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Descriptive to Substantive Representation: A Study of Gender Quotas in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 2002-2018

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Descriptive to Substantive Representation:
A Study of Gender Quotas in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 2002-2018

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A Dissertation Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri-St. Louis
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Descriptive to Substantive Representation:
A Study of Gender Quotas in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 2002-2018

by

Ameena Mohyuddin Zia

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2019

David Kimball, Ph.D., Chair

Women’s political representation is linked to the empowerment of women in society. In efforts to alleviate women’s disenfranchisement from the political discourse, the international development framework included gender quotas as mechanisms to facilitate an increase in the presence of women in parliaments. Existing research has examined the link between Hanna F. Pitkin’s conceptualization of descriptive representation and substantive representation with a focus on performative measures of women parliamentarians. This longitudinal study expands the scope of existing inquiry and captures the transformational change in power relations as an outcome of the increase in women members of parliaments. This research provides an in-depth review of the constitutional mandate of 17 per cent gender quotas in Pakistan’s National Assembly from the adoption in 2002 to 2018. An intersectional comparative approach is utilized to trace Pakistan’s longest democratic rule to date of 16 years, comprised of three National Assemblies, as a case study of representation. A review of historical and feminist dimensions suggests geo-political and identity implications on women’s participation in the political sphere. The findings demonstrate a limited impact of the increase in descriptive representation through gender quotas on women’s substantive representation.
Acknowledgments

As I sit down to write this section, I find I am at a loss of words. This is not because I do not have enough content, but because I have too much to write. Over the last few years, I have come across many wonderful people and have met with opportunities that have allowed me to grow professionally and add to my research work.

My academic journey has been a source of inspiration in my life. The practice of learning, producing and sharing knowledge has served as a conduit in turning passion into deliverables. I am grateful to my parents for instilling the importance of civic engagement and for encouraging me to harness opportunities of leadership development which helped shape my interest in the higher education of social sciences.

I chose to attend the University of Missouri St. Louis because I wanted to study under the leadership of the Public Policy Institute. As I began the Ph.D. program, I knew I wanted to study “representation”. With a background in policy and development, I soon found myself working for St. Louis County Government while simultaneously enrolled in the program. I was fortunate to work under the leadership of St. Louis County Executive Charlie A. Dooley who believed in my theoretical ideas of securing representation as a policy and allowed me the space to turn theory into practice. I am grateful to Terry Jones for his continuous guidance and positive feedback which made it possible for me to juggle both work and school through the coursework. I would like to acknowledge Joyce Mushaben who was one of the toughest critics of my work and guided me through my coursework. I am thankful to Kenny Thomas for his continuous support, guidance and friendship during the coursework.

I am thankful to the City University of New York’s York College for my appointment as an Adjunct Professor which let me to share knowledge and craft my own teaching philosophy through practice. I am also thankful to the United Nations Civil Society Network participation modality for providing me with the opportunity to engage in policy recommendation and formation. These experiences have been a source of my personal and professional inspiration throughout this research project.

I am very fortunate to have a wonderful dissertation committee. I met Farida first of class and it was then, that I knew my dissertation topic and she helped me to outline my course of study towards it. I am grateful to David for his guidance in statistics through the years and his help through the dissertation process. I am appreciative of both for their guidance, knowledge and friendship through the years. I am also grateful to Adriano and Meg for their time, feedback and interest through the writing process.

Above all, I am thankful to my family for their encouragement and support through my academic journey and especially throughout the PhD process. I am especially grateful to my mother, Anjum, for her invaluable help, continuous encouragement and faith in me. I am appreciative of my father, Ahsan, who continues to inspire me through his resolve. In addition, my brothers Ibrahim and Yaqoob have been my constant support network and have always believed in my abilities.
Last, but certainly not least, my best friend and husband, Yaseen’s, understanding has been phenomenal throughout the project and without his support this project would not have been possible. I am thankful to my two-year old daughter Lana and my two-month old daughter Eva, for their love, patience and sheer entertainment through the writing process.
cogito, ergo sum.
-Rene Descartes, 1637, Discourse on the Method
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Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

What is democracy? Is it people for the people, or men for the people?
-Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive Director – UN Women, CSW61

The late twentieth century has witnessed a growing participation and representation of women in the political arena (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015; United Nations Fourth World Conference, Beijing, China, 1995; & Jaquette & Wolchik, 1998). Scholars credit certain factors with this shift in political practice including: the increased development and awareness of global women’s movements, the willingness of political systems to adopt institutional mechanisms (including gender quotas) to include women, and shifts in the leadership and political ideology in the post-Cold War political environment. One of these institutional mechanisms to accelerate the presence of women in the political space has included the adoption of reserved seats. Recent Inter-Parliamentary Union\(^1\) data indicates that global average of women in national parliaments increased to 23.3 percent in 2016 and the number of female Speakers of the House increased up to 19 percent. However, there has been a decline in the number of women Heads of State or Heads of Government from 19 in 2015 to 17 in 2016, a large decline in just one year’s time.

The 61st Commission on the Status of Women (CSW61) in New York City, the largest inter-governmental forum on women’s rights and gender equality launched the Women in Politics Map in collaboration with IPU and UN Women. The map shows that in Latin America, women’s participation in parliaments rose up to 25 percent even as the region witnessed a loss of key female Heads of State with the Presidents of Brazil and Argentina leaving office; in Africa, female ministers saw a decline in numbers after a steady growth and currently 19.7 percent of the region’s ministerial posts are held my women; among the Arab States, 9.7 percent of senior executive posts are held by women as Tunisia (with 23.1 percent) and United Arab Emirates (with 26.7 percent); and in Europe, Nordic countries which have traditionally led global stage in politics saw a 6 percent decline in the number of ministers to now 43.5 percent holding office while the continent itself stands at a total percentage of 22.5 percent women in politics. With women making up more than half of the world’s population\(^2\) (World Bank Data, 2018), these figures highlight that women’s voices are still missing from political decision making worldwide (A.M. Zia Statement, CSW61). Therefore, the question remains, has the adoption of gender quotas (the increase in the physical presence of women) led to gains in women’s power relations in parliaments?

As political systems deliberate and debate quotas, mechanisms aimed at accelerating the achievement of balanced participation and representation by establishing a

\(^{1}\) IPU was established in 1889 and serves as the focal point for world-wide parliamentary dialogue and works for peace and co-operation among peoples and for the firm establishment of representative democracy. Today the IPU supports the efforts of and works in close cooperation with the UN on relevant objectives.
defined allocation metrics, they end up having implications for key dimensions of any political system, including its accountability, legitimacy, and democratic institutions in political representation\(^3\) of marginalized groups in society.

This research project focuses on understanding political representation as it is legitimized by democratic institutions by creating incentives for governments to be responsive to citizens (Pitkin, 1967). I investigate whether the increase in gender quotas, through reserved seats, leads to a change in women’s power relations in the National Assembly. I borrow elements of Pitkin’s (1967) conceptualization of representation as a framework for inquiry to assess the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation. Descriptive representation is defined as the mirroring effect with characteristics of the representative resembling those being represented. Substantive representation is defined as acts that serve the interest of the represented. In this dissertation, I examine if scaling this increase in descriptive representation, defined as the presence of women through reserved seats, translates into substantive representation, defined as “acting for” women (Pitkin, 1967, Pg. 209).

This dissertation’s intersectional approach (Crenshaw, 1989) to inquiry provides value to existing research in the field. I utilize this intersectional analysis to identify interlocking societal elements that impact the marginalized or oppressed with the assumption that women in Pakistan (and around the globe) are oppressed in their capacity to create influence and retain decision-making power in the political sphere in comparison to men. I argue that to understand women’s political participation, it is necessary to use a feminist approach of intersectionality because it serves as “a vital element of gaining political and social equality and improving our democratic system” (DeAgostino, 2011, Pg. 8). Existing literature (Bari, 1998, 2001; Aurat Foundation, 2013) reflects a narrow focus on assessing the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation because it borrows the strict modalities of inquiry based on data from traditional sources. These works, although shed light on the relationship between the presence of women and the impact on women’s interests, they do not, however, reflect the complex realities of the constant renegotiations of representation with broader elements such as identity politics, self-actualization and seeking alternatives. Therefore, to assess the scalability of gender quotas, in addition to utilizing the National Assembly of Pakistan as a longitudinal case study, I review global and domestic political landscape and colonial and post-colonial South Asian flirtations with identity, nationalism and religion to further academic scholarship in the field on women’s political representation in Pakistan.

1.2 Significance of the Dissertation

Literature establishes that quotas are implemented to increase women’s descriptive representation in the political arena. This normative claim that quotas are a means to enhance women’s representation finds roots in the larger post-World War II international development scheme which includes women in the policy agenda and sets the parameters of inquiry into the effectiveness of these measures. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination

\(^3\) Political representation is legitimized by democratic institutions which create institutional incentives for governments to be responsive to citizens (Pitkin, 1967).
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the seminal 1995 *Beijing Platform for Action*\(^4\) garnered widespread support for increasing women’s access to the political arena and specifically outlined women’s physical presence in legislative politics as transformative for “redefining political priorities, (and) placing new items on the political agenda that reflect and address women’s gender-specific concerns, values and experiences” (Beijing Platform Declaration, 1995, Pg. 79; Tripp & Kang, 2008). The United Nations estimates that nearly three-quarter of all states have established some form of national machinery for the advancement of women in the wake of the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (UN Fact Sheet No. 8).

The complex debate on gender quotas states that although this strategy for strengthening women’s empowerment though political participation is merely a temporary response to discrimination and marginalization of women (Mumtaz Interview, 2017), it does not solve the over-arching issue of societal attitudes and perceptions of women (Jones, 1997). Others claim that in societies where politics is a male dominant arena and society views leadership as synonymous with male characteristics, perhaps the only way to ensure a foot in the door for women is through the allowance of gender quotas. Gender quotas, as a modality of women empowerment, carries the assumption that a certain group identity will eventually form and translate into the responsibility of carrying women’s interests and demonstrate a greater commitment to the goal of women’s empowerment (A.M. Zia Statement, DPINGO 2015). Mansbridge’s (2005) criticism of the quota system almost discredits this notion of inclusive representation. Her discussion highlights the flaws of a common sisterhood perspective and argues that even if women gain access to decision making and policy formation avenues, it is not guaranteed that women would band together and unanimously focus on the policies that would benefit women at large.

Empirical literature focusing on gender in comparative politics is codified into regions. Within the American context, comparative reviews reflect legislative outcomes (Jones, 1997), review sex quotas comparisons between Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand (Gertzog, 2002; Krook & Squires, 2006), women’s district representation in state legislature (Matland & King, 2002), and women’s presence in Congressional elections (Matland & Brown, 1992). Studies in the field focus on the European experience of representation and the outcome of women’s agency include analysis of the Slovene Parliament (Matland, 2004), review of Western European parliaments and the role of political parties (Childs & Kittilson, 2006), observations of the British party politics through the lens of Pitkin’s (1967) model of descriptive, substantive and symbolic representations (Childs & Krook, 2008), and the impact of political party quotas on women’s representation in Scandinavia (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005) and Germany (Davidson-Schmich, 2006), and the French implications on women’s presence in politics (Sineau, 2008) Similarly, African focused research examines the effects of gender quotas in East and Southern African countries (Tripp, Casimiro, Kwesiga & Mungwa, 2009; Ballington, 2004; Bauer, 2008). There is also an increase in case studies from Latin America that review implications of quotas in Mexico (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Chaney, 1979; Baldez, 2004; Bruhn, 

review of women ministers in Latin American governments across the board (Escobar-Lemon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005) and examination of women’s empowerment in Peru (Htun, 2005 and Htun & Jones, 2002). While sorting through literature in the field, I find minimal, in comparison to other parts of the world contexts, research focusing on South Asia. Most of the work is centered around the post 9-11 reconstruction of Afghanistan (Bauer & Britton, 2006; Fleschenberg, Derichs & Ng, 2010). Similarly, East Asian literature in the field concentrates on the Japanese case study on gender equality (Naikaku, 2006) and an analysis of the House of Representatives and the Supreme Court (Jichisho, 2000).

Findings in the field indicate a trend for younger women to enter the political system and believe in its ability to “address existing social ills and institute reforms” (Mumtaz Interview, 2017) through innovation and creative change. Although avenues for limited participation are available for women, scholars argue that women’s participation is not only about visibility and numbers, but rather rooted in the effectiveness and their impact on broader policy making institutions and development. Scholars have reviewed characteristics and factors that contribute to women legislators’ likelihood of pursuing women-friend agendas. Chaney (1979) claimed that female politicians had a nurturing tendency that led them to care for the “needs of her big family in the larger casa of the municipality or even the nation” (Pg. 21). Similarly, through interviews of female candidates and politicians Schwindt-Bayer (2006) reported that “women viewed political office as an extension of their roles as mothers and wives and felt a responsibility to focus on issues derived from those roles – protecting children and the family, education, and healthcare, for example” (Pg. 570). Researchers view the entrance of women in politics as an asset as their “freshness brings the insights, vision and perspective that political veterans may have lost through time” (Reyes, 2002, Pg. 3). Similarly, findings in the field highlight that “women are more likely than their male counterparts to promote legislation geared to ameliorate women’s economic and social status, especially concerning issues of health care, poverty, education, and gender equity” (Krook, 2008, Pg. 81).

In the context of Pakistan, existing review of descriptive and substantive representation is recorded through a qualitative analysis that examines whether a link exists (Bari, 2011) in the parliamentary republic’s bi-cameral structured governance (Abbasi Interview, 2016). Similar work around gender touches on women’s empowerment, progress, and measurement (Mumtaz & Shaheed, 1987; Kabeer, 1999; Jamal, 2014). Records of women’s participation is also captured by commissioned works on institutional levels by the National Commission on the Status of Women’s annual reports; in forms of newsletters and reports by non-profit organization of Aurat Foundation, think-tanks Heinrich Boll-Stiftung and Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT).

Although literature in the field observes women’s empowerment, participation, and engagement within the political sphere, it uses frameworks that confine the inquiry to a strict correlation. I argue that there is a lack of scholarship that connects women’s political representation to country’s larger geo-political and feminist discourse. More specifically, I find that no existing scholarship analytically explores:
(1) a theoretical review of representation in society at large with a historical analysis of the understanding of women’s representation as part of the larger international development framework of post-war neo liberal agenda; 
(2) what are the implications of the post-colonial and militarized history of the region on women’s participation in the political sphere and the role of Pakistan feminism; 
(3) what happens once women achieve access to the National Assembly of Pakistan.

This dissertation is a holistic three-part inquiry that goes beyond the traditional empirical study of gender quota effectiveness (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). In the background of Pakistan’s unique relationship with the conceptualization of representation, which I argue served as the premise for its formation in 1947, I examine its implications within the confines of women’s presence in the political space, specifically in the Parliament. I employ a multi-level observation that: outlines the role of the global development agenda on mandating the acceleration of women’s presence in the political space in Pakistan; traces the historical implications of political identity in the post-colonial context of state-building; analyzes the feminist discourse during the Islamization period of the 80s and 90s through informal means of women’s “participatory actions” (Weiss, 1985); and investigates whether a correlation exists between the increased presence of women on reserved seats and the change in power relations in national decision making through a longitudinal case study of the National Assembly of Pakistan through the 16 years of uninterrupted civilian rule from 2002 to 2018. This dissertation project will add a global development and a regional feminist dimension as context to the traditional study of gender quotas, as reserved seats, in Pakistan.

1.3 Existing Research

It is necessary to trace the steps of various prominent researchers in the field to gain a sense of the political landscape of Pakistan in regards to women’s political participation and its implications for women’s representation. Representation is a condition characterized by the satisfaction of the frame of mind (Pitkin, 1967, pg. 104) and is defined by “certain behavioral norms or certain things a representative is expected to do” (Pg. 112) as a two-way correspondence (relationship) between the satisfaction and the belief that it is represented with the audience. This power relation (leaders having power over followers) may be of consent which is created by the leader’s own energy, intelligence, and masterful personality. Therefore, political representation has to do with people’s irrational beliefs and responses. It is important to question whether all people are satisfied by the representatives and under what circumstances they feel they are not being represented (A.M. Zia, 2018).

The Concept of Representation (Pitkin, 1967)\(^5\) is the first comprehensive exploration into the conceptualization of representation. This foundational piece serves as a conduit to the professional knowledge to the field with concise and perceptive analysis and sets the stage for political representation dialogue. This classic dialogue, regarded as one of the most influential and most often cited works of literature on political representation, explores historical context of representation through centuries and ties it back to

\(^5\) In 2003 was awarded the Johan Skytte prize in political science for coining the groundbreaking theoretical framework of representational descriptive representation, symbolic representation, formalistic representation, and substantive representation).
contemporary theorists understanding. This intersectional work views representation as a paradox as it both unifies and conflicts with views simultaneously and urges the importance of institutionalizing representation. Since its publication, scholars (Mansbridge, 2003; Mansbridge, 2009; Young, 1999; and others) in the discipline have utilized this framework and study as a threshold for examining many facets of political study (ranging from understanding the American political system to examining the role of minority communities in both Western nations and also in the developing world).

A literature review proves beneficial in bridging various factors and variables to form a comprehensive and well-structured research design to analyze substantive representation of women parliamentarians. This section draws on the existing literature to serve as a guide to formulate a framework for understanding gender quotas within the larger field of comparative and gender politics.

1.3.1 Examining Gender Quotas, as Reserved Seats, in Pakistan

Scholars argue “the touchstone of the morality of a nation or society is the way it treats its women” (Isphani, 2010, Pg. 1) since women make up over half of the world population and are an important part of all societies (Durrani, 2016). “Without their unhindered participation in all spheres of national life, no nation can march towards its cherished goals of economic, political, and moral progress or aspire to earn a respectable place in the comity of nations” (Pg.1). Yet, women’s political empowerment in Pakistan has traditionally been relatively low in comparison to their male counterparts. According to Compendium on Gender Statistics, the 47.5% of women in the country translate into a gender imbalance with 92 women to every 100 men. Although the population of the country has increased steadily, the low number of women and girls (Sen, 1992) is attributed to the various economic and cultural factors such as poor status of women, neglect of children and infanticide. Compared to other South Asian countries, the Pakistani sex ratio is significantly lower indicating discrimination against female children. India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal all have populations comprised 50% or more of women (Siddiqui, et. al., 2000). The skewed sex ratio serves as a reflection of gender discrimination in Pakistan. Whether through tradition or culture, society discriminates against females in Pakistan (Sahi Interview, 2011). The prevailing idea of boys and men being treated with privilege by males and females alike reside deep into the fabric of society’s perspective. In the context of these realities, this study examines the impact of the larger discourse on the feminization of Pakistan’s public spaces, specifically the male-dominated political arena, will add to the existing scholarship and present a holistic understanding of history, development and feminism.

Scholars in the field contend that women’s participation, defined by women’s political representation, is a strategy that is employed to counter the significant disparity in gender ratios in Pakistan which directly translates into gender discrimination (Mumtaz Interview, 2017). The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) asserts that the higher the number of women in parliament translates into strong attention to women’s issues. Scholars in the field claim that gender quotas do translate into an increase of women in office by ten percent (Htun and Jones, 2002), however researchers also find that a certain view persists examining women on quota seats as less qualified than their male counterparts.
Inter-Parliamentary Union statistics report that the presence of women in political positions continues to increase as more than 27 parliaments around the globe have reached the critical mass of 30 percent of women legislators. Mansbridge (2005) suggests that the mere number of women do not indicate an automatic formation of women-group identity among women politicians and securing women's interest issues as priority.

It is regarded in the field that “gender quotas can be necessary, but not sufficient, to engender legislatures” (Rincker, 2017, Pg. 15). Although women on reserved seats do pursue policies related to improving women’s status in the public space (Krook, 2009; Mazur 2002) and therefore, do engage in substantive representation in areas of women’s interests such as gender violence, childcare, reproductive rights, etc.; existing studies provide mixed findings on whether this representation is enough to create a change in societal women’s status and influence in political institutions (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012).

These findings suggest the need to explore further into the underlying cultural implications for women in an electoral democracy. This longitudinal case study of the National Assembly of Pakistan captures a correlation by analyzing empirical data collected directly from government archives. Expanding on the scholarship, this study serves as an inquiry into the substantive representation of women parliamentarians by establishing a relationship between characteristics of parliamentarians and their agenda selection and further, will attempt to determine if the recent increase in Pakistan's gender quota from 60 percent instituted in 2002, can, in fact, predict women parliamentarian’s substantive representation in assessing the effectiveness of the mandate.

Table 1 Women Membership in the 12th, 13th and 14th National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th># of women Reserved Seats</th>
<th># of women General Seats</th>
<th>Total # of women/ Total # of men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>71/342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>78/342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>70/342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The increase of an additional reserved seat in 12th and 14th National Assembly is the non-Muslim minority reserved seat, served by a woman
Source: Data compiled from the Pakistan National Assembly website, 2015

For this research project, I examine the specific period in contemporary Pakistan of 2002-2018 because it is during these three election cycles (2002-2007 as 12th National Assembly, 2008-2012 as the 13th National Assembly and 2013-2018 as the 14th National Assembly) that the government of Pakistan has avoided dissolution of the government and or military coup d'états’ (Table 1).

This unique period serves as a good case study of an emerging democracy because these three election cycles capture the representational impact of gender quotas following the latest reforms of the mandated increase of women in parliament. The 12th National Assembly had 71 women parliamentarians of which 61 were on reserved seats (an additional
seat for the non-Muslim minority) and 13 on general seats. 13th National Assembly was comprised of 76 women legislators, of which 16 were elected on general seats while 60 women secured reserved seats. The 14th National Assembly had a total of 69 women legislators, of which 9 were elected on general seats\(^6\). Observing the decline in the number of elected seats held by women parliamentarians highlights the lack of adequate representation of women and serves as the motivation for delving into further inquiry of the effectiveness of gender quotas in Pakistan to examine the role of reserved seats in securing minority representation in the context of Pakistan’s complex political landscape. Recent scholarship claims that women’s political landscape has, in fact, changed as women continue to enter the once male-dominated space (Chattopadhyay and Deflo, 2004; Chen 2010) which has provided new access to women and the constant number of 60 parliamentarians in office through reserved seats showcases the need for institutionalized mechanisms such as gender quota to secure space for women.

1.3.2 Recognizing the Role of the International Development Agenda

In response to the increasing inequalities witnessed around the globe because of neo-liberal economic policies, the international development community recognized the need for inclusive participation of minorities. To enhance women’s presence within the male dominated democratic halls of Parliaments, gender quotas were identified as the solution as part of the women’s advancement narrative (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014). I outline the trajectory of the inclusion of women’s agenda into the larger international development discourse in this section.

In 1945 gender equality was highlighted as central to development with the establishment of the United Nations and since international dialogue, policies and laws on equality have been highlighted at the world’s stage. Although number of treaties, conferences and campaigns were aimed at spearheading gender development, the first two decades of international development work did not consider gender as a salient analytical tool. As colonies transitioned into independent nations in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, researchers observed an expansion of the development agenda with a focus on economic and social designs to improving quality of life for citizens, and since the primary task was to stimulate economic growth, men were assumed breadwinners and were the sole focus on men (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014).

Researcher Esther Boserup (2007) argues that women were regarded as homemakers with the assumption that overall economic growth would naturally trickle down to women. Boserup’s work as an economist and a development specialist is accredited with shifting the focus on the important role of women in development and to this day her empirical and intellectual work is regarded as classic scholarship in the field. Lobbying efforts for increasing funding and attention for women’s development were initiated as the development process of the time of deemed unequal for gender in the context of socioeconomic issues of position and status in society. At the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), a few women, led by Finnish feminist Helvi Sipila,

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succeeded in having the General Assembly pass a resolution calling for “the full integration of women in the total development effort”, which resulted in the assembly to declared the Decade of Women from 1976-1985 (Pietila, 1999). The beginning of the decade of women was marked by the First World Conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975, and two more gender related conferences in Copenhagen (in 1980) and Nairobi (in 1985) to review the achievements of a ten-year campaign which galvanized public interest and raised awareness of women’s issues. These conferences brought together senior government officials and the outcome highlighted the need for governments to create and or bolster domestic level agencies devoted to women’s issues. This stimulated the establishment of women’s ministries with hopes of creating access points for domestic women’s movements to lobby to advocate and to work for explicit policies affecting women’s status. These conferences facilitated the emergence of transnational feminist networks (1970s onwards) which were complemented by the CSW NGO forum that brought together thousands of women activists and provided an opportunity to exchange experience and build transnational alliances.

In the 1980s an organized and transnational women’s network came together and identified common areas of concerns for women worldwide such as violence against women and the rapid growth of globalization. This in turn translated in the creation of new transnational organizations that provided development alternatives for women through international advocacy (Moghadam, 2005). In the 2000’s world leaders and development agencies renewed efforts to integrate gender concerns into the larger development agenda strategies with the millenial development goals (MDGs), six over achieving development goals. MDG Goal 3 promised gender equality and it is marked as the first time a sense of gender equality was fostered to address specific concerns of women and acknowledge the importance of gender as central to development (Iqbal Interview, 2015), including education parity, equalizing representation in Parliaments (Abbasi Interview, 2016), wage employment increase, etc. With the adoption of the 2015 sustainable development goals (SDGs) by over 180 world leaders during the historic 70th UN General Assembly, gender equality once again became the focal point of international development which cut across the 17 global goals to ensure equal participation of women. Women’s organizations and advocates have played a key role in effectively lobbying development agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union in devoting more time, rhetoric, research and money to the advancement of gender equality and have filled spaces in women’s policy machinery (A.M. Zia Statement, CSW 62) at the international level which has had a strong influence on development policy (Moghadam, 2005).

1.3.3 Recognizing the Role of Colonial, Historical and Feminist Discourse

Over the course of Pakistan’s existence of 63 years, in order to lessen the gap in the country’s gender disparity, women’s advocates highlight the empowering wisdom of President Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s 1944 speech, “No nation can rise to the height of glory unless your women are side by side with you” (Weiss, 1999, Pg. 141). Scholars suggest that to understand the gender identity of women in Pakistan, it is necessary to probe into the cultural construction of gender in the country, which can be traced to post-colonial stratification of power, influence and privilege. A historical peek into the legislation on women’s rights in Pakistan highlight the shock-jolt policy of women’s agenda as the military
directly seized power and control of the government for several of the seven decades of the nation’s history (Ahsan Interview, 2016). Scholars point to the connection between the entrenchment of anti-woman laws and laws enacted during the regime of General Zia ul-Haq⁷ (between the years of 1977 and 1988) which was responsible for initiating the Islamization of the government and laws⁸ (pertaining to women according to the Hudood Ordinance⁹) and the leadership tenure of General Pervaiz Musharaff (between 1999 and 2008) which repealed the Hudood Ordinance with the Women’s Protection Bill¹⁰ and the revolutionary increase in reserved seats for women in National Assembly from 20 to 60 (following the critical mass theory) which immediately brought an increase of women in political representation from 1988 at the 2008 elections. The Hudood Ordinances are laws that outline punishments according the Islamic Shari’a law for the act of zina (extramarital sex); the act of qazf, false accusations of zina; offense against property; and prohibition. Since the establishment of the Hudood Ordinances, along with the Law of Evidence, the Qisas and Dyiat, and the Family Law of 1961 (Korson & Maskiell, 1985), women’s advocates argue that these laws have hurt women’s advancement, equality, and empowerment more than they have benefitted the women of Pakistan. Researchers claim that these laws limit in granting equal rights to women, which result in the exacerbated rates of violence against women (Bari, 1998). Female members in National Assembly were critical actors who sponsored legislation to amend the Hudood Ordinances. They did so in 2006 by passing the Women’s Protection Bill which allowed the criminal act of rape to be prosecutable under civil law (Dawn News, 2006¹¹). In the case study “Quotas for Women for Legislative Seats at the Local Level in Pakistan”, Reyes (2002) concludes through her investigation that for Pakistan the quota system “has opened doors for socially disadvantaged and marginalized groups that otherwise stand no chance to win positions of formal political authority traditionally obtained through the politics of money, family influence and party patronage” (Pg. 3).

Though incomplete, the Women’s Protection Bill or amendment of the Hudood Ordinances is still a milestone in the Pakistan’s recent history in regards to women friendly policy decisions (Rincker, 2017). Soon after, another law providing women security and empowerment emerged on the policy agenda due to advocacy of women Ministers both in the Provincial Assemblies and in the National Assemblies (Abassi Interview, 2016). Realizing the society’s trend of women joining the workforce, policymakers adopted the Code of Conduct for Gender Justice in the Workface which protects women from sexual harassment at the workplace. These laws have provided women in Pakistan with the

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¹⁷ Pakistan Army General who imposed martial law (coup d’état) in 1977, later installed himself as President and is known for Islamizing the nation’s laws.

¹⁸ These include Government initiatives through the Pakistan’s Social Action Programme, the National Consultative Committee for Women, the Ministry for Women’s Development, and also explore the public-private partnership in regards to education, healthcare, and legal aid for women (Weiss, 1999).

¹⁹ Hudood Ordinances/Laws were intended to implement the Sharia law (in accordance with the Islamic Quran and Sunnah) for punishments for the following acts: extramarital sex, false accusation of rape, offence against property – theft, and prohibition – consuming alcohol. See Quraishi (1997).

²⁰ The Women’s Protection Bill of 2006 placed rape laws under the penal code (as was prior to 1979) and served to essentially repeal the Hudood Ordinance. What is particularly of interest is that the bill’s chief architects include a panel of all male members including Justice Haqiqul Khairi, former Attorney General Makhdoom Ali Khan and former chairman of the Council of Islamic Ideology Muhammad Khalid Masud.

opportunity to seize their role in society. Women's activist groups emphasize that policy on child labor (especially the younger female workforce), property ownership, voting, equal testimony, and other issues are also important for review on the Provincial and National Assemblies' women initiative agenda (Dahlerup, 2003). A mixture of social welfare organizations, women's movement groups, and politically charged organizations have worked together in giving a voice to the overarching need for women empowerment in Pakistan (Durrant, et al., 2003). Literature presents the argument that women have organized their voice with a purpose that has led to significant advancements in the construction of the civil society of country (Jahan, 1996). The women's movement has led to the emergence of greater promotion of women participation in the civil society to battle against and negotiate between the social, political, economic, ethnic, and cultural and gender spheres of marginalization present in all four provinces of Pakistan (Rostami-Povey, 2007, Rincker 2017) and the establishment of gender quotas has provided an avenue for women to bring women's issues and concerns on the political agenda.

1.3.4 Examining the Case Study of the National Assembly of Pakistan

This research adds value to existing scholarship in the field of women's representation by assessing if the establishment of gender quotas, as reserved seats, provides an avenue for women to bring women's issues and concerns on the political agenda through the change in power relations in the National Assembly. I investigate whether descriptive representation leads to substantive representation. Descriptive representation in this investigation is defined as the proportional representation “mirroring or reflecting” (Pg. 61) the various socio-demographic divisions within the electorate (Lawless, 2004; Franceschet, Krook & Piscopo, 2012). I utilize descriptive representation because of its inclusive nature of categorically recognizing the differences amongst the women in public office

Scholars have established the relationship between the descriptive representation and substantive representation as the responsiveness to further interests of a specific group and claim that presence of women in politics increases the internal efficacy (the understanding of and participation in politics) among women officials which translates into the advancement of women in society.

In this dissertation project, I examine political participation of women during a 16-year period of uninterrupted civilian rule, which make up three successfully completed National Assemblies. Although political participation is understood as “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing public action, either directly, by influencing the making of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of political decision makers” (Verba, et al. 1995, Pg. 38), for this study, I focus specifically on parliamentary political participation of women in Pakistan. I argue that if the purpose of reserved seats is to initiate a change in women's outcomes, then it is necessary to observe the change (if any) within the confines of women's parliamentary achievements. Therefore, I define descriptive representation as the presence of women in parliament specifically through reserved seats and substantive

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12 These differences include education levels, family in politics, previous political experience, etc.
13 For the purpose of this project, the measure of women's political participation is captured by the number of women found in formal politics, “in positions of public office to which they have been elected” (Goetz, 2003, pg. 3).
representation as the gains made towards women’s influence in parliament. In measuring substantive representation, the change in power relations in the National Assembly, I use the following indicators:

(1) the change of women-friendly committee assignments;  
(2) the change in the number of women’s leadership appointments;  
(3) the change in the number of women on general seats.

1.4 Outlining the Theoretical Framework

According to World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report of the years 2008-2013, Pakistan has consistently ranked 143/144, securing a spot in the second to last place in global rankings.14 This dissertation adds to the existing scholarship of the region by capturing a well-rounded snapshot of the women’s political participation in Pakistan through a historical observation, a feminist examination and specific case study.

I conceptualize a model to explore the change (if any) between descriptive representation, defined as the access to resources as the constitutionally mandated reserved seats for women and substantive representation, defined as the change in existing power relations by measuring women’s empowerment.

Descriptive Representation → Substantive Representation  
(Resources) → (Empowerment: Δ in power relations)

Chapter 1 includes a study of women’s representation as part of the development agenda through an analysis of literature reviews, historical accounts and scholarly debate on the topic of representation as playing an important role in democracy15 and the larger global women’s empowerment16 agenda (as part of the global development agenda which was furthered by contributions of the United Nations). In this section I define concepts and examine their relation to the larger political discourse of women’s political representation.

In Chapter 2, I utilize Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) definition of representation as the “means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pg. 209) and outline the understanding of representation as a mobilizer of citizen participation. I trace the inclusion of women’s agenda within the international development framework as a result of widening disparity in access to resources within the neo-liberal economic model. I conceptualize resources as necessary “…to empowering women to participate in decision-making in society…” (UN FWCW Beijing, 1994, 69) as vital in addressing gender inequalities.

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15 Review of Hobbes, Burke, Mills, will be included in addition to Pitkin’s understanding.  
16 For the purpose of this study I utilize Farzana Bari’s (1997) examination of the concept of empowerment as “a sophisticated, multidimensional and complex notion” (pg. 130) which serves as “a ladder with many steps, including education, economic independence, political power, and awareness of rights” (pg. 130).
and operationalize it to include “institutional mechanisms”\textsuperscript{17} (196) available for political participation. In measuring women’s empowerment, I borrow Farzana Bari’s (1997) conceptualization of empowerment as a “sophisticated, multidimensional and complex notion” (Pg. 130) which serves as “a ladder with many steps, including education, economic independence, political power, and awareness of rights” (Pg. 131). I examine the dimensions of representation from the lens of securing empowerment for women in democratic systems.

Chapter 3-4 function as a continuation of the dialogue on women’s political participation and focus on the topic of quotas as the avenue of access to resources. It motivates the dissertation and lends support to the theoretical framework. This portion recognizes the need for delving into the post-colonial framework of the region and the role of women and women’s mobilization. First, I analyze existing literature and case studies to examine the historical inception of the independent Republic of Pakistan as a need to secure political representation. In this discussion, I define political identity as an extension of liberal democratic values by codifying integration and equality (Schlesinger, 1991; Mushaben, 2008). I make the argument that the path to the independence of Pakistan was a result of new political identity which facilitated the mobilization around the concept of representation. Second, I review the colonial and post-colonial political identity of Pakistan through an understanding of nationalism along religious lines. In this study, I trace the conceptualization of nationalism from the traditional notion rooted in soil as a unifier towards the new nationalism, born out of the French Revolution and focused on humanity and liberal progress with “liberty, equality, fraternity” (Kohn, 2018; A.M. Zia, 2018). Third, I explore the effects of repeated militarized coup d’état in institutionalizing religion into the country’s original secular state-building agenda. I borrow the conceptualization of secularism from Oliver Roy (2007) and define it as “a social phenomenon that requires no political implementation…it comes about when religion seizes to be at the center of human life even through people still consider themselves believers” (Pg. 34).

Chapter 5 serves as the direct inquiry into establishing a correlation between descriptive and substantive representation through a review of the empirical data of the National Assemblies of Pakistan from 2002 to 2018. I borrow the concept of \textit{process tracing} from Andrew Bennett (2008) for purposes of building an argument about the effectiveness of women’s gender quotas, as reserved seats, by using an already established causal theory of descriptive representation and substantive representation. First, in the above-mentioned parts (Chapters 2-4), I search theoretical literature to gain an understanding of potential mechanisms that could link a relationship to outcomes within the parameters of the existing theory. I then hypothesize about the observable empirical manifestations and outline three indicators of outcomes. These include women-friendly legislation, women’s leadership positions and gains in women’s general seats. I employ this framework because it identifies mechanisms not as the achievements (outcomes) but rather as the process by linking multiple mechanisms towards a weighted outcome (relationship) and also provides space for in-between linkages which are lost in strict causal models. In this dissertation I find these

\textsuperscript{17} According to UN FWCW Beijing (1995), “National machineries for the advancement of women have been established …to promote the implementation of, execute, monitor, evaluate, advocate and mobilize support for policies and promote the advancement of women” (pg. 196).
In-between linkages add value to the overall inquiry as I examine indicators in comparison to male members of National Assembly outside of the correlation analysis to include: (1) understanding the role of political parties in ensuring women’s participation in parliaments and reviewing electoral patterns of women contesting federal level elections on general seats; (2) an overview of the economic status of women members of National Assembly as a reflection of descriptive representation to gauge whether access is granted to women across the socio-economic space or is reserved strictly for a certain segments of the female population; (3) an examination of the education levels between female and male members of National Assembly to analyze whether access to resources is a determinant of access to national decision-making and influence; and (4) an observation of parliamentary competency between female and male members of National Assembly measured by parliamentary performance.

In the case study, I introduce substantive representation as a function of descriptive representation and measure it as the change in power relations for women in the National Assembly. In doing so, I borrow Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) conceptualization of the idea of doxa, defined as normalized public opinion. I argue that elements of women’s self-actualization lead to seeking alternatives. These alternatives are what guide women to engage in political participation before entering the parliament and after securing seats (reserved or general), motivate women parliamentarians to seek positions or opportunities of influence as the exercise their agency through participatory political action (Sen, 1992). I argue the change through the three National Assemblies, the ability to define goals and pursue actions, reflects the change in seeking alternatives to the established societal doxa in the context of women’s presence in the male dominated political space. In essence, positive change, then, reflects an element of women’s empowerment (Bari, 2008) as a single step on the ladder towards parity.

1.5 Examining the Case Study of the National Assembly of Pakistan

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded on the concept of political representation (A.M. Zia, 2018). Since its inception as an independent Republic in 1947, Pakistan continues to witness a movement of collective efforts of advocacy organizations, political parties, media and community leaders that battles against the state, militarism, patriarchy, and cultural religiosity and constantly negotiates between the social, political, economic, ethnic, and cultural and gender spheres. Article 25 of Pakistan’s Constitution contains a legal basis for gender equality in Pakistan. It clearly states:

i. All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection law.
ii. There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.
iii. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the protection of women and children.

18 I consciously use the term “parity” instead of “equality” here because it indicates comparability of strength or intensity rather than a blanket abstract notion of equal treatment of people. (CEDAW Press Release, 2003).
19 I used the term cultural religiosity instead of just religiosity because Pakistan’s religiosity has been influence by the Saudi-influenced parameters of Islam.
The above stated guarantees of dignity, freedom and equality stand as the cornerstone of the country's legal framework. However, through the decades there has been a lack of concrete implementation of these rights in Pakistan. Socio-cultural norms in the country promote female segregation and low levels of female political participation, which in turn, leads to women and girls not realizing equal rights. The National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) recognizes that ‘woman’s marginalized role in mainstream politics is the result of inequality that exists in political process and the patriarchal negative perception about women as public representatives (NCSW Report, 2009, Pg. 5). Specifically, in the context of securing women’s political participation, the convention on the Political Rights to Women, of 1952 was adopted by Pakistan and concrete steps were taken to ensure the right to vote, stand for elected bodies, and hold all public offices on par with men.

Subsequently, the National Plan of Action (NPA) further endorsed action and proposed enhancement of women seats in elected legislatures with stakeholders and experts of NGOs, parliamentarians, representative of Ministry of Women Development (MoWD), Ministry of Law and Justice (MoLJ) and Human Rights. Furthermore, in 2002, the Chief Executive’s Order (under General Pervaiz Musharraf’s tenure) increased reserved seats for women in parliament to 17 percent

The Ministry of Women Development included elements from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform of Action into the 1998 National Policy Agenda (Para 297). With a focus on “(a) improving women’s decision-making within the family and community; and (b) creating social awareness, and a societal commitment to greatly improve women’s participation in decisions at all levels and sharing of household responsibilities” (NCSW, 2009, Pg. 5), it was unanimously adopted.

With these advances in the background, there still exists a disparity between men and women in the engagement in the political sphere and the power relations in decision making legislative bodies (Mumtaz Interview, 2017; Foreign Service Interview #1, 2016). Scholars attribute the lack of women’s parity in mainstream politics to the patriarchal doxa about women as public representatives.

Following the theory-building study in Chapters 2 to Chapter 4, the debate on women’s political participation continues in Chapter 5 by grounding the analysis in an empirical case study of the elections of 2002, 2008 and 2013. I investigate if descriptive representation leads to substantive representation with the number of increased reserved seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan. I utilize the conceptual framework of representation, prescribed by Hanna F. Pitkin (1967), to measure women politician’s shift

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20 I point out that this number was less than the original 33 percent (regarded internationally as the critical mass) which was promised in Strategic Objective G.2, of the National Plan of Action. Refer to historical significance in Chapter 3.

21 In addition, measures were established to achieve 40 percent representation of women in public sector institutions and a series of training and awareness campaigns were planned to ensure effective women participation (Waseem, interview, 2011).

22 The Pakistani system of government follows the parliamentary system and the Constitution of 1973 indicates a power sharing federal legislature comprised of the National Assembly and Senate, referred to as the Lower and Upper Houses of Parliament.
from access (descriptive representation) to influence (substantive representation) of members of National Assembly.

Due to the country’s patriarchal culture, women have been marginalized from the political process and, as a result, the 1956, 1962, and the 1973 Constitutions included reservation of seats, as mechanisms of quotas, for women at both the National and Provincial Assemblies (Ahsan Interview, 2016). Reserved seats accelerate the presence of women to ensure fair representation in national decision making (Global Database of Quotas, accessed 2018). Researchers indicate that women’s political empowerment can be attained through the utilization of the quota mandates which provide an avenue for certain minorities to be represented to enrich democratic inclusion (Kittilson, 2001).

The percentage of women’s reserved seats in Pakistan has varied over the years, and in the 2002 elections an approximated 17% of reserved seats were allocated for women in both the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies (Reyes, 2002). Furthermore, it is necessary to note that the increase in the percentage of reserved seats for women (4% in 1997 to 17% in 2002) was a result of the country’s “efforts to fulfill its commitments in international treaties and conventions to promote women’s free, equal and full political participation”.

Reflected in Table 2, under the Constitution of Pakistan Article 106, 66 seats are reserved for women MPAs in Punjab, 29 seats reserved in Sindh, 11 in Balochistan and 22 in the NWFP through proportional representation (Quota Project, 2008). According to Pakistan Constitution Article 32, “The State shall encourage local Government institutions composed of elected representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions, special representation will be given to peasants, workers and women” (Quota Project, 2014). In the 2000s, women’s networks and 11 of the major political parties endorsed reserved seats for women. The literature on the topic claims that the country’s efforts to quota commitments are displayed through a variety of international treaties and conventions that promote women’s free, equal and full participation.

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23 This was a result of combined endorsement from the Ministry of Women and Development and the National Campaign for Restoration of Women’s Reserved Seats, and the Commission of Inquiry for Women and the National Plan for Action.

24 Women’s networks to endorse the increase in women’s reserved seats included the Ministry of Women and Development, the National Campaign for Restoration of Women’s Reserved Seats, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry for Women, and the National Plan for Action (The Quota Project, 2014).
Table 2 Mandated Women’s Reserved Seats in the Provincial Assemblies, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th># of Reserved Seats for Women</th>
<th>Percentage (women/total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>66/371</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>29/168</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>11/65</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>22/124</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Given the gendered nature of Pakistani society, I argue that expectations play a key role in the influence of women’s advancement and in changing power relations in the political sphere. Bari (1998) reports that the prescribed cultural roles and responsibilities of women in Pakistan create an economic dependency on men and create a plethora of issues for women that ultimately lead to their suppression. Division of labor ascribes roles, rights, and responsibilities for women which translate into an entrenched structure power relations of their political existence. The lack of access to resources, education and technical skills, and the lack of financial independence further seclude women from mainstream society and leave them dependent on the male dominance for their sole survival. This creates a “false hierarchy between productive and reproductive work” (pg. 126) and consequently, “women are considered financial liabilities by their families” (pg. 126).

1.5.1 Research Design

In this dissertation, I examine if scaling this increase in descriptive representation (presence of women in politics) in the nascent democracy25 of Pakistan translates into substantive representation of women (advancement of women’s empowerment) in the National Assembly?

Scholars note that “advocacy on behalf of women which builds on claimed synergies between feminist goals and official development priorities has made greater inroads into the mainstream development agenda than advocacy” (Kabeer, 1999, Pg. 435). Through a holistic multi-level inquiry that goes beyond the traditional study of gender quotas, rooted solely in empirical measure of effectiveness (Bratton & Ray, 2002; Grey, 2002; Kittleson, 2008; Krook, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005; Tolbert & Steuernagel, 2001), I examine a correlation between the increase in number of women on reserved seats and their contributions (if any) towards the changing power relations in national decision-making through a longitudinal case study of three National Assemblies through the only 16 year period of uninterrupted civilian rule of 2002 to 2018.

The analysis examines whether a correlation exists between descriptive representation, the presence of women on reserved seats, and substantive representation, the change in power relations in the National Assembly, and capture a positive or negative strength of the link.

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This study measures indicators that reflect gains for women in National Assembly compared to men. These include (1) the number of women-friendly committee assignments; (2) the number of women-friendly policies and (3) the number of leadership assignments of women parliamentarians.

I formulate the main inquiry as:

Alternative Hypothesis 1: *The increase in women’s descriptive representation through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in women’s substantive representation in the National Assembly of Pakistan.*

While observe substantive representation, I investigate the following variables:

Alternative Hypothesis 2: *The increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in women-friendly legislation in the National Assembly of Pakistan.*

Alternative Hypothesis 3: *The increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in women’s leadership in the National Assembly of Pakistan.*

Alternative Hypothesis 4: *The increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in the number of women on general seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan.*
Dependent Variable

I identify the observation of the research in this analysis as substantive representation. To measure the change in power relations in the National Assembly, I explore women-friendly legislation; leadership roles (including Federal Ministers, Ministers of State, Committee Chairs and Committee/Parliamentary Secretaries); and the number of women elected on general seats.

Independent Variable

I identify descriptive representation as affecting the change in power relations in the National Assembly and characterize it as the (17% of women compared to the total membership) presence of women on reserved seats.

Correlation Design

To ensure the process of change towards women’s empowerment in the National Assembly, I develop the construct the following model:

(constitutional reserved seats) ➔ (∆ in power relations)

Data

In observing the existence of a positive correlation between descriptive and substantive representation, I include basic comparative statistics of wealth, education, and parliamentary competency, operationalized through performance, between female and male members of National Assembly. In this dissertation project, I compile disaggregate data from government archives such as the National Assembly of Pakistan, Election Commission of Pakistan, Commission on the Status of Women and the Provincial Assemblies of Pakistan. In addition, to capture the qualitative narrative of women’s representation on reserved seats compared to overall performance of men in National Assembly, I conduct informal interviews with “panel of experts” (Weiss, 2013) including national male and female political figures such as Ambassadors, Chairs of Women’s Commissions, and experts in the field.

1.6 Dissertation Outline

This dissertation project is structured in chapters through the examination of the impact (if) any of gender quotas, as reserved seats, on women’s empowerment in parliaments. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the to the inquiry of women’s political representation. I outline the significance of the project and contributions in furthering the scholarship in the field. I present a brief review of the existing research on representation as it relates to the historical and feminist trajectory of Pakistan. I introduce the intersectional approach to this dissertation’s inquiry by defining concepts and highlighting the research design for the case study of the National Assembly of Pakistan. Chapter 2 engages in the conceptualization of representation and its adoption into the women’s agenda to secure political presence of women. I examine the role of global economic development priorities in
including women’s agenda as a conduit to managing widening inequalities within the marginalized communities. Chapter 3 continues the dialogue by including the historical importance of the concept for Pakistan given its independence from British India along the need to secure representation. I examine the historical implications of Pakistan’s flirtations with institutionalizing religion during its military regimes to provide an understanding for the larger male-dominated political discourse. Chapter 4 provides the foundational background for understanding women’s political representation in Pakistan through the lens of mobilization, utilization of networks and informal avenues of feminist engagement. Chapter 5 serves as a direct case study of the National Assembly of Pakistan by observing correlation between descriptive and substantive representation during the 16-year uninterrupted civilian rule. I utilize disaggregate data directly from government archives and informal interviews to capture the realities of women’s presence. Further, it will present a brief outline of the developed theoretical framework and of testing of the competing hypothesis using both qualitative and quantitative analysis of women parliamentarians in Pakistan and express the complexities of the relationship between mere presence of women parliamentarians and policy representation. Chapter 6, the last portion of the research project, outlines discussions of the main topics of representation, history of Pakistan checkered with post-colonialism and militarism and summarize major findings and limitations of the empirical case study of the national women parliamentarian’s access to influence of the three elections cycles, and highlights the research imperatives and knowledge gaps and articulate recommendations for future research. In addition, I discuss the broader implications of the study for future research and outline further research questions that may have emerged from the study.

1.7 Summary

As governments around the world have formally adopted gender quotas as reforms within the larger agenda of development to mitigate gender discrimination26 and inequality in the institutions of government and law-making bodies, literature indicates that as the number of women in government and public life increase, gains are made in women-friendly policies (Lovenduski and Norris, 2003). As gender parity in government is not the ends but the means to secure gender equality, literature claims it can result in an equitable political agenda focusing on issues that impact women and families (Krook, 2005; Barnes and Burchard, 2013; Schwindt-Bayer, 2006; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Reingold, 2000; Kittilson, 2005).

In this dissertation, in addition to examining whether a correlation is present between the presence of women’s reserved seats and the change in power relations towards women’s empowerment in parliament, I develop alternative hypotheses to explain the existence of a direct relationship in the event that a relationship fails to surface. If women-friendly legislation, leadership positions and the number of women on general seats are identified as functions of descriptive representation, it is important to allow room for the assumption that they will not always result in gains for women in parliaments.

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26 Gender discrimination is defined as “established laws, customs, and practices which systematically reflect and produce group-based inequities in any society” based on gender or sex and is regarded as a global phenomenon, inhibiting women’s access to empowerment (Lovenduski and Norris, 2003).
Chapter 2
Representation, Making the Absent Present Again

“It is because the signifier exists, because it represents (through symbolic action), that the group being represented and symbolized exists and that in return, it causes its representative to exist as representative of a group.” –Pierre Bourdieu (2001), “La delegation et le fetichisme politique” (Pg. 260)

2.1 Introduction

Democratic parliament works to promote equal suffrage based on universal human rights (Abbasi Interview, 2016) making it the most representative institution protecting and promoting minorities. Structural barriers continue to limit women’s options through discriminatory laws and institutions leading to capacity gaps with disparity between women and men. However, other indicators of equality such as cultural, socioeconomic and political variables should be taken in consideration when assessing women’s representation. The UN General Assembly argues that “women in every part of the world continue to be largely marginalized from the political space, often as a result of discriminatory practices and laws, attitudes and gender stereotypes, low levels of education, lack of access to healthcare and a disproportionate effect of poverty on women” (UNGA, 2011, www.un.org).

As this dissertation project investigates whether the increase in gender quotas, as reserved seats, in parliament leads to an increase in women’s empowerment. In doing so, I examine if scaling the increase in descriptive representation, the presence of women through reserved seats, translates into substantive representation of women. This three part inquiry includes observation of historical implications of representation for the country of Pakistan (in chapter 3); outlines the feminist trajectory of women’s agency through the country’s interrupted periods of democratic rule by military influence (in chapter 4); and investigates a correlation between the presence of women and the change in power relations within the confines of a longitudinal case study of three successive sessions of the lower house of Parliament, the National Assembly, from 2002 to 2018 (in chapter 5).

Within the investigation of this dissertation, this chapter serves as the foundational platform of knowledge for the examination. Specifically, it focuses on building a conceptual understanding of representation and its adoption into the international development agenda following implementation of gender quotas as a conduit to change in power relations in the status of women in Pakistan. Existing research highlights the importance of studying women as it provides opportunities to check leadership and political theories derived exclusively by men (Jalalzai, 2016).

In this chapter, I establish the “gender in politics” (Jalalzai, 2016, Pg. 8) approach to outline a gendered lens to facilitate the analysis and enhance the understanding of women’s political leadership. By identifying concepts, this chapter serves as a theoretical review of political representation in society at large through a historical analysis of the understanding of women’s representation as part of the larger international development framework of post-war neo-liberal agenda. In this chapter, I employ a constructivist lens to examine the
interaction between human experiences and behavior-patterns by outlining representation as a mobilizer of women’s agency.

As gender emerges as a significant force (Skykes, 1993), scholars note the pervasive disparity in the distribution of power and decision-making across the political system which serve as barriers to “women’s leadership opportunities” (Jalalzai, 2016, Pg. 2). Through this constructivist understanding (Piaget, 1971) of representation, I draw on elements of power and decision-making in the political environment as barriers to women’s political participation. I analyze Pitkin’s (1967) standardized conceptualizations of representation in the field of gender politics to observe the women’s political power and influence in the political space as it intersects sociocultural and socio-historical perspectives.

I utilize a *posteriori* argument\(^{27}\) that by including women and minorities, those marginalized by and deemed vulnerable to the pervasive global model of economics, within the international development framework set the tone for international policy to promise the achievement of the abstract notion of women’s equality in society. The chapter begins with a basic reflection of women’s representation as a performative (Butler, 1990) agent in society by examining Pitkin’s (1967) representation as a mobilizer of women’s participation. Second, I outline the inclusion of women’s political representation as a means to ease inequalities of the neoliberal economic order around the world. Next, in the chapter I focus on the role the electoral system of proportional representation within parliaments as conduits to achieving justice in women’s political representation through gender quotas. I argue that the reflections of broader understanding of representation as a facilitator of women’s political participation provides insight and build on the three parts of inquiry in the following chapters.

### 2.2 Conceptualizing Representation

Drawing from the Weberian methodology, the concept of representation is constructed through historical and sociological abstractions of the term towards an empirical presentation of its value to help capture present realities (A.M. Zia, 2018). As science depends on concepts which grow from ideas, it is through inquiry into these constructions\(^{28}\) of representation that lead researchers to ask questions and seek explanations. Thompson (1961) argues that, in doing so, concepts are essential in drawing lessons across national boundaries because they provide common vocabulary that allows for comparative analysis.

The constructivist perspective examines social groups and political communities as socially constructed entities and therefore, I argue that the examined political representation, as being performative (Pitkin, 1967; Spivak, 1988), contributes to the shaping of the social *doxa*, the normalized public opinion. Representation is defined as a production of images and dialogues exchanged in the public sphere through various actors such as artists, media, the academy, social movement organizations and ordinary citizens (Spivak, 1988). Together,

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\(^{28}\) Borrowed from the concept of social construction from Berger and Luckmann’s (1967)’s foundational resource *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. 
these actors construct a reality and provide a space to act and to engage even for the most marginalized segments (Pitkin, 1967) of population.

Representation has been designated and legitimated through labels of ambassadors, elected officials, leaders dating back to the Middle Ages and is outlined in writings of Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313-1356) as “to represent someone else by establishing fictitious juridical unity between the representative and the represented was a developed in various domains but did not necessarily project consent by the represented” (Pitkin, 1976, Pg. 48). Fast forward to the modern era, Hobbes constructed a more developed understanding of representation as the relationship between the sovereign and the citizens and has been utilized by scholars as a foundation for all examinations of the concept.

Dahl (1971) defines representative democracy as “responsiveness of the government to preferences of its citizens” (Pg. 1). As this traditional model of representation (Mansbridge, 2003) places responsiveness at the core of representation (Grasten, 2009; Hayward, 2009; Williams, 1990), it draws heavily on Pitkin (1967)’s fundamental assertion of the role of democratic representation. With roots in revolutions of the West (United States and France) it identifies sources of power through legitimate delegation (Rosanvallon, 2008). As scholarship points, representation is “not easy to operationalize” (Mansbridge, 2003, Pg. 1) and is mostly captured empirically through data driven understanding of constituent preferences and legislator responsiveness. However, mere numbers do not capture the entire scope of the concept and therefore elements of participatory representation must be examined. Participatory democracy29 is representative and for this study understood as all active engagement through non-elected or government channels and is defined as “democratic rediscovery of representation” (Urbinati, 2006, Pg. 5; Mansbridge, 1999, 2003; Young, 1997, 2000). In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I analyze these channels of women’s participation through informal measures of mobilization and organization towards seeking alternatives to the existing patriarchal doxa.

Similarly, French political historian Marcel Gauchet (1995) conceptualizes the symbolic dimensions of political representation and argues that “democracy, being essentially representative and far from reducing itself to the people’s exercise of sovereignty, inseparably requires the institutional production of this sovereignty in its true nature. It seeks a collective disposition of its own, but a disposition that only exists if self-signified and for which it is not less indispensable to be imagined than to be executed” (Pg. 48). In this study, I argue that democratic representation follows Pitkin (1967)’s reflection of mobilization30 that actively works to recruit constituencies and systems because it closely mirrors Pakistan’s historical conceptualization of representation traced back to the 18th century democratic revolutions. These constituencies go beyond the traditional legislator and voter relation, and

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29 Defined by academia through empirical works as civil society movements such as civil rights, student organized and antiwar movements, etc. (Barber, 1984; Miller, 1987; Pateman, 1970).

30 For this study, the definition of mobilization is borrowed from Disch (2011) to understand representation and “applies to the work that images, narratives, and other mediated messages do in soliciting individuals to identify with a larger group or principle” (Pg. 107).
include civil society forces with similar agendas, and draw on political identity as a response to oppression and a call to mobilize.

Existing research notes that women are comparatively less represented (Jalalzai, 2016) in political positions of power. I argue that assessment of women’s political power is related to the political identity of women. Scholars argue that gender identity, as a social identity, motivates the formation of a political identity which works to facilitate the process of consciousness-raising and collective action (Lorde, 2007). A conduit to understanding women’s condition, scholars note the consciousness raising offers insight into the organization of women’s efforts through non-traditional emphasis on personal experiences (Willis, 1984 cited in Lorde, 2007). In efforts to build an engage in the discourse of participatory efforts of the women of Pakistan in the public space against the political oppression of their rights, I introduce the importance of poetry as a facilitator of resistance in Chapter 4. As this dissertation project is structured within the informal confines of gender analysis (Jalalzai, 2016), I define political identity as the formation of consciousness by self-actualization of systemic conditions of oppression through patriarchal dimensions’ socio-political culture. In doing so, I borrow from feminist scholarship’s (Lorde, 2003, 2007; Enloe, 1990, 2000) inquiry of women’s condition from the basis of oppression and marginalization (Mushaben, 2010) and outline identity politics as means to articulate political claims that lead to participatory participation with a focus on shared injustices (Wiarda, 2016) and marginalization. In chapter 4 I examine the function of identity politics by reviewing the history of women’s political participation in Pakistani society. I argue that women’s engagement in the public sphere is a factor of resistance in the need to seek alternatives to the existing patriarchal doxa which leads to the facilitation of political participation of women in parliaments and the change in gendered power relations (as examined in chapter 5).

2.2.1 Pitkin’s Representation

*Without representation, we are without a conception of what political reality – the represented – is like” …and without representation there is no represented –and without political representation there is no nation as a truly political entity.* -Ankersmit, 2002, Pg. 115

To understand the change in power relations in the political realm in this dissertation project, I borrow the theoretical understanding of Pitkin’s (1967) concept of representation. For Representation is understood as “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967, pg. 208) and this responsiveness is emphasized as the central focus of a representative government (Kuklinski and Segura, 1995). Looking at the etymological origins of the word, Pitkin (1967) highlights that “re-presentation” means “….making present again” (Pg. 8) which, she claims, serves as the distinction between democratic leadership and authoritarian manipulation. As the represented must be logically prior, the representative, then, must be responsive (Pg. 140) indicating a “one-way flow of influence from public opinion to policy” (Manza and Cook, 2002, Pg. 639) of democratic representation. As Pitkin’s book emerged in the US in 1967, similarly in France, Derrida’s book Speech and Phenomena surfaced and added to the discussion of the primordial presentation of representation and proposed that it was through repeated symbols and repetition that give space to the concept to flourish. This highlight of representation is regarded as a hallmark of democratic political representation because it provides space
outside of the confines of the legislator and constituency (principal-agent\textsuperscript{31}) relation with an expansive role of influence.

As democracy is viewed to represent the interests of the voters and or constituency, I utilize Pitkin’s (1967) model of representation to review the oppression and or marginalization of women’s participation in politics. The constructed framework assigns four different values to political representation. These include symbolic representation which embodies an idea or an entity; formal representation refers to institutional rules and procedures that designate representation; descriptive representation refers to the identity or attributes that are used to describe the representative (including gender, race, and age) and substantive representation refers to policies supported and advancements made as a representative.

The formalistic representation refers to institutional arrangements which mandate representation through authority of power and accountability by constituency outlined by “the rules that empower representatives to act and by which constituents hold representatives accountable” (Jalalzai, 2016, Pg. 4). Descriptive representation caters to the mirroring effect of the representative in attributes and characteristics (Pitkin, 1976) and experiences (Mansbridge, 1999) of the represented. Substantive representation, on the other hand, refers to the responsiveness to the political interests (Jalalzai, 2016) of women captures the process (interventions made on behalf of constituents) and the outcomes (legislation and policies) (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). Symbolic representation “engages emotional responses and relates to the extent to which constituencies believe their representatives support their interests” (Jalalzai, 2016, Pg. 4).

Since the introduction of this framework, scholars have identified dimensions of interrelations between the four conceptualizations of representation. As descriptive representation is regarded as the “procedure by which representation transpires” (Jalalzai, 2016, Pg. 4), the responsiveness measured as substantive representation functions as the outcome. Although majority of existing studies find that with the increase of women in legislators, an increase in the actions on behalf of women’s policy do surface (Bratton and Ray, 2002; Childs, 2002; Swers, 2002; Taylor-Robinson and Heath, 2003), some works highlight an inconclusive nature of the relationship (Skykes, 1993).

Existing literature explores the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation by focusing on the increase in women’s presence in parliaments, the identity of female legislators and institutional characteristics that constrain or enable participation (Childs and Krook, 2009). Advocates of gender quotas argue that it is a certain “critical mass” of women that would change the agenda and outcomes in favor of women (Kanter, 1977; Dahlerup, 1988) because numerical strength will allow them to coordinate with each other and exert feminizing influence (Bratton, 2005; Saint-Germain, 1989; Thomas, 1994). Along with the presence in numbers, women can lead the path towards inclusive women’s agenda through their structural positions, life experiences and behavior results in a unique perspective on identity (Phillips, 1995, 1998; Lovenduski & Norris, 2003; Reingold, 1992). However, scholars are cautious in assigning a unified agenda and collective legislative

\textsuperscript{31} See (Sunstein, 1991 and Wahlki, 1971).
identity across the board to all women because there are differences in class, age, race, priorities, etc. (Dodson & Carroll, 1991).

Through additional literature review, I find scholarly claims of symbolic representation of women on a positive impact on engagement and participation (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001; Lawless, 2004) as they break stereotypes of the dominance of male in the political space. However, studies also indicate that although women may ascend the political ladder within the male-dominated political realm, it does not necessarily translate into the transformation of the power relations within the larger political sphere and that these examples work as outliers, especially in the case of Benazir Bhutto as the first female head of state of the Muslim world and the first female Prime Minister of Pakistan (Jalalzai, 2016).

In assessing the performative nature of representation as a transformative agent of broader power relations in the political world, scholars continue to examine a relationship between descriptive and substantive representation (Phillips, 1998; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2008). This dissertation study aims to further the scholarship by focusing on representation as a mobilizer of the comparatively young democracy of Pakistan which has a special relationship with the ideals of securing minority presence in political arenas. As majority of debate on representation centers on demands for political inclusion from marginalized segments of population, I argue that the exclusion of minorities from decision making signifies a lack of representation. As scholars report that fair representation must include similar experiences (Phillips, 1995) and the representation must mirror the representative (Mansbridge, 1999), I examine the historical significance of the independence of Muslim-majority Pakistan from a Muslim-minority British India in Chapter 3.

2.2.2 Representation as a Mobilizer

The majority of work in the field limits the understanding of political representation to the legitimacy of elective representation in parliaments. I argue the importance of contextualizing specific variables that affect the political system and impact representation in setting forth a collective effort towards women's participation and, in turn, empowerment. This study focuses on representation as transcending the mere descriptive understanding between a defined constituency, the represented, and its elected representor. I borrow Mansbridge (2003)'s understanding of interest oriented as "enlightened preferences" of "experience and emotional understanding" (Pg. 517) of the self-actualized agency of women in the political space to capture substantive representation. Through a systematic process of political representation I explore the role of political agency of women.

In contextualizing, political representation within the confines of mobilization of women's agency, I find that majority of political discourse is a product of "crafted talk" (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, Pg. 27) developed by elites as messaging for support in a bid for power.

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32 Although Pitkin ventures into a different direction in her later research and places importance on the need for "centralized, large-scale, necessarily abstract representative system to be based in a lively, participatory, concrete direct democracy at the local level" (Pitkin, 2004, Pg. 340), for purpose of this study, the previous assertions are used as the foundation of examining active representation in Pakistan.
(Schattschneider, 1960). Within the power and influence dialogue, civil society (women’s organizations, academia, etc.) serves as representatives (Mumtaz Interview, 2017) outside of the traditional bounds of citizenship and elections (Montanaro, 2010; Saward, 2010) and “citizens...form themselves into constituencies...debate and struggle over the wisdom and implications of policy decisions” (Young, 2010, Pg. 131). I argue, this mobilization of citizenry is a function of “information networks of discussions” (Forst, 2001, Pg. 369) within the public space towards the formation of specific political identity around an issue agenda. As I review literature in the field, I find that it is within this space that an inclusive civil society, consisting of “political parties, political challengers, the media, interest groups, hearings, opinion surveys and other processes of communications” (Mansbridge, 2003, Pg. 519), promotes the process of interest formation within the system, which I argue leads to the recognition and mobilizes the need to seek alternatives to the dominant culture.

Pitkin (1967) conceives political representation as a “public, institutionalized arrangement” not because of “any single action by any one participant, but from the over-all structure and functioning of the system” (Pg. 221-222) and places importance on the mentioned systems that work within the political sphere as collective relations and influences of mobilization.

As this process continuously defines and re-defines group identities and acts on behalf of the “unorganized group” (Pitkin, 1967, pg. 215), I argue that it serves as a platform for engagement that leads to the actualization of the marginalized power relations along gender lines. Existing work claims that Pitkin’s “point is not that representation invents constituencies out of whole cloth but that it draws them together” (Disch, 2011, Pg. 107) ...rather, “it imputes to them a unity that they discover only through being represented” (ibid) through participation. Therefore, I use the classification of this participatory representation as a "process of forming demands and social cleavages" (Disch, 2011, Pg. 107) as it not only "allows the social to be translated into the political, but...facilitates the formation of political groups and identities" (Urbinatik, 2006, Pg. 109). This performative element of representation (Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge 2003; Saward, 2006), I argue, allows space for agendas to form and paves the way for identity politics to emerge along dimensions of women’s political inequalities.

I argue that understanding women’s mobilization is necessary to capture the performative nature of representation. Theories emphasize that political identities and demands emerge from social differences. As these conceptualizations follow the poststructuralist or pro-Marxist pluralist frameworks (Laclau, 1996), a movement or the potential of a movement emerges within a democratic constituency. The mobilization effects of political movements “frame...relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Bendord, 1988, 198). This is a “dialectical” process, constrained by the belief system of the potential supporters, their issues and their assessment of the “utility of become active in the cause” (Snow and Bendford, 1988, pg. 202, 204) and serves as a facilitator of representation.

33 The dialectical method is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned arguments.
To understand the impact of mobilization on societal values and beliefs, I build on Aristotle’s notion of “rhetorical deliberation” which works to influence a particular audience as a specific rhetoric is injected into an audience (society) and engages in sympathies of the specific audience through value commitments (Garsten, 2006). Existing research notes that “a good rhetorician targets an audience ‘where they stand’ and seeks to bring them ‘to thoughts or intentions they might not otherwise have adopted’ (Garsten, 2006, pg. 3, 6 cited within Dirsch, 2011, pg. 110). For the analysis of the changing power relations for women parliamentarians in Pakistan, I use this conceptualization of the identity negotiation because I argue it reaffirms the injection of the socially constructed Islamization of society. Historical analysis (in chapter 3) observes its implications as it resulted in the narrowing of women’s agency by creating an imbalance in the social fabric of the Pakistani society (Foreign Service Interview #2, 2017) through the mobilization of identity politics along religious and gender lines. In order for the rhetoric to successfully take hold, active participation from the audience is a pre-requisite because it is the audience that changes its own values and belief systems and I argue that in the case of Pakistan, societal elites such as party leaders, military junta and religious leaders facilitated this art of persuasion (Rosanvallong, 2008) in the adoption of societal values and beliefs in further inserting masculine domination in political power relations.

I argue that just as the collective mobilization of Pakistani society along religious and gender lines furthered the oppression of women, in the same manner, women’s collective mobilization efforts surfaced in response as resistance to the power elites and decision-makers. Further, I emphasize that by de-constructing (Lorde, 2007) the popular doxa, representation facilitates constituency to action by enabling a viable space for the recognition of an issue and paving the path towards its narration defined as issue framing (Rosanvallong, 2008).

As researchers claim that women’s informal mobilization around issues have led to more formal movements which have successfully shifted institutional paradigms to mandate representation. To examine this transition in the context of the inclusion of women’s issues into larger global discourse on the conditions and status of women (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014), I trace the emergence of the rhetoric around the mobilization of women’s political participation (in response to the need to alleviate inequalities) in the next section.

2.3 Mandating and Mobilizing Women’s Political Participation in the Development Framework

*Human rights are women’s rights…* –Hillary Rodham Clinton, Beijing Conference, 1995

2.3.1 Feminization of Inequality as a Consequence of Globalization

To understand the global mobilization and facilitation of the need to mandate women’s political participation, I find that efforts to advance women’s agenda did not occur in a vacuum in the absence of women’s mobilization, but as “part of the success of the emerging 2nd wave of feminism that put women’s lives and feminist questions onto the formal agenda of the foreign policy establishments of dozens of nation states and international
agencies” (Enloe, 2001, Pg. 111). The study on women’s political participation in Colonias Populares in Guadalajar, Mexico highlighting the need to include women’s movements in understanding the larger participation of women in politics (Craske, 1993 cited in Henderson and Jeydel, 2014). Existing scholarship notes that women’s movements cultivate a trail of motivated, skilled and politically active women that result in mobilization and facilitation of “citizenship and political subjectivity among the women involved” (Pg. 54). The women may have initially join the movement or organization as a response to curtailed rights as a mother or to protect their children or women, but in the process, may result in “discovering a new political identity” (Tripp, 2000, Pg. 110) and the actualization of their marginalized power relations in the political sphere. Further, scholars note that participation of women in movements may result in more advance participation such as running for higher political positions when opportunities arise (Jalalzai, 2016) and alter the way in which women view themselves. This mobilization serves as a participatory act (Foreign Service Interview #2, 2019) that for the marginalized segments of society to fight for change (Henderson Jeydel, 2014) and I cite this transformative nature of political identity in the 2015 efforts of collective political participation in the United States witnessed through the passing for the LGBTQ advocacy and the Ferguson activism.

In addition, the review of literature indicates that peace movements adopt feminist ideology frames and organizational structures to build on feminist processes and adapt tactical innovations of women’s movements. Similarly, women’s mobilization has resulted in an increase in study of women in leadership positions at research institutions. The rise in the interest to examine women’s organization and facilitation of change in public space, I argue, reflects the broad transformational effects of women’s mobilization. Although the change is more visible in postindustrial societies, industrial and agrarian societies have depended on larger processes of socioeconomic modernization (Iqbal Interview, 2015) with the women’s movements central to transformation (Inglehard & Norris, 2003).

### 2.3.2 Contextualizing the Inequality of Women’s Political Participation

In the section above, I highlight the role of women’s mobilization within the context of a transformative impact on society. As stated previously, mobilization is a response to the actualization of oppression or injustice. I argue that to understand the broader dimensions of women’s inequality of women’s political participation, it is necessary examine global structures of development. Research indicates that inequality is present and visible across the world as women continue to lack as authorities of political power and decision-making (Sahi Interview, 2011). These disparities are a product of the lack of a middle class and of the concentration of wealth concentrated in a small segment of the population. I find that International development actors at the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other transnational networks have tried to resolve these inequalities on the ground as prompting change is different than delivering on the promise. I highlight that although international agencies have the power to lobby nations, they do not have the power to coerce. However, I argue, through structural policies wrapped in economic aid packages, the West has been successful in rolling out descriptive change from the top down in developing countries through mandates.
According to UNDPI (2011) reports, extreme poverty is still a constant in much of the world population and serves as a key factor in women’s advancement and participation. In the developing world, poverty issues are concentrated around access to the allocation and inequality of resources between men and women. Scholars add that economic information levels are not sole indicators of poverty because additional dimensions of empowerment include lack of access and physical security (Sen, 2000). As the face of poverty around the world has constantly been that of women, it is argued that women’s participation in the public sphere cannot make substantive strides unless poverty balances and inequalities are eradicated (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014).

I argue that majority of the post-colonial developing world suffers from inadequate access to resources, representation and social justice. Existing research notes that “globalization is the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before” (Friedman, 2000, Pg. 7) and therefore, its profound effects on both international and domestic systems (Ahsan Interview, 2016) are real. It is necessary to examine the effects of globalization for women because traditionally the condition of women has been salient and absent from mainstream theoretical and empirical research. The negligence of accounting for women as players in society has resulted in a distortion to “ubiquitous social and political phenomena” (Gary, et. al., 2006, Pg. 1) because gender does, in fact, have social, cultural, political and economic implications across societies. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Index attempts to capture and quantify levels of quality of life of citizens from over 187 countries and reflects increased amounts of inequalities in achievements between men and women in all facets of society. Similarly, the World Economic Forum (WEF)’s Global Gender Gap Index ranks countries according to gender gaps in of inequalities including economic participation and opportunity; educational attainment; political empowerment; and health and survival (www.wef.org).

I find that as globalization united women by highlighting the commonalities of economic restructuring and “increasing the divide between winners and losers within the process”, scholars theorize that this growth in nationalism facilitated the increase in the mobilization of women’s movements (Meyers, 2003, Pg. 279). International development agendas and treaties have assisted in slowly shifting global gender paradigms as pressures are placed on governments to honor commitments made on the international stage to establish national level commissions as an access point for domestic women’s movement and advocacy and provide opportunities to team up with international networks to place pressure on governments to respond to constituency.

I argue that the mobilization of women’s movement on the international scene and global pressures, in favor of women’s access to political representation, are important variables in explaining the growing feminization of legislative arena’s around the world.

34 UNDP is the United Nations global development network which advocates for change and connects countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life for themselves (www.undp.org).
35 World Economic Forum is a public-private cooperation that aims to engage political, business and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas.
According to Henderson & Jeydel (2014), “challenge for the future is to continue to force stronger links between women across cultures without obliterating their differences” and if power continues to rest in national institutions, “global women’s movements will have to respond with new strategies, new tactics...to keep pace with the ever-changing international structures” (Pg. 62).

Globalization integrated economies and societies and aimed to improve lives around the world by providing economic opportunities that lead to the reduction of poverty (Iqbal, 2016). Opponents of globalization note that these neo-liberal economic policies grew disparities rather than eradicating and further marginalized citizens of the world (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014). Due to the constant evolution of global realities, I argue that narrow approaches do not address discrepancies between men and women as new challenges of the international political economy as met with the increase in trans-border migration and war. I further assert that by viewing women’s empowerment process strictly out of the poverty lens, development policies gloss over the number of women and girl migrants crossing borders as they impact demographic shifts within the country’s formal government policies, institutional structures and resource allocation (A.M. Zia, 2018, HLPF Oral Intervention).

2.3.3 Trajectory of Women’s Development Agenda

The previous section established the pervasiveness of gendered inequality. In this section, I trace the trajectory of women’s development agenda as a response to the increased inequality. In doing so, I find that the role of international policy was sanctioned to guide, encourage or mandate countries (based on their circumstances) developing national agendas and policy frameworks that would facilitate in the alleviation of poverty and inequality. History notes that in the first two decades of international development work, organizations did not consider gender as a salient analytical tool. The inclusion of women’s advancement within the development framework is a recent addition within the confines of the United Nations and other transnational networks.

As international organizations began to include economic and social designs to improve quality of life in the 1950s, 60s and 70s and to stimulate economic growth for men, there was an assumption that eventually overall growth would reach women (Esther bose Estherrup, 1970, cited in Henderson & Jendel, 2014). Women’s development practitioners mobilized in the international development community and lobbied for increased funding for women’s programs by arguing that development process was not gender neutral and women did not benefit from development in the same way as men. It wasn’t until 1963 that the idea of using development aid monies (proposed by Ingra Thorsson in Swedish Parliament) led to the (government) funding of two distinct positions to the United Nations to ensure a voice for women at the policy level. Similarly, in the United States, Midred Marcy (of US Information Agency) made similar arguments and secured a spot through the Percy Amendment in Senate to integrate women into US funded development programs (Momson, 2004). Historical analysis confirms that these Women in Development (WID) approaches were linked directly to the second wave of feminism, based on liberal egalitarianism, that swept across the industrialized North and continued to argue that development agenda did not cater to women and therefore, emphasized the inclusion of women. Shortly after, the UN Commission on Status of Women, led by Finnish feminist Helvi Sipila, mobilized the passage
of for the UN General Assembly resolution calling for women’s integration into the
development agenda at large. These advancements led to the following decade being
dubbed the “decade for women” (www.unwomen.org).

The First World Conference on Women held in Mexico City (1975), followed by the
Second World Conference on Women held in Nairobi (1985) “galvanized public interest,
raised awareness on women’s issues and adopted international plans of action relating to
gender” (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014, Pg. 15). I emphasize that these conferences were
integral in jump-starting the mobilization which led to the recognition of the women’s
development agenda, reviewing progress and bringing awareness and encouraging senior
government officials from around the world to include women into their national development
frameworks. As the Mexico City Conference Plan of Action called for government prepared
reports on the status of women, countries established women’s ministries “with hopes to
create access points for domestic women’s movements to lobby, advocate and work for
explicit policies affecting women’s status” (Tinker, 2006, Pg. 277). These conferences led to
the facilitation of transnational feminist networks in 1970s and also the emergence of the
NGO Forum which brought together women activists to exchange experiences and build on
translational alliances. Women formed networks and identities while acknowledging their
differences during these conferences leading to “a new era and the sisterhood” that became
active in advocating women’s issues at the international level (Moghadam, 2005, Pg. 7). I
further outline the impact of these networks as policy machines in the next section.

women’s rights to participate in public life and called for the removal of barriers to equal
participation. Experts in the field claim that this acknowledgement of women’s political
representation was critical in ensuring equality and recognized structural barriers for women
through discriminatory laws and institutions which limited women’s access into the political
sphere (Interview with Rafi, 2015). The United Nations Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) built on these outcomes and set measurement guidelines which included the
proportion of women in parliamentary seats. As UN Women provided training and capacity
building, it also advocated inclusion of women in political parties and governments (Interview
with Mumtaz, 2017).

An increased attention to issues of motherhood surfaced in the 1970s on the
international development platform and the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)
emerged to promote, report and monitor the progress of various treaties (Interview with Rafi,
2015). In addition, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979 and defined what constitutes
discrimination against women. Pakistan, along with 173 countries around the world serve as
signatories legally binding national agendas to put provisions into practice. These
frameworks, utilized by development agencies actively lobbied for time, research and
resources to advance gender equality and have served as critical players in developing and
filling spaces in women’s policy machinery impacting developing policy (Interview with Rafi,
2015).

As development agencies navigate the 21st century shifting political economy have
to navigate the intersection of gender with poverty, political instability, social changes in
economic, social and political infrastructures. As a result, development agencies recognized that the increase in wars in the developing counties in the last few decades resulted in an increase in issues of war crimes and other violence against women within the context of poverty and deprivation. In the last few decades, the United Nations has focused on women, peace and security by recognizing the importance of women as integral in resolving issues of peace and security and negotiating peace agreements and reconstructing war-torn countries (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002).

In the decade of the 2000s, leaders and development agencies renewed efforts to women’s advancement by integrating gender within the larger development agenda as a result of the failed ambitious Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the United Nations with the promise to eradicate world poverty by the year 2015. Although MDG 3 focused on empowering women by achieving education parity and equalizing representation in Parliament and increasing the share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural sectors, critics argue that it did not encompass broader dimensions of tackling challenges of the disenfranchisement of women and girls (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014). Women’s advancement agenda includes equality dimensions around access to education, stable employment, adequate political representation and physical and mental well-being with the assumption that to ensure strong families and communities, development efforts must cater to raising quantity and quality of life for world citizens. Although overly ambitious, the MDGs, for the first time, included gender equality as central to the larger societal development (UN.org, accessed 2017).

2.3.4 Institutional Policy Machines

As an economic indicator of development goal, women’s political empowerment was regarded as a political public good. In unpacking the term empowerment, for this dissertation project, I assume that systemic marginalization of women exists and define it as the process of transformation from no or little agency to that of self-actualization and decision-making.

Scholarship in the field notes that women’s movements, as a response to international women’s participation awareness, led to the creation of “women’s policy machines” (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014, Pg. 52) that included emergence of ministries and bureaus that specifically addressed women’s issues. Although these agencies mushroomed in industrialized countries in the 1970s and 1980s, I find that it wasn’t until 1990s and into the 2000s that developing countries, such as Pakistan, recognized and created these policy machines. As these shifts were regarded as consequences of feminist movements (Beckwith, 2000) to pursue alliances with political parties to push for policy reform along with pressure from “femocrats”36 (Stetson & Mazur, 1995, Pg. 10), they played an influential role in outlining gender equality policies. These institutionalized women’s policy machines ranged from equal opportunity commissions and councils to departments and ministries of women with the aim of integrating gender concerns and international policy agendas. Researchers note these avenues provided further access to institutional politics (Stetson & Mazur, 1995).

36 Femocrats is a term used to refer to feminists employed as administrators, democrats in positions of power and to women politicians advocating gender equality policies (Stetson & Mazur, 1995).
As gender disparities continue to exist, even in the advantaged and interconnected societies (Human Development Report, 1995), institutions, like women’s machines, are linked to the “pervasive basis for such differentiations” (Young, 2000, Pg. 12) as “institutions involve the exercise of power to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others” (ibid).

Competing scholars claim that effects of institutionalization\textsuperscript{37} of women of anti-globalists claim negative correlation to the enhancement of women’s position in society and emphasize a level of reinforcement of “subordination” (Enloe, 1990, Pg. 67) which surfaces and further “perpetuates the revalorization of women’s work in most societies” (ibid). The growth in “capital mobility, trade and offshore manufacturing leads to an increasing feminization of labor because women continue to be constructed as dependents and thus confined to the worst paying jobs” (Gray, et. al., 2006, Pg. 4). These claims emphasize that institutionalization does benefit women’s placement in society as job opportunities through mechanisms provide women with a chance to participate in the workforce while simultaneously empowering their psyche as they strengthen personal autonomy and independence (Anshar and Barrientos, 1999).

In contrast, United Nations through its own policy machinery devoted efforts to women’s agenda through the platform of political machines like the Commission on the Status of Women and its administrative arm known as the Division for the Advancement of Women. These avenues lobbied national governments to establish similar structures and to assess progress of women’s advancements. The United Nations estimates nearly three-quarter national governments established national machinery for the advancement of women especially since the First World Conference of Women (1995) in Beijing (UN Fact Sheet No. 8). With the historic passage and adoption of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 180 nations around the globe committed to the intersecting 17 development goals, including Global Goal 5\textsuperscript{38} aimed to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. Subsequently, conferences and high-level meetings and commissions have incorporated gender into development dialogues with the recognition that gender intersections all other development in achieving sustainability. On the nation level, politicians were forced to pay more attention to women’s issues, organizations, and voters (Mumtaz Interview, 2017; Rafi Interview, 2015). As women’s ministries and bureaus emerged in national institutional structures as women’s political machines, so did the introduction and passage of moral laws with positive impact on women (Stetson & Mazur, 2012).

\textsuperscript{37} Institutionalization is borrowed from Gray, et. al (2006) and refers to a broad comprehension of globalization encompassing trans-border movement of goods, services, capital, people, ideas, information and symbols (Gray, et. al., 2006).

\textsuperscript{38} UN Global Goal 5, in achieving gender equality for women and girls, uses 9 targets to create action for gender equality. These targets include: end discrimination against women and girls; end all violence against and exploitation of women and girls; eliminate forced marriages and genital mutilation; value unpaid care and promote shared domestic responsibilities; ensure full participation in leadership and decision-making; universal access to reproductive health and rights; equal rights to economic resources, property ownership and financial services; promote empowerment of women through technology; and adopt and strengthen policies and enforceable legislation for gender equality (Globalgoals.org, 2016).
political parties around the world also made an increase effort to organize women’s sections within party structures (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014).

I find that Pakistan adopted the model of women’s political machines with the emergence of the National Commission of the Status of Woman (NCSW) a statutory body created by government in 2002, with the objective to ensure that all women parliamentarians focus on ensuring gendered legislation and policies (NCSW.gov.pk, accessed 2017). Similarly, the Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) was established in 2008 to facilitate coordination among all women parliamentarians across party lines. I expand further on the role of women’s political machines and the behavior of women parliamentarians within the case study of the National Assembly of Pakistan from 2008 to 2013 in Chapter 5.

2.4 Gender Quotas to “fast-track” Development

Just as women’s political machines are adopted as tools to alleviate inequalities, gender quotas, in forms of reserved seats, are also mandated in efforts to secure descriptive representation of women to allow for broader participation. For the purpose of this dissertation study, I emphasize that gender quotas serve as gatekeepers to representation (A.M. Zia, HLPF Statement, 2017). I further assert that it is the very role of gender quotas in political space to operationalize the inclusion of minority representation. I highlight that intersectional scholars (Lorde, 2003, 2007; Enloe 1990, 2000) claim women as being oppressed on the basis of gender, class, race and other social constructions. As women, historically, have been marginalized, (due to a multitude of factors ranging from patriarchal social structures, economic dimensions, social capital and political capacities) gender quotas are viewed as a productive strategy for advancing women’s representation in hopes to increase women’s empowerment through political representation.

Existing research examines that on average, gender quota laws translate into a ten percent increase in the number of women in office (Htun & Jones, 2002) when there is cultural support and less party leadership constraints (Franchet & Piscopo, 2008). Studies also indicate that newly elected women under quota system can provide substantive representation by pursuing policies related to women’s status (through policies related to reproduction, childcare, gender violence and work-life balance) in the public space (Krook, 2009; Mazhur, 2002).

Although research supporting and positively linking descriptive representation to substantive representation exists, scholars still claim that results are inconclusive whether quotas result in a shift for women’s status and in influencing political institutions for sustainable change. Perhaps quotas are necessary, but certainly not sufficient (Rincker, 2016), in securing gendered representation in public offices. I argue that; therefore, it is important to expand the scope of inquiry and include other variables as in assessing why quotas are not enough. The longitudinal correlation study in Chapter 5 will expand on additional variables.

2.4.1 Injecting Gender Quotas in Electoral Systems
Do electoral systems play a role in the adoption of gender quotas? Existing research notes that “if the mechanics of a particular electoral system exclude a large degree members of a particular ascriptive group (women or otherwise) then more often than not that is damning evidence that the system is excluding the interests of that particular group from the structures of decision-making power” (Reynolds, 1999, Pg. 549 cited in Jalalzai, 2016). This section briefly contextualizes the importance of electoral systems in the introduction of affirmative action mandates. I find that electoral systems do not act in isolation within the political space and there is a constant interaction with a host of cultural, socioeconomic and political variables to create a political dynamic that influences the curation of legislative assemblies. Although globalization can be a counter weight to the resistance of certain voting systems of the election of women, scholars note that women’s political mobilization can overcome the anti-women friendly electoral systems (Rule, 1987). Therefore, an electoral system is an important variable to women’s representation in legislatures because it determines the type of affirmative action that can be utilized and scholars in the field argue that “the electoral system is neither an unnecessary nor is sufficient condition to guarantee women’s representation” (Norris, 2000, Pg. 350).

As research in the field identifies electoral systems as a determinant in ensuring women’s political representation (Matland, 2003; Norris, 1987, 1997a, 2004; Norris and Inglehart, 2005; Sawer, 1997; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005), the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) indicates that proportional representation system, although has achieved only modest proportion of female legislators, allows for an increase in women in parliaments when compared to the majoritarian systems. Scholars note that the proportional representation government model is more conducive to effective gender quotas because of the inclusive nature because both the majority and minority proportionally translate party votes into party seats in parliaments. In contrast to the majoritarian system, based on principal-agent representation that reserves power to the winner (winner-take-all), proportional representation secures space for minorities. However, scholars have also indicated that perhaps there has been an exaggeration in assessing whether voting systems promote or hinder achievement of women’s presence in parliaments.

The representative government is democratic because it realizes not the majority rules but “minorities rule” (Dahl (1956, Pg. 132), and therefore, scholars argue that parliamentary systems of government provide a healthy platform for the success of gender quotas (Foreign Service Interview #1, 2016)). As a mechanism for achieving gender equality, gender quotas are “mandatory for targeted percentages of women candidates for public elections” (Global Database of Quotas for Women) in forms of constitutional, legislative or political party quotas. Scholars claim that quotas, an institutional tool, help women gain descriptive representation in parliaments and legislatures and potentially enable women’s representation (Krook, 2009).

2.4.2 Gender Quotas as Descriptive Representation

The discussion on political representation of women has been a topic of interest over the course of the last few decades as work around the gendering of political space has infiltrated national development agendas. As stated in the previous section, gender quotas are viewed as an institutional tool in achieving gains for women in political offices as
“mandatory or percentages of women candidates for public elections” (Global Database of Quotas for Women). Quotas are administered in forms of constitutional, legislative and or political party quotas and apply to minority or oppressed populations along religious, regional, ethnic and linguistic lines to fulfill the mandate of increasing the presence of women in the political space, defined as descriptive representation. Reserved seat quotas, as a policy measure, aim to fulfill international and domestic objectives of securing women’s political participation. On the international level, nation-states secure these commitments through the ratification of treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). On the state level, mandates are introduced as a dialogue on the underrepresentation of women from the political space which serves as messages to the citizenry at large that reforms are on way (Tripp and Kang, 2008). This provides opportunity for male dominated elites agree to the separate process of allocation of additional seats to women because it does not interfere nor does it take away seats from male candidates (Abbasi Interview, 2016; Ahsan Interview; 2016).

Scholarship in the field asserts that an increase in women in legislatures is witnessed as quotas are implemented into the national policy which leads to an increase in women’s representation as a “fast-track” (Dahlerup and Friendenwall, 2005) approach or a “jumpstart-mechanism” (Paxton and Hughes, 2015). The assumption of the above statement contends that the mere increase in numbers is sufficient as a temporary fix until women’s participation in politics doesn’t normalize. Comparatists in gender politics and similar academic disciplines have examined the impact of quotas by measuring the outcome of women’s representation. According to The Quota Project39, countries have adopted reserved seat quotas for women with the explicit intention to “ameliorate the under-representation of women in national legislatures” (www.quotaproject.org). More than 84 countries around the globe have mandated some form of quotas to enhance women’s representation in legislatures (Tripp and Kang, 2008). Although the rules and implementations vary, legislative quotas require parties to field certain number of women candidates (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008, 394). Pakistan adopted the development path crafted by the international community as mandated specifically by economic packages.

As international policy makers shifted their focus on increasing inequalities and poverty linked to neo-liberal economic policies, I argue that social policy began to surface as a tool to assist the poor and to masque its failed promises. Scholars note that these evolved social policies included elements of “targeting, privatization and pluralization of service provides, along with a great reliance on the market for poverty relief, mostly evident in micro-credit programmes” (Molyneux, 2006) and were viewed as (pro-market and anti-poverty) market fundamentalism as they were packaged in strict controls imposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Due to pressure and resistance, especially from Latin America, IFIs started pushing their role as more of facilitators in state-building.

As a response, in the 1990s Pakistan women activists loosely protested these social policies, however, not under the formal umbrella of neoliberal impacts but as critics of market led priorities instead of rights based. As the 4th World Conference on Women (WCW, Beijing,
1995) emphasized participation and empowerment of women, donor led projects surfaced in Pakistan as a result of World Bank’s New Poverty Agenda (which later translated into the Millennium Development Goals, MDGs) stressing gender equality and good governance as measurable goals of development.

In Pakistan, the mandate of reserved seats is a top-down policy which parallels the country’s checkered past of frequent leadership changes (due to military takeovers and shifts in governments). Military General Zia ul-Haq expanded reserved seats in the national assembly from 2-3% (reserved in 1954, 1956, 1962, 1967, 1970 and 1973) to 9% in mid 1980s and General Musharraf increased them further to 17% in national assembly and senate in post 9-11 Pakistan (in 2002). The impact on these mandates are void of organic grassroots efforts of women’s organizations.

I argue that the support for gender quotas draws on the potential link between descriptive and substantive representation. Existing research emphasizes that creation and strength of quota adoption is linked to the mobilization of activists who support the introduction as a positive mechanism (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). Scholars also note that quotas do disproportionally result in a labelling effect that further stereotypes the quota legislator as unqualified and appointment as lacking meritocracy (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008). Further, studies reflect on the top-down approach of quotas indicating that the increase in numerical representation is likely to benefit elite women who are disenfranchised from the women voters or women’s organizations (and movements) (Kittilson, 2005; Baldez, 2004). At times regimes, have used reserved seats to meet political agendas through patronage and power (Goetz, 2003) and ensuring party loyalty (Tamale, 1999; Tripp, 2000) or as bargaining tools to secure coalition partners (Chowdhury, 2002). Keeping these dimensions in purview, I investigate the variables that may impact the influence of gender quotas, as reserved seats, in Pakistan in Chapter 5.

2.5 Summary

From local to global dimensions, women’s leadership and political participation are restricted as women are underrepresented in the public sphere as voters, leadership positions, elected offices, civil service, private sector and academia. In the post Millennium Development Goals (MDG) world, women continue to be underrepresented despite proven abilities as leaders and agents of change, and despite rights to participate equally in democratic governance (Iqbal, 2013).

In this dissertation project, I argue that as women’s empowerment increases in society, distributions of power relations should shift as entrenched patterns of gender inequality across economic and social (in private and public) space are also re-configured. In my inquiry, I analyze historical and feminist dimensions of representation. In doing so, I first I examine the conceptualization of representation and the contextualization of formal and informal mobilization of women’s political participation in this chapter. Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between descriptive representation (how the legislator looks) and substantive representation (how the legislator acts) concluding that it is the activities and responsiveness of legislators rather than the physical characteristics that matter. If representing means “acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967,
Pg. 209), then, it is argued that, quality of representation depends on the mechanisms to hold representatives accountable. I argue this chapter facilitates the argument of this study serving as a foundational link between the linear relationship of substantive (politics of idea) and descriptive representative (politics of presence). The next three chapters will act as the three-part observational analysis of this argument by: (1) outlining the historical dimensions of representation for Pakistan; (2) tracing the feminist implications of women’s mobilization; and (3) observing the change in power relations within the confines of a 16-year period, through three successive National Assemblies of Pakistan.
Chapter 3

Historical Implications of Representation and Identity in Pakistan

3.1 Introduction

While this dissertation project serves as a reflection on the topic of representation and the study of power and decision making infrastructure within the confines of the globalized discourse on women’s political representation, this chapter discusses historical negotiations of theory and practice through non-academic sources of review. I employ this process of inquiry as a response to the hegemonic development and circulation of the existing understandings of the topic of women’s representation. I argue this process is better suited to examine social science concerns of the South and hope that it results in broader intellectual configurations to help capture a more realistic and culturally relative review.

I argue that as Pakistan’s story of representation is internationalized (Weim, Celik, & Wohrer, 2014) within the European context of democracy, an increase in tensions is observed between the societal needs and the compatibility level of the imported Western concepts. Existing literature highlights that the short history of Pakistan finds roots within the chronicles of colonialism (Sumar, 2002; Zing, 1999) nationalism (Khan, 2008), and women’s movements in South Asia (Shaheed, 2002; Jalal, 1991) through the intersection of contemporary struggles around issues of religion (Mahmood, 2005; Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1991; Bhasin, Nighat & Menon, 1994), statehood (Charania, 2007), human rights (Hasan, 2002), war and peace (Rashid 2000), sexuality (Khan, 2003; Rashid, 2006; Jahangir & Jillani, 1990), globalization (Rashid, 2000; Roy, 2004; 2007) and the exploitation of labor (Loomba and Lukose, 2012) as it continues to negotiate a framework of representation within its borders. Majority of these studies follow the unilateral track of inquiry dependent on hegemonic frameworks. I argue that these works dominate the production of knowledge in Pakistan on the topic of women’s political representation and therefore, in this dissertation, I utilize a slightly broader mode of inquiry by reviewing the co-constructions of knowledge (Weim, Celik & Wohrer, 2014).

Existing work highlights that women’s representation in elected assemblies throughout Pakistan’s parliamentary history has been largely marginal (Waseem, 2006) due to patriarchal social norms, feudal societal structures, politicization of religion, abject poverty and the “security-oriented character of the state” (Inayatullah, 1999). In order to gain a holistic understanding of the conceptualized representation in Pakistan, I argue it is necessary to delve into historical configurations of the changing environment of geo-political happenings. I examine the realities of state-building; the implications of representation as a concept imported from Western thought; and the political identity pre-and post partition of the region in order to counterbalance the current dominations of the hegemonic analysis and hope to add a new mode of understanding to the existing literature.

3.2 Historical Observations: An Overview

Pakistan has witnessed a panorama of turbulent history of regimes since its inception. It has passed through regional conflicts, military dictatorships, and corrupt democratic
command. History notes that the birth of Pakistan was marked by the religious and territorial dispute (over Jammu and Kashmir); onslaught of partition violence, followed by the decade of 1950s with American and British foreign policy lodged into the nation’s political fabric as it set up bases to spy on Soviet Union and is continued today through the post 9-11 War on Terror. I analyze that this not only played a role in weakening democratic institutions over the decades but also offered a conduit to political leadership and those in power to exert influence over the policies of the time, specifically in regards to women. I argue this resulted in a power balance of the military and democratic system being challenged as Western assistance made its way into the directives of Pakistan’s military.

First Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan (in office from 1947-1951) was assassinated by a nationalist and the first military coup by General Ayub Khan was immediately implemented (Rais, 2017). As the West intervened in Pakistan’s military and provided it with power, the democratic society slowly lost control to the army. The army continued to gain strength (both logistically and financially) paving the way towards the acquiring a nuclear power. I argue that this highly militarized psyche of the leadership and powers of Pakistan is necessary to highlight because it reflects on the masculine nature of policies and decision making.

During its early years, Pakistan found itself tangled in border clashes with Afghanistan as it entered an unnecessary battle between the West and the Soviet Union. I argue that Pakistan’s intervention in the Soviet/Afghanistan war (fought for the West) was the price of acquiring logistic and monetary assistance with the military’s atomic program. I argue this reflects the priorities surrounding national decision making and the policy agendas of the times. Scholars also highlights the Western perception of Pakistan as a hyper militarized and patriarchal society and culture which neglects the empowerment of its women and therefore, the West must save the veiled and oppressed (Blakeman, 2014) women of the region from this entanglement of religious and political oppression.

In addition, since its formation, Pakistan has stayed on guard and fought with India over the Indian controlled Kashmir and continues today as a hefty part of the nationalistic rhetoric (Khan, 2008). In 1971, analysts claim, Pakistan found itself engaged in the Indo-Pakistan War which led to the succession of East Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh which called into question nationalistic identities (Milam, 2009).

Historians note that continuous struggles and uprisings in provinces (especially Balochistan) to nationalistic policies of socialist Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (in office 1973-1977), the nuclear program and the power of the ISI to the Kargil War of 1989, and current complexities of right-winged religious parties have embraced the country (Milam, 2009). I argue the 9-11 era and the current conflict ridden environment is a testament to the failed nature of Pakistan as a state. In a pre-dissertation research, I found that the consistent collapse and re-emergence of resulted in state failure.

The decades that followed Pakistan’s military actively participated in the Arab conflicts including the Six-Day war, the north Yemen civil war, Black September and the Gulf War of 1990 (Associated Foreign Press in Dawn News, 2017). To further complicate the societal environment and its institutional structures of Pakistan, the wave of globalization (regarded
as the capitalist expansion and an economic integration of the worlds systems through liberal or neo-liberal economic policies) swept across the region.

With deregulation of economies and financial markets, capital flows, and the downsizing of government power and its commitment to social enterprises, trade liberalization through the reduction in tariffs, quotas and other commerce barriers led to the further tampering of the power balance as it shifted from military to multinational corporations. Scholars note that as multinational corporations became the center of the power hierarchy, government officials and the military were no longer the dominant player and the state’s sovereignty was sold to large trading blocs such as the EU, the NAFTA, the ASEAN, and MERCOSUR towards a pro free market system which favored the developed nations (Lipson, 2005; Bernstein and Pauly, 2007). I argue that today, we witness an ongoing debate indicative of shaping future discussions within the post 9-11 generation of scholars in the field as re-structuring of legal, social and economic history presents new interpretations and understanding of sociopolitical movements. These debates have resulted in constructions of new fundamentalist Islam within borders (Wolfe and Mendelsohn, 2007 in Bernstein and Pauly, 2007, Eds.).

3.3 Realities of State-building

I argue that prior to the formation of Pakistan as a state, its people and culture were victims of state led imperialism and expansion in India by the British; and since its creation, the people and institutions of the state have been subjected to liberal economic model of the West (engrossed in Adam Smith and David Ricardo’s notions of a positive sum of free trade). And thus, I argue, Pakistan has not had the time to develop its government, society and or identity because at each step of the way, it has been burdened with foreign influence and intervention in exchange for its national sovereignty.

I find that as institutions have not had a chance to develop, neither have the security dimension of societal contract, which is essential in securing minority and women’s rights. According to Max Weber, the state is, in essence, a compulsory organization with a territorial basis and as the state establishes itself, the basic functions and responsibilities it adheres to are centered on the notion of safety including the enactment of law, the protection of personal safety and the maintenance of public order (Ritzer, 2016). A review of the internal dimensions of Pakistan’s society indicate that the increased erosion of security had resulted in discouraging women from participated in the public space.

In understanding social contract theory, philosophers Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and John Rousseau argue that citizens are required to form an organization to band together in

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Roy (2004) defines new fundamentalism as “a common intellectual matrix that can nevertheless be manifested in various political attitudes” (Pg. 232).

Positive-sum of trade is the notion that countries can gain from exporting and importing because imports are good for an economy by helping consumers, lowering prices and increasing varieties for the buyers (Bhagwati, 2007).

Social contract, product of the Age of Enlightenment, outlines the legitimacy of authority of the state over individuals. Individuals surrender certain freedoms and submit to the authority of the ruler (decision maker) in exchange for protection of themselves and for all. It is a relationship between natural and legal rights (Morris, 1998).
efforts to secure comfort and security for all. Institutions of social contract are codified as law enforcement, are necessary products of governments (Morris, 1998). Sociologist Emile Durkheim referred to the state as a night watchman of the collective society with the responsibility of guarding it. Aligned with Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*, the civil society should counterbalance the efforts to avoid the night watchman from engaging in unfair and tyrannical patterns (Ibid). Scholars note that governmental charters and constitutions provide the platform for checks and balances on the institution of law enforcement so that the concept is not diminished by the abuse of power and authority. Within this context, I argue that Pakistan continues to grapple with its responsibility of providing security for women and minorities as a result of draconian legislation and lack of enforcement mixed with warped religious and cultural implications.

Existing research notes that the law and order in Pakistan has deteriorated since its creation as a result of laxed policing and lack of implementation of justice services (Patel, 2010). The police are often reluctant or refuse to act in cases of violence against women. Further, custodial violence and illegal detention by the police, slow suspension of justice, insufficient and inadequate judicial officers, detrimental and discriminatory and arcane laws against women (instituted in 1970s and 1980s during General Zia’s regime) allow perpetrators to avoid trial and punishment. International organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan have argued that the state machinery does not respond to women’s rights to safety and protection. According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2001), “the attitude of officers towards violence against women reflect the institutionalized gender bias which is pervasive in the state machinery including the law enforcement apparatus” (Pg. 102). Although it is the duty of the state to protect the individual from violence, enforce law and order and to establish an unbiased and efficient judicial system, I argue Pakistan’s failure to do so is its failure as a state to protect its citizens.

I consider Pakistan a failed state (Gros, 2012) because it is unable to perform the sovereign responsibilities of providing security, justice and public services. The weak and ineffective central government or institution of a failed state is a victim of social, political and economic failure which can perpetuate into the fabric of the state’s society and prompt greater issues of widespread corruption, criminality, erosion of legitimate authority (Kaufmann, 2010; Bhagwati, 2007), and as highlighted in the post 9-11 world, security concerns of terrorism. I argue that Pakistan has witnessed an increase in security tensions, both within its borders and across due to the lack of effective state mechanisms.

I argue that Pakistan, with a limited priority on state-building and a heavy focus on militarization and constructing a nuclear identity, coupled with foreign interventions and border disputes lacks a holistic national policy agenda specifically on state-building (A.M. Zia, 2018). There are competing theories that construct the motivational framework of state building as the idealist notions of state building are provoked by the spread of humanitarian

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43 Gros (2012) highlights states such as Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Pakistan, Kuwait and Cameroon as failed states due to their limited state-building capacity.

44 The idealist of liberal view of international world looks at the world through the perspective of humanitarian development with a focus on institutional organizations such as the World Health Organization
and democratic principles and the realist\textsuperscript{45} context of state building is influenced by the spread of capitalism and effective globalization (Lipson, 2005). As Fukuyama (2004) asserts that it wasn’t until the post 9-11 world that efforts to state-building were reflective in the agendas of international institutions (Payne, 2010). Scholars note that there is not a universal formula for state building and although some institutional capacity is transferrable (based on systematic and specialized objectives) others are not and therefore, should cater to individual states based on their culture, traditions, history and environment (Gross, 2012; Fukuyama, 2004; Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1991; Payne, 2010).

Since Pakistan’s baggage of wars and political turmoil can easily translate into its inefficiencies as a state, scholars, argue that these elements do not directly contribute to state\textsuperscript{46} failure. They do, however, exacerbate its likelihood in presence of a weak public administration system (Zing, 1997). Scholars argue the goal of state-building is to make the state self-sufficient and secure and the unrealistic transplant of attitudes and practices into a failed state of the West do more harm than good by glossing over the culture, environment and the people and their history (Fukuyama, 2004). As feminists in Pakistan agree with this notion with the adoption of women’s advancement policies, they advocate a more grassroots (local) solution to strategize the inclusion of social capital, cultivation of organizational norms based on the region itself (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1991; Waseem, 2006; Henderson and Jeydel, 2014).

3.4 Conceptualizing Representation as the Story of Pakistan

In studying the political representation of women in Pakistan, I argue it is important to first review the importance of representation for the country given its historical creation based along the need to secure equity in representation. I examine the origins of Pakistan through the lens of representation and outline the trajectory of its conceptualization in this section.

As I review the origins of the concept of representation, I find that sociologists remind us that human behavior is a product of human ideas and therefore, must be examined through networks of concepts which are products of recurrent human behavior guided by ideas (Ritzer, 2016). It is behaviors and ideas that are understood through notions of power and or interest captured through representation. These abstract conceptualizations of ideas and their link to representation is not a new phenomenon of exploration in the

\textsuperscript{45} The realist view observes the state of anarchy in the international realm as guided by individual states’ self-serving agendas of economic imperialism or security threats which undermined the international institutions not as multilateral forces but rather (if utilized at all) aligned with hegemonic interests (Lipson, 2005; Chohn, 2002).

\textsuperscript{46} Two examples: World history observes political instability, successive regimes (differing in political orientation) and abrupt and frequent political changes of France. Similarly, Germany witnessed periods of extreme disruptive changes such as the establishment of the unified Reich, the German Empire, Weimar Republic, Nazi dictatorship, post WW II, and East and West Germany separation and then reunification. Although these two states experienced heightened frustration, endured disunity and absence of political culture, they managed to not fall into the dismal black hole in the absence of public administration (Fukuyama, 2004) but maintained consistency and self-sufficiency in the organizational structures and institutions (Zing, 1997).
discipline. Although ancient Greeks did not have a specific world for representation, the idea of influence played a role in society formation. It was the Roman era that introduced the term representation (in old French as *repraesentare*) and it was in the thirteenth century that it emerged in Latin and utilized in the English language in political realms (as individuals participated in church councils or the parliament as representatives) (Lagarde, 1937). The term, eventually, took on a deeper meaning during the American and French revolutions as the right of man and the fight for freedom were posited (Fairlie, 1940). The deepened meaning associated with representation has since been linked to the notion of self-government and has, hence, seeped into the embodiment of present institutions. Today, representation is a condition characterized as a two-way correspondence (relationship) between the satisfaction and the belief that it is represented with the audience and can flourish in a democratic society with the preservation of freedom, equality and justice (Pitkin, 1972). I argue that this contemporary view of representation is utilized in international development arena as a tool to overcome inequality and therefore, I use it as the parameter this study.

I find that a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s story of representation is necessary within the context of global influencers and shifting post World War world systems. Scholars claim that mid-19th Century to mid-20th Century is defined by the redefinition of social, economic political realities as ideas of citizenship emerged (Kymlicka, 1995) and the legitimacy of popular sovereignty and citizenry were categorized as active and passive with active participating in decision making and passive defined as those without property (women and minorities) had natural civil rights, but were not allowed space to exercise political rights. Historians note that it was during this time that the world witnessed the passive citizenry form networks around ideas and manage a collective identity which resulted in securing political rights (Zing, 1999). As a result, I employ methodology of analysis that serves to further the inquiry into the role of identity formation, the redefinition of nationhood in the context of preserving minority representation is important in gaining insight into the current challenges of representation faced by Pakistan’s women (minority) population.

### 3.5 The Colonial Context

To understand the deeper roots of representation I argue that it is necessary to examine the world influencers of the time. Most of the nineteenth century is defined by the industrial revolution in England, marked by a continuing cyclical process of increased mechanization of production in the world system and the bourgeois revolution in France (Lake, 2010). Scholars note that it was during this time that ideas of citizenship emerged and the legitimacy of popular sovereignty were codified into specific categories of active and passive citizens (Mushaben, 2008) and the world witnessed the passive citizens organizing and fighting for political rights (Ibid). As the resistance surfaced, so did the growing need for the creation of social sciences as ways of understanding the real world as restricting and separation of knowledge lead to the invention of disciplines of studies (Bernstein and Pauly, 2007; Reimers, 2017).

In my previous research, I have argued that the story of Pakistan is the story of representation (A.M.Zia, 2018). Fearful of domination and wanting to secure a political voice
(in the colonized British India) that would not be drowned out by the Hindu majority in the subcontinent, I argue that the Muslims of India collectively organized through networks\textsuperscript{47} (Zing, 1999). Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, a Muslim leader in the British India and the Secretary of the renowned Aligarh College, stated:

We are numerically one fifth of the other community. If at any time, the British Government ceases to exist in India, we shall have to live as the subjects of the Hindus, and our lives, our property, our self-respect, and our religion will be all in danger... (cited in Alibiruni, 1950, Pg. 109).

Though the path of the independence movement can be characterized as anything but linear in securing space for the cultivation of a new political identity\textsuperscript{48}, it was, however, consistent in gaining momentum around a reformed view of nationalism from the turn of the century to 1947. The organized networks successfully transformed an abstract idea of political identity and representation by unifying segments of population across the subcontinent into tangible outcomes of a negotiated settlement of Pakistan and is regarded as quite remarkable by historians (Devji, 2013). It serves as the foundation of inquiry as its formation augmented the development of new global political futures and deviated from the conceptualizations of the Old-World nationalism\textsuperscript{49} (which can be argued to have potentially led to the failure of the League of Nations\textsuperscript{50} in maintaining world peace in the rapidly changing world) (Bernstein and Pauly, 2007; Bhagwati, 2007; Lipson, 2005; Ellis, 2003).

I analyze that the restructured nationalism\textsuperscript{51} transcended territory (soil) with the idea of a nation based on principle and the inherent right to self-determination. Scholars note that nationalism based on people and fraternity was born out of the revolutions of 1848 that sought independence from old monarchies that laid foundations of the new definition of nationhood based on the choice of people, to be governed by consent (Malesevic, 2006; 2013). I utilize this very conceptualized notion of representation as a modality of self-governance with the assumption that people are free, equal and capable of self-determination (Kohn, 1995; 2018). The abstract idea of nationalism, void of the traditional

\textsuperscript{47} Max Weber highlights the importance of networks and organizing through bureaucracy (Ritzer, 2016).

\textsuperscript{48} For the purpose of this discussion I define political identity as an extension of liberal democratic values around codifying integration and equality, especially of the oppressed. According to American Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. (1991), it has been applied retroactively to various global movements that long predate its coinage in the late twentieth century and is aimed towards integration of marginalized groups into mainstream culture.

\textsuperscript{49} Old world nationalism is defined as one rooted in soil as a unifier rather than along shared traditions, religion, customs, etc., while new nationalism, born out of the French Revolution, focused on humanity and liberal progress with “liberty, equality, fraternity” at its core and resonated with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, regarded as one of the basic charters of human liberties (Kohn, 2018).

\textsuperscript{50} With a mission of maintaining world peace, it was an intergovernmental organization founded in 1920 as a byproduct of the Paris Peace Conference which ended the First World War. Due to more failures than successes, it was dissolved in 1946 and somewhat morphed into the United Nations (Tomuschat, 1995; Ellis, 2003).

\textsuperscript{51} A belief that citizenship in a state is defined through ethnic, cultural, religious or identity group or that multi-nationality in a single state should comprise the right to express and exercise national identity even by minorities (Mushaben, 2008; Kymlicka, 1995).
blood and soil, brought together diverse and scattered Muslims of India to invoke a certain unity (Devji, 2016).

Political economists note that the fluctuating global political landscapes, because of both World Wars and the dissolution of the League of Nations, eroded the Old-World systems (Bernstein and Pauly, 2007; Bhagwati, 2007; Lipson, 2005; Ellis, 200) and disillusioned minority leaders, especially in the colonized world, and compelled the argument of national belonging as the international system of minority protections seemed to have collapsed (Zing, 1997). In addition, South Asian scholarship highlights that Mohammad Ali Jinnah, dubbed the founder of Pakistan, in a presidential address to the special Pakistan session of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation in 1941, announced the death of the League of Nations as a significant global event and stated: “you do not realize that the entire face of the world is changed from week to week and from month to month in the European and other fields of battle” (Ahmad, 1952, Pg. 213).

I find that Muslim and non-Muslim leaders of the Pakistan movement negotiated religious dogma and collectively progressed towards the idea of an independent Muslim nation. French philosopher on nationhood, Ernest Renan, argued that “if people make the choice of consolidating differences, perpetuate unity and will governance by consent, then, in fact, they cumulate a nation” (Pg. 2).

I argue that the creation of Pakistan challenged traditional politics and redefined nationality in the wake of Second World War and paved the way to a new dimension of political identity translating into the self-determined representation to avoid oppression by a majority. Decades after the creation of Pakistan and across the Atlantic, scholars of the black feminist group Combahee River Collective coined this movement identity politics as a political position held by people around common interests and or perspectives to form networks of influence and coalitions to amplify voice of the minority (Harris, 2007; Crenshaw, 1989). Although literature on identity politics is largely associated with intersectional American movements, and can theoretically be traced back to James Madison’s reference of “factions” in Federalist Paper No. 10 (1787) and also witnessed within the creation of the Jewish state of Israel, I argue it is visible between history pages of the subcontinent’s pre- and post- partition India, the independence of East Pakistan, the political challenge of Kashmir and more recently the Balochi and Pashtun movements. As a Governor-General of the newly created Pakistan, Jinnah compared the politics of identity in the context of nationhood and sense of belonging at a meeting in Dacca, Bangladesh in 1948 by

52 A black feminist organization based in Boston (1974-1980) that highlighted void in addressing needs of people of color within the white feminist movement and explored concepts of identity through political organizing and social theory (Women’s Realities, 2005).

53 “Now I give you an example. Take America. When it threw off British rule and declared itself independent, how many nations were there? It had many races: Spaniards, French, German, Italian, English, Dutch and many more. Well, there they were. They had many difficulties. But mind you, their nations were in existence, and they were great nations, whereas you had nothing. You have got Pakistan only now. But there a Frenchman could say "I am a Frenchman and belong to a great nation," and so on. But what happened? They understood and they realized their difficulties because they had sense; and within a very short time, they solved their problems and destroyed all their sectionalism, and they could speak not as a German or a Frenchman or an Englishman or a Spaniard, but as an American. They spoke in this spirit: "I am an American" and "We are Americans"; and so, you should think, live, and act in terms that your country is Pakistan and you
highlighting the example of the United States which was also constructed around common ideals of freedom and liberty by successfully destroying “sectionalism” and identified collectively as Americans (Ahmad, 2003).

The review of representation in the context of the creation of Pakistan signifies the Western import of democratic ideals which, I argue, had implications for the development of new political identities. The next section outlines the origins of the established Muslim political identity which, I argue, was carried on to Pakistan.

3.5.1 Muslim Political Identity in British India

In understanding the origins of the Muslim political identity in the sub-continent, specifically in British India, it is important to assess the modes of influence of the time. From mid-1800s, young men of top echelons of British Indian society from around the Raj, were sent to study in London. Saigol (2016) examines that “the British replaced the traditional education systems prevalent in India with their own, not to liberate the local population from the shackles of feudal and traditional arrangements, but rather to create a class of loyal Indians schooled in British traditions who would owe their position in society to the colonial intervention” (Pg. 3). Muslims of British India were caught in a complex space as they negotiated between the sense of tradition and modern knowledge. Scholars note that these differences were reconciled by a division of the public and private space which emerged within Muslim community as it placed the burden of “guarding the symbolic frontiers of identity by maintaining tradition and culture” and encouraged men to enter “fields of politics and commerce where transactions occurred with the colonial state and competing religious communities” (Pg. 3). These education reform movements tried to maintain patriarchal control and domination in the home and family which was a “measure to ensure continuity with the past while stepping into an uncertain future created by an ‘other’ or outsider” (Pg. 3).

Simultaneously modernist leaders supported the education of the Muslim males while expressing skepticism of the secular western education (Sheikh Interview, 2018) effects on Muslim women who were confined to religious and domestic boundaries of knowledge (Saigol, 1997; Zing, 1997). These debates continued through the partition between modernist and traditional Muslims as the Muslim identity, in the context of marginalization, constructed in the background of aggressive intervention of the masculine colonial state that resulted in the emasculation of the Muslim nation, ideology and geographical boundaries. I argue that these elements of power and control transferred onto the gender dimensions of the newly established Pakistan. Similarly, remnants of these thoughts echo the marginalization of minority representation even in today’s Pakistan with its post-colonial and post 9-11 nationalism.

54 Saigol (2016) cited Honorable T.B. Macaulay (dated Feb 2, 1835)’s comment “I feel with them that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern, --a class of persons Indian in blood and color, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and intellect.”
3.5.2 Pre-Partition Muslim India

I find that pre-partition motivations of the Muslim community in India are important to contextualize in attempts to understand the formation of a political identity along religious lines which, I argue served as a conduit to the need for representation. Historians trace the origins of outlined identity differences between the Hindus and the Muslims in India as a response to the British patterns of codification in India (Saigol, 2016). The East India Company arrived in India in early 1600s and by the late 1700s had morphed into a thriving firm of British merchants that ruled India with its own army. As the English power continued to expand in the 1800s, the resentment of Indians grew towards the British and I argue this paved the way for the need to cultivate a both collective and individual identities in response to the British. Per historians, it was the Mutinies of 1857 that marked the turning point in the history of the British Raj as it brought an end to the 250-year-old East India Company. The British government dissolved the Company and took direct control of India when British interests were threatened (Saigol, 2016). At the same time the pan-Islamic political campaign, the Khalifat movement, was launched by Muslims of India to influence the British government to avoid abolishing the Ottoman caliphate (which at the time was regarded as the symbol of political Islam) (Minault 1982).

The pan-Islamic activism and political identity spread across British India. Many Muslim families barred their children from being educated at English universities because they did not want to promote of English language and Western education and wanted to establish their own ethnic independence. As a result, interest in traditional and religious understanding of activism, mobilization and citizenship arose. Indian parents sent their children to Aligarh Muslim University and others which were set up for native Indians. In the analysis of the dichotomy between the western educated and Indian educated Muslims scholars note that “western education, accompanied by imitation of Western culture, brought in its wake intellectual and cultural separation between Muslim elite who were Westernized and loyal to the British Government, and the poorer classes of illiterate Muslims” (Zing, 1996, Pg. 33). The Western education created a chasm between the Muslim leaders and two ideological groups surfaced: the orthodox religious leaders, mostly ignorant of modern sciences and technology; and the modern educated classes who “lacked Islamic fervor and

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55 According to Blunt (2000), the Mutiny of 1857 in India is marked in history as a major uprising against the Bright East India Company’s rule. At the time the Company functioned as a sovereign power on behalf of the British Crown. Also, known as the Sepoy Mutiny and the Indian Rebellion was widespread across areas of Meerut, Delhi, Cawnpore, Lucknow, Jhansi and Gwallor.

56 A political mobilization and resistance in South Asia as a protest to Western attack on the Ottoman Empire and a show of resistance for the Indian Muslims who did not wish to fight the Muslim Turks. The movement collapsed in 1922 as Turkey accepted secularism and abolished the roles of the Caliph (Minault, 1982).

57 Originally founded in 1875 as the first modern institution of higher education for Muslims in India as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh Muslim University was the leading intellectual center of Muslim political activity. Before 1939, the faculty and students supported an all-India nationalist movement, however, as WWII began, the political sentiments shifted towards demands for a Muslim separatist movement and tremendous intellectual support originated from Aligargh University as the hub of success of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League, who adopted the objective of self-governance for India within the Empire in the early 1900s (Ambedkar, B.R., 1946).
had only a nodding acquaintance with their religion” (Pg. 33) signifying a major divide in ideology around nationalism, religion and modernity.

I argue these historical accounts are important to review because it serves to understand the role of communal rhetoric in the development of identity which led to the mobilization of activism around representation. In my review of the historical implications, I find that a communal political identity was established by community elites, not as a source of mobilization but also as a source persuasion. One account that reflected this is by Lady Minto, wife of British colonial diplomat and statement Gilbert John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, as she recounts in her dairy the utilization of religion as a political strategy by Muslim leaders:

“The Aga Khan arrived to stay with us today...He says that the only real way to appeal to the feelings of Natives is by means of the superstitions of their religion, and consequently he has instructed the priests in every mosque to issue a decree that any Mohammedans who incite to rebellion, or go about preaching sedition, will be eternally damned” (Zing, 1996, Pg. 33).

From this point in the historical timeline of Muslim representation, I assess that in pre-partition India that the division of political representation within the Muslim community took root as leaders took advantage of religious fervor and geo-political happenings.

At this point, I would like to introduce the implications of the Muslim League, a major political party, in establishing a grounded political identity. The Muslim League rose out of the literary movement at the Aligarh Muslim University, which advocated first the establishment of reserved representation for Muslims in the Hindu majority India and later shifted its agenda towards the establishment of a separate Muslim majority nation-state which successfully led to the partition of British India in 1947 (Zing, 1999; Zing, 1996). The Muslim League utilized various strategies which garnered them success including the inclusion of women and their contributions and utilization of symbolic representation to unify ethnically diverse Muslims of India towards a unified idea of a state (Sheikh Interview, 2018).

During elections of 1946 in India, the Muslim League secured majority of Muslim votes and seats in both central and provincial assemblies which led to Congress to recognize the Muslim League as the sole representative body of Indian Muslims (Zing, 1996). I argue the importance of the election for the creation of a strong pre-partition Muslim identity which carries its weight even today in contemporary Pakistan as its political history continues to struggle between religious orthodoxy and secularism. While the province of Punjab served as the battleground, the Muslim League built its power base by incorporating countryside policies of patronage (with loyalties of landlords and pirs who exerted local influence); the

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58 Per Oliver Roy (2007), secularism is a social phenomenon that requires no political implementation. It comes about when religion seizes to be at the center of human life even though people still consider themselves believers.

59 Pir refers to a saints, spiritual guide or teacher. In south Asia, it translates into guidance and instructions on various life paths, including political allegiances. In today’s Pakistan, it still exits as followers, regarded as murshid refer to them for their guidance. The pir culture holds a special place in hearts of South Asians it was the early Muslim mystics who were responsible for converting large parts of the Indian
utilization of religious symbolism by incorporating political narrative into the joined communal prayers and held meetings after the Friday prayers as they toured villages and cities across India; by quoting scripture from the Quran to gain emotional support which translated into financial support; harnessed the biradar (extended family) network and appealed to tribal loyalties to accelerate support amongst landlords (which resulted in exploiting indentured servitude for votes which continues today); influenced students across Indian universities through activism and political ideology to carry the basic message to the masses and functionally organize and mobilize masses; and also exploited the post-WWII economic slump by providing jobs within the organization that resulted in allegiance to the cause (Khan, 2008).

I find that playing into the strategy of using superstition and control of the masses, Muslim League also cozied up to the spiritual Islamic landscape dominated by the pirs, saints (and or spiritual guides). Muslims of Punjab at the time offered their allegiance to the pirs providing them with considerable political influence. The Muslim League tactfully used the urs ceremonies (enthusiastic death anniversaries of saints passed) and musical compositions of qawalli (devotional music) at shrines for meetings and rallies which influenced the narratives of the fatwas (Islamic ruling of position on a topic) pronounced by the pirs (Zing, 1996; Sherani, 1991) which continue even today.

The Muslim League drew on support of the Islamic scholars and Sufi pirs by voicing the rallying cry “Islam in danger” (Zing, 1997, Pg. 18) which resulted in the various ulama endorsements as well, including the Barelvi Ulema’s fatwa and the Deobandi Ulema’s support. I argue that this reflects an example of collective action centered on the development of a political identity. It is important to note that the Deobandi Ulema initially opposed the creation of Pakistan and the two-nation theory because they wanted a multi-religious nation, not one exclusively for the social unity of Muslims and highlighted the fact that most of the Muslim League leaders proposing a specific Muslim political identity were not practicing Muslims and hence, did not understand the philosophical implications of a religiously formed nation-state (Ibid). I will address the implications of this in the post-partition Pakistan section as it carried and continues to carry staunch consequences that play into Pakistan’s continuous identity struggle between religious orthodoxy (as understood through narrowed lens of political leaders for gains) and secularism (Khan, 2008).

Historical review indicates that the election results indicated a win for the Muslim League in 7 of the 11 provinces. The main motivating and integrating factor was the desire for representation within the Muslim intellectual class. As the masses needed a platform to unite, I argue the Muslim League introduced western thought by John Locke, John Milton...
and Thomas Pain of representation and citizenship and capitalized on the Aligargh Muslim University to disseminated the narrative that initiated the emergence of the Pakistan movement. In regards to the policy of creating an independent state of Pakistan, with the threat of succession if not granted, Lord Mountbatten, Viceroy of British India, commented about Jinnah that “there was no argument that could move him from his consuming determination to realize the impossible dream of Pakistan” (Zing, 1996, Pg. 43) which I argue highlighted the intensity of the Muslim agenda to secure representation.

In the backdrop of the formation of distinct political identities within the minority segments of British India, Britain did not wish to break up India and arranged the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 as its last attempt to decentralize but keep India united. The erosion of trust on all three sides of the political triangle (Indian Hindus – Britain – Indian Muslims) led to a non-agreement which paved the road to the partition of India. As the two main political parties, the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League determined a power sharing arrangement between the respective communities and the Cabinet Mission held talks with both parties to prevent communal disputes. As both Hindus and Muslims sought representation, the Congress (under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru) advocated a strong central government with oversight over the state governments; and the Muslim League (under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah) wanted to keep India united but with political safeguards provided to Muslims such as parity in legislatures (a secured representation) across India to avoid the transfer of the British Raj to that of a Hindu Raj.

In the geo-political backdrop, the constraints of WWII transformed the national political landscape in India and re-shaped the motivations of provincial politicians while strengthening the demands for a separate Muslim homeland. The agenda of parity in legislature eventually led to the end of the British Raj and the partition of India as a political space was carved out with membership based on a unified religious identity to secure representation. On August 14th, 1947 Pakistan gained its independence from India and the world witnessed the creation of a nation-state formed under the exclusive unifying identity of religion on the maps and within less than a year, the world witnessed the creation of the Jewish state of Israel on May 14th, 1948. I argue that both these new global members rooted their identity along religious lines giving rise to the freshly implemented conceptualizations of nationalism and political identity. I note that these new reconfigurations of nationalism were not grounded in soil and political identity meant common political goals (Zia, 2018).

I further assess that perhaps the independence of India and Pakistan from the British Empire played a role in prompting a wave of decolonization that swept across Asia

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61 Having realized that the independence was inevitable, the British formulated the plan to keep India united so it could still influence a system of imperial defense even after granting it independence. Per Darwin (2011), “…the British still hoped that a self-governing India would remain part of their system of defense and was desperate to keep India and its army united” (Pg. 2). Retrieved from Darwin, John (2011). “Britain, the Commonwealth and the End of Empire”. BBC.

62 Mohandas K. Gandhi was an Indian activist and leader of the Indian Independence movement against the British rule and globally recognized for his practice of non-violent civil disobedience. Jawaharlal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of the Independent India and also a central figure in Indian politics pre-partition. Both leaders advocated a secular nation-state (Zing, 1997).
and Africa based on the need to secure a voice through representation. In the next section, I outline a historical review of the realities of the new nation-state formed on the basis of a single religion along the Western construct of representation and democratic values of pluralism.

3.6 Post-Colonial, Post-Partition Pakistan

In the previous sections I have outlined that the creation of Pakistan find roots in the need to secure representation for a single religious minority. I have also highlighted that the creation of Pakistan was focused on Western ideals of representation and democratic pluralism. I argue that complexities exist between these two motivations. Can a nation-state focus on ideals of one religion secure fair representation for multiple religions?

I examine post-partition realities through historical and theoretical lens. I find that although a peaceful formation of nation-state on paper, the realities of independence included communal violence, erosion of ethnic identities and served as a breeding ground for religious tensions fueled by propaganda that demonized the other (Mushaben 2008) community which was utilized by politicians and local leaders for influence purposes. In examining the negotiation of competing rhetoric of religious and secular governance, I utilize Mushaben’s (2008) concept of othering the minority and marginalized in the context of citizenship. In the next chapter, I examine the narration and historical implications of the violence of mass transfer of people across the freshly laid boundaries as cited through women’s voices (through use of poetry). I find that communities on both sides of the partition were attacked and killed in their homes and neighborhoods while traveling in convoys via train or foot. During the journey, women were raped, assaulted, and abducted and separated from their families in large numbers (Zing, 1997). Although there is sparse literature narrating the realities and horrors of the partition in Pakistan, scholars have been able to identify a depraved privilege of the hatred which brewed as men used women’s bodies were utilized as a battleground of violence and community identities were relegated to a visual of corpses lined roadsides and in villages.

Through my interviews for the examination of women’s representation, I inquired about the violence of the partition targeted towards women, children and men. Most respondents agree that mass violence took place but surprisingly respondents were not willing to share stories of personal experiences shared by their grandparents or parents who migrated to Pakistan from India. I argue that there seems to be a certain rose-tinted memory of the positive experience of the partition which led to a new life and new space for Muslims. I find that history books also codify the partition as one of the most peaceful independence (of course on paper). I argue that it is only now in contemporary Pakistan and India that projects of partition recollection have spurred an interest in efforts to record details from a fleeting generation that witnessed it.

I argue that the displaced identities of the partition are reflective in communities of India and Pakistan today because both nations have not faced the realities of the forced division of a single nation and has resulted in sustained hatred along communal, ethnic and religious parameters in South Asia. I find that there are unresolved questions about the place of religious minorities in both India and Pakistan which translate into an uncertain placement
of identity and belonging. In India, with a substantial Muslim minority the constitution promises explicit commitment to secularism and to the separation of religion from the institutions of the state. However, the narrative of Muslims in India as outsiders still lingers which was re-born out of the partition resulting in the rise of majoritarian Hindu politics targeting Muslims in the echoes of horrors of the partition years. In Pakistan, home to a small number of religious minorities, the negotiation of relationship between Islam and the state remains complex as successive waves of displaced policies of Islamization, combined with military and civilian rules, have continued to marginalize minorities. Both nation-states have witnessed their own share of minority violence which showcase the pervasive narrative of hatred that is continuously utilized by leaders for political gains.

Historians note that Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s vision of an independent Pakistan, although rooted in representation for Muslims also offered secular dimensions of nationalism and citizenship. He was supported by Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Jews and Christians who lived in Muslim dominated regions of undivided India along with the Muslim communities (Zing, 1996). A review of the formation of governance structures months after partition indicate that the founding fathers of Pakistan included renowned Hindu, Christian, Ismaili and Ahmadiyya sect leaders who internalized the declaration that non-Muslims would be equal citizens in the new country. These included the notable and influential Hindu figure in the Pakistan movement, Jogendra nath Mandal from Bengal. Representing the Hindu contingent calling for an independent Pakistan, he is regarded as one of the founding fathers of Pakistan. Pre-partition and even immediately post-partition there were other non-Muslim leaders such as Sir Victor Turner, a practicing Christian stood behind the vision of Pakistan and played a vital role in the movement in the context of economic and financial planning of the country. Responsible for establishing the Pakistan civil service, he also guided Pakistan in its early years on economic affairs, taxation and in the handling of administrative units. Similarly, Alvin Robert Cornelius served as a Chief Justice of Lahore High Court. These notifications shed light on the dual nature of secularism and nationalism as founders of Pakistan tried to find a balance. I note that at the time of the partition in 1947, non-Muslims made up 23% of the population (Vali Nasr, 1999) (and, today, less than 3% of non-Muslims make up the population).

Historian Vali Nasr (1999) argues that Islamic universalism had become the main source of the Pakistan movement that shaped patriotism within the non-Muslim leaders of the movement as well. However, post-partition historians analyze that most of the non-Muslim leaders of the movement although securing positions in various ministries, high courts, etc., returned to India and did not wish to continue their life and work in the newly created Pakistan. I argue that this can only lead one to conclude that they foreshadowed, perhaps, a state which would abandon notions of secularism. I further contend that the complexity in negotiating religious and secular identities of the country arose right after the partition.

Through my qualitative investigations on the topic through personal interviews and or conversations, I argue that scholars and researchers continue to narrate the story of Pakistan, more than 70 years later, through the lens of nationalism by chasing Mohammad Ali Jinnah (his Anglicized personal life, his western political thought, and his speeches of securing minority rights) and continue to examine the basis of the Pakistan’s establishment
through the secular notion of its origins. I argue that this creates a confusing understanding from history books to personal comprehension to the current narrative.

A review of historical literature finds that leaders from pre-to post-Pakistan used Islam to gain legitimacy for the vision, the rule, and as a tool of state policy. I argue that the institutional and systemic marginalization of religious minorities in Pakistan finds roots in the very ideology of its creation based on the fear of persecution by the majority. Scholars note that perhaps it was the 1949 Objectives Resolution, the pre-constitutional document that later became a substantive part of the Constitution, that included religion in politics. The adoption of the resolution marked the beginning of compromise between the secularists and those seeking the Islamic state (Nasr, 1999; Shaikh, 2014) as Jinnah’s vision for the new state based on inclusivity and pluralism (Devji, 2013) was sidelined. This is regarded as the beginning of the rapidly growing oppressive hardline politics of mainstream religious representation seen today in Pakistan, which, I argue, ironically was the very oppression the founder(s) of Pakistan were trying to escape in post-British India.

Scholars note that in the newly formed Pakistan (along religious lines) by Muslim League leaders with Western education lacked the blueprint for a political Islamic state (Zing, 1996; Zing, 2010; Devji, 2013). Shaikh (2014) argues that the ambiguous heritage, sheer abstraction and lack of political foundation resulted in unclear state policies. Founder of the religious political party Jamaa-e-Islaami (JI), Abdul al-Maududi, was tasked with laying the foundation for an Islamic state based on the underlying assumption that sovereignty rested with Allah and that the state’s functions were solely to administer the country with Sharia, Islamic laws, as the law of the land and laws could not be made that would contravene the Sharia (Zing, 1996).

I argue that the Objectives Resolution, as part of the constitutional blueprint, made state policy subservient to the teachings and requirements of Islam. In the political realm, intersection of faith and reason have resulted in complex differences and scholars of law and philosophy have recommended that the very inclusion of religion in state affairs and building the country around the teachings and traditions of Islam would further sideline minorities and perhaps even create rifts within Islam (Zing, 1997). However, Liaqat Ali Khan, one of the founding fathers of Pakistan and the first Prime Minister, void of deep political insight in his actions and decisions post-partition (Zing, 1996) stated that one of the most important achievements of the independence was the right to an Islamic nation-state and, therefore, it was necessary to include Islam into the state affairs. Along the same lines, General Zia ul-Haq, during a 1981 interview with The Economist, stated that “Pakistan is, like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it would fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse” (Pg. 48). I argue that perhaps it was the need to fit Islam into the Western construct of democratic ideals and pluralism that led founding leaders to task the reformist Islamic scholar of the

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63 SOCH Conference at Columbia University (March 2018) titled “Rethinking the Partition” where I was invited to the panel on “Minority Representation in Pakistan”, New York City, New York.

64 Jamaat-e-Islama (JI) is an Islamic political organization and social conservative movement founded in 1941 in British India by Maulana Maududi rooted in revitalizing modern revolutionary conception of Islam (Adams, 1983) and continues to play a significant role in present day Pakistan.
time, Maududi, with outlining religious democratic parameters for the newly formed Pakistan. I also contend that

Following the resolution, the Ahmadiyya sect (and community) was declared non-Muslim by the state and other minorities such as Christians, Hindus and Sikhs became victims of targets of suicide bomb attacks in neighborhoods, battled forced conversions to Islam, vandalized graveyards and victims of blasphemy laws (Zing, 1997).

Pakistan is one of the four countries (including Iran, Iraq and UAE) in the world with a constitution that indicates an Islamic basis for legislation. Article 1 of the 1973 Constitution confirms Pakistan as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; Article 2 stipulates Islam as the state religion; Article 31 states that it is the Pakistani government’s duty to foster an Islamic way of life; Article 33 states that it is the country’s duty to discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian, and provincial prejudices among citizens and unfortunately, Article 33 has not been utilized to protect the Muslim and non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan in a serious, disciplined method (Pakistan Constitution, accessed May 5, 2018).

Although created along religious unifying elements, I argue that Pakistan is divided along ethnic, provincial, cultural, religious, class and linguistic lines in the background of civilian and military manipulations for political gains. This religious identity, morphed into a national identity, imposed the artificial construction of a communal narrative and forced ethnically different Muslims of India to come together under a common banner of nationalism. I argue that the country’s checkered history of consistent overarching influence and power of the military, geo-political entanglements, punctuated equilibrium policy processes as a young democracy and lack of substantive representation have furthered sidelined the minority communities, including women.

Further advancing the continuous negotiations between religious orthodoxy and secularism, governments of Ayub Khan, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq all adopted policies to include pirs within their government mandates by securing the Department of Auqaf which administered the shrines to influence their message (Ewing, 1983). Scholars note that this inclusion of pirs into the government agendas and policy served as a conduit to rallying support in the countryside which, although, resulted in “retarded modernization and democratic growth” (Sherani, 1991, pg. 216) did strengthen government rule.

Although General Zia’s Islamization of legislation in Pakistan has, no doubt, sidelined religious and ethnic minorities along with women and girls at the intersection of militaristic politics and religious dogma resulting in the growth of intolerance; it was in the absence of two of the larger political parties (PPP and PMLN) during General Musharraf’s tenure, that provided space for hardline religious parties to gain influence in mainstream politics (Saigol, 2016). Consequently, I argue, the growing intolerance, draped in the veil of religious sentiments, has resulted in multiple episodes of mob protests and violence against various religious minorities (including Christian, Hindu, Sikh, and the Ahmadiyya communities) and different sects of Islam (Shia-Sunni clashes) across the country. Intercommunal violence and blasphemy laws add to the challenges of securing expression and representation of minority communities.
Although proportional representation (PR) system of governance is best suited towards inclusion of minority representation (Tripp, et. al., 2009; Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Waseem, 2006) and Pakistan’s reserved seats do place religious minorities in Provincial and National Assemblies (Zia, 2014; Mumtaz & Shaheed, 1999; Saigol, 2016; Rincker, 2016), scholars note that mere descriptive representation is not sufficient since it does not lend legislative power or influence towards policy (Waseem, 2011). I argue that this lack of substantive representation feeds into the marginalized rhetoric of non-Muslim segments of Pakistan’s population as minority persecution is embraced within parameters of the law as witnessed through intercommunal violence and non-secular laws.

3.7 Conclusion

I find that with the turbulent history of pre- and post-Pakistan in the backdrop of shifting global realities of the Old World and the New World Order, South Asia has had its share of complexities in historical analysis and has provided scholars with an interest in inquiry. Deeply rooted in colonial frameworks coupled with prospects of embedded liberalism, I argue, Pakistan finds its identity in the midst of political negotiations along religious, cultural, liberal economics and realist politics. I find that the course of Pakistan is defined by the need to secure representation in British India; by understanding the journey through political motivations, religious fervor; and by coalition building and responsiveness to Western pressures in light of the Cold War. I note that this analysis is a product of mining data (knowledge) that is presented through popular networks.

Scholars proposing alternative knowledge production relative to the South note that as narratives are (re)configured upon dissemination, subtle transformations of everyday practices (re)shape popular discourse (Keim, Celik & Wohrer, 2014). I argue that Pakistan continues to face the challenge of preserving a religious identity parallel to nationalism. In addition to securing a functioning democratic space, I note that further inquiry into the effective representation of minority communities, especially religious minorities, through coalition building and networks is necessary.

In the next chapter I continue the discussion of women’s political representation in Pakistan. In efforts to engage beyond the dominant discourse of women and development, I introduce a framework that adds to the existing debate on women’s agency by examining non-traditional avenues of political expression.
Chapter 4

Gendered Implications on Women’s Agency

…It is we sinful women
who come out raising the banner of truth
up against barricades of lies on the highways
who find stories of persecution piled on each threshold
who find the tongues which could speak have been severed?
-Kishwar Naheed (Ahmad, 1991)

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I outlined the historical underpinnings of the post-colonial reflection of Pakistan’s historic trajectory in the context of women’s political participation. As highlighted through the analysis, the link between the international dimensions of political and the historical implications for the young democracy of Pakistan is not fully outlined in regards to the understanding of the local institutional environment and challenges relative to the South.

Existing scholars of knowledge assessment explain this phenomenon as a product of the emergence and development of the global regime of knowledge production and circulation rooted in hegemonic tendencies (Okamoto, 2013). I argue that established work on the topic focuses on religious and societal underpinnings, nationalistic fervor and a mix of cultural tendencies of the Arab world and the Hindu majority of pre-partition, and the scholarship of women’s political representation and is framed within the international conceptualization of women’s empowerment and development.

To grasp an understanding of women’s agency in Pakistan, I argue, it is necessary to examine the histories of colonialism, nationalism and women’s movements in the region as well as contemporary struggles faced by women around issues of sexuality, religion, human rights, war, peace, globalization and the exploitation of labor. Major challenges in South Asia to women's agency are centered around conceptualizing feminism (Zia, 2014; Jamal, 2010; Shaheed, 2002), power and decision making (Enloe, 2000; Waseem, 2007; Memon 1998) and the centralization of religious fundamentalism (Shaheed, 2009; Saigol, 2010; Zia, 2009; Loomba and Lukose, 2012) in state-led policymaking (Ahmad, 2003, Talbot, 2005; Malik 1998; Toor 1997). As women are often powerless in their households, with no access to public spaces, and with lack of social services, their situation translates into economic poverty, poor health, lower levels of personal safety and overall inability to make choices about their own lives (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014; Bari and Zia, 1999). I argue this hinders women's representation in the public sphere.

In this study, women’s agency is understood through the lens of religion as “a bridge between the realms of the spiritual and social” (Shaheed, 2002: 366) within the political space suggesting that political expression of Islam is central to the empowering and personal agenda of the Muslim woman in Pakistan. Existing research defines and, therefore,
understands women’s participation in the public space through Western defined structures of modernity, development, democracy and secularism. I argue that there is a lack of utilization of local sources of knowledge (Keim, Celik & Wohrer, 2014) in inquiry of women’s representation in Pakistan. Therefore, this chapter examines local sources of knowledge including data, concepts and theories in understanding local realities of women’s agency in political representation in attempts to reflect beyond the collective fervor of Islamic nationalism as mentioned in previous studies (Zia, 2004; 2009; 2014; Waseem, 2002; 2006; Shaheed, 2009; 2002).

This chapter utilizes an alternative social science perspectives from the global South with roots in intersectionality. I find that existing research over looks local power dynamics and as a result, defines political changes, civil strife and gendered violence through a geopolitical lens. This, I argue, has the potential of (re) creating displaced narratives of the omnipresent colonialism and is ultimately used as a tool to justify local repression. I employ non-traditional modes of knowledge assessment by expanding the rules of inquiry to include political expressions to fill in the gaps of existing works.

I argue that, although a narrow space for participation and engagement, women have captured the historical, political and national consciousness by using literature as a tool (Anantharam, 2009; Raheja and Gold, 1994; Lorde, 2003; Nazneen and Sultan, 2014) to articulate important issues of self, sexuality and space which, otherwise, could not be expressed through other avenues. To narrate a holistic appreciation of women’s representation in Pakistan, this chapter examines roots of women’s agency from local sources of knowledge through interconnections among social processes. In addition, to avoid falling into the trap of disseminating knowledge out of context, I analyze women’s political representation through a broader review that connects political economy and the nature of political choice relative to the region. This chapter connects issues to power structures to avoid producing knowledge in a vacuum by contextualizing feminism, understanding the codification of power elites and decision making through the lens of gender, and reviewing the historical trajectory of state-led structured policies.

4.2 Contextualizing Feminism

Scholars note that at times, especially when studying the global South, social research displaces the understanding or description of social phenomenon’s due to the lack of connection between political economy and political choice (Beteille, 2013). To avoid this trap, I take inspiration from the Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)65, a network of feminist scholars, researchers and activists from the South that work on contextualizing economic and gender justice, and sustainable and democratic development (Keim, Celik & Wohrer, 2014). As I highlighted (in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) the impact of interlinked systems of global happenings and their impact on women’s political representation, I explore alternative versions of understanding women’s political voice through alternative analysis.

65 DAWN started in Bangalore, India after the Third UN Conference on Women (Nairobi 1985) and it elaborated the South feminist critique of three decades of development and challenged the dominant discourse of women and development (Keim, Celik & Wohrer, 2014).
In efforts to avoid the “circulation of text without context” (Bourdieu, 2002), I find it necessary to define what some of the loaded terms associated with the discussion refer to in the context of this investigation. In recent decades, a plethora of appropriate feminist vocabularies and agendas have been introduced by local and national governments, NGOs and international funding organizations which have constructed empowerment and participation platforms hoping to advocate for women. These efforts have led to dialogue around interconnection between theory and activism and between South Asia and the West and “this re-thinking, along with significant new regional and global developments, has revised the relationship between theory and praxis” (Loomba and Lukose, 2010, Pg. 3). In the context of nuanced, complexities and variations of feminist implications, for the purpose of this study the term feminism refers to the political movement, a roadmap and or a vision, of women in Pakistan by “transforming the social, economic and political structures and discourses of discrimination and exclusion, through individual and collective action” (Saigol, 2016, Pg. 2).

This re-thinking between theory and praxis challenges mainstream feminism in global north and focuses on the interaction between feminist inquiry and South Asia. Traditionally South Asian feminist scholarship is examined through the legacy of colonial past seeped in nationalism, which offers knowledge of the post-colonial state (Chatterjee, 1993; Haase-Dubose, 2002, 2006; Lorde, 2003; Sumar, 2002). However, this chapter argues that in Pakistan a new understanding of female agency, along with patriarchy and the post-colonial feminism is linked more closely to the place of gender in a nationalist creation of a new state (Ahmad, 2003; Zing, 1999) crafted within the confines of religion (Hassan, 2008; Ahmad, 1997; Ahmad, 1994). Kumari Jayawardena (1986) examines roots of Asian and Middle East feminism by examining its relationship with nationalist movements in the classic work Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. De Mel (2001) in her work Women and the Nations Narrative states “nationalism has produced one of the harshest ethnic wars of south Asian in which thousands of lives have been lost, property destroyed, welfare, education and health programs have been neglected and a culture of violence has taken root” (Pg. 21).

Did this oppression of women’s agency, clothed in religious and cultural fervor, give rise to feminism? According to Loomba and Lukose (2012) feminism was not a western import, but rather emerged and immersed organically in parts of the once colonized world through anti-imperial indigenous struggles and it was the rise of communalism, sectarian violence and militarism that paved the way for a continued feminist engagement with “histories of religious identity, community and social memory” (Pg. 5).

I argue that Pakistan continues to architect its policies and nationalistic consciousness around heuristics of religion and culture with the harshest implications reserved for women and minorities. Similarly, scholarship on women’s agency suggests that feminists have focused more on the dialogue on the role of Islam in women’s struggles in the independent Pakistan (Hassan, 2008; Chandra, 1985; Ahmad, 1997) than outlining the anti-colonial or nationalist histories (Bhasin and Menon, 1993) as witnessed in the rest of South Asia. Feminist activists believe that although several women’s groups, platforms, networks and coalitions have formed through the decades, they do not work towards a
unified women’s movement or feminist (Saigol, 2016; Waseem interview, 2011). To overcome regional and class divisions, activists of the women’s movement used religion as a tool “to unite women across the class, ethnic, and linguistic communities” (Gardezi, 1994, Pg. 53) in attempts to “not be perceived as alien, there is a need to operate within the Pakistani culture, and therefore, within Islam” (Pg. 52). Therefore, scholars have defined Pakistani feminism and gender empowerment within the confines of Islam while reinterpreting and re-examining masculinity of the Quran and the Shariah (Hassan, 2008; A. S. Zia, 2009; Mahmood 2005).

4.2.1 Defining the other woman

Tracing the trajectory of women’s participation takes us to pre-partition British India where “rudimentary seeds of political awareness were manifested in the context of religious and nationalist movements” (Saigol, 2016, Pg. 1) with elements of active participation and the desire for personal and political emancipation (as examined in chapter three).

To understand the modes in means of representation of the Pakistani postcolonial woman between postcolonial discourse and the feminist discourse, I investigate the identity of the south Asian oriental woman, the third world woman (Mahmood, 2005; Davis, 1983; Stephens, 1989), as it is narrated without speaking for her and without condemning her to an archetype of the docile wife or subordinate daughter? Through the ethnocentrism of Western feminist discourse and the universalist agenda, identity of the south Asian woman is relegated to the other. The other is regarded as condemned to be muted, and to be spoken for, the subjugated (A. S. Zia, 1994; Mahmood, 2005; Talpade, 2003).

I argue that representation of the other in the colonial and postcolonial discourse is understood by looking at women’s agency and empowerment (Van Woerken, 1995) in combination to the western codified singular identity (Hooks, 2003) placed on the south Asian woman. At this juncture, I note that it is necessary to recognize the majority of scholarship on the anthology of feminism and the identity of the south Asian woman refers to the Indian south Asian woman which draws heavily on the interplay between historical intricacies of the Indian cultures and religions (Spivak, 1995; Mohanty, 1991; Bhabha, 1994). I argue that these explorations do not, however, reflect the Muslim south Asian woman and therefore it is immature to group both a Pakistani woman and an Indian woman’s struggles, representation and otherness through a unified quantifier. Further, I analyze that due to the lack of scholarship, most work on the Pakistan woman of South Asia draws heavily on scholarship of the Muslim woman of the Middle East (Hassan, 2008), and again, it immaturesly quantifies women of both regions under the umbrella of a singular framework (in this case, under the banner of Islam while neglecting regional, nationalist and cultural intricacies).

66 In a strong seminal essay, “Recovery, Rupture, Resistance-Indian State and Abduction of Women during Partition”, on women during partition, Bhasin and Menon (1993) used the metaphor of women as “permanent refugee”. Similarly, Amrita Pritam’s (2017) “Exploration of Radical Womanhood in the Partition Narratives” uses “skeleton” as a metaphor for women’s condition where marginalization is the norm and speaking is not authorized.
As I examine the otherness of the pre-partition and post-partition Pakistani woman through the already established discourses (Bhasin and Menon, 1993), I go a step further and includes literary narratives into the assessment of women’s representation (or the lack of women in public spaces) to avoid standardizing the women, and oppression, and the different modes of struggle (Bhabha, 1994).

In attempt to de-construct the orientalist image of the docile and silent Third World woman, the other, and to rebalance the discourse of and on women (Chatterjee, 1993), I note that it is important to look at non-Western feminist movements. I re-examine the colonial concept of gender by confronting its singular perspective (of ethnocentric and universalist normative discourse) and by exploring different modes (Chakravarty, 2000) of women’s movements to construct a dialogue and a structure that bypass the pitfalls of universalism (Lorde, 2003).

The essentialist representation of the other woman fails to recognize women’s agency (Spivak, 1995; Van Woerkens, 2010) and codifies her as “victims of barbarian and generate practices” and therefore, need the West to engage in “…missions of salvation” which justifies the idea of “white men…saving brown woman from brown men” (Van Woerkins, 2010, pg. 327). I analyze that this colonial discourse, through its victimization of the other woman, is also reflected in post 9/11 foreign policy (war on terror) justifications for recent Western wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc. Scholars note that this misalignment has become an object of study, debate, dialog within the context of Islam versus the west (Hassan, 2008), tradition versus modernity, and women’ agency versus activism (Zia, 2014).

In contrast, to understand woman’s agency an examination of woman’s positioning within women’s space (of religion, society, politics, family and nation) is necessary for a more accurate narrative of the struggles, tensions and oppression that are constantly negotiated. Jamal (2006) argues that social construction and control of women’s (lack of) sexual autonomy in Pakistan is due to the imbrication of law, religion, and politics at moments of national history (Ahmad, 1994; Ahmad, 1997; Hassan, 2008). Within the demarcations of legal, political and social spheres in between the imperatives of nation-state formation and the cultural political project of Islamization, the courtroom becomes the construction site of ideas about the nation, the Muslim Pakistani woman and citizen (Patel, 1979, 1986). Within the demarcations of legal, political and social spheres in between the imperatives of nation-state formation and the cultural political project of Islamization, the courtroom becomes the construction site of ideas about the nation, the Muslim Pakistani woman and citizen (Patel, 1979, 1986). Scholars contend that the assertion of women’s agency is a result of the ideology of the heterosexual middle-class nuclear family and the nation-state, and is even outlined in the language of citizenship (Ahmad, 2003; Zing, 1999).

I argue that further exploration in scholarship is needed to grasp the foundation of women’s identity in Pakistan in relation to women’s agency. In the upcoming sections, studying the space of women by examining decision-making, action in resistance, and state-led policies will shed light on women’s situation.

4.3 Gendered Decision-Making

Political scientists and international relations theorist observe political power and its influence on public policymaking. To analyze power relations of political systems, political scientists assess the behavior of voters, legislators, executives, officials, politicians, leaders
of interest groups and other actors; and the theorists of international relations examine political activities beyond domestic systems and across boundaries. Since the two usually do not overlap, I argue that it is important to locate the actual political power holders within domestic boundaries and the implication of decision-making across international borders through a multidisciplinary lens. I note that the practice, performance or normative construct of masculinity in Pakistan finds its roots in post-colonial baggage of Muslim nationalism (Ahmad, 1994). I argue that western influence and dominance in the country’s socio-economic and political domains can be analyzed through competing frameworks of governance and religion and through decades of authoritarian rule which has resulted in weak democratic rule and failure to develop institutional capacity (Waseem, 2002; Zing, 1999; Zaidi, 2008).

I note that it is necessary to examine where and with whom does the power and decision making reside? I argue that power dynamic associated with decision making is important to examine because it helps to understand the lack of women’s development through state institutions and civil society (Toor, 1997). I find that in Pakistan the power is held by governing elites (Memon, 1998; Waseem, 2007; Fatima, 2014). Scholars note that concept of ruling class in the governing elite varies across the globe and is based on individual countries “peculiar historical experiences and societal fabric (Memon, 1998; Fatima, 2014). In Pakistan, as with most developing democracies, I argue that the political system retains its power and decision making through non-political institutionalized elite governing structures. An analysis suggests that the governing elite of Pakistan are not defined by the changing Government and political parties, but rather by the two institutions: the civil service (bureaucracy) and the military (Zaidi, 2008; Waseem, 2007; Fatima, 2014). This decision-making framework of governing elite can be traced to the British reign, which continued post-partition (Waseem, 2007; Cohen, 2005; Zing, 1999).

Although the country’s history has periodically been intercepted with short periods of democratic rule of politically elected civilians, I find that their influence has continuously been to a lesser degree then the institutionalized governing elites. Scholars note that the “army and bureaucracy have been the self-appointed guardians of the Pakistan State since independence... political parties and constitutions have come and gone or been transformed but these twin non-elected institutions have remained the pillars of state” (Talbot, 2000, pg. 215) as a consequence of domestic, regional and international factors which instrumented their dominance in decision-making.

Historical analysts note that as the Army became the “guarantor of ...state integrity” (Fatima, 2014, Pg. 3), General Ayub Khan’s Ministerial position within a civilian government of 1953-1954 and General Zia’s regime further solidified the Army’s position by constructing an ideological identity of Pakistan (Cohen, 2005; Memon, 1998). I argue that priority was not placed on domestic state-building, economic and social developments (as discussed in chapter three) but rather was directed towards securing itself as a nuclear state and its position in international relations as a strong regional player. I find that this process of militarization is entrenched within the fabric of the Pakistani society on multiple levels (Zaidi, 2008; Ahmad, 2003). And since gender is generally not a part of the core of international relations (Enloe, 1990), I argue that systematic women’s development and policy was
sided. This very politics of gender (masculinity) that matters as military and bureaucratic elites with power continue to shape policy and politics that fails to include women.

The very masculine nature of Pakistan’s power and decision-making of the governing elite (Ahmad, 1994) are reflected in alliances and constructed hierarchies including race and class and the “political process of normalization...that is driven...largely by assumptions of politics and decisions around masculinity and femininity...that makes the world go round” (Enloe, 2000).

At this juncture of study, I argue that it is worth exploring the role that structured gender (masculinity) plays in the larger context of women’s representation in Pakistan? Through the lens of Enloe’s (2000) conceptualization of gender theorizing (about the world and the impact on women), the military plays the role of the patriarch as the protector of the political system and civilian (democratically elected) government which must be protected and domesticated. Since the protected is feminized and the proctor is masculinized (Enloe, 2000), I argue that this curated political hierarchy serves as a guide to policy structures, decision making and power exchanges that consciously exclude women. Consequently, I analyze that this exclusion of women from the public and policy space is internalized and embedded in society and culture.

As highlighted in chapter 3, I find that the concept of modernity and democracy in Pakistan are intertwined with religious fervor (with the assumption that Western democracy is culturally ill suited) which continues to strengthen the position of these power structures and, consequently, impact women’s space in the public sphere (Bari and Khattak, 2001). Waseem (1994) cites comments by a Major General of the Army Iskandar Mirza on Pakistan’s incapacity of civilian rule (Ahsan Interview, 2016) by stating that “democracy required education, tradition, and pride in your ability to do something, unless by condemning to ruthless struggle for power corruption, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest, patriotic and industrious masses” (Pg. 157). Similarly, General Ayub Khan (secured a ten-year leadership rule) commented that his responsibility was to “…set up institution which should enable people of Pakistan to develop their material, moral, intellectual resources and capacities to the maximum extent” (ibid) insinuating the trust deficit in civilian rule. Scholars note that as the military has been the lead contender in the struggle for power, derived from colonial legacy, it has “had pretension to being liberal, utilitarian, and modern...liked associating with foreigners, no less than with capitalists, both were pro-western, pro-Islamic, pro-order, pro-development, pro-guided democracy, proprietors, both anti-politicians, anti-mullahs, and anti-communists” (Fatima, 2014).

I find that these observations suggest that women’s place in Pakistani society relies heavily on the gendered constructs of governance (Sheikh Interview, 2018). I note that as military assumes power and, in turn, decision making, its priorities rest with securing borders (in the backdrop of global tensions) and not with developing internal social structures.

4.4 Resistance as an Agent of Change

Through observational inquiry I suggest there a “feminism by experience” (Zia article, 2019) that takes root in Pakistan in the form of daily resistance which re-defines feminism in
the traditional liberal sense as women archive their feminist roles and actions through daily activities. Therefore, in this chapter, I look beyond history books and political analysis and examines regional literature. I highlight that literature fosters a communal consciousness and a certain sense of nationalism (Lorde, 2003; Ahmad, 2003) as it constructs a reality that offers special meaning and insight into the lives of women. The partition essays (Bhasin and Menon, 1993; Butalia, 2000), autobiographical narratives (Sarkar, 2001), and literary texts (Mufti, 2000; Chatterjee, 1993) present an alternative to feminist history as it is constructed in the present within margins of historical accounts that have been silenced (Nazneen and Sultan, 2014). I argue this indicates the (re)creation of knowledge which is turned into popular discourse.

Through historical observations I find that the women’s movement of 1980s and 1990s were a direct response to the opposition to military dictatorship and increased influence of religion in policymaking. (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1991; Jalal, 1991; Iqbal, 1992; Bhasin et al., 1994, Zia, 2014).

Analysts note that during this time the slogans that were repeatedly used by Pakistani feminist in the public space in the process of their political resistance included “man, money, mullahs, and the military” (Zing, 1999) as Pakistani intelligence agencies, funded by the United States (ibid), created ideological and armed gorilla outfits like the Taliban to fight against communist invasion of Afghanistan and in the fight against Russia (Rashid, 2000). Feminist historians claim that sections of the Pakistani woman’s movement were complicit in these patriarchal constructions of religion in state-led policies. I find that alliances between the State and parts of the movement were strengthened to accommodate religion in the policy framework as parts of the movement helped mobilized Islamic discourse towards normalizing a patriarchal state. As “…both the State and sections of the women’s movement used Islamist political defense against foreign ideologies (communism and western feminism, respectively)” (Zia, 2009, Pg. 33), new religious movements emerged, with independent Islamic organizations of proactive, socio-political agenda beyond the original goals of resistance further complicating the concept and practice of women’s agency. I argue that the interplay between women’s participation discourse and the geo-political realities of the region cannot be ignored when trying to understand the larger context of feminist movement in the country.

Scholarship on women’s movement clearly highlights the dynamic relationship of feminists with the state, the military and the larger geo-political capitalist development. Majority of research and historical perspectives argue that religion garners a central role in identity formation, strategies and cultural frameworks. As mentioned above, the military takeover of 1977 and the decade that followed made women direct targets of the socially

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67 To capture the relevance of the “mullah” it’s important to understand that these are self-appointed male preachers, outside of the scholarship associated with Islamic learning. Historically scholars such as these do not have legitimate Authority within the larger of religious discourse but they do exert an important cultural influence within the communities, especially in Pakistan. One could even go further and are you that these mullahs the Product of political bargaining, political influence, big Utility as a political tool even, who gained state sanctioned to operate as vigilantes to help “enforce the state prescription of chador and chardevari (the veil and the household for women)” (A. S. Zia article, 2014) …and surfaced in large-scale doing the general’s regime between 1977 and 1988.
constructed Islamization project (Jahangir and Jillani, 1990; Baxter, 1991, 2001; Ahmad, 1997; Patel, 1986). Scholarship notes that this led to resistance influenced by concepts of modernity and globalization and it created “complex negotiations and engagement for Pakistani women as newly constructed identities and restricting of feminism” (Zia, 1999, Pg. 23) defined the Pakistani women’s movement.

4.5 Poetry as an Agent of Change

In measuring women’s agency and autonomy in Pakistan I find the research must look beyond the limits of traditional feminist inquiry. While Western feminism centers on liberal notions of agency, self-determination, and autonomy (Habib, 1987; Mahmood 2005, Scott 1988), I argue that the question arises how do we evaluate feminist agency in countries like Pakistan where oceans of self and sovereignty emerge from a different set of motivations and traditions? I find that anthropologist Saba Mahmood (2001) reiterated liberal feminist agency “sharply limit our ability to understand and interrogate the lives of women whose desire, affect, and will have been shaped by non-literal traditions” (Pg. 203).

In the void space between misplaced Western feminism and the reality of women’s agency, I argue that alternative framework of Islamic discourse (wrapped in militarized patriarchy), served as the foundation of social consciousness. And it is through literature that women in Pakistan gave rise to women’s movement and articulated a nuanced feminist consciousness outside of the liberal notions of women’s agency and sovereignty (Nazneen and Sultan, 2014). Scholars note that liberal feminist analysis seems to fundamentally be at odds with explaining women’s lives and experiences in the Islamic states (due to its hegemonic constraints of gender, class, religion and nation), as the Pakistani woman has had a history of advocating for representation (pre-partition) and mobilizing movements (during and post General Zia’s Islamization) for their own interests and agendas during specific historical moments (Mahmood 2005).

In attempts to investigate feminist agency in Pakistan, I argue that powerful narrative presented in literature compel us to evaluate parameters of women’s identity and representation and the discourses of nationalism in South Asia. From a historical analysis, it is noted by scholars, that women’s voices are absent in the women’s experience and nationalism is also absent (Sen, 1990; Stoler, 2002). It is noted that this space was filled through “sustained engagement with both politics and religion” through literature as women’s “triumphs and failures” were “recorded and circulated in poetic metaphors” as “communities are imagined through linguistic appropriation... and filial piety served through words uttered at the right moment” (Anantharam, 2009, Pg. 209). I employ this additional method of inquiry by contextualizing literary voices as “acts of participation” (Sen, 1990) and as political expression. I argue that these modalities of engagement are within the scope of the defined mobilization of women’s agency.

For the purpose of this study, I examine the efforts of two poets, Fahmida Riaz and Kishwar Naheed. I argue that their work reflects the self and community (Islam) and offers a reflective archive of nationalism through storytelling by reaching large audiences of women. I note that their articulation of explicit feminist politics gave voice to the silenced issues and provided salient women’s engagement from the confines of their private sphere (as they
read and became aware of the issues). According to Anantharam (2009) agents of feminism used “poetry to revise subtly the complex relationship between women and men, in gender and nationalism in Pakistan” and it is because of this reason that when investigating women’s empowerment to an engagement and movement in Pakistan an examination of these nontraditional modes of historical analysis such as art and literature must be included.

This method is also outlined by feminist scholars (Lorde, 1984) as a mechanism to capture a holistic understanding of women’s agency. In doing so, I argue that feminist movements are measured through conventional conduits of historical observations and policy agendas and unconventional means of observing and describing the voice of women through the popular means of poetry (Lorde, 1984). I find that in Pakistan these unconventional avenues serve as an expression vehicle of oppression as feminist poets draw on a tradition in which “political struggle and spiritual continuity are meshed” (Lorde, Pg. 214) by using political expression as a mobilizer. Rich (1986) claims that “art of so many others uncanonized the dominant culture – (and it) is not produced as a commodity, but as a part of a long conversation with the elders and with the future…” (Pg. 36) and similarly Lorde (1984), I argue, notes that “poetry is not a luxury but a necessity through (which) we give name to those ideas which are … nameless and formless, about to be birthed, but already felt” (Pg. 36).

Through my examination I find that in Pakistan, Urdu poetry is not exclusively a luxury of the cultural elite, rather mushai’ras, poetry readings, are an established and popular convention of the Pakistani society and were utilized extensively as means of vocalizing messages during the struggle for freedom. I note that Pakistan has witnessed a wave of self-aware and highly politicized women poets “who understand the dimensions of the battle on their hands whose work is concerned with women’s issues and informed with careful, sensitive thought” (Ahmad, 1999, Pg. 19). Scholars highlight that “because poetry has not been claimed as the archive of historical, political, and national consciousness, a crucial component of the story of nationalism and feminism in Pakistan, has not yet been told” (Anantharam, 2009, Pg. 209). Therefore, I note that Urdu poetry by women writers offers a glimpse and a better understanding of the position of women in society, their cultural and historical environment and their personal struggles against the established norms of the patriarchal society. I find that, in her works, Naheed has utilized the Urdu poetic form of ghazal to critique the local and nationalist interpretations of space of women. Similarly, Riaz employed the use of free verse, nazm, to highlight the increasing patriarchy of power by questioning the degenerative interpretations of religion, the suppression of women and the continuous dictatorial rule. I argue that these engagements of political expression with literary mechanics serves as an example of the salient efforts of engaging in women’s movement.

I find that these sustained poetic engagements with politics and religion have recorded triumphs and failure, circulated metaphors, and raised intimate issues of self and sexuality. Poetry concerned with women during the military regime of General Zia explores complex metaphors highlighting the imbalances between the sexes, the failure of the society

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68 Including works by Emily Dickenson, Maya Angelou, Maxine Kumin, Denise Levertov, Adrienne Rich, Muriel Rukeyser and others.
and the legal systems to provide justice and the draconian state of patriarchy that is prevalent even today. I analyze that their poetry calls for judicial rights for women and poetry, as a political tool, stands up against state regulation on women’s bodies and sexuality. I find that through feminist literature, women exercise their agency as advocates for the freedom of women and gave voice to the silenced by calling out state suppression of women as means of exercising masculinity through control and power.

I provide sections of poetry below to emphasize my findings mentioned above.

Your fear of my being free, being alive
And able to think might lead you, who knows
Into what travails. – Kishwar Naheed, “Anti-clockwise” (Ahmad, 1999)

Literary analysts note that the poem above “is powerful, not only because of its spirited resistance to hegemonic sociopolitical structures, but also because it grants power to women’s voices within those very subjugating social structures of Islam or Pakistani modernity” (Anantharam, 2009, pg. 213). Within the movement, Kishwar Naheed’s *Hum Gunahgar Aurtain* (We Sinful Women) and Fehmida Riaz’s poem *Chaadar Aur Chaardivari* (the veil and four walls) became “anthems for the movement…” (Saigol, 2016, Pg. 15) and I argue, continue to serve as anthologies of contemporary Urdu feminist poetry. Both poets through the decades have become a symbol of women’s empowerment as they tackled the complexities of political issues. Poet Judy Chicago (cited in Ahmad, 1991) in her book *Through the Flower* comments on Naheed’s work by stating: “There was no frame of reference in 1970 to understand a woman’s struggle, to value it or to read and respond to the imagery that grew out of it…And even if the male world could acknowledge that struggle, could it even allow it to be considered ‘important’…” (Pg. 202).

I find that these overtly political feminist voices through poetry reflected the reactionary forces in Pakistan which threatened to undermined women’s positions further and dispelled Western assumption that women in Pakistan were passive, voiceless and hopeless conformists. Scholars emphasize that poetry provided a powerful narrative that compelled the “re-evaluation of the parameters of contemporary feminist historiography and discourses of nationalism in South Asia” (Anantharam, 2009, Pg. 208) as it revised “subtly the complex relationships between women and men, and gender and nationalism in Pakistan” (Pg. 208).

I find that Fehmida Riaz’s poem *Stoning* outlines the constant battle women in Pakistan faced as civic rights were curtailed further with the declaration of women’s testimony valued at the worth of half of a man’s. Ahmad (1999) notes that “the absurdity of this law and fears that it might be a step towards disenfranchising them brought women out on a march in Lahore on 12 February 1982, led by professional women” (Pg. 16). Through this analysis, I argue that with these slanted laws, societal changes were visible as women began to alter their dress and behavior in public as the public space grew smaller and increasingly unwelcoming.

I find that in response to the narrowing space for women in public, literature served as a conduit in negotiating complexities of the patriarchy of military and religion and national
identity towards a continuous dialogue and narrative offering a space for storytelling as public dissent, and integral part of civil society (Anantharam, 2009). I find that these strategic uses of metaphors of expression served in a safe space were successful in addressing larger social debates about women and Islam, feminism, nationalism, tradition and modernity.

I argue that these narratives of women’s engagement participation within their cultural context blatantly contrast the orientalist and Western ideology of the silence woman or the other woman that is presented repeatedly in the academic discourse. In addition, I find that there was a collection of poets and writers who published volumes of work recognizing atrocities of political policies centered around military decisions of civil war of 1971 and creation of Bangladesh and destruction of Afghanistan as it impacted the lives of women. Scholars note that their works humanized the wars as they captured complexities of love, friendships, joys and sorrows within trans-border conflicts (Zing, 1999). I find that the written words provided an insight into the everyday lives of women which cannot be found in the text of political and historical accounts.

4.6 Mobilization of the Women’s Movement in Pakistan

Through the examination of the literary reviews, I find that a lot has been written on the ambiguity linked to the evaluation of the social, familial, cultural, political, historical, and symbolic role of women in Asia (Kiswar, 1985; Chatterjee, 1993; Sarkar 1999 & 2001). I argue that the colonial discourse aimed to emancipate women the South Asian woman by depicting them as victims of traditional barbarianism. This omnipresence of victimization by the South Asian man (and patriarchy) is found in the salvation, political and historical discourses. I note that as the victimized south Asian woman is silenced she is not capable of self-actualization and hence, exercising agency. However, I also examine that the alternative readings of history examine self-actualization through avenues which retell the stories, experiences and give voice to women at large (Bhasin and Menon, 1993) through liberated expression.

I find that in contrast to liberal feminist theory, Muslim south Asian woman was, in fact, self-actualized pre-partition as the need for institutionalized representation was championed by both women and men in British India as reserved seats were introduced in light of suffrage and candidacy. Through a historical examination scholars outline that spearheaded and organized by the Indian Women Association69, the 1919 Montague-Chelmsford reforms70 “granted limited franchise to women in addition to men” (Waseem, 2006, Pg. 201) and the Government of India Act 1935 constitutionally reserved women’s seats for the first time in the Council of State (both the Indian Legislative Assembly and provincial legislatures) (McDermott, 2015; Shamsie, 2015). I find that Muslim women in pre-partition India exercised agency to secure a space for themselves which led them to not only advocate for educational opportunities, as proposed by Sir Syed Ahmad of the Aligarh

69 Founded in 1917 by British women Annie Besant, Marget Cousins and Indian woman Jeena Raja Dasa with the aim of liberating women from deplorable conditions around the context of socio-economic and political matters (WIA, 1967).
70 Montague-Chelmsford Reforms were introduced by British colonial government in India to introduce self-governing institutions and formed the basis of the Government of India Act 1919 as constitutional reforms (Kaul, 2004).
University, but also encouraged participation in the Pakistan movement through the Muslim League. Historians note that the Muslim League meetings, rallies and gatherings were attended by women as well (McDermott, 2015) and women played a role in advancing the message and agenda of the Muslim League within their own women networks.

Historians note that the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was comprised of two women members (McDermott, 2015). I find that the introduction of the 1949 Objectives Resolution which served to limit the women’s franchise as priority made a shift towards ensuring a universal adult franchise for all, which took the spotlight away from women. Scholars note that the years that followed proved difficult for women (Shamsie, 2015; Burki, 2013) as they found their role shrinking in the public sphere due to Islamic idioms and the messages spread, in favor of governments, by the mullahs in neighborhood mosques (Saigol, 2016).

I argue that soon after the United Nations was formed gender equality was included as a central concern and since, has remained a crucial international player in fostering dialogue, policies and laws fostering equality. Historians note that as multiple treaties, conferences and campaigns have highlighted the pervasive nature of gender inequalities, a number of UN sponsored development agencies have emerged specifically devoted to gender equality. In addition, scholars outline that the governments have established offices within overall development assistance programs and a number of international organizations and nonprofits have emerged, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Ford Foundation and the Global Fund for Women, with a focus on positioning the status of women as an integral part of their efforts. In the 1970s, “a large number of southern hemisphere based women’s NGOs” mobilized efforts to provide better input and feedback into the international efforts, to give women in the developing world a voice in shaping their own futures, and to ensure greater levels of domestic pressures to the international stage with local solutions to global problem (Henderson & Jeydel, 2014, Pg. 228).

Women scholars note that the women’s movement in the 1970s and early 1980s was undergoing serious transformations from within, and women activists were continually challenging the capacity of the movement to include all women across class and regional divisions. According to Gardezi (1994) the question of Islam and its discursive role in governing sociopolitical lives of women within Pakistani culture was at the heart of these debates and, I argue, that women were actively constructing the Islamic discourse as much as they were being interpreted by it. In efforts to unpack the construction and interpretation

71 1. Begum Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah (Pakistani-Bengali politician, diplomat, author and first Muslim woman to earn a PhD from the University of London) was a leader in the All-India Muslim League’s Women’s Sub-committee pre-partition (Shamsie, 2015); served as United Nations Pakistan delegate in 1948 and worked on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Convention Against Genocide (1951) (McDermott, 2014).

2. Begum Jahanara Shahnawaz (Pakistani politician and Muslim League activist) was responsible for getting the All-India Muslim Women’s Conference to pass a resolution against polygamy in 1918 (Shamsie, 2015); founded the Punjab Provincial Women’s Muslim League; is widely known for her arguments for five percent reservation for women in legislatures; and led a protest of thousands of women in Lahore against the removal of a bill that afforded economic opportunities for women which led to the passing of the Muslim Personal Law of Shariat of 1948, legally recognizing a woman’s right to inherit property, especially agricultural land which previously, under the British rule of Pakistan, had not been recognized (Burki, 2013).
of the Islamic discourse, I review the impact of the women’s engagement within the context of the geo-political environment

4.6.1 Contextualizing the 1980s

In this section, I outline the implications of militarized geo-political influences on governance. Historians note that the early 1980s witnessed a rise in women’s resistance (to the military rule and growing fundamentalism seeping into the everyday lives and legislation) reflected through traditional measures (pickets, demonstrations and protest rallies) and manifested itself in cultural forms such as poetry, literature, music, dance, theatre, films, art and painting. I argue that these “acts of participation” (Sen, 1990) were reflective of the engagement of women’s voices which fostered a sense of salient representation.

I find that although during this time sporadic efforts surfaced around the state-led oppression of women’s rights, they lacked in strategic and guided mobilization of a unified women’s agenda. Scholars emphasize that the debate around employing strategies to counter the religious and state-led attack on women’s rights took place within the urban based women’s movement (Khan, 1994) and was vocalized within the formed alliance of Women’s Action Forum (WAF) against Islamization and the Martial Law. Historical analysis highlights that critical to the movement, WAF enhanced its presence in multiple cities and today, stands as a non-partisan, non-hierarchical and secular organization lobbying women’s rights and issues regardless of political affiliations, belief systems or ethnicity (WAF, 2006). I find that the movement sought to counter State influence of religion by highlighting progressive interpretations of Islam and gaining support and sympathy (in the form of alliances) from moderate and right-wing Islamic feminists, women’s urban movements, progressive political parties, left politics, professional women’s groups, trade unions and development organizations.

I find that the trajectory of women’s participation finds its roots within the history of the WAF. Scholars note that in the early 1990s, WAF, through a radical departure from its liberal feminist history declared itself secular on principle and created a division causing confusion within the women’s movement which remains unresolved even today (Zia, 2014). In addition, I find that WAF’s path towards secular leanings by the modernist Islamic feminists did not help mobilize women across the various social classes as it championed misplaced identities while neglecting the resistance discourse of gender priorities and agendas. I argue that this allowed for the complex intersectional relations between religion, customs and culture to sideline effective policy change.

I find that the feminist spectrum of Pakistan includes moderates, liberals, and extremists as part of the same social space in attempts to foster women’s engagement. The two main categories of feminist agendas include the group that seeks to understand women’s agency through the intersection of religion and women’s rights (and caters to the women of lower economic class and lower-middle economic class), while the other seeks to recognize women’s rights through the context of secular human rights (and appeals to the upper economic and upper-middle economic class) (Rashid, 2006). These internal challenges and divisions, I argue, are reflective of the difficulty in negotiating Pakistan’s religious or secular identity even for the champions of women’s rights.
I find that traditional criticism of the women’s movement focuses on its ineffectiveness to bring about radical, visible progress for women, particularly for the working-class women. I focus this critique on the upper-class background of women activists and the NGOs responsible for creating a culture that, I find in my pre-dissertation research, encourages donor driven activism rather than independent or indigenous in their agenda setting. These agendas, I argue, perceived as western influenced propaganda, weakened mobilization of women’s issues and created further rifts within the feminist space as socially conservative groups (including trade unions and student union movements) grew suspicious. I note that this leads to the re (contextualizing) of knowledge which leads to the creation of narratives regarding feminist movement within Pakistan.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, I emphasize the geo-political influences and the aftermaths of the liberation of Afghan Mujahedeen from the Soviet invaders. I find that these realities projected the rule of General Zia as a champion and not as a villain. Scholars note that in both Pakistan and India, decades after the partition, horrific escalation of violence and riots along religiosity surfaced during the 1980s with heightened religious rhetoric and practices along nationalism as the women were “jolted into action by the Islamization process started by Zia in 1979” (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1991, Pg. 2).

I find the emergence of political expression through resistance slogans of “man, money, mullahs72 and the military” (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1999, Pg. 4) in response to complex interplay between religious identity, global economic movement and cultural relevancy. I argue that this was the by-product of political bargaining and influence as a political tool. Scholars also note that religious political parties and scholars were sanctioned by General Zia to operate as vigilantes to help “enforce the state prescription of chador and chardevari (the veil and the household for women)” (Zia, 1994).

I argue that it would be unfair to lay the entire blame on the military regime of General Zia-ul Haq for the diminishing status of women in Pakistan. I find that the competing Islamic discourse of post-partition and its inclusion in setting state and governance parameters provided a complex comprehension of religion in practice. I note that the General’s regime merely used women’s issue to control society for his own political agenda associated with foreign policy. He dubbed this under religious fundamentalism, a phenomenon which “operates under different religious slogans, but is a political movement using God to justify injustices and discriminates between people, nations, classes, races, sexes, colors and creeds…” (Saadawi, 1989, Pg. 202). Therefore, I assess that General Zia’s Islamization was a political agenda to garner support from the right-wing elements to curtail democracy to establish a theocratic state. I note that this theocracy was assumed to potentially cement or reconfigure the crumbling national identity (Noreen & Musarrat, 2014; Oberdorfer, 1980; Baxter, 1979). In addition, due to the foreign influencers, I argue that Pakistan did not prioritize internal state-building and that it was not just the curtailing of

72 The relevance of “mullah” in this context is understood as self-appointed male preachers, outside of scholarship associated with Islamic learning. Historically, scholars such as these do not have legitimate authority within the larger religious discourse but they do exert an important cultural influence within the communities, especially in Pakistan (A. S. Zia, 2014).
women’s rights that were sidelined, other state-building elements such as education, economics, healthcare (Durrani Interview, 207), etc., were neglected. Scholars contend that foreign influence assisted this agenda as substantial aid from the United States further sidelined democracy and gave space for the growth of a tyrannical process (Baxter, 1979).

In the backdrop of the growing tensions of the Cold War, scholars argue that it was Bhutto’s government that paved the path to the erosion of personal freedoms and inclusion of religion in legislation of daily life which led to the furfur narrowing of women’s rights due to pressures of the military agenda. It was, in fact, the efforts of his government to appease the right-winged coalitions by enacting the Prohibition of Alcohol, declaring Friday as the holiday in the working week and administering a ban on western-style discoteques (Ahmad, 1994, Pg. 10). I find that during this time women struggled to retain their basic rights as nationwide media campaigns were mounted to enforce the seclusion of women from public space. These included the Chadur aur Chardiwari (the veil and four walls) campaign as the government issued directives on female government employees and television personalities to wear chadurs; an anti-pornography campaign that drastically reduced the participation of women in television and entertainment; nationwide attempts to deny educational opportunities to girls and young women; relegating them to segregated universities (which failed due to financial implications); and decreasing the minimum marriage age for women from 18 to the onset of puberty as a sign of maturity and of consummation of marriage (which failed due to World bank intervention) among other efforts (Noreen & Musarrat, 2014).

In addition, scholars note that the Hudood Ordinances of 1979 made it apparent that women were being subjected to a campaign of oppressive laws as issues of theft, drunkenness, bearing false witness, and zina (rape and adultery) placed boundaries and limits on women with maximum penalty imposed on women for the offenses (Noreen & Musarrat, 2014; Carroll, 1982). These penalties included amputation of limbs for theft; flogging for drunkenness, public order offences and other petty crimes which created an atmosphere of fear and silenced dissent; stoning for zina for a married person and up to a hundred lashes; and the failure of clear distinctions in law between fornication, adultery and rape resulted in prosecution of rape impossible creating a culture of unreported assaults by women (Noreen & Musarrat, 2014). Historical review indicates that in 1979, public stoning of women shook the women’s groups across Pakistan as the Hudood laws trapped vulnerable individuals and innocent victims with its extremely cruel and unjust punishments against women during the Zia years. A seminal article entitled “The Importance of Stoning a Woman”, published in Dawn newspaper in 1987 stated, “…the stoning of a woman is a means of declaring (as do all other arbitrary sentences, ordinances and directives) to who calls the shots, driving the message home with anticipated paralyzing effect” (Sadeque, 1987). Women clearly recognized that “as the law stands it protects rapists, prevents women from testifying and confuses the issue of rape with adultery” (Shaheed & Mumtaz, 1987, Pg. 101).

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73 The first case of public death by stoning in Pakistan was of Lal Mai - a woman in the district of the hollow core was the first woman to publicly whip for adultery on September 30, 1983. This forced feminist organizations do intervene on behalf of all women by organizing public protest over the cases such as these (Ahmad, 1991, pg. 13).
I find that in 1983 passing of the law of evidence eliminated and reduced the woman’s testimony in court to half the value of a man. The implications of such laws on women are worth exploring because in matters of rape and sexual violence (zina) women are profoundly affected. Anita Weiss (1985) argues that the punishment of offenders of rape and sexual violence regardless of sex was constitutionally the same (Pg. 8) and with women’s power of testimony inadmissible in court, the legislation of zina had serious gender bias is built into it. When women were convicted for these offenses there was little room appeal and men, as a result, were acquitted (Weiss, 1985, Pg. 9). I argue that these initiatives narrowed women’s agency and forced women to disengage from the public sphere. Therefore, I note that it is important to review the response by the women’s movement which, I argue, would signify participation.

During this period, scholar N.S. Khan (1992) argues that the women’s movement employed inclusive strategies to counter State influence of religion through progressive interpretations of Islam while garnering support also from the moderate and right-wing Islamic feminists, support from women’s urban movements, progressive political parties, left politics, professional women’s groups, trade unions and development groups. Giving rise within Pakistan a religiously driven narrative of misplaced Islamic identity with the help of religious extremist elements, Zia (2005) argues that sections within the Pakistani women’s movement were also complicit in creating this alternative ideology as a tool to fight patriarchal state religion. These alliances mobilized and accommodated religious perspectives as “both the state and sections of the women’s movement used Islamist political defense against foreign ideologies (communism and western feminism, respectively)” (Zia, 2009, Pg. 33). This interplay between women’s engagement and geopolitical realities of the region cannot be ignored when trying to understand the larger context of feminist movements in the country.

4.6.2 Contextualizing the 1990s

Existing scholarship notes that during the neo-liberal global period, a rise in NGOs and the concept of civil society became important focal points of oppositional politics and social transformations which centered on “modes of covert intervention and destabilization openly adopted by the US around the world” (Forte, 2014, Pg. 32; Harvey, 2005; Wallace, 2004). As parliamentary democracy (Ahsan Interview, 2016) revived itself with the crash of General Zia’s plane (in 1988) with the end of his rule, an era of democratic governance surfaced along with a plethora of foreign-funded NGOs, especially centered on women’s rights, labor, environment, sustainable development and child rights with a mantra of (human) development (Wallace, 2004). Scholars argue this contributed to the fragmentations of the women’s movement.

Further analyzing the role of women’s participation in Pakistan, I find that the secular stand by the modernist Islamic feminist did not help in mobilizing women across classes and therefore, represents a misplaced identity and suggests that certain “priorities and agendas other than gender” (Shaheed, 2009, Pg. 373). I argue that, within a historical analysis, it is important to note that decade of 1980s in Pakistan were marked with increased funding from the United States which resulted in an ideological construction of Islamic brotherhood through armed gorilla entities (called the Taliban) in fighting against the communist invasion
of Afghanistan and its fight against Russia (Rashid, 2000) along with establishment of social
development NGOs across the country. As NGOs surfaced as part of civil society with the
mandate to act as a watchdog for social development (United Nations, 2010), according to
scholars “the de-politicization that occurred in the decade of 1990s served the global and
national powers...when an elected government was removed illegally by the military and yet
another military dictator took over in 1999, a number of the NGOs served their global masters
well by supporting both the coup and failing to challenge the transfer of power from civilian
to military hands” (Sarwar, 1999, Pg. 1). I argue that this highlights a conflict between vested
economic interests as being the focus of military and civil regimes in Pakistan as ideologies
of liberalism and fundamentalism have been (and continue to) be used to the ruling party’s
advantage.

As martial law threatened individual liberties and the elective populist government
reflected a conservative strain of Islam through a moral lens, I find that women’s agency
came under scrutiny and was reflected in policies that emerged around the context of family,
citizenship, kinship, work, and sexuality. Historical review indicates that the major contender
of politics during this time was the religiously conservative political party Jamaat I Islami74,
under the leadership of religious scholar Maulana Maududi, and offenses such as drinking
alcohol and drug use, pre-and extramarital sexual relations, rate, and martyr were seen as
cries against the state and carried with them the severest punishments, including public
floggings and death by stoning (Nasr, 1994). These ordinances, I note, under the banner of
religiosity, resulted in severe repercussions for women in both public and private realms. As
woman continue to shrink within matters of economic, legal, and educational representation
(Weiss, 1985), I find that the need for an engaged women’s movement emerged again.

I examine the revival of the movement and find that in 1990s, within the purview of
NGOs, the “movement itself...lost its political sharpness and its energy” (Khan, 2000, Pg. 5)
as activists competed for recognition and validation from transnational actors and positioned
their agenda alongside popular liberal feminist ideologies of the times. I analyze that the
larger implication of this interconnectivity of western influenced NGOs, agenda setting and
the movement resulted in the elite women of middle and upper middle social structures of
urban society (mostly from political families) as influencers and dictators of the movements
agenda (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987; Khan, 1994). I argue that this exclusive and skewed
perception of women’s issues fragmented the larger women’s movement discourse and
alienated majority of women’s needs.

History indicates that the decade of 1990s witnessed rapid fluctuations of civilian
governments as two tenures of Benazir Bhutto and two of Nawaz Sharif battled weak and
unstable civilian governments with ultimate power resting with the military establishment. I
argue that it is necessary to highlight that elected Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s two
governments (1988-1990 and 1993 to 1996), as the first woman in the Muslim majority nation
to head a democratic government, although liberal and secular in ideology, did not make
attempts to reverse these draconian laws negatively affecting women. As a western
educated woman of a successful political family, her visible appearance, through symbolic

74 Jamaat I Islami was an offshoot of the all India Muslim League., which gained
momentum in post-partition Pakistan and is regarded as a conservative political party.
representation, expressed through her veil and traditional Pakistani clothes prescribed Islamic manner, mostly in patriotic colors, indicated her acceptance (Waseem Interview, 2011) and or support of the masculinized political and social Pakistan. In addition, I find that she did not restore reserved seats for women and her political party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), tabled three bills for the restoration of women’s representation (Waseem, 2007). This lack of substantive representation observed during Bhutto’s tenure is important to note. In examining the reason behind the lack of substantive gains during her leadership, I find that the national agenda and was focused on securing Pakistan’s position in the international community and domestic development was a priority. I also analyze that during this time there was a strategic need for civilian government, in tandem with the military establishment, to appease the religious leaders of the right so they could continue to facilitate dialogue with the religious leaders across the border in Afghanistan in the fight against the Soviet Union. I emphasize that this, again, reflects the implications of global influencers on the lack of domestic development.

Further examination of the time through a historical lens notes that a line of demarcation emerged between the women’s movement and women’s political participation due to lack of a unified agenda. In the context of political representation, I find that women did gain influence in general policymaking and women’s issues during the two terms under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s leadership as NGO’s found more negotiating space and less threatening state (in the backdrop of international women’s agenda). An analysis of newspaper articles indicates that during Benazir Bhutto’s tenure in office, women-friendly measures originated as top-down policies rather than organically influenced incremental grassroots efforts. These included setting up Women’s Studies Centers at public universities across the country, establishing the First Women Bank responsible for providing loans to women entrepreneurs, and separate women’s police stations (for mobility and ease of registering the First Information report, FIR) (Noreen & Musarrat, 2014). In contrast to General Zia’s suffocating vigilante atmosphere for women, Benazir Bhutto did not enforce a dress code and created an atmosphere of inclusion in the public spaces for women and women were not deterred from the right to education or work. In addition to her state-led interventional approach to women’s policies, I find that she also took the lead in recognizing the Pakistani woman’s rights on the international stage as well. In addition to serving as Pakistan’s representative at the seminal Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, she also led the country in acceding to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) which, as it meant for most states, provided a framework of defining women and gender rights within the development platform. I argue that this allowed the movement to shift its efforts towards sensitizing, negotiating, influencing and infiltrating government policy and galvanizing the movement (by providing space) to engage with the government in a meaningful way.

I note that although these efforts promised a new era for women in Pakistan, inclusion in public spheres and empowerment in private realms continued to find guidance

in religious values and tradition. I argue that as a result women’s empowerment was once again sidelined in Pakistan with geo-political influences taking precedence with gendered power. I find that during Benazir Bhutto’s second term as Prime Minister, her leadership adopted the strategic policy of facilitating the Taliban in Afghanistan. Scholars note that this led to the Taliban becoming a powerful force in the region as they violently took power from different factions of the Mujahedeen and their warlords in the northern areas of Pakistan resulting in decades long dislocation, erosion of communities and bloodshed (Fatima, 2014). I analyze that these policies eroded women’s rights and used women as pawns of the war. In addition, I argue that ramifications of these policies are witnessed even today as the cultural impact rippled into future decades.

It is important to note that although Benazir Bhutto and her political party strongly opposed the view and practices of the Taliban regime, her government did recognize them as major stakeholders and the Interior Minister Nasrallah Babar even referred to the Taliban as “our children” (cited in Saigol, 2016, Pg. 22). I argue that this conflict between agenda and practice of her government reflects its lack of decision-making power as the military forced its agenda forward.

In further examination, I find that General Zia’s unfinished Islamization was adopted by Prime Minister Nawaz’s leadership (from 1990-1993 and 1997-1999) as it continued to pave the way for religious right through the government endorsement of the National Plan of Action (NPA) in 1998. NPA did not include measures for women’s advancement and NGOs were slapped with regulations and control. Scholars observe that the relationship between women’s movement and the state and women’s policies during the 1990s were anything but incremental as the cooperation and collaboration witnessed during Benazir Bhutto’s tenure was met with confrontation and contestation during Nawaz Shariff’s leadership (Zia, 2014; Saigol, 2016; Khattak, 2006).

I find that under the successive leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999), women’s groups lost support and access which they had gained in the previous years to the growing political conservatism and religious revival at various socio-political levels. Among the regressive narrative being spread against women’s freedoms, the Council of Islamic Ideology recommended the obligatory wearing of the hijab (the veil) (Rashid, 2006); provincial governments announced ban on cultural activities in girl’s schools and colleges; introduced a dress code for girls and young women attending school and colleges, along with women in entertainment; and instituted a ban on all female dance performances (which crippled the thriving entertainment/media/music industry) of the time. I argue that although these announcements were not official nor legislative, these contributed to the growing confusion and complexities.

Through an analysis of newspaper headings of the time, I find that an increase in honor killings spread from rural and tribal areas to urban locales. I examine that NGO’s came under scrutiny, suspicion and criticism from the conservative government and elements along the mullah culture dubbed their work as “spreading (of) vulgarity, immorality and obscenity in the name of human rights” (Rashid, 2006, Pg. 150).
I find that unlike General Zia’s military dictatorship of the 1980s (with the project of Islamization), General Musharraf’s military dictatorship (1999-2008) was one of self-acclaimed “enlightened moderation” (Rashid, 2006, Pg. 153) as it stressed the need for political empowerment of women to justify his coup d’état and especially in the changing tides of the post-9/11 world where Pakistan’s fate was defined through the Afghanistan and Taliban lens. I argue that the rise of Islamophobia in the West and the War on Terror gave root to the oppressed Afghan and Pakistani women from the brutal and savage Muslim men (Toor, 1997) which led to the social development projects (funded by the West). I also emphasize that the narrative of saving or helping the other woman, the veiled woman, became a justification for the West to engage in the war in Afghanistan.

Through a historical review, I find that the global war on terror coincided with the military takeover in Pakistan. I argue that it is necessary to point out that just as during the Ayub Khan and General Zia’s military dictatorship, this period was also marked with Western funding pouring into the country for social and military development and General Musharraf “became entrenched as the self-proclaimed Enlightened Moderate warmly embraced by the liberal intelligentsia as a savior” (Saigol, 2016, Pg. 25). Zaidi (2008) argues that it was the civil society elites who supported anti-democratic military takeover and the self-proclaimed enlightened agenda of the dictatorial regime. “The largest and most public support for Musharraf in October 1999 came from the socially and culturally liberal and westernized section of Pakistan’s elite, who embraced Musharraf as one of their own...activists in NGO movement in Pakistan were also vociferous in their support for Musharraf...clearly, for the westernized sections of civil society in Pakistan, the military general, who had overthrown a democratically-elected prime minister, was seen as Pakistan’s latest savior” (Zaidi, 2008, Pg. 15).

I note that this analysis sheds light on the non-traditional conceptualization of civil society and democracy in Pakistan, which is important to unravel to understand political representation and its relation to the larger democratic discourse. Scholars agree that civil society in Pakistan wrestles between identity issues as well as ideologies of western liberalism versus fundamentalist Islamic symbols and values which translates into a skewed understanding of democracy. In classical political philosophy, the autonomy and independence of civil society from state is a necessary condition in the pursuit of democratic ideals. However, in Pakistan, I argue, the pursuit of democratic ideals is not a necessary and defining requisite. Further, it is also apparent through analysis that historically women have gained more rights during military regimes than in periods of democratic rule. For example, the 1961 Family Laws Ordinance was promulgated by General Ayub Khan and the Women Protection Act and the increase in reserved seats for women’s political representation was instituted by General Musharraf.

4.6.3 Contextualizing the Post 9/11 Space – 2000’s Onwards

In outlining the trajectory, this section focuses on the most recent implications of political environment on women’s participation. I argue that the constructed stereotypes of women within the larger patriarchal discourse of nationalistic identities and partition find roots in the war on terror and the post 9/11 world as women, more than before, became symbols for the western audience and scholars to understand the veiled, traditionalist, faith-
based politics. The influence of Western military was justified as its policies are regarded as saving the veiled woman from the unresolved issues of identities, religion and the state (Zia, 2014). In the post 9/11 space, I find that scholars have focused on revisions and re-definitions of legal, social and economic histories by presenting new interpretations and understandings of socio-political movements in the Muslim world.

I emphasize that since 9/11 there has been an interest in trying to understand the codified radical, moderate, or liberal Muslim in academia and beyond. In the process the Muslim woman is used as a political tool in not only creating but also internalizing the ideological warfare against Islam and extremism. For the West, I argue that, it was the stance on women’s rights which became a litmus test and justified military intervention in the Middle East within the framework of human rights. This narrative of preserving human rights saw the Muslim woman is a passive victim of institutionalized patriarchy.

Scholars note that as the urban and upper middle and elite classes embraced the changing tides of women’s identity defined by Western Islamophobia (Rouse, 1992), women’s expression in mainstream Pakistan (lower and middle class) continued to find sanctuary in religion within the framework of the disempowering society where they were losing basic rights and representation (Zia, 2009, Pg. 49). Mumtaz and Shaheed (1991) reiterate the centrality of Islam to Pakistani culture and argue that women’s movement discourse must operate within the Pakistani culture.

I find that the election of 2002 marked a jumpstart for women’s political representation and participation in the history of Pakistan with hopes to shift this descriptive representation from an indirect mode of participation to that of direct elections. In 2002, a significant increase of women was witnessed in both the National Assembly and provincial assemblies as 60 women made their space in the National Assembly through reserved seats and thirteen were elected on general seats and one was nominated from the minority reserved seat. In total 74 women in National Assembly and 139 total in all four provincial assemblies (66 in Punjab, 29 in Sindh, 22 in NWFP and 11 in Balochistan) with an additional eleven women elected through general seats reflecting not only an attitudinal change but also a structural change in patriarchal and security-oriented state. I note that the credit for this historic increase of women’s presences in both national and provincial political space rests with political parties who adopted the narrative of women’s inclusion. Waseem (2006) argues that although the world witnessed this drastic increase of women’s presence in the political world, gender mainstreaming was not a priority for the “male dominated institutional structures of authority” (Pg. 203) in Pakistan and campaigns of direct election opportunities were opposed by major political parties and power brokers. In fact, it was in the interest of political parties and major power brokers to utilize the indirect elections for women’s seats so they could control who was nominated on reserved seats such as women who belonged to political families and or party workers who would carry forward their agenda.

76 Similarly, according to Khan (1999), “feminist activists find themselves competing for recognition and validation from transnational actors and in many ways, have had to position themselves alongside liberal feminist ideologies to not be seen as regressive or outdated...thus, middle-class and elite women from urban centers continue to influence and dictate the agenda for the women’s movement overall which has led to a skewed perception of women’s issues in countries like Pakistan” (pg. 45).
I find that the election of 2008 marked a record of women at the National Assembly elected through direct elections. In addition to the 60 women in National Assembly through the reserved seats, the 18 women candidates who contested direct elections totaled 78 women parliamentarians in the National Assembly. Even under the leadership of the PPP government, with the additional reserved seats allotted by General Zia to women and minorities, the draconian state constructed and designed by General Zia was not dismantled (Khattak, 2006) as the blasphemy charge against a Christian woman led to the murder of Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in January 2011 that shook the country and highlighted the need for acknowledging the conflict between religious ideology, legal framework and democratic ideals. During this time the Anti-Women Practices Law of 2011 (although weak in implementation) was established, prohibiting oppressive and discriminatory customs practiced towards women in Pakistan. During this time space was allotted to women’s groups to enter the parliamentarian space through the Parliamentary Women’s Caucus and the National Assembly Standing Committee on Women which worked closely with stakeholders to place women’s bills and laws on the agenda and introduce in parliaments. A seminal measure that gained support and passed was the law against sexual harassment in the workplace, the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act (2010). It reclaimed the public space for women and allowed added protection and enforceable rights for women in workplace. Further, an act of parliament created the National Commission on the Status of Women Bill 2012, a measure of the Pakistan Senate, unanimously approved, to protect women’s rights against discrimination. It replaced the National Commission on the Status of Women Ordinance from 2000 (established by General Musharraf) and strengthened the Commission by allocating it financial and administrative autonomy through an independent Secretariat. It is important to note that although during this time the religious community did oppose pro-women bills, strong voices in the National Assembly of women parliamentarians (like Nafisa Shah, Bushra Gohar and Sherry Rehman) (Saigol, 2016).

I argue that what shook the nation and the world in 2012 was when a young girl, Malala Yousafzai was shot in Swat region of Pakistan for claiming her right to education. I emphasize that once again the world’s eyes were fixated on Pakistan and its northern tribal areas subscribing to ancient customs and distorted views of religion in territory controlled by the Taliban. Saigol (2016) argues that “what began as a reconstruction of state policy in 1979 in response to global pressures and the military’s need to entrench itself in government, became a nightmare in 2009…the ruling alliance comprising of liberal and secular parties followed a policy of appeasement of the religious right, often giving in to their demands at the cost of women’s rights” (Pg. 30).

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77 Lobbied for by the women’s movement and led by woman parliamentarian Dr. Donya Aix (PML-Q) which criminalized customary practices such as giving a female in marriage as part of a deal; depriving women from inheriting property; forced marriages; and marriage with the Quran among other things (The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices, Criminal Law Amendment, Act 2011).

I find that the election of 2013 brought with it the leadership of Nawaz Shariff for the third time. There was a sharp decrease, by 50%, in the number or women candidates elected through direct seats. In addition to the 60 women in National Assembly through reserved seats, only 9 women were directly elected across the country. The newly formed government of Nawaz Shariff and the PML-N political party took an aggressive economic development agenda as its focus on women’s issues remained on the back burner. However, the National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) continued to recommend significant measures to end discrimination against women in compliance with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance of 1961 and developed training manuals and consultations with relevant parties. In addition, NCSW reviewed and gave inputs on the anti-rape bill, the Juvenile Justice System Bill (2015), and made recommendations for electoral reforms to the Election Commission of Pakistan to ensure women’s access to voting, domestic violence bill (2014), Reproductive Health Bill (2014) and the Christian Marriage and Divorce Amendment Bill (2014) under the leadership of Khawar Mumtaz. NCSW has also commissioned research studies around issues of women’s agency and conducted national baseline survey on the social and economic well-being of women. However, these efforts are not in collaboration with the larger women’s movement or women’s groups, but rather individual projects of the NCSW (NCSW website, accessed Jan 12, 2019).

I find that during the tenure of the 12th National Assembly, a unique movement for the restoration of judiciary, also known as the “Lawyers Movement” or the “Black Boat Protests”, reflected the need to seek alternatives to the increasing acceptance of the anti-democratic doxa. Initiated as a response to the military chief Pervez Musharraf’s action of unconstitutional suspending a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court Bar Association, including both female and male members, in collaboration with major political parties declared the action an “assault on the independence of judiciary” (Dawn Newspaper, 2007). A snowball effect of multiple public resistance efforts witnessed during 2007 and 2008, which I argue, gained momentum because of the collective effort of various interest groups including major political parties, segments of pro-government groups, civil society, the free media and the pro-judiciary groups. Institutional misuse of power and influence were highlighted by events such as police brutality in the city of Sahiwal (2007), the Black Saturday riots in Karachi, the dismissal of judiciary under the emergency rule, and unsubstantiated house arrests of various activists of the movements. I argue that women activists, organizations, politicians and civil society leaders led civil disobedience efforts and were at the forefront of the mobilization of collective demand for alternatives to the increasingly militaristic and masculine political atmosphere. I note that the movement provided a platform and a safe space for women to collectively engage in pro-women, pro-democracy and pro-development public dialogue. The momentum, coupled with the increasing popularity of the comparatively new political party of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, served as the space for civic engagement and participation for women, which in the past was not an option. The historic Pakistan Long March, from the southern city of Karachi to the capital city of Islamabad, provided a safe space for women to participate alongside men rallying for the restoration of the independent judiciary. Women leaders of the movement
included prominent TV anchor Asma Shirazi\textsuperscript{79}, lawyer and human rights advocate Asma Jahangir. I argue this reflects the continuation of women’s voice in the public sphere against the institutionalized patriarchy of the military.

Through examination I came across a study that found that from women who participated in the movement were equally as ambitious as men in seeking political office. Out of the 24 female participants of the movement who were surveyed, 72 percent in comparison to the 68 percent of men indicated ambitions for running for political office (Rincker, Aslam & Isani, 2016). I argue that the realization of the need for change and the change in perception is evident by the participation of women in such public spaces demanding change. These conditions, I argue, are a response to various elements such as awareness because of the increasing interconnectivity through information technology communications (ICTs), the media and the rampant flow of trans-border information regarding democratic values and human rights.

I find that the seminal election of 2018, under the banner of Naya Pakistan (a new Pakistan) led by the populist party of word renowned cricketer Imran Khan, proved even more detrimental for women parliamentarians as only 8 women candidates won direct seats in the National Assembly. This continuous decrease in the number of women indicates a downward trend of women being elected to National Assembly in Pakistan. With the total of 59 women on reserved seats and 1 woman on the minority reserved seat, a total of 68 women parliamentarians make up the current National Assembly.

4.7 Conclusion

I find that stereotypes of the women of Pakistan are constructed within the larger patriarchal discourse within the confines of the partition, nationalistic identities, war on terror and the post 9-11 world. As women continue to become symbols of the veiled (Blakeman, 2014), the traditionalist, faith-based politics for the western audience, their agency is continuously scrutinized. I argue that these findings reflect a hegemonic understanding through the lens of Western constructs. What I find missing from the discussion is the local knowledge and realities that view the veil more than a religious symbol; rather it views it as a form of self-expression, a refuge against male harassment and a way of negotiating for more spaces in the public space as assumed by existing literature. The prevalent narrative (in academic inquiry) refers to religion as a tool of participation by highlighting that “female religious political leaders have earned the power by compromising within militarized, dictatorial state that has assumed a moderate religious and liberal rhetoric” (Zia, 2009, Pg. 45).

In addition, I find that the relationship between personal identity and political activism is complex and must be examined through a local view point rather than the western feminist

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approach. Pakistani feminist fall under two main categories across liberal to extremist social spectrum and their agenda interplays religion and women’s rights (Rashid, 2000). Once group seeks to recognize the appeal of religion for lower class and lower middle-class women (works of Shaheed & Mumtaz, 1991) and the other self identifies as representatives of upper and upper middle-class feminist who state that women’s rights fall into the realm of secular human rights (works of Jahanghir and Jillani, 1990; Gardezi, 1994; Bhasin, Nighet & Menon, 1994; Zia, 2005).

I find that inquiries of Islam and its discursive role in governing the socio-political lives of women within Pakistan were the theme of the Urdu poetry of this time (Gardezi, 1994) as “women were actively constructing Islamic discourse as much as they were being interpreted by it” (Anantharam, 2009, Pg. 213). I note that the trajectory of the Pakistani woman’s engagement is rooted in political expression which draws heavily from poetry. As existing work in political identity notes that poetry has been utilized as a conscious-raising (Lorde, 2007) mechanism as a means to engage in the larger societal discourse of (the oppression of) women, I find that during the time of systematic narrowing of women’s agency, the literary writing experiences (Castelao-Gomez, 2016), as forms of resistance, were regarded as praxis of liberation (Yu, 2018).

As existing literature argues that in Pakistan when there is “a threat to the patriarchal and capitalist state, governments appear to be much less amenable to change” and the feminist discourse gets lost in “government’s male-dominated bureaucracies” (Saigol, 2016, Pg. 38) as a consequence of bureaucratic controls, red tape and limited funding. I note that this lack of cohesion between the women’s movement, women/gender academia and the political representatives highlight a major source of the lack of a unified women’s movement towards substantive progress as they fail to reconcile feminism with faith-based politics. As a result, I argue, women’s activism now focuses on women’s political participation and not necessarily on empowerment; on violence against women (as victims) rather than on prevention; and failed attempts to challenge networks of formal negotiation between men or misogynist to cultural practices (which tackles the root causes of the issues). Further, I note that there is a growing polarization between the good and the bad woman, based on religious interpretations against strict and literal interpretations of male religious and political discourse. I argue that this is a result of the popularly utilized hegemonic social science perspective that neglects the development and the social and intellectual changes in Pakistan, further signifying a disconnect from reality of the region of knowledge production (Keim, Celik, & Wohrer, 2014).

In the next chapter I try to avoid the “paucity of systematic studies” (Beteille, 2013, Pg. 3), the lack of interconnections among social processes in a systematic way, as I observe the impact of gender quotas, as tools to increase minority political representation, on women’s substantive representation by utilizing a multi-method model to the case study of the National Assembly of Pakistan.
Chapter 5

Analysis of 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies of Pakistan

5.1 Introduction

Political representation is legitimized by democratic institutions which create incentives for governments to be responsive to citizens (Pitkin 1967). Development studies indicate that legislative gender quotas are a product of Western policy to equalize or normalize the political playing field for women in the wake of increasing inequalities as a result of the prevailing neo-liberal economic framework around the world. Quotas make the universal assumption that the increased number of women legislators will activate a shift in cultural and societal dimensions with the assumption that women’s physical presence in legislative politics is transformative for “redefining political priorities, (and) placing new items on the political agenda that reflect and address women’s gender-specific concerns, values and experiences” (Beijing Platform Declaration, 1995, Pg. 79).

In this study, I investigate whether the increase in gender quotas in Pakistan’s National Assembly leads to an increase in women’s empowerment. I borrow elements of Pitkin’s (1967) conceptualization of representation as a framework for my inquiry to assess the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation which negotiate between accountability, legitimacy and democratic institutions in political representation of marginalized groups in society. In this dissertation, I examine if scaling this increase in descriptive representation, the presence of women through reserved seats, translates into substantive representation, defined as “acting for” women (Pitkin, 1967, Pg. 209) and measured as women’s empowerment?

This dissertation is a holistic three-part inquiry that goes beyond the traditional empirical study of gender quotas’ effectiveness (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). In the background of Pakistan’s unique relationship with the conceptualization of representation, which I argue was the reason for its formation in 1947, I examine implications of global development agenda on women in Pakistan in Chapter 2 and analyze the post-colonial, historical and feminist implications for women in politics in Pakistan in Chapter 4. These qualitative observations and analyses provide a detailed look at the need and or compatibility of mandated gender quotas (as reserved seats) in Pakistan and assess whether gender quotas are scalable across the world. In this chapter, I specifically explore whether a positive correlation exists between the presence of women and women’s empowerment in National Assembly and find that a limited effect exists.

5.2 Theoretical Framework

In assessing women’s substantive representation, I borrow the concept of process tracing from existing scholarship as “the ambition to find...” (Bennett, 2008) a relation, I trace the process of change during the 16 years of gender quotas (at 17%) and examine the

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change in power relations through the 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies of Pakistan to capture a correlation of women on reserved seats and contributions (if any) to the advancement of women’s empowerment in National Assembly.

To capture this change, I conceptualize substantive representation as the political expression of engaging in alternatives as a result of de-constructing existing patriarchal doxa, norms, of the National Assembly. Borrowing from interdisciplinary literature, I argue this process of change, as a function of gender quotas, serves as a conduit for women to seek alternatives to and de-construct (Hill-Collins, 1999) existing political doxa (Bourdieu, 1986).

Descriptive Representation → Substantive Representation

To analyze this relationship, I measure the change in women’s representation through a 16-year period of uninterrupted civilian rule (12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies). I examine whether substantive representation is a function of descriptive representation. I operationalize descriptive representation as resources, the institutionalized mechanism (of access) to representation in parliament, specifically the constitutionally mandated gender quotas. I operationalize substantive representation as empowerment which measures the change in power relations in parliament (in favor of women).

Resources → Empowerment: Δ in power relations in NA of Pakistan

Traditional examination of substantive representation in the field is defined as women-friendly (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005) activities by parliamentarians. In keeping with the tradition, I define substantive representation as the change in power relations in parliament by observing women’s participation (as empowerment) in parliament in three distinct areas: (1) the number of women-friendly legislation; (2) the number of leadership appointments; and (3) a change in the number of women on general seats.

In the study, I examine National Assembly’s responsiveness (Table 1) to gender in the following three questions:

1. Does an increase in descriptive representation in Parliament lead to an increase in the number of women-friendly legislation?
2. Does an increase in descriptive representation in Parliament lead to an increase in the number of women leadership appointments?
3. Does an increase in descriptive representation in Parliament lead to an increase in the number of women on general seats?

Table 3. Conceptually Tracing Change in National Assembly, 2002-2018

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<tr>
<th>Resources →</th>
<th>Δ in power relations in National Assembly of Pakistan</th>
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<td>Descriptive Representation → Substantive Representation</td>
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<tr>
<th>Gender Quotas</th>
<th>Women-friendly legislation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>Women in leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender Quotas</td>
<td>Women in general seats</td>
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Source: Self-Conceptualized

5.2.a Change in Power Relations

Although international practice (through UNDP’s gender-disaggregated Human Development Index and Gender Empowerment Index (GEM)) regards empowerment achievements as a function of measuring both basic human needs and outcomes through an empirical understanding, I argue that these dimensions reflect bias of the one conducting the analysis without looking at dimensions outside of the material understanding that may not be quantifiable in capturing values. Here I use Bourdieu’s (1977) conceptualizing of the idea of *doxa* which draws attention to aspects of tradition and culture that have become normalized. I use *doxa* as a tool for the formation of argument that is defined as rhetoric, popular opinion or the norm imposed by society which, because of its routine and constrained nature in social orders, places limits on political mobility. Further, I also use Plato’s conceptualization that argues that by normalizing commercial success as the outcome, the role of knowledge seeking is diminished which leads ones to venture beyond the accepted and seek alternatives (Szaif, 2007). In this study, I use the philosophical assumption that knowledge seeking leads to self-actualization which can potentially lead to the propensity of, as Bourdieu (1977) claims, seeking alternatives. As women engage in self-actualization (and identity formation), measured as empowerment, they can move past the normalized *doxa* and look towards availability of alternatives. Scholars suggest that knowledge about self and social requires the ability to break free from the basic *doxa* of material and cultural possibilities and engage in alternatives. As the possibility of power is reflected in preferences, values and choices, seeking alternatives signifies the break from *doxa* and is captured through the achievement of empowerment. I argue that this process of change is captured by women’s political empowerment. I borrow conceptualization of empowerment from Bari’s (1998) study of women’s political representation in Pakistan as “a sophisticated, multidimensional and complex notion…” (Pg. 130) which serves as a “ladder with many steps...”. (ibid). Therefore, I argue that substantive representation captures the change in patriarchal *doxa* as it measures positive or negative women’s empowerment.

Scholarship in the field regards agency and the ability to make strategic decisions as a key part of empowerment (Kabeer, 1999). For this study, I borrow Sen’s (1992) conceptualization of agency as a *participatory political action*. Agency is the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them (Sen, 1985) as an element of empowerment. In research, agency is categorized as both negative and positive in defining individual capacity, life

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81 In democracy, the concept of *doxa*, a rhetoric that creates public opinion, is essential to democracy because it has the potential to give rise to common action and can be used to define mobilization.
choices and the pursuit of goals. In the South Asian context, researchers argue that a negative women’s agency exits as they lack the exercise of decision-making. Traditional scholarship measures women’s decision-making in areas of food consumption, education, land ownership, purchasing choices, labor, etc. (Sathar and Kazi, 2000). As more of an observational dimension, agency assists in identity formation through self-actualization, and is often operationalized in research as decision-making. For the purpose of this study, I regard agency (decision-making) as an outcome and therefore, use mobilization as a determinant with the assumption that it will either lead women towards exercising agency in efforts to seek alternatives to their current status in society.

As I measure empowerment, I am essentially interested in inequalities that exist as barriers to achievements. Because inequalities are a basic function of extreme scarcity and are generally confined to the analysis of gender in social science, I use the assumption that women’s disempowerment is largely a matter of poverty (of resources and collective mobilization). I argue that reducing economic inequalities does not necessarily lift social restrictions on women’s abilities to make choices (Razavi, 2001), and therefore, in this study, expand the scope of poverty, beyond sheer financial capacity, to include women’s legislation, leadership and impact on general seats in the National Assembly.

In order to measure the process of change towards empowerment, I develop the following correlation model:

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(\text{constitutional reserved seats}) \rightarrow (\text{participatory political action})
\]

5.3 Research Design

I argue that exploratory understanding of the impact of reserved seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly helps in generating a posteriori hypotheses by examining the data available and looking for potential relationships. Although studies from developing countries have indicated a positive relationship between gender quotas and women’s empowerment, I explore whether gender quotas (as a vehicle for reducing inequalities in politics) are scalable across emerging democracies. Given the complex governance structure with military (based on foreign influence) interventions of Pakistan, I assume that a relationship exists, but in which direction or strength is the aim of this case study as it reviews Pakistan’s National Assemblies during its longest civilian rule 2002-2018 (comprising of three National Assemblies, the 12th, 13th and 14th). I use a case study approach “because it gives an opportunity for one aspect of a problem to be studied in some depth within a limited time scale” (Bell, 1999) in examining this phenomenon.

In this case study, I use A.D. de Groot’s empirical cycle, as displayed in Table 2 which includes the process of examination. The observation stage includes observation of a phenomenon and inquiry of its causes; the induction includes the formulation of hypotheses as generalized explanations for the phenomenon; deduction is defined as the formulation of experiments that test the hypotheses by either confirming as true or refuting as false; testing is procedure by which hypotheses are tested and data are collected; and the evaluation is the interpretation of the data and formulation of the abductive argument, presenting the
results of the experiment as the most reasonable explanation of the phenomenon (Heitink, 1999).

### Table 4- Case Study Analysis Cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Induction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Deduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I use a non-experimental descriptive research design which does not involve the manipulation of a situation, circumstances or experience of participants through a longitudinal design and examine variables as performance measures exhibited by women in each of the National Assemblies over the course of a 16-year period. Through an empirical examination of the change in women’s empowerment I collected data from: National Assembly archives, Pakistan National Assembly Archives, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), archives of the Aurat Foundation; archives of the National Commission on Status of Women (NCSW), the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN). To add to these data points, I have also conducted informal interviews by borrowing Weiss’s (2013) methodology of “panel of experts” from 2011 to 2018. The interview responses of 2011 which I use in this study are a product of pre-dissertation research for a comparative politics class. Interview responses from 2015-2018 are a product of my appointment to the United Nations Civil Society Network (CSO) as a UN Representative in consultative status at the Economic and Social Affairs Council (ECOSOC). Due to access to major stakeholders in Pakistan’s sustainable development arena on the domestic and international level, I was able to gather direct information from participants in women’s empowerment journey.

**Alternative Hypothesis:** *The increase in women’s descriptive representation through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in women’s substantive representation in the National Assembly of Pakistan.*

I find that a negative correlation exists between women in leadership and the # of women on general seats. Therefore, accepting the alternative hypothesis, I conclude that the increase in women’s descriptive representation through reserved seats has a limited effect on the increase in women’s substantive representation in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

### 5.3.1 Dependent Variable –Substantive Representation
Political participation is understood as “activity that has intent or effect of influencing public action, either directly, by influencing the making of public policy, or indirectly, by influencing the selection of political decision makers” (Verba, et al, 1995, Pg. 38). Pitkin (1967) defines substantive representation as “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (pg. 285). She notes that government responsiveness to citizen preferences is a foundational goal of democracy. Therefore, attention and responsiveness to citizen preferences, concerns and interests is also what constitutes substantive representation.

I identify substantive representation as the dependent variable, the observation of research, as the measurement of women’s empowerment. Scholarship argues that access to parliament (gender quotas) is an insufficient determinant of empowerment. Therefore, to measure empowerment, I use the following indicators: women-friendly legislation; leadership roles (Federal Ministers, Ministers of State, Committee Chairs, Committee Secretaries); and women’s agency (on general seats) as indicators that widen the scope of measurement in terms of outcome achievements.

5.3.1. a Dependent Variable 1: Legislation

I categorize the change in women-friendly legislation as a dependent variable and investigate the number of women-friendly legislation during the 13th, 14th and 15th National Assemblies.

As the mere presence of women is increased, it serves as role models for other women in society (Barnes and Burchard, 2013) and places emphasis on substantive representation as it affects the type of legislation introduced, deliberations and passed. In this analysis, I measure legislation strictly as all legislation, passed and amended, on issues serving human rights, women and children. I conceptualized legislation as women-friendly, male-friendly and neutral based on the model of feminine and masculine political activity by Schwindt-Bayer (2006), Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson (2005) and Sapiro (1981). Although in research neutral domains are categorized as administration, human rights, religion, etc., I argue that in the context of Pakistan, human rights and religion should fall under the feminine domains because of the suppressing women’s rights (Appendix 1).

Alternative Hypothesis: The increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in women-friendly legislation in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

I find that a positive correlation exists. Therefore, rejecting the alternative hypothesis, I conclude that the increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does lead to the increase in women-friendly legislation in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

5.3.1.b Dependent Variable 2: Leadership

I categorize the change in leadership as a dependent variable and investigate the number of women in various leadership roles during the 13th, 14th and 15th National Assemblies.
I investigate the characteristics of Federal Ministries, Ministries of State, and Committees that were led by women. I conceptualize the various leadership positions as women-friendly, male-friendly and neutral based on the model of feminine and masculine political activity by Schwindt-Bayer (2006), Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson (2005) and Sapiro (1981). By assigning identity, I dichotomize the leadership positions into the gendered political patterns of feminine and masculine policy domains. Feminine domains are composed of women’s issues jurisdictions and include family, culture, social welfare, education, etc., while masculine domains reflect issues of defense, military, finance, economics and agriculture. Although I conceptualized human rights and religion under feminine domains in measuring legislation, I argue that in the context of leadership in parliament, human rights and religion should fall under masculine domains because of the prevalent patriarchal and militaristic culture in agenda setting and policy making.

Alternative Hypothesis: \( \text{The increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in women’s leadership in the National Assembly of Pakistan.} \)

I find that a negative correlation exists. Therefore, accepting the alternative hypothesis, I conclude that the increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in women’s leadership in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

5.3.1.\( c \) Dependent Variable 3: General Seats

I categorize the change in general seats as a dependent variable and investigate the number of women in general seats during the 13th, 14th and 15th National Assemblies.

Although Pakistan is one of the few countries around the world to have had a female head of state in the last five decades, women’s political participation on all levels remains low. Existing research makes a strong claim that women’s presence in legislatures and predicts women’s representation, I argue that this generalized claim should be investigated in country specific political landscapes. I argue that if the justification of women’s reserved seats is to eventually lead to higher levels of women’s representation, then, the change (if any) of women’s participation in parliament on general seats should be examined.

Alternative Hypothesis: \( \text{The increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in the number of women on general seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan.} \)

I find that a negative correlation exists. Therefore, accepting the alternative hypothesis, I conclude that the increase in women’s presence through reserved seats does not lead to the increase in the number of women on general seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan.

5.3.2 Independent Variable – Descriptive Representation

Hanna Pitkin (1967) describes descriptive representation as “standing for”, “acting for”, “speaking like” and “acting like” (Pg. 67). Conceptualized as the politics of presence
(rather than politics of ideas), in this study, I define descriptive representation as the number of reserved seats for women in parliament.

Gender quotas are introduced as a mechanism to normalize the growing inequality. The classic liberal idea of equality rested on creating equal opportunities and a competitive equality by removing formal barriers. In the context of women, this involved giving women voting rights and by extension, after the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995, gender quotas in the political space. According to the IPU, greater numbers of women in parliaments increases the women’s influence on political policies and priorities. Studies indicate that a critical minority, critical mass of 30 or 40 percent (International IDEA, Stockholm, 200382), must be present in political systems to ensure influence in decision making and policy. In Pakistan, gender quotas are introduced as reserved seats which are constitutionally mandated. In the absence of an electoral constituency, these reserved seats are guaranteed through party lists. Table 3 shows the number of reserved seats in Pakistan National Assembly. Although there has been an increase in the number of reserved seats for women, the total percent still falls of the critical mass needed as identified by existing studies of developing democracies.

### Table 3: Number of Reserved Seats in National Assembly (1988-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of General Seats</th>
<th># of Reserved Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


#### 5.3.2. a Resources – Reserved Seats

I categorize the number of reserved seats constitutionally mandated for women as the dependent variable during the 13th, 14th and 15th National Assemblies.

In categorizing women reserved seats as an independent variable, I conceptualize it as a resource in addressing gender inequalities. I operationalize resources to include institutionalized mechanisms available for political participation. These can include political party mandates, constitutional provisions and gender responsive policies. For the scope of this study, I use the constitutional provision of gender quotas as resources, as a reflection of presence.

82See IDEA, [https://www.idea.int/](https://www.idea.int/)
5.4 Evaluation

Is there a pattern of engagement for women’s movements with formal politics?

Persistent gender gap exists in political participation and representation (Kittilson, 2015). In order to understand the personal and public patterns of women’s role in the political sphere, I conduct a qualitative analysis of various forms of political expression provide additional insight into the women’s representation.

5.4.1 Evaluating Descriptive Representation

Political scientists refer to resources beyond the conventional economic sense and include human and social relationships within institutional domains that make up society (Kabeer, 2005). Resources are a scarcity in society and the allocation of resources, who gets what and who decides who gets what, reflect power and decision-making. Scholars generally use access to resources to capture control and decision making (Sathar and Kazi, 2000; Jejeebhoy, 1995). The access reflects rules and norms which govern the distribution and exchange of these resources as the “allocative resources tends to be embedded within distribution of authoritative resources” (Giddens, 1967). Therefore, I argue that reserved seats are the resource that provide women access to parliament.

In assessing whether descriptive representation leads to substantive representation in Pakistan National Assembly, I, first, examined the inclusion of reserved seats as a mechanism of gender quotas through a historical overview (Table 3).

The international development agenda, in response to increasing inequalities because of neo-liberal economic policies, recognized the need for inclusive participation of all marginalized segments of society. And since, Pakistan’s the public discourse, centered on western constructs like representative government, democracy, public opinion and nation-state, has attempted to expand the incorporation of women into the political space, but cautiously within the confines of the framework of Islamic polity (Waseem, 2006).

Pakistan’s constitutions of 1956, during the government of Prime Minister Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, granted ten reserved seats in a 310-member National Assembly and ten additional seats each in East and West Pakistan. The constitution of 1962, under the leadership of a special commission and Presidency of Ayub Khan, limited the number of reserved seats to six for women in the National Assembly which were to be elected by members of each provincial assembly and each provincial assembly secured five seats for women which were also to be elected by the assembly members. In the Constitution of 1973, under the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the reserved seats for women in National Assembly was increased back to ten seats, which was roughly 5% of total seats and similarly, 5% of seats were reserved for women in the four provincial assemblies. After a gap of about ten years (and two general elections), the number of reserved seats for women in the National Assembly was increased from ten to twenty based on representation from provincial affiliations (12 seats were allocated to Punjab; four to Sindh, and two each to NWFP and Balochistan).
In addition, the mandate of 5% reservation of 1973 stayed in effect in the context of provincial assembly seats for women. Based on international provisions, these mandates were instituted as temporary boosts to increase women’s presences in the political spear of representation as they followed the international development strategies for women’s empowerment and democratic representation.

The election of 1988 reflected a significant increase in the representation of women at the time. Although not a democratic transfer of power, the election highlights the presence of women included 20 reserved seats out of 237 total seats in the National Assembly. President and former General Zia declared the current administration corrupt and inefficient and dismissed the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and called for new elections which would not be held around political parties. However, following his suspicious accidental death, the Supreme Court reversed the decision to ban parties from elections and a new government was formed. From a total of 1,370 candidates for National Assembly, 16 women from 18 constituencies contested general seats (9 of the 16 women as party candidates and the rest as independents) and 4 won National Assembly seats. Also, the first woman Prime Minister of Pakistan and the first female head of a Muslim country, Benazir Bhutto, took office as the winning political party, who ran against the campaign of President Zia’s islamization. With the provision of 20 reserved seats on National Assembly, the government lasted two years and was dismissed again with new elections in 1990. In the elections of 1990, 1993 and 1997, there were no reserved seats and during this time the proportion of women representation fell to 3.2 percent in the National Assembly.

As women’s participation fell to a dismal 3.2% in parliament in the election of 1990, human rights organizations and women’s rights groups began to raise concerns. The Commission of Inquiry for Women was appointed by the government and headed by a Supreme Court judge who commented:

Equal participation of men and women in decision-making is a prerequisite for effective and genuine democracy. It is unfortunate that even major decisions that affect their lives in the form of laws and policies are made primarily by male-membership bodies with virtually no participation by women. This is a major reason why so many of the laws are discriminatory and why most policies marginalize women. While it is vital for women to have a decisive voice on issues of concern to them, it is equally critical to have their perspective and views reflected in other decisions in other spheres and at all levels. (Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid, Report of The Commission of Inquiry for Women, 1998, cited in Aurat Foundation, 2013).

Civil rights organizations, such as Aurat Foundation launched campaigns to mobilize networks for advocacy on women’s representation and lobbied legislators and government in power. In 1995, in the backdrop of international commitments to the increase in women’s participation, Aurat Foundation (2013) successfully delivered an output document from around table on reserved seats that resulted in signing of a joint declaration

by party representatives to restore women’s reserved seats. Parallel to this, the Commission of Inquiry for Women also endorsed the principles of reservation and recommended 33 percent reservations for women seats in all elective bodies. These joint efforts were a result of multi-stakeholder participation, network collaborations and alliances (Interview with Rafi, 2015). According to Aurat Foundation records, “more than 1500 civil society organizations; thousands of individuals; opinion leaders; legislators of 19 political parties; some ministers and office bearers of several women wings of political parties” (Aurat Foundation, 2013) were instrumental in restoring and enhancing reserved seats in the four provincial assemblies and in getting unanimous resolutions passed in urging federal government to restore and enhance seats in all legislative bodies. It is noted that one of the first provincial assemblies to approve the resolution and raise its number of reserved seats for women was Balochistan, from 16.4 percent to 25.8 percent, as the highest of any achievement in the history of Pakistan (Aurat Foundation, 2013).

After a period of silenced democracy, in 2001 the Ministry of Women’s Development organized a consultation on women’s legislative representation that resulted in the endorsement of 33 percent seats in all legislative bodies (Aurat Foundation, 2013). This background provides an understanding of participatory actions which, eventually, led to reforms. These reform measures provided foundation, in addition to the international rhetoric and post 9-11 US-Pakistan relations, which led to the 17% reserved seats in National Assembly and 17.6 percent in provincial assemblies (these numbers were cut from the initially endorsed 33 percent to 17 percent).

Observations of news articles from the time highlight anxiety within political parties regarding the high number of reserved seats because of the lack of women candidate pool to fill the seats. A system of compiling lists was introduced according to Article 51, sub article 6 (d) of Chapter 2 of the amended Constitution, “…members to the seats reserved for women…shall be elected…through proportional representation system of political parties’ lists of candidates on the basis of total number of general seats secured by each political party...in the National Assembly” In the election of 2002, approximately 36,000 women came into political mainstream through the local councils (Senator Anousha Rehman Interview, 2016).

Article 51, section 1 of the constitution outlines the number of seats in National Assembly (including women and minorities). As part of a constitutional mandate, The Legal Framework Order of 2002 (S no. 3) amended the number of seats in the National Assembly from 217 to 342 (to include 60 reserved seats for women and 10 for minorities). Distributed proportional to population across the four provinces, these include 35 out of 148 in Punjab, 14 out of 61 in Sindh, 8 out of 35 in KPP, and 3 out of 14 in Balochistan (Chart 1). Similarly, quotas were also incorporated into the framework of Provincial Assemblies. According to Article 106, section 1, of the constitution provides the number of reserved seats in Provincial Assemblies to include 66 out of 297 in Punjab; 29 out of 130 in Sindh; 22 out of 99 in KPP; and 11 out of 51 in Balochistan (see Table 4).

Chart 1: Distribution of the 60 Reserved Seats for Women in National Assembly
Table 5: Distribution of Seats in Provincial Assemblies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Area</th>
<th># General Seats</th>
<th># Reserved Seats</th>
<th># Reserved Seats</th>
<th># Reserved Seats</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Minities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>371</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPP</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>577</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>733</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There was limited backlash once quotas were implemented because “quotas did not discriminate against men, rather they gave political parties additional seats” (Rafi interview, 2015), while compensating for structural barriers faced by women in electoral process. Therefore, these numbers significantly increased the presence of women in national and provincial assemblies by addition seats without impacting male representation.

5.4.2. Evaluating Substantive Representation

I capture the impact of access to parliament on power and decision-making of women on reserved seats by observing the number of women in leadership positions such as appointments as federal ministers, ministers of state, committee chairs and committee secretaries.
Although literature indicates that as the number of women in government and public life increase, gains are made in women-friendly policies (Saint-Germaine, 1989; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003). While gender parity in government is not the ends but the means to secure gender equality, it can result in equitable political agendas with a focus on women. I argue that sweeping generalization about formally adopting gender quotas, as reforms within the larger agenda of development to mitigate gender discrimination and inequality fails to account for country specific challenges and or compatibility of quotas within various political landscapes.

While analyzing substantive representation through the three dimensions of political participation acts, I found that dialogue on women’s empowerment in parliaments was not void of the inclusion of party politics.

Political parties are “endemic to democracy, an unavoidable part of democracy” (cited in Waseem, 2006) because they serve as the mode of functioning for the government and citizens. As in most parliamentary democracies, in Pakistan the “political party in majority mandates the government agenda, the political parties in opposition police the functions through a check on abuses of power” (Waseem interview, 2011). This means that prioritizing issues based on agendas are a sole function of party politics, regardless of women’s agency to empower women’s issues. However, I found that in the context of Pakistan that wasn’t the entire reality. By observing the geo-political influencers during the Cold War up to the post 9/11 political landscape, I find that government agenda is not necessarily a product of political party positions, but rather “strictly guided and monitored or with the approval of” (Rasool Interview, 2018) the military and the parties in power have consistently been recognized as the “military puppets” (ibid.) through the 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies.

As studies indicate that women do not involve themselves in women’s issues and are strictly focused on the same agenda as their male counterparts (Jones, 1997), I find that when given the opportunity, women parliamentarians, do, championed an agenda of inclusivity, such as Parliamentarian Sherry Rehman, towards women’s parity in the election process. In a similar situation, Parliamentarian Anousha Rehman vocalized the “need for technology in equalizing the standard education system to ensure that girls had access and training necessary to meet challenges of the shifting marketplace” (Rehman Interview, 2016). I argue that this is an example where it is uncertain if the parliamentarian herself endorsed and championed the issue or the issue was part of the party agenda which she adopted and chose to vocalize as part of symbolic representation of women and girls.

Studies note that the feminist label keeps women from pursuing women-friendly policies, and women legislators account for party loyalties and party agendas over gender identity (Htun and Jones, 2002). Similarly, “women’s political loyalties, first and foremost, rest with the political party or organizations to which they belong. Gender loyalty, for all practical purposes, comes in (a distant) second. Even among women of the same party, it is noticeable that their solidarity and loyalty rest with policies and programs, political patrons and mentors, career plans and ambitions – not with the other women in the party” (Rodriguez, 1998, Pg. 8). While conducting interviews of women parliamentarians, I found that majority
of them did not want to discuss barriers for women in parliaments, rather they would point to the increase in descriptive representation of women as a successful outcome by quoting the figure of “over 32,000 women in political positions in local district elections” (Rehman Interview, 2016; Durrani Interview, 2016).

I find that women shy from taking pro-women stances because they know it would limit their political chances (Craske, 1999). One parliamentarian stated that she made her party issues a priority because “things need to get done and you are expected to get them done” (Durrani Interview, 2016). I argue this statement reflected lack of agency for the parliamentarian on reserved seat. Although women do become vocal advocates of women’s rights and join women caucuses once elected, they are less likely to champion women’s issues during their campaigns (Htun, 1998) and this was visible during the 60th-62nd UN Commission on Status of Women (2016-2018) as women delegates focused on the role of economic growth as a priority and a determinant of women’s advancement without mentioning women’s political participation. I point out that the Pakistan National Agenda (of the 14th National Assembly) as part of the majority political party, PMLN’s agenda, Pakistan Vision 2025, paralleled the UN Sustainable Development Goals85 in areas of economic growth but failed to mention direct avenues or schemes to ensure substantive representation of women in national and provincial assemblies. On the contrary, I observed that various written statements and oral interventions were made through the civil society urging Pakistan to make inclusive development policies, assessment metrics and training opportunities.

On the other hand, experts who observe parliamentarian politics in Pakistan from within the political machinery endorse work by researchers in the field that state that women legislators view women and women’s groups as a priority than their counterparts (Schwindt-Bayer, 2005) and prioritize constituency work with increased commitment. According to “general consensus in parliament (even among the men folk), women parliamentarians do majority of the heavy lifting in regard to the everyday work, they attend more sessions and speak more often” (Rasool Interview, 2018). Women are more likely to initiate and propose policies and take active leadership roles in passage and implementation (Thomas, 1999; Carroll, 2001) and spend more time talking about social issues (such as abortion, women’s rights, civil rights, gay rights and the environment), while men discuss economic and military issues (taxes, federal budget, foreign policy, and the military) (Reingold, 2000). Similarly, other studies argue that these issues that women legislators prioritize of social concerns are women-friendly while male legislators focus on men-friendly policies (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005).

I argue that further examination of Pakistani women politicians’ behavior at the international stage to assess whether a projection of a positive and thriving Pakistani society and not focusing on areas of improvement is a strategy of the Office of Foreign Affairs. I emphasize the importance of further study into the confidence and or agency of a junior women parliamentarian versus a seasoned (politician) or senior women parliamentarian. I


observe that my informal discussions with senior parliamentarians, women leaders and or civil service personnel was more informed about the topic and women did not hesitate in answering questions. I also contend that place matters in the sense that I conducted these informal interviews while they were on official trips or assignments to the United States. Perhaps the duty of representing the country in a positive light superseded their need to engage in candid dialogue.

5.4.2.a Women in Leadership

Scholarship claims that women’s political landscape has, in fact, changed as women continue to enter the once male-dominated space (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Chen, 2010). Keeping in mind that leadership roles in parliament provide access and opportunity for women parliamentarians to change power relations, I examined the number of women appointments as Federal Ministers (Table 5), Ministers of State (Table 6), Committee Chairs (Table 7) and Parliamentary Secretaries (Table 8) through the 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies.

Table 6: Number of Women Federal Ministers

Table 7: Number of women Ministers of State

Table 8: Number of women Committee Chairs
Although the number increase in the number of women in the 12th National Assembly reflects an increase from the past National Assemblies, the tables do not demonstrate a steady increase of women in leadership positions from the 12th to the 14th National Assemblies. According to Strøm and Müller (2008), a new cabinet is formed when any of the following conditions are met: 1) the set of parties holding cabinet membership changes (where cabinet members are defined as parties that have designated representatives with voting rights within the government); 2) the prime minister changes; 3) there is a general election. In the context of Pakistan, new cabinets have emerged through the years following the dissolution of National Assembly by the presiding President. In my analysis, each of the three National Assemblies witnessed changes in leadership as the Prime Ministers shuffled in and out of position as highlighted in Table 9. These changes are reflected in leadership appointments. Especially in the 12th National Assembly, three Prime Ministers took leadership and with each came changes in parliamentary leadership assignments. For example, during the 12th National Assembly, Prime Minister ZK Jamali was encouraged by party leadership to resign because he failed to follow Military General Musharraf's policies and, instead, focused on party agenda. Similarly, in another example, women parliamentarian, Eman Wasim on a general seat, was forced to resign from her Ministerial appointment to allow for a technocrat, World Bank economist Shaukat Aziz, the position so he could be considered for the party appointment (heavily endorsed by the Military) of Prime Minister. Fast forward to 2018, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the leader of his party, was forced to resign by a military backed judicial review. Many similar instances have transpired through the tenures of the 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies and I recommend an in-depth review of these instances for a separate case study.

Table 9: Number of women Parliamentary Secretaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>No. of Women Parliamentary Secretaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: List of Prime Ministers during 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>National Assembly</th>
<th>Governing Political Party</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>PML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>PML</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In the 13th National Assembly, there were three different cabinets under the three Prime Ministers with 7% women Federal; 10% in the second cabinet under Prime Minister Gillani; and 11% in the third cabinet under Prime Minister Ashraf. The number of women Ministers in the 14th Assembly decreased as the first cabinet, under Prime Minister Sharif (9%) and further decreased down to 7% in the cabinet of Prime Minister Abbasi.

Within these two National Assemblies, on average women Federal Ministers served in both masculine and feminine categorized Ministries. Collectively, women led the following masculine categorized Federal Ministries of Information and Broadcasting, Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology; and the following feminine categorized Federal Ministries of Population and Welfare, National Rules and Services, Social Welfare and Education, Women’s Development, National Heritage and Integration, and the Benazir Income Support Programme. The 13th National Assembly was historic in women’s empowerment because the first woman Minister was appointed to the Foreign Office, Ms. Hina Rabbani Khar, a junior parliamentarian from a “political dynasty” (Asako et al., 2015; Folke, 2016).

I also observe that the Benazir Income Support Programme, providing access to financial services to women, was created as a Federal Level Ministry. I argue that the adoption and continuation of the Benazir Programme offers insight into the shifting cultural and social trends on women’s engagement in the public space. Researchers note that women-friendly social policies tend to surface as a result of a larger societal recognition of failure of macro policies in addressing disparities and as a mechanism social protection. In Pakistan the shifting responsibilities of gender relations highlights efforts towards gender parity.

Scholars note that “advocacy on behalf of women which builds on claimed synergies between feminist goals and official development priorities has made great inroads into the mainstream development agenda than advocacy” (Kabeer, 1999, Pg. 435). Given the decrease in the number of women Federal Ministers through the course of the Assemblies, I find that women are not able to develop agenda and therefore, lack the access to guide policy priorities.
I did not analyze the date from the 12th National Assembly because I found discrepancies in the numbers when viewing different sources.\(^8^6\)

5.4.2.a.ii Ministers of State

However, observing data from the 13\(^{th}\) National Assembly, I find initially the tenure started with 16% women Ministers of State, but as the cabinets shifted with Prime Ministers, the number of women Ministers of State decreased to 5%. Hina Rabbani Khar was the only woman parliamentarian who stayed the tenure under two cabinets serving as head of finance and economic affairs and under the third cabinet, was promoted to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As she was promoted, another woman did not fill her spot. Again, I note that she was able to keep her position and ascend the ladder because of her family connections to the party.

In the 14\(^{th}\) National Assembly, I find a slight increase in the number of women Ministers of State down to 7%.

In comparing two National Assemblies, in the 13\(^{th}\) National Assembly women exclusively led masculine categorized Ministries of State including Finance and Economic Affairs; Parliamentary Affairs; Foreign Affairs; Science and Technology. In contrast, the 14\(^{th}\) National Assembly Ministers of State exclusively led feminine committees, including State Ministry of Federal Education and Professional Training.

Studies have found that female officeholders do exhibit more concern about issues of women, children and families such as education, equal rights, abortion rights, child support, harsher penalties for sexual assault and violence against women (Phillips, 1998), therefore, I argue the dynamic shift in power relations of the 13\(^{th}\) National Assembly reflects an increase in possible support for women’s legislation. I will assess this in the next section.

I did not analyze the date from the 14th National Assembly because I found discrepancies in the numbers when viewing different sources.

5.4.2.a.iii Committee Chairs

There were significantly more women Parliamentarians appointed as Standing Committee Chairs during the 12\(^{th}\) National Assembly, 24% as compared to 6% in the 14\(^{th}\) National Assembly. Reserved seats have the potential falling victim to patronage as party leaders utilize it to expand party agenda through selective recruitment (Goetz, 2003) and serve as stand ins or proxies for male party leaders or male relatives within political dynasties (Nanivadekar, 2006). I argue this significant decrease is more striking in observation of committee categorization since collectively women Parliamentarians mostly chaired...\(^8^6\) Here I only compare 13th and 14th National Assemblies because I found significant discrepancy in the numbers of women Ministers in the 12th National Assembly from different sources. The data for the 12th National Assembly is no longer available on the National Assembly website and different government and NGO reports (by Aurat Foundation) present different numbers. Therefore, I decided not to use data since I was not able to verify it.
masculine categorized standing committees in the 12th & 14th National Assemblies including Petroleum & Natural Resources, Tourism, Health and Environment, Religious Affairs and Parliamentary Affairs.

Given these results, I further investigated whether these women Chairs were on reserved seats or on general seats to understand if parliamentarians on reserved seats were following male party mandates. I found that entirely all the women parliamentarians who were appointed as Committee Chairs were exclusively on reserved seats in both 12th and 14th National Assembly. I argue this brings up a new line of inquiry as to why party gatekeepers (Sahi Interview, 2011) would appoint women (usually) with no political background a leadership position in Parliament, especially in masculine categorized committee? I examine this later in the chapter.

5.4.2.a.iv Parliamentary Secretaries

I find an increase in the number of women appointed as Parliamentary Secretaries from 18% in the 12th National Assembly to 24% in the 14th National Assembly. Surprisingly I find that in the 14th National Assembly women parliamentarians who were appointed as secretaries were appointed to all masculine categorized committees. I argue this shift indicates the recognition of women’s capacity through the last couple assemblies which paved the way for women to have key leadership role and access to significantly important committees. I argue that with the emergence of women in prominent positions has resulted in Pitkin’s (1967) symbolic representation by reinforcing positive perceptions of women’s abilities in power and decision making. With the appointment of Hina Rabbani Khar as the Foreign Minister, Dr. Fehmida Mirza as the Speaker of the House and others in positions of influence further strengthened the image of women as capable leaders.

Collectively, women parliamentarians were appointed secretaries of the following masculine categorized committees: Environment, Health, Capital Administration and Development Division, Climate Change, Commerce and Textile, Human Rights, National Health Services, Regulation and Coordination, Parliamentary Affairs, States and Frontier Regions, Petroleum & Natural Resources and Tourism. The feminine categorized committees included Women Development, Social Welfare & Special Education, and Education.

5.4.2.b Women-friendly Legislation

As most developing world adopted legislative gender quotas as a direct response to international pressures of global women’s movement for gender equality (Bush, 2011), a parliamentary women Caucasus and pro-women laws and policies did surface. The 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies promoted significant gains in women’s rights and protection by passing new laws and or amending existing laws (Appendix 1).

The 12th National Assembly passed more laws targeting traditional and cultural practices of dowry, inheritance, and prohibition of rural practice of marriage with the Quran. The 13th National Assembly focused on securing public spaces for women through bills that
protected women against harassment at the workplace, anti-women practices, compulsory education, corporal punishment, reproductive and healthcare rights, family courts, acid control and domestic violence. Similarly, the 14th National Assembly continued the work towards women’s empowerment by focusing on acid and burn issues, granting protections and rights to the transgender person, status of women, rights of child, prevention of trafficking and protection for women in distress.

Research indicates that male representatives can support and represent women’s interests, but women must be present if their views, interests and needs are to take shape and transform the political debate (Phillips, 1995; Thomas, 1994; Kathleen, 1995). As gender makes a difference in legislators’ policy priorities, case studies observe that descriptive representation does, in fact, translate into substantive representation (Reingold, 2000). I argue that the increase in women’s presence in National Assembly since 2002 has certainly resulted in bringing attention to women’s issues that have translated into legislation. Simultaneously, I argue that media has also made an impact in highlighting women’s issues, along with tragic incidents that made international headlines.

5.4.2.c Women in Leadership

Nobody is going to define you, you have to define yourself and define which glass ceilings are you willing to break. –H.E. Permenant Representative Maleeha Lodhi, CSW63

I find that the number of women elected on general seats has decreased from 4% to 2% from the 12th National Assembly to the 14th National Assembly. However, I identify observations of the 13th National Assembly as an outlier with 5% of women on general seats. The increase and then a sudden decrease suggest outside factors. However, in the 12th National Assembly, for the first time in history of Pakistan, the National Assembly elected a female speaker Dr. Fahmeeda Mirza.

The 14th National Assembly was a product of the first civilian transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another. Although gains have been made in the political space, women were still excluded from these gains. The historic election of 2013 reflected the largest number of women candidates who contested National Assembly elections on general seats from a wider range of constituencies, however, the number of women on general seats was significantly lower (Table 10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Constituencies</th>
<th>Contesting as Party Candidates</th>
<th>Contesting as Independent</th>
<th>Won General Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After further investigation, I find that when examining the number of women candidates who contested general seats jumped 41% from the election of 2002 (12th National Assembly) to the election of 2013 (14th National Assembly), with 56 women contesting in general elections to 66 in 2008 and 135 women contesting in 2013 (Table 10). As the number consistently increase, so did the representational cross districts signify that urban and rural areas both were present. In 2002, 56 of the women contesting general seats represented 49 different constituencies, in 2008, 66 of women represented 60 different constituencies and in 2013, 135 of the women contesting general seats represented 113 different constituencies.

I also observed the number of women who came in second, as runners up, in their elections and found that from the election of 2002 to the election of 2013 there was a 64% increase. I argue this suggests trust and ability of women candidates if they receive significant amounts of votes.

Although the data reflects an increase, I find there is still a large and persistent voter registration gap across the country (and especially in majority of tribal culture such as KPK and Baluchistan). An estimated an eligible 11.6 million women excluded from electoral rolls in 2015 per the Free and Fair Elections Network (2016). This severity in gender gap was also highlighted by civil society organizations in their documentation of multiple instances of women being barred from voting through informal agreements between political parties and male village leaders through handwritten agreements in the Federally Administered Trial Areas (FATA) and in Punjab. Civil society has raised this issue at the international level in hope to pressure government as the “the gap of 11 million women in voter registration compared to men leads to…further exclusion from the democratic process and citizenry…” (A.M. Zia CSW 61 Statement, 2016).

The results of visible increase in voter behavior towards women candidates and the increase in the number of candidates contesting National Assembly and observations of gender gaps in voter registration suggest a socio-cultural mindset, with religious underpinnings that these votes seem to defy with still many more strides left to make. I argue this suggests a change in the traditional cultural doxa as women and men both are seeking. In the next section, I examine party candidacies versus contesting as independents.

In the field, critical mass theory proposes that women are unlikely to have a major impact on political outcomes unless they constitute a large minority of the elected representatives (Dahlerup, 2005) with at least 30-35% percent representation in legislative bodies (Childs and Krook, 2008; Kittilson, 2005; Thomas, 1995). Given the actual number of women getting elected on general seats decreasing suggests that women’s representation has not reach a level playing field and it needs much more attention and perhaps, intervention.
5.5. Role of Political Parties

Waseem (2006) argues that the fate of women’s reserved seats in Pakistan is tied more to the preferences of political parties than that of civil society due to the lack of institutional support systems in place or feminist movements working towards a common goal of advancing the representation of agenda. He further states that “reserved seats for women run the risk of becoming just another exercise in collecting numbers on the floor of elected assemblies without changing the national agenda” (Pg. 204). Given this increase in the number of women contesting elections, I examined the role (if any) of political parties in providing party tickets. Political parties act as gatekeepers to National Assemblies through seat tickets in general elections and through appointments to reserved seats, therefore their policy platforms serve as the basis for legislative agenda (of the winning party) (Katz, 1992). In the election of 2008, I examine an increase in women who ran as independents in the general election. This was a result of the lack of party willingness to grant tickets to the increase in numbers of women wanting to run in general elections from the party. Upon refusal, women decided to pave their own path to parliament outside of the party and all (except 1) lost. According to Bari (2008), these trends highlight the resistance of political parties in “granting party tickets to female candidates whereas women’s aspirations to become representatives within public domain are moving beyond constraints” (Pg. 30).

In a pre-dissertation research, I examined that although political structures of all parties include women’s wings, the membership is much smaller in comparison to male membership of the party. Women’s wings serve more as a platform for women in the party to come together through a categorized identity without formal power or influence in party’s decision making. Women’s wings are basically relegated to mobilize women during elections to work as polling agents in women’s booths, etc. Preference to reserved seats is also given first to the women of political families (who are usually not active in the women’s wings) and later to more active members of the women’s wings.

With the freedom of media to report realities on the ground in the 2000s, news of religious parties and tribal and feudal structures’ collective scheme of curtailing women’s electoral rights surfaced. Local election bodies and religious parties in NWFP had convened a meeting to sign the election agreement by political parties to keep women from participating in the political space. Women were prevented from filling nomination papers and from voting. In certain areas religious leaders declared that if women participated, their religious rights would be sanctioned such as their nikah (marriage contract) would be declared invalid, would not be allowed the Namaaz-I-Janaza (a religious funeral), etc. (Mooraj, 2004). With heightened awareness, due to the open press and women’s advocacy, the 2008 elections witnessed a change as women in South Waziristan voted for the first time. However, there are areas that still deny women representation at the ballot in both FATA region and the NWFP. In other areas, such as economically deprived areas of Sindh, women participated in the election of 2013 as they sought to make their voices heard in mainstream political system to draw attention to those issues being neglected by male politicians, such as education, health, and women’s rights. In the analysis of the recent 2018 election of Pakistan for the Australian Broadcast Company, I highlighted that “in certain areas women turned out to vote for the first time where decades of patriarchy controlled their right to the
ballot box which signifies a lack of representation”. Further in the context of women’s electoral participation, for the analysis I analyzed that “women are often relegated to the private space including home and family life ...and as women are disengaged from the political process which is considered a very public sphere they’re further marginalized in their political representation” (Zia, ABC News Radio, 2018)\textsuperscript{67}.

Along the lines of this traditional claim, it is, then, up to the women parliamentarians to ensure that party agenda is representative of women’s issues which eventually will lead to legislation. In the case study of Pakistan, although political parties determine who enters the National Assembly, they do not always serve the policy agenda of their political party because of a pattern of outside influence of the military in policy formation and the lack of commitment from political parties towards attention to women’s issues and the empowerment of women party members.

I examine this phenomenon in detail by looking at the number of women parliamentarians in Pakistan both through general and reserved seats and find that although women are appointed to roles with the potential of changing the agenda in masculine domains, women have little autonomy because of party pressures and or even external military influences which guide the agenda. However, I do find that since women have consistently been engaged in Women’s Development Committees, there have been significant legislative pieces that have surfaced. I find a correlation but, I argue that it does not necessarily mean causation since outside influences could also be determinants of women friendly legislation. In addition, I note that social activism has increased around the awareness of international treaties and human rights conventions signed by Pakistan. As international organizations (such as UN Women, UNDP, Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), National Democratic Institute (NDI) and others have utilized a public-private and multi-stakeholder approach with national and local entities, more public dialogues around these issues have surfaced.

In my pre-dissertation research, I examined the participation of women within political parties and found that although the increase of women in political parties has not led to a significant increase in the number of women appointees in important positions within the parties. In the absence of regular elections within the political parties, leaders are usually nominated through the pool of party activists to positions of influence within the party organizations. I found that PPP (Pakistan People’s Party), a liberal party, positioned only one female among its 36 male members of the Central Executive Committee (PPPP, 2008). In addition, through a historical review I found that only 5 women (in the country’s history of 71 years served as leaders of their respective political parties. These included Fatima Jinnah (PML), Benazir Bhutto (PPPP), Nusrat Bhutto (PPP), Ginwa Bhutto (Shaheed Bhutto Group) and Nasim Wali Khan (ANP). However, the above female party heads inherited their political careers because of their political dynasties (from their brother, husband or father).

Political parties play a significant role since the selection for reserved seats is allocated through appointments from party leaders and are likely to recruit women with male

\textsuperscript{67}Interview with ABC Radio’s Steve Chase on Pakistan Elections 2018.
party relatives. Therefore, women on reserved seats and general seats have different incentives which guide their legislative behavior. As women on reserved seats are not linked to an electoral constituency, their behavior is not riven by electoral incentives and their re-election is focused on legislative participation.

Political dynasties are pervasive in developing democracies (Asako et. al, 2015; Folke, 2016) and especially in Southeast Asia (Chandra, 2016), including Pakistan, and imply an intricate network of individuals in power through blood and marriage (Cheema, Javid & Naseer, 2013). These networks are gain importance in the political space because they are viewed as a form of social capital, defined as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1998, Pg. 88), and are used as strategic advantage over those who lack ties.

Political dynasties play a significant role in Pakistani political landscape as they are deeply entrenched into the party systems. Although scholars note that political dynasties have helped women gain political office (Basu, 2016; Folke, 2016), the level of substantive representation as an outcome is inconclusive. The selection bias against female candidates (King and Matlab, 2000; Matland, 1994; Yoon, 2008) is pervasive but per Basu (2016), it at least allows for the participation of women in political office because reserved seats are allotted to wives and daughters of male politician’s winnings elections to further secure legislative power.

5.6. Data Collection

I want to highlight that when I began collecting data, I was overwhelmed by the number of reports on effects of gender quotas in Pakistan. These were not university driven academic investigations, rather were products of NGOs like the Aurat Foundation; reports from the National Commission on Status of Women (NCSW); and the Elections Commission focusing on data from the election of 2002 (12th National Assembly). The reports provided a good contextual reference for the topic of women’s representation. However, they were biased reports that catered to a certain audience with a purpose. I argue that these reports completely erased the activism and advocacy of women leaders in the 1980s and 1990s and projected General Musharraf as a democratic-friendly leader and held him responsible for the installation of reserved seats. In the previous chapters I highlight the advocacy of women on the international stage as well as within the country that led to the negotiating of quotas before the coup d’ etat led by General Musharraf.

I argue that implication of post 9/11 world and in need for projecting Pakistan as a country on path towards liberal democracy led to the making women’s voice an agenda priority to secure foreign relations. General Musharraf took support from the wealthy Pakistani American diaspora and empowered them with decision making and agenda setting. This is reflected in the Ministerial appointments with his endorsement of Pakistani Americans who left their non-political careers in the United States to join the political sphere in Pakistan. The appointment of Dr. Naseem Ashraf to the Ministry of Commission on Human Development and World Bank economist Shaukat Aziz, who later ascended to position of
Prime Minister with General Musharraf's endorsement, provide some examples of this strategy.

As I collected data, I found it increasingly difficult to find credible data because of the variations in numbers. I also found that that data which I could access through National Assembly archives in 2013-2018 was not the same as when I tried re-accessing it in 2019. With the installation of the new civilian government, historical archives of past parliaments were no longer available. Upon investigation, I was informed by the civil service office that as each government takes the stage, it re-configures public (online) platforms in efforts to provide transparency with new information communication technologies (ICTs) and in the process, data is either shrunk or entirely placed in hard to find archives. Thus, the new government of Pakistan is providing an overhaul of the IT platform and in the process, making it difficult to access data.

5.7 Results

I find the results of the observations highlight a limited correlation between women's descriptive representation and women's substantive representation within Pakistan's National Assembly. Accepting the alternative hypothesis, I find these results limited in supporting the larger claim in favor of gender quotas as transformative in re-negotiating power, influence and decision making for women in Parliament.

Existing literature focuses on the presences of women in legislators and only a few that examine the importance of women in cabinets (O'Brien and Rincker 2014). I argue that all parliament makeup varies across the board and is country specific given the political landscape and therefore, borrow Annesley and Gains (2010) perspective of identifying the “appropriate institutional venue for policy change” (pg. 925) to capture a realistic observation of any change in power relations.

88 I argue that ownership and a false sense of entitlement to the diaspora in the United States surfaced as General Musharraf chose the American Pakistani Physicians Association (APPNA) meeting as a place to announce Shaukat Aziz as the new Prime Minister. I argue that General Musharraf employed a strategy of engaging through the diaspora with US Congressional leaders to soften the perception of Pakistan in wake of the War on Terror and to strategically position Pakistan as a potential economic partner. In my personal encounters and conversations with Congressional leaders, seasoned Foreign Policy Committee Members, and others, they refer to Pakistan within the framework presented by the non-political diaspora members in favor of General Musharraf. I argue that all these factors worked together in facilitating an image of Pakistan during the post 9/11 and War on Terror space and therefore, the Pakistani diaspora in the US was used strategically for access. Similarly, with the passage of the Kerry Lugar Bill, US Department of State and USAID empowered organizations such as the Aurat Foundation, Human Development Foundation and others for development. As mentioned before, these organizations presented their work to cater to a certain audience with a certain aim which included showcasing Pakistan as a country of liberals on its way to economic and societal progress.

89 Unsettled by the response, I further examined and found that government contracts were allotted to local technology companies. In developing Pakistan, private companies providing modern infrastructure services are outperforming some of the traditional commodities. Since the soft military takeover in the late 1990s, in efforts to modernize and compete in the global marketplace, General Musharraf empowered private investment, void of regulations. This resulted in industries offering kick-backs to all political party leaders to secure their interests.
Existing literature suggests that women’s representation in the legislature is one of the best predictors of women’s presence in decision-making (Davis, 1997; Reynolds, 1999) rather than by simply analyzing the presence of women in legislatures. Since the control over agenda is typically located inside the cabinet (Muller and Storm, 2008) which includes “prized political appointments” (Rasool Interview, 2018), cabinet ministers formulate party agenda into the national agenda framework and are regarded as gatekeepers of legislation. Since having the mere increase in the presence of women does not necessarily directly translate into policy formation, it does increase the pool of potential women ministers who can access to positions within the cabinet reflect power and decision-making. In Pakistan National Assembly, each Minister within the cabinet has control over a government department and power to shape corresponding party agenda (Rasool Interview, 2018) and influenced to a degree by preferences of coalition partners (Martin, 2004). Ministerial appointments are traditionally granted to seasoned politicians or senior party officials.

Parliamentary literature on governance highlights the role of political parties as the unitary actors and parliamentarians as agents of the party who work to implement goals (Laver and Shepsle, 1994). However, I argue that in upon examination, in the case of Pakistan, the reality is more complex because of the power held by the military, in addition to that of the civilian government. I find that parliamentarian activities do not necessarily reflect party agendas.

Former National Assembly’s first female Speaker Mirza stated that women’s presence in all levels of political institutions has resulted in positive transformation in the socio-political perceptions about women’s place in politics and has “legitimized women’s presence” which has led to the inclusion of women’s issues within the national agenda. Women’s presence in National Assembly significantly decreased in the 1960s and in the 1990s (Table 11). Prior to the constitutionally established reserved seats for women on National Assembly, 113 women (between 1947-1997) were elected on general seats.
Table 12: Women in Pakistan’s Legislatures, 1947-1999 (pre-gender quotas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislatures</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Women elected directly</th>
<th>Women seats</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947 - 54</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 - 58</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 - 65</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 - 69</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 - 77</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1977 - July 1977</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 - 88</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 - 90</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 - 93</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 - 96</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 - 99</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I analyze that these gains in descriptive representation have legitimized women’s entitlement to citizenship and inclusive governance. The oppressed years of patriarchal rule and Islamization which had shrunk the space for women in the public sphere was fought with organized women’s movement. During the end of the 12th National Assembly tenure, women politicians and activists come together across party lines at the All Parties’ Women Conference in Karachi and highlighted the need for an increase in reserved seats to 33 percent in parliaments90. The consistent demands of raising the percentage of reserved seats since the 1990s signifies the commitment of the women’s movement through collaboration, alliances and organization.

5.8 Additional Findings

Although women’s representation in the assemblies has increased due to quotas, will women of Pakistan (across the socio-economic spectrum) be represented? In addition to the above formulated model of inquiry and by building on my pre-dissertation research on the topic, I examined the makeup of the women in National Assemblies over the 16-year period of observation.

Investigations of this case study have highlighted that there is a lack of participation of women in politics and majority of the women follow direction and or guidance of the male dominated political elites resulting in the continuation of the male-centric policy agendas. The concept of public and private spheres in the context of women’s participation (discussed in Chapter 3) prescribes traditional gender roles and tasked centered on activities that do

not include political engagement (CID, 2002). As women jobs are relegated to the private space as wives, mothers, and sisters, a political career is the second or third job (Matland, 2004). In addition to the traditional perception and stigma of politics as a “dirty” and “corrupt”, women are discouraged to participate.

5.8.a Economic Status

Table 13: Total Net Worth of Women Elected on Reserved Seats in 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Net Worth</th>
<th>PMLQ</th>
<th>PMLN</th>
<th>PPP</th>
<th>PTI</th>
<th>MQM</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>ANP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 500,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 to 1 million</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 million to 10 million</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 million to 50 million</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 million to 100 million</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 million to 500 million</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 million and above</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of the data available on the election nomination form V of the Fair and Free Election Network (FAFEN) 2013 compiled a Declaration of Assets reviews of candidates highlighting the total net worth of women elected on reserved seats (Table 13). I examined the data from the 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies of the 7 represented political parties including PMLQ, PMLN, PPP, PTI, MQM, Religious Parties and ANP. I found that women parliamentarians affiliated with both PMLQ and PMLN (both factions of the same parent party) were significantly wealthier than all other parties combined. Majority of parliamentarians declared total net worth (personal, not including household net worth) between Rs. 10-50 million, and the second largest group between Rs. 1-10 million. Of the total observed parliamentarians on reserved seats, 9% declared a total net worth of less than Rs. 500,000. These parliamentarians were equally across political parties except for PTI. I argue that PTI's women parliamentarians offer a very small sample size and the party caters to the educated liberals, while the traditional more established parties do have active grassroots presence in marginalized segments of the population. I find these numbers to be consistent and a reflection of the political party constituencies. PML is comprised of industrialists and business owners and therefore their party agenda has consistently primed economics as their focus in the development of the country; PPP prides itself as the only democratically liberal champion in the country and has representation across the socioeconomic scale; MQM is literally labeled the party of immigrants and small business owners and does not find representation in the heavily wealthier segments of society; and similarly both the religious parties and the ANP (socialist workers party) also finds representation in the middle class range. I argue these distributions parallel the agenda setting in political parties and therefore, disproportionately exclude the lower and lower middle-class representation. As women’s representation on reserved seats is disproportionately dominated by the elite as descriptive representation, it does not represent majority of the country's female population. Per the income and consumption indicators, the IBA-SBP Consumer Confidence Index suggests that although Pakistan middle class has rapidly
grown in the last 20 years (because of rising remittances by expatriates and foreign investment), more than 60% of the population still belongs below the middle-class socio-economic line.

5.8.b Education

Given disproportionately low levels of literacy rates between men and women, education and governance awareness serve as a barrier for women's representation. The lower levels of education in girls and women in Pakistan compared to boys and men impacts the status of women in society, discourages women’s empowerment and women’s political participation and participation in the formal economic sector. Civil society network representation at the United Nation's High-Level Political Forum has repeated urged the permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN to place “inclusive education as a driver of sustainable economic development in the national priorities and agendas” (Zia, HLPF, 2018).

Building on my pre-dissertation findings on women's political capacity, I find that all the women possess at least secondary degrees (college). When specifically looking at data, from Election Nomination Forms, I find that over half of the women Parliamentarians on reserved seats in the 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies were college graduates with (Bachelors) degrees (51%); and 42% held post-graduate degrees (Masters); and 7% possessed basic secondary education (Table 13). These findings coincide with the above net worth findings as the propensity of access to education increases as resources increase. I argue this further asserts the claim that those in society with access to resources are the ones who have the opportunity and luxury to participate in politics. I argue that with a female literacy rate of 45%, with over 70% of girls dropping out, women's representation in parliament does not reflect or mirror the larger women's constituency. As the world of politics is left for women with education (and therefore, access to resources), I argue that it excludes more than half of the women's population.

Table 14: Education Levels of Women on Reserved Seats in 12th, 13th and 14th National Assemblies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate (Bachelors)</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate (Masters)</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


5.8.c Parliamentary Competency

As I examined data and conducted informal interviews, I noticed confusion on whether women parliamentarians participated with competency. In reviewing the Pakistan

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Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) reports (2008) of the 12th National Assembly, I find low women’s participation which, I argue led to women’s role in parliament as marginalized. Data indicates that out of the 2,769 questions raised, women only contributed to 201 questions (roughly 7%); out of the total number of 335 resolutions, only 43 (12%) were moved by women and of the total 400 motions, only 26 (7%) were passed by women. These numbers reflect a lack of power and influence but also indicate a larger problem: maybe the women parliamentarians do not understand the system of participation. To compare this to the trends witnessed in the 13th National Assembly and found a significant increase in women’s participation in the data compiled by the Free and Fair Election Network (FFEN, 2013). On average, for every question asked by a male parliamentarian, a woman parliamentarian asked three questions. In addition, women contributed to the oversight of the executive branch of government by putting forward 51% of all questions during the Question Hours (8,138 out of 16,056 questions). These questions were presented by 55 women parliamentarians (an average of 148 questions per woman) whereas 161 male legislators put forward the rest of 7,918 questions (an average of 49 questions per male representative).

5.9 Summary

In this study, I conclude that descriptive representation of women on reserved seats has a limited effect on substantive representation of women in Parliament. The findings demonstrate a positive correlation between the increase in the number of women members and the increase in the number of women friendly legislation. A positive correlation does not exist between the increase in the number of women members and the increase in leadership positions or in the increase in general seats secured by women. Reflecting on this longitudinal case study of Pakistan’s National Assembly, I find that traditional means of measuring substantive representation by examining performance is an insufficient measure of the impact and or effectiveness of gender quotas in society.

I find that strictly reviewing activities within the parliament does not capture the holistic impact of gender quotas on the advancement of women in society at large. I make this claim because as I ventured beyond the impact on parliament, I found a significant and consistent increase in the number of women contesting general seats and from across both rural and urban districts around the country. Similarly, the number of women contesting on party tickets also increased consistently over the course of 16 years. I argue that this increase suggests a positive impact of gender quotas through symbolic representation that encourages and motivates women to engage in politics and to seek alternatives to the existing societal doxa. In addition, I also found that the number of questions that were asked by women parliamentarians increased consistently over the course of 16 years indicating an increase in competency of parliamentary modalities. I argue this increase suggests that experience through the 16 years has helped women become active participants from dormant participants and to some level it suggests a lose positive correlation to gender quotas.

I argue that this provides a better understanding of whether quotas work in Pakistan. As a practitioner in the field I find that development stakeholders in Pakistan use claims from academic research to ground policies that best suit their interests at the given time. The
existing work in forms of reports from NGOs and government institutions such as the Elections Commission cater to a certain audience, whether for donor support or establishing a certain rhetoric for the public. Therefore, measuring Parliamentary performance is not insufficient determinant of the role of quotas, and therefore, I adopt a wider approach to include a historical review of representation and implications of postcolonial women’s political engagement to understand a change in the patriarchal doxa. From a larger societal examination, I find that gender quotas do provide women with the access to the male dominated political space and I argue that the space of parliament is just one of the many variables, not the only variable, necessary for inclusive and holistic understanding of the effectiveness of gender quotas.
Chapter 6
Conclusions

6.1 Introduction

International development frameworks and existing research indicate that quotas help pave the road for an increase in representation of women in the political space. Since there is limited academic work on Pakistan in this context, I argue a wider perspective is necessary to understand representation and empowerment to contribute to existing literature. Therefore, to examine the correlation between descriptive and substantive representation I conceptualized a model that explored the change (if any) between access of resources (increase in descriptive representation through the constitutionally mandated gender quota of reserved seats) and the outcome (a change in existing power relations by measuring women’s empowerment).

Descriptive Representation → Substantive Representation
(Resources) (Empowerment: Δ in power relations)

Through a review of historical and feminist implications of post-colonial Pakistan, I find that the increase in women’s political participation is not exclusively a product of the recent increase in gender quotas (of 2002). Rather, it is a consequence of decades long resistance (both informal and formal) of the South Asian woman (pre-and post partition) which has cultivated and continues to foster a consciousness through mechanisms of religion, nationalism and identity.

Although I barely scratch the surface of examination with this study, my findings suggest that perhaps the model of representation utilized in the field of study is not adequate and therefore, does not help further the understanding of realities in Pakistan since the focus is usually on fitting a situation into the prescribed framework. Instead of examining the data first and then coming up with a framework specific to it, existing literature (and even this case study) explored the topic of women’s representation through a liberal lens. I argue whether the results are viable.

Upon examination, I did not find a strong correlation between gender quotas (as resources\(^\text{92}\)) and women’s empowerment (as the outcome). I find that additional variables play a role in women’s empowerment such as foreign influence of the war on terror in the 9-11 space, the impact of a free press in bringing political awareness and civic education and the changing winds of civic engagement because of the hyper globalized world. With the results of limited correlation between descriptive representation and substantive representation in Pakistan’s National Assembly, I do not think this dissertation adds to the existing literature through the strict parameters of representation inquiry. However, I do think this dissertation highlights the need to de-construct (Hill-Collins, 1999) the existing parameters of inquiry, model and frameworks to achieve insight that mirrors a holistic reality of the South Asian woman’s political agency.

\(^{92}\) I argue that the first element of power is resources include economic, human and social resources which are acquired through various societal relationships.
6.2 Results

I utilize a three-prong holistic measure to gain insight to women’s political representation. First, I reviewed the historical implications of representation in the context of the 1947 partition of British India and the formation of the independent state of Pakistan. I find that the western concept of representation as part of a larger societal contract was used as the motivation and framework by the British-educated native Muslim gentry to secure a political voice in the majority Hindu India. In doing so, I argue, the rhetoric of collective religious identity was used as a mobilization tool to organize and influence community behavior. I further analyze that the newly formed country, along religious lines, was required to fit Islam into the democratic framework to validate its existence and therefore, included versions of the reformed Islamic interpretations within its constitutional structure. I argue that the formation of Pakistan is a product of Western political influence which serves as the cause of complex identity negotiations between religion, nationalism and democracy.

Second, I reviewed implications of post-colonial feminism on the agency of Pakistani women by tracing a historical trajectory of women’s participation in the public sphere. I find that the 2002 constitutional mandate of gender quotas as women’s reserved seats (across the political space) does not serve as an impetus to women’s engagement and participation. Women have played an active role in the pre-and post partition political history of Pakistan and continued “political participatory actions” (Weis, 1999) through the decades. I also find that the systemic lack of state building because of power and decision-making (reserved for the military) serves as the principal barrier to women’s empowerment in the political space as women’s agendas (along with larger domestic issues) are not recognized as a priority considering the continuous geo-political influencers.

Third, I argue that if the justification for implementing gender quotas is to advance women’s political representation, with the assumption that sheer increase in numbers leads to more women friendly outcomes, then effectiveness should also measure the change in the larger discourse on re-negotiating power in the masculine political space. I argue a certain cultural resistance of women to seek alternatives to the current patriarchal societal doxa must be analyzed and measured (if possible) in terms of the process of achieving inclusivity in the political space which is the outcome (women’s agency).

To observe a positive correlation in a longitudinal case study, I examine women’s representation across the three National Assemblies (the 12th, 13th and 14th) during the 16-year of uninterrupted civilian rule. To capture a broader sense of the effectiveness of gender quotas in Pakistan, I observe the change in the number of women parliamentarians on general seats, as women’s agency in National Assembly, conceptualize patterns of political expression as “participatory political actions” (Sen, 1992) and review efforts towards women’s representation. I find a limited correlation between the implementation of gender quotas and women-friendly outcomes.

Although I find an increase in women-friendly legislation in the 16-year period, I do not find evidence of women parliamentarians making grains towards changing and or re-defining power relations within the National Assembly. The lack of leadership positions within the National Assembly means that there is little access for women to assist in agenda setting.
in favor of women. In addition, I do not find an increase in the number of women being elected on general seats. However, I did find an increase in the number of women running contesting elections.

I argue that the positive increases in women-friendly legislation and the number of women contesting general elections cannot be linked directly to the mandated gender quotas. Therefore, I emphasize that other variables must be at play which require further investigation. Further, I contend that this model of representation does not provide an adequate framework to assess responsiveness of gender quotas because it does not cater to the intricacies of societal values and the resistance of feminist engagement in Pakistan.

6.3 Discussions

Women in most countries have not achieved much, because they can’t be liberated under the patriarchal, capitalist, imperialist and military system that determines the way we live now, and which is governed by power, not justice, by false democracy, not real freedom.
- Nawal El Saadawi, Egyptian Feminist

6.3.1 Historical & Feminist Implications

Literature from most of the Third World reduces and universalizes women as disempowered (Mohanty, 1991). There is a trend of persistent gender stereotypes which place women in communal terms as being warm and selfless and man as being more aggressive and decisive on an individual level (Welch and Studlar, 1996). Non-traditional modalities of participation indicate that women, through the decades, have made contributions and impact as mothers, daughters, grandmothers and wives as active participants within the larger discourse of nationalism in Pakistan. In the previous chapters I examined the impact of identity formation and women’s self-actualization (part of agency) through a historical lens. I find that women’s movements have been a part of the country’s nationalist activities since its inception as women have continued to participate within the confines of the boundaries of their homes, walls and the purdah (the veil).

In understanding agency, I argue that identity formation takes place where the idea of representation of the “self” manifests itself through efforts of organization and mobilization. In post partition India and Pakistan influential political figures like Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took center stage and unraveled the stereotype of the submissive other woman, the oriental woman. Proponents of Western feminism point out that in the 1970s the influence of western mobilization and the pinnacle of feminist movements also made their way to south Asia and is responsible for the emergence of women in leadership.

In the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, women’s space in the public domain kept decreasing. I argue this was not due to patriarchal cultural roles dictating male dominance, authority and oppression, but, in fact, it was as response to geo-political influencers such as the Cold War and Pakistan's strategic importance in assisting the United States in Afghanistan. This resulted in Pakistan power elites (military) to engage with and empower
the extremely religious minority through alliances. The religious leaders became power brokers between the formal government (the military) and the disenfranchised tribal populations in northern Pakistan and across the border in Afghanistan. I argue that in this background, women’s issues were not a priority and therefore, even political parties, formed alliances with the disenfranchised religious networks which eventually increased in power and authority. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the first female head of the Muslim world, also formed alliances during her multiple tenures as party leader and head of government. Although her party agenda was rooted in democratic ideals and especially, the advancement of women, her government activities reflect otherwise. I argue this is a result of the masculine power presence of the military over civilian governments. As I note in the previous chapters, the civilian governments of Pakistan exercise autonomy only to the extent that it does not interfere with foreign relations.

Zia (2013) claims that this “lack of clarity on the issue of religious identity within the secular or progressive women’s movement have constructed quite effectively towards forming a new brand of feminism, one rooted in predominately religious identity” (Pg. 31). This, as a result, led to the women’s movement and or feminism in Pakistan to work within the Islamic discourse, as curated by the power elites. Thus, it can be summed up that politics did play a critical role and continue to play a focal point in understanding and accepting identities and definitions of feminism and Pakistan (Rashid, 2006). Zia (2013) claims that the women’s movement managed to negotiate successful representation with governments in democratic interregnum (1988-1999) between the military dictatorships of General Zia (1977-1988) and General Musharraf (1999-2008).

The narrative in Pakistan continues to be defined by debates on religion versus secularism and the theme of the imperial War on Terror (post 9/11) with the identification of the veiled and oppressed woman. These larger global consequences have profound impact on Pakistan’s policy agendas, feminist discourse and the disconnect between women practitioners and women policymakers. As both the modernizing and religious governments have supported patriarchal control over women, they have re- created the private domain as representing culture and tradition and the public sphere as legal and political (Jamal, 2010) that continues to insert religion in the legal apparatus (Shaheed, 2009). This has resulted in a hegemonic discourse centered on religion as lines of both private and public spheres continue to blur between political and civil society (Toor, 1997).

There is a complex interplay between religious identity, the global economic movement, and cultural relevancy. Scholarship on the movements clearly highlight the dynamic relationship of feminists with the state, the military and the larger geo-political capitalist development. Most of the literature and a historical perspective continues to highlight the central role of religion in identity formation, strategies, and cultural frameworks.

6.3.2 Reserved Seats

Waseem (2006) argues that the fate of women’s reserved seats in Pakistan is tied more to the preferences of political parties than that of civil society due to the lack of institutional support systems in place or feminist movements working towards a common goal of advancing the representation agenda. He further states that “reserved seats for
women run the risk of becoming just another exercise in collecting numbers on the floor of elected assemblies without changing the national agenda” (Pg. 204). In chapter five I examine this phenomenon in detail by looking at the number of women parliamentarians in Pakistan both through general and reserved seats. It can be analyzed that in the case of Pakistan, reserved seats do open limited public space for women where agency is exercised, choices are made and are battles fought and that is a gain. However, what is the impact, if any, on long term sustainability of women’s representation and on substantive gains without a clear women’s movement agenda and or wide support from stakeholders?

When examining the periphery impact of quotas, a correlation surfaces which highlights the number of women candidates on general seats across the country has significantly increased. Observing from the election of 1988 (the democratic election prior to the increase in gender quota mandate) 27 women ran for general seats (and 4 were elected) and 20 years later the number increased to more than 60 women (and 13 were elected).

The seminal work by Sen (1992) in the field on the phenomenon of missing women in Asia points to Pakistan as having the lowest ratio of women to men among large countries lagging in standard indicators of women’s empowerment such as property ownership, education and employment. Other works point to the challenges of cultural norms that complicate women’s mobility resulting in women’s restricted ability to participate (Jabeen, 2004; Mumtaz and Salway, 2005). I argue that women’s movements and feminist agency serve as mediators between the state and the citizenry; and if inequality exists, I examine patterns of political expressions are in response engagements of activism and advocacy.

I examine whether the change in power relations within National Assembly is a function of identity politics with links to broader women’s movement and feminist thought or is the change a function of larger political mandates which acts parallel to (or in a vacuum of) incremental societal transformation? I find that the limited change in power relations (regarding passing women-friendly legislation) is related to larger salient societal happenings than participatory activity of and by women parliamentarians on National Assemblies. However, given the weight of foreign influence in Pakistan through the years, I believe further exploration is necessary to capture a holistic footprint of the gender quota.

6.4 Limitations

In attempting to evaluate and measure women’s process towards the outcome of achieving agency in the political space, I argue that existing literature and frameworks in the field rest exclusively on liberal notions of agency, self-determination and autonomy (Habib, 1987; Mahmood, 2005; Scott, 1988). Per Mahmood (2001) “liberal notions of feminist agency which seek to locate a self-actualized subject acting in her own self-interest sharply limit our ability to understand and interrogate the lives of women whose desire, affect, and will have been shaped by non-liberal traditions” (Pg. 203). Therefore, to understand Pakistan’s unique feminist agency, rooted in self and sovereignty (Mahmood, 2001), I argue a wider scope of inquiry is necessary and, in my evaluation, incorporated elements of social consciousness of women (through formal and informal engagements such as women’s movements and literature).
I find that through the years of military dictatorships, weak civilian rules and foreign-influenced domestic tensions which resulted in lack of priorities to women’s agendas, women’s presence in resistance was sustained through formal and informal modalities and successfully articulated “nuanced feminist consciousness outside of liberal notions of women’s agency and sovereignty” (Anantharam, 2009, Pg. 208). Through my examination, I find that an undeniable link exists between expression and politics through the decades in Pakistan. Although the modes of expression may change from literature to visual arts to theatre, it is “not produced as a commodity, but as part of a long conversation...with the future” (Pg. 214) drawing on political struggle and spiritual continuity which is “not a luxury but a necessity” (Lorde, 1984, Pg. 36) through which ideas are formed and give rise to consciousness. Per scholars, policy facilitate intimate self-expression, as it allows an opportunity for sensitive issues of identity, can ship, marriage, and sexuality under the protective blanket of metaphors, symbolism, and literary convention (Abu-Loghod, 1986; Raheja & Gold, 1994).

By examining two of the popular poets during the Islamization period of Pakistan, I find that creative expression provides a safe space for women to engage in dialogue on “Islam, feminism, nationalism, tradition and modernity” (Anantharam, 2009, Pg. 214) as it affects their identity and agency. And it is through this strategic use of metaphors that women in South Asia that “became a necessity for translating...political visions, and more importantly, crucial to...survival” (ibid). Upon exploration, I contend that existing modalities of categorizing and reviewing do not account for these variables and therefore, do not present an accurate understanding of women’s engagement.

Similarly, when observing the change (if any) in women’s access and agency in Pakistan’s National Assembly, I argue that the examination must look beyond the existing framework of representation as employed by scholars in the field. Therefore, when defining substantive representation as the outcome, a function of descriptive representation, I expanded the parameters of inquiry to include the change (if any) to the number of women not only successfully securing general seats, but also contesting in general elections on the federal level. I find this serves as a better determinant of the effect of the increase in descriptive representation in the context of women’s self-actualized identities, nationalism, and communal dimensions of participation. To conceptualize this change, I borrowed Bourdieu (1977)’s concept of doxa to trace the change (if any) of the complex relationship of women with patriarchal power structures and the masculine political space. Although I found a limited change in power relations within the confines of the National Assembly case study, I did find an upward change in the increase of women’s participation and engagement within the masculine political space across rural and urban locales. I examined an increase in the number of women running for federal level political positions; an increase in the

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93 It is also highlighted that “poetry, throughout its history in the South Asian subcontinent, thrives in the social sphere as it is recited at the opening ceremonies, at conferences, appreciated and spread through gatherings (mushairas), set to music and performing concerts, and this performative nature makes it a useful medium through which to spread political messages” (Anantharam, 2009, Pg. 212). Partition and post partition Pakistan witness poets such as Mohammad Iqbal and Faiz Ahmad Faiz who spread the visions of Islam and Pakistan during the early 20th century. While Iqbal was an advocate of the partition, Faiz was not in favor of the partition and wrote numerous works critiquing the partition and the violence in the name of religion and the state.
districts which represented these numbers; and an increase in women contesting on party tickets. I analyze this to suggest that through self-actualization, women are seeking alternatives and displaying the will and action to a change in the patriarchal power discourse of masculinized political space.

6.5 Future Studies

As the women of Pakistan are trapped in a web of dependency and subordination because of low autonomy in dimensions of social, economic and political status, studies indicate that inclusive governance structures and substantive changes in policies and programs towards gender parity are necessary (ADB Report, 2015). On the international level, civil society continues to make similar recommendations calling for “the establishment of democratic processes to ensure women’s increased participation and candidates in elections” by highlighting the UN Women Global Strategic Plan (GSP 2011-2013) that “prioritizes women’s political participation and violence against women in electoral and decision making” spheres (Zia CSW61 Statement, 2016).

Academics carefully critique inadequacy of liberal ideas of freedom, agency and the rights in understanding complexities of religious subjects. Similarly, I find in the context of Pakistan, identity, nationalism and religious are areas that need further academic examination in relation to inclusive state building efforts. I find that this case study serves as the beginning of inquiry into the realm of women’s descriptive and substantive representation with the need for detail analysis of various dimensions of women’s empowerment in Pakistan. I make the following recommendations:

1. Quotas are intended to reduce obstacles (political, economic and ideological) in the path of women’s progress and to overcome prejudices that prevent women from entering the political arena. At an oral intervention at CSW 62 (2018) interactive expert panel, Pakistan civil society reiterated “the importance of national gender equality mechanisms...as tools for advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment” (Zia, 2018). I find that it is important to examine, what is the impact, if any, on long term sustainability of women’s representation and on substantive gains without a clear women’s movement agenda or wide support from stakeholders?

2. I contend that new frameworks of inquiry are needed to explore alternative strategies of resistance that constructed by looking at the narration of literature and art because it provides a better understanding of the modes of representation and women’s space through the years. Keeping in mind that data collection in Pakistan has its hurdles, I emphasize the importance of utilizing non-traditional variables to capture realities that can be examined through quantifiable value.

3. Through my analysis of the three-fold increase in the number of women contesting elections (from a wide range of constituencies across the country) on increased party tickets, I find that the exercise of women’s agency (actualization and decision-making) is the threshold that serves as the catalyst of seeking alternatives in existing situations that leads women to act as agents of change. Therefore, for future studies, I contend that a model that captures the interrelated dimensions of the changing
power relations would serve as a better framework to review women’s empowerment and or achievements (the outcome) as a function of resources (as the pre-condition or the space) and agency as a process.

4. One of the determinants of women’s representation is women’s suffrage. Through formal representation, the institutional rules and procedures use voting system as primary mechanism (the will of the people) to secure designation. Members are elected through the first-past-the-post system under universal adult suffrage, representing electoral districts known as National Assembly constituencies. I argue that future investigation into the role of women’s universal franchise in the wake of geo-political happenings is necessary since the right to vote has consistently been unevenly exercised through the history of Pakistan.

5. I argue that the 12th National Assembly provides a case study that would highlight the jumpstart of progress in Pakistan. I recommend a separate analysis to review roles of political parties, the military and outside influencers in creating the agenda of feminizing the country’s narrative in wake of the 9-11 War on Terror.

6. In addition, I conducted fieldwork in summer 2011 for a paper on women’s political representation. I conducted interviews with provincial assembly members and researchers on the role of women politicians. The paper observed a disconnect between women legislators and the women’s movement at large. I argue that a separate in-depth tracing of the links between the two is also necessary in deciphering the process and outcome of women’s representation.

7. I believe there is an inability of a purely statistical approach in capturing a holistic insight due to measurement failure. Therefore, future studies should point to the importance of larger structural dimensions which categorize inequalities through a collective emphasis of organization and movements that create conditions for change.

Quotas serve as gatekeepers to representation. This study has analyzed the role of gender quotas in the political space in operationalizing the inclusion of women. Through an intersectional approach, this study analyzed factors ranging from patriarchal social structures, institutional dimensions and political capacities to examine a correlation between Pitkin’s (1967) conceptualizations of representation. In Pakistan’s National Assembly, descriptive representation has a limiting effect on substantive representation. This finding is not meant as a conclusion to the inquiry, rather it is the beginning of exploration of women’s substantive representation in Pakistan.
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## Appendix 1  Women-Friendly Legislation of 12th, 13th and 14th National Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assembly Number</th>
<th>Short Title of the Bill</th>
<th>Year Passed/Amended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill</td>
<td>Became Act 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Uplift and Welfare of Women Bill</td>
<td>Introduced on 14-02-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Equality of Opportunity for Women Employment Bill</td>
<td>Introduced on 07-02-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Prevention of Domestic Violence Bill</td>
<td>Introduced on 8-08-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Hudood Laws (Repeal) Bill</td>
<td>Introduced on 07-02-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Prohibition of Marriage with the Holy Quran Bill</td>
<td>Introduced in the House on 13-09-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Protection of women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act</td>
<td>November 11, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Dowry and Bridal Gifts Restriction Bill</td>
<td>Introduced on 07-02-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>The Domestic Violence Against Women (Prevention and Protection) Bill</td>
<td>Introduced on 08-08-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The Prevention of Domestic Violence Bill</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>The Acid Control and Acid Crime Prevention Bill</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>The National Commission for Women Bill</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>The Right to free and Compulsory Education Act</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>The Prohibition of Corporal Punishment Act</td>
<td>March 14, 2013</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>The Reproductive Healthcare and Rights Act</td>
<td>March 12, 2013</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>The Women in Distress and Detention Fund (Amendment) Act</td>
<td>December 14, 2017</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>The Hindu Marriage Act</td>
<td>September 26, 2016</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>The National Commission on the Status of Women (Amendment) Act</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>The National Commission on the Rights of the Child Act</td>
<td>September 13, 2017</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>The Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>The Transgender Person (Protection and Rights) Act</td>
<td>2018</td>
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