Important	.164	Economic Inequality	.367***	Economic Inequality	.324***
	(.086)		(.092)		(.101)		(.111)		(.099)
Catholicism	.049	Catholicism	.082	Catholicism	.044	Catholicism	-.087	Infant Mortality	.468****
	(.102)		(.102)		(.090)		(.081)		(.110)
Cath x God Important	.311***	Cath x God Important	.277***	Cath x God Important	.210**	Cath x God Important	.030	Individual Responsibility	.032
	(.094)		(.091)		(.083)		(.074)		(.085)
Protestantism	.108	Protestantism	.058	Protestantism	.161*	Protestantism	-.110	Protestantism	-.100
	(.086)		(.091)		(.083)		(.105)		(.112)
Prot x God Important	.308****	Prot x God Important	.325****	Prot x God Important	.334****	Prot x God Important	.204**	Prot x God Important	.122
	(.084)		(.088)		(.083)		(.079)		(.079)
Adjusted R^2	.407	Adjusted R^2	.389	Adjusted R^2	.498	Adjusted R^2	.518	Adjusted R^2	.608
N	80	*N*	80	*N*	78	*N*	75	*N*	74

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Service Attendance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.024	Judaism	.082	Hinduism	-.086	Hinduism	-.103	Hinduism	-.012
	(.092)		(.088)		(.082)		(.085)		(.083)
Religious Service Attendance	.548****	Religious Service Attendance	.724****	Religious Service Attendance	.695****	Religious Service Attendance	.697****	Religious Service Attendance	.511****
	(.096)		(.094)		(.098)		(.099)		(.144)
Prot x Religious Service	.154	Judaism x Religious Service	.094	Hinduism x Religious Service	.205**	Hinduism x Religious Service	.213**	Hinduism x Religious Service	.163
	(.110)		(.075)		(.091)		(.092)		(.104)
Catholicism	.185	Catholicism	-.147	Buddhism	-.048	Religious Pluralism	.109	Atheism	-.323***
	(.114)		(.116)		(.092)		(.092)		(.111)
Cath x Religious Service	.251*	Cath x Religious Service	.107	Buddhism x Religious Service	.038	Pluralism x Religious Service	-.003	Atheism x Religious Service	.145
	(.150)		(.121)		(.102)		(.104)		(.099)
Orthodox	.235*	Islam	-.343***	Islam	-.327***	Islam	-.284***	Islam	-.261***
	(.125)		(.109)		(.101)		(.102)		(.098)
Orthodox x Religious Service	-.042	Islam x Religious Service	-.263**	Islam x Religious Service	-.228**	Islam x Religious Service	-.250**	Islam x Religious Service	-.198*
	(.137)		(.102)		(.093)		(.109)		(.106)
Adjusted R^2	.348	Adjusted R^2	.345	Adjusted R^2	.351	Adjusted R^2	.360	Adjusted R^2	.426
N	79	*N*	84	*N*	84	*N*	84	*N*	79

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Service Attendance

	Model 6
Single w/ kids	.383****
	(.083)
Religious Service Attendance	-.081
	(.103)
Economic Inequality	.142
	(.104)
Infant Mortality	.716****
	(.106)
Economic Freedom	-.001
	(.081)
Islam	-.272****
	(.077)
Islam x Religious Service	-.102
	(.106)
Adjusted R^2	.653
N	75

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Person

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.131	Protestantism	.135	Protestantism	.109	Protestantism	.172**	Protestantism	.151*
	(.082)		(.085)		(.083)		(.080)		(.079)
Religious Person	.404****	Religious Person	.430****	Religious Person	.428****	Religious Person	.373****	Religious Person	.380****
	(.102)		(.100)		(.088)		(.085)		(.107)
Prot x Religious Person	.323****	Prot x Religious Person	.352****	Prot x Religious Person	.324****	Prot x Religious Person	.332****	Prot x Religious Person	.312****
	(.090)		(.088)		(.087)		(.084)		(.077)
Catholicism	.061	Catholicism	.035	Islam	-.162	Hinduism	-.047	Hinduism	-.120
	(.118)		(.110)		(.102)		(.087)		(.093)
Cath x Religious Person	.211*	Cath x Religious Person	.188	Islam x Religious Person	-.161	Hinduism x Religious Person	.198**	Hinduism x Religious Person	.229***
	(.125)		(.125)		(.107)		(.090)		(.076)
Orthodox	.090	Judaism	-.092	Judaism	-.113	Judaism	-.081	Buddhism	.123
	(.099)		(.097)		(.097)		(.094)		(.145)
Orthodox x Religious Person	-.031	Judaism x Religious Person	.188**	Judaism x Religious Person	.187**	Judaism x Religious Person	.122	Buddhism x Religious Person	.041
	(.114)		(.079)		(.084)		(.079)		(.093)
Adjusted R^2	.280	Adjusted R^2	.309	Adjusted R^2	.340	Adjusted R^2	.316	Adjusted R^2	.309
N	79	*N*	79	*N*	79	*N*	79	*N*	79

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Person

Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
Protestantism	.104	Protestantism	.224**	Single w/ kids	.369****	Single w/ kids	.365***
	(.093)		(.087)		(.071)		(.118)
Religious Person	.384****	Religious Person	.139	Religious Person	-.044	Religious Person	-.100
	(.084)		(.144)		(.098)		(.100)
Prot x Religious Person	.250***	Prot x Religious Person	.247**	Private Ownership	-.034	Individual Responsibility	-.024
	(.096)		(.098)		(.087)		(.075)
Hinduism	-.071	Hinduism	-.046	Hinduism	-.093	Protestantism	-.072
	(.090)		(.081)		(.067)		(.114)
Hinduism x Religious Person	.235***	Hinduism x Religious Person	.170**	Hinduism x Religious Person	.137	Prot x Religious Person	.129
	(.086)		(.077)		(.088)		(.085)
Religious Pluralism	.151	Atheism	-.352***	Infant Mortality	.392***	Infant Mortality	.432****
	(.109)		(.130)		(.118)		(.114)
Pluralism x Religious Person	.068	Atheism x Religious Person	.101	Economic Inequality	.323****	Economic Inequality	.323***
	(.085)		(.094)		(.083)		(.097)
Adjusted R^2	.320	Adjusted R^2	.401	Adjusted R^2	.597	Adjusted R^2	.608
N	79	*N*	78	*N*	73	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Member

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	-.072	Protestantism	-.094	Protestantism	-.123	Protestantism	-.080	Protestantism	-.090
	(.102)		(.107)		(.116)		(.106)		(.116)
Religious Member	.665****	Religious Member	.616****	Religious Member	.601****	Religious Member	.626****	Religious Member	.554****
	(.126)		(.115)		(.122)		(.125)		(.113)
Prot x Religious Member	.137*	Prot x Religious Member	.161**	Prot x Religious Member	.178**	Prot x Religious Member	.164**	Prot x Religious Member	.182*
	(.082)		(.082)		(.080)		(.080)		(.094)
Catholicism	.086	Judaism	-.175	Islam	-.098	Hinduism	-.181*	Buddhism	-.070
	(.106)		(.109)		(.104)		(.109)		(.106)
Cath x Religious Member	.328**	Judaism x Religious Member	-.011	Islam x Religious Member	-.033	Hinduism x Religious Member	.037	Buddhims x Religious Member	-.092
	(.166)		(.097)		(.094)		(.134)		(.150)
Orthodox	.217*	Orthodox	.219*	Orthodox	.176	Orthodox	.130	Orthodox	.131
	(.121)		(.120)		(.119)		(.120)		(.122)
Orthodox x Religious Member	-.190*	Orthodox x Religious Member	-.204*	Orthodox x Religious Member	-.207*	Orthodox x Religious Member	-.258**	Orthodox x Religious Member	-.213*
	(.110)		(.115)		(.112)		(.125)		(.117)
Adjusted R^2	.270	Adjusted R^2	.233	Adjusted R^2	.217	Adjusted R^2	.237	Adjusted R^2	.218
N	77	*N*	77	*N*	77	*N*	77	*N*	77

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix E Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide: Conditional Effects w/ Religious Member

Model 6		Model 7		Model 8	
Protestantism	-.107	Protestantism	.086	Single w/ kids	.434****
	(.131)		(.117)		(.107)
Religious Member	.583****	Religious Member	.287**	Religious Member	-.127
	(.114)		(.135)		(.116)
Prot x Religious Member	.171*	Prot x Religious Member	.128	Economic Inequality	.303***
	(.093)		(.092)		(.105)
Religious Pluralism	.042	Atheism	-.383****	Catholicism	.024
	(.112)		(.100)		(.075)
Pluralism x Religious Member	-.013	Atheism x Religious Member	-.140	Cath x Religious Member	-.089
	(.098)		(.102)		(.125)
Orthodox	.161	Orthodox	.137	Infant Mortality	.445****
	(.116)		(.101)		(.124)
Orthodox x Religious Member	-.209*	Orthodox x Religious Member	-.151	Economic Freedom	-.055
	(.116)		(.111)		(.116)
Adjusted R^2	.210	Adjusted R^2	.342	Adjusted R^2	.582
N	77	*N*	75	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix F. Added Variable Plots



Appendix G. Leverage Versus Squared Residual Plot



Appendix H. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.471****	ð	.471****	Single w/ kids	.412****	ð	.412****	Single w/ kids	.452****	ð	.452****	Single w/ kids	.376****	ð	.376****
	(.127)		(.127)		(.098)		(.098)		(.081)		(.081)		(.098)		(.098)
Protestantism	-.098	.146***	.048	Protestantism	-.090	.125***	.034	Economic Discrimination	.104	-.017	.087	Economic Discrimination	.065	.024	.089
	(.070)	(.051)	(.063)		(.064)	(.045)	(.052)		(.086)	(.069)	(.093)		(.081)	(.050)	(.080)
Catholicism	-.155	.489**	.334	Catholicism	.480*	.577**	1.06***	Catholicism	.068	.681***	.749**	Catholicism	.390	.564**	.954***
	(.458)	(.242)	(.463)		(.278)	(.237)	(.329)		(.292)	(.239)	(.340)		(.268)	(.219)	(.302)
Orthodox	.053	.054*	.107	Orthodox	.091**	.050**	.141***	Orthodox	.058	.069**	.127**	Orthodox	.095**	.047*	.142***
	(.066)	(.030)	(.072)		(.044)	(.025)	(.054)		(.050)	(.031)	(.057)		(.045)	(.025)	(.053)
Judaism	-.038	.007	-.031	Religious Pluralism	.110***	.024	.135****	Charity	-3.07*	3.73****	.660	Religious Pluralism	.103***	.021	.124***
	(.063)	(.039)	(.074)		(.035)	(.023)	(.038)		(1.62)	(.982)	(1.75)		(.037)	(.023)	(.037)
Islam	-.051	-.020	-.071	Atheism	-.516****	-.038	-.554****	Atheism	-.504****	.015	-.489****	Atheism	-.493****	-.059	-.552****
	(.056)	(.025)	(.060)		(.069)	(.038)	(.078)		(.067)	(.052)	(.088)		(.073)	(.038)	(.081)
Hinduism	-.016	.041*	.026	Hinduism	-.003	.036**	.034	Hinduism	-.012	.032	.020	Hinduism	.012	.021	.033
	(.050)	(.023)	(.055)		(.032)	(.018)	(.035)		(.032)	(.025)	(.041)		(.030)	(.016)	(.034)
Buddhism	-.020	-.075***	-.095	Buddhism	.059	-.055***	.004	Buddhism	.063	-.042	.022	Protestantism	-.060	.108**	.048
	(.059)	(.029)	(.060)		(.037)	(.020)	(.041)		(.041)	(.028)	(.046)		(.063)	(.047)	(.049)
Adjusted R^2		.362		Adjusted R^2		.539		Adjusted R^2		.515		Adjusted R^2		.536	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.225**	ð	.225**	Single w/ kids	.258***	ð	.258***	Single w/ kids	.404****	ð	.404****	Single w/ kids	.205**	ð	.205**
	(.094)		(.094)		(.082)		(.082)		(.099)		(.099)		(.096)		(.096)
Protestantism	-.018	.052*	.034	Protestantism	.019	.080**	.099***	Protestantism	-.042	.103***	.061	Religious Pluralism	.010	.015	.025
	(.049)	(.031)	(.040)		(.042)	(.033)	(.032)		(.049)	(.039)	(.045)		(.028)	(.012)	(.027)
Catholicism	.218	.268**	.485**	Catholicism	.631***	.296**	.928****	Catholicism	.268	.113	.381	Charity	5.29***	1.67**	6.96****
	(.227)	(.135)	(.237)		(.227)	(.146)	(.248)		(.328)	(.164)	(.343)		(1.67)	(.834)	(1.71)
Orthodox	.194****	.056**	.250****	Orthodox	.219****	.040**	.258****	Orthodox	.190****	.043**	.233****	Orthodox	.225****	.037**	.262****
	(.045)	(.022)	(.044)		(.032)	(.016)	(.037)		(.039)	(.022)	(.045)		(.044)	(.018)	(.046)
Religious Pluralism	.043	.0001	.043	Economic Discrimination	.091	.013	.103	Economic Discrimination	.040	.009	.050	Economic Discrimination	-.031	.010	-.021
	(.033)	(.012)	(.034)		(.067)	(.030)	(.072)		(.072)	(.044)	(.075)		(.080)	(.024)	(.087)
Atheism	-.303****	.019	-.284****	Atheism	-.060	-.003	-.063	Economic Inequality Ratio	.928****	.523***	1.45****	Charitable Giving	-2.69***	.140	-2.55***
	(.067)	(.022)	(.072)		(.068)	(.039)	(.079)		(.247)	(.165)	(.190)		(.846)	(.306)	(.900)
Economic Inequality	.069****	.013**	.083****	Economic Inequality	.048****	.012**	.060****	Health Benefits	-.158****	.076***	-.083**	Economic Inequality	.091****	.014*	.105****
	(.011)	(.006)	(.010)		(.009)	(.005)	(.010)		(.037)	(.026)	(.038)		(.011)	(.007)	(.010)
Charity	1.20	1.56**	2.76*	Infant Mortality	.562****	-.006	.555****	Educ. Benefits	-.041	-.026	-.068	Educ. Benefits	-.039	.028	-.011
	(1.51)	(.718)	(1.60)		(.099)	(.058)	(.120)		(.048)	(.034)	(.054)		(.049)	(.018)	(.047)
Adjusted R^2		.681		Adjusted R^2		.788		Adjusted R^2		.656		Adjusted R^2		.638	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 9		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.486****	ð	.486****
	(.094)		(.094)
Economic Freedom	-.023*	-.002	-.025*
	(.012)	(.007)	(.015)
Individual Responsibility	.078	.119	.197
	(.115)	(.093)	(.138)
Orthodox	.054	.038	.091
	(.054)	(.036)	(.059)
Economic Discrimination	.136	.048	.184
	(.108)	(.061)	(.117)
Charitable Giving	-.894	1.28	.389
	(1.43)	(.790)	(1.65)
Income Differences	1.43*	-.114	1.32
	(.751)	(.535)	(.933)
Private Ownership	-1.98*	.414	-1.57
	(1.04)	(.632)	(1.27)
Adjusted R^2		.385	
N		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.704****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.160	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.039	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.404***	ð	1.00f
	(.099)				(.144)				(.111)				(.125)		
Protestantism	.067	-.021	.046	Religious Pluralism	.052*	-.003	.049*	Economic Discrimination	.103	-.005	.099*	Economic Freedom	-.005	-.011**	-.015
	(.047)	(.039)	(.062)		(.028)	(.004)	(.027)		(.063)	(.013)	(.057)		(.012)	(.005)	(.011)
Catholicism	.300	.126	.426	Atheism	-.238**	-.084	-.322****	Atheism	-.043	-.022	-.065	Competition	-1.77	-.346	-2.11
	(.348)	(.365)	(.464)		(.092)	(.075)	(.065)		(.095)	(.061)	(.066)		(1.24)	(.546)	(1.32)
Orthodox	.212****	-.104**	.108	Orthodox	.184****	-.007	.176****	Orthodox	.169****	-.003	.166****	Orthodox	.076	-.039	.037
	(.060)	(.053)	(.066)		(.042)	(.009)	(.041)		(.039)	(.008)	(.036)		(.053)	(.025)	(.049)
Judaism	-.070	.037	-.033	Single w/ kids	.216***	.004	.220***	Single w/ kids	.276****	.002	.277****	Single w/ kids	.387****	.054*	.441****
	(.053)	(.051)	(.073)		(.062)	(.010)	(.064)		(.057)	(.005)	(.058)		(.079)	(.032)	(.085)
Islam	-.148***	.095*	-.053	Islam	-.067*	.014	-.054	Islam	-.127****	.003	-.124****	Islam	-.145***	.058*	-.087**
	(.052)	(.053)	(.061)		(.037)	(.014)	(.034)		(.036)	(.009)	(.034)		(.042)	(.031)	(.043)
Hinduism	.028	-.006	.023	Economic Inequality	.062****	.006	.068****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.641****	.014	.655****	Charitable Giving	-2.51***	.354	-2.15**
	(.036)	(.037)	(.053)		(.012)	(.005)	(.009)		(.173)	(.041)	(.159)		(.946)	(.410)	(1.01)
Buddhism	.016	-.096*	-.080	Buddhism	-.00003	-.009	-.009	Infant Mortality	.685****	.007	.691****	Life Meaning	-3.66***	-2.71***	-6.37****
	(.043)	(.053)	(.061)		(.037)	(.010)	(.036)		(.081)	(.018)	(.084)		(1.18)	(.906)	(1.09)
Adjusted R^2		.453		Adjusted R^2		.698		Adjusted R^2		.810		Adjusted R^2		.591	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	
G^2		83.01 (p < .001)		G^2		58.19 (p < .001)		G^2		66.61 (p < .001)		G^2		61.22 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.19		G^2/df		2.24		G^2/df		2.56		G^2/df		2.35	
RMSEA		.161		RMSEA		.121		RMSEA		.136		RMSEA		.126	
CFI		.886		CFI		.948		CFI		.939		CFI		.936	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.250*	ð	1.00f
	(.147)		
Religious Member	.062	.113	.175
	(.134)	(.077)	(.111)
New Govt.	.609***	.045	.654***
	(.191)	(.053)	(.188)
Latin Nation	.606	.431	1.04****
	(.406)	(.274)	(.293)
Single w/ kids	.308****	-.027	.281***
	(.085)	(.023)	(.084)
Islam	-.082	.063	-.019
	(.056)	(.040)	(.035)
Charity	-2.17	-.834	-3.00*
	(1.56)	(.649)	(1.61)
Life Meaning	-4.63****	-1.35*	-5.98****
	(1.15)	(.774)	(.987)
Adjusted R^2		.548	
N		85	
G^2		89.99 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.46	
RMSEA		.170	
CFI		.893	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.054	Single w/ kids	.255****	Single w/ kids	.343****	Judaism	.087	Buddhism	-.140
	(.073)		(.073)		(.090)		(.107)		(.086)
Economic Inequality	.693****	Economic Inequality	.371****	Economic Inequality	.438****	Economic Inequality	.566****	Economic Inequality	.452****
	(.079)		(.084)		(.084)		(.092)		(.089)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	.042	Infant Mortality	.461****	Infant Mortality	.320**	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	.034	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	-.002
	(.082)		(.072)		(.128)		(.123)		(.114)
Catholicism	.107	Catholicism	.149**	Health Benefits	-.087	Islam	-.027	Religious Pluralism	.137*
	(.074)		(.059)		(.106)		(.085)		(.079)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.125*	Cath x Econ Ineq.	.089	Educ. Benefits	-.034	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.096	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	-.037
	(.074)		(.055)		(.084)		(.111)		(.074)
Orthodox	.460****	Orthodox	.364****	Orthodox	.356****	Hinduism	-.152	Atheism	-.291***
	(.095)		(.075)		(.077)		(.096)		(.104)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.244**	Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.193*	Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.181	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.009	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	-.058
	(.118)		(.102)		(.115)		(.082)		(.092)
Adjusted R^2	.484	Adjusted R^2	.692	Adjusted R^2	.680	Adjusted R^2	.313	Adjusted R^2	.449
N	77	*N*	76	*N*	75	*N*	82	*N*	77

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
Protestantism	.017	Judaism	.033	Buddhism	-.152*	Protestantism	.071	Judaism	.061
	(.078)		(.103)		(.088)		(.075)		(.063)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.668****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.551****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.469****	Infant Mortality	.759****	Infant Mortality	.785****
	(.083)		(.093)		(.074)		(.072)		(.069)
Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	.075	Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.113	Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.034	Prot x Mortality	-.008	Judaism x Mortality	.040
	(.088)		(.104)		(.087)		(.082)		(.057)
Catholicism	.047	Islam	.028	Religious Pluralism	.141*	Catholicism	.418****	Catholicism	.193*
	(.077)		(.088)		(.075)		(.104)		(.101)
Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.061	Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.108	Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.003	Cath x Mortality	.341****	Cath x Mortality	.218**
	(.072)		(.109)		(.070)		(.086)		(.084)
Orthodox	.380****	Hinduism	-.139	Atheism	-.307***	Orthodox	.280***	Islam	-.262***
	(.089)		(.099)		(.094)		(.088)		(.086)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.091	Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.053	Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.043	Orthodox x Mortality	.132	Islam x Mortality	-.149**
	(.112)		(.093)		(.084)		(.086)		(.074)
Adjusted R^2	.444	Adjusted R^2	.327	Adjusted R^2	.475	Adjusted R^2	.589	Adjusted R^2	.566
N	76	*N*	81	*N*	76	*N*	77	*N*	83

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 11		Model 12		Model 13		Model 14		Model 15	
Islam	-.260***	Islam	-.271***	Islam	-.263***	Islam	-.209**	Single w/ kids	.360****
	(.087)		(.090)		(.088)		(.091)		(.099)
Infant Mortality	.766****	Infant Mortality	.771****	Infant Mortality	.783****	Infant Mortality	.670****	Infant Mortality	.516****
	(.071)		(.069)		(.065)		(.102)		(.122)
Islam x Mortality	-.142**	Islam x Mortality	-.131*	Islam x Mortality	-.143*	Islam x Mortality	-.102	Economic Inequality	.168
	(.071)		(.067)		(.087)		(.082)		(.114)
Catholicism	.194*	Catholicism	.183*	Catholicism	.201**	Catholicism	.176*	Catholicism	.126
	(.101)		(.099)		(.099)		(.100)		(.088)
Cath x Mortality	.225***	Cath x Mortality	.225***	Cath x Mortality	.205**	Cath x Mortality	.207**	Cath x Mortality	.127
	(.083)		(.084)		(.084)		(.088)		(.082)
Hinduism	.020	Buddhism	-.032	Religious Pluralism	.021	Atheism	-.133	Health Benefits	-.032
	(.067)		(.078)		(.082)		(.098)		(.123)
Hinduism x Mortality	.077	Buddhism x Mortality	.031	Pluralism x Mortality	-.024	Atheism x Mortality	.107	Charity	-.123
	(.062)		(.076)		(.072)		(.071)		(.076)
Adjusted R^2	.569	Adjusted R^2	.563	Adjusted R^2	.561	Adjusted R^2	.584	Adjusted R^2	.592
N	83	*N*	83	*N*	83	*N*	77	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.130	Judaism	.093	Hinduism	-.057	Religious Pluralism	.196**	Protestantism	.070	Protestantism	-.079
	(.096)		(.089)		(.117)		(.086)		(.120)		(.098)
Health Benefits	-.481****	Health Benefits	-.452****	Health Benefits	-.404****	Health Benefits	-.158	Charity	.142	Charity	-.099
	(.086)		(.079)		(.073)		(.145)		(.134)		(.076)
Prot x Health	-.122	Judaism x Health	-.073	Hinduism x Health	-.014	Pluralism x Health	-.077	Prot x Charity	-.157*	Prot x Charity	-.023
	(.084)		(.079)		(.078)		(.071)		(.089)		(.069)
Catholicism	.307**	Catholicism	.211	Catholicism	.277***	Catholicism	.196**	Catholicism	.144	Single w/ kids	.393****
	(.132)		(.131)		(.105)		(.090)		(.123)		(.109)
Cath x Health	-.173*	Cath x Health	-.175*	Cath x Health	-.243***	Cath x Health	-.102	Cath x Charity	.129	Economic Inequality	.245**
	(.089)		(.095)		(.084)		(.083)		(.134)		(.098)
Orthodox	.258**	Islam	-.088	Buddhism	-.067	Atheism	-.487***	Orthodox	.175	Infant Mortality	.468****
	(.108)		(.114)		(.117)		(.154)		(.155)		(.097)
Orthodox x Health	-.064	Islam x Health	.129	Buddhism x Health	-.041	Atheism x Health	-.124	Orthodox x Charity	-.095	ð	
	(.117)		(.095)		(.102)		(.121)		(.139)		
Adjusted R^2	.257	Adjusted R^2	.198	Adjusted R^2	.175	Adjusted R^2	.371	Adjusted R^2	-.006	Adjusted R^2	.590
N	76	*N*	82	*N*	82	*N*	76	*N*	76	*N*	71

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
Judaism	.017	Buddhism	-.182	Religious Pluralism	.107	Atheism	-.553****
	(.119)		(.118)		(.105)		(.104)
Charity	.123	Charity	.128	Charity	.104	Charity	-.051
	(.113)		(.107)		(.103)		(.095)
Judaism x Charity	-.027	Buddhism x Charity	.133	Pluralism x Charity	.152	Atheism x Charity	-.059
	(.116)		(.169)		(.118)		(.114)
Islam	-.036	Islam	-.073	Islam	.001	Islam	-.205*
	(.095)		(.096)		(.108)		(.109)
Islam x Charity	.179**	Islam x Charity	.217***	Islam x Charity	.253**	Islam x Charity	-.039
	(.082)		(.082)		(.112)		(.095)
Hinduism	-.043	Hinduism	.047	Hinduism	-.029	Hinduism	.108
	(.122)		(.119)		(.109)		(.095)
Hinduism x Charity	-.191	Hinduism x Charity	-.289**	Hinduism x Charity	-.209**	Hinduism x Charity	-.125
	(.120)		(.131)		(.100)		(.117)
Adjusted R^2	-.005	Adjusted R^2	.037	Adjusted R^2	.025	Adjusted R^2	.289
N	79	*N*	79	*N*	79	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.025****	ð	-.025****	Individualism	-.024****	ð	-.024****	Individualism	-.025****	ð	-.025****	Individualism	-.023****	ð	-.023****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)
Protestantism	.043	-.084**	-.041	Protestantism	.050	-.089**	-.039	Protestantism	.013	-.088**	-.075	Protestantism	-.165***	-.087**	-.251****
	(.069)	(.039)	(.068)		(.065)	(.036)	(.059)		(.076)	(.037)	(.075)		(.061)	(.038)	(.071)
Catholicism	.869*	-.147	.723	Catholicism	1.13***	-.194	.940**	Catholicism	.114	-.227	-.113	Religious Pluralism	.086	.008	.094
	(.462)	(.249)	(.496)		(.395)	(.193)	(.434)		(.521)	(.247)	(.583)		(.061)	(.023)	(.067)
Orthodox	.116	.019	.135*	Orthodox	.164**	.025	.188**	Orthodox	.018	.011	.029	Single w/ kids	.476****	.034	.510****
	(.074)	(.033)	(.072)		(.082)	(.034)	(.078)		(.091)	(.038)	(.093)		(.127)	(.070)	(.142)
Judaism	.102	-.123**	-.021	Judaism	.076	-.131***	-.054	Judaism	.083	-.125***	-.042	Judaism	.038	-.110***	-.072
	(.067)	(.048)	(.073)		(.080)	(.049)	(.077)		(.071)	(.045)	(.070)		(.053)	(.039)	(.056)
Islam	-.039	.016	-.024	Hinduism	.022	.011	.033	Buddhism	-.257***	.004	-.253**	Buddhism	-.128	.019	-.109
	(.054)	(.037)	(.067)		(.050)	(.018)	(.049)		(.086)	(.045)	(.101)		(.104)	(.046)	(.122)
Adjusted R^2		.193		Adjusted R^2		.221		Adjusted R^2		.352		Adjusted R^2		.491	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix H Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.012**	ð	-.012**	Individualism	-.004	ð	-.004	Individualism	-.004	ð	-.004
	(.005)		(.005)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)
Protestantism	-.080	-.024	-.104	Infant Mortality	.654****	.003	.656****	Infant Mortality	.379**	.041	.420***
	(.071)	(.018)	(.074)		(.176)	(.010)	(.178)		(.166)	(.050)	(.155)
Atheism	-.254***	-.033	-.286***	Health Benefits	.114**	-.012	.102**	Atheism	-.111	.0002	-.111
	(.091)	(.029)	(.098)		(.050)	(.019)	(.044)		(.097)	(.008)	(.098)
Single w/ kids	.443****	-.034	.409****	Educ. Benefits	-.019	-.016	-.035	Single w/ kids	.397****	-.022	.375****
	(.106)	(.034)	(.104)		(.078)	(.026)	(.073)		(.076)	(.027)	(.071)
Judaism	.049	-.042*	.007	Judaism	.087	-.006	.081	Economic Freedom	-.007	-.0004	-.008
	(.047)	(.023)	(.045)		(.057)	(.011)	(.057)		(.010)	(.001)	(.010)
Economic Inequality	.030**	.010*	.040***	Economic Inequality	.059****	.0004	.059****	Economic Inequality	.031**	.003	.034***
	(.014)	(.006)	(.013)		(.012)	(.001)	(.012)		(.013)	(.004)	(.012)
Adjusted R^2		.569		Adjusted R^2		.465		Adjusted R^2		.612	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o South Africa: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.474****	ð	.474****	Single w/ kids	.410****	ð	.410****	Single w/ kids	.336****	ð	.336****	Single w/ kids	.227**	ð	.227**
	(.129)		(.129)		(.098)		(.098)		(.074)		(.074)		(.095)		(.095)
Protestantism	-.104	.146***	.042	Protestantism	-.094	.122***	.028	Economic Discrimination	.111	-.008	.103	Protestantism	-.018	.051	.033
	(.070)	(.051)	(.063)		(.064)	(.044)	(.051)		(.080)	(.050)	(.087)		(.049)	(.031)	(.041)
Catholicism	-.080	.522**	.442	Catholicism	.539*	.598**	1.14****	Catholicism	.493*	.632**	1.13***	Catholicism	.222	.278**	.500**
	(.460)	(.250)	(.459)		(.277)	(.239)	(.325)		(.291)	(.245)	(.324)		(.236)	(.139)	(.243)
Orthodox	.054	.055*	.109	Orthodox	.092**	.051**	.143***	Orthodox	.106**	.029	.135**	Orthodox	.198****	.055**	.253****
	(.067)	(.031)	(.074)		(.044)	(.025)	(.055)		(.048)	(.027)	(.054)		(.045)	(.021)	(.044)
Judaism	-.050	.002	-.048	Religious Pluralism	.110***	.025	.135****	Religious Pluralism	.088**	.053**	.141****	Religious Pluralism	.049	.001	.050
	(.064)	(.038)	(.076)		(.035)	(.023)	(.038)		(.038)	(.026)	(.039)		(.033)	(.012)	(.034)
Islam	-.049	-.019	-.069	Atheism	-.517****	-.039	-.556****	Atheism	-.515****	-.034	-.549****	Atheism	-.303****	.017	-.286****
	(.058)	(.025)	(.063)		(.068)	(.038)	(.077)		(.071)	(.041)	(.082)		(.068)	(.022)	(.073)
Hinduism	-.040	.032	-.008	Hinduism	-.020	.029*	.009	Hinduism	-.020	.026	.006	Economic Inequality	.071****	.013**	.084****
	(.049)	(.021)	(.054)		(.032)	(.017)	(.033)		(.032)	(.018)	(.033)		(.012)	(.006)	(.012)
Buddhism	.003	-.067**	-.064	Buddhism	.074**	-.048***	.026	Buddhism	.057	-.026	.030	Charity	1.36	1.57**	2.93*
	(.059)	(.027)	(.059)		(.037)	(.018)	(.041)		(.040)	(.019)	(.042)		(1.53)	(.722)	(1.60)
Adjusted R^2		.221		Adjusted R^2		.550		Adjusted R^2		.533		Adjusted R^2		.678	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o South Africa: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.259***	ð	.259***	Single w/ kids	.399****	ð	.399****	Single w/ kids	.484****	ð	.484****
	(.082)		(.082)		(.100)		(.100)		(.090)		(.090)
Protestantism	.024	.079**	.103***	Protestantism	-.036	.100***	.064	Economic Freedom	-.018	.001	-.016
	(.043)	(.032)	(.033)		(.049)	(.038)	(.045)		(.012)	(.007)	(.014)
Catholicism	.633***	.309**	.941****	Catholicism	.272	.127	.399	Individual Responsibility	.082	.134	.216
	(.238)	(.151)	(.256)		(.343)	(.165)	(.358)		(.111)	(.088)	(.140)
Orthodox	.224****	.039**	.263****	Orthodox	.193****	.041**	.234****	Orthodox	.028	.045	.073
	(.032)	(.016)	(.037)		(.039)	(.021)	(.045)		(.050)	(.033)	(.057)
Economic Discrimination	.109	.015	.124*	Economic Discrimination	.058	.009	.068	Income Differences	1.31*	-.168	1.14
	(.066)	(.030)	(.072)		(.072)	(.042)	(.076)		(.782)	(.556)	(.982)
Atheism	-.063	-.005	-.068	Economic Inequality Ratio	.908****	.492***	1.40****	Private Ownership	-1.67	.373	-1.29
	(.069)	(.039)	(.079)		(.250)	(.162)	(.189)		(1.21)	(.624)	(1.53)
Economic Inequality	.049****	.011**	.060****	Health Benefits	-.153****	.074***	-.079**	Competition	-1.02	-.530	-1.55
	(.010)	(.005)	(.011)		(.036)	(.025)	(.038)		(1.69)	(1.18)	(2.11)
Infant Mortality	.560****	-.006	.554****	Educ. Benefits	-.058	-.027	-.086	Charitable Giving	-1.85	.953	-.896
	(.101)	(.058)	(.120)		(.047)	(.033)	(.053)		(1.26)	(.769)	(1.57)
Adjusted R^2		.786		Adjusted R^2		.656		Adjusted R^2		.364	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o South Africa: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.704****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.181	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.121	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.419***	ð	1.00f
	(.096)				(.156)				(.158)				(.121)		
Protestantism	.063	-.022	.041	Religious Pluralism	.039	-.002	.038	Religious Pluralism	.026	-.002	.024	Economic Freedom	-.002	-.010*	-.012
	(.047)	(.040)	(.062)		(.031)	(.005)	(.031)		(.030)	(.004)	(.030)		(.012)	(.005)	(.011)
Catholicism	.372	.166	.537	Atheism	-.214**	-.099	-.313****	Atheism	-.015	-.063	-.078	Competition	-2.07*	-.527	-2.59*
	(.345)	(.372)	(.466)		(.103)	(.085)	(.072)		(.109)	(.084)	(.082)		(1.25)	(.589)	(1.35)
Orthodox	.209****	-.104*	.104	Orthodox	.187****	-.008	.179****	Orthodox	.178****	-.008	.171****	Orthodox	.079	-.039	.040
	(.060)	(.054)	(.068)		(.043)	(.010)	(.041)		(.044)	(.010)	(.040)		(.052)	(.026)	(.051)
Judaism	-.076	.029	-.047	Single w/ kids	.237****	.005	.242****	Economic Discrimination	.103	-.013	.090	Single w/ kids	.381****	.061*	.442****
	(.053)	(.052)	(.075)		(.064)	(.012)	(.066)		(.068)	(.017)	(.062)		(.080)	(.036)	(.087)
Islam	-.144***	.096*	-.048	Islam	-.072*	.016	-.057	Islam	-.138***	.009	-.129****	Islam	-.147***	.060*	-.087*
	(.052)	(.055)	(.065)		(.040)	(.015)	(.036)		(.040)	(.012)	(.036)		(.043)	(.032)	(.045)
Hinduism	.006	-.020	-.014	Economic Inequality	.062****	.006	.069****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.929****	.061	.990****	Charitable Giving	-2.70***	.239	-2.46**
	(.035)	(.038)	(.052)		(.014)	(.006)	(.011)		(.208)	(.080)	(.183)		(.949)	(.420)	(1.05)
Buddhism	.036	-.082	-.047	Buddhism	.012	-.010	.002	Infant Mortality	.589****	.021	.611****	Life Meaning	-3.51***	-2.86***	-6.37****
	(.043)	(.053)	(.061)		(.038)	(.010)	(.036)		(.111)	(.029)	(.114)		(1.19)	(.915)	(1.09)
Adjusted R^2		.467		Adjusted R^2		.684		Adjusted R^2		.745		Adjusted R^2		.597	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	
G^2		84.04 (p < .001)		G^2		60.25 (p < .001)		G^2		50.31 (p < .01)		G^2		61.01 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.23		G^2/df		2.32		G^2/df		1.94		G^2/df		2.35	
RMSEA		.162		RMSEA		.124		RMSEA		.105		RMSEA		.126	
CFI		.884		CFI		.945		CFI		.961		CFI		.936	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o South Africa: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.239	ð	1.00f
	(.146)		
Religious Member	.050	.106	.157
	(.132)	(.076)	(.111)
New Govt.	.630***	.043	.673****
	(.190)	(.051)	(.186)
Latin Nation	.759*	.427	1.19****
	(.415)	(.277)	(.294)
Single w/ kids	.291***	-.028	.263***
	(.087)	(.024)	(.085)
Islam	-.077	.060	-.017
	(.055)	(.040)	(.035)
Charity	-1.81	-.755	-2.57
	(1.53)	(.626)	(1.60)
Life Meaning	-4.57****	-1.29*	-5.86****
	(1.14)	(.770)	(.972)
Adjusted R^2		.558	
N		85	
g^2		91.21 (p < .001)	
g^2/df		3.51	
RMSEA		.172	
CFI		.892	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.078	Judaism	.060	Buddhism	-.118	Protestantism	.031	Judaism	.020
	(.080)		(.103)		(.087)		(.082)		(.101)
Economic Inequality	.705****	Economic Inequality	.540****	Economic Inequality	.454****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.682****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.523****
	(.093)		(.098)		(.097)		(.095)		(.097)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	.068	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	.006	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	.046	Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	.100	Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.132
	(.094)		(.120)		(.125)		(.099)		(.104)
Catholicism	.094	Islam	-.031	Religious Pluralism	.164*	Catholicism	.035	Islam	.025
	(.079)		(.086)		(.084)		(.081)		(.088)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.112	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.109	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	-.003	Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.049	Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.115
	(.083)		(.113)		(.096)		(.078)		(.109)
Orthodox	.425****	Hinduism	-.175*	Atheism	-.309***	Orthodox	.351****	Hinduism	-.166
	(.094)		(.099)		(.106)		(.088)		(.101)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.182	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.087	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	-.081	Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.028	Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.025
	(.119)		(.124)		(.098)		(.111)		(.107)
Adjusted R^2	.443	Adjusted R^2	.317	Adjusted R^2	.433	Adjusted R^2	.430	Adjusted R^2	.347
N	77	*N*	82	*N*	77	*N*	76	*N*	81

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10
Buddhism	-.133	Protestantism	.065	Judaism	.027	Hinduism	-.022	Buddhism	-.009
	(.088)		(.075)		(.068)		(.065)		(.081)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.472****	Infant Mortality	.753****	Infant Mortality	.783****	Infant Mortality	.768****	Infant Mortality	.773****
	(.077)		(.072)		(.070)		(.072)		(.071)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.076	Prot x Mortality	-.016	Judaism x Mortality	.023	Hinduism x Mortality	.051	Buddhism x Mortality	.046
	(.087)		(.082)		(.060)		(.059)		(.077)
Religious Pluralism	.156**	Catholicism	.430****	Catholicism	.199*	Catholicism	.203**	Catholicism	.198**
	(.077)		(.104)		(.102)		(.101)		(.100)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.029	Cath x Mortality	.362****	Cath x Mortality	.231***	Cath x Mortality	.235***	Cath x Mortality	.243***
	(.083)		(.087)		(.086)		(.083)		(.085)
Atheism	-.317***	Orthodox	.254***	Islam	-.275***	Islam	-.271***	Islam	-.271***
	(.095)		(.091)		(.091)		(.090)		(.090)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.068	Orthodox x Mortality	.116	Islam x Mortality	-.143*	Islam x Mortality	-.137*	Islam x Mortality	-.122*
	(.089)		(.088)		(.075)		(.074)		(.066)
Adjusted R^2	.474	Adjusted R^2	.559	Adjusted R^2	.556	Adjusted R^2	.558	Adjusted R^2	.557
N	76	*N*	77	*N*	83	*N*	83	*N*	83

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 11		Model 12		Model 13
Religious Pluralism	.028	Atheism	-.148	Single w/ kids	.371****
	(.084)		(.098)		(.101)
Infant Mortality	.783****	Infant Mortality	.658****	Infant Mortality	.505****
	(.067)		(.101)		(.127)
Pluralism x Mortality	-.034	Atheism x Mortality	.116	Economic Inequality	.179
	(.072)		(.072)		(.131)
Catholicism	.214**	Catholicism	.183*	Catholicism	.125
	(.099)		(.101)		(.097)
Cath x Mortality	.215**	Cath x Mortality	.220**	Cath x Mortality	.130
	(.085)		(.089)		(.089)
Islam	-.272***	Islam	-.220**	Health Benefits	-.040
	(.090)		(.096)		(.125)
Islam x Mortality	-.143	Islam x Mortality	-.098	Charity	-.114
	(.087)		(.083)		(.076)
Adjusted R^2	.557	Adjusted R^2	.578	Adjusted R^2	.572
N	83	*N*	77	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.118	Judaism	.049	Hinduism	-.169	Religious Pluralism	.210**	Protestantism	.064	Judaism	-.017
	(.093)		(.094)		(.113)		(.091)		(.119)		(.121)
Health Benefits	-.473****	Health Benefits	-.451****	Health Benefits	-.427****	Health Benefits	-.159	Charity	.140	Charity	.171
	(.086)		(.079)		(.075)		(.145)		(.137)		(.113)
Prot x Health	-.128	Judaism x Health	-.062	Hinduism x Health	-.027	Pluralism x Health	-.074	Prot x Charity	-.131	Judaism x Charity	-.055
	(.086)		(.079)		(.077)		(.071)		(.091)		(.116)
Catholicism	.314**	Catholicism	.211	Catholicism	.312***	Catholicism	.213**	Catholicism	.162	Islam	-.055
	(.133)		(.133)		(.103)		(.091)		(.122)		(.098)
Cath x Health	-.187**	Cath x Health	-.178*	Cath x Health	-.256***	Cath x Health	-.105	Cath x Charity	.139	Islam x Charity	.162*
	(.090)		(.097)		(.084)		(.083)		(.135)		(.086)
Orthodox	.221*	Islam	-.112	Buddhism	.016	Atheism	-.491***	Orthodox	.119	Hinduism	-.114
	(.114)		(.120)		(.126)		(.154)		(.170)		(.115)
Orthodox x Health	-.066	Islam x Health	.122	Buddhism x Health	-.031	Atheism x Health	-.123	Orthodox x Charity	-.144	Hinduism x Charity	-.184
	(.116)		(.094)		(.105)		(.121)		(.153)		(.116)
Adjusted R^2	.244	Adjusted R^2	.199	Adjusted R^2	.199	Adjusted R^2	.377	Adjusted R^2	-.007	Adjusted R^2	.017
N	76	*N*	82	*N*	82	*N*	76	*N*	76	*N*	79

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o South Africa: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9
Buddhism	-.119	Religious Pluralism	.109	Atheism	-.550****
	(.115)		(.106)		(.103)
Charity	.167	Charity	.137	Charity	-.017
	(.109)		(.102)		(.099)
Buddhism x Charity	.182	Pluralism x Charity	.163	Atheism x Charity	-.071
	(.167)		(.121)		(.110)
Islam	-.073	Islam	-.013	Islam	-.227**
	(.096)		(.110)		(.112)
Islam x Charity	.221***	Islam x Charity	.244**	Islam x Charity	-.055
	(.080)		(.114)		(.099)
Hinduism	-.047	Hinduism	-.099	Hinduism	.040
	(.111)		(.105)		(.088)
Hinduism x Charity	-.314**	Hinduism x Charity	-.216**	Hinduism x Charity	-.122
	(.129)		(.098)		(.112)
Adjusted R^2	.045	Adjusted R^2	.046	Adjusted R^2	.290
N	79	*N*	79	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o South Africa: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.029****	ð	-.029****	Individualism	-.028****	ð	-.028****	Individualism	-.029****	ð	-.029****	Individualism	-.025****	ð	-.025****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)
Protestantism	.042	-.090**	-.048	Protestantism	.057	-.096**	-.039	Protestantism	.028	-.094**	-.066	Protestantism	-.162***	-.096**	-.258****
	(.070)	(.041)	(.069)		(.067)	(.038)	(.059)		(.073)	(.040)	(.070)		(.060)	(.040)	(.070)
Catholicism	1.01**	-.186	.825	Catholicism	1.25***	-.233	1.02**	Catholicism	.453	-.274	.179	Religious Pluralism	.080	.012	.092
	(.465)	(.282)	(.504)		(.381)	(.219)	(.429)		(.476)	(.288)	(.573)		(.059)	(.025)	(.066)
Orthodox	.138*	.021	.159**	Orthodox	.159*	.032	.190**	Orthodox	.053	.011	.063	Single w/ kids	.495****	.055	.550****
	(.080)	(.036)	(.078)		(.086)	(.038)	(.082)		(.100)	(.042)	(.105)		(.128)	(.071)	(.148)
Judaism	.085	-.145***	-.060	Judaism	.082	-.157***	-.075	Judaism	.066	-.148***	-.081	Judaism	.025	-.123***	-.098
	(.068)	(.051)	(.078)		(.080)	(.053)	(.081)		(.069)	(.050)	(.076)		(.054)	(.041)	(.060)
Islam	-.042	.017	-.025	Hinduism	-.013	.015	.002	Buddhism	-.198**	.004	-.194*	Buddhism	-.103	.025	-.078
	(.058)	(.041)	(.073)		(.045)	(.021)	(.047)		(.084)	(.052)	(.106)		(.102)	(.048)	(.122)
Adjusted R^2		.279		Adjusted R^2		.301		Adjusted R^2		.355		Adjusted R^2		.507	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o South Africa: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.015***	ð	-.015***	Individualism	-.019**	ð	-.019**	Individualism	-.007	ð	-.007
	(.005)		(.005)		(.007)		(.007)		(.006)		(.006)
Protestantism	-.079	-.024	-.103	Economic Discrimination	.143	.036	.179	Infant Mortality	.370**	.071	.441***
	(.070)	(.022)	(.075)		(.113)	(.037)	(.115)		(.168)	(.061)	(.155)
Atheism	-.249***	-.038	-.288***	Atheism	-.369***	-.034	-.403***	Atheism	-.121	.005	-.116
	(.090)	(.033)	(.099)		(.133)	(.033)	(.141)		(.097)	(.013)	(.098)
Single w/ kids	.467****	-.038	.428****	Health Benefits	.038	-.085**	-.048	Single w/ kids	.416****	-.030	.386****
	(.108)	(.039)	(.106)		(.061)	(.034)	(.049)		(.078)	(.028)	(.074)
Judaism	.035	-.051**	-.106	Judaism	.100	-.043	.058	Economic Freedom	-.004	-.001	-.005
	(.048)	(.024)	(.047)		(.067)	(.027)	(.069)		(.010)	(.002)	(.010)
Economic Inequality	.023	.015**	.039***	Charity	1.46	-1.27	.191	Economic Inequality	.028**	.007	.035***
	(.015)	(.006)	(.014)		(2.28)	(.795)	(2.14)		(.014)	(.006)	(.013)
Adjusted R^2		.569		Adjusted R^2		.296		Adjusted R^2		.600	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.503****	ð	.503****	Single w/ kids	.427****	ð	.427****	Single w/ kids	.354****	ð	.354****	Single w/ kids	.386****	ð	.386****
	(.131)		(.131)		(.098)		(.098)		(.074)		(.074)		(.099)		(.099)
Protestantism	-.091	.161***	.070	Protestantism	-.093	.131***	.038	Economic Discrimination	.086	-.011	.075	Economic Discrimination	.066	.029	.096
	(.071)	(.054)	(.063)		(.065)	(.046)	(.052)		(.081)	(.054)	(.087)		(.083)	(.051)	(.081)
Catholicism	-.213	.534**	.321	Catholicism	.357	.605**	.962***	Catholicism	.335	.652**	.987***	Catholicism	.278	.576**	.854***
	(.458)	(.261)	(.462)		(.255)	(.252)	(.307)		(.280)	(.260)	(.312)		(.254)	(.227)	(.286)
Orthodox	.061	.061*	.122	Orthodox	.088*	.053**	.141**	Orthodox	.098**	.030	.127**	Orthodox	.089*	.049*	.138**
	(.070)	(.033)	(.078)		(.045)	(.026)	(.055)		(.048)	(.029)	(.054)		(.046)	(.026)	(.054)
Judaism	-.046	.001	-.046	Religious Pluralism	.119***	.029	.148****	Religious Pluralism	.098**	.061**	.159****	Religious Pluralism	.114***	.022	.137****
	(.064)	(.041)	(.076)		(.035)	(.024)	(.038)		(.038)	(.028)	(.039)		(.037)	(.024)	(.037)
Islam	-.022	-.019	-.041	Atheism	-.511****	-.044	-.556****	Atheism	-.512****	-.040	-.552****	Atheism	-.485****	-.061	-.547****
	(.055)	(.028)	(.062)		(.067)	(.041)	(.077)		(.071)	(.044)	(.083)		(.072)	(.040)	(.080)
Hinduism	-.024	.041*	.016	Hinduism	-.006	.035*	.029	Hinduism	-.007	.034*	.027	Hinduism	.010	.021	.030
	(.050)	(.024)	(.056)		(.032)	(.018)	(.035)		(.032)	(.020)	(.035)		(.031)	(.016)	(.035)
Buddhism	.016	-.073**	-.067	Buddhism	.073*	-.052***	.021	Buddhism	.055	-.030	.025	Protestantism	-.059	.113**	.054
	(.058)	(.030)	(.060)		(.037)	(.020)	(.042)		(.040)	(.020)	(.043)		(.064)	(.048)	(.050)
Adjusted R^2		.219		Adjusted R^2		.554		Adjusted R^2		.529		Adjusted R^2		.541	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.234**	ð	.234**	Single w/ kids	.267***	ð	.267***	Single w/ kids	.434****	ð	.434****	Single w/ kids	.204**	ð	.204**
	(.094)		(.094)		(.082)		(.082)		(.098)		(.098)		(.101)		(.101)
Economic Inequality	.069****	.015**	.084****	Economic Inequality	.048****	.013**	.062****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.852***	.633****	1.48****	Economic Inequality	.090****	.013*	.103****
	(.012)	(.007)	(.012)		(.010)	(.006)	(.011)		(.247)	(.157)	(.214)		(.011)	(.007)	(.010)
Catholicism	.201	.291**	.492**	Catholicism	.590**	.318**	.908****	Catholicism	.205	.136	.340	Charitable Giving	-3.16****	-.128	-3.29***
	(.236)	(.141)	(.247)		(.234)	(.153)	(.257)		(.333)	(.176)	(.348)		(.905)	(.270)	(.950)
Orthodox	.192****	.060***	.252****	Orthodox	.219****	.043**	.262****	Orthodox	.181****	.051**	.232****	Orthodox	.228****	.041*	.269****
	(.047)	(.023)	(.045)		(.033)	(.017)	(.039)		(.040)	(.023)	(.046)		(.039)	(.022)	(.041)
Religious Pluralism	.051	-.001	.050	Economic Discrimination	.103	.017	.120	Economic Discrimination	.050	.015	.065	Economic Discrimination	-.054	.024	-.030
	(.033)	(.013)	(.034)		(.067)	(.030)	(.073)		(.071)	(.046)	(.075)		(.083)	(.028)	(.085)
Atheism	-.305****	.020	-.285****	Atheism	-.055	-.006	-.060	Health Benefits	-.169****	.091****	-.078*	Charity	5.66****	1.33*	6.99****
	(.067)	(.023)	(.072)		(.070)	(.042)	(.081)		(.036)	(.026)	(.040)		(1.62)	(.760)	(1.68)
Charity	1.35	1.63**	2.98*	Infant Mortality	.568****	-.011	.557****	Educ. Benefits	-.039	-.036	-.075	Educ. Benefits	-.040	.019	-.021
	(1.52)	(.736)	(1.61)		(.102)	(.062)	(.124)		(.048)	(.035)	(.054)		(.049)	(.018)	(.051)
Protestantism	-.020	.054*	.034	Protestantism	.023	.083**	.106***	Protestantism	-.040	.108***	.067	Protestantism	.024	.051	.075
	(.049)	(.032)	(.040)		(.043)	(.033)	(.033)		(.050)	(.040)	(.045)		(.053)	(.031)	(.047)
Adjusted R^2		.674		Adjusted R^2		.784		Adjusted R^2		.653		Adjusted R^2		.662	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 9		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.490****	ð	.490****
	(.092)		(.092)
Economic Freedom	-.020*	.0002	-.020
	(.012)	(.007)	(.014)
Charitable Giving	-1.79	1.03	-.762
	(1.37)	(.813)	(1.61)
Orthodox	.033	.036	.069
	(.052)	(.037)	(.058)
Economic Discrimination	.100	.054	.154
	(.105)	(.065)	(.114)
Individual Responsibility	.119	.143	.262*
	(.114)	(.093)	(.140)
Income Differences	1.65**	-.075	1.58*
	(.721)	(.549)	(.906)
Private Ownership	-1.57*	.383	-1.19
	(.949)	(.676)	(1.21)
Adjusted R^2		.402	
N		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.718****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.191	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.137	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.237*	ð	1.00f
	(.096)				(.154)				(.162)				(.143)		
Protestantism	.083*	-.013	.069	Religious Pluralism	.041	-.003	.038	Religious Pluralism	.028	-.002	.026	Religious Pluralism	.008	-.024*	-.016
	(.047)	(.039)	(.062)		(.033)	(.005)	(.032)		(.031)	(.005)	(.031)		(.036)	(.014)	(.033)
Catholicism	.300	.104	.404	Atheism	-.206**	-.103	-.310****	Atheism	.003	-.071	-.068	Life Meaning	-2.76**	-1.36*	-4.12****
	(.353)	(.366)	(.462)		(.103)	(.084)	(.071)		(.111)	(.087)	(.084)		(1.25)	(.800)	(.996)
Orthodox	.218****	-.099*	.119*	Orthodox	.184****	-.007	.177****	Orthodox	.180****	-.008	.171****	Orthodox	.191****	-.005	.186****
	(.060)	(.055)	(.070)		(.043)	(.009)	(.042)		(.046)	(.010)	(.042)		(.042)	(.011)	(.042)
Judaism	-.075	.029	-.046	Single w/ kids	.241****	.004	.246****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.992****	.073	1.06****	Single w/ kids	.235****	.004	.239****
	(.053)	(.052)	(.074)		(.063)	(.012)	(.065)		(.217)	(.086)	(.195)		(.062)	(.016)	(.062)
Islam	-.125**	.107*	-.018	Islam	-.068*	.014	-.054	Islam	-.134***	.010	-.124***	Islam	-.065	.026	-.038
	(.052)	(.057)	(.063)		(.040)	(.013)	(.038)		(.041)	(.012)	(.037)		(.041)	(.020)	(.037)
Hinduism	.022	-.011	.011	Economic Inequality	.061****	.007	.068****	Economic Discrimination	.108	-.014	.094	Economic Inequality	.065****	.016	.081****
	(.036)	(.037)	(.054)		(.013)	(.006)	(.010)		(.069)	(.018)	(.064)		(.014)	(.010)	(.009)
Buddhism	.041	-.081	-.040	Buddhism	.013	-.011	.002	Infant Mortality	.590****	.023	.613****	Buddhism	.009	-.021	-.012
	(.044)	(.054)	(.061)		(.039)	(.011)	(.037)		(.113)	(.029)	(.116)		(.041)	(.015)	(.039)
Adjusted R^2		.465		Adjusted R^2		.681		Adjusted R^2		.739		Adjusted R^2		.680	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	
G^2		95.54 (p < .001)		G^2		66.91 (p < .001)		G^2		55.19 (p < .001)		G^2		64.76 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.67		G^2/df		2.57		G^2/df		2.12		G^2/df		2.49	
RMSEA		.177		RMSEA		.136		RMSEA		.115		RMSEA		.132	
CFI		.867		CFI		.936		CFI		.954		CFI		.936	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5				Model 6		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.423****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.144	ð	1.00f
	(.121)				(.105)		
Economic Freedom	-.001	-.009*	-.011	Protestantism	.007	-.023	-.017
	(.012)	(.005)	(.012)		(.065)	(.023)	(.056)
Life Meaning	-3.26***	-2.78***	-6.04****	Life Meaning	-4.58****	-.986	-5.56****
	(1.18)	(.916)	(1.07)		(1.10)	(.721)	(.983)
Orthodox	.075	-.040	.035	Charity	-2.32	-.370	-2.69*
	(.053)	(.026)	(.052)		(1.55)	(.363)	(1.58)
Single w/ kids	.402****	.061*	.463****	Single w/ kids	.300***	-.007	.293***
	(.079)	(.034)	(.087)		(.098)	(.013)	(.099)
Islam	-.129***	.064*	-.066	Religious Member	.112	.078	.190*
	(.042)	(.033)	(.043)		(.136)	(.072)	(.110)
Competition	-2.06	-.506	-2.56*	New Govt.	.676****	.014	.690****
	(1.26)	(.586)	(1.37)		(.193)	(.032)	(.194)
Charitable Giving	-2.87***	.216	-2.65**	Latin Nation	1.02****	.086	1.10****
	(.958)	(.413)	(1.06)		(.272)	(.064)	(.279)
Adjusted R^2		.592		Adjusted R^2		.537	
N		85		*N*		85	
χ^2		65.49 (p < .001)		χ^2		98.26 (p < .001)	
χ^2/df		2.52		χ^2/df		3.78	
RMSEA		.134		RMSEA		.181	
CFI		.929		CFI		.878	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.075	Judaism	.069	Buddhism	-.108	Protestantism	.034	Judaism	.024
	(.075)		(.107)		(.093)		(.077)		(.103)
Economic Inequality	.726****	Economic Inequality	.570****	Economic Inequality	.437****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.692****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.558****
	(.081)		(.094)		(.087)		(.082)		(.094)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	.069	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	.002	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	.085	Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	.108	Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.140
	(.083)		(.124)		(.132)		(.085)		(.103)
Catholicism	.108	Islam	-.033	Religious Pluralism	.190**	Catholicism	.034	Islam	.025
	(.087)		(.087)		(.079)		(.089)		(.089)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.136	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.100	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	.062	Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.048	Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.113
	(.097)		(.113)		(.076)		(.097)		(.110)
Orthodox	.448****	Hinduism	-.158	Atheism	-.306***	Orthodox	.357***	Hinduism	-.145
	(.111)		(.098)		(.105)		(.103)		(.101)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.225	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.007	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	-.051	Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.038	Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.052
	(.156)		(.105)		(.102)		(.150)		(.095)
Adjusted R^2	.441	Adjusted R^2	.301	Adjusted R^2	.437	Adjusted R^2	.425	Adjusted R^2	.326
N	77	*N*	82	*N*	77	*N*	76	*N*	81

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10
Buddhism	-.120	Protestantism	.101	Judaism	.044	Hinduism	.019	Buddhism	.011
	(.094)		(.079)		(.067)		(.067)		(.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.447****	Infant Mortality	.739****	Infant Mortality	.794****	Infant Mortality	.778****	Infant Mortality	.784****
	(.076)		(.072)		(.070)		(.073)		(.072)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.109	Prot x Mortality	.025	Judaism x Mortality	.031	Hinduism x Mortality	.070	Buddhism x Mortality	.054
	(.092)		(.087)		(.059)		(.063)		(.079)
Religious Pluralism	.185**	Catholicism	.363***	Catholicism	.143	Catholicism	.144	Catholicism	.146
	(.075)		(.108)		(.099)		(.098)		(.098)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.094	Cath x Mortality	.316***	Cath x Mortality	.187**	Cath x Mortality	.193**	Cath x Mortality	.202**
	(.066)		(.091)		(.083)		(.082)		(.083)
Atheism	-.313***	Orthodox	.232**	Islam	-.297***	Islam	-.294***	Islam	-.286***
	(.094)		(.092)		(.092)		(.092)		(.092)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.044	Orthodox x Mortality	.109	Islam x Mortality	-.163**	Islam x Mortality	-.159**	Islam x Mortality	-.136**
	(.089)		(.093)		(.076)		(.074)		(.067)
Adjusted R^2	.476	Adjusted R^2	.539	Adjusted R^2	.554	Adjusted R^2	.558	Adjusted R^2	.553
N	76	*N*	77	*N*	83	*N*	83	*N*	83

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 11		Model 12		Model 13
Religious Pluralism	.063	Atheism	-.125	Single w/ kids	.413****
	(.085)		(.100)		(.099)
Infant Mortality	.784****	Infant Mortality	.688****	Infant Mortality	.468****
	(.065)		(.105)		(.125)
Pluralism x Mortality	-.005	Atheism x Mortality	.095	Economic Inequality	.152
	(.074)		(.069)		(.113)
Catholicism	.160*	Catholicism	.130	Catholicism	.085
	(.096)		(.099)		(.086)
Cath x Mortality	.171**	Cath x Mortality	.178**	Cath x Mortality	.088
	(.082)		(.087)		(.078)
Islam	-.278***	Islam	-.242**	Health Benefits	-.097
	(.091)		(.097)		(.116)
Islam x Mortality	-.145	Islam x Mortality	-.123	Charity	-.108
	(.089)		(.085)		(.076)
Adjusted R^2	.555	Adjusted R^2	.569	Adjusted R^2	.585
N	83	*N*	77	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.152	Protestantism	-.221**	Judaism	.070	Hinduism	-.089	Religious Pluralism	.250***	Protestantism	.115
	(.097)		(.097)		(.094)		(.122)		(.091)		(.120)
Health Benefits	-.479****	Health Benefits	-.631****	Health Benefits	-.465****	Health Benefits	-.431****	Health Benefits	-.207	Charity	.138
	(.091)		(.092)		(.082)		(.077)		(.142)		(.138)
Prot x Health	-.151*	Prot x Health	-.077	Judaism x Health	-.055	Hinduism x Health	-.011	Pluralism x Health	-.069	Prot x Charity	-.144
	(.089)		(.086)		(.078)		(.084)		(.071)		(.093)
Catholicism	.231*	Single w/ kids	.758****	Catholicism	.150	Catholicism	.250**	Catholicism	.185**	Catholicism	.083
	(.124)		(.105)		(.129)		(.097)		(.087)		(.114)
Cath x Health	-.214**	Educ. Benefits	.122	Cath x Health	-.191*	Cath x Health	-.280***	Cath x Health	-.124	Cath x Charity	.184
	(.091)		(.098)		(.098)		(.087)		(.082)		(.131)
Orthodox	.186*	Charitable Giving	-.134	Islam	-.111	Buddhism	.026	Atheism	-.448***	Orthodox	.091
	(.112)		(.099)		(.123)		(.134)		(.150)		(.169)
Orthodox x Health	-.101	ð		Islam x Health	.161	Buddhism x Health	-.005	Atheism x Health	-.068	Orthodox x Charity	-.143
	(.113)				(.099)		(.117)		(.119)		(.154)
Adjusted R^2	.259	Adjusted R^2	.603	Adjusted R^2	.219	Adjusted R^2	.186	Adjusted R^2	.370	Adjusted R^2	-.007
N	76	*N*	65	*N*	82	*N*	82	*N*	76	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Columbia: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
Judaism	-.003	Buddhism	-.108	Religious Pluralism	.168	Atheism	-.529****
	(.122)		(.116)		(.105)		(.100)
Charity	.172	Charity	.167	Charity	.137	Charity	-.019
	(.113)		(.109)		(.102)		(.098)
Judaism x Charity	-.062	Buddhism x Charity	.184	Pluralism x Charity	.157	Atheism x Charity	-.090
	(.118)		(.170)		(.119)		(.111)
Islam	-.035	Islam	-.052	Islam	.018	Islam	-.207*
	(.095)		(.092)		(.107)		(.109)
Islam x Charity	.150*	Islam x Charity	.212***	Islam x Charity	.236**	Islam x Charity	-.070
	(.085)		(.080)		(.112)		(.096)
Hinduism	-.043	Hinduism	.019	Hinduism	-.030	Hinduism	.102
	(.122)		(.119)		(.111)		(.097)
Hinduism x Charity	-.208*	Hinduism x Charity	-.339**	Hinduism x Charity	-.236**	Hinduism x Charity	-.145
	(.121)		(.133)		(.102)		(.117)
Adjusted R^2	.010	Adjusted R^2	.035	Adjusted R^2	.055	Adjusted R^2	.277
N	79	*N*	79	*N*	79	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.025****	ð	-.025****	Individualism	-.024****	ð	-.024****	Individualism	-.026****	ð	-.026****	Individualism	-.022****	ð	-.022****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)
Protestantism	.070	-.076**	-.006	Protestantism	.071	-.084**	-.013	Protestantism	.043	-.084**	-.041	Protestantism	-.168***	-.083**	-.251****
	(.071)	(.037)	(.070)		(.069)	(.035)	(.062)		(.078)	(.036)	(.075)		(.061)	(.035)	(.068)
Catholicism	.823*	-.179	.644	Catholicism	.995**	-.249	.746*	Catholicism	.065	-.272	-.206	Religious Pluralism	.101*	.011	.112*
	(.460)	(.246)	(.490)		(.390)	(.199)	(.403)		(.517)	(.253)	(.560)		(.060)	(.022)	(.065)
Orthodox	.114	.016	.131	Orthodox	.165*	.023	.187**	Orthodox	.011	.008	.019	Single w/ kids	.515****	.035	.550****
	(.080)	(.032)	(.079)		(.088)	(.032)	(.086)		(.101)	(.037)	(.104)		(.124)	(.063)	(.138)
Judaism	.086	-.122**	-.036	Judaism	.060	-.131***	-.071	Judaism	.064	-.127***	-.063	Judaism	.023	-.106***	-.084
	(.068)	(.047)	(.076)		(.081)	(.049)	(.080)		(.072)	(.046)	(.076)		(.053)	(.038)	(.058)
Islam	-.020	.024	.004	Hinduism	.019	.011	.031	Buddhism	-.236***	.010	-.225**	Buddhism	-.095	.024	-.071
	(.057)	(.038)	(.070)		(.052)	(.018)	(.052)		(.090)	(.045)	(.105)		(.102)	(.042)	(.118)
Adjusted R^2		.163		Adjusted R^2		.202		Adjusted R^2		.284		Adjusted R^2		.488	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix J Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Columbia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.016***	ð	-.016***	Individualism	-.013**	ð	-.013**	Individualism	-.010	ð	-.010	Individualism	-.004	ð	-.004
	(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.008)		(.008)		(.005)		(.005)
Protestantism	-.142**	-.036	-.179**	Protestantism	-.070	-.024	-.094	Economic Discrimination	.114	.015	.128	Infant Mortality	.456***	.046	.502***
	(.068)	(.024)	(.072)		(.070)	(.019)	(.074)		(.113)	(.020)	(.115)		(.158)	(.054)	(.146)
Religious Pluralism	.054	.003	.057	Atheism	-.246***	-.034	-.280***	Atheism	-.341**	-.007	-.348***	Atheism	-.085	.002	-.083
	(.045)	(.015)	(.048)		(.089)	(.030)	(.097)		(.134)	(.014)	(.134)		(.096)	(.008)	(.097)
Single w/ kids	.497****	-.041	.456****	Single w/ kids	.459****	-.034	.426****	Health Benefits	-.028	-.049	-.077*	Single w/ kids	.411****	-.022	.389****
	(.114)	(.038)	(.110)		(.107)	(.034)	(.106)		(.065)	(.042)	(.045)		(.079)	(.026)	(.074)
Judaism	.024	-.060**	-.036	Judaism	.035	-.045*	-.011	Judaism	.103	-.024	.079	Economic Freedom	-.002	-.0002	-.003
	(.052)	(.028)	(.050)		(.048)	(.023)	(.047)		(.067)	(.023)	(.070)		(.010)	(.001)	(.010)
Economic Inequality	.036**	.015**	.051****	Economic Inequality	.028*	.011*	.039***	Charity	1.02	-.591	.431	Economic Inequality	.025**	.003	.029***
	(.015)	(.008)	(.013)		(.015)	(.006)	(.013)		(2.30)	(.587)	(2.12)		(.012)	(.004)	(.011)
Adjusted R^2		.505		Adjusted R^2		.557		Adjusted R^2		.231		Adjusted R^2		.611	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Zambia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.479****	ð	.479****	Single w/ kids	.419****	ð	.419****	Single w/ kids	.343****	ð	.343****	Single w/ kids	.218**	ð	.218**
	(.132)		(.132)		(.100)		(.100)		(.076)		(.076)		(.097)		(.097)
Protestantism	-.101	.147***	.046	Protestantism	-.094	.124***	.030	Economic Discrimination	.119	.001	.120	Protestantism	-.021	.047	.026
	(.071)	(.052)	(.064)		(.064)	(.045)	(.052)		(.082)	(.051)	(.086)		(.049)	(.030)	(.040)
Catholicism	-.137	.511**	.374	Catholicism	.500*	.600**	1.10***	Catholicism	.458	.628**	1.09***	Catholicism	.231	.260*	.491**
	(.463)	(.252)	(.466)		(.279)	(.243)	(.328)		(.296)	(.246)	(.325)		(.231)	(.136)	(.238)
Orthodox	.066	.062*	.127*	Orthodox	.097**	.056**	.152***	Orthodox	.113**	.034	.147***	Orthodox	.202****	.056**	.257****
	(.067)	(.032)	(.074)		(.045)	(.026)	(.055)		(.049)	(.027)	(.054)		(.047)	(.023)	(.044)
Judaism	-.054	.001	-.053	Religious Pluralism	.115***	.027	.142****	Religious Pluralism	.093**	.055**	.148****	Religious Pluralism	.048	-.00003	.048
	(.065)	(.039)	(.076)		(.035)	(.024)	(.039)		(.039)	(.027)	(.041)		(.033)	(.012)	(.034)
Islam	-.051	-.019	-.070	Atheism	-.519****	-.037	-.556****	Atheism	-.514****	-.031	-.545****	Atheism	-.297****	.022	-.275****
	(.058)	(.026)	(.065)		(.069)	(.039)	(.078)		(.073)	(.042)	(.083)		(.068)	(.022)	(.072)
Hinduism	-.028	.037	.009	Hinduism	-.011	.033*	.022	Hinduism	-.011	.030	.019	Economic Inequality	.071****	.013**	.083****
	(.050)	(.023)	(.056)		(.032)	(.018)	(.035)		(.032)	(.019)	(.036)		(.011)	(.006)	(.010)
Buddhism	-.0004	-.068**	-.069	Buddhism	.071*	-.051***	.020	Buddhism	.054	-.028	.025	Charity	1.53	1.60**	3.14*
	(.059)	(.028)	(.060)		(.037)	(.019)	(.042)		(.040)	(.020)	(.043)		(1.59)	(.765)	(1.63)
Adjusted R^2		.221		Adjusted R^2		.546		Adjusted R^2		.530		Adjusted R^2		.682	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Zambia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.268****	ð	.268****	Single w/ kids	.372****	ð	.372****	Single w/ kids	.499****	ð	.499****
	(.063)		(.063)		(.088)		(.088)		(.094)		(.094)
Economic Discrimination	.132**	-.002	.130*	Economic Discrimination	.105	-.008	.097	Economic Freedom	-.017	.003	-.014
	(.063)	(.035)	(.073)		(.067)	(.049)	(.076)		(.012)	(.007)	(.014)
Catholicism	.808***	.396**	1.20****	Catholicism	.292	.218	.510	Individual Responsibility	.668	1.12*	1.79*
	(.251)	(.173)	(.291)		(.338)	(.192)	(.351)		(.810)	(.659)	(1.00)
Orthodox	.221****	.022	.243****	Orthodox	.206****	.017	.223****	Orthodox	.028	.050	.078
	(.037)	(.017)	(.042)		(.040)	(.021)	(.047)		(.050)	(.034)	(.056)
Religious Pluralism	.046	.033*	.079**	Religious Pluralism	-.009	.038*	.029	Income Differences	1.18	-.326	.852
	(.031)	(.017)	(.033)		(.035)	(.020)	(.035)		(.774)	(.579)	(.991)
Atheism	-.064	-.011	-.075	Economic Inequality Ratio	.933****	.500***	1.43****	Private Ownership	-1.65	.429	-1.22
	(.081)	(.044)	(.095)		(.240)	(.147)	(.192)		(1.20)	(.640)	(1.51)
Economic Inequality	.045****	.011*	.055****	Health Benefits	-.157****	.068***	-.089**	Competition	-.789	-.205	-.994
	(.010)	(.005)	(.011)		(.037)	(.025)	(.039)		(1.68)	(1.15)	(2.02)
Infant Mortality	.583****	-.035	.549****	Educ. Benefits	-.048	.013	-.035	Charitable Giving	-2.04	.744	-1.30
	(.108)	(.072)	(.139)		(.047)	(.028)	(.050)		(1.25)	(.763)	(1.55)
Adjusted R^2		.791		Adjusted R^2		.660		Adjusted R^2		.355	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Zambia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.703****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.176	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.138	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.420****	ð	1.00f
	(.095)				(.157)				(.158)				(.119)		
Protestantism	.065	-.020	.045	Religious Pluralism	.037	-.001	.036	Religious Pluralism	.026	-.002	.024	Single w/ kids	.387****	.063*	.450****
	(.047)	(.040)	(.063)		(.031)	(.004)	(.031)		(.030)	(.004)	(.029)		(.081)	(.037)	(.088)
Catholicism	.326	.145	.471	Atheism	-.210**	-.097	-.307****	Atheism	.004	-.073	-.069	Economic Freedom	-.001	-.010*	-.010
	(.351)	(.372)	(.470)		(.103)	(.087)	(.071)		(.112)	(.086)	(.082)		(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
Orthodox	.219****	-.098*	.121*	Orthodox	.188****	-.008	.180****	Orthodox	.186****	-.009	.177****	Orthodox	.083	-.039	.044
	(.060)	(.054)	(.069)		(.043)	(.010)	(.042)		(.045)	(.011)	(.041)		(.053)	(.027)	(.052)
Judaism	-.078	.026	-.052	Single w/ kids	.230****	.005	.235****	Infant Mortality	.575****	.025	.600****	Competition	-1.86	-.494	-2.36*
	(.053)	(.052)	(.075)		(.065)	(.012)	(.067)		(.114)	(.031)	(.117)		(1.26)	(.612)	(1.36)
Islam	-.145***	.097*	-.049	Islam	-.071*	.015	-.056	Islam	-.132***	.010	-.121***	Islam	-.145***	.061*	-.085*
	(.053)	(.055)	(.066)		(.039)	(.015)	(.035)		(.040)	(.012)	(.036)		(.043)	(.032)	(.045)
Hinduism	.017	-.014	.003	Economic Inequality	.062****	.006	.068****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.964****	.072	1.04****	Charitable Giving	-2.82***	.222	-2.60**
	(.036)	(.038)	(.055)		(.013)	(.006)	(.010)		(.200)	(.082)	(.177)		(.952)	(.419)	(1.06)
Buddhism	.033	-.084	-.051	Buddhism	.010	-.009	.0004	Economic Discrimination	.117*	-.016	.101	Life Meaning	-3.56***	-2.90***	-6.46****
	(.044)	(.053)	(.062)		(.038)	(.010)	(.036)		(.070)	(.019)	(.065)		(1.19)	(.924)	(1.10)
Adjusted R^2		.466		Adjusted R^2		.688		Adjusted R^2		.750		Adjusted R^2		.594	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	
G^2		81.81 (p < .001)		G^2		58.03 (p < .001)		G^2		48.40 (p < .01)		G^2		59.84 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.15		G^2/df		2.23		G^2/df		1.86		G^2/df		2.30	
RMSEA		.159		RMSEA		.120		RMSEA		.101		RMSEA		.124	
CFI		.888		CFI		.948		CFI		.964		CFI		.937	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Zambia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.210	ð	1.00f
	(.143)		
Single w/ kids	.278***	-.028	.250***
	(.085)	(.025)	(.082)
Religious Member	.051	.090	.141
	(.130)	(.069)	(.108)
New Govt.	.703****	.050	.754****
	(.188)	(.052)	(.183)
Latin Nation	.853**	.391	1.24****
	(.405)	(.284)	(.280)
Islam	-.068	.053	-.015
	(.054)	(.039)	(.035)
Charity	-1.58	-.578	-2.16
	(1.49)	(.516)	(1.50)
Life Meaning	-4.74****	-1.14	-5.89****
	(1.13)	(.756)	(.985)
Adjusted R^2		.570	
N		85	
g^2		87.45 (p < .001)	
g^2/df		3.36	
RMSEA		.167	
CFI		.898	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.064	Judaism	.069	Buddhism	-.121	Protestantism	.018	Judaism	.026
	(.077)		(.107)		(.088)		(.079)		(.103)
Economic Inequality	.700****	Economic Inequality	.563****	Economic Inequality	.463****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.683****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.545****
	(.079)		(.096)		(.090)		(.083)		(.095)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	.046	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	.006	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	.050	Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	.079	Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.134
	(.086)		(.122)		(.120)		(.089)		(.103)
Catholicism	.095	Islam	-.032	Religious Pluralism	.166**	Catholicism	.034	Islam	.027
	(.075)		(.086)		(.082)		(.078)		(.088)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.110	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.106	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	.013	Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.045	Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.115
	(.075)		(.113)		(.079)		(.072)		(.109)
Orthodox	.430****	Hinduism	-.170*	Atheism	-.299***	Orthodox	.357****	Hinduism	-.156
	(.098)		(.098)		(.106)		(.090)		(.100)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.189	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.038	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	-.072	Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.037	Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.025
	(.125)		(.110)		(.100)		(.115)		(.100)
Adjusted R^2	.457	Adjusted R^2	.323	Adjusted R^2	.440	Adjusted R^2	.444	Adjusted R^2	.352
N	77	*N*	82	*N*	77	*N*	76	*N*	81

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10
Buddhism	-.137	Protestantism	.087	Judaism	.037	Hinduism	.008	Buddhism	-.006
	(.089)		(.081)		(.067)		(.070)		(.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.479****	Infant Mortality	.756****	Infant Mortality	.808****	Infant Mortality	.793****	Infant Mortality	.797****
	(.074)		(.073)		(.077)		(.079)		(.078)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.075	Prot x Mortality	.001	Judaism x Mortality	.030	Hinduism x Mortality	.072	Buddhism x Mortality	.046
	(.087)		(.090)		(.059)		(.064)		(.079)
Religious Pluralism	.159**	Catholicism	.407****	Catholicism	.179*	Catholicism	.182*	Catholicism	.178*
	(.076)		(.106)		(.104)		(.103)		(.102)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.043	Cath x Mortality	.340****	Cath x Mortality	.212**	Cath x Mortality	.218**	Cath x Mortality	.223**
	(.073)		(.088)		(.086)		(.085)		(.086)
Atheism	-.307***	Orthodox	.252***	Islam	-.295***	Islam	-.292***	Islam	-.291***
	(.095)		(.092)		(.093)		(.093)		(.094)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.059	Orthodox x Mortality	.124	Islam x Mortality	-.167**	Islam x Mortality	-.164**	Islam x Mortality	-.144**
	(.089)		(.094)		(.078)		(.078)		(.070)
Adjusted R^2	.481	Adjusted R^2	.535	Adjusted R^2	.542	Adjusted R^2	.546	Adjusted R^2	.542
N	76	*N*	77	*N*	83	*N*	83	*N*	83

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 11		Model 12		Model 13
Religious Pluralism	.042	Atheism	-.149	Single w/ kids	.383****
	(.084)		(.100)		(.100)
Infant Mortality	.803****	Infant Mortality	.676****	Infant Mortality	.507****
	(.073)		(.110)		(.134)
Pluralism x Mortality	-.019	Atheism x Mortality	.114	Economic Inequality	.210*
	(.073)		(.076)		(.115)
Catholicism	.194*	Catholicism	.160	Catholicism	.105
	(.100)		(.102)		(.088)
Cath x Mortality	.196**	Cath x Mortality	.197**	Cath x Mortality	.115
	(.085)		(.089)		(.084)
Islam	-.286***	Islam	-.240**	Health Benefits	-.024
	(.092)		(.099)		(.128)
Islam x Mortality	-.158*	Islam x Mortality	-.116	Charity	-.119
	(.090)		(.090)		(.077)
Adjusted R^2	.542	Adjusted R^2	.560	Adjusted R^2	.575
N	83	*N*	77	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.126	Judaism	.057	Hinduism	-.132	Religious Pluralism	.227**	Protestantism	.067	Judaism	-.010
	(.096)		(.094)		(.123)		(.093)		(.121)		(.121)
Health Benefits	-.474****	Health Benefits	-.453****	Health Benefits	-.420****	Health Benefits	-.161	Charity	.150	Charity	.164
	(.087)		(.080)		(.075)		(.147)		(.135)		(.113)
Prot x Health	-.134	Judaism x Health	-.067	Hinduism x Health	-.024	Pluralism x Health	-.078	Prot x Charity	-.141	Judaism x Charity	-.054
	(.087)		(.079)		(.078)		(.071)		(.092)		(.116)
Catholicism	.295**	Catholicism	.188	Catholicism	.287***	Catholicism	.201**	Catholicism	.142	Islam	-.051
	(.134)		(.134)		(.104)		(.090)		(.123)		(.098)
Cath x Health	-.179**	Cath x Health	-.167*	Cath x Health	-.249***	Cath x Health	-.099	Cath x Charity	.135	Islam x Charity	.162*
	(.090)		(.098)		(.084)		(.083)		(.135)		(.085)
Orthodox	.230**	Islam	-.122	Buddhism	.004	Atheism	-.489***	Orthodox	.140	Hinduism	-.087
	(.114)		(.121)		(.129)		(.158)		(.166)		(.121)
Orthodox x Health	-.070	Islam x Health	.130	Buddhism x Health	-.032	Atheism x Health	-.121	Orthodox x Charity	-.129	Hinduism x Charity	-.191
	(.117)		(.096)		(.107)		(.123)		(.149)		(.119)
Adjusted R^2	.238	Adjusted R^2	.191	Adjusted R^2	.176	Adjusted R^2	.363	Adjusted R^2	-.010	Adjusted R^2	.010
N	76	*N*	82	*N*	82	*N*	76	*N*	76	*N*	79

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Zambia: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9
Buddhism	-.124	Religious Pluralism	.129	Atheism	-.547****
	(.117)		(.108)		(.105)
Charity	.162	Charity	.131	Charity	-.023
	(.109)		(.103)		(.099)
Buddhism x Charity	.191	Pluralism x Charity	.168	Atheism x Charity	-.070
	(.169)		(.121)		(.110)
Islam	-.071	Islam	-.006	Islam	-.224**
	(.096)		(.109)		(.112)
Islam x Charity	.224***	Islam x Charity	.248**	Islam x Charity	-.055
	(.081)		(.113)		(.098)
Hinduism	-.017	Hinduism	-.073	Hinduism	.070
	(.119)		(.110)		(.097)
Hinduism x Charity	-.326**	Hinduism x Charity	-.220**	Hinduism x Charity	-.133
	(.131)		(.100)		(.114)
Adjusted R^2	.041	Adjusted R^2	.046	Adjusted R^2	.274
N	79	*N*	79	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Zambia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.025****	ð	-.025****	Individualism	-.024****	ð	-.024****	Individualism	-.026****	ð	-.026****	Individualism	-.023****	ð	-.023****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)
Protestantism	.038	-.086**	-.048	Protestantism	.047	-.089**	-.042	Protestantism	.030	-.091**	-.061	Protestantism	-.174***	-.090**	-.263****
	(.070)	(.039)	(.069)		(.065)	(.036)	(.058)		(.075)	(.038)	(.071)		(.060)	(.038)	(.070)
Catholicism	.875*	-.146	.730	Catholicism	1.15***	-.188	.960**	Catholicism	.315	-.175	.140	Religious Pluralism	.092	.010	.101
	(.468)	(.248)	(.507)		(.393)	(.191)	(.431)		(.519)	(.250)	(.579)		(.060)	(.023)	(.066)
Orthodox	.148*	.026	.173**	Orthodox	.192**	.031	.222***	Orthodox	.056	.025	.081	Single w/ kids	.518****	.036	.555****
	(.077)	(.033)	(.074)		(.083)	(.033)	(.080)		(.100)	(.039)	(.102)		(.131)	(.067)	(.149)
Judaism	.076	-.128***	-.052	Judaism	.055	-.134***	-.080	Judaism	.061	-.135***	-.074	Judaism	.020	-.113***	-.093
	(.067)	(.048)	(.078)		(.081)	(.049)	(.081)		(.070)	(.048)	(.076)		(.054)	(.039)	(.060)
Islam	-.042	.015	-.027	Hinduism	.014	.010	.024	Buddhism	-.205**	.021	-.184*	Buddhism	-.100	.022	-.078
	(.059)	(.037)	(.075)		(.051)	(.018)	(.051)		(.090)	(.048)	(.106)		(.104)	(.045)	(.124)
Adjusted R^2		.228		Adjusted R^2		.261		Adjusted R^2		.307		Adjusted R^2		.486	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix K Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Zambia: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.013**	ð	-.013**	Individualism	-.013	ð	-.013	Individualism	-.005	ð	-.005
	(.005)		(.005)		(.009)		(.009)		(.005)		(.005)
Protestantism	-.076	-.025	-.101	Economic Discrimination	.167	.028	.195*	Infant Mortality	.397**	.055	.452***
	(.072)	(.019)	(.076)		(.109)	(.029)	(.113)		(.171)	(.055)	(.159)
Atheism	-.245***	-.034	-.279***	Atheism	-.364***	-.020	-.385***	Atheism	-.110	.001	-.110
	(.091)	(.031)	(.100)		(.136)	(.027)	(.140)		(.096)	(.010)	(.097)
Single w/ kids	.460****	-.034	.426****	Health Benefits	.003	-.058	-.055	Single w/ kids	.419****	-.025	.394****
	(.108)	(.035)	(.106)		(.066)	(.039)	(.049)		(.079)	(.026)	(.074)
Judaism	.034	-.046**	-.012	Judaism	.099	-.032	.067	Economic Freedom	-.004	-.0004	-.005
	(.048)	(.023)	(.047)		(.068)	(.026)	(.071)		(.010)	(.001)	(.010)
Economic Inequality	.031**	.011*	.042***	Charity	.941	-.837	.104	Economic Inequality	.031**	.004	.036***
	(.015)	(.006)	(.013)		(2.30)	(.703)	(2.15)		(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
Adjusted R^2		.561		Adjusted R^2		.261		Adjusted R^2		.602	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.510****	ð	.510****	Single w/ kids	.433****	ð	.433****	Single w/ kids	.361****	ð	.361****	Single w/ kids	.390****	ð	.390****
	(.130)		(.130)		(.099)		(.099)		(.075)		(.075)		(.099)		(.099)
Protestantism	-.101	.163***	.061	Protestantism	-.094	.132***	.039	Economic Discrimination	.114	-.013	.101	Economic Discrimination	.094	.027	.122
	(.072)	(.054)	(.064)		(.065)	(.046)	(.053)		(.081)	(.054)	(.088)		(.083)	(.051)	(.082)
Catholicism	-.199	.530**	.332	Catholicism	.478*	.621**	1.10***	Catholicism	.421	.675***	1.10***	Catholicism	.362	.586**	.949***
	(.469)	(.258)	(.475)		(.280)	(.247)	(.330)		(.296)	(.260)	(.333)		(.270)	(.226)	(.300)
Orthodox	.055	.061*	.116	Orthodox	.093**	.055**	.147***	Orthodox	.107**	.031	.138**	Orthodox	.099**	.050*	.148***
	(.068)	(.034)	(.077)		(.045)	(.027)	(.056)		(.048)	(.029)	(.055)		(.047)	(.026)	(.055)
Judaism	-.042	.004	-.038	Religious Pluralism	.116***	.029	.145****	Religious Pluralism	.093**	.062**	.155****	Religious Pluralism	.108***	.023	.130***
	(.073)	(.043)	(.089)		(.035)	(.024)	(.039)		(.039)	(.028)	(.040)		(.038)	(.024)	(.039)
Islam	-.051	-.022	-.073	Atheism	-.530****	-.047	-.578****	Atheism	-.528****	-.043	-.571****	Atheism	-.502****	-.063	-.565****
	(.058)	(.027)	(.064)		(.070)	(.041)	(.080)		(.073)	(.045)	(.085)		(.074)	(.040)	(.083)
Hinduism	-.030	.041*	.011	Hinduism	-.010	.036*	.025	Hinduism	-.011	.034*	.024	Hinduism	.006	.021	.027
	(.051)	(.024)	(.057)		(.032)	(.018)	(.035)		(.033)	(.020)	(.036)		(.031)	(.017)	(.035)
Buddhism	-.003	-.076**	-.079	Buddhism	.072*	-.053***	.019	Buddhism	.054	-.030	.024	Protestantism	-.055	.114**	.059
	(.060)	(.029)	(.061)		(.037)	(.020)	(.042)		(.040)	(.021)	(.042)		(.064)	(.049)	(.051)
Adjusted R^2		.232		Adjusted R^2		.558		Adjusted R^2		.542		Adjusted R^2		.552	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.230**	ð	.230**	Single w/ kids	.264***	ð	.264***	Single w/ kids	.405****	ð	.405****	Single w/ kids	.203**	ð	.203**
	(.095)		(.095)		(.082)		(.082)		(.100)		(.100)		(.102)		(.102)
Economic Inequality	.071****	.014**	.085****	Economic Inequality	.050****	.012**	.062****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.986****	.524***	1.51****	Economic Inequality	.094****	.013*	.107****
	(.011)	(.006)	(.010)		(.009)	(.005)	(.010)		(.237)	(.162)	(.186)		(.011)	(.007)	(.009)
Catholicism	.213	.273**	.486**	Catholicism	.618***	.303**	.922****	Catholicism	.211	.112	.323	Charity	5.36***	1.32*	6.69****
	(.230)	(.136)	(.241)		(.233)	(.150)	(.255)		(.334)	(.163)	(.350)		(1.62)	(.766)	(1.67)
Orthodox	.199****	.057**	.257****	Orthodox	.226****	.041**	.267****	Orthodox	.195****	.043**	.238****	Orthodox	.240****	.041*	.281****
	(.045)	(.022)	(.044)		(.032)	(.016)	(.037)		(.039)	(.021)	(.045)		(.039)	(.021)	(.041)
Religious Pluralism	.048	.0001	.048	Economic Discrimination	.105	.012	.117	Economic Discrimination	.056	.009	.065	Economic Discrimination	-.037	.023	-.014
	(.033)	(.012)	(.034)		(.067)	(.030)	(.073)		(.071)	(.043)	(.076)		(.081)	(.027)	(.084)
Atheism	-.305****	.019	-.286****	Atheism	-.062	-.003	-.066	Health Benefits	-.153****	.075***	-.078**	Charitable Giving	-2.87***	-.137	-3.01***
	(.068)	(.023)	(.073)		(.069)	(.040)	(.080)		(.036)	(.025)	(.039)		(.867)	(.251)	(.910)
Charity	1.36	1.60**	2.96*	Infant Mortality	.560****	-.007	.553****	Educ. Benefits	-.046	-.024	-.070	Educ. Benefits	-.045	.019	-.026
	(1.53)	(.733)	(1.62)		(.101)	(.060)	(.123)		(.048)	(.033)	(.055)		(.049)	(.018)	(.051)
Protestantism	-.018	.053*	.036	Protestantism	.025	.082**	.107***	Protestantism	-.035	.102***	.067	Protestantism	.024	.051	.075
	(.049)	(.032)	(.040)		(.043)	(.033)	(.033)		(.049)	(.038)	(.045)		(.052)	(.031)	(.047)
Adjusted R^2		.693		Adjusted R^2		.796		Adjusted R^2		.671		Adjusted R^2		.679	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 9		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.508****	ð	.508****
	(.094)		(.094)
Economic Freedom	-.020*	.0003	-.020
	(.012)	(.008)	(.014)
Individual Responsibility	.781	1.06	1.84*
	(.849)	(.704)	(1.05)
Orthodox	.056	.041	.098
	(.055)	(.037)	(.061)
Economic Discrimination	.153	.060	.213*
	(.109)	(.062)	(.118)
Charitable Giving	-1.20	1.17	-.031
	(1.44)	(.818)	(1.70)
Income Differences	1.43*	-.133	1.29
	(.772)	(.564)	(.970)
Private Ownership	-2.26**	.263	-2.00
	(1.02)	(.645)	(1.29)
Adjusted R^2		.410	
N		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.716****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.171	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.120	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.419****	ð	1.00f
	(.094)				(.164)				(.157)				(.120)		
Protestantism	.076	-.015	.060	Religious Pluralism	.037	-.002	.036	Religious Pluralism	.029	-.002	.027	Economic Freedom	-.001	-.010*	-.011
	(.047)	(.041)	(.064)		(.031)	(.004)	(.031)		(.030)	(.004)	(.030)		(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
Catholicism	.302	.128	.430	Atheism	-.217**	-.095	-.312****	Atheism	-.007	-.064	-.071	Competition	-2.02	-.522	-2.54*
	(.351)	(.386)	(.478)		(.107)	(.092)	(.071)		(.111)	(.087)	(.083)		(1.26)	(.605)	(1.37)
Orthodox	.219****	-.107*	.112	Orthodox	.188****	-.008	.180****	Orthodox	.182****	-.008	.175****	Orthodox	.078	-.042	.036
	(.061)	(.056)	(.070)		(.043)	(.010)	(.042)		(.045)	(.010)	(.041)		(.054)	(.027)	(.052)
Judaism	-.069	.031	-.038	Single w/ kids	.240****	.005	.245****	Infant Mortality	.597****	.022	.619****	Single w/ kids	.403****	.066*	.469****
	(.060)	(.062)	(.087)		(.063)	(.012)	(.065)		(.115)	(.030)	(.118)		(.079)	(.036)	(.086)
Islam	-.150***	.098*	-.052	Islam	-.071*	.015	-.056	Islam	-.136***	.009	-.127****	Islam	-.147***	.061*	-.086*
	(.053)	(.056)	(.065)		(.039)	(.016)	(.035)		(.040)	(.012)	(.036)		(.043)	(.032)	(.044)
Hinduism	.019	-.013	.005	Economic Inequality	.063****	.006	.069****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.978****	.061	1.04****	Charitable Giving	-2.80***	.225	-2.57**
	(.037)	(.040)	(.055)		(.013)	(.006)	(.010)		(.201)	(.080)	(.179)		(.954)	(.425)	(1.06)
Buddhism	.030	-.091*	-.061	Buddhism	.010	-.009	.001	Economic Discrimination	.098	-.013	.085	Life Meaning	-3.55***	-2.95***	-6.50****
	(.045)	(.055)	(.063)		(.038)	(.011)	(.037)		(.069)	(.018)	(.064)		(1.21)	(.939)	(1.11)
Adjusted R^2		.473		Adjusted R^2		.698		Adjusted R^2		.755		Adjusted R^2		.605	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	
G^2		84.42 (p < .001)		G^2		60.50 (p < .001)		G^2		51.12 (p < .01)		G^2		61.53 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.25		G^2/df		2.33		G^2/df		1.97		G^2/df		2.37	
RMSEA		.163		RMSEA		.125		RMSEA		.107		RMSEA		.127	
CFI		.885		CFI		.945		CFI		.960		CFI		.936	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.246*	ð	1.00f
	(.143)		
Charity	-2.06	-.839	-2.90*
	(1.55)	(.653)	(1.60)
Religious Member	.062	.115	.178
	(.134)	(.078)	(.112)
New Govt.	.650***	.049	.699****
	(.191)	(.054)	(.188)
Single w/ kids	.312****	-.028	.284***
	(.085)	(.024)	(.085)
Islam	-.081	.063	-.019
	(.056)	(.040)	(.035)
Latin Nation	.686*	.441	1.13****
	(.409)	(.275)	(.290)
Life Meaning	-4.59****	-1.37*	-5.96****
	(1.16)	(.779)	(.997)
Adjusted R^2		.571	
N		85	
χ^2		89.99 (p < .001)	
χ^2/df		3.46	
RMSEA		.170	
CFI		.895	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.079	Judaism	.114	Buddhism	-.120	Protestantism	.034	Judaism	.069
	(.074)		(.124)		(.088)		(.077)		(.123)
Economic Inequality	.707****	Economic Inequality	.587****	Economic Inequality	.467****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.690****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.574****
	(.078)		(.094)		(.090)		(.082)		(.092)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	.070	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	-.009	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	.055	Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	.108	Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.124
	(.083)		(.121)		(.119)		(.085)		(.105)
Catholicism	.094	Islam	-.032	Religious Pluralism	.170**	Catholicism	.033	Islam	.028
	(.076)		(.087)		(.080)		(.079)		(.089)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.111	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.111	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	.019	Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.045	Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.116
	(.077)		(.113)		(.075)		(.073)		(.109)
Orthodox	.426****	Hinduism	-.186*	Atheism	-.306***	Orthodox	.354****	Hinduism	-.170
	(.097)		(.105)		(.106)		(.090)		(.109)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.184	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.011	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	-.089	Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.033	Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.038
	(.124)		(.102)		(.097)		(.113)		(.096)
Adjusted R^2	.471	Adjusted R^2	.344	Adjusted R^2	.461	Adjusted R^2	.459	Adjusted R^2	.371
N	78	*N*	82	*N*	78	*N*	77	*N*	81

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10
Buddhism	-.135	Protestantism	.093	Judaism	.019	Hinduism	.009	Buddhism	-.002
	(.089)		(.078)		(.073)		(.067)		(.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.482****	Infant Mortality	.760****	Infant Mortality	.809****	Infant Mortality	.794****	Infant Mortality	.802****
	(.074)		(.072)		(.072)		(.075)		(.074)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.078	Prot x Mortality	.010	Judaism x Mortality	.046	Hinduism x Mortality	.066	Buddhism x Mortality	.040
	(.086)		(.085)		(.062)		(.063)		(.081)
Religious Pluralism	.163**	Catholicism	.406****	Catholicism	.178*	Catholicism	.182*	Catholicism	.180*
	(.075)		(.106)		(.103)		(.103)		(.101)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.050	Cath x Mortality	.342****	Cath x Mortality	.213**	Cath x Mortality	.214**	Cath x Mortality	.218**
	(.070)		(.090)		(.087)		(.085)		(.087)
Atheism	-.315***	Orthodox	.250***	Islam	-.302***	Islam	-.295***	Islam	-.295***
	(.095)		(.091)		(.093)		(.092)		(.093)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.074	Orthodox x Mortality	.118	Islam x Mortality	-.158**	Islam x Mortality	-.157**	Islam x Mortality	-.142**
	(.089)		(.091)		(.077)		(.074)		(.068)
Adjusted R^2	.499	Adjusted R^2	.552	Adjusted R^2	.561	Adjusted R^2	.564	Adjusted R^2	.560
N	77	*N*	78	*N*	83	*N*	83	*N*	83

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 11		Model 12		Model 13
Religious Pluralism	.053	Atheism	-.148	Single w/ kids	.381****
	(.085)		(.100)		(.100)
Infant Mortality	.810****	Infant Mortality	.683****	Infant Mortality	.498****
	(.067)		(.104)		(.129)
Pluralism x Mortality	-.030	Atheism x Mortality	.107	Economic Inequality	.208*
	(.072)		(.071)		(.114)
Catholicism	.202**	Catholicism	.159	Catholicism	.105
	(.100)		(.102)		(.088)
Cath x Mortality	.185**	Cath x Mortality	.197**	Cath x Mortality	.113
	(.085)		(.089)		(.083)
Islam	-.291***	Islam	-.243**	Health Benefits	-.031
	(.091)		(.097)		(.124)
Islam x Mortality	-.153*	Islam x Mortality	-.123	Charity	-.117
	(.088)		(.085)		(.076)
Adjusted R^2	.562	Adjusted R^2	.578	Adjusted R^2	.593
N	83	*N*	78	*N*	74

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.150	Judaism	.068	Hinduism	-.111	Religious Pluralism	.238***	Protestantism	.103	Judaism	-.019
	(.097)		(.106)		(.123)		(.091)		(.122)		(.122)
Health Benefits	-.476****	Health Benefits	-.458****	Health Benefits	-.418****	Health Benefits	-.148	Charity	.126	Charity	.160
	(.087)		(.081)		(.077)		(.149)		(.136)		(.113)
Prot x Health	-.144	Judaism x Health	-.066	Hinduism x Health	-.020	Pluralism x Health	-.081	Prot x Charity	-.145	Judaism x Charity	-.052
	(.088)		(.079)		(.079)		(.071)		(.093)		(.117)
Catholicism	.291**	Catholicism	.188	Catholicism	.289***	Catholicism	.204**	Catholicism	.139	Islam	-.061
	(.135)		(.135)		(.105)		(.090)		(.123)		(.098)
Cath x Health	-.183**	Cath x Health	-.172*	Cath x Health	-.259***	Cath x Health	-.098	Cath x Charity	.137	Islam x Charity	.163*
	(.091)		(.099)		(.086)		(.083)		(.135)		(.085)
Orthodox	.217*	Islam	-.126	Buddhism	-.006	Atheism	-.513***	Orthodox	.119	Hinduism	-.063
	(.114)		(.123)		(.130)		(.157)		(.167)		(.123)
Orthodox x Health	-.076	Islam x Health	.142	Buddhism x Health	-.040	Atheism x Health	-.128	Orthodox x Charity	-.135	Hinduism x Charity	-.200*
	(.117)		(.099)		(.109)		(.124)		(.151)		(.121)
Adjusted R^2	.236	Adjusted R^2	.190	Adjusted R^2	.168	Adjusted R^2	.376	Adjusted R^2	-.011	Adjusted R^2	.008
N	77	*N*	82	*N*	82	*N*	77	*N*	77	*N*	80

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Israel: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

	Model 7		Model 8		Model 9
Buddhism	-.135	Religious Pluralism	.137	Atheism	-.569****
	(.118)		(.108)		(.105)
Charity	.158	Charity	.126	Charity	-.030
	(.109)		(.102)		(.099)
Buddhism x Charity	.195	Pluralism x Charity	.170	Atheism x Charity	-.065
	(.169)		(.121)		(.113)
Islam	-.083	Islam	-.014	Islam	-.235**
	(.096)		(.110)		(.112)
Islam x Charity	.225***	Islam x Charity	.250**	Islam x Charity	-.058
	(.080)		(.113)		(.098)
Hinduism	.009	Hinduism	-.052	Hinduism	.087
	(.119)		(.111)		(.096)
Hinduism x Charity	-.337**	Hinduism x Charity	-.228**	Hinduism x Charity	-.138
	(.132)		(.101)		(.116)
Adjusted R^2	.041	Adjusted R^2	.044	Adjusted R^2	.292
N	80	*N*	80	*N*	77

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.027****	ð	-.027****	Individualism	-.026****	ð	-.026****	Individualism	-.028****	ð	-.028****	Individualism	-.024****	ð	-.024****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)
Protestantism	.066	-.088**	-.022	Protestantism	.073	-.093**	-.020	Protestantism	.043	-.093**	-.049	Protestantism	-.170***	-.092**	-.262****
	(.073)	(.040)	(.072)		(.070)	(.037)	(.063)		(.079)	(.039)	(.077)		(.061)	(.039)	(.071)
Catholicism	.887*	-.155	.732	Catholicism	1.13***	-.183	.945**	Catholicism	.186	-.213	-.027	Religious Pluralism	.088	.013	.101
	(.476)	(.271)	(.512)		(.396)	(.211)	(.442)		(.533)	(.271)	(.607)		(.062)	(.024)	(.068)
Orthodox	.125	.022	.147*	Orthodox	.173**	.030	.203**	Orthodox	.023	.014	.037	Single w/ kids	.540****	.047	.587****
	(.079)	(.035)	(.078)		(.086)	(.036)	(.084)		(.102)	(.040)	(.106)		(.129)	(.067)	(.147)
Judaism	.106	-.158***	-.051	Judaism	.101	-.170***	-.069	Judaism	.086	-.163***	-.077	Judaism	.034	-.138***	-.104
	(.081)	(.058)	(.097)		(.093)	(.059)	(.100)		(.079)	(.055)	(.091)		(.060)	(.046)	(.069)
Islam	-.037	.013	-.024	Hinduism	.007	.017	.024	Buddhism	-.238***	.007	-.231**	Buddhism	-.099	.024	-.075
	(.059)	(.041)	(.073)		(.054)	(.019)	(.054)		(.091)	(.049)	(.109)		(.106)	(.046)	(.126)
Adjusted R^2		.206		Adjusted R^2		.243		Adjusted R^2		.319		Adjusted R^2		.502	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix L Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Israel: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.013**	ð	-.013**	Individualism	-.012	ð	-.012	Individualism	-.006	ð	-.006
	(.005)		(.005)		(.008)		(.008)		(.005)		(.005)
Protestantism	-.074	-.026	-.099	Economic Discrimination	.065	.017	.082	Infant Mortality	.392**	.054	.447***
	(.071)	(.020)	(.075)		(.106)	(.024)	(.102)		(.166)	(.053)	(.156)
Atheism	-.250***	-.037	-.287***	Health Benefits	-.002	-.052	-.053	Atheism	-.111	.0004	-.111
	(.090)	(.031)	(.099)		(.052)	(.037)	(.043)		(.097)	(.010)	(.098)
Single w/ kids	.465****	-.033	.432****	Charity	1.40	-.713	.691	Single w/ kids	.420****	-.028	.392****
	(.108)	(.035)	(.107)		(2.30)	(.618)	(2.10)		(.078)	(.028)	(.073)
Judaism	.054	-.058**	-.003	Judaism	.113	-.034	.078	Economic Freedom	-.004	-.0004	-.005
	(.053)	(.027)	(.055)		(.079)	(.026)	(.079)		(.010)	(.001)	(.010)
Economic Inequality	.031**	.011*	.042***	Economic Inequality	.072****	.004	.076****	Economic Inequality	.031**	.005	.036***
	(.014)	(.006)	(.013)		(.015)	(.004)	(.014)		(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
Adjusted R^2		.583		Adjusted R^2		.344		Adjusted R^2		.621	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.515****	ð	.515****	Single w/ kids	.432****	ð	.432****	Single w/ kids	.365****	ð	.365****	Single w/ kids	.241**	ð	.241**
	(.128)		(.128)		(.099)		(.099)		(.076)		(.076)		(.098)		(.098)
Protestantism	-.081	.161***	.079	Protestantism	-.089	.130***	.041	Economic Discrimination	.112	-.014	.099	Protestantism	-.017	.054*	.036
	(.071)	(.054)	(.065)		(.065)	(.046)	(.054)		(.079)	(.054)	(.085)		(.050)	(.032)	(.040)
Catholicism	-.227	.536**	.310	Catholicism	.499*	.612**	1.11***	Catholicism	.457	.664**	1.12***	Catholicism	.244	.258*	.502**
	(.462)	(.256)	(.476)		(.278)	(.245)	(.330)		(.296)	(.263)	(.335)		(.229)	(.132)	(.243)
Orthodox	.053	.062*	.115	Orthodox	.093**	.055**	.148***	Orthodox	.107**	.032	.139**	Orthodox	.198****	.059**	.258****
	(.066)	(.034)	(.075)		(.045)	(.027)	(.056)		(.048)	(.030)	(.055)		(.045)	(.023)	(.044)
Judaism	-.059	.002	-.057	Religious Pluralism	.121***	.027	.148****	Religious Pluralism	.103***	.057**	.160****	Religious Pluralism	.054	-.004	.050
	(.064)	(.041)	(.076)		(.036)	(.025)	(.040)		(.039)	(.028)	(.042)		(.033)	(.013)	(.034)
Islam	-.063	-.022	-.085	Atheism	-.516****	-.051	-.567****	Atheism	-.507****	-.053	-.561****	Atheism	-.297****	.016	-.281****
	(.057)	(.027)	(.064)		(.072)	(.042)	(.084)		(.074)	(.045)	(.089)		(.067)	(.023)	(.072)
Hinduism	-.011	.040	.029	Hinduism	-.006	.034*	.028	Hinduism	-.003	.031	.028	Economic Inequality	.070****	.015**	.085****
	(.051)	(.025)	(.058)		(.032)	(.019)	(.036)		(.032)	(.020)	(.036)		(.011)	(.007)	(.010)
Buddhism	-.041	-.071**	-.112*	Buddhism	.057	-.048**	.009	Buddhism	.035	-.019	.015	Charity	1.27	1.69**	2.96*
	(.059)	(.032)	(.065)		(.043)	(.023)	(.050)		(.044)	(.024)	(.049)		(1.54)	(.770)	(1.62)
Adjusted R^2		.258		Adjusted R^2		.559		Adjusted R^2		.544		Adjusted R^2		.695	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.286****	ð	.286****	Single w/ kids	.430****	ð	.430****	Single w/ kids	.555****	ð	.555****	Single w/ kids	.473****	ð	.473****
	(.082)		(.082)		(.099)		(.099)		(.097)		(.097)		(.106)		(.106)
Protestantism	.026	.082**	.108***	Protestantism	-.029	.099**	.069	Economic Freedom	-.022*	.002	-.020	Protestantism	-.051	.053	.003
	(.044)	(.032)	(.033)		(.049)	(.038)	(.045)		(.012)	(.008)	(.014)		(.064)	(.044)	(.074)
Catholicism	.666***	.264*	.931****	Catholicism	.246	.098	.344	Individual Responsibility	.369	1.48**	1.85*	Educ. Benefits	-.077	.054	-.023
	(.232)	(.151)	(.256)		(.336)	(.172)	(.348)		(.808)	(.711)	(1.05)		(.064)	(.041)	(.069)
Orthodox	.224****	.045***	.269****	Orthodox	.192****	.046**	.239****	Orthodox	.057	.042	.098	Religious Member	.285**	.262***	.547****
	(.033)	(.017)	(.037)		(.039)	(.022)	(.045)		(.053)	(.037)	(.062)		(.122)	(.086)	(.132)
Economic Discrimination	.129**	.0003	.130*	Economic Discrimination	.072	-.004	.068	Economic Discrimination	.170	.044	.214*	Economic Discrimination	.006	.062	.068
	(.063)	(.030)	(.070)		(.069)	(.046)	(.074)		(.108)	(.067)	(.115)		(.102)	(.062)	(.107)
Atheism	-.031	-.032	-.062	Economic Inequality Ratio	.912****	.585****	1.50****	Income Differences	1.24*	.066	1.31	Income Differences	.297	.022	.319
	(.067)	(.041)	(.081)		(.239)	(.166)	(.187)		(.741)	(.582)	(.954)		(.795)	(.477)	(.938)
Economic Inequality	.046****	.016***	.062****	Health Benefits	-.155****	.078***	-.077**	Private Ownership	-1.90*	-.085	-1.98	Private Ownership	-1.78*	-.151	-1.93*
	(.009)	(.005)	(.010)		(.036)	(.027)	(.038)		(.987)	(.617)	(1.31)		(.926)	(.438)	(1.04)
Infant Mortality	.608****	-.052	.556****	Educ. Benefits	-.055	-.020	-.075	Charitable Giving	-1.36	1.34	-.018	Charitable Giving	-2.93***	-.102	-3.03***
	(.094)	(.062)	(.126)		(.047)	(.035)	(.053)		(1.42)	(.888)	(1.65)		(1.02)	(.532)	(1.14)
Adjusted R^2		.803		Adjusted R^2		.679		Adjusted R^2		.438		Adjusted R^2		.456	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.711****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.174	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.134	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.396***	ð	1.00f
	(.097)				(.147)				(.151)				(.117)		
Protestantism	.076	.003	.080	Religious Pluralism	.045	-.002	.044	Religious Pluralism	.030	-.003	.028	Economic Freedom	-.004	-.010**	-.013
	(.049)	(.038)	(.064)		(.032)	(.005)	(.031)		(.030)	(.005)	(.030)		(.012)	(.005)	(.011)
Catholicism	.299	.139	.439	Atheism	-.196*	-.097	-.293****	Atheism	.007	-.073	-.066	Competition	-1.46	-.351	-1.81
	(.355)	(.383)	(.480)		(.103)	(.082)	(.073)		(.112)	(.085)	(.086)		(1.18)	(.592)	(1.27)
Orthodox	.219****	-.102*	.117*	Orthodox	.186****	-.008	.178****	Orthodox	.183****	-.009	.175****	Orthodox	.074	-.039	.035
	(.061)	(.054)	(.070)		(.043)	(.010)	(.041)		(.044)	(.010)	(.041)		(.052)	(.026)	(.049)
Judaism	-.082	.024	-.059	Single w/ kids	.249****	.005	.254****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.982****	.069	1.05****	Single w/ kids	.439****	.074**	.512****
	(.053)	(.054)	(.074)		(.065)	(.012)	(.067)		(.198)	(.078)	(.176)		(.080)	(.037)	(.086)
Islam	-.151***	.092*	-.059	Islam	-.070*	.016	-.054	Islam	-.133***	.010	-.123***	Islam	-.144***	.059*	-.085*
	(.053)	(.056)	(.066)		(.038)	(.015)	(.034)		(.040)	(.012)	(.036)		(.043)	(.031)	(.044)
Hinduism	.022	.002	.023	Economic Inequality	.063****	.006	.069****	Infant Mortality	.594****	.023	.617****	Charitable Giving	-2.98***	.150	-2.83***
	(.038)	(.039)	(.056)		(.012)	(.005)	(.010)		(.113)	(.028)	(.117)		(.950)	(.392)	(1.03)
Buddhism	.030	-.122**	-.092	Buddhism	-.004	-.009	-.013	Economic Discrimination	.110	-.016	.094	Life Meaning	-3.41***	-2.72***	-6.13****
	(.052)	(.053)	(.067)		(.041)	(.010)	(.040)		(.069)	(.019)	(.063)		(1.20)	(.891)	(1.12)
Adjusted R^2		.473		Adjusted R^2		.702		Adjusted R^2		.755		Adjusted R^2		.622	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	
G^2		74.58 (p < .001)		G^2		56.71 (p < .001)		G^2		65.96 (p < .001)		G^2		50.60 (p < .01)	
G^2/df		2.87		G^2/df		2.18		G^2/df		2.54		G^2/df		1.95	
RMSEA		.148		RMSEA		.118		RMSEA		.134		RMSEA		.106	
CFI		.906		CFI		.952		CFI		.940		CFI		.956	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.243*	ð	1.00f
	(.141)		
Charity	-2.06	-.834	-2.89*
	(1.54)	(.647)	(1.58)
Religious Member	.048	.113	.160
	(.136)	(.077)	(.114)
New Govt.	.625***	.048	.672****
	(.191)	(.055)	(.188)
Single w/ kids	.329****	-.025	.304***
	(.092)	(.024)	(.092)
Islam	-.079	.063	-.016
	(.056)	(.040)	(.036)
Latin Nation	.690*	.436	1.13****
	(.406)	(.272)	(.290)
Life Meaning	-4.54****	-1.35*	-5.89****
	(1.16)	(.767)	(1.00)
Adjusted R^2		.577	
N		85	
g^2		93.54 (p < .001)	
g^2/df		3.60	
RMSEA		.175	
CFI		.892	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.104	Infant Mortality	.493****	Judaism	.069	Buddhism	-.129	Protestantism	.060
	(.075)		(.127)		(.108)		(.108)		(.077)
Economic Inequality	.689****	Economic Inequality	.301**	Economic Inequality	.581****	Economic Inequality	.469****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.675****
	(.081)		(.120)		(.095)		(.089)		(.083)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	.099	Economic Freedom	.066	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	.002	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	.049	Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	.132
	(.087)		(.107)		(.125)		(.127)		(.087)
Catholicism	.113	Catholicism	.141*	Islam	-.037	Religious Pluralism	.175**	Catholicism	.052
	(.078)		(.079)		(.086)		(.084)		(.080)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.133*	Cath x Econ Ineq.	.123	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.109	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	.023	Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.061
	(.080)		(.078)		(.114)		(.077)		(.074)
Orthodox	.445****	Individual Responsibility	.026	Hinduism	-.165*	Atheism	-.299***	Orthodox	.374****
	(.099)		(.087)		(.099)		(.108)		(.092)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.202	Income Differences	-.033	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.019	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	-.084	Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.043
	(.127)		(.082)		(.106)		(.096)		(.114)
Adjusted R^2	.482	Adjusted R^2	.489	Adjusted R^2	.337	Adjusted R^2	.459	Adjusted R^2	.467
N	77	*N*	79	*N*	82	*N*	77	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
Judaism	.024	Buddhism	-.164	Protestantism	.125*	Judaism	.037	Hinduism	.010
	(.103)		(.106)		(.074)		(.067)		(.068)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.562****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.489****	Infant Mortality	.775****	Infant Mortality	.804****	Infant Mortality	.788****
	(.093)		(.075)		(.070)		(.071)		(.073)
Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.143	Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.067	Prot x Mortality	-.007	Judaism x Mortality	.029	Hinduism x Mortality	.070
	(.103)		(.090)		(.083)		(.059)		(.062)
Islam	.024	Religious Pluralism	.177**	Catholicism	.433****	Catholicism	.187*	Catholicism	.190*
	(.089)		(.078)		(.104)		(.106)		(.104)
Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.119	Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.061	Cath x Mortality	.340****	Cath x Mortality	.215**	Cath x Mortality	.221***
	(.110)		(.072)		(.089)		(.086)		(.085)
Hinduism	-.145	Atheism	-.292***	Orthodox	.286***	Islam	-.289***	Islam	-.285***
	(.101)		(.099)		(.089)		(.093)		(.092)
Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.048	Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.067	Orthodox x Mortality	.106	Islam x Mortality	-.162**	Islam x Mortality	-.157**
	(.094)		(.086)		(.089)		(.076)		(.074)
Adjusted R^2	.364	Adjusted R^2	.501	Adjusted R^2	.570	Adjusted R^2	.561	Adjusted R^2	.565
N	81	*N*	76	*N*	77	*N*	83	*N*	83

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 11		Model 12		Model 13		Model 14
Buddhism	-.023	Religious Pluralism	.063	Atheism	-.144	Single w/ kids	.444****
	(.091)		(.089)		(.112)		(.089)
Infant Mortality	.792****	Infant Mortality	.797****	Infant Mortality	.685****	Infant Mortality	.513****
	(.073)		(.067)		(.108)		(.122)
Buddhism x Mortality	.039	Pluralism x Mortality	-.018	Atheism x Mortality	.106	Economic Inequality	.160
	(.080)		(.073)		(.071)		(.111)
Catholicism	.182*	Catholicism	.212**	Catholicism	.161	Catholicism	.125
	(.102)		(.101)		(.107)		(.088)
Cath x Mortality	.225***	Cath x Mortality	.197**	Cath x Mortality	.198**	Cath x Mortality	.108
	(.086)		(.085)		(.092)		(.082)
Islam	-.291***	Islam	-.271***	Islam	-.242**	Health Benefits	-.049
	(.093)		(.092)		(.100)		(.122)
Islam x Mortality	-.143**	Islam x Mortality	-.148	Islam x Mortality	-.122	Charity	-.135*
	(.068)		(.090)		(.085)		(.076)
Adjusted R^2	.561	Adjusted R^2	.562	Adjusted R^2	.577	Adjusted R^2	.615
N	83	*N*	83	*N*	77	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.172*	Protestantism	.086	Judaism	.057	Hinduism	-.097	Religious Pluralism	.248***	Protestantism	.127
	(.099)		(.099)		(.094)		(.133)		(.093)		(.123)
Health Benefits	-.472****	Health Benefits	.207**	Health Benefits	-.456****	Health Benefits	-.415****	Health Benefits	-.146	Charity	.121
	(.087)		(.100)		(.083)		(.078)		(.148)		(.135)
Prot x Health	-.161*	Prot x Health	-.085	Judaism x Health	-.070	Hinduism x Health	-.030	Pluralism x Health	-.087	Prot x Charity	-.139
	(.086)		(.079)		(.080)		(.081)		(.072)		(.093)
Catholicism	.306**	Economic Inequality	.444****	Catholicism	.193	Catholicism	.295***	Catholicism	.210**	Catholicism	.156
	(.135)		(.104)		(.139)		(.107)		(.092)		(.124)
Cath x Health	-.191**	Infant Mortality	.494***	Cath x Health	-.174*	Cath x Health	-.261***	Cath x Health	-.102	Cath x Charity	.142
	(.091)		(.148)		(.103)		(.087)		(.083)		(.135)
Orthodox	.239**	Economic Freedom	-.032	Islam	-.126	Buddhism	-.023	Atheism	-.509***	Orthodox	.137
	(.115)		(.119)		(.125)		(.148)		(.157)		(.168)
Orthodox x Health	-.089	Individual Responsibility	.007	Islam x Health	.134	Buddhism x Health	-.021	Atheism x Health	-.130	Orthodox x Charity	-.141
	(.117)		(.089)		(.099)		(.114)		(.123)		(.151)
Adjusted R^2	.251	Adjusted R^2	.508	Adjusted R^2	.190	Adjusted R^2	.169	Adjusted R^2	.376	Adjusted R^2	-.004
N	76	*N*	73	*N*	82	*N*	82	*N*	76	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Thailand: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
Judaism	-.020	Buddhism	-.176	Religious Pluralism	.155	Atheism	-.588****
	(.122)		(.133)		(.113)		(.110)
Charity	.159	Charity	.156	Charity	.123	Charity	-.031
	(.113)		(.109)		(.103)		(.099)
Judaism x Charity	-.052	Buddhism x Charity	.189	Pluralism x Charity	.173	Atheism x Charity	-.059
	(.117)		(.171)		(.120)		(.114)
Islam	-.061	Islam	-.092	Islam	-.009	Islam	-.242**
	(.098)		(.097)		(.110)		(.112)
Islam x Charity	.163*	Islam x Charity	.220***	Islam x Charity	.253**	Islam x Charity	-.059
	(.085)		(.081)		(.113)		(.099)
Hinduism	-.059	Hinduism	.033	Hinduism	-.045	Hinduism	.082
	(.124)		(.126)		(.112)		(.096)
Hinduism x Charity	-.200*	Hinduism x Charity	-.337**	Hinduism x Charity	-.225**	Hinduism x Charity	-.138
	(.121)		(.134)		(.101)		(.116)
Adjusted R^2	.005	Adjusted R^2	.045	Adjusted R^2	.046	Adjusted R^2	.295
N	79	*N*	79	*N*	79	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.026****	ð	-.026****	Individualism	-.026****	ð	-.026****	Individualism	-.027****	ð	-.027****	Individualism	-.022****	ð	-.022****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.004)		(.004)
Protestantism	.073	-.083**	-.010	Protestantism	.079	-.088**	-.010	Protestantism	.077	-.090**	-.013	Protestantism	-.162**	-.084**	-.246***
	(.076)	(.041)	(.074)		(.073)	(.037)	(.065)		(.079)	(.040)	(.074)		(.065)	(.036)	(.073)
Catholicism	.926*	-.142	.784	Catholicism	1.19***	-.200	.987**	Catholicism	.204	-.208	-.003	Religious Pluralism	.166****	.015	.180****
	(.480)	(.272)	(.518)		(.399)	(.206)	(.437)		(.520)	(.260)	(.587)		(.042)	(.027)	(.051)
Orthodox	.125	.022	.146*	Orthodox	.174**	.028	.203**	Orthodox	.019	.017	.036	Single w/ kids	.479****	.034	.513****
	(.080)	(.035)	(.078)		(.087)	(.035)	(.084)		(.100)	(.041)	(.102)		(.122)	(.061)	(.141)
Judaism	.082	-.135***	-.053	Judaism	.058	-.142***	-.084	Judaism	.060	-.140***	-.081	Judaism	.001	-.112***	-.111*
	(.068)	(.050)	(.077)		(.081)	(.051)	(.080)		(.077)	(.049)	(.079)		(.058)	(.038)	(.061)
Islam	-.037	.018	-.019	Hinduism	.019	.011	.029	Buddhism	-.278***	.015	-.263**	Buddhism	-.230***	.008	-.222**
	(.058)	(.039)	(.072)		(.052)	(.019)	(.051)		(.087)	(.052)	(.108)		(.071)	(.048)	(.096)
Adjusted R^2		.205		Adjusted R^2		.238		Adjusted R^2		.359		Adjusted R^2		.591	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.021****	ð	-.021****	Individualism	-.007	ð	-.007	Individualism	-.013**	ð	-.013**	Individualism	-.014	ð	-.014
	(.004)		(.004)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.008)		(.008)
Economic Discrimination	.080	.065	.145	Economic Discrimination	.132	.017	.150*	Protestantism	-.071	-.025	-.095	Economic Discrimination	.132	.030	.162
	(.089)	(.048)	(.100)		(.080)	(.017)	(.085)		(.071)	(.019)	(.074)		(.112)	(.031)	(.115)
Religious Pluralism	.113**	-.007	.107*	Religious Pluralism	.037	.0002	.037	Judaism	.028	-.046**	-.018	Judaism	.108	-.034	.074
	(.048)	(.026)	(.055)		(.036)	(.006)	(.036)		(.049)	(.023)	(.047)		(.068)	(.026)	(.071)
Single w/ kids	.479****	.020	.498****	Single w/ kids	.533****	-.016	.517****	Single w/ kids	.484****	-.037	.446****	Health Benefits	.011	-.061	-.050
	(.128)	(.055)	(.143)		(.072)	(.016)	(.068)		(.115)	(.038)	(.113)		(.065)	(.038)	(.049)
Economic Freedom	-.023*	-.018**	-.040***	Infant Mortality	.609****	.094	.702****	Atheism	-.232**	-.037	-.269***	Atheism	-.407***	-.020	-.427***
	(.013)	(.007)	(.014)		(.122)	(.068)	(.097)		(.093)	(.031)	(.102)		(.143)	(.027)	(.148)
Buddhism	-.158	.064	-.095	Individual Responsibility	-.324	-.124	-.448	Economic Inequality	.030**	.011*	.042***	Charity	.768	-.875	-.108
	(.100)	(.048)	(.117)		(.703)	(.144)	(.717)		(.014)	(.006)	(.013)		(2.30)	(.705)	(2.15)
Adjusted R^2		.560		Adjusted R^2		.632		Adjusted R^2		.581		Adjusted R^2		.264	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix M Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Thailand: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 9		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.005	ð	-.005
	(.005)		(.005)
Infant Mortality	.413**	.052	.464***
	(.166)	(.053)	(.157)
Economic Freedom	-.008	-.0003	-.009
	(.010)	(.001)	(.010)
Single w/ kids	.465****	-.026	.439****
	(.075)	(.028)	(.068)
Atheism	-.061	.001	-.061
	(.095)	(.010)	(.095)
Economic Inequality	.030**	.004	.034***
	(.013)	(.005)	(.012)
Adjusted R^2		.635	
N		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Appendix N. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.521****	ð	.521****	Single w/ kids	.444****	ð	.444****	Single w/ kids	.290****	ð	.290****	Single w/ kids	.398****	ð	.398****
	(.129)		(.129)		(.098)		(.098)		(.064)		(.064)		(.099)		(.099)
Protestantism	-.087	.162***	.075	Protestantism	-.085	.125***	.040	Economic Inequality	.068****	.020***	.088****	Protestantism	-.046	.107**	.061
	(.070)	(.054)	(.065)		(.066)	(.046)	(.057)		(.010)	(.006)	(.011)		(.065)	(.049)	(.055)
Catholicism	-.337	.561**	.224	Catholicism	.412	.689**	1.10***	Catholicism	.086	.398**	.483**	Catholicism	.309	.645**	.955***
	(.467)	(.271)	(.476)		(.288)	(.270)	(.350)		(.234)	(.157)	(.244)		(.279)	(.251)	(.317)
Orthodox	.036	.063*	.099	Orthodox	.085*	.057**	.141**	Orthodox	.192****	.050**	.242****	Orthodox	.090*	.052*	.142**
	(.068)	(.035)	(.077)		(.044)	(.028)	(.057)		(.040)	(.022)	(.044)		(.047)	(.027)	(.055)
Judaism	-.047	.001	-.046	Religious Pluralism	.106***	.040	.145***	Economic Discrimination	.075	-.015	.060	Economic Discrimination	.090	.028	.117
	(.064)	(.042)	(.076)		(.037)	(.028)	(.043)		(.072)	(.040)	(.081)		(.083)	(.052)	(.082)
Islam	-.060	-.023	-.082	Atheism	-.515****	-.054	-.570****	Atheism	-.276****	.047	-.229***	Atheism	-.488****	-.070	-.558****
	(.057)	(.027)	(.063)		(.070)	(.044)	(.081)		(.057)	(.037)	(.069)		(.075)	(.043)	(.084)
Hinduism	-.042	.044*	.002	Hinduism	-.017	.040**	.023	Hinduism	-.010	.030*	.020	Hinduism	.0004	.025	.025
	(.048)	(.025)	(.056)		(.033)	(.020)	(.037)		(.027)	(.016)	(.030)		(.031)	(.018)	(.036)
Buddhism	.0002	-.077***	-.077	Buddhism	.074**	-.055***	.019	Buddhism	.023	-.031	-.008	Religious Pluralism	.100**	.032	.132***
	(.059)	(.030)	(.061)		(.037)	(.020)	(.0410		(.038)	(.019)	(.044)		(.039)	(.027)	(.042)
Adjusted R^2		.248		Adjusted R^2		.551		Adjusted R^2		.681		Adjusted R^2		.544	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.233**	ð	.233**	Single w/ kids	.272****	ð	.272****	Single w/ kids	.392****	ð	.392****	Single w/ kids	.508****	ð	.508****
	(.094)		(.094)		(.064)		(.064)		(.085)		(.085)		(.093)		(.093)
Protestantism	-.013	.052	.039	Infant Mortality	.600****	-.008	.593****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.956****	.554****	1.51****	Economic Freedom	-.020*	.0002	-.020
	(.051)	(.032)	(.043)		(.108)	(.071)	(.139)		(.232)	(.154)	(.191)		(.012)	(.008)	(.014)
Catholicism	.182	.289**	.472*	Catholicism	.845***	.470***	1.31****	Catholicism	.238	.253	.491	Individual Responsibility	.803	1.05	1.86*
	(.240)	(.145)	(.259)		(.276)	(.179)	(.305)		(.346)	(.211)	(.364)		(.839)	(.701)	(1.04)
Orthodox	.197****	.058***	.254****	Orthodox	.222****	.025	.247****	Orthodox	.197****	.019	.216****	Orthodox	.052	.041	.093
	(.045)	(.022)	(.044)		(.037)	(.017)	(.043)		(.041)	(.023)	(.049)		(.055)	(.037)	(.061)
Economic Inequality	.071****	.014**	.085****	Economic Inequality	.045****	.012**	.057****	Health Benefits	-.151****	.074***	-.077*	Income Differences	1.35*	-.119	1.23
	(.011)	(.006)	(.010)		(.010)	(.005)	(.010)		(.037)	(.026)	(.040)		(.755)	(.562)	(.944)
Atheism	-.300****	.018	-.282****	Atheism	-.063	-.008	-.071	Educ. Benefits	-.061	.0001	-.061	Private Ownership	-2.17**	.261	-1.91
	(.068)	(.023)	(.073)		(.080)	(.044)	(.096)		(.046)	(.029)	(.051)		(1.02)	(.644)	(1.28)
Charity	1.38	1.58**	2.97*	Economic Discrimination	.130**	-.012	.118	Economic Discrimination	.088	-.026	.062	Economic Discrimination	.149	.061	.210*
	(1.55)	(.720)	(1.64)		(.063)	(.035)	(.072)		(.068)	(.052)	(.079)		(.107)	(.063)	(.115)
Religious Pluralism	.043	.003	.046	Religious Pluralism	.051	.040**	.091***	Religious Pluralism	-.008	.045**	.037	Charitable Giving	-1.12	1.16	.031
	(.036)	(.014)	(.038)		(.032)	(.018)	(.034)		(.035)	(.021)	(.036)		(1.41)	(.808)	(1.65)
Adjusted R^2		.687		Adjusted R^2		.795		Adjusted R^2		.654		Adjusted R^2		.414	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.703****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.161	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.131	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.407***	ð	1.00f
	(.095)				(.156)				(.161)				(.121)		
Protestantism	.078	-.004	.074	Religious Pluralism	.036	-.002	.034	Religious Pluralism	.030	-.003	.028	Economic Freedom	-.002	-.010**	-.012
	(.049)	(.041)	(.064)		(.032)	(.004)	(.031)		(.030)	(.005)	(.030)		(.012)	(.005)	(.012)
Catholicism	.282	.047	.329	Atheism	-.224**	-.090	-.314****	Atheism	-.001	-.070	-.070	Competition	-1.91	-.370	-2.28*
	(.356)	(.386)	(.479)		(.103)	(.088)	(.071)		(.113)	(.089)	(.083)		(1.27)	(.578)	(1.38)
Orthodox	.211***	-.113**	.098	Orthodox	.183****	-.008	.175****	Orthodox	.182****	-.009	.173****	Orthodox	.073	-.042	.031
	(.062)	(.056)	(.071)		(.043)	(.010)	(.042)		(.045)	(.011)	(.041)		(.054)	(.026)	(.052)
Judaism	-.077	.031	-.046	Single w/ kids	.245****	.007	.252****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.988****	.065	1.05****	Single w/ kids	.404****	.067*	.471****
	(.053)	(.053)	(.074)		(.064)	(.012)	(.066)		(.199)	(.080)	(.177)		(.079)	(.036)	(.086)
Islam	-.152***	.092	-.060	Islam	-.072*	.014	-.058*	Islam	-.135***	.010	-.125****	Islam	-.147***	.059*	-.088**
	(.052)	(.056)	(.065)		(.039)	(.015)	(.035)		(.040)	(.012)	(.036)		(.043)	(.032)	(.044)
Hinduism	.017	-.020	-.003	Economic Inequality	.062****	.005	.067****	Infant Mortality	.593****	.022	.615****	Charitable Giving	-2.75***	.277	-2.48**
	(.037)	(.039)	(.054)		(.013)	(.005)	(.010)		(.112)	(.029)	(.116)		(.955)	(.420)	(1.06)
Buddhism	.029	-.089	-.060	Buddhism	.011	-.008	.003	Economic Discrimination	.105	-.014	.090	Life Meaning	-3.55***	-2.78***	-6.33****
	(.044)	(.055)	(.063)		(.038)	(.010)	(.037)		(.069)	(.018)	(.063)		(1.20)	(.920)	(1.10)
Adjusted R^2		.457		Adjusted R^2		.691		Adjusted R^2		.750		Adjusted R^2		.597	
N		85		*N*		85		*N*		85		*N*		85	
G^2		84.51 (p < .001)		G^2		60.13 (p < .001)		G^2		49.92 (p < .01)		G^2		62.05 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.25		G^2/df		2.31		G^2/df		1.92		G^2/df		2.39	
RMSEA		.163		RMSEA		.124		RMSEA		.104		RMSEA		.128	
CFI		.883		CFI		.945		CFI		.962		CFI		.934	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.241*	ð	1.00f
	(.142)		
Charity	-1.77	-.779	-2.55
	(1.53)	(.641)	(1.58)
Religious Member	.049	.110	.159
	(.133)	(.076)	(.112)
New Govt.	.642***	.047	.688****
	(.189)	(.053)	(.186)
Single w/ kids	.315****	-.026	.290***
	(.085)	(.023)	(.085)
Islam	-.082	.062	-.020
	(.055)	(.040)	(.035)
Latin Nation	.675*	.431	1.11****
	(.406)	(.273)	(.291)
Life Meaning	-4.56****	-1.33*	-5.89****
	(1.15)	(.771)	(.987)
Adjusted R^2		.566	
N		85	
G^2		90.82 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.49	
RMSEA		.171	
CFI		.892	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.088	Judaism	.068	Buddhism	-.117	Protestantism	.041	Judaism	.024
	(.075)		(.108)		(.088)		(.079)		(.103)
Economic Inequality	.698****	Economic Inequality	.572****	Economic Inequality	.459****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.683****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.554****
	(.079)		(.094)		(.091)		(.084)		(.094)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	.058	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	-.003	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	.051	Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	.098	Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.146
	(.084)		(.124)		(.119)		(.088)		(.102)
Catholicism	.086	Islam	-.043	Religious Pluralism	.164**	Catholicism	.028	Islam	.017
	(.077)		(.086)		(.081)		(.080)		(.089)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.119	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.105	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	.030	Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.050	Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.115
	(.077)		(.113)		(.077)		(.074)		(.109)
Orthodox	.423****	Hinduism	-.171*	Atheism	-.306***	Orthodox	.352****	Hinduism	-.155
	(.097)		(.098)		(.106)		(.090)		(.100)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.184	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.008	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	-.095	Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.033	Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.057
	(.124)		(.105)		(.097)		(.113)		(.094)
Adjusted R^2	.460	Adjusted R^2	.329	Adjusted R^2	.447	Adjusted R^2	.446	Adjusted R^2	.357
N	77	*N*	82	*N*	77	*N*	76	*N*	81

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10
Buddhism	-.134	Protestantism	.104	Judaism	.033	Hinduism	-.003	Buddhism	-.006
	(.089)		(.078)		(.067)		(.067)		(.083)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.473****	Infant Mortality	.755****	Infant Mortality	.795****	Infant Mortality	.772****	Infant Mortality	.786****
	(.075)		(.073)		(.073)		(.075)		(.073)
Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.074	Prot x Mortality	-.004	Judaism x Mortality	.034	Hinduism x Mortality	.083	Buddhism x Mortality	.048
	(.086)		(.086)		(.060)		(.063)		(.079)
Religious Pluralism	.155**	Catholicism	.401****	Catholicism	.173*	Catholicism	.177*	Catholicism	.173*
	(.076)		(.106)		(.104)		(.102)		(.101)
Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.065	Cath x Mortality	.352****	Cath x Mortality	.224**	Cath x Mortality	.233***	Cath x Mortality	.235***
	(.072)		(.091)		(.088)		(.086)		(.088)
Atheism	-.312***	Orthodox	.250***	Islam	-.298***	Islam	-.293***	Islam	-.294***
	(.096)		(.092)		(.093)		(.092)		(.093)
Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.083	Orthodox x Mortality	.119	Islam x Mortality	-.156**	Islam x Mortality	-.147**	Islam x Mortality	-.133*
	(.090)		(.091)		(.078)		(.075)		(.069)
Adjusted R^2	.487	Adjusted R^2	.544	Adjusted R^2	.553	Adjusted R^2	.559	Adjusted R^2	.553
N	76	*N*	77	*N*	83	*N*	83	*N*	83

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 11		Model 12		Model 13
Religious Pluralism	.031	Atheism	-.152	Single w/ kids	.378****
	(.085)		(.100)		(.100)
Infant Mortality	.792****	Infant Mortality	.668****	Infant Mortality	.498****
	(.069)		(.105)		(.129)
Pluralism x Mortality	-.003	Atheism x Mortality	.107	Economic Inequality	.203*
	(.076)		(.071)		(.114)
Catholicism	.184*	Catholicism	.153	Catholicism	.099
	(.101)		(.102)		(.089)
Cath x Mortality	.212**	Cath x Mortality	.209**	Cath x Mortality	.127
	(.089)		(.091)		(.085)
Islam	-.290***	Islam	-.246**	Health Benefits	-.020
	(.090)		(.097)		(.125)
Islam x Mortality	-.146	Islam x Mortality	-.114	Charity	-.108
	(.091)		(.086)		(.077)
Adjusted R^2	.552	Adjusted R^2	.570	Adjusted R^2	.585
N	83	*N*	77	*N*	73

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.157	Judaism	.049	Hinduism	-.135	Religious Pluralism	.210**	Protestantism	.124	Judaism	-.018
	(.098)		(.093)		(.124)		(.093)		(.124)		(.122)
Health Benefits	-.463****	Health Benefits	-.438****	Health Benefits	-.400****	Health Benefits	-.124	Charity	.129	Charity	.205*
	(.090)		(.084)		(.078)		(.155)		(.135)		(.108)
Prot x Health	-.129	Judaism x Health	-.075	Hinduism x Health	-.056	Pluralism x Health	-.118	Prot x Charity	-.123	Judaism x Charity	-.053
	(.087)		(.080)		(.080)		(.074)		(.099)		(.114)
Catholicism	.282**	Catholicism	.176	Catholicism	.282***	Catholicism	.181*	Catholicism	.119	Islam	-.071
	(.136)		(.134)		(.105)		(.093)		(.124)		(.098)
Cath x Health	-.197**	Cath x Health	-.191*	Cath x Health	-.286***	Cath x Health	-.129	Cath x Charity	.106	Islam x Charity	.151*
	(.095)		(.103)		(.088)		(.084)		(.138)		(.085)
Orthodox	.212*	Islam	-.135	Buddhism	.019	Atheism	-.516***	Orthodox	.117	Hinduism	-.088
	(.116)		(.123)		(.137)		(.159)		(.166)		(.122)
Orthodox x Health	-.078	Islam x Health	.124	Buddhism x Health	-.005	Atheism x Health	-.124	Orthodox x Charity	-.135	Hinduism x Charity	-.238**
	(.118)		(.102)		(.120)		(.123)		(.152)		(.118)
Adjusted R^2	.220	Adjusted R^2	.181	Adjusted R^2	.164	Adjusted R^2	.365	Adjusted R^2	-.018	Adjusted R^2	.034
N	76	*N*	82	*N*	82	*N*	76	*N*	76	*N*	79

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
Buddhism	-.113	Buddhism	-.025	Religious Pluralism	.098	Atheism	-.552****
	(.114)		(.091)		(.109)		(.104)
Charity	.210**	Charity	.069	Charity	.167*	Charity	.009
	(.102)		(.100)		(.096)		(.099)
Buddhism x Charity	.259*	Buddhism x Charity	-.006	Pluralism x Charity	.111	Atheism x Charity	-.033
	(.157)		(.159)		(.120)		(.106)
Islam	-.082	Economic Inequality	.420****	Islam	-.036	Islam	-.227**
	(.096)		(.104)		(.111)		(.112)
Islam x Charity	.234***	Infant Mortality	.352***	Islam x Charity	.213*	Islam x Charity	-.044
	(.079)		(.102)		(.114)		(.099)
Hinduism	-.020	Hinduism	-.086	Hinduism	-.077	Hinduism	.065
	(.117)		(.095)		(.112)		(.096)
Hinduism x Charity	-.407***	Hinduism x Charity	-.039	Hinduism x Charity	-.256***	Hinduism x Charity	-.181
	(.121)		(.130)		(.097)		(.112)
Adjusted R^2	.076	Adjusted R^2	.439	Adjusted R^2	.048	Adjusted R^2	.296
N	79	*N*	77	*N*	79	*N*	76

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.026****	ð	-.026****	Individualism	-.025****	ð	-.025****	Individualism	-.026****	ð	-.026****	Individualism	-.023****	ð	-.023****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.004)		(.004)
Protestantism	.070	-.080**	-.010	Protestantism	.078	-.084**	-.006	Protestantism	.051	-.083**	-.032	Protestantism	-.158**	-.079**	-.237***
	(.074)	(.039)	(.073)		(.071)	(.036)	(.065)		(.082)	(.037)	(.081)		(.063)	(.039)	(.073)
Catholicism	.824*	-.195	.630	Catholicism	1.12***	-.228	.895**	Catholicism	.058	-.279	-.221	Religious Pluralism	.080	.003	.083
	(.490)	(.261)	(.514)		(.410)	(.208)	(.443)		(.562)	(.266)	(.620)		(.065)	(.025)	(.071)
Orthodox	.116	.018	.135*	Orthodox	.162*	.022	.184**	Orthodox	.004	.006	.010	Single w/ kids	.543****	.042	.585****
	(.080)	(.033)	(.078)		(.088)	(.034)	(.085)		(.105)	(.038)	(.110)		(.127)	(.064)	(.143)
Judaism	.081	-.134***	-.053	Judaism	.067	-.139***	-.072	Judaism	.055	-.135***	-.081	Judaism	.017	-.116***	-.099*
	(.068)	(.050)	(.077)		(.080)	(.050)	(.079)		(.073)	(.047)	(.077)		(.054)	(.040)	(.059)
Islam	-.046	.012	-.033	Hinduism	.009	.006	.016	Buddhism	-.257***	-.001	-.259**	Buddhism	-.092	.025	-.067
	(.059)	(.037)	(.071)		(.053)	(.019)	(.052)		(.095)	(.047)	(.111)		(.105)	(.043)	(.123)
Adjusted R^2		.189		Adjusted R^2		.216		Adjusted R^2		.323		Adjusted R^2		.493	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix N Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.012**	ð	-.012**	Individualism	-.014	ð	-.014	Individualism	-.006	ð	-.006
	(.005)		(.005)		(.008)		(.008)		(.005)		(.005)
Protestantism	-.066	-.023	-.088	Economic Discrimination	.139	.028	.167	Infant Mortality	.372**	.054	.426***
	(.072)	(.019)	(.075)		(.111)	(.030)	(.114)		(.166)	(.054)	(.156)
Atheism	-.255***	-.034	-.289***	Atheism	-.394***	-.022	-.416***	Atheism	-.118	.001	-.117
	(.090)	(.029)	(.097)		(.137)	(.027)	(.142)		(.096)	(.010)	(.097)
Single w/ kids	.469****	-.033	.436****	Health Benefits	.018	-.060	-.042	Single w/ kids	.426****	-.027	.399****
	(.108)	(.034)	(.107)		(.066)	(.038)	(.049)		(.078)	(.028)	(.073)
Judaism	.029	-.045**	-.017	Judaism	.097	-.033	.064	Economic Freedom	-.005	-.0004	-.005
	(.047)	(.023)	(.046)		(.067)	(.025)	(.071)		(.010)	(.001)	(.010)
Economic Inequality	.029**	.010*	.040***	Charity	1.16	-.871	.293	Economic Inequality	.030**	.005	.034***
	(.014)	(.006)	(.013)		(2.30)	(.714)	(2.16)		(.013)	(.005)	(.012)
Adjusted R^2		.579		Adjusted R^2		.255		Adjusted R^2		.619	
N		68		*N*		68		*N*		68	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Colombia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand & Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.449****	ð	.449****	Single w/ kids	.378****	ð	.378****	Single w/ kids	.222**	ð	.222**	Single w/ kids	.248****	ð	.248****
	(.120)		(.120)		(.096)		(.096)		(.107)		(.107)		(.067)		(.067)
Protestantism	-.076	.119**	.043	Protestantism	-.081	.101**	.019	Protestantism	-.020	.041	.021	Economic Inequality Ratio	.526***	.247***	.773****
	(.068)	(.047)	(.064)		(.064)	(.040)	(.055)		(.048)	(.028)	(.043)		(.177)	(.083)	(.180)
Catholicism	-.327	.395*	.068	Catholicism	.371	.555**	.926***	Economic Inequality	.079****	.015*	.094****	Catholicism	.877***	.312*	1.19****
	(.392)	(.230)	(.417)		(.259)	(.242)	(.328)		(.012)	(.008)	(.012)		(.267)	(.165)	(.304)
Judaism	.012	.034	.046	Orthodox	.082*	.041*	.123**	Orthodox	.233****	.045**	.278****	Orthodox	.176****	.029**	.205****
	(.066)	(.037)	(.078)		(.044)	(.023)	(.052)		(.043)	(.023)	(.044)		(.038)	(.015)	(.041)
Islam	-.044	-.025	-.068	Religious Pluralism	.103***	.018	.122***	Economic Discrimination	.009	.025	.033	Religious Pluralism	.066**	.023	.089***
	(.049)	(.024)	(.055)		(.038)	(.024)	(.042)		(.088)	(.031)	(.092)		(.031)	(.015)	(.034)
Hinduism	-.045	.016	-.029	Atheism	-.461****	-.029	-.490****	Educ. Benefits	-.087*	.028	-.059	Atheism	-.050	-.027	-.077
	(.044)	(.021)	(.048)		(.066)	(.037)	(.074)		(.051)	(.022)	(.049)		(.071)	(.037)	(.089)
Buddhism	-.034	-.066**	-.100*	Buddhism	.043	-.030	.012	Charity	3.03	1.49*	4.52**	Infant Mortality	.664****	-.049	.615****
	(.056)	(.029)	(.060)		(.042)	(.020)	(.048)		(1.89)	(.822)	(1.91)		(.101)	(.065)	(.142)
Adjusted R^2		.201		Adjusted R^2		.489		Adjusted R^2		.546		Adjusted R^2		.733	
N		79		*N*		79		*N*		79		*N*		79	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Colombia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand & Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Single w/ kids	.436****	ð	.436****	Single w/ kids	.216**	ð	.216**	Single w/ kids	.351****	ð	.351****
	(.098)		(.098)		(.103)		(.103)		(.085)		(.085)
Economic Discrimination	.132	.001	.134	Religious Member	.249**	.084*	.332**	Religious Member	-.017	.192***	.175
	(.087)	(.059)	(.108)		(.125)	(.049)	(.128)		(.120)	(.063)	(.107)
Catholicism	.089	.692**	.780**	Catholicism	-.677**	.141	-.536*	Catholicism	.146	.011	.156
	(.389)	(.291)	(.396)		(.338)	(.123)	(.314)		(.250)	(.157)	(.266)
Orthodox	.058	.026	.084	New Govt.	.694***	.092	.786****	New Govt.	.403**	.183**	.586***
	(.052)	(.030)	(.056)		(.220)	(.066)	(.223)		(.191)	(.090)	(.207)
Religious Pluralism	.057	.040	.097**	Religious Pluralism	.012	.014	.026	Economic Inequality	.007	.00004	.007
	(.043)	(.028)	(.047)		(.035)	(.013)	(.033)		(.016)	(.009)	(.019)
Economic Freedom	-.042****	.006	-.036***	Latin Nation	1.34****	.196*	1.54****	Latin Nation	.567*	.428**	.995***
	(.010)	(.006)	(.011)		(.302)	(.102)	(.283)		(.331)	(.167)	(.379)
Competition	-1.42	-.041	-1.46	Charity	-1.82	.407	-1.41	Infant Mortality	.585****	-.104	.481****
	(1.51)	(.903)	(1.89)		(2.00)	(.519)	(2.00)		(.095)	(.067)	(.121)
Adjusted R^2		.373		Adjusted R^2		.349		Adjusted R^2		.599	
N		79		*N*		79		*N*		79	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.536****	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.196	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.071	ð	1.00f	Secularization	.381***	ð	1.00f
	(.101)				(.201)				(.225)				(.116)		
Protestantism	.035	.004	.039	Orthodox	.195****	-.008	.187****	Orthodox	.177****	-.002	.175****	Orthodox	.079	-.028	.051
	(.057)	(.026)	(.064)		(.046)	(.011)	(.043)		(.043)	(.007)	(.041)		(.050)	(.021)	(.049)
Catholicism	-.060	.227	.167	Religious Pluralism	.046	-.005	.041	Religious Pluralism	.028	-.002	.025	Single w/ kids	.398****	.043	.441****
	(.343)	(.234)	(.416)		(.037)	(.006)	(.036)		(.032)	(.008)	(.033)		(.081)	(.032)	(.083)
Judaism	.052	.0003	.052	Atheism	-.158	-.098	-.256***	Atheism	-.053	-.033	-.086	Competition	-1.03	-.128	-1.16
	(.065)	(.037)	(.079)		(.131)	(.102)	(.083)		(.126)	(.108)	(.088)		(1.15)	(.539)	(1.18)
Islam	-.138***	.091**	-.047	Islam	-.086**	.012	-.073**	Islam	-.127***	.005	-.122***	Islam	-.108***	.059**	-.049
	(.046)	(.039)	(.056)		(.038)	(.014)	(.036)		(.044)	(.014)	(.038)		(.041)	(.029)	(.041)
Hinduism	-.048	.014	-.034	Economic Inequality	.069****	.006	.076****	Economic Inequality	.049***	.002	.051****	Charitable Giving	-2.96****	-.162	-3.12****
	(.036)	(.026)	(.048)		(.015)	(.007)	(.012)		(.016)	(.006)	(.013)		(.707)	(.318)	(.778)
Buddhism	-.019	-.067*	-.086	Buddhism	-.029	-.012	-.041	Infant Mortality	.532****	.011	.543****	Life Meaning	-3.37***	-2.42***	-5.79****
	(.046)	(.036)	(.061)		(.044)	(.015)	(.046)		(.124)	(.034)	(.128)		(1.08)	(.821)	(.955)
Adjusted R^2		.267		Adjusted R^2		.579		Adjusted R^2		.670		Adjusted R^2		.567	
N		79		*N*		79		*N*		79		*N*		79	
G^2		71.99 (p < .001)		G^2		50.58 (p < .001)		G^2		52.36 (p < .001)		G^2		53.11 (p < .001)	
G^2/df		3.13		G^2/df		2.20		G^2/df		2.28		G^2/df		2.31	
RMSEA		.164		RMSEA		.123		RMSEA		.127		RMSEA		.129	
CFI		.897		CFI		.952		CFI		.950		CFI		.942	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ Secularization

	Model 5		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Secularization	.221	ð	1.00f
	(.134)		
Charity	-.742	.308	-.434
	(1.37)	(.340)	(1.37)
Single w/ kids	.282****	-.009	.273***
	(.079)	(.017)	(.081)
New Govt.	.624***	.038	.662****
	(.193)	(.045)	(.188)
Islam	-.062	.049	-.013
	(.048)	(.033)	(.033)
Latin Nation	.688*	.421	1.11****
	(.388)	(.276)	(.280)
Life Meaning	-4.33****	-1.37	-5.70****
	(1.09)	(.836)	(.939)
Adjusted R^2		.507	
N		79	
G^2		81.79 ($p < .001$)	
G^2/df		3.56	
RMSEA		.180	
CFI		.896	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: f = fixed coefficient. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Protestantism	.054	Infant Mortality	.436****	Infant Mortality	.453****	Judaism	.119	Buddhism	-.150
	(.078)		(.081)		(.095)		(.119)		(.104)
Economic Inequality	.651****	Economic Inequality	.359****	Economic Inequality	.155	Economic Inequality	.480****	Economic Inequality	.384****
	(.099)		(.101)		(.128)		(.097)		(.100)
Prot x Econ Ineq.	-.005	New Govt.	.045	New Govt.	.155**	Judaism x Econ Ineq.	.036	Buddhism x Econ Ineq.	-.034
	(.097)		(.072)		(.079)		(.116)		(.136)
Catholicism	.152*	Catholicism	.258****	Catholicism	.087	Islam	-.008	Religious Pluralism	.128
	(.081)		(.061)		(.078)		(.085)		(.085)
Cath x Econ Ineq.	.215**	Cath x Econ Ineq.	.198***	Cath x Econ Ineq.	.126	Islam x Econ Ineq.	-.075	Pluralism x Econ Ineq.	-.056
	(.092)		(.072)		(.087)		(.110)		(.098)
Orthodox	.510****	Orthodox	.403****	Single w/ kids	.350****	Hinduism	-.192*	Atheism	-.266**
	(.103)		(.097)		(.073)		(.108)		(.108)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.325**	Orthodox x Econ Ineq.	.195	Latin Nation	-.025	Hinduism x Econ Ineq.	-.076	Atheism x Econ Ineq.	.036
	(.139)		(.130)		(.083)		(.119)		(.102)
Adjusted R^2	.408	Adjusted R^2	.586	Adjusted R^2	.576	Adjusted R^2	.205	Adjusted R^2	.341
N	72	*N*	75	*N*	71	*N*	76	*N*	72

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10
Protestantism	.008	Judaism	.080	Buddhism	-.173	Protestantism	.077	Judaism	.041
	(.086)		(.121)		(.106)		(.067)		(.069)
Economic Inequality Ratio	.598****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.471****	Economic Inequality Ratio	.417****	Infant Mortality	.735****	Infant Mortality	.730****
	(.102)		(.094)		(.083)		(.069)		(.074)
Prot x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.018	Judaism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.073	Buddhism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.027	Prot x Mortality	-.069	Judaism x Mortality	.050
	(.110)		(.109)		(.100)		(.081)		(.063)
Catholicism	.084	Islam	.036	Religious Pluralism	.142*	Catholicism	.427****	Catholicism	.182*
	(.086)		(.086)		(.082)		(.100)		(.096)
Cath x Econ Ineq Ratio	.136	Islam x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.092	Pluralism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.007	Cath x Mortality	.341****	Cath x Mortality	.231***
	(.101)		(.107)		(.086)		(.082)		(.083)
Orthodox	.411****	Hinduism	-.194*	Atheism	-.270***	Orthodox	.312****	Islam	-.241***
	(.097)		(.112)		(.096)		(.085)		(.087)
Orthodox x Econ Ineq Ratio	.136	Hinduism x Econ Ineq Ratio	-.047	Atheism x Econ Ineq Ratio	.020	Orthodox x Mortality	.124	Islam x Mortality	-.096
	(.144)		(.108)		(.082)		(.084)		(.077)
Adjusted R^2	.349	Adjusted R^2	.224	Adjusted R^2	.371	Adjusted R^2	.588	Adjusted R^2	.524
N	71	*N*	75	*N*	71	*N*	72	*N*	77

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Economic Dominance

Model 11		Model 12		Model 13		Model 14		Model 15	
Hinduism	.002	Buddhism	-.041	Religious Pluralism	.050	Atheism	-.102	Single w/ kids	.352****
	(.066)		(.078)		(.088)		(.106)		(.089)
Infant Mortality	.716****	Infant Mortality	.716****	Infant Mortality	.732****	Infant Mortality	.622****	Infant Mortality	.452****
	(.078)		(.074)		(.069)		(.109)		(.102)
Hinduism x Mortality	.064	Buddhism x Mortality	.026	Pluralism x Mortality	-.021	Atheism x Mortality	.120	Economic Inequality Ratio	.200*
	(.064)		(.077)		(.073)		(.077)		(.109)
Catholicism	.184*	Catholicism	.176*	Catholicism	.206**	Catholicism	.175*	Catholicism	.096
	(.095)		(.093)		(.098)		(.100)		(.084)
Cath x Mortality	.235***	Cath x Mortality	.236***	Cath x Mortality	.204**	Cath x Mortality	.232**	Cath x Mortality	.119
	(.082)		(.081)		(.083)		(.090)		(.079)
Islam	-.239***	Islam	-.249***	Islam	-.230**	Islam	-.168*	Charitable Giving	-.118
	(.087)		(.088)		(.089)		(.093)		(.084)
Islam x Mortality	-.092	Islam x Mortality	-.081	Islam x Mortality	-.086	Islam x Mortality	-.043	New Govt.	.124
	(.076)		(.066)		(.091)		(.086)		(.087)
Adjusted R^2	.525	Adjusted R^2	.522	Adjusted R^2	.521	Adjusted R^2	.546	Adjusted R^2	.606
N	77	*N*	77	*N*	77	*N*	72	*N*	71

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
Protestantism	.099	Judaism	.116	Hinduism	-.124	Religious Pluralism	.137	Religious Member	.162*	Protestantism	.042
	(.087)		(.099)		(.109)		(.086)		(.098)		(.111)
Health Benefits	-.464****	Health Benefits	-.418****	Health Benefits	-.384****	Health Benefits	-.226*	Health Benefits	-.126	Charity	.193
	(.091)		(.080)		(.074)		(.132)		(.089)		(.132)
Prot x Health	-.105	Judaism x Health	-.032	Hinduism x Health	-.072	Pluralism x Health	-.097	Life Meaning	-.262****	Prot x Charity	-.115
	(.080)		(.075)		(.081)		(.075)		(.073)		(.088)
Catholicism	.285**	Catholicism	.200	Catholicism	.240**	Catholicism	.161*	Catholicism	.004	Catholicism	.117
	(.119)		(.125)		(.096)		(.091)		(.092)		(.112)
Cath x Health	-.223**	Cath x Health	-.234**	Cath x Health	-.293***	Cath x Health	-.177**	Cath x Health	-.110	Cath x Charity	.153
	(.090)		(.095)		(.085)		(.086)		(.084)		(.131)
Orthodox	.263**	Islam	-.024	Buddhism	-.027	Atheism	-.356**	New Govt.	.297***	Orthodox	.188
	(.104)		(.114)		(.134)		(.139)		(.088)		(.156)
Orthodox x Health	-.086	Islam x Health	.118	Buddhism x Health	.053	Atheism x Health	-.039	Latin Nation	.342****	Orthodox x Charity	-.109
	(.114)		(.097)		(.121)		(.106)		(.089)		(.143)
Adjusted R^2	.308	Adjusted R^2	.231	Adjusted R^2	.229	Adjusted R^2	.349	Adjusted R^2	.386	Adjusted R^2	.009
N	71	*N*	76	*N*	76	*N*	71	*N*	72	*N*	71

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Generalized Structural Equation Models for Homicide w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Conditional Effects w/ Social Welfare

Model 7		Model 8		Model 9		Model 10	
Judaism	.044	Buddhism	-.143	Religious Pluralism	.079	Atheism	-.459****
	(.119)		(.115)		(.103)		(.097)
Charity	.190*	Charity	.193*	Charity	.167*	Charity	.019
	(.108)		(.101)		(.098)		(.096)
Judaism x Charity	-.042	Buddhism x Charity	.158	Pluralism x Charity	.078	Atheism x Charity	-.064
	(.113)		(.153)		(.117)		(.101)
Islam	.0005	Islam	-.029	Islam	.024	Islam	-.150
	(.091)		(.091)		(.107)		(.105)
Islam x Charity	.153*	Islam x Charity	.202**	Islam x Charity	.198*	Islam x Charity	-.034
	(.081)		(.079)		(.113)		(.096)
Hinduism	-.121	Hinduism	-.030	Hinduism	-.096	Hinduism	.029
	(.110)		(.111)		(.103)		(.087)
Hinduism x Charity	-.207*	Hinduism x Charity	-.320***	Hinduism x Charity	-.221**	Hinduism x Charity	-.150
	(.112)		(.119)		(.095)		(.110)
Adjusted R^2	.035	Adjusted R^2	.070	Adjusted R^2	.043	Adjusted R^2	.253
N	74	*N*	74	*N*	74	*N*	71

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3				Model 4		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.024****	ð	-.024****	Individualism	-.024****	ð	-.024****	Individualism	-.024****	ð	-.024****	Individualism	-.021****	ð	-.021****
	(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.004)		(.004)
Protestantism	.006	-.066*	-.061	Protestantism	.012	-.076**	-.063	Protestantism	.020	-.074**	-.054	Protestantism	-.157**	-.069**	-.226***
	(.064)	(.036)	(.064)		(.060)	(.033)	(.054)		(.067)	(.035)	(.065)		(.067)	(.033)	(.075)
Catholicism	.936**	-.199	.737	Catholicism	1.00***	-.255	.747*	Catholicism	.172	-.274	-.102	Religious Pluralism	.146****	.017	.163***
	(.455)	(.243)	(.470)		(.383)	(.204)	(.399)		(.437)	(.252)	(.495)		(.042)	(.027)	(.050)
Orthodox	.145*	.014	.160**	Orthodox	.154*	.021	.175**	Orthodox	.050	.009	.059	Single w/ kids	.345***	.020	.365***
	(.074)	(.031)	(.072)		(.082)	(.032)	(.078)		(.087)	(.037)	(.087)		(.121)	(.061)	(.135)
Judaism	.119	-.125**	-.006	Judaism	.134	-.143***	-.009	Judaism	.096	-.132***	-.036	Judaism	.051	-.115***	-.064
	(.081)	(.051)	(.092)		(.092)	(.051)	(.101)		(.078)	(.048)	(.084)		(.059)	(.040)	(.064)
Islam	-.009	.018	.009	Hinduism	-.019	.017	-.002	Buddhism	-.240***	.008	-.232**	Buddhism	-.240***	.006	-.234***
	(.058)	(.038)	(.074)		(.048)	(.018)	(.052)		(.075)	(.049)	(.097)		(.071)	(.044)	(.090)
Adjusted R^2		.236		Adjusted R^2		.265		Adjusted R^2		.399		Adjusted R^2		.560	
N		62		*N*		62		*N*		62		*N*		62	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 5				Model 6				Model 7				Model 8		
	Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total		Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.004	ð	-.004	Individualism	-.006	ð	-.006	Individualism	-.015***	ð	-.015***	Individualism	-.008	ð	-.008
	(.006)		(.006)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.005)		(.006)		(.006)
Economic Inequality	.010	.004	.014	Economic Inequality	.019	.004	.023*	Economic Inequality	.011	.015**	.025*	Economic Inequality	.041***	.004	.045****
	(.012)	(.005)	(.010)		(.015)	(.005)	(.014)		(.015)	(.007)	(.013)		(.012)	(.003)	(.011)
Religious Pluralism	.017	-.0004	.017	Buddhism	-.101	.007	-.093	Protestantism	-.080	-.022	-.102	Religious Pluralism	.148****	-.005	.143****
	(.035)	(.004)	(.035)		(.091)	(.012)	(.097)		(.069)	(.023)	(.073)		(.036)	(.008)	(.036)
Single w/ kids	.441****	-.018	.424****	Single w/ kids	.338***	-.015	.323**	Single w/ kids	.455****	-.040	.415****	Infant Mortality	.314**	.096	.410****
	(.073)	(.026)	(.065)		(.127)	(.022)	(.129)		(.110)	(.041)	(.108)		(.147)	(.072)	(.111)
Infant Mortality	.526****	.045	.571****	Infant Mortality	.425***	.063	.488****	Judaism	.065	-.059**	.005	Judaism	.084	-.032	.051
	(.138)	(.058)	(.109)		(.155)	(.064)	(.137)		(.052)	(.028)	(.054)		(.061)	(.027)	(.053)
Life Meaning	-1.20	-.103	-1.30	Life Meaning	-1.21	-.133	-1.34	Atheism	-.225**	-.042	-.267***	Buddhism	-.323****	.015	-.308****
	(1.04)	(.198)	(1.02)		(1.02)	(.222)	(1.02)		(.092)	(.036)	(.102)		(.061)	(.018)	(.064)
Adjusted R^2		.568		Adjusted R^2		.589		Adjusted R^2		.501		Adjusted R^2		.639	
N		62		*N*		62		*N*		62		*N*		62	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes: All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix O Cont. Maximum Likelihood Standardized Parameter Estimates of the Influence of Religion on Homicide Rates w/o El Salvador, South Africa, Columbia, Zambia, Israel, Thailand, & Norway: Direct, Indirect, & Total Effects w/ alternate Individualism

	Model 9		
	Direct	Indirect	Total
Individualism	-.005	ð	-.005
	(.005)		(.005)
Economic Inequality	.014	.004	.019
	(.014)	(.005)	(.012)
Single w/ kids	.455****	-.017	.438****
	(.075)	(.024)	(.071)
Infant Mortality	.438***	.052	.490***
	(.167)	(.063)	(.152)
Economic Freedom	-.009	-.0005	-.010
	(.010)	(.001)	(.010)
Atheism	-.046	.006	-.041
	(.094)	(.011)	(.094)
Adjusted R^2		.565	
N		62	

*p<.10,**p < .05; ***p < .01; ****p < .001 (two-tailed)

ð Indicates parameter not estimated

Notes : All models are saturated. Standard errors in parentheses.