Role of Municipal Governance in Stabilizing Mature Inner Suburbs: A Study of Five St. Louis Municipalities 1970-2015

Napoleon Williams III
University of Missouri-St. Louis, nwf35@mail.umsl.edu

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Role of Municipal Governance in Stabilizing Mature Inner Suburbs:
A Study of Five St. Louis Municipalities
1970-2015

Napoleon Williams III

M.A., Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2019
B.S., Professional Interdisciplinary Studies, Harris-Stowe State University, 2011

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Advisory Committee
Todd Swanstrom, Ph.D.
Chairperson

Terry Jones, Ph.D.

David Kimball, Ph.D.

David Robertson, Ph.D.

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I dedicate this dissertation to the spirit of my mother, Mary T. Allen. I am eternally grateful to have been blessed with such a fine model of humanity for a mother. You never wavered in providing me unconditional love, support, and encouragement. You showered me with praise and proclaimed my accomplishments to all who listened. You chastised me with agape love ensuring I understood your disappointment with my behavior did not mean I was a disappointment. Thank you for preparing me for a moment such as this.

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Abstract

This study explores the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization of inner suburbs in St. Louis County, Missouri. The data, from 1970 to 2015, include a robust collection of official government archives collected from five municipalities in St. Louis County, historical documents, city-state-national statistical data, and related materials. Interviews of 25 stakeholders were conducted and data were analyzed based on the community power structure framework.

I outline five mature St. Louis inner suburbs’ evolution in municipal-level conditions from 1970 to 2015, and I detail the role each suburbs’ municipal governance played in the evolution of municipal-level conditions. I conclude, the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization is to affect impacts of housing discrimination, neighborhood blight, and fiscal stress through policy, administrative action, programs, and practices. I find two distinct philosophies of municipal governance: open housing and exclusion. I conclude the role of exclusion is more significant in municipal-level decline than open housing is in municipal-level stabilization.

Much of what has been written about neighborhood stabilization espouses a common theme of preemptive action to prevent decline. For many mature inner suburbs, preemption is no longer an option as decline has long been realized. I offer recommendations for future research and projects designed to produce economic, structural, and civically vibrant neighborhoods by equipping officials and community stakeholders with refined strategic planning tools to leverage existing resources, build capacity, and employ revitalization methods in more effective and sustainable ways.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

On August 9, 2014, the fatal police shooting of unarmed Michael Brown, Jr. focused the world’s attention on Ferguson, Missouri, a mature inner suburb of St. Louis. Scholars argue Ferguson represented a microcosm of area cities that exhibit extreme levels of segregation and concentrated poverty. Some attest the events of Ferguson could have occurred in any number of other St. Louis municipalities as they lack the capacity to address destabilizing activities, experience fiscal collapse, and revert to taxation by citation measures to remedy financial strain.

My examination of five St. Louis inner suburbs reveals Ferguson possessed unique municipal governance characteristics which created an exceptionally volatile environment. I observed successful municipal-level stabilization through proactive planning, policy adoption, and consistent tools refinement in University City and Hazelwood. In Jennings, I found proactive action and open housing were ineffective absent adequate administrative management. Maplewood exhibited nonracial associated municipal-level destabilization, leveraged many of the same tools utilized in the north county cases, and experienced a renaissance.

Municipal-level stabilization and decline denote conditions ranging from economically and racially stable to fiscally stressed and racially homogenous. Conditions are influenced by a combination of institutional, spatial, structural, and socioeconomic factors working in relation. Municipal-level stabilization is rooted in a city’s capacity to stabilize its neighborhoods.

The Fair Housing Act of 1968 made housing discrimination illegal, and blacks began exiting the big city in pursuit of suburban living. Dramatic shifts in suburban
demographics and fiscal health in the post-fair housing 1970s to 1990s posed new questions and introduced new neighborhood destabilizing activities to inner suburbs. Black immigration, white flight, and loss of tax base were big city problems up to that point. University City, MO experienced these phenomena in the 1960s and had some success stabilizing neighborhoods by employing several antidiscrimination policies and supporting citizens’ efforts.

Open housing, minimum housing codes, and residential services were pioneering approaches, and the municipality was lauded for adopting the tools. Other St. Louis inner suburbs followed suit demonstrating timely use of measures and instituting policies prior to any noteworthy change in neighborhoods’ racial composition. Some municipalities went so far as to expand and redefine their city’s objectives and philosophies, modify planning and zoning patterns, and form new community and human relations committees in anticipation of change.

Inner suburbs who rejected or delayed the use of neighborhood stabilization tools were no longer able to levy some of the more familiar neighborhood preservation methods. Some officials opted to expand and reinforce exclusionary policies such as zoning for large-lot single-family homes, and existing residents levied various deterrence methods to prevent the entry of blacks into certain areas of the community. As deterrence measures gave way to supply and demand, blockbusting, and racial steering, the influx of blacks into these areas soon rivaled and in some suburbs exceeded numbers in open housing municipalities.

A notable influx of blacks, whether in an open housing or exclusion suburb, resulted in public and private housing practices which fashioned resegregated areas plagued by
HUD foreclosures, vacant homes and lots, low-cost rentals, and subsidized housing. Some municipalities were able to combat these trends and stabilize. Others resegregated, experienced severe fiscal stress, and struggled to provide basic city services to residents. Whether through an array of evolutions, varying levels of professionalism, or policy precedence, changing neighborhoods revealed municipal governments’ unique foresight, lack of capacity, or abundance of disdain.

**Purpose of Study and Research Questions**

The purpose of this study is to illuminate contributing factors impacting municipal-level conditions which are unique to municipal governance to better understand municipal governance effects on racial composition and economic conditions in mature inner suburbs. I plan to utilize my findings to develop and disseminate tools designed to strengthen neighborhood revitalization and stabilization efforts by utilizing refined strategic planning tools to leverage existing resources, build capacity, and pursue objectives in more effective and sustainable ways.

This dissertation seeks to answer a central question: What is the role of municipal governance in stabilizing inner suburbs? To answer this question, I must answer two refining questions: What are the contributing factors influencing inner suburbs’ success and failure in achieving and maintaining municipal-level stabilization? And what factors outside of municipal governance authority impact municipal-level stabilization? These questions are answered through a qualitative examination of policy decisions, administrative actions, and related functions.
Significance of the Study

By 1970, fair housing laws prohibited discrimination in the sale, rental, and financing of housing based on race. Laws invalidated explicit discrimination, but less overt discriminatory practices like racial residential steering, redline mortgage lending, and blockbusting persisted. Policy changes were followed by racial integration in some inner suburbs. While some municipalities boasted notable levels of black-white populations, others transitioned to nearly all black. There is robust literature detailing black suburbanization, housing, economics, and the racial implications associated with the era.¹

During the black suburbanization period, many inner suburbs’ government faced similar challenges that had plagued central cities for decades. Neighboring suburbs and more secluded exurban locales poached residents and commercial businesses. Housing crises and declining revenues increased costs for delivering services to citizens. Schools resegregated and began to struggle. As poverty and isolation increased, so did crime. Federal programs funded large initiatives, cities adopted creative taxing and financing methods to fund developments, and municipalities revised policies and zoning ordinances in attempts to remain competitive.

As blacks resettled, residential patterns exhibited in big cities emerged in inner suburbs. Blacks were steered to the least desirable neighborhoods regardless of economic means. This led to residential resegregation. Government action reinforced private discrimination as subsidized housing and mortgage loan programs targeted these neighborhoods. The disproportionate placement of the poor and discriminatory mortgage lending, many ending in foreclosures, concentrated poverty in these neighborhoods.

Neighborhoods began to experience significant decline as they were isolated from economic opportunities and challenges compounded over time.\(^2\)

Some municipalities experienced success in dealing with these issues while others did not. Characteristics of successful stabilization efforts include proactive policy action, community involvement, high level of membership and participation, progressive and inclusive beliefs and attitudes, and financial support. Factors that played a significant role in failed efforts include lack of capacity, delayed initiatives as demonstrated by slow response to rapid racial changes, and advanced level of municipal decline exhibited in deteriorated buildings. By the time attempts to stabilize were made, efforts were rendered useless as the damage of housing discrimination, public housing concentration, and school segregation had already occurred.

Political, institutional, and organizational structures were important contributing factors to determining municipal governments’ timing, type, and level of action and involvement. These structures, working in relation with size, resource richness, and fiscal policies, guided decision making along well-defined philosophical views. These elements determined policy patterns, administrative prowess, and financial management practices. Consequentially, stabilization and decline were largely dependent upon these interrelated dynamics as they determined suburbs’ capacity and willingness to respond to threats and opportunities.

Adoption of open housing policies and supportive measures did not necessarily result in effective stabilization. Fiscal incapacity could render an otherwise effective municipal-level stabilization agenda ineffective. According to scholar Rebecca Hendrick

fiscal capacity, both internal and external, is one of the most important factors affecting municipal governance. Internal fiscal capacity consists of fiscal structure, prior policy decisions, revenues, revenue wealth (level of revenue a government can generate), and spending needs and obligations.\(^3\)

External fiscal capacity includes state-level institutional rules that limit or enhance access to different revenue sources, and the level of financial aid received from state government. While Hendrick’s 2011 study focused on Chicago municipalities, the researcher stresses the importance of examining cities’ municipal governments and the state in which cities are located. Hendrick goes on to layout a model for measuring a city’s fiscal capacity as conditions resulting from the governing body’s financial decision-making patterns. As such, fiscal capacity is viewed as problem solving in the context of strategic management.\(^4\)

Fiscal capacity impacts municipalities’ professional standards, policies, practices, and their ability to manage fiscal stress. Officials’ and administrators’ professionalism and specializations are primary factors affecting how cities solve financial problems, avert risk, and approach entrepreneurialism. It is important to understand that good fiscal capacity (defined generally as high revenue wealth and low spending needs) does not always protect local governments from crisis and poor financial conditions. Conversely, low fiscal capacity does not necessarily result from a crisis.\(^5\)

---

\(^3\) See Hendrick 2011. Note: I apply Hendrick’s theory that financial conditions are a culmination of financial policies and practices. The researcher outlines specific areas in which to develop measurements for establishing fiscal strength of municipalities which helps to explain municipal officials’ response to events. Since level of professionalism affects these elements, I examine not only the financial decisions of municipal governance in the context of institutional structure and socioeconomic philosophy, but I take care to consider how the level of professionalism may interact with philosophy.

\(^4\) Ibid

\(^5\) Ibid
The effects of capacity, governance, and other micro level factors on municipal financial decisions are determined by how governments with different features respond to threats and opportunities, especially ones with financial impact. Consider St. Louis County’s decisions in shaping patterns of residential land use. Zoning authority rested in the hands of individual municipal governments and the county. With no mechanism in place to incentivize local officials to consider regional economic development and infrastructure needs, land use decisions focused on maximizing local tax revenues. As a result, large-lot single-family enclaves formed.⁶

Eventually, the lack of attention to larger metropolitan-level deficiencies garnered increased stress for local governments. Municipalities were forced to compete for new developments. Aggressive tactics were employed to attract new commercial developments and increase economic activity. This often resulted in one suburb luring a business away from a neighboring suburb. Similar processes occurred when suburbs developed further west. These fresher, more exclusively zoned exurbs began poaching residents and resources from the older municipalities. Eventually, the conditions that made local revenues so scarce and local services so expensive in the metro city spilled over into the suburbs.⁷

Specific reasons for past crises vary tremendously, but there was one obvious similarity. Most mature inner suburbs struggled with economic deficits which made it difficult to cover spending demands. Their local economies did not provide sufficient wealth for them to draw enough revenues to maintain high-level quality services to citizens

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⁶ For an exhaustive examination of how governments brought on their own problems through exclusionary zoning policies, restrictive housing measures with little forethought for the health of the region, see Gordon 2008.

⁷ Ibid
and property owners. Inner suburbs’ situations became progressively worse as economically stable taxpayers continued exiting, residents were becoming increasingly poorer, and destabilizing neighborhoods required even more city spending and resources to service.

Conditions increased the tax burden on remaining taxpayers to fund basic city services. Well-run, professionally staffed municipal governments were not immune to these phenomena. Fiscal stress also severely compromised their ability to provide quality services. Some governments were not fiscally sustainable in the long run, while others had significant challenges managing their short-term financial situation. Cash shortages, which were less likely to be publicized, contributed to numerous inner suburbs’ descent into financial crisis.\(^8\)

While this is a familiar story, often referred to as neighborhood decline in older central cities and suburban decline in older inner-ring suburbs, municipal-level stabilization has not been fully explored. Suburban decline theory posits the patterns of racial resegregation, isolation, and inequities observed in inner suburbs are a reproduction of those previously observed in metrocentric cities. Scholars point out metro centers usually possess enough assets to fend off threats of municipal-level destabilization and decline, while smaller, less asset rich inner suburbs are more vulnerable to decline as a result of destabilizing activities.\(^9\)

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\(^8\) For good insight into fiscal stress causing decisions and impacts of fiscal stress on municipal governances’ ability to deliver services see, Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck 2000; Delisle 2010; and Hendrick 2011.

\(^9\) Resegregation in neighborhoods traditionally attributed to “tipping.” For more about tipping models, see Schelling 1969; 1971; and Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2006; 2008. See also, Orfield and Luce 2013. See Lake 1981 for an early examination of suburban resegregation following the patterns exhibited in cities previously.
As more is learned about suburban decline, however, important discoveries emerge which challenge the notion that suburban decline was an inevitable phenomenon for ill-prepared, ill-equipped, fiscally strapped inner suburbs experiencing significant black in-migration. I agree with the position that policy and program defenses against housing discrimination, neighborhood blight, and fiscal stress improved suburbs’ stabilization forces. However, stabilization depended a great deal on factors outside of local governments’ authority.

Municipal governance which asserts concerted efforts to avoid, deter, and isolate are much more effective at destabilizing neighborhoods independent of support. Resegregation in and of itself does not cause suburban decline. There are middle-class black suburbs with median family incomes greater than the national average. Furthermore, areas of concentrated poor people are not inevitably doomed to resegregate, descend into crime and mayhem, or require aggressive policing to manage.¹⁰

There are scores of poorer areas that are integrated, racially stable places that have managed to remain stable for significant periods of time. Although policing tends to be heavier handed in these areas when compared to whiter, higher-income areas, police-community relations are usually better, and tensions are not as high as observed in Ferguson. It follows that racial tipping, concentrated areas of poor people, and fiscal stress fail to sufficiently account for suburban decline. My examination exposes this critical shortcoming by demonstrating, principally, that just as municipal-level stabilization takes work to achieve, sometimes decline does as well.¹¹

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¹⁰ For more about the varying income levels seen in municipalities with high numbers of black residents, see Johnson 2002; and Logan 2014.
¹¹ Cortright 2018.
**Research Paradigm**

The community power structure framework serves as the research paradigm for this dissertation. Power is simply the capacity to bring about change, and a study of the role of municipal governance requires an understanding that policy decisions and subsequent outcomes do not necessarily have a causal relationship. There are multiple factors at play when considering municipal conditions and the role municipal governance occupies in prevention, management, and exacerbation of conditions. Nevertheless, research has demonstrated that policy decisions impact communities in various ways. Community power structure provides a framework in which to analyze key policy choices, identify who influenced and made those choices, and what those choices mean for the community.¹²

**Organization of Dissertation**

This dissertation consists of eight chapters. You have reached the end of chapter one where I provide an overview of the research and outline my rationale for conducting this study. Chapter two is background of the literature on neighborhood stabilization, racial integration maintenance, and suburban decline. Chapter three is the methods and data used in the research. Chapter four begins the findings sections of the dissertation with municipal governance in St. Louis County. Chapters five, six, and seven present findings in housing policy, land use policy, and fiscal policy, respectively. Chapter 8 is conclusions where I provide a summation of my findings and offer recommendations for future research.

¹² My examination and analysis leverage critiques of political power, community power structures, and spatial inequalities. See Neumann 1950; Hunter 1969; Kraus 2000; Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001; and Hayward and Lukes 2008.
Chapter 2. Background

This chapter is a summation of literature and principal theories regarding neighborhood stabilization, racial integration maintenance, and suburban decline in mature inner suburbs. Through this literature review, I layout contextual information relevant to my examination of inner suburbs’ municipal governance to better understand what is known, what gaps exist, identify why it is important to address these gaps, develop my research questions, and construct a plan for answering my research questions.

Contextual Factors

According to the literature, there are mature inner-ring suburbs that achieved stabilization and remain stable. Multiple studies have identified the contributing factors to achieving and maintaining municipal-level stabilization. Research points to various strategies including early implementation of antidiscrimination housing policies, racial integration maintenance programs, civilian boards, and police-community relations programs as effective stabilization tools. Reports detail efforts of inner-ring suburbs that defy odds by demonstrating racial balance, mixed housing stock, and diverse commercial businesses and industry.\(^\text{13}\)

Scholars highlight a specific set of factors that need to be present for stabilization to be sustained over a significant period of time: 1. Human capital (talented, inclusive, committed); 2. Preemptive action (efforts begin prior to tipping occurring); 3. Environmental capital (mixed housing stock, institutional involvement, regional efforts); 4. Political support and influence; and 5. Adequate funding. As much as these elements

\(^{13}\)Saltman 1990; Kirwin 1999; and Pitkin 2001 presents a helpful synthesis of neighborhood change theories which outlines the three major schools of theoretical understandings of neighborhood change—ecological, subcultural, and political economy.
need to be present for successful stabilization, according to the literature, there are factors that are outside of the authority of municipal governance that are just as important to stabilization.14

Of the factors impacting stabilization, over which municipal governance enjoys no authority, the most notable are: 1. Sprawl and regional development, 2. Architectural and locational features, and 3. Residential choice. Findings also suggest various factors determining inner suburbs’ preexisting conditions such as jurisdictional boundaries, political polarization, and school district battles play a significant role in municipal-level stabilization. These factors present challenges for municipal governance as they can have significant impact on conditions, yet local governance often has little say in the matter.15

**Suburban Sprawl and Neighborhood Designs**

In weakening housing demand through inflated housing production, sprawl and poor community design receive blame from some scholars for the decline of older inner-ring suburban municipalities. Researchers use examples of failed expansions into undeveloped terrains to demonstrate their points. Anti-sprawl proponents contend that newly developed exurbs attract middle-class residents away from the inner and middle rings leaving poorer suburban residents behind. They contend, developing outlying areas are usually unjustified as population stagnation does not call for additional housing, and developments are usually for whites attempting to locate further away from communities in transition.16

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16 Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck 2000; Madden 2003; Gallagher 2013; Orfield and Luce 2013.
Some researchers focus on periods of housing shortage crises that spur policy decisions which result in adverse outcomes; actions which result in relocating poor blacks from concentrated poverty in central cities to inner-ring poverty concentrations. Since some zoning patterns in inner suburbs resembled metro city zoning which contained more mixed use, more multifamily districts, and smaller single-family lot sizes, this process repeated itself time and time again in some areas. Therefore, the patterns of residential segregation and economic decline could not be attributed entirely to sprawl.\textsuperscript{17}

**Architectural and Locational**

Architectural and locational features can make a home or neighborhood obsolete. Age of a neighborhood’s housing stock and the neighborhood’s location in relation to the metrocentric city’s commercial corridor may threaten the viability of any neighborhood because it affects decisions to invest in property as well as decisions to move. Studies have demonstrated that a neighborhood’s proximity to other neighborhoods also matter.\textsuperscript{18}

Municipal decisions can influence the architectural identity of a neighborhood. However, a municipality’s location cannot be changed. While it is true that some neighborhoods, as they age and face competition from outlying areas do seem to sink in socioeconomic status, this is by no means inevitable. As Bruegmann (2005) points out, even a cursory glance at the location of many of the most affluent suburbs will confirm that many of these communities today are the same ones that held this distinction in the 1920s or even the 1880s.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17}Berkovec et al. 1996; Gordon 2008; Rothstein 2014.  
\textsuperscript{18}Swanson, Webber and Metzger 2015.  
\textsuperscript{19}Bruegmann 2005.
When comparing the differences in municipalities’ success in stabilizing their respective communities, scholars often point to the differences in their housing stocks. Housing in some areas include many row homes, and the density of populations are considerably greater than in areas’ zoned for large lot housing. Housing stock proves to be a significant impactor of a community’s ability to stabilize. However, this does not necessarily determine the success or failure of efforts. Many factors contribute to conditions, and one must be wary of focusing inordinately on just one.20

**Residential Choice**

Some studies have attributed residential choice to influencing municipal-level conditions and point to limitations of municipal governance’s control in such cases. According to Keating and Smith (1996), residential choice is most influenced by socioeconomic factors such as race, ethnicity, income, and age. As new inhabitants enter the city seeking employment, the inner zone pushes into the next outer ring. This process is referred to as invasion. Invasion continues until, eventually, the new inhabitants take over the physical space of that zone. It is at this point that succession is achieved. This process is presumed to be ongoing as long as migration and economic growth continue and areas for different income groups are designated.21

In compliment to the income argument, status seeking based on socioeconomic hierarchies has also been put forward. This theory suggests that people atop the income and social order elect to reside in areas comprised of people with similar status. In other words, high-income families prefer to live among other high-income families. Some

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20 Washnis 1971; Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998; Bier 2001; and Semmes 2007.
21 Keating and Smith 1996. See Pitkin 2001 for overview of residential transition theories. See also, racial specific transition theory known as the “tipping model” in Schelling 1969; 1971; and Anas 1980.
scholars challenge these findings, arguing socioeconomic differences account for only a small percentage of black-white segregation.\footnote{Grodzins 1957; Farley et al. 1978; Goering 1978; Lake 1981; Schuman et al. 1997; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999; Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi 2002; Krysan and Farley 2002; Bayer, McMillan and Rueben 2004; Farley 2004; 2005; Charles 2005; Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2006; 2008; and Sampson 2012.}

Tests show income, occupation, or education level as weak predictors of racial segregation. Some analysts argue that racial residential segregation is most attributable to white families preferring to reside in neighborhoods where the presence of black residents is low. From an institutional standpoint, residential choice theory presents additional challenges for municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization efforts and must be considered when strategic planning.\footnote{Leven et al. 1976; Farley et al. 1978; Goering 1978; Galster 1990; 1991; Schuman et al. 1997; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999; Ellen 1999; Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi 2002; Krysan and Farley 2002; Bayer, McMillan and Rueben 2004; Charles 2005; Farley 2005; Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2006; 2008; Sampson 2012.}

**Institutional Factors**

Some stable areas were challenged by declining surrounding areas, and the outmigration of middle-class blacks to the suburbs had negative effects on the economic conditions of the inner-city poor left behind. Regardless of the neighborhood capital and integration groups’ efforts, as the literature indicates, these areas may be in serious trouble. Conditions in an area are affected by municipal governance activities such as zoning, code enforcement, rent control, property assessment, lending practices, policing, and school partnership strategies which shape housing-market operation and can precipitate negative as well as positive neighborhood change. It is important to remember that these institutional factors, like the factors outside the authority of municipal governance, are neither natural nor inevitable.\footnote{Schneider and Logan 1982; Wilson 1987; 2012; Sampson 2012; Swanstrom et al. 2012; Swanstrom, Webber and Metzger 2015.}
Thus, there are decisions and non-decisions creating institutional elements that influence municipal-level conditions. Identifying and examining how municipal governance interacts with and influences socioeconomic and physical conditions in a municipality is crucial to better understanding the role municipal governance plays in stabilization and decline and what associated factors precipitate success and failure in stabilizing municipalities.²⁵

**Constraints**

Economic, political, and legal constraints limit what decision-makers may do in efforts to achieve success. Examinations of urban politics conclude that because of the many constraints on municipal governments, political influence on policies is minimal. Despite influencing elements that are outside of municipal authority and constraints that may hinder efforts, literature asserts that municipal governance can affect municipal-level stability. While the federal and state policies and the timing of integration maintenance efforts attribute to local success and failure in stabilizing a municipality, other internal and environmental attributes may be more important determinants.²⁶

Research has illuminated key factors for integration maintenance initiatives to be effective and uncovers serious threats to prospects. Considering that two of the most successful examples in the literature are government supported initiatives, budget cuts threaten similar efforts in the future. Literature highlights that most successful and sustaining stabilization efforts result from the interventionist approach. The interventionist

view suggests that to achieve true racial integration, which means mixed and stable, proactive coalition building, mobilization, and adequate resource dedication is required.\textsuperscript{27}

**Voter Preferences**

Municipal-level data of citizens’ policy preferences are scarce. Consequently, it is difficult for researchers to study how responsive municipal lawmakers are to constituents’ desires. Some researchers have overcome this problem. Utilizing advanced techniques of measurement, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014) determine mean policy conservatism in cities with 20,000 or more residents by leveraging opinion estimation. Findings contradict the theory that posits institutional change is required to improve municipal governance’s responsiveness to citizens. They found that on a wide range of policy issues, local policymakers enact laws that are consistent with the national policy preferences of their voters.\textsuperscript{28}

Further, the study shows that local government’s response to voter preferences are minimally impacted by differences in institutional structures and episodic phenomena. These findings serve as helpful insight in examining different municipal governments with varying governmental structures. In demonstrating there is local official reverence for voters’ policy demands, such studies provide additional context for examining the effects of outside forces influencing decision making in municipal governance. They also highlight the importance of considering resident interaction and response to the interaction in determining municipal governance success and failure.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Orfield 1981; Saltman 1990; and Kirwin 1999.
\textsuperscript{28} Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014.
\textsuperscript{29} Yang and Callahan 2005; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014.
Many blacks looking to trade in deteriorating inner-city neighborhoods for suburban oases found that what they gained was access primarily to suburbs adjacent to central cities. In this process, whites fled the older deteriorating inner-ring and were replaced by black inhabitants. Referencing this phenomenon, Galster (1991) argues:

"The average black household, though now residing farther from the central city than before, remains as close to it as ever relative to the average white household."

And "Suburban residence per se is not equivalent to desegregation or relief from the burdens of ghetto residence."30

This observation is confirmed by studies that link the racial distribution of suburban blacks to the characteristics of the suburbs where they reside. Black suburban residents are typically segregated from their white counterparts in suburbs located just outside the edge of the metro city. These inner suburbs lack economic viability, are poorly managed and serviced by local government, and levy exorbitant taxes. The ecologist approach observes this process of whites being likely to relocate to outer-ring and exurban areas as being consistent with the "invasion-succession" theory.31

However, by applying the political economy framework it becomes apparent that other forces such as discrimination in the housing market are involved in the process. Studies have shown continued violations of Fair Housing laws and lack of enforcement. Designing policies and programs that better empower, strengthen, and support suburban municipalities and their citizens is extremely important work and requires valid research

31 See Keating and Smith 1996. Also, scholars track the process of black populations following whites to the suburbs and refer to the phenomena as “Black Suburbanization.” For more about black suburbanization see, Galster 1991; Schneider and Phelan 1993; Orfield and Luce 2013; and Logan 2014.
goals. Despite significant policy advancements, the damaging impact of segregation remains.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{De jure Segregation}

As Rothstein (2014) asserts, “We must not allow our distain for de facto segregation to blind us into ignoring that it does not account for the segregation we currently observe.” Rothstein highlights the importance of not making this mistake as it prevents us from recognizing windows of opportunities that lead, not just to more integrated communities, but to more stably integrated ones. We must seek newer, more innovative methods, begin to think more regionally, and expand revitalization efforts beyond just the metrocentric city as this model allows continued neglect of inner suburbs.\textsuperscript{33}

Through landmark Supreme Court decisions from Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 to Missouri v. Jenkins in 1995, the federal government of the United States sanctioned racial segregation. Promulgating doctrine such as “separate but equal” and “local control,” the Court has repeatedly issued rulings that serve to reinforce segregation, undermine desegregation efforts, and dismantle or weaken earlier desegregation rulings. Despite Supreme Court decisions that serve to make racial integration less of a federal priority and local governments’ minimal support of integration efforts, integration does occur.\textsuperscript{34}

It is important to understand racial integration policies as they relate to effects and efforts at the local level. While federal-level decisions have significant implications associated with the racial spatial dynamics of the country, literature asserts that racial

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Farley 1977; 2004; Yinger 1986; Berkovec et al. 1996; Mehlhorn 1998; Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001; Orfield 2002; Turner et al. 2002; Farley and Squires 2005; Allard and Roth 2010; Kneebone and Garr 2010; Kneebone and Berube 2013; Murphy 2010; 2016; and Murphy and Allard 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} Excerpt taken from Rothstein 2014. See also, Orfield 2002; and Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Berkovec et al. 1996; Orfield and Eaton 1996; Judd 1997; Popkin, et al. 2003; Rothstein 2014; and Pearcy 2015.
\end{itemize}
integration maintenance efforts at the municipal level have demonstrated success. This serves to better inform the examination of the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization.\textsuperscript{35}

**Approaches to Stabilization**

As black entry into traditionally white municipalities increased, communities adopted integration maintenance plans. Integration programs seek to limit or channel black entry while stemming the tide of white flight. Racial integration maintenance posits that proactive antidiscrimination action, mitigation of black overrepresentation in residency, and white flight prevention methods must be employed to prevent racial tipping, housing stock deterioration, and economic decline in white neighborhoods experiencing immigration of black families.\textsuperscript{36}

Scholars have found that there are many neighborhoods that have stabilized and have not tipped to all-black where intervention of institutional networks and resources are present. Based on Lee’s (1985) findings, racially mixed areas in the largest U.S. cities are not inevitably doomed to experience the irreversible process of resegregation like social scientists have traditionally thought. We need to better identify and understand what policy decisions and non-decisions are most influential in impacting positive and negative municipal-level change.\textsuperscript{37}

Some scholars argue that the variety of forms that integration maintenance policies can take complicates the evaluation of their legality. They point to the allowance of

\textsuperscript{35} Saltman 1990; Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998; Perkiss 2014. For examples, see West Mount Airy Neighbors: 1983-1985 and East Mount Airy Neighbors 1985 Annual Reports, Philadelphia, PA.
\textsuperscript{36} Smolla 1981; Wilson 1983; Berlin 2010; Harris 2012; Bell 2013; and Adams 2014.
\textsuperscript{37} Lee 1985. See also, Ahlbrandt & Cunningham 1978; Orfield 1981; Keating, Pammer and Smith 1988; Saltman 1990.
communities to develop plans with varying levels of exclusion, racial preferences, and government involvement. These opponents of integration maintenance, often law scholars, question the constitutionality of such policies because the social, political, economic, and legal judgments can be unique to each community. They argue that because integration maintenance treats prospective entrants in a community differently based on race it is essentially violating the constitutional rights that protect prospective entrants from similar actions that brought about disparities to begin with.\textsuperscript{38}

Some think of it as freedom of choice versus integration maintenance. This position suggests that efforts to maintain integration deny freedom of choice to blacks thus rendering them fundamentally in conflict with fair housing laws and equal housing opportunity. Critics point out that blacks’ rights are violated for the sake of attempting to achieve neighborhood integration and prevent tipping. However, as Saltman (1990) highlights, the truth about integration maintenance is that it relies on affirmative marketing, which is a moral, effective, and essential movement strategy, consistent with fair housing laws.\textsuperscript{39}

Given the question raised as to the legalities of integration maintenance policies and practices, it is important to outline the approaches to serve as a guide to better understanding the political implications of the different types of municipal efforts undertaken. The most direct approach to integration maintenance is to limit the number of blacks entering one neighborhood by restrictive selling and renting practices. This

\textsuperscript{38} Smolla 1981.
\textsuperscript{39} Saltman 1990.
approach, when considered at face value, resembles the discriminatory housing practices employed both by the private and public sectors during the era.\textsuperscript{40}

Limiting a specific demographic from accessing housing based solely on race is an egregious violation of civil rights and provides opponents to integration maintenance strong support for their constitutionality argument. The literature explicitly refers to racial residential integration maintenance when describing efforts that sought to address the resegregation process that takes place because of black in-migration to a municipality and white flight from that municipality by curbing white flight. A review of municipal and historical archives uncovers examples of this type of integration maintenance practice. The literature examines several attempts to enact such a practice by ordinance in Oak Park, Illinois and an incentive of service in Shaker Heights, Ohio.\textsuperscript{41}

Instead of deterring black entry, a less rigorous approach to integration maintenance is to encourage entry into designated areas and promote to whites the benefits of remaining. This approach can vary in rigidity and racial emphasis. A community can choose to establish definitive targets for racial composition, such as a 30\% black population limit. Real estate agents would be required to encourage white entry whenever the black population exceeded 30\% and to encourage black entry whenever the black population fell below that level.\textsuperscript{42}

A community can choose a more fluid and less racially explicit alternative, such as requiring encouragement of the entry of underrepresented racial groups in a community in relation to the entire metropolitan community, the state, or the nation. The encouraged

\textsuperscript{40}Smolla 1981; Saltman 1990.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid
\textsuperscript{42}Smolla 1981.
racial group will vary according to the racial demographics of the community and the shifting of larger geographic population units. This practice, referred to as the mirror approach, is the most frequently observed approach utilized in integration maintenance efforts.43

However, it is important to point out that while implicit in the literature is the aim to “preserve” a certain racial balance; only a small number of references of specific racial composition targets were made by interventionists. A third form of integration maintenance is the race-conscious dispersal of entrants throughout a community. This type of plan encourages whites to move into areas that already contain some blacks and encourages blacks to move into areas that are predominantly white. This form of integration maintenance can be viewed as addressing the issue of racial residential segregation within an area that may be inaccurately considered integrated when analyzing census tract data.44

**Segregated Integration**

Often communities are labeled “integrated” when they have racial compositions comparable to that of the greater metropolitan area. However, upon closer examination researchers discover that many of these communities are segregated with whites concentrated in one specific area of the community and blacks concentrated in another. Literature outlines in-depth examinations of examples of this form of racial residential integration maintenance condition exposing a high-level frequency of this occurrence.45

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43 Orfield 1984
44 Smolla 1981; Orfield 1984; Saltman 1990.
45 Applies to various forms of uneven distribution. For instance, one racial group might be overrepresented in areas that are scattered throughout a city or packed closely together in the center of the city. This is important to note as research has demonstrated that blacks were not particularly segregated in northern cities during the 19th century. See Massey and Denton 1989; 1993. For more about tipping, distribution, and dissimilarity index see Schelling 1969; Goering 1978; Lake 1981; Orfield 1984; Farley 1987; 1989; 2004; Ellen 1999; Massey 2001; Fischer et al. 2004; Orfield and Luce 2013.
Suburban Typology

There remain gaps in the literature regarding the role municipal governance plays in influencing municipal-level stabilization and decline. In developing a suburban typology, researchers must be careful not to commit the ecological fallacy of assuming that suburban populations are automatically middle-class. Conversely, black suburbanites do not always reside in poor, ghettoized suburbs. Research points to many examples to strengthen this argument.46

For instance, a third of Washington, DC’s suburbs are categorized as black middle-class areas. Some of these suburbs are home to large populations. As such, the percentages of middle-class black residents are not inflated by statistical anomalies from smaller population sizes. Another assumption researchers should be careful not to make is that suburbs are inherently better off than their central city. Some suburbs are comprised mainly of blue-collar workers with modest incomes.47

These communities often do not have the resources and infrastructure to effectively combat economic decline and other threats. Central cities are usually better equipped with a tax base, business community, law enforcement, and social service providers needed to navigate various pressures cities face. Without certain critical financial, institutional, and social tools, inner suburbs are more vulnerable than major cities to succumbing to challenges.48

It is important to note that suburban poverty differs from the urban poverty traditionally associated with central cities. Further, not all suburbs with increasing poverty

46 Orfield 1997; Bruegmann 2005; Hanlon, Vicino and Short 2006; Holliday and Dwyer 2009; Murphy 2010; Kneebone and Berube 2013; Gallagher 2013; Allard 2014; Kneebone 2014; and Murphy and Allard 2015.
48 Orfield 1997; Holliday and Dwyer 2009; Murphy 2010.
experience the trend the same. Some individuals experiencing poverty reside in middle-class suburbs while others live in areas where poverty is prevalent throughout the neighborhood and municipality. Identifying the presence and the effects of poverty in the suburbs is complicated by these variations in conditions. For policy to be impactful it must incorporate diverse solutions for addressing poverty at the specific levels in which it exists.\footnote{In fact, Hanlon, Vicino and Short (2006) found that the poorest suburban place has a lower median family income than the central city. Although the overall poverty rate is still lower in the suburbs than in cities, Gallagher (2013), Allard (2014), and Kneebone and Holmes (2014) all make convincing arguments that many inner-ring suburbs may be worse off than their central city. See also, Lucy and Philips 2000; Kneebone and Berube 2013; Kneebone 2014; and Murphy and Allard 2015.}

Furthering these distinctions, researchers must consider that there are big suburbs neighboring small suburbs; there are boroughs and hamlets; and there are suburbs that rest in the hills while some others are flat suburbs located in low-lying valleys. A suburb’s geographical proximity to the metropolitan area’s central city has important implications as well. Whether the suburb is located in the inner-ring, the middle-ring, or the outer-ring often referred to as exurb, is a critical factor that impacts social, economic, racial, and environmental determinants.\footnote{Bruegmann 2005; Gallagher 2013.}

**Schools**

One of the first places to show signs of economic decline is the local schools, both public and charter. Anti-segregation policies and enforcements such as public-school desegregation have waned since the declines in segregation during the civil rights era of 1960 to 1990. Multiple studies have found that racial isolation of contemporary black students is nearly as extreme as it was for black students during the civil rights era. In fact,
since the signing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, not much has changed in terms of black-white school segregation rates.⁵¹

Research demonstrates underperforming outcomes for black children experiencing racial isolation. They score less on tests, have higher high school dropout rates, have lower wage-paying jobs, and are more likely to have interaction with the criminal justice system than black children living in more integrated areas. As with housing segregation, school segregation can serve as a precursor to economic decline in the area.⁵²

In his Twin Cities study, Orfield (1997) found that by 1994, more than 20% of students received free or reduced lunch in nine of 11 inner suburbs’ school districts. According to the findings, growth of low-income students outpaced Minneapolis schools and eight of the schools were experiencing higher rates of minority enrollment. Orfield uncovered that over the course of 10 years, 18 out of 29 mature inner suburbs experienced significant white flight of preschool children. In inner-ring suburban Minneapolis, high school non-graduation rates closely resemble the percentage of poor children in the central cities. These schools typically become “school-to-prison pipelines” as the likelihood of children being incarcerated often outweigh odds children will attend college.⁵³

Municipal efforts in local schools are prevalent throughout the literature. For example, a study of Milwaukee demonstrates how instrumental municipal governance can be in local school stabilization efforts. Of 44 schools constructed between 1950 and 1965,

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⁵² Massey and Denton 1993; and Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999. “Being black not only greatly accentuates the level of segregation on any single dimension but also increases markedly the dimensionality of segregation, generating an accumulation of segregation across multiple dimensions simultaneously (Massey and Denton 1989).”
⁵³ Orfield 1997.
only two were in areas where black enrollment was over 50%. When white schools became overcrowded or were closed down for remodeling, the school system for many years had bused white children to receiving schools which absorbed them routinely. This practice was known later as intact busing.\textsuperscript{54}

Like housing segregation, school segregation is most pronounced in the Northeast and Midwest. Municipalities that focus efforts in local schools demonstrate higher success rates in stabilization efforts as conditions in local schools are improved. The purpose of the school efforts is to promote quality integrated education, to inform the community of educational programs in area schools, to support those programs, and to develop supplementary educational activities for neighborhood children.\textsuperscript{55}

Racial inequities span a broad range of economic strata. For example, a majority of Ferguson residents are black. Although sections of the municipality have less poverty than comparable neighborhoods, the city exhibits distinctly different characteristics than its white neighbors. Elementary schools in the Ferguson-Florissant School District are among the lowest performing schools in the state. Classified in the bottom 10\% to 15\%, Ferguson schools only slightly outperform the typical central city school in the metro area.\textsuperscript{56}

An effective municipal school strategy will exert a significant influence on school board policies. By working with the school board, municipal government affects major changes in local schools. In addition, it can be instrumental in reducing racial tensions

\textsuperscript{54} Feit and Bonds 2014. See also, Judd 1997; and Nelsen 2015.
\textsuperscript{55} See Orfield 1981; and Orfield and Luce 2013.
\textsuperscript{56} Logan 2014.
when schools are desegregated and support people from the community who run for the school board.\textsuperscript{57}

This dissertation utilizes principles associated with local school stabilization efforts in studying municipal governance success and failure. Several municipalities have fairly contiguous school district boundaries. Others share school district boundaries with other municipalities. Due to varying school district structures among the study cases, analyses are performed in a way that considers these differences.

\textbf{Regional Fragmentation}

It is clear that many factors impact municipal government decision making. Some scholars point to regional fragmentation as an influential factor. Inner suburbs’ physical and fiscal health are connected with those of neighboring inner suburbs. Regional fragmentation dissuades collaborative stabilization efforts in which cities throughout the region leverage resources in a collective manner to address deficits. Thus, it is not uncommon for governments in fragmented regions to be entrenched in fiscal deficits and to exacerbate their problems with budgeting and financial practices that ignore the economic deficits.\textsuperscript{58}

In the absence of a solidified regional response to inner-ring suburban decline, some municipalities have managed to avoid decline while others have declined dramatically. Considering various municipal choices such as open housing policy, land planning and growth management, property tax-base sharing, and investments in transportation systems,

\textsuperscript{57} Concepts of cooperative housing and school desegregation and civic capacity and community/school partnerships are considered in the examination of the five St. Louis inner suburbs. For more about these types of strategy, see Toward a Strategy for Urban Integration, Orfield 1981; and “The Case of 24:1,” Swanstrom et al. 2012.

\textsuperscript{58} Weiher 1991; Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom 2001; Orfield 1997; 2002; Fischer et al. 2004; Hendrick 2011.
this study will identify municipal characteristics that may serve as predictors of municipal success at stabilizing in a highly fragmented region. Of particular interest to this study is the fact that some municipalities have stabilized in this fragmented environment.\textsuperscript{59}

**Summary**

One of the largest social and racial transitions in the nation occurred in inner suburbs of cities during the 1970s to 1990s. As scores of middle-class residents moved out of inner-ring suburbs, low-income families were replacing them. While this transition along with some physical decline may explain some of the racial tipping and economic decline in mature inner suburbs, change in financial status of residents fails to sufficiently account for the totality of the phenomena.

Examining the interrelated dynamics of municipalities’ institutional and fiscal capacity will serve as a critical component to this study. As purported in the literature, some municipalities that have suffered decline may have talented leadership capable of governing effectively. However, financial troubles due to low revenue or external factors, such as a national and local economic downturn can bring on severe fiscal stress for a municipality despite municipal efforts. This point raises the importance of considering a municipality’s size, resources, and policy tools available when examining its influence on stabilization and decline.\textsuperscript{60}

This study considers the impact of sprawl, architecture, location, and residential choice factors. Of great importance, however, is the understanding that sprawl and an aged housing stock do not necessitate decline. There is an interaction of elements, decisions, and

\textsuperscript{59} For more about St. Louis’ fragmented nature and how citizens have actually preferred the accessibility of small town governments, see *Fragmented by Design*, Jones 2000. For an examination of the newer “community-based regionalism” model, see Swanstrom and Banks 2009.

\textsuperscript{60} See Delisle 2010: CBO report “Fiscal Stress Faced by Local Governments.”
non-decisions occurring. For example, understanding that the strength of residents’ social networks, neighborhood sentiment, and symbolism may all play significant roles in municipal-level change. Identifying these interrelated dynamics better informs the study.

This dissertation will contribute evidence to the field, providing a clearer understanding of municipal governance’s role in municipal-level stabilization. In doing so, the examination will better explain unique municipal governance characteristics that result in municipal-level stabilization, economic growth, and increased diversity. I look forward to providing the reader recommendations for increasing municipal level stability.
Chapter 3. Methods and Data

In this chapter, I discuss the methods employed and data used in the study. I used quantitative data to select the five case studies. I collected archives spanning from 1970 to 2015. I interviewed 25 community stakeholders, and I used the community structure framework as the method of analysis to better understand the role of municipal-level governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs.

By performing a data analysis on multiple quantitative data of municipal conditions from 1970 to 2015, I identify five St. Louis municipalities that meet several varying criteria ranging from economically and racially stable to economically declined and racially tipped. Comparative exercises are executed generating histograms, scatter plots, and charts of key measurements. Results of the exercises are analyzed for key trends and conditions that exhibit stable levels of racial composition and economic conditions as well as distinct upward or downward trajectories in municipal-level conditions.

To illuminate factors unique to specific elements of municipal governance that affect economic health and racial composition, qualitative case studies are conducted on the five municipalities. I examine municipal government decisions, administrative actions, professional capacity, size, fiscal strength, location, interaction with residents, and factors outside of municipal governance control.

**Selecting the Cases**

In some studies, researchers follow the standard used by the U.S. Census Bureau which defines suburbs as municipalities located in metropolitan statistical areas, have populations greater than 2,500, and are not central cities. In other cases, available data and research questions determine the definition of the term suburb. The Census Bureau’s definition does not delineate inner suburb, middle suburb, and exurb. The researcher must make these distinctions to demonstrate that suburbs’ characteristics vary and these variations impact conditions as well as municipal governance decisions.⁶¹

To circumvent this challenge, this study will use more finely grained place-level data to categorize suburbs into inner, middle, and exurban and identify and examine mature inner suburban areas of St. Louis County. This study asserts that the Census category “Places” is the best available category for identifying suburbs and sets specific parameters for identifying cases and for determining how to measure and analyze them.

Minimum thresholds are set to study like cases. First, only municipalities maintaining at least a population of 10,000 residents throughout the study period 1970-2015 were considered. Fourteen municipalities met the population minimum over the

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⁶¹ For more about how the U.S. Census Bureau designates geographical areas, see Understanding “Place” in Census Bureau Data Products by Michael Ratcliffe, Geography Division U.S. Census Bureau available at https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/data/developers/understandingplace.pdf or visit https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural.html.
period (See Figure 1., p.317). Additionally, municipalities demonstrating at least 30% black residency at some point during the study period 1970-2015 were considered. Six municipalities met the racial minimum: 1. Bellefontaine Neighbors, 2. Ferguson, 3. Florissant, 4. Hazelwood, 5. Jennings, and 6. University City (See Figure 2, p.318).

Based on trajectories of racial composition and economic conditions over the study period, municipalities were partitioned into three categories: 1. Stable, 2. Declined, and 3. Transitioning. Two municipalities were selected that exhibited stabilization. At least one of the municipalities demonstrated stable racial and economic conditions for at least 20 years. The other exhibited stable racial and economic conditions at some point during the study period but exhibited at least 10 years of demonstrable stabilization after exhibiting signs of acute transition which threatened stability.

Two municipalities were selected that had declined or at least showed traits of transitioning to decline in terms of racially resegregating and exhibiting stressed economic indicators. One municipality had experienced decline for a minimum period of 20 years exhibiting racial resegregation and economic decline during the study period. One exhibited at least 10 years of demonstrable destabilization showing signs of transitioning into declined status.

For racial composition, selected cases considered to be stabilized demonstrated characteristics such as black population at least 30% of the total population in the municipality for a time period of at least 20 years between years 1970 and 2015. Through plotting municipalities’ racial compositions at decennial points 1970 to 2010 as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015, trajectories in racial change and stabilization were observed. Municipalities that met criteria outlined earlier and exhibited racial change
including increase in black residents to at least 30 % and remained at least 30 % without exceeding 70 % were considered stabilized or transitioning depending on the circumstances and were eligible cases for the study.

Selected cases considered to be declined in terms of resegregating demonstrated characteristics such as black population at 71 % or more for at least 20 years. Cases considered to exhibit signs of decline demonstrated significant increases (at least 30 percent in a ten-year period) in black population and contained a minimum of 60 % black residents at any point during the study time period. Identification of these cases was also performed by plotting municipalities’ racial compositions at decennial points 1970 to 2010 as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015.

Before an effective examination of municipal governance’s effects on stabilization could be performed, a clear understanding of how the conditions in suburbs were changing and why these changes were unique to suburbs needed to be reached. In addition to considering racial shifts, this study operationalized the concepts of suburban poverty by defining it and distinguishing it from other forms of economic conditions and poverty observed in cities.

Poverty is generally accepted to mean a lack of resources to sufficiently provide for one’s needs. Official measurements tabulate income and size of household to determine poverty status. For this study, county-wide averages were used in measuring the prevalence of poverty in a municipality and in determining overall economic conditions in the municipality. For economic conditions, selected cases considered to be stabilized demonstrated characteristics such as median household income at least 80 % of the county’s median household income, per capita income at least 70 % of the county’s
average, and poverty rate less than 200% of the county’s average for a period of at least 20 years between years 1970 and 2015.  

Through plotting municipalities’ economic conditions at decennial points 1970 to 2010 as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015, trajectories in economic conditions were observed. Municipalities that exhibited the aforementioned economic conditions in addition to meeting the racial composition threshold were considered stabilized and were eligible cases for the study. Selected cases considered to be in decline in terms of economic condition demonstrated characteristics such as median household income of 70% or less of the county’s median household income average, per capita income of 50% or less of the county’s average, and poverty rate of 200% or more of the county’s average for at least 10 years.

Identification of these cases was also performed by plotting municipalities’ economic conditions at decennial points from 1970 to 2010 as well as five-year estimates from 2010-2015. Municipalities that exhibited the aforementioned economic conditions in addition to meeting the racial composition threshold for municipalities in decline were considered to be declined or transitioning depending on the circumstances and were eligible cases for the study.

**Proximity to Metro City**

Stabilized, declined, and transitioning cases exhibited similar attributes related to population size, capacity, and municipal structure. Therefore, geographical proximity to the central city was also considered in the selection process. However, given the impossibility of selecting a group of municipalities that fit perfectly into these categories, 

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62 For more about considering differences in suburban poverty, see Murphy 2010; 2016; Kneebone 2014; and Murphy and Allard 2015.
variations in these factors were considered in the examination and played a significant role in the final interpretation of results. Further, additional indicators such as housing stock, education levels of residents, and number of single parent headed households were considered during the selection process as well as throughout the study.

A suburb’s geographical proximity to the metropolitan area’s central city has important implications. Whether the suburb is located in the inner-ring, the middle-ring, or the outer-ring often referred to as exurb, is a critical factor that impacts social, economic, racial, and environmental determinants. This study considered implications associated with the location of municipalities and how these conditions may have affected municipal governance. Proximity to the central city, which in this case is St. Louis, MO, correlates with black population shifts. Municipalities to the northwest of St. Louis demonstrated a significantly higher increase in black population during the study period than municipalities located in other areas of the region. For instance, of the six municipalities that have experienced at least 30% black population at some point during the study period, only one municipality (University City) is not located in an area northwest of St. Louis City (See Figure 3, p.319).

While University City’s proximity to the central city differs from the other cases, it was not eliminated from consideration as this study seeks to better explain the influences geographical proximity may have on municipal governance. University City offered an opportunity to study a mature inner-ring suburb’s municipal governance effects on racial and economic conditions in the context of enjoying proximity to the central city. Other interesting aspects making University City an acceptable case study are visited later in this analysis.
As for the remaining five municipalities, a closer examination of their racial and economic conditions over the study period was warranted to delineate them and identify best cases for the study. There were several sets within the group with very similar proximities to the central city (e.g. Bellefontaine Neighbors / Jennings, and Florissant / Hazelwood). While Ferguson lies northwest of St. Louis City, as do the others, it is located between the two aforementioned sets of municipalities.

Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings are located on the northwest border of the city while Florissant and Hazelwood are located in the northwest corner of St. Louis County. It was determined that Ferguson’s proximity to the city was unique from the other sets of municipalities. This factor was considered a point of interest during the analysis of racial and economic conditions.

Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings were considered first. Given their similarities in location (northwest border of St. Louis City) and their populations as of 2015 (10,815 and 14,755), these cases were analyzed closer for dissimilarities that may make one a more relevant case for study than the other. If no striking differences were identified between the two, one would be selected based on traits important to the study such as commonalities and differences in racial, economic, and other demographic indicators related to the other selected cases.

Racial Composition

Like the other municipalities under consideration, with the exception of University City whose black population was 20 % in 1970, both Bellefontaine Neighbors and Jennings contained small black populations in 1970 (1.2 % and .5 %). Notably, Jennings’ black population increased dramatically over the next ten years reaching 27.1 % by 1980. During
the same period, Bellefontaine experienced a relatively small increase of 1.6% in black population which represented 2.8% of total population in 1980.

The modest black population increase would continue for Bellefontaine Neighbors over the next decade while Jennings experienced another significant increase in black population over the same period. By 1990, Jennings was well on its way to racially tipping with black residents representing nearly half (48%) of its population—a nearly 47% increase in only two decades. While Bellefontaine Neighbors experienced a higher rate of black population increase than in the previous decade, the municipality was yet to show signs of tipping as black population was still fewer than 10% (eight percent).

During the 10 years from 1990 to 2000, Bellefontaine would experience a significant increase in black population reaching 44.4% in black residents (an increase of 36.4%). This was notable and worth investigating to better understand what policies, actions, and phenomena occurred to bring about such a drastic increase in such a short period. However, Jennings offered valuable insight into explaining what was happening not only in Jennings but in the neighboring municipality. During the same period, Jennings’ black population increase by 30.6%. Since Jennings’ racial shift began two decades earlier and continued throughout the study period eventually topping 91.70% black residents by 2015, Jennings represents a fully tipped municipality.

While Bellefontaine Neighbors tipped racially, according to this study’s metric, it failed to meet the 20-year minimum threshold for declined. The municipality did not reach the tipping threshold until 2010 (See Figure 4, p.320). Jennings met the 20-year minimum threshold having tipped by 1995 (See Figure 5, p.320). Considering the geographical and population similarities of these two cases, Jennings presented the unique attribute of tipping
earlier and more dramatically. Additionally, the similarities decreased the need to examine both municipalities. Jennings remained in consideration for the study as a declined case by meeting the racial resegregation requirements. Bellefontaine Neighbors was excluded.

Florissant and Hazelwood were considered next. At initial glance, a glaring difference in these two municipalities was apparent. Their population sizes were quite different. As of 2015, Florissant had 52,356 residents while Hazelwood had just under half of that with 25,686 residents (See Figure 1, p.317). While this raised the issue of whether these were comparable cases, another notable statistic was also considered. These municipalities experienced opposite overall population shifts during the study period.

From 1970 to 2015, Florissant experienced an over 20% decrease (from 65,908 to 52,356) in overall population while Hazelwood enjoyed a 45% increase (from 14,082 to 25,686) in overall population (See Figure 1, p.317). During the same period, both municipalities experienced a gradual increase in black population (approximately seven percent per decade) with the highest uptick coming during 2000 to 2010 (approximately 14% for Hazelwood and 19% for Florissant). Hazelwood reached the 30% black population threshold in 2010, while Florissant did not experience a 30% black population until 2015 (See Figures 6 and 7, p.321).

Florissant’s decline in overall population and Hazelwood’s increase in overall population since 1970 were not unusual as other municipalities in St. Louis County demonstrated similar trends. However, of the 14 municipalities meeting the population eligibility for this study, only Ballwin and Hazelwood experienced population growth over the study period; and both were significant increases—65% and 45%, respectively (See
Figure 1, p.317). Notable was the fact that Hazelwood, unlike Ballwin, experienced more than minimal black population increase.

Halfway into the decade of the 2010s, Hazelwood was on pace to maintain the trend of modest increases in black population over 10-year spans. This was counter to trends exhibited by other St. Louis County municipalities that reached the 30% black population mark during the study period (excluding University City and a number of small municipalities).

According to this study’s metrics, the similarities in geographical proximity and rate of black population growth were where the commonalities ended with Florissant and Hazelwood. Their size difference, difference in population trajectory, and varying time in which they reached the 30% black population threshold made it difficult to select one or the other based solely on their racial trends and was grounds to consider their economic conditions before making a selection or perhaps selecting both cities for the study.

Upon initial review of Ferguson’s racial trajectory over the course of the study period, it was clear the municipality had experienced significant population shifts. It was third only to Jennings and University City in increase in black population during the period between 1970 and 1980 and third behind Jennings and Bellefontaine Neighbors in increase in black population over the entire study period from 1970-2015 (See Figures 8 and 9, p.322-323).

This was very intriguing because, while Ferguson experienced one of the highest levels of black population increases of the municipalities in the set, it had not yet tipped according to this study’s metric (71% or more). Notwithstanding, at 67.4% black population Ferguson appeared to be poised to inevitably tip to all black.
However, upon closer examination of Ferguson’s racial trajectory, several interesting attributes further distinguished Ferguson from its neighbors. Of each of the municipalities in the set, as well as smaller neighbors such as Berkeley and Dellwood that reached 30% black population at some point in the study period (excluding University City), Ferguson was the only municipality that did not experience a 30% or more increase in black population over any one 10-year period.

Further, Ferguson was second only to University City in decline in black population since 2010 (See Figures 10 and 11, p.324). These characteristics coupled with Ferguson’s unique location between border municipalities like Jennings and north county municipalities like Florissant offer intriguing elements for case study. Based on Ferguson’s racial shifts and accompanying elements, it was considered for the study as a transitioning case.

University City offers perhaps the most interesting case of all the municipalities in the set. Its unique geographical proximity to the central city was covered earlier. In addition to that and possibly because of that, the city experienced racial shifts unlike any other case in the group of eligible municipalities and otherwise. By 1970, black residents already comprised 20% of University City’s population—over 13% more than second place Kirkwood (See Figure 12, p.325). Consider Hazelwood was fourth in black population in 1970, and blacks represented only 1.9% of that city’s population.

During the 1970 to 1980 period, University City and Jennings experienced similar growth in black population (See Figures 13-16, p.326-327). By 1990, the municipalities’ racial trajectories intersected at 48% and 48.2%, respectively. Over the next 25 years, University City and Jennings went in completely different directions related to racial
composition (See Figure 17, p.328). It is important to note that University City’s path to 48% black residents by 1990 was a much shorter one than was Jennings’ given University City began at 20% in 1970 while Jennings had only .5% black residents in 1970.

The rapid racial shift in Jennings from 1970 to 1990 was indicative of the racial tipping that was occurring and continued until present day. Jennings was 91% black at study’s end. University City, on the other hand, managed to avoid the racial tipping that claimed many of its smaller neighbors like Pagedale, Wellston, and Pinelawn. University City offered a very interesting case as it represented a long-term stable case having enjoyed black population above 30% for over 35 years without resegregating to all black. Notable, however, was the fact that University City lost over 10% of its black population since its black population peaked at 48.2% in 1990.

It is possible that University City’s loss of nearly a quarter of its overall population since 1970 accounted for some of the black population decline (See Figures 1, p.317 and 11, p. 324). However, closer examination of the data reveals that the largest loss of overall population in any one decade came during the period between 1970 and 1980. What is key here is that this was also the period in which University City experienced its largest gain in black residents (23% increase).

This may indicate that there was some flight of white residents during this period. More critical to this analysis, however, is what circumstances, actions, decisions prevented University City from continuing on a trajectory that ultimately leads to racial resegregation? Based on University City’s racial stabilization for over 35 years of the study period, it was selected for analysis of its municipal governance influence on conditions.
Selected cases, based on racial conditions over time, include Ferguson, Jennings, and University City. An examination of each of their economic conditions over the study period would confirm or invalidate their eligibility for the study. Additionally, Florissant and Hazelwood were deliniated more granularly for final selection based on their economic conditions over time.

**Economic Conditions**

Ferguson’s economic conditions over time presented an interesting trajectory which demonstrated steady increases in per capita income and median household income accompanied by significant increase in the municipality’s poverty rate over the same period. It is important to point out that though there were steady increases in the income strata, the levels were consistently below county-wide averages while the poverty rate exceeded 200% of the county average by 2015 (See Figures 18 and 19, p.329).

This raised important questions regarding the income levels of Ferguson residents prior to the significant increase of black residents over the period from 1980 to 2010 as well as the income levels of black residents moving in to the area over the period. Ferguson appeared to get poorer as it increased in black residents. Consistent with appearing to get poorer, Ferguson’s single parent headed households increased most significantly during the period in which it experienced its highest increase in black population. This suggested that a disportionate number of low-income families were represented in the population of black residents moving to the municipality.

This served as an important indicator to analyze as it was possibly associated with Ferguson’s decisions related to low-income housing placement. Also notable was that while residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher increased steadily during this same time
period, the rate remained well-below the county average (See Figure 20, p.330). Changes in housing conditions offered further evidence of Ferguson’s economic decline being consistent with its growth in black population. Percent of owner occupied homes declined while percent of renter occupied homes increased during the period of greatest black population increase (See Figure 21, p.331). Even more intriguing was the trajectory of percent of vacant housing.

A review of Figure 22 (p.331) demonstrates that during the period between 1980 to 1990, a nine percent increase in vacant housing occurred despite only an 11.5 % increase in black population—roughly the same amount of black population increase the previous decade which experienced only .7 % increase in vacant housing. Yet, during the decade in which Ferguson experienced its highest increase in black residents (1990 to 2000) doubling from 25.1 % to 52.4 %, its vacant housing rate decreased by 5.3 %. This suggest that a clearing out and filling up process occurred. Such a phenomenon is consistent with the increase in low-income housing developments taking place in the county during the period.

Ferguson presented evidence related to its economic conditions to qualify as an exceptional case for this study. It was categorized, for purposes of the study, as a transitioning municipality. While the municipality experienced 200 % of the county average poverty rate, this level was just recently achieved between the 2010 to 2015 time period and did not meet the minimum ten-year threshold for declined. Further, its median household income was 72 % of the county average and its per capita income met the minimum threshold of 50 % of the county average. Ferguson’s selection for investigation of its municipal governance influence on racial and economic conditions was confirmed as a transitioning municipality.
Jennings was a much clearer case than Ferguson as it related to presenting definitive evidence of a municipality that had declined in terms of economic conditions. The city ranked within each economic indicator as a declined case. Jennings’ median household income and per capita income were both demonstrated as being less than 50% of the county average for over 10 years while its poverty rate had been at least two times the county average for 15 years and nearly three times the county average in the last five years of the study period (See Figures 23 and 24, p.332).

A review of Jennings’ demographic shifts provided additional evidence of the suburb’s economic struggles. While some decreases in single parent headed households occurred, the rate remained nearly one in every five. In terms of residents with bachelor’s degree or higher, Jennings had nearly 30% less than the county average at 11.2% (See Figure 25, p.333). Jennings demonstrated similar traits as Ferguson in that it experienced some economic improvements over time but the key difference was Jennings’ increases were much more below county averages.

Several final elements related to Jennings’ economic conditions over time were considered. As demonstrated in Figure 26 (p.334), Jennings’ housing conditions steadily declined in ownership and increased in rentership to the point that there were nearly the same percent of renters as homeowners (47.7% and 52.3%). Jennings’ vacancy rates over time exhibited several significant spikes in vacancies during the 1980 to 1990 period and again during the 2000 to 2010 period after enjoying a 10-year span of modest decrease in the rate. As of 2015, estimates were that nearly one in every five homes in Jennings were vacant (See Figure 27, p.334).
As mentioned earlier, Jennings shares a number of similarities with Ferguson and the two differ significantly in other areas. For instance, a review of median home values shows notable similarities in trends of increase and decrease in value and noteworthy differences in values at each decennial period (See Figures 28 and 29, p.335). These observations offered additional economic evidence that further strengthened the case for both Ferguson and Jennings to be included in the study as a transitioning and a declined municipality.

University City presented an opportunity to investigate a case that demonstrated economic conditions over the entire study period that remained within the stable range of county-wide averages required for this study. Additionally, University City served as an excellent contrast to Jennings. While University City’s population was over two times larger than Jennings’ over the study period, the municipalities shared several commonalities worth noting.

Both cities are positioned on the border of the central city. During the 1970 to 1980 period, the municipalities grew in black population at roughly the same rate. As noted earlier, the municipalities’ percent of black residents were nearly identical in 1990. It was at this point when the trajectories of University City and Jennings went in entirely different directions.

As observed in Figure 30 (p.336), University City experienced some interesting variances in economic conditions including poverty rates that appear to contradict the notion of municipalities becoming poorer as its black residency increases. By 1990, University City had experienced its largest gain in black population and peaked at 48.2% black residents. At this point, the city’s poverty rate was approximately 10% less than the
county average. Further, data indicates that over the next 25 years University City would lose 11.3% of its black population while experiencing a sharp increase in its poverty rate up to just over 100% of the county average.

Much of this increase could be attributed to declines in the overall economy during these periods. However, the phenomena of black population decrease and increase in poverty in the suburb raised important issues associated with University Cities’ economic conditions over time which were well-worth investigating.

Despite University City’s increase in poor residents, its overall economic strata remained strong throughout the period. This again raised a notable element associated with the city’s racial shift and the impact on its economic conditions. Over the period between 1980 to 1990, University City enjoyed its largest jump in per capita income and median household income. Notable was the fact that this period followed the period in which University City experienced its largest growth in black residents. The following decades saw a decrease of over 11% in black population (See Figure 31, p.336).

In analyzing University City’s economic conditions, it became clear that the city faced threats to its economic stability over the years such as acute shifts in rate of poor residents. However, these threats appeared to have been effectively mitigated. Perhaps this successful mitigation was due in part to positive trends that counter the threats. For instance, when University City’s single parent headed households peaked in 1980 (17.2%), though still below the county average, the spike was followed by a decade which saw a peak of 58.3% of residents with a bachelor’s degree or more (See Figure 32, p.337).

A 58% increase in residents with a bachelor’s degree or higher could help explained some of how University City managed to avoid full decline during periods of
significant economic shifts. The city enjoyed a significant proportion of residents who were more likely to be civically involved. However, following this surge in educated constituents, University City experienced a significant decline in residents with degrees over the next 10 years. Although the city rebounded with modest increases over the next 15 years, the rate has not returned to the 1990 level (See Figure 32, p.337).

University City’s residential demographics may offer an even more intriguing quandry than its racial-economic dichotomy. During the periods of largest per capita and median household income increases, University City experienced its largest declines in owner occupied residency rates and its highest rates of renter occupied homes (See Figure 33, p.338). Further, during this period, the city’s median home values rose steadily (See Figure 34, p.339). Most notably, the biggest jump in home values occurred during the period of black population decline accompanied by a sharp increase in vacant housing (See Figure 35, p.339).

It is possible that municipal governance had minimal impact on these trends and that these phenomena were mostly caused by market forces, resident choices, or a combination of the two. However, because University City was such a unique case among this set and among most mature inner suburbs, an examination of the suburb’s municipal government was warranted to better understand decisions and impacts of those choices on economic conditions over time. Therefore, University City was confirmed as a stabilized case for study.

Despite significant difference in total population, Florissant and Hazelwood exhibited very similar traits elsewhere. Selecting the municipality that reflected attributes most relevant to this study required a comparative analysis of the cities’ economic
conditions over time. Florissant and Hazelwood’s economic attributes were viewed in the context of the size differential between the two as certain comparisons were skewed due to the population gap. Therefore, the analysis was not Florissant versus Hazelwood but rather Florissant in relation to the study and Hazelwood in relation to the study.

A review of both municipalities’ economic trends revealed that conditions over time remained within stable ranges of county-wide averages. Neither city experienced any noteworthy spikes unique to trends exhibited at county levels. However, each city recently experienced notable increases in their black population and reflected noticeable changes in median household incomes. Florissant experienced an insignificant increase in its median household income (See Figure 36, p.340). Hazelwood, on the other hand, experienced a 6.3% decrease in median household income in 2015 after its black population more than doubled since 2000 (See Figure 37, p.340).

While Hazelwood’s black population grew at a slightly higher rate than Florissant’s, the growth may not have been significant enough to account for the drop in Hazelwood’s median household income. Florissant’s size and capacity could help explain why the suburb’s median household income remained stable during the period. This highlighted the possibility of size impacting municipalities’ ability to stave off economic threats.

This also shed light on municipalities’ experiences related to their poverty rates during the period in which both cities experienced their highest black migration into the areas. As observed in Figures 38 and 39 (p.341), Florissant remained below the county-wide average poverty rate while Hazelwood exceeded the county-wide average by 2015.
Hazelwood exhibited signs of being acutely impacted economically by moderate to significant shifts in racial composition while Florissant appeared to experience insignificant changes in its economic conditions as a result of racial change in its residency. However, further investigation illuminated that the phenomenon of black population growth influenced some demographic attributes in the municipalities in virtually identical ways and other demographic attributes in the inverse.

In analyzing Florissant and Hazelwood’s rates of single parent headed households and percent of residents with bachelor’s degree or higher, the numbers were nearly indiscernible, particularly during the period of the highest increase in black residents from 2000 to 2015 (See Figures 40 and 41, p.341-342). Despite their parallel trajectories in demographic shifts over the 2000-2015 period, Florissant and Hazelwood exhibited distinctly different residential traits. Contradictory to the results in poverty rate and income levels for the cities, residential figures reflect Hazelwood experiencing a lower level of adverse impact on its residential conditions over the period.

Despite Florissant’s occupied homeownership figures remaining higher and its rentership lower than Hazelwood’s, Hazelwood’s homeownership decreased and rentership increased at slower rates than Florissant’s during the period (See Figures 42 and 43, p.342-343). Further, Hazelwood’s home values (despite some decrease due to the housing crisis of 2008) and vacancy rate were representative of a stable municipality with the capacity to effectively navigate crisis and prevent decline (See Figures 44 and 45, p.343).

This is not to imply that Florissant did not have the capacity to navigate crisis and avoid decline. In fact, Florissant may have had more effective resources needed to thwart
significant threats to its stability. This concept was important for better understanding the varying levels of stability represented in these municipalities. Even though Florissant’s homeownership decreased (See Figure 42, p.342), vacancy rate increased (See Figure 46, p.344), and median home values decreased during the period of black population growth (See Figure 47, p.344), it remains stable with values in stable range of county averages.

Additionally, one must consider how Florissant’s geographical space, number of buildings, and number of residents impact figures. Based on the results of the analyses of Florissant and Hazelwood’s economic conditions over the study period, Hazelwood was selected as the fourth case for study for several key reasons: 1. Hazelwood’s sharp population growth over the study period provided an interesting counterbalance to the other cases that have all declined in population over the same period. And 2. Hazelwood’s size presented additional bonuses for the investigation.

Hazelwood was a municipality large enough to leverage certain resources to effectively address concerns of decline but was small enough to experience similar challenges that have proven too great for several comparably sized cities in the region. Hazelwood experienced positive demographic trends in response to racial and economic shifts thus far. However, will the suburb maintain a balanced turnover rate and remain stable or will a continued increase in black population and lower income residents lead to resegregation and economic decline?

While this study does not seek to answer this question per se, the looming possibility of the newly integrated area eventually tipping provided relevant information to the study. I proceeded with caution and skepticism regarding Hazelwood’s status as a stable municipality thus categorizing the suburb as a transitioning case for analysis purposes.
**Selected Cases**

Ferguson, Hazelwood, Jennings, and University City (Note: Maplewood was added to the study as a comparison case and was not held to the minimum thresholds).

**Data Collection**

Data was collected through primary sources such as official government archival records of council, board, and committee meeting notes; legislation; ordinances; codes; budgets; purchase orders; legal briefs; case files; transcripts; memos; letters; historical documents; US Census including the American Community Survey; National Historical Geographic Information System; St. Louis County; Missouri State auditor; and related materials. Additionally, interviews of 25 stakeholders were conducted.

Secondary sources included books, prior studies, reports, electronic sources, print articles, and multimedia news sources.

**Recruitment**

Interviewees were identified by accessing public records such as historical data, occupancy permits, data bases, neighborhood associations’ membership logs, etc. Some participants referred candidates for interview. Candidates were contacted via letter, phone, and email notification requesting their participation in the study. Participants were provided all the required forms and information prior to interviews commencing.

**Participants**

Individuals considered for participation in this study were limited to those who had experience as a resident, public official, business owner, and other relevant connection to the municipality being studied (e.g. employed in or by municipality, parents home located in municipality, attended school in municipality). The criteria for participant eligibility
included at least five years’ experience in one or more of the aforementioned areas and must be over the age of 35 at the time of interview.

**Interviews**

Interviews were preceded by a short conversation to confirm eligibility and level of knowledge about areas. This process served to better categorize the participant in terms of relevance to the study as well as topic of priority. Conducting this pre-interview conversation allowed for effective and efficient organization of submissions for easier and accurate identification and interpretation during the qualitative data analyses.

Interviews were conducted in person, over the phone, or via video chat. Interviews were audio taped and handwritten notes were taken as well. The method in which the interview was conducted depended primarily on how a participant was categorized and how pertinent the participant’s perspective was to the study. While the selection process may appear rather subjective, a clear rubric outlining various levels of priority was developed based on timing of policies, institutional structure, fiscal conditions, racial composition, and function of suburb (e.g. bedroom, commercial, etc.). This process produced rigorous parameters for minimizing subjectivity.

**Data Preparation**

Data were considered with other relevant elements before performing the examination for final interpretation. Along with integrating various quantitative data, qualitative characteristics collected independent of interviews were categorized and prioritized to be considered during the analyses phase. Certain integrated data were ranked to account for variances in conditions and considered in a weighted context to better glean unique nuances of municipal governance without significant skewing of findings due to
outliers, unusual circumstances, one-time occurrences, and distinct municipal characteristics outside of municipal governance authority.

**Trustworthiness of the Research Process**

There were potential biases, errors, and other subjective possibilities that could skew results of the examination. The research methods accounted for these by acknowledging them as well as leveraging techniques throughout the study to minimize their effects. Scholars suggest that theory, policy, and decisions based on studies that only offer a snapshot in time are problematic because the full picture may not be exposed, and HUD determined that an area is racially impacted when more than a 10% change in black population occurs in a 10-year period, or when an area becomes more than 40% black.\(^{63}\)

With these principles serving as one of the guides to ensuring this study produces reliable findings, an examination of time series data integrating a variation of the elements above was performed. No one point in time was weighted more than another. To better understand the changes occurring in racial composition and economic conditions, phenomena were observed over time and contextualized with other factors before interpreting the changes and identifying factors which influenced those changes.

In isolating factors which were outside the authority of municipal governance, a better understanding of the role municipal governance played was achieved. Once the role of municipal governance was identified, illuminating specificity and uniqueness within each municipality was possible. Identifying and examining differences in municipal policy and other related decisions provided information critical to an effective study of municipal governance success and failure in stabilization efforts.

\(^{63}\) According to HUD 1979.
Data analysis

Selected cases were categorized into three groups: 1. Stabilized, 2. Declined, and 3. Transitioning. Since some suburbs had small segregated pockets of poverty, transitioning refers to municipalities exhibiting significant municipal-level segregation and poverty increases over a shorter period but have yet to meet the declined thresholds. In some areas, poverty remains well-concealed. Exclusive zoning and minimal pedestrian-friendly conveniences which tend to increase resident interaction make it difficult for residents and visitors to observe poverty in certain areas.

Race is more easily identifiable than economic characteristics. Participant submissions related to economic conditions may have been more tainted by the invisibility of poverty in some areas than submissions related to race. Therefore, analyses of economic conditions were performed utilizing more of the quantitative data and archival records than data collected in interviews.

As for measuring race, the literature reveals that scholars depend a great deal on U.S. Census data which helps mitigate the race quandary. Still, some researchers struggle with what level of data to utilize due to potentially misleading findings. Researchers express concerns that areas, often mistaken as integrated at the tract level, are not all that integrated when data are examined at the block level. 64

While this study utilizes Census place data in selecting the cases, more granular nuances associated with the racial composition of municipalities were leveraged. These included specific interview questions about racial dynamics, school enrollment records, and racial composition in neighborhood associations.

64 Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998.
Of important interest to researchers is the transition to predominantly black municipalities from exclusively white ones and the transition from one race to integrated over time. This study, however, dealt primarily with cases in which the municipality shifted from all white to an integrated area and cases in which the municipality appeared to be tipping to all black after experiencing a period of stabilization. However, the study does not assume that municipalities were automatically tipping from all white to all black. A selected case could have included a formerly stabilized area that was experiencing resegregation back to all white.65

This study developed measures and interpretations that offered more insight on what was truly happening as it relates to racial and economic change. For instance, measuring the length of time an area maintains a certain racial composition and economic health was a critical component to the study. The analysis challenged notions of success and failure and offers an expanded understanding of effectiveness and political influence by establishing metrics for better assessing varying degrees of integration and economic implications.

Degrees of integration vary as its measures rang from slightly integrated to moderately and then substantially integrated. This dissertation considered integration as referring to the amount of black-white mix of residents in a given municipality. To measure this mix, numbers were assigned to each level of integration relative to the proportion of blacks in a municipality and how the proportion of blacks in a municipality compared to the proportion of blacks in the county.

65 See Ellen 1999; and Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008.
Economic strength was analyzed over the 45-year period by considering the changes in the data points relevant to economic conditions. These figures were measured against county-wide averages and compared within the set of selected cases in order to ensure that cases were appropriately categorized according to fiscal strength and analysis of financial decisions were performed equitably by adjusting measures to ensure relativity.

The case studies involved a robust set of qualitative data such as interviews, archival records, and media stories. Interpreting the qualitative data involved integrating the quantitative data elements and developing context in which to explain phenomena and tell the story of municipal governance success and failure in stabilization. This process required a great deal of subjectivity. Therefore, the analyses of quantitative data in selecting the five cases as well as the integration of quantitative data into metrics with the qualitative data were extremely important in minimizing subjectivity prior to the examination.

The examination of cases was performed with the utmost reverence to both the quantitative and qualitative data. While eliminating all subjectivity in the study was impossible, producing findings that consider only the data in measurable and replicable contexts was attainable. This dissertation outlined a definitive rubric by which evidence collected was measured and cataloged. This process assisted in strengthening the validity of interpretations of the findings.
Chapter 4. Municipal Governance in St. Louis Inner Suburbs

(Post-Fair Housing Era)

Introduction

By 1970, St. Louis County had become highly urbanized and was approaching a million in population. Approximately 75% of county residents lived in one of 96 incorporated areas. Of the 96 municipalities, 44 had less than 2,000 inhabitants. Efforts to consolidate smaller municipalities had been ongoing since the mid-1960s. Proponents of consolidation believed if these municipalities merged it would help solve many of the problems county residents were experiencing. Meanwhile, some cities sought growth through annexing pockets of unincorporated areas adjacent to their boundaries.66

The City of Ferguson had recently finalized its 15th annexation since incorporating in 1894 and boasted a population in excess of 28,900 residents. Although University City had lost around 10% of its population since 1960, the municipality was still home to 46,309 residents. Study group cities Jennings, Hazelwood, and Maplewood recorded populations of 19,379, 14,082, and 12,785 citizens, respectively. While these five cities were not among the smaller communities under pressure to consolidate, they were experiencing pressure nonetheless.67

Housing stocks, infrastructure, and service delivery systems were antiquated, and demographics were rapidly changing. Populations in the inner ring were now older and becoming increasingly poorer. Revenue sources were inadequate, inflexible, and in some

cases, obsolete. Inflation in the nation’s economy further intensified economic woes as expenses often outpaced revenues. Concurrently, the failure of large urban renewal projects in the City of St. Louis displaced many black families and in part, sparked a significant housing shortage in the central city. Along with recent fair housing enactments, the lack of available dwellings in the city resulted in more black families moving to the suburbs.68

As blacks moved westward, a complex financial crisis not unlike the one that had existed in central cities for decades was emerging in the county’s older inner-ring suburbs. A dramatic decline in revenues threatened significant reduction in public services and spurred the need to continually increase taxes and commercial activity to maintain quality public services. This created a cyclical effect that served to compound economic struggles. Balancing budgets was increasingly difficult, and fiscal tools were limited. Suburban governments were ill-equipped to effectively manage such dynamic changes without some form of alteration in governance structure, financial aid, and resources from state and federal agencies.69

Municipal officials scrambled to address public safety concerns, stem the tide of residents exiting for newer suburbs established further from the central core, and to maintain financial solvency. Left unaddressed, housing discrimination, mass exodus of tax base, and outmoded suburban idealism would result in resegregated neighborhoods of concentrated poverty garnering nominal property tax revenues from deteriorated housing

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68 Claim references multiple archival mentions of the results of urban renewal in St. Louis. For example, Mayor Cervantes, St. Louis City sends communication regarding the housing shortage in the St. Louis Metropolitan area which is included in City of Ferguson archival document from August 25, 1970, page 5.

69 Note: Larger municipalities like University City were not immune to the rapidly changing business markets, demographics, and public demands. The city was feeling the strain from a shrinking and poorer tax base. By 1970, 19 % of residents qualified for some form of public assistance or tax relief. University City had already reached the legal limit of taxation on real property at $1 per $100 assessed valuation and could not increase the rate without a vote of the people.
stocks. Most pre-fair housing policies were no longer legal preventative options. Suburban cities needed to develop creative strategies, enact policies, and support grassroots efforts for meeting physical, fiscal, and social challenges.

**Forms of Government**

At the beginning of the study period (1970), University City and Ferguson were two of only fifteen Missouri municipalities operating under a home rule charter having adopted the provision in 1947 and 1954, respectively. Electing to govern under the council-manager form of government, both municipalities had professionally trained and highly skilled city managers. They were well-versed in county, state, and federal laws and understood how policies at those levels impacted conditions and local governments’ tools for dealing with conditions. Each city had a council comprised of six councilmembers (two for each of the three wards) and one councilmember at-large (mayor) possessing one equal vote in the council.\(^{70}\)

Acting on recommendations from the charter review committee and with voter approval, University City made several revisions to its charter in the last third of the 1970s. Revisions included adjusting term limits from two years to four, establishing a conflict of interest section, and stipulating council members deal with administrative staff only via the city manager. In the late 1980s following a turnover of councilmembers, a rumor emerged that Ferguson’s council was against the city manager form of government. Officials vehemently denied these claims imploring citizens to allow the new council to gain experience. Aside from a few charter moderations and an unfounded rumor, I found

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\(^{70}\) For more on charter cities and other forms of government and years of adoption, see Westbrook 1968, page 45.
nothing to suggest these cities were anything other than satisfied with the council-manager form of government.\textsuperscript{71}

Hazelwood and Maplewood adopted home rule charters and established the council-manager form of government in the 1970s. Residents voted to transform their governmental structure citing the need for a professionally trained manager. They believed it was in their respective city’s best interest to have a city manager responsible for the day-to-day administration of city business. While the municipalities took different paths to enacting the council-manager form of government, both cities struggled to adjust to the change and experienced extreme difficulties early on.\textsuperscript{72}

In 1969, the board of trustees of the Village of Hazelwood adopted its first charter electing to institute the council-manager form of government. The village became a city on April 7, 1970, established six wards with one councilmember per ward and a councilman-at-large (mayor), and initiated a search for a city manager. On September 15, 1970, the City of Hazelwood officials began governing as a council-manager city. The first decade was plagued with uncertainty, internal strife, and a high rate of administrative turnover. According to one official, “With the newness of the charter, confusion arose. The council was used to acting in the capacity of administrators.”

\textsuperscript{71} Ferguson officials believed the rumor began because of difficulties new councilmembers were experiencing adjusting to being in office. They thought residents needed to give the new council a fair chance to gain the experience needed to navigate public office. One councilmember stressed that he supported the city manager form of government and as for inexperience, “By the time any new persons would be elected they would be the inexperienced ones and the current members will have at least one year of experience on the council.” City of Ferguson, MO archival document dated January 10, 1989, page 2.

\textsuperscript{72} According to claims in transcript of City of Hazelwood Mo archives Regular Session: July 26, 1978, page 9 of 13.

\textsuperscript{73} Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: March 11, 1971, page 1-2. City of Hazelwood, MO Charter set forth on page 40, Section 4. ”The Village Trustees shall remain in office until the date the charter is adopted after the election of April 7, 1970. See also: City of Hazelwood, Mo archival documents dated March 4, 1970; April 14, 1970; and September 9, 1970.
Maplewood began its transition, in October 1974, by first establishing the office of city administrator to be appointed by the mayor and approved by a majority of the city council. Although the position required professional training and duties resembled those of a city manager, the city administrator served at the pleasure of the mayor as the chief administrative assistant. As was the case in Bridgeton, Missouri where 17 different managers had served since 1968, the arrangement was not successful in Maplewood. Shortly after the institution of the city administrator citizens began petitioning for the city manager type of government. One petitioner exclaimed, “We’ll have a city manager who is not the council's yes man. He's not anybody's yes man.”

While Maplewood City Council initially rejected requests to transition, appeals gained steam when candidates campaigned on a platform promising the installation of a city manager. In 1976, the city began investigating the charter form of government and on April 4, 1978, voters elected to adopt a home rule charter by a narrow margin of 1,462 to 1,325. The city selected the council-manager government, appointed its first city manager on May 8, 1978, and later divided the city into three wards with two legislators serving each ward. As in the other council-manager cities, the mayor was elected city-wide, had an equal vote in the council, and did not have veto power.

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Maplewood’s early experience with the council-manager government mirrored Hazelwood’s experience. Attempts to remove mayors for alleged violations including administrative interference were accompanied by suspension, resignation, and termination of city managers. Hazelwood had three different city managers in its first five years as a council-manager government and four in the first eight years. Maplewood changed city managers three times in its first three years as a council-manager city. Some observers believed the cities lost several very capable city managers during these times. Nonetheless, each city would eventually settle into their new structure and enjoy competent, long-serving city managers.76

The City of Jennings has never favored the council-manager form of government. Through the years, officials and residents alike have expressed their preference to have more elected officials rather than appointed administrators running the city. As a third class city, Jennings possessed the authority to establish any form of government it wished without voter approval. The municipality chose the mayor-council structure. The only notable call for a city manager in the city’s history registered amid escalating turmoil during the 1990s. Opponents of the idea mobilized, Jennings elected not to transition to the council-manager governing arrangement, and the municipality remains a mayor-council city to this day.77

76 Allegations were that the mayor of Hazelwood violated a charter provision under Article II, Section 10 (Prohibition of Interference). See: City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: March 11, 1971, page 1. See also: archive dated September 15, 1971 for allegations Hazelwood mayor failed to report city mail received. For city manager transitions, see archives Special Session: April 15, 1971; Regular Session: November 5, 1975; Special Session: January 24, 1979; and Regular Session: June 6, 1979. See also, Resolution No. 60, 1981 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives dated April 10, 1981 approved April 28, 1981 in Document No. 448; and 2/8/83 Document 133.

77 For more information about preferences see City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Council Session: December 28, 1992, page 3. For more information on elected offices in Jennings in the 1970s, see City of Jennings, MO archives Regular Session: February 8, 1971, page 5; and Jennings election results in Regular Session April 12, 1971, page 6. Researchers from the University of Missouri conducted a study examining a
Governing under the mayor-council form, the mayor of Jennings was an executive official possessing veto power and the power to appoint boards and commissions. The mayor performed many of the duties executed by city managers and other administrative staff in council-manager cities. For example, Jennings’ mayors have been responsible for planning for the city, directing community development, administering Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs, liability and property insurance programs, and the signing of checks.\(^{78}\)

A 1992 University of Missouri examination concluded, “The value of functions performed by Jennings’ mayor far outweighs the compensation the mayor receives.” Although the prevailing rationale for retaining the mayor-council form in Jennings rests in the notion of more voter influence on administrative forces, it was clear affordability played a role as well. The city saved money by not paying a mayor and a city manager. Did this decision cost the city more long-term? Did the other municipalities better position themselves to deal with stabilization threats by adopting the council-manager form of government?\(^{79}\)

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\(^{78}\) Section 7.250 of the Missouri revised statutes 1969: Mayor to be president of council, the mayor shall be president of the council and shall preside over same but shall not vote except in case of a tie in said council when he shall cast the deciding vote but provided however that he shall have no such power to vote in cases when he is an interested party. He shall have the superintending control of all the officers and affairs of the city and shall take care that the ordinance of the city and the state laws relating to such city are compiled with. See: Jennings Regular Council Session: October 14, 1974, page 4 Document 2887; and Resolution dated December 13, 1993.

\(^{79}\) Jennings record Regular Session 1240: February 10, 1992, page 1; and Document dated August 10, 1992, page 41. Note: In one instance, a Jennings mayor offered to pledge his personal assets to the bank to secure a loan so that the city employees’ payroll could be met. See Jennings documents above.
I examined the municipalities’ forms of government to determine if and how form of government impacted their role in stabilization.

**Impact of Forms of Government on Municipal Governance**

By the end of the study period (2015), Jennings had recently elected the first black mayor in the city’s history. The city was also embroiled in a lawsuit filed against the city by the new mayor. As the city’s contract with the St. Louis County Police Department neared the renewal date, officials were seeking cheaper pricing for police services. City lawmakers were also initiating impeachment procedures against the mayor on grounds of incompetence and creating a hostile work environment. There were allegations of sunshine law violations, misappropriation of funds, and abuse of power.\(^\text{80}\)

The state of Jennings’ municipal government in 2015 bore striking resemblances to the City of Maplewood in the 1970s—highly polarized and politically charged. Politicians doubled as administrators, the city struggled financially, and local government was largely ineffective and entangled in corruption allegations. In fact, one lawmaker in Maplewood was indicted on 18 charges in 1973. Policymaking and administering city business is difficult work. Trying to stabilize a municipality in this type of political environment is much more daunting. However, not only did I find this type of environment in each municipality at some point during the study period, I also observed increased responsiveness to voter preferences and efficiency as negative environments proliferated.\(^\text{81}\)

Campaign violations, corruption, “stealthy” backdoor dealings, and ineffective municipal governance were not reserved for the mayor-council form of government in the

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\(^{80}\) City of Jennings, MO archives Regular Session: June 22, 2015, page 4; Regular Session: August 24, 2015, page 3; Regular Session: November 23, 2015, page 2-3.

\(^{81}\) While there were four lawmakers removed from office, only one was indicted on charges. See City of Maplewood, Missouri archives Year 1973, Documents 253-254; 320-321;
City of Jennings. Intense infighting among lawmakers, polarized politics, divisive rhetoric, and hardline stances were observed at one time or another in each study city during the study period. These activities were exacerbated by recall attempts and multiple political power struggles within local government. Just as Jennings had a strong mayor, each charter city had strong city managers who not only managed the day-to-day but also enjoyed immense power in the policymaking sphere.\footnote{Stealthy,” part of a larger quote referencing the speaker’s description of management style in City of University City, MO archive Regular Meeting: October 10, 2005, page 13.}

Interviewee U4 recalled about one city manager, “He gradually came to feel that it was his city. He kind of just made decisions and the city council would rubber stamp it.” The goal for the new council-manager cities was to separate politics from the administration. However, citizens often complained their city manager behaved “like a dictator.” Atmospheres were especially toxic when incoming legislators, voted in as pseudo referendums, challenged veteran officials and established norms. Disagreements regarding delineation of legislative and administrative duties often resulted in what one former local lawmaker framed, “an inertia model for cooperation in an era of individualism.”\footnote{Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents. Also, from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official. “There was a council that was not, in my opinion, protecting its initiative in the policy-making of the city. We had a city manager at that time who, in my opinion was too active. Now with the current administration, he's trying to take it back to his time.” Excerpt of Quote taken from City of University City transcript of archive Council Retreat: October 31, 2006, page 1-4. Excerpt of quote from transcript of City of Hazelwood, Mo Public Hearing dated July 26, 1978, page 9 of 13. For more information regarding the changing political landscape and divide see archives: Regular Session: March 6, 2006, page1; and Council Study Session: August 28, 2006, page 1.}

Interviewee U2 thought it pertinent to point out, “In a council-manager city, the council decides the budget and a professional administrator runs the city.” In doing so, some city managers’ decisions led to votes of no confidence for poor performance, disturbing results from financial audits initiated by citizen petitions, employment
discrimination lawsuits, and alleged violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. Despite the presence of professional administrations, council-manager cities faced “potentially crippling financial obligations”\(^\text{84}\)

There is broad agreement among political science scholars that there are significant benefits to municipalities having a professional administrator. According to Interviewee J4:

“Having a council-manager form of government with a professional city manager plugs the policymaking apparatus into a tradition of looking for best practices. You have a much broader sweep of alternatives that can be presented to elected officials for making a determination about policy.”

Like pre-charter Hazelwood and Maplewood, Jennings lacked the expertise of a professional city manager, and by the end of the study period, Jennings had long been resegregated and economically stressed.\(^\text{85}\)

Considering these observations, one may deduce that cities like pre-charter Maplewood and Jennings struggled in large part because they were not council-manager municipalities, and one rebounded in large part because it became one. However, the

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\(^{84}\) Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official. It is important to note that despite intense division and diminished federal and state supports, the council-manager cities sustained high service levels. See: City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session Public Hearing dated May 5, 1971; September 1, 1976, page 7-8 of 11; City of University City Council meeting transcript of Regular Session 1408: May 5, 1986, page 1; City of University City public hearing transcript of archive Session 1915: March 29, 2004, page 13; City of University transcript of archive Session 1934: September 20, 2004. Excerpt of quote from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official. Also, a poll of several thousand city residents showed 55.4% were in favor of a state audit of city finances, 17.6% opposed the audit, and 27% were undecided. Poll numbers listed in City of University City archive Regular Session: December 7, 2009. See also, Humphreys v. City of University City, et al. Case information outlined in City of University City archive Regular Council Meeting October 26, 2009, page 13. For example, University City’s insurance deductible was as high as $150,000 as a result of so many lawsuits levied against the city. According to a University City official, the city was no longer in the insurance pool because “we had been sued so often.” Note: Deductibles for cities like University City normally range between $10,000 to $15,000.

\(^{85}\) Excerpt of quote from Interview J4: 07/26/2019. White / Male / Educator / Consultant / Ex-Outreach Director.
evidence does not support such claims. It is clear their institutional structures, operational mechanisms, and subsequent conditions differed from the council-manager municipalities.

Nevertheless, I found that the forms of government did little to influence the quality of municipal governances’ policy decisions. In fact, I found Jennings’ policy decisions—particularly pre-2000s were slightly superior to Ferguson’s in terms of quality (number of times best practice was applied to in-common destabilizers). Best practice refers to policies and practices which mitigated negative effects of destabilizing activities. Examples of best practice include open housing/antidiscrimination policies, zoning which dispersed low income rentals, and establishment of a land clearance authority or housing corporation.

Jennings’ mayor-council government did not preclude the city from proactively intervening, supporting grassroots stabilization efforts, and making good policy and administrative decisions. Equally, the presence of a city manager did not exclude Ferguson from failing to do so. As a former mayor of Hazelwood said:

"No government is better than the people who run it. It makes no difference what the form may be so long as the administrators are honest and capable."86

Faced with the Jennings/Ferguson form of government dilemma, I examine other distinguishing characteristics which may better account for discrepancies in quality of policies. I posed the question, did officials’ characteristics and the varying composition of individuals in municipal government determine the quality of policy decisions? I examined municipal officials’ characteristics and the composition of governments to better determine if and how these attributes impact municipal governances’ role in stabilization.

86 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Session: April 22, 1981.
Characteristics and Composition of Municipal Governance

Many transitions occurred in the 1970s, but few were more significant than the changes in characteristics and composition of municipal governments. Some cities tried to improve conditions by professionalizing. They were new to the council-manager form and struggled adjusting to the transition. Others witnessed longtime serving officials and established professionals cycle out. Some were replaced with individuals who upheld previous policies and practices. Others were replaced with reformers. Cities created new positions and redefined roles for existing ones. Regardless of the shifts and alterations in municipal governance, municipalities experienced perpetual crisis in the 1970s.87

Policymakers and administrators diligently attempted to serve as stabilizing influences in their respective cities. They generally tried to engage and educate citizens and work with various groups for their city’s betterment. Municipal leaderships consisted of talented, knowledgeable decisionmakers possessing unique specializations. They held firm commitment to upholding the constitution as public officials, took pride in their public service, and believed by governing according to the letter of the law, “Every citizen was amply protected.”88

87 See City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 202; City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 202; City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 209; and City of Maplewood archives September 28, 1979 Document number 273 -274. City of Ferguson, MO archive dated March 26, 1974 page 7. In University City, by mid-year 1975, City Manager announced on May 12, 1975 he accepted the city manager position in Eugene, Oregon. His departure signaled a substantial changing of the guard. Henry had served as city manager since 1958. City of University City archive Regular Session 1105: June 16, 1975, page 28; For more about resignations and decisions not to run for reelection see the following: City of University City archives: Session 1172: October 17th, 1977, page 2; Session 1176: December 12, 1977, page 15; and Session 1187: May 22, 1978, page 2. Also, see Charter revisions of 1975. The term councilmember replaced councilman. Councilman at-large was now referred to as mayor. For more on the city’s charter revisions of 1975 refer to City of University City archive Session 1120: December 15, 1975, page 5. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated April 18, 1979.
88 Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City archive Regular Session 1069: March 18, 1974, page 10.
However, civility and collaboration were difficult to achieve during this period, especially between parties with diverging perspectives on how to approach changes in racial composition and economic conditions. Interviewee U5 described the environment this way:

“Before, there were always people striving to get to the middle to make decisions, understanding that compromise was important for peace and stability. But you didn't see that anymore in city government.”

Lines were clearly drawn. Officials stood firm on either side and did not mince words regarding alliances.  

While each municipality’s municipal governance consisted of a majority of officials in favor of progressive racial integration policies and practices, opponents of such measures were present and vocal in each case. Opposing integration, albeit a view held by a minority of officials in the study group, was widely accepted, and in some situations expected. To get a better sense of the atmosphere during this period, observe the language used by a Ferguson lawmaker to refer to Kinloch residents and councilmates in the following excerpts of a 1970 public hearing transcript:

“We have people here in the city saying that we have to play it [really] careful, it’s touchy. I think we should call a spade a spade, a black a black, and not be afraid to face up to these people and tell them we don’t want their little pickaninnies coming over and throwing rocks at our kids…. Call a coon a coon and nigger a nigger. If you are [diplomatic] about it they walk right over you.”

“I sometimes get disgusted by some of the outrageous antics of the council majority…. In these times when it sometimes seems as though the limp wristed, weak wheel types are [predominant] in so many areas, it has been a pleasure for me

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89 Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / Resident / Ex-State Government Official. Interviewee says, “I would go to a meeting and I wouldn’t care if it was about whether or not we should put a tag on a dog at the dog park; half the people were yes, and half the people were no. Nobody was in the middle.”
to serve on the council with a real man’s man…who is not afraid to espouse the proper…position no matter how politically unpopular.\textsuperscript{90}

Despite the fact that some fellow city officials held racist convictions, municipal leaders employed collegial approaches in attempts to reach consensus. They quickly became adept at navigating rough political, economic, and social terrains consistently seeking to learn new strategies and techniques. They participated in professional development groups and held memberships in local, state, and national consortia designed to help build municipal capacity for combating threats to stability. Council majorities often responded to issues in concert—particularly in matters related to justice. However, decisions did not always align with their expressed views. In these instances, minority rule prevailed.\textsuperscript{91}

For cities like Hazelwood, where civic engagement was relatively low, and Maplewood, where no threat of resegregation ever emerged, municipal leadership enjoyed more liberty to enact policy and practices consistent with the preferences of the council majority and administrative recommendations. These municipalities realized tremendous progress and accomplishments. Hazelwood grew from a small village occupying the 15\textsuperscript{th} position in 1970 to registering as the fifth largest municipality in St. Louis County by 2002.


\textsuperscript{91} When the Missouri Municipal League decided to endorse a Missouri, Peace Officers Association-supported mandatory sentencing bill, University City Council unanimously opposed the league’s position. They sympathized with the association’s objectives but thought it inappropriate for the league to take a position on the matter. Officials argued the function of imposing criminal sentences should be left to the judiciary and not enacted into law by the Missouri General Assembly. For more information regarding the council’s position on the bill refer to archive Regular Session 1061: November 26, 1973, page 6-7. See also, See University City, MO archive Session 1120: December 15, 1975, page 2.
As far as revitalizations are concerned, Maplewood’s renaissance serves as a model that cities continue attempting to replicate.\footnote{Note: As late as 1980, Maplewood was still working on improving its fair housing policies. See, City of Maplewood, MO archives Year 1980, Document No. 346. Bill No. 4141: an ordinance authorizing and directing the mayor of Maplewood to enter into a contract with St. Louis County for assistance and services to further the policies of the fair housing code of the City of Maplewood passed unanimously; City of Maplewood, archives March 25, 1980, Document 350. Bill number 4141 was approved on March 25, 1980 as Ordinance Number 4035 filed in Document No. 350. According to City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated November 4, 1970; City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated April 21, 1971, page 10. City of Hazelwood, Mo archives dated September 1, 1976; and November 20, 2002. City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 3, 1983, Document 221; City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 23, 1983 Document number 224; City of Maplewood Missouri archives May 8, 1984, Document number 289; City of Maplewood, Missouri archives August 23, 1983.}

While increased flexibility in municipal governance does not explain their success, it did increase the probability of decisionmakers voting according to their preferences—which usually aligned with best practice. In the civically engaged cities experiencing change in racial composition, policymakers did not enjoy the same freedoms. Voting according to best practice sometimes meant going against an overwhelming majority of constituents. Against their better judgement lawmakers could choose to honor the requests of those who put them in office and preserve their seat, or they could choose to vote for best practice and risk losing it.

In chapter 5, I examine policy decisions and contextualize them in their respective citizen environment to better understand if and how citizen environment impacted policy decisions, how policy decisions impacted municipal stabilization, and how this relationship influenced municipal governance’s role in stabilization.
Chapter 5. Housing Policy

Introduction

For decades, suburban governing bodies enjoyed immunity from having to deal with the types of racial and spatial challenges emerging in the suburbs in the 1960s, 1970s, and in to the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, most were ill-equipped to effectively do so. Their policies were designed and enacted in the pre-fair housing era. In many suburban communities, archaic restrictive deed covenants were still in use and various other discriminatory laws still stained the pages of city code books. With the advent of fair housing laws, suburbs began to face threats traditionally reserved for central cities.

With diverse housing options and a county-wide apartment boom occurring, cities like this study’s five municipalities could accommodate homebuyers and renters of all races and economic stations. This status rendered these cities vulnerable to panic selling, white flight, and loss of tax base. When black suburbanization began in the early 1960s, it was primarily working-class, middle-class, and upper middle-class individuals and families in search of a safe, pleasant, and affordable community in which to settle. Black home seekers desired good schools, pedestrian friendly public spaces, quality public services, and a mix of amenities.

As black migrants from St. Louis City settled in the various municipalities, a disturbing trend emerged. Black families were relocating from isolated concentrations in the central city to rapidly transforming areas in the suburbs. They settled in resegregating neighborhoods comprised of primarily smaller, more affordable post-WWII homes and multifamily dwellings. Eventually, many of these communities mirrored the segregated neighborhoods of St. Louis city. Differences in white/black median household incomes and
neighborhood preferences could explain only a modest percentage of racial disparities in the housing market.\textsuperscript{93}

Municipalities’ housing stock and income of home seekers could not account for the level of resegregation occurring in these neighborhoods. Inner suburbs were resegregating in large part because of housing discrimination. Real estate agents would not show black families homes in white neighborhoods and discouraged white families from moving into areas where blacks were present. Regardless of economic status blacks were steered towards neighborhoods where blacks lived (traditionally offering low-value housing at inflated prices) and white families were steered away from those areas. The practice of racial steering was emblematic of the federal government’s real estate policies.

The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also engaged in housing discrimination. HUD’s mortgage insurance program administered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) refused to insure loans for white families attempting to buy homes in and around black residential areas. HUD properties repossessed through foreclosure and tax sales were often left vacant and in need of substantial repairs. Some were vandalized and left in such disrepair they had to be condemned and demolished.\textsuperscript{94}

The real estate industry and federal housing administrators engaged in housing discrimination and other activities which were detrimental to communities. Their actions

\textsuperscript{93} According to reviews of 1970-2010 US Census data and 1970-2015 demographical indicators from each study city.
\textsuperscript{94} Example of discriminatory housing practices being employed during a time following the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act. For more details about this example see: City of University archives Regular Council Meeting Session 1104: June 9, 1975, page 15. In one instance, a white family moved from Kansas City and purchased a University City business. They placed $2,500 down on a three-bedroom home in the Third Ward but were denied an FHA loan. The denial letter cited “instability” as the reason the agency did not approve the loan. The family involved was a family of means. It was widely known that the FHA would have authorized the same house for a minority family who needed counseling to cope with the payments.
helped accelerate and intensify resegregation and neighborhood blight and made stabilizing these areas much harder for local governments and citizens. When HUD amended its public housing program, proponents pointed to the new format as an effective way to avoid the decline experienced during the failed public housing projects model.

The new system involved HUD transitioning from developing and managing public housing to paying a share of low-income renters’ rent on the open market through Section 8 subsidized housing. Local officials wrestled with the question of proportionality of Section 8 housing within their municipal borders. Most municipalities discouraged developments and aimed to restrict the total amount of rental property by setting maximum limits. However, as suburban populations aged and transitioned income levels, notable numbers of residents could no longer maintain their larger homes. Thus, certain areas allowed for higher percentages of subsidized housing.

As black suburbanization progressed, migration became more a result of displacement rather than choice. North St. Louis County became inundated with low-income black residents uprooted from failed housing projects in the central city. Some communities possessed the resources, capacity, preparedness, and willingness to mitigate negative reactions to integration thus minimizing their destabilizing effects. Although some others were not as resource rich or equipped to effectively combat resegregation and economic decline, each possessed the capability to implement policies designed to help stabilize their city.

Regardless of policy starting point, each of the study’s municipal council demonstrated attention to detail, performed careful analysis of issues, and enlisted the assistance of independent experts. Officials navigated rapidly evolving environments
which included significant demographic shifts, market fluctuations, and funding modifications. Circumstances required amending allowances for multifamily developments, affordable housing, and subsidies. Through various policy actions related to antidiscrimination, appropriations, building codes, zoning, and land reutilization local governments enacted ordinances based on their respective goals.  

Policy decisions were distinguished by each respective municipality’s policymaking processes; level of citizen civic engagement, citizens’ preferences, and legislators’ responses to citizen engagement and preferences; types of policies enacted; timing of policy actions; and other ancillary factors such as varying instructions for how administrative forces were to implement and execute policies and monitor policy impacts. Municipal governance’s role in municipal-level stabilization started with open housing / antidiscrimination, housing, and land use decisions, indecisions, and nondecisions.

**Open Housing / Antidiscrimination**

While no singular variable exists to explain why black residents in Maplewood represented only .2% of the city’s population at the start of the study period, research allows us to conclude racism played a part. Like 18 other counties in Missouri, blacks were

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95 Residents accused city servicers of treating apartment complexes as rows of single-family homes and allowing multiple families to occupy single-family units. Municipal governments set out to address the issue of overcrowding by instituting new policies and regulations which dictated who could live together in a single housing unit. Policies aimed to alleviate overcrowding in neighborhoods and schools ignited a fierce debate over the definition of family. Many residents felt defining family in occupancy policy was an outrageous infringement on privacy. Other opponents of the policies felt ulterior motives may be behind the restrictions. Detractors argued the laws were discriminatory because they targeted low-income families, served to only protect wealthier residents and property values, and were based on fear of opening the gates to poor blacks. Groups like the League of Women Voters spoke out against the policies. They along with others worked to increase the supply of low and moderate-income housing by getting zoning laws changed to allow for shared housing. Shared housing was critical as older adults and other groups living on limited incomes represented a significant proportion of residents.

96 I use the term “Positive” to denote municipal influence that helped municipality stabilize. Conversely, negative influence would denote inaction or actions which influenced the expansion of resegregation in the community.
not yet welcome to reside in most areas of St. Louis County in 1970. One-half of one percent of Jennings’ residents were black, less than one percent in Ferguson, and just under two percent in Hazelwood. University City’s black residents accounted for 20 % of that municipality’s total population. The city had experienced remarkable growth in black residency over a short period of time.97

Just 10 years earlier, only 88 of University City’s 51,000 residents were black. Of the city’s 260 employees, only 35 were black and they held only unskilled jobs in the sanitation department. Much of post-1970 neighborhood change and racial integration literature praise University City as a pioneer of open housing in the 1960s and rightfully so. However, one should be careful not to romanticize the University City experience as a racially harmonious utopia borne of exceptionalism, altruism, and passivity. As late as 1959, University City seemed just as unlikely to be a leader in the protection and promotion of blacks’ civil rights as the other municipalities in the study.98

Racial discrimination was not only prevalent in the city, it was still officially sanctioned by law in many arenas. A University City ordinance adopted in 1938 requiring black males working as city porters and janitors to wear badges bearing their photographs and fingerprints was still in use. And a survey conducted by the League of Women Voters found that of 45 establishments serving food and drink more than half did not serve blacks. When black families began migrating to the area in 1962, racist fears of irresponsible

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97 According to US Census data; and demographical indicators taken from each city’s archives as of 2015.
98 Population figures according to the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS). Also referenced in Harris 1981, p.156; and Lubeck 1978, p.73 along with Missouri counties’ persistence of discriminatory views of blacks and city employment figures.
tenants, absentee landlords, declining property values, and proliferation of crime abounded.  

The in-migration of black families prompted an exodus of white residents and a dramatic reduction in the growth of new white residents. Interviewee U5 recalls:

“I was the second African American in the neighborhood in 1967. As time went by though, I started seeing other African Americans move in around me. Before long it was a little over 50% African American. It stayed like that for a while, and it was stable.”

University City’s success in stabilizing was in large part the result of intelligent, proactive, and strategic action by a cooperative collection of municipal officials and citizen advocates. Notwithstanding, policy decisions were the critical component supporting and empowering the actors to effectively navigate amenable as well as adversarial environments.

Throughout the 1960s, instead of denying the inevitable (a substantial increase of blacks residing within their municipal borders) or engaging in futile prevention attempts, University City lawmakers went about the work of instituting progressive policies aimed at preventing resegregation. They enacted fair housing ordinances, established anti-blockbusting policies prohibiting real estate agents from steering and soliciting sales, banned the use of “for sale” signs, and implemented an occupancy permit system. University City’s municipal governance was not necessarily prepared for the situation, but


100 Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 52-year Resident / Ex-State Government Official.
it acted swiftly. Officials maximized available policy tools, innovated, educated, and advocated new policy tools.\textsuperscript{101}

By 1970, University City looked strikingly different than the other four municipalities. It was a multi-ethnic, multi-racial city comprised of residents of various nationalities and religious affiliations with a wide range of educational backgrounds. As the community’s ethnic character broadened, it retained its upper-middle-class standing.

Blacks moving into the municipality matched whites in education and income levels. Data indicates 73% of the work force were employed in white collar jobs and 61.5% of houses were owner-occupied. Perceptions of a crisis that had gripped the city several years earlier soon dissipated.\textsuperscript{102}

Although University City’s forward thinking put them ahead of the integration curve during the turbulent 1960s, the phenomenon still brought with it many social challenges amid growing economic strife and inter-suburban and exurban competition. Except for episodic examples, the study’s remaining cities were not experiencing such destabilizing activities. Migration of St. Louis blacks had not yet reached their municipal boundaries. Via direct communication, consortia updates, and other avenues, local government leaders in other cities remained abreast of the events happening in University City. They were well-aware the municipality was combating resegregation of its neighborhoods and was no longer an enclave of white exclusivity.

University City’s experience granted other municipalities not only the benefit of additional time to prepare, but also demonstrable evidence of effects of certain policy

\textsuperscript{101} See City of University City, MO Fair Housing Information at ucitymo.org/203/Fair-Housing-Information; Harris 1981, p.160.
\textsuperscript{102} Figures taken from Harris 1981, p.163.
actions. Among the study group city councils, none leveraged these benefits more effectively than Hazelwood City Council. Additionally, no other city’s local lawmakers held as many meetings and reviewed the same items more repetitiously before deciding an action than Hazelwood’s.

The City of Hazelwood held a minimum of four meetings per month—one each Wednesday and held additional meetings as needed. Councilmembers were aggressively involved often performing duties executed by city managers in other cities. Only months into operating as a charter city, Hazelwood City Council established itself as a highly productive, progressive policymaking body.103

In July 1972, Hazelwood requested a copy of the City of Berkeley’s anti-steering/anti-blockbusting ordinance to study. Despite the most recent census indicating the municipality was home to only 270 black people out of a total population of over 14,000 residents, Hazelwood City Council initiated a stabilizing policy implementation program. On August 7, 1974, the city council unanimously passed Bill No. 1101 strengthening the prohibition of housing discrimination. Filed as Ordinance No. 1071-74, the legislation outlawed the practices of steering and solicitation. Less than a year later, on June 18, 1975, the city adopted Ordinance No. 1118 -75 banning real estate signs.104

103 City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated February 7, 1979.
104 City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated July 19, 1972; Special Session dated July 13, 1972; Regular Session August 7, 1974: An ordinance amending the municipal code of the City of Hazelwood, Missouri, by amending Chapter 7, Buildings, buy the adoption of Article IV, Sections 7.13 and 7.14 relating to the regulations of solicitation of the sale, rental, leasing, or otherwise disposing of or moving away from such dwellings, and discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. To prohibit interference with the peace of owners and occupants of such dwellings by the use of certain tactics to encourage such owners or occupants to sell or move from such desires to make available to any person, regardless of race. For real estate ban see City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated June 18, 1975: Bill 1144 was adopted as ordinance number 1118-75 by vote of 4 to 2 on June 18, 1975; and Special Session dated August 25, 1975.
Hazelwood’s enactment of these legislations was in no way unprecedented. As referenced earlier, University City and Berkeley had similar ordinances on the books and larger central cities had leveraged the policy tools in various forms years earlier. Nevertheless, Hazelwood’s actions were noteworthy as they occurred long before any notable signs of resegregation or threats materialized. In fact, Hazelwood had ten fewer real estate listings over the year leading up to enacting the real estate sign ban than it had two years prior.105

Hazelwood officials’ position on proactive antidiscrimination, blockbusting, and steering policies was best demonstrated in the following two statements made by two different councilmembers: “The appearance of two or three for sale signs in an area has a psychological effect and could create a problem.” And, “Since we do not have this problem as yet, this would help prevent its developing.” Racial integration literature lists early intervention as a critical requirement in stabilizing municipalities. Like University City before them, Hazelwood acted early.106

By the year 2000, Hazelwood’s black population had grown to 16% from just under two percent 30 years earlier. Consider also, Hazelwood’s total population nearly doubled during the 30-year period growing from 14,082 to 26,206. Contrast that with Ferguson where total population had declined 23% but black residency went from less than one

105 According to statistics referenced in City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated June 18, 1975. The City of St. Louis system only allowed real estate signs in residential areas if the petitioner paid a fee of $5.00 and appeared before the Human Relations Commission to seek a variance to permit such a sign. The city did not grant many permits. Opponents of the ban including representatives of the Real Estate Board of Metropolitan St. Louis suggested alternatives which were in use in various locales along the east coast (e.g. Baltimore County). They argued they had been effective without being as restrictive as the Hazelwood ban. Signs may be used, but if ten voters petition to have certain signs removed, the authorities must hold a public hearing to decide if they should be removed. They then pass a resolution to ban signs in that area. This process took a minimum of 90 days. The procedure was unresponsive to immediate problems.

106 Excerpts of quotes taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated May 21, 1975.
percent in 1970 to accounting for over 52% of the municipality’s population by 2000. Racial composition and population were not the only discernable differences between the two cities. Ferguson not only gained a disproportionate number of new black residents, they gained a disproportionate share of poor black residents.¹⁰⁷

Consider that by the time Ferguson instituted its landlord initiative in 2005, the problem the city hoped to solve already had an over 35-year head start. Of the 385 tenant eviction recommendations made through Ferguson’s landlord initiative between January 2008 and June 2010, 46% emanated from six apartment complexes on the city’s eastside. Nearly half of all emergency and police calls made in Ferguson in 2010 were attributed to these six apartment complexes and of those, more than 2/3 originated in two apartment complexes: Canfield (42) and Northwinds (56). Contrast this with the five calls made from the six-building Arbor Village Courts apartment complex on the city’s westside and an obvious distinction in conditions begins to emerge.¹⁰⁸

Erected in the late 1960s, a cluster of apartment complexes on the eastside of Ferguson adorned an area flanked by small homes, neighboring Jennings, and a busy thoroughfare. For the city of nearly 30,000 residents, 28% renters, and 84% post-WWII

¹⁰⁸ City of Ferguson, MO archives entitled Extended 2010 Council Work Session Transcript, pages 86, 89, 91. Ferguson officials held a council work session to discuss the problems emanating from the city’s eastside apartment complexes. Officials believed the complexes were becoming a public safety issue. Despite 40 years of citizen complaints and concerns, officials were asking “What’s going on there?” And did not know “what else we’re going to do from the council standpoint.” They were unsure if the problem was their concern. The mayor expressed this, “I almost feel like if that’s a concern of ours, we should probably just go ahead and instruct our staff now to start brainstorming or coming up with a solution to bring something to us.” Officials identified two major conflicts: 1. Need for a better screening process of acceptable tenants. 2. Properties’ ownership needs to provide a safe environment by enhancing their security with private security on location, gated communities, etc. City of Ferguson, MO archives entitled Extended 2010 Public Hearing Transcript, pages 86, 89, 91.
dwellings, developments like the Canfield and Village apartments went largely unnoticed—except by area homeowners. Longstanding problems had existed in the area prior to the advent of the apartments.\textsuperscript{109}

With no traffic light system at the intersection of West Florissant and Canfield, no speed limit signs, and no speedbumps on the access road, heavy traffic and speeders made negotiating the area extremely dangerous for pedestrians. Insufficient city services and government apathy left this section of Ferguson’s Third Ward feeling ignored. The apartment complexes added overflowing trash dumpsters and constant drainage backups intensifying local frustrations. Supplicating for action from the city, one civicly engaged citizen asked, “What can be done for the people living on Canfield?”\textsuperscript{110}

The city attributed its inaction to having no authority in these matters. West Florissant was a state road, apartment complexes were private properties responsible for providing refuse services, and MSD held authority over the sewer system. Before long homeowners who had resided on streets like Canfield, Glen Owen, Ellison, and Clarion for decades began putting their homes up for sale. When this process began, Ferguson was still overwhelmingly white. There were only 265 black citizens in the entire city, and the majority of racial hostility focused on the black municipality to the west—Kinloch.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid}


\textsuperscript{111} Note: University City took a decidedly different approach. Even though similar traffic light installations were needed in their city and were beyond their scope of authority, University City worked with the Missouri State Highway Department to get them installed. University City officials implemented requirements for private complexes to secure refuse services and even negotiated contracts to provide the
It had only been months since the municipality removed barricades erected to prevent Kinloch resident’s entry into Ferguson. While the city’s racist animus focused on preserving and protecting the westside of Ferguson from a Kinloch invasion, demographics on the city’s eastside were transforming. The city’s policies, however, were not. Within a decade, Ferguson’s total population declined 14.4 %, black population increased to 13.6 %, and Jennings had erected a barricade quarantining Ferguson’s eastside residents from its western borders. By 2010, the transformation was complete, Ferguson was 67.4 % black, and its eastside was home to a resegregated area comprised of multifamily complexes, low-cost single-family rentals, and concentrated poverty.¹¹²

During the fall of 1996, the Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Opportunity Council (EHOC) conducted an audit of real estate firms serving Ferguson. Utilizing tests designed to detect disparate treatment and noncompliance with fair housing laws, the agency found firms treated minorities different. According to a Ferguson resolution, “Violators may be required to attend housing training provided by EHOC.” By the time the City of Ferguson contracted EHOC to investigate real estate practices, 35 years had

¹¹² According to Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. http://doi.org/10.18128/D050.V11.0. Ferguson officials finally sought to address the West Florissant/Canfield intersection problem by calling for a bond issue election for a traffic signal in 1977. See bond issue resolution and Jennings barricade issue in City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: March 8, 1977, page 4; Ferguson Regular Session: March 22, 1977, pages 1 and 4. See also, Jennings Regular Session: April 11, 1977, page 1, Document No. 3082: Public hearing to decide if a barricade should be erected on Clarion Dr. and Ellison Dr. at the boundary line separating the City of Jennings and the City of Ferguson. A unanimous decision that the streets could be blocked with no detrimental effects. Jennings argued there were adequate fire plugs and alternate automobile routes available to the residents of Ferguson. Ferguson citizens did not want the barricade and stated they believed the only reason people wanted the barricade was racial. Jennings Regular Session: February 28, 1977 document 3069; Jennings Regular Session: April 11, 1977, page 4, Document 3087; Jennings council approved the barricade. See, Bill No. 1201: An ordinance authorizing the Jennings street department to barricade Ellison drive at the boundary line separating the City of Jennings and the City of Ferguson passed unanimously and approved as ordinance No. 1183. Jennings Regular Session: April 25, 1977, page 1, Document No. 3089.
elapsed since the first black families began migrating west to settle in University City, black residents had represented roughly 15% of Ferguson residents for nearly 20 years, and had represented a quarter of the total population for a decade.¹¹³

For blacks moving into Ferguson during the black suburbanization period, they were entering a city with a decidedly different policy agenda than University City and Hazelwood. Consider that by 1995, Ferguson still had not accepted Oak Park, IL racial integration group’s offer to help initiate programs, and the city had not implemented any of the group’s recommendations. During a council work session, officials made their positions on the Oak Park matter clear through the following statements:

“I see it as governmental steering. I don’t think that is an appropriate governmental activity. I have been opposed to a report listing occupancy turnover and how many of the different races have moved into Ferguson. There are too many other important things for the council to do like economics and streets.”

“I’m not totally against the Oak Park programs. There are some good things behind it, but I don’t think most of it would work for us.”

A former Ferguson councilmember attending the council work session said, “Ninety-nine percent of comments involved racial issues. I believe this is one more attempt to enforce racial integration.”¹¹⁴

Long before the word Ferguson became synonymous with suburban transgressions, the seeds of the city’s principal challenge were sown. Divided policy preferences, lack of political will among a slim council majority, and disproportionate policy power enjoyed by a slim citizen majority led to a deficit in best practice policies which plagued the city throughout the study. For decades, community members supporting integration efforts in Ferguson had been overshadowed by those opposing such measures.

¹¹³ Excerpt of Resolution passed and approved by the city council of the City of Ferguson, MO archive filed January 14, 1997.
¹¹⁴ Excerpts of quotes taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Council Work Session included in Regular Session dated January 10, 1995, page 3-4.
Opponents felt support of racial integration maintenance programs should, “Forget about Oak Park.” According to one resident, “If people want to live that way, they can move to Oak Park.” In expressing their disapproval of policies they believed would transform their municipality in an “undesirable fashion,” Ferguson’s slim citizen majority often referred to places like Hazelwood and University City as examples.115

Ferguson has a longstanding reputation as a city that did not desire to integrate. Such an assessment is demonstrably accurate. However, it is important not to rely solely on subsequent policy action or inaction without unpacking contextual nuances to better identify motivating factors behind policy action and inaction.

When the mayor of Ferguson received a letter from the chairman of the Real Estate Board of Metropolitan St. Louis, in September 1970, Ferguson’s population of 28,915 included only 265 blacks, and a Ferguson homeowner “could refuse to sell to someone because of race, color, or creed and he would not be in violation of city code.” The purpose of the letter was to inform the mayor that the board was “becoming increasingly alarmed at reports of block-busting.” In response to the letter, Ferguson’s mayor introduced Bill No. 445: an ordinance enacting Chapter 52 “Fair Housing Code.” A Ferguson official not aligned with the council majority’s philosophies objected. According to the lawmaker, “A fair housing code in this city will only bring on problems.”116

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Essentially, the bill was redundant as federal law already prohibited discrimination in the sale and rental of properties based on race. Nevertheless, Ferguson’s discussion on the matter offers an illuminating glimpse into the complexities involved in their policymaking process. Despite having the 4 to 3 majority required to pass the bill, proponents continued attempting to convince those in the minority to support the legislation. They pointed out that there had been no trouble with the city’s public accommodation bill, claimed the bill did not apply to individual property owners, and argued the bill could improve the city’s position in dealing with federal agencies. One official tried to elicit support by framing the issue as a matter of morality exclaiming, “A vote against this bill would be a vote in favor of discrimination.”

The majority’s efforts did little to sway the three opposed to the bill. Despite being in the minority among councilpersons, they enjoyed the support of a slim but politically powerful citizen majority who were very civically engaged residents. For them, claims that no problems were realized with the public accommodation bill and equating an opposition vote to discrimination were categorically false and weakened proponents’ arguments. They cited robust citizen disapproval of the public accommodations law and argued such laws “placed further limitations on the people of Ferguson to use their property.” Ferguson’s city council was decidedly split along two philosophical lines.

Each official agreed Ferguson citizens had the right to protect their property and families. However, one contingent believed this meant the character of the city should be

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118 For examples of citizen’s disapproval of the bill, see City of Ferguson, MO archives October 13, 1970, page 1. Also used here is an additional excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Ferguson, MO archive dated September 22, 1970, page 5.
determined by the people, and they felt the mandate from the people was clear: The council enacts policies which preserve that character and prevent change. The other contingent believed it meant that, in electing them as representatives, the people had conferred protection responsibilities to the council, and “there are times when leadership should be exerted.”

Through these types of exchanges, I observed a critical component in Ferguson’s policymaking process which had significant impact on policymaking processes, shaped policies, and resulted in enduring and detrimental effects. Nearing the end of the 1970s, a decade in which Ferguson experienced exponential growth in black population (approx. 13%), the city was yet to enact anti-blockbusting/anti-steering legislation. Complaints of housing discrimination were common but went largely unaddressed.

It was not until homeowners began complaining of being disturbed and pressured by real estate firms using scare tactics and other unethical behavior in residential areas that the council began considering legislation. In June 1978, Ferguson’s city manager secured copies of University City’s ordinance to use as a template for drafting a Ferguson anti-blockbusting bill. Local real estate industry representatives opposed the legislation as unnecessary citing the existence of federal law as sufficient and arguing all reputable firms respected the law.

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119 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive dated September 22, 1970, page 5. Also note: Bill No. 4450 was declared passed by a vote of 5 ayes to 2 noes and became Ordinance No. 70-119 “Fair Housing Code” filed in the City of Ferguson, MO Ordinance Book No. 4, page 3.


Ferguson officials responded to the real estate industry’s objection by suggesting they send the council a copy of a bill “with any deletions and rewording [they] felt would be more acceptable to the real estate people.” Ferguson had not reached the end of the decade without such legislation because of a lack of local efforts. Concerned citizens and civic groups had been lobbying for similar measures since before black residency eclipse one percent of the total population.122

As early as 1975, initial signs of resegregation were beginning to show. There were already pockets of concentrated low-income black residents and a proliferation of for sale signs throughout residential areas of Ferguson—especially in the central city area. Citizens that had been petitioning the council to take actions such as removing and banning real estate signs from Ferguson were initially met with fierce opposition. Scores of homeowners complained an ordinance prohibiting real estate signs would be too restrictive as it would greatly limit their ability to sell their homes.123

Officials told those in favor of a ban they could contact real estate companies and request the excess signs be removed. By mid-1975, however, the inevitable was finally beginning to be realized and panic was widespread. Officials were “surprised at the number of real estate signs that [were] up in neighborhoods and how very few [were] Ferguson

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122 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: June 13, 1978, page 3. See also, Regular Session: March 28, 1978, page 1. Some Ferguson citizens had been expressing specific opposition to things like the misuse of for sale signs on properties and felt the practice should be eliminated through city ordinance. See, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 10, 1973, page 1.

123 Citizens were present in the council chambers requesting the council place the matter on the floor for future advisement. They presented a petition to remove all real estate signs in Ferguson. The petition contained approximately 160 signatures. A citizen claimed to have contacted a Dellwood real estate company said the agency said they would not take their signs down. Citizens were working diligently to get legislation to ban real estate signs. See, City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Session: June 10, 1975, page 1; and Regular Session: June 24, 1975. Citizens presented another petition bearing 90 additional signatures. See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session: July 22, 1975, page 1. Some citizens felt that after a real estate sign ban is established it caused more panic selling. They suggested integrating a neighborhood by establishing a percentage system regulating the number of homeowners to a fixed percentage.
Support for the real estate sign ban had grown substantially and the city’s planning commission recommended enacting the measure. On August 26, 1975, Bill No. 4828 was declared passed and became Ferguson Ordinance No. 75-1509 prohibition of real estate signs.124

A decade later, Ferguson remained philosophically split. One contingent was still accusing the other of “attempting to control who moves into the city… [introducing bills designed] to keep minority groups out of the city.” Members of the majority lauded, “The council is proud of the diversity of races, home sizes, residents in this community, and feel that it is an asset to the city to have this diversity.” A member in the minority responded by suggesting the matter be “placed on the ballot to allow the citizens of Ferguson to vote.” Meanwhile, the city’s black population continued to rise and did so until 2010.125

Interviewee F2 shared some insight into the Ferguson experience with the following:

“At first, I didn’t see the edges of the neighborhoods and how it would…. I hate to say infect, because that sounds so negative. But some of the other communities and neighborhoods were just bringing themselves into Ferguson. Like you had Kinloch who was going through its ups and downs and people were trying to find a place to live. You had north city St. Louis where people were getting kicked out of homes and they had to find a place to live. Normandy, with the school district going up and down. [You] had people saying I still want to live in an affordable home, but I want my educational system. With that influx of all these different communities trying to come in to one, trying to make it, I don’t think that we were ready for that diversity and newness.126

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124 Excerpt of quote from City of Ferguson, MO archives public hearing Regular Session: June 24, 1975; Planning Commission meeting July 2, 1975; Regular Session: July 22, 1975, page 3; Regular Session: August 26, 1975, page 2 and 9. Ferguson Ordinance No. 75-1509 is permanently filed in codebook No. 8, page 107.
125 Excerpt of larger quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Outgoing Council Session: April 17, 1984, page 2.
Ferguson, University City, and Hazelwood offer three examples of varying policymaking motivators, processes, action, inaction, and subsequent conditions. Notwithstanding, these factors are not necessarily linked, do not require specific sequencing, and tend to be nonconsequential when isolated. Only when certain other factors are considered in combination with these elements do these factors become significantly important in better understanding the many complex dynamics influencing the role of municipal governance. No municipality in the study group demonstrates this more revealingly than the City of Jennings.

Like Ferguson, Jennings’ black population at the start of the 1970s was minuscule (.5 %) and increased at a very high rate in a short period of time. Just a decade later, black residency was 53 times higher and grew to represent 4/5 of total population by 2000. By period’s end, over nine out of every 10 Jennings residents were black. Jennings is a quintessential example of a resegregated suburban municipality, and the city exhibits many of the conditions scholarly literature classifies as symptoms of suburban decline. However, Jennings’ policy path is not emblematic of the typical tipped, fiscally stressed suburb.¹²⁷

Unlike Ferguson, Jennings entered the decade of the 1970s with several antidiscrimination policies already on the books, and the city continued to enact additional policies throughout the decade. In summer 1971, with fair housing and anti-solicitation/anti-blockbusting ordinances in place, Jennings sought to strengthen its anti-destabilization defenses. City lawmakers unanimously passed a minimum housing code initiating an occupancy permit system and banned real estate signs. The city attorney began

issuing legal notices in local publications advising real estate companies for rent and for sale signs were no longer permitted in single or multifamily dwellings in the City of Jennings.  

Two weeks after notification, the city’s building commissioner embarked on a compliance check throughout the city, and violators were prosecuted under the city code’s penalty clause for noncompliance. Less than a year later, Jennings City Council passed Bill No. 1012 as Ordinance No. 990 which expanded the city’s prohibition of solicitation to include other tactics such as steering. When Jennings enacted these policies, its black population had not yet reached one percent of total population. More notable, Jennings’ City Council instituted these policies amid a citizen environment bearing striking resemblances to the citizen environment of Ferguson.

Jennings’ municipal government operated under intense scrutiny from a civically engaged citizenry comprised of a majority of residents who disapproved of integration or at least preferred not to integrate the municipality. However, Jennings’ citizens were engaging a council that enjoyed unanimous consensus in their definition of the role of municipal governance in municipal stabilization. The Jennings City Council was unified on issues, objectives, and strategies for achieving outcomes. This infused the council with

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128 Jennings considered a real estate sign ban as early as February 1970. See, City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session: February 9, 1970, page 6: Bill 909. See, Regular Session: August 9, 1971, page 4. See also, Bill No. 976: An ordinance that provided minimum health standards for sanitation facilities in housing requiring adequate ventilation, light, and heating, required safe and sanitary maintenance prohibiting substandard conditions, and provided for occupancy permits. The ordinance set forth enforcement regulations, penalties, and corrective measures for the violations of its provisions. Bill was unanimously passed and approved as Ordinance No. 958. Fee for the occupancy permit was originally set at $15. See, City of Jennings Regular Session: August 24, 1971, page 4.

129 Mayor instructs building commissioner not to confiscate real estate signs erected in violation of the city code. Instead, he is instructed to file property owner’s, real estate agency, or other relevant party’s name and information with the city for prosecution. City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session: August 9, 1971, page 4.; and City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session: June 12, 1972, page 3-4.
policymaking efficiency, empowered it to lead in matters of consequential importance, and essentially insulated the body from citizen backlash.

Relishing complete collegial support of policies such as the real estate sign ban, Jennings’ mayor responded to citizen and real estate industry opposition by asserting, “I would not think of repealing the ordinance; it is a good ordinance.” As reviewed earlier, governing in a council structure where a separation of powers endows one member with veto authority and supplementary controls not possessed by the other members does not prevent municipal lawmakers from producing policies designed to help stabilize municipalities. Nevertheless, leveraging antidiscrimination policies was only a first step to achieving stabilization.\footnote{Excerpt of quote made by the mayor of Jennings in response to requests to repeal the city’s prohibition of real estate signs in the city. See, Regular Session No. 791. A meeting of the City Council of Jennings, MO dated July 10, 1972, page 1.}

Enacting anti-discrimination laws did not eliminate discrimination and inequities in housing. In fact, “open housing” policies did little to combat the resegregation and isolation blacks experienced in these communities. For instance, some residents of University City’s eastern end felt “trapped in the area either because they could not afford better housing or because they were black.” However, some officials and residents were reluctant to concede that race played a role and argued that despite some challenges, the area remained more desirable than most areas in other municipalities.\footnote{Excerpt of quotes taken from a St. Louis Post-Dispatch staff who wrote a series on the county apartment boom. In the first two articles, residents of the eastern end of University City are pictured and quoted as recorded in City of University City archives Session 986: March 1, 1971, page 9.}

In response to residents’ claims of racial bias contributing to conditions, University City’s mayor asserted:

“There are many residents of the area, who like me, are not black and could afford to live anywhere in St. Louis County. We live in the eastern end of [U City] by
choice. No other area of St. Louis County can boast of the cultural advantages we have, the proximity to a major university, art museum, and zoo. No other area has a library that is without equal in the county. As for recreational, we do not have our own private club houses, but we are five minutes away from a heated indoor pool in the winter and a wonderful outdoor pool in the summer. Trapped? Not on your life."\textsuperscript{132}

The mayor was expressing the sentiments shared by many University Citians like Interviewees U4 who, due to their pride in the city’s ethnic diversity, were quick to defend against accusations of racism. As they put it, “We were very progressive. Remember we came from Hyde Park [IL].” Interviewee U2 asserted, “I think that the people in University City don't care who lives in the house next door as long as they take care of the house. I don't care what color my neighbors are as long as they're taking care of the house. Municipal governance plays a role in bringing about policies, but they won’t affect that.”\textsuperscript{133}

Prevailing attitudes and integration policies did not insulate the municipality from transitory effects, however. Racial resegregation can sometimes occur in subtle increments with housing policy serving as an insidious perpetrator. In cities like University City with its integrated communities, mixed incomes, and amenities, this can be especially difficult to acknowledge and accept. According to Interviewee U3, “That was indicative of the challenges [U City] faced. I think one of the main problems is many people don't even think there are challenges.”\textsuperscript{134}

By late 1976, property values had risen in the first and second wards and many people could no longer afford properties in those areas. While there were some modest property value increases in the Third Ward, they only occurred in a small area of the ward.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid
\textsuperscript{133} Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents; and Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official.
\textsuperscript{134} Excerpt from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official.
With University City’s Third Ward being home to the majority of the city’s black population, once again, negative perceptions of increased crime, bad tenants, and poverty emerged.

However, perceptions were often inconsistent with reality. Interviewee U3 said, “I had people who had lived here for 15 or 17 years and had never been north of Olive and were surprised at what a nice neighborhood it was.” Some areas of University City’s Third Ward did exhibit destabilizing symptoms—particularly those areas closest to struggling neighboring municipalities like Pagedale and Wellston. However, the Third Ward consisted mainly of owner-occupied homes while 85% of University City’s Section 8 renters resided in the Second Ward.\(^\text{135}\)

My examination revealed that adoption of open housing antidiscrimination policy whether early or delayed offered indications of municipal governances’ preferences and for some the preferences of their citizenry. Preferences impacted timing of implementation and degree to which local policymakers promoted and enhanced policy. Policy influenced subsequent policies, use of tools and allocation patterns, and affected demographic, housing, and fiscal conditions. Affordable housing policy decisions demonstrate this best.

**Affordable Housing**

St. Louis County’s suburban municipalities consist of a range of residential zoning standards, neighborhood designs, and housing styles. City officials established codes regulating building size, buffering requirements, use of greenspace, and certain aesthetic features. Many municipalities zoned exclusive allowing only homes built on large single-
family plats. Following WWII, there was a substantial surge in more affordable suburban housing. Increased affordability combined with the apartment boom of the 1960s, 70s, and into the 80s blended accessibility with exclusivity. Accessibility did not mean equitable treatment or service delivery, however.

Exclusionary planning and disparate allocation of suburban resources predates the arrival of black suburbanites. Regardless of race, areas containing clusters of low-income nonowner inhabitants received the least consideration in decision making. A Hazelwood resident’s 1978 statement, “I do not feel renters should have a voice in the park issue,” reflects this attitude. Local governments often neglected these areas and their inhabitants, failed to protect them from hazards, and allowed conditions to further deteriorate while protecting and prioritizing the preferences of wealthier sections of the community—often at the expense of the entire municipality.  

Residents and officials alike were largely opposed to new apartment developments. “The backbone of the community are the people who buy their homes and raise their families,” decried one Ferguson resident in June 1971. During a 1975 building permit hearing, a Ferguson councilperson stated, “I believe multifamily dwellings would be repulsive to the people who live in the surrounding areas.” Some opponents cited spot zoning or complained apartment complexes overcrowded the schools and worsened traffic conditions. Others questioned if adequate police protection would be provided in these areas.  

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137 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO transcript of public hearing dated June 22, 1971, page 1; and Excerpt from quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting: February 25, 1975, page 4. Also see, City of Ferguson, MO archives dated March 24, 1970, page 1-2 and April 28, 1970, page 2 which demonstrate more about how residents submitted petitions against rezoning to multifamily and had
While the presence of multifamily housing does not necessarily indicate a preponderance of low-income residents or a deteriorating housing stock, they are usually nonowner occupied and were perceived as likely placements for public housing. Amid a hostile environment, the era ushered in an immense wave of new residents and the need for additional housing was great. For certain areas in some municipalities, rezoning from single-family districts to multifamily was unavoidable. Apartment projects represented large investments, and officials believed certain developments would be an asset to some neighborhoods.

In addition to city ordinances specifying multiple requirements such as the installation of new sidewalks and parking lots, new apartment developments could attract more young couples and professionals to the area. Scores of developers submitted requests for rezoning and presented detailed plans before city plan commissions. Presentations incorporated skillfully crafted marketing strategies emphasizing the blending of amenities, proximity, modernity, and practicality in designs. Cities approved plans for the erection of multistory apartment buildings, apartment complexes, duplexes, and townhomes.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{138} In a June 1971 report on the conditions of the Kensington Subdivision Apartments in Ferguson, MO an advertisement in a local newspaper is referenced in which a realtor is advertising rentals for single people. This is notable because the realtor originally marketed the property to the city as geared towards young executives and their families. Ferguson residents in the area were very upset with the new project. From March 24, 1970, page 1. Ferguson May 12, 1970 page 1 “Maison de Ville” Apartments; Ferguson July 27, 1971 page 2 Florissant Valley Garden Apartments presented that the property was close to W. Florissant and I-270 for easy access, close to the Jr. College, and close to other services like YMCA, Churches, and shopping Center at W. Florissant. 132 units- 66 one bedrooms, 66 two-bedroom apartments, swimming pool children’s play area, and club house. The building line are staggered in order to get away from the row type development.
By 1970, the five study cities were comprised of a mixture of districts zoned for small to large-lot single-family homes as well as multifamily dwellings. Variations in size and price provided housing for a broad range of tenant incomes. As urban renewal projects began winding down, federal funds to cities for redevelopment transitioned in format. Revenue sharing, which city officials had lobbied so diligently for, was authorized by the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. But these were unrestricted funds that did not necessarily encourage development of affordable housing.  

The Housing and Development Act of 1974 authorized the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) process. In the CDBG program, cities applied for grants to be utilized in developing affordable housing, anti-poverty programs, and infrastructure improvements. Like central cities, inner-suburban municipalities were familiar with HUD initiatives as many of them received funding from the agency for parks and urban renewal projects. In order to qualify for CDBGs, a community had to have a planning consultant either on staff or under contract and have a comprehensive plan for community improvements. This meant some cities were not prepared.  

As a newly formed city in August 1970, Hazelwood lacked the administrative prowess to qualify for HUD’s 701 grant which would pay 2/3 of the cost for preparation of a comprehensive plan. Contrast that with Jennings, who in 1972 entered into an urban planning contract with the Missouri Department of Community Affairs, St. Louis County Department of Planning, and East-West Gateway Coordinating Council to obtain 701 grant  

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139 For more about the act, see General Explanation of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, Public Law 92-512. February 12, 1973.
140 See, Section 109 of the Housing and Community Development (HCD) Act 1974 at HUD.gov.
funds for planning assistance, preparation of a comprehensive plan, and implementation of administrative control measures.\textsuperscript{141}

Qualifying for a CDBG was only part of the battle, however. Many residents opposed receiving CDBG monies. Members of a Ferguson citizens’ group spoke out against accepting CDBG funds warning its council, “This is an attempt to inveigle Ferguson into regional government.” Officials in each of the study cities pondered the implications of accepting federal dollars. They wanted, and in many cases needed the money. However, municipal leaders did not want the federal involvement in city affairs that came with the funds. Grants required strict adherence to programmatic standards focusing on anti-poverty goals and increasing subsidized housing. Despite reservations and objections, however, cities applied for CDBGs.\textsuperscript{142}

Ferguson was one of the few cities to put the issue to a city-wide vote following citizen calls for a referendum. Ironically, in Ferguson’s general election held Tuesday April 1, 1975, Ferguson voters approved the city’s use of CDBG funding by a vote of 2,346 to 1,663. In defeat, opponents believed that most residents did not fully understand the proposition. They felt they had failed to effectively communicate the downsides of the city’s agreement with HUD. Along with CDBGs, the federal government instituted the Section 8 subsidized housing program, and the low-income housing market was born.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{141} See City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session: August 13, 1970; Taken from archived transcript of presentation by a community planner from the St. Louis County Department of Planning to the Jennings, MO City Council: Regular Session 796 meeting of the City Council August 14, 1972, page 1. See also, passing of Ordinance Number 1002 in Jennings Regular Council Session: October 9, 1972, page 4.
\textsuperscript{142} Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing Regular Session: December 10, 1974, page 2.
\textsuperscript{143} According to the Board of Election Commissioners of the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri abstract of certified votes related to the referendum proposition Ordinance No. 75-14 Housing and Community Development Act. By Ordinance No. 74-1449, the council of the City of Ferguson, MO authorized the mayor to enter into a municipal housing and community development corporation and supplemental agreements with St. Louis County. Note: Citizens had spoken in opposition to Bill No. 4751 Housing and Community Development Act.
The vast majority of residents opposed increasing public housing and officials and administrators wrestled with the question of proportionality within their municipal borders. Nevertheless, meeting CDBG eligibility requirements meant cities committed to increasing federally assisted housing in their municipality. Dedicating dwellings to federal assistance, opponents argued, would further hamper cities’ ability to effectively ensure a high-quality housing stock as officials had no control over which landlords, buildings, or tenants received subsidies.

There remained the issue of an aging population, however. By the 1970s, many suburban municipalities were comprised of significant numbers of low to moderate fixed-income households headed by residents over the age of 65. Many of these residents could no longer maintain larger homes and required subsidized housing assistance. Consequentially, municipal officials were left with no other option but to try and balance the issue by allowing for a limited amount of subsidized housing. Attempting to restrict the increase of public housing, officials either excluded or minimized the amount of resources for subsidized housing in their community development plan.144

Interviewees U4 criticized University City officials’ omission of Section 8 housing in its initial community development application adding, “Municipal governments can mandate a certain amount of public housing, affordable housing, or they can pass policies.” With no CDBG funds dedicated to Section 8 housing development in its original plan, HUD denied University City’s 1975 application. After polling other local jurisdictions who

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Development Act of 1974. However, when asked for a show of hands relative to the city’s participation, a majority of hands raised where in favor of the city signing the agreement for participation. See public hearing Regular Session: December 10, 1974, page 3.
had submitted community development applications, city staff arrived at a three-year goal of 90 housing units for the Section 8 housing category. HUD approved the revised plan.\textsuperscript{145}

Some prospective residents, otherwise impressed with the city, highlighted University City’s HUD plan as “serious cause for concern.” Consider that municipalities rely on property taxes for general revenue and financing of capital improvements. People not only viewed subsidized housing as potentially harmful to the physical characteristics and desirability of an area but concluded it would also further erode the local tax base and interfere with local assessment and rate setting processes. A proliferation of subsidized housing further intensified fears of the deterioration of suburban oases. However, early agreements with HUD for CDBGs were fairly nonconsequential.\textsuperscript{146}

Hazelwood received an initial grant of only $34,000 and expected to receive between $190,000 and $210,000 over three years. Hazelwood used the funds to upgrade housing and make improvements in an unincorporated area adjacent to their city limits. Maplewood received $48,000 and was approved to spend $34,600 of the funds on constructing sewers under contract with the St. Louis Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD). Jennings’ initial block grant allocation totaled $55,950 with which the suburb remodeled an old police station, demolished some vacant houses, and made repairs to senior citizens’

\textsuperscript{145} Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents. For more information regarding the city’s HUD application process see: City of University City archives Session 1102: June 2, 1975.

\textsuperscript{146} Missouri municipalities lobbied for what was called a circuit breaker approach to property tax relief. This was a system of property tax relief for older, low-income citizens enacted by state legislatures in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Vermont that benefited both senior citizens and local communities. The relief was for older homeowners and renters through state income tax credits or cash rebates. For more see, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session: February 23, 1970, page 2.
houses. The announcement of the fourth round of CDBG funding in 1977 signaled to cities that the stakes were exponentially higher.\textsuperscript{147}

The implementation of a new formula resulted in the St. Louis area gaining $20 million in CDBG funding. Although most of the funds would go to the City of St. Louis, St. Louis County officials were pleased. The new formula made more revenue available for the entire area. For 27 St. Louis County municipalities, however, the new formula significantly reduced their allocation. The principal change in the formula concerned age of housing stock. According to the new formula, old houses were blighted and age of housing now accounted for 50\% of the allocation.\textsuperscript{148}

This was problematic as many of St. Louis’ oldest communities were also some of the wealthiest. According to the new formula, Webster Groves was the most blighted community in St. Louis County. However, the formula failed to assess true community need by employing a flawed metric which disproportionately weighted age of housing while disparaging growth lag and measures of poverty. Nothing illustrates this better than contrasting Hazelwood’s $30,200 grant with the $460,700 Webster Groves received following the implementation of the 1977 formula change.\textsuperscript{149}

Behind the leadership of its mayor, Hazelwood joined other area leaders and successfully advocated for revisions in the formula. For each of the next two years, Hazelwood’s allocation was $136,875 and by 1979, municipal officials considered CDBG

\textsuperscript{147} According to City of Hazelwood, MO archive Council Work Session dated November 20, 1974. Note: On December 18, 1974, Bill No. 1121 authorizing the agreement was unanimously adopted as Ordinance 1092-4. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated January 2, 1975 for more on how the city spent CDBG. According to City of Maplewood, Missouri archives from year 1976 Document number 10. According to City of Jennings, MO transcript of the Community Development Public Hearing dated October 24, 1977, pages 4-9.

\textsuperscript{148} City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session: October 19, 1977.

\textsuperscript{149} Figures taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session dated October 5, 1977. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Meeting dated October 12, 1977.
an imperative revenue stream. At this point, Maplewood was receiving over $275,000 with a total balance of $335,426 under contract, and Jennings had allocated $555,750 over the previous three years. Despite limits on eligible uses, CDBG spending garnered contentious debate. This was especially true in the civically engaged cities of Ferguson and University City.\textsuperscript{150}

Citizens, organized groups, and associations often presented detailed plans for how to spend CDBG funds, and vigorously contested councils, city managers, and finance directors’ positions. More revenue via CDBG funding not only attracted more parties lobbying for a bigger portion, it also required more subsidized housing commitments. Subsidized housing became more intertwined with infrastructure improvements and new developments as cities relied more on CDBGs to fund projects. By the end of the study period, CDBG agreements were essentially renewed automatically every three years.

Increased reliance on CDBG funding to help finance municipal improvements resulted in rapid growth in subsidized housing for some municipalities. As early as 1979, fearing similar fates would befall them, suburban cities like Ferguson and Maplewood were enacting moratoriums on all subsidized housing within their municipal borders. However, officials quickly realized how integral the support had become to their city’s ecosystem and within two years, moratoriums were removed. The tide in suburban locales had changed dramatically in a short period of time.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{150} Figure taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session: August 2, 1978. Note: In August 1977, St. Louis County Department of Human Resources announced that the City of Hazelwood had been authorized to receive $93,850 from the Community Development Act funding for the acquisition of property for a city garage. I did not include in analysis of formula as it was not related. City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated August 17, 1977. According to figures in City of Maplewood, MO archival Documents numbers 262-264 dated October 9, 1979; and City of Jennings, MO transcript Community Development Public Hearing dated October 24, 1977, pages 4-9.

\textsuperscript{151} See, City of Ferguson, MO archive Special Council Meeting dated March 18, 1980, page 1. Bill number 5135 an ordinance declaring a 6 month moratorium on the approval of condominium subdivision plans and
Officials that once opposed federally funded housing were now forced to become advocates. A collection of 1981 Maplewood resolutions best demonstrate this point. The resolutions, which passed five to one, outline the municipality’s agreement with HUD to participate in a Section 8 demonstration project. Additionally, documents indicate officials directed and authorized the city attorney to obtain a restraining order stopping the St. Louis County Housing Authority from terminating the Section 8 subsidy for tenants of an apartment complex and called for an investigation into revocation of subsidies.\textsuperscript{152}

Municipal officials set out to restrict the amount of rental properties, subsidized units, and low-income housing in the 1970s. But by the end of the 1980s, the opposite was evident. A robust market consisting of rental properties, subsidies, and low-income housing had emerged in the suburbs. Apartment complexes and rental homes had become a part of most inner suburbs’ fabric. University City was home to roughly 2,800 multifamily units. Rental properties accounted for nearly 40\% of dwellings with a disproportionate number of single-family rentals located in the city’s majority black Third Ward. With a population density of approximately 6,000 people per square mile, ½ to 2/3 of University City residents resided north of Delmar.\textsuperscript{153}


In Hazelwood, over 40% of the housing stock was in the form of multifamily housing structures. While Ferguson residents believed, “Neighboring communities [didn’t] have the number of renters Ferguson [had],” the city’s rate of rentals was less than 25% of housing—notably lower than Hazelwood and University City’s. Interviewee F2 says, “Ferguson was still one of the desirable districts for homebuyers. People were more worried about Jennings during that time.” Rental property comprised 47% of Jennings housing selection. In contrast, Ferguson seemed to be avoiding any significant proliferation of low-cost housing or decline in homeownership. However, housing numbers masked what was actually transpiring in Ferguson.\footnote{Figure taken from public hearing on public housing in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated July 29, 1981. For more about Hazelwood’s IDA activities also see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session: July 11, 1984; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive IDA Village Square Apartments dated March 6, 1985. This project consisted of 47 buildings containing a total of 148 one and two-bedroom units. Note: One apartment building permit netted Hazelwood $22, 000 in 1984-85. See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Budget Meeting May 20, 1985. According to figures in archive City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session: March 11, 1980, page 5; Excerpt of quote taken Interview F2: 07/26/2019 Black / Male / 32-year Resident / Ex-Public Official; and According to City of Jennings, MO Redevelopment Plan in public hearing dated January 29, 1990, page 2.}

Inaction and delayed policies of the 1970s had rendered the city more vulnerable to resegregation and decline. Over the next decade, Ferguson’s acute growth in nonowner residency indicated noticeable differences. Its new nonowner residents tended to be poorer than the renters arriving in neighboring municipalities a decade earlier. This 1995 Ferguson resident statement was more appropriate for 1980:

“We are concerned about subsidized housing like in Hazelwood. We need to prevent further subsidies in Ferguson because there are too many greedy people who want to rent through Section 8 to get more money and become slumlords.”\footnote{Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing notes dated October 10, 1995, page 1. Note: A communication reporting St. Louis County will discourage the concentration of low-income housing projects in areas where a disproportionate amount already exists was sent to Hazelwood by the St. Louis County Executive. North County Inc. and the Florissant Valley Chamber of Commerce sent a memo to Hazelwood opposing a rental housing financing for a development of opposition to the funding of a 200-unit proposed subsidized housing development. For more see City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated October 18, 1995; and March 20, 1996.}
By this time, however, Ferguson’s housing subsides already rivaled Hazelwood’s. And just five short years later, Ferguson had nearly reached Hazelwood in percentage of renters with 33\%, while Hazelwood’s percentage of renters had declined from 1990s 36.5\% to 2000s 35\% nonowner occupancy. Other indicators shed more light on the neighbors’ divergent trajectories. Per capita income in Ferguson and Hazelwood was $17,661 and $22,311, respectively. Of Hazelwood households, 7.5\% were headed by single parents while over 16\% of Ferguson households were single parent headed.\textsuperscript{156}

While these numbers only illustrate a snapshot, they lend context to a larger picture. Municipal-level figures serve as a glimpse into what was occurring in neighborhoods. High rates of renter occupancy, particularly in single-family residential areas, indicate low desirability. Stable neighborhoods of single-family residential dwellings would boast around 85\% owner occupancy. Municipal-level destabilization was well-underway in some municipalities as assessed value of residential property declined dramatically.

Several key components drove the decline in property values. Typically, white homeowners who fled the area were now unable to sell their properties. Consequentially, housing stock preservation measures became inadequate as a growing number of houses were becoming renter occupied. Besides performing daily tasks of general upkeep and addressing minimum maintenance matters, renters generally lack the authority and finances to initiate improvements or rehabilitation that correct structural deterioration. This dilemma was exacerbated in inner suburbs due to age and obsolescence.

While advanced-aged housing does not automatically suggest deterioration, preserving older homes required more maintenance and updates to compete with newer

homes offering the latest in amenities and convenience. Many residential areas in inner suburbs still bore obsolete spatial and structural designs which rendered them impractical for modern residential use. Housing demands, specifications, and expectations had evolved.

Characteristics once considered essential were now deemed objectionable and undesirable. These elements helped create a perpetual cycle of housing stock erosion culminating in blight and socioeconomic liabilities for inner suburbs. The challenges of an aged housing stock, decline in homeownership, and neighborhood blight were especially prevalent in the study cities.

Established in 1908, Maplewood was the first centrally located municipality outside the St. Louis city limits. Amid difficult economic times, Maplewood began to lose its dedicated residential core. The inner suburb of just under 13,000 had seen its share of ups and downs over the years. In previous decades, however, homeowners braved the storms which allowed for the natural transfer of homeownership. A growing number of them were now choosing to relocate instead. Maplewood struggled to retain longtime residents and preserve the quality of its historic homes and neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{157}

Degeneration of housing conditions in the north county suburbs was more rapid and severe than in Maplewood and occurred for different reasons. During the 1970s and 1980s, HUD’s housing policies were in direct conflict with cities’ revitalization and stabilization efforts. Negatively impacting cities’ housing stock, property values, and overall attractiveness, HUD’s activities resulted in concentrated poverty, dilapidated

\textsuperscript{157} Figure according to US Census data 2016; and Minnesota Population Center. National Historical Geographic Information System: Version 11.0 [Database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 2016. For more, see Mitchell 2006; and Houser 2019.
houses, and vacant lots. North St. Louis County municipalities were disproportionately impacted by HUD’s practices as the agency targeted these areas and concentrated its activities in these places.

A 1980 North Area Community Forum report noted while representing only 18 % of eastern Missouri’s population (from Jefferson City east to the Mississippi River), north St. Louis County accounted for 73 % of FHA insured mortgages, 40 % of all FHA activity, and 35 % of HUD repossessions. Negative effects of this type of discriminatory targeting compounded as image problems arose further hampering these municipalities’ stabilization efforts. Property values plunged as renter occupancy, low-income housing, and Section 8 subsidies grew.158

A 1989 St. Louis County planning department report cited, “The high percentage of Section 8 housing being located in north St. Louis County is the biggest concern of officials in north St. Louis County municipalities.” Responding to inquiries about denied subsidized housing requests in 1991, Jennings’ mayor replied, “The city has too high of a percentage of such housing now and the maintenance record of this type of housing has been poor.” Often these properties became neglected rental housing. The negative loop was devastating for these municipalities.159

A 1991 examination of single-family homes in Jennings found that between 1987 and 1989, 31 % of the 75 homes surveyed experienced a decline in recorded appraisals.

158 Figures taken from the North Area Community Forum report in City of Hazelwood, MO dated March 19, 1980. The North Area Community Forum, founded in 1975, was funded through the St. Louis County Department of Human Resources, Office of Community Development. The organization provided a forum for elected officials and other representatives of North County and University of Missouri-St. Louis Public Policy Administration Program.
159 Report included in City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Session dated November 13, 1989 page 2; and Excerpt of quote taken from City of Jennings, MO 1236 Meeting of the City Council November 25, 1991, page 1.
Declining property values meant loss of revenue and higher taxes. This further increased dependency on federal aid which mandated more subsidized housing. The loss of property tax revenues also made it extremely difficult to maintain quality-level public services such as policing. Perceptions emerged that there was more crime in these areas than in other parts of St. Louis County. North St. Louis County suburbs were caught in a vicious cycle.\textsuperscript{160}

Although University City was not technically located in north St. Louis County, it lied just south of Page which served as north county’s southern border. Proximity to struggling north county municipalities as well as decaying areas of the City of St. Louis made University City a target for similar transitory activities. Furthermore, the mature inner suburb was only partially protected by its proactive housing policies of the 1960s. Participation in low-income subsidized housing funding programs did not necessarily serve as a registerable contributing factor to achieving stabilization.

Instead, policies which dictated the way in which cities participated in these programs and whether cities leveraged these resources in combination with other resources and activities served to determine if participation was significant or negligible. The seeds of stabilization were planted with the timing and degree of open and affordable housing policies. However, specific types of policy designed to combat housing stock deterioration were required as well. As Interviewee U3 framed it, “Housing stock preservation was a place for municipal governance.”\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{160} St. Louis County records of City of Jennings, MO in Redevelopment Plan dated January 29, 1990, page 3-9.
\textsuperscript{161} Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official.
Housing Stock Preservation

City leaders, lawmakers, and administrators worked tirelessly throughout the 1970s to combat housing discrimination practices like racial steering, redlining, and blockbusting. Some officials enacted policies, initiated programs, and pursued legal recourse. But as smaller, poorer populations replaced larger more economically stable citizenries, property values changed dramatically. Officials had to decide rather to uphold, amend, or exchange prevention, preservation, and improvement policies from previous decades.

Race predominated municipal-level decision making prior to 1970 and continued to influence choices in the post-civil rights era. However, socioeconomics dominated policy in the post-fair housing period. According to one longtime resident of University City’s Third Ward, “It became less about race and more about economics.” Residents of St. Louis’ inner suburbs identified with their town’s social character and economic class, and homeowners took pride in how the houses in their neighborhood differentiated them from neighboring municipalities.162

In the study cities, however, shrinking tax base and social change confronted deeply rooted identities and neighborhood nostalgia. Meanwhile, a serious threat to municipalities’ stability existed in the form of a public agency. HUD’s discriminatory housing practices and its neglecting of homes repossessed for defaulted Federal Housing Authority (FHA) insured mortgages presented additional challenges.

HUD properties repossessed through foreclosure and tax sales were often left vandalized and condemned. Many of the properties repossessed by HUD needed substantial repairs or were in such disrepair they had to be demolished. This left behind

scores of vacant parcels, some of which were being used as makeshift parking lots in some municipalities. As geography dictated, Jennings and University City were among the first municipalities to experience the neighborhood blighting impacts of HUD’s practices. City officials and administrators initially attempted to work with local HUD officials to address the issue of deteriorating housing.

Municipal leaders made minimal progress through these means. City officials often felt the agency ignored cities’ concerns. Records indicated as early as June 1974, Jennings City Council instructed its city’s building commissioner to forward complaint letters and pictures of HUD houses to senators, congressional representatives, and the county supervisor. Further worsening housing conditions in 1975, HUD changed its policy for handling repossessed houses to include low-priced “as is” investor purchases. That same year, University City’s local government decided to submit a grievance directly to the source of the activities.163

University City’s city manager sent a letter of complaint directly to the HUD secretary’s Washington, D.C. office. The correspondence included spot maps showing the locations of foreclosures and derelict HUD properties along with a report detailing the impact of “as is” housing in residential areas in the city. Nevertheless, HUD repossessions continued to mount, properties deteriorated, and the devastating impact on property values persisted. University City homes that listed for $15,000, when HUD acquired 26 buildings between 1972 and 1973, garnered less than $3,000 three years later.164

163 See Document No. 2852 in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session: June 24, 1974, page 6; and Document No. 42 in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session: July 22, 1974, page 2.
164 For more about the contents of the letter see: City of University City archives Regular Session 1101: May 19, 1975, page 13. Letter of complaint addressed to HUD Secretary, Washington, D.C. The correspondence included spot maps showing locations of foreclosures and recent reports regarding derelict HUD properties. Of the 26 properties, 15 were considered buildable lots. The lots involved structures which required
With collegial measures proving futile, municipal decision-makers collaborated to openly promote filing a lawsuit against HUD. Officials accused HUD of violating Chapter 89 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The law authorized cities to regulate and restrict the use of land within their jurisdiction for the purposes of promoting health, safety, morals, and the general welfare of the community. According to a local newspaper announcement, “City officials claimed to have received a greater degree of cooperation from HUD following the threat of a lawsuit.” Whether the news of a potential lawsuit was truly a catalyst to increased cooperation is unclear. What is clear, however, is that municipal leaders recognized that HUD’s activities threatened municipal-level stability.165

Prior to any recorded FHA foreclosures within their borders, Hazelwood officials began lobbying for regulatory changes, strategically planning to combat the agency’s practices, and coalition building. The municipality’s leadership served as a prominent voice in the county’s push for more rigorous mortgage bank requirements, penalties for bad actors, and prospective homebuyers’ education. Working with the North County Community Forum, Hazelwood leveraged tracking reports to monitor FHA lending activity and advocated for the equitable dispersing of low to moderate-income housing throughout north, south, and west county.166

165 Excerpt of quote referenced in transcript of City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1117; and City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1160 dated May 23rd, 1977, page 5.; Statute referenced in discussions regarding filing a lawsuit against HUD. See: University City, MO Regular Session 1089 dated November 18, 1974, Page 4.

166 For more information see City of Hazelwood, MO archives Regular Session October 4, 1978; Hazelwood Regular Session August 1, 1979; Hazelwood FHA Activity Special Meeting January 23, 1980; Hazelwood Special Meeting June 25, 1980; Hazelwood Regular Session February 27, 1980; Hazelwood Regular Session March 19, 1980. See also, North Area Community Forum proposal under Section VIII, Support Program, funded out of the St. Louis County, MO Office of Community Development. There were 312 units proposed, with the vast majority being in South St. Louis County and a few in Berkeley, MO and Ferguson, MO in
Hazelwood policymakers saw what was happening in Jennings. A city of just over 19,000 persons at the time, Jennings’ unemployment rate was above the national average. Residents, both existing and forthcoming, were largely working-class folks of modest means. Stability was already fragile. Jennings officials understood they needed to act with urgency. In October 1976, Jennings leveraged dollars from the Department of Commerce and Economic Development’s capital investment program to establish a special community stabilization fund.\textsuperscript{167}

Utilizing capital investment funds, Jennings started home loan and home improvement programs. They leveraged CDBG funds and partnered with a local bank who reserved $250,000 in loans for program participants to purchase homes in Jennings. On January 23, 1978, Bill 1250 unanimously passed as Ordinance1221 authorizing the City of Jennings to enter into a contract with FHA to purchase foreclosed properties. Bypassing the county’s HUD agreement, Jennings began working directly with HUD in the Federal Urban Homesteading Program. The homesteading program established grant accounts for cities to draw upon to address the HUD foreclosure problem.\textsuperscript{168}

Homesteading involved HUD selling foreclosed homes to cities for $1. Loan balance of the houses was then deducted from the account. The previous year, University City had taken advantage of a similar program involving vacant lots. As mentioned earlier, HUD foreclosures often ended up in demolition leaving behind vacant parcels. Within the


\textsuperscript{168} Jennings Regular council session January 23 1978 page 2 document 03162.
first several years alone, HUD transferred deeds to over 50 plots to University City. Jennings aimed to avoid the proliferation of vacant lots by helping the homebuyer avoid foreclosure to begin with. In the event of foreclosure, Jennings acquired the home for resale through the homesteading program in the period between foreclosure and dilapidation.¹⁶⁹

Utilizing the services of the North Area Community Forum, who screened for qualified applicants, the city would then sell the property as a three-year lease-option to first-time homebuyers. Program participants would have one year to bring the house up to code. Once the city’s building department verified compliance with all health and safety conditions, the deed was conveyed to the new owner. According to Jennings’ mayor, “There will be no need for advertising because at this time we have approximately 50 applicants in our files waiting for property to purchase.” Jennings sold 11 of the HUD foreclosures in the first year of the program.¹⁷⁰

Jennings prioritized preventing neighborhood blight by keeping the FHA homes occupied. However, they also recognized their efforts would be ineffective without physical improvements to other segments of the housing stock. They instituted a home improvement rebate program and earmarked funds to rebate 20% of any improvement cost homeowners incurred in making improvements to their home. Jennings modeled the program after University City’s homeowner rehabilitation program which required homeowners to pay a portion of the costs of labor and materials on a sliding scale according to certain criteria.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁹ HUD transfer of deeds referenced in transcript of City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1117; and City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1160 dated May 23rd, 1977, page 5.
¹⁷⁰ Excerpt of quote taken from City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated June 11, 1979, page 1. See also, City of Jennings Regular Council Session dated October 8, 1984, page 2.
Partnering with a local bank, University City established a revolving loan and interest subsidy program for eligible homeowners as housing rehabilitation assistance. Initially, the city’s policy was to extend home rehabilitation loans to single-family residential areas only. However, to encourage rehabilitation throughout the city, officials leveraged CDBG dollars to initiate a two-tiered system which included two-family dwellings and met the objective of giving special consideration to low-income residents. By the end of 1976, the city had extended loans to 247 homeowners.\textsuperscript{172}

University City policymakers further improved its housing stock by authorizing the city to rehab homes designated for low-income seniors. Certain areas of the city were comprised of blocks of single story, one and two-bedroom homes with small lots grouped close together. The houses required modest rehabbing, were easy to maintain, and were taxed at a minimal rate. The city acquired groups of these homes and partnered with the University City School District to rehab the homes. The rehabilitated homes were either sold or dedicated to leasing through the Section 8 assisted housing program.

By the end of the study period, in 2015, Hazelwood’s home improvement loan program was entering its 33\textsuperscript{rd} year in existence. The program contained enough funds to provide 13 loans averaging $5,000 each to 13 low to moderate-income homeowners and provided grants to homeowners meeting certain income qualifications. Emerging in the second half of the 1970s, Hazelwood modeled its program after neighboring Bridgeton whereby the county and city acted as intermediaries between homeowner and contractor.

\textsuperscript{172} Figures taken from City of University City archives Session 1149: December 20, 1976, page 7.
Upon securing community development funds from the St. Louis County Office of Community Development, Hazelwood compensated the contractor for the work.\footnote{City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated September 11, 1978; and Regular Session dated October 11, 1978; Figures taken from City of Hazelwood, MO City Manager’s Report on the Municipal Housing and Community Development Cooperation Agreement 2015-2017 with St. Louis County Office of Community Development.}

The county selected sections of unincorporated north county to initiate the program. Berkeley, Riverview, and Flordell Hills, along with the aforementioned study group cities, were among the north county incorporated areas receiving support from the program. Initially absent from the group was Ferguson. Ferguson originally resisted enacting homesteading and home improvement policies to protect its housing stock. In September 1975, by a narrow margin of four to three, the city approved a ways and means committee recommendation to procure and renovate a foreclosed HUD home. However, the city had no formal plan in place for how to move forward.\footnote{City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975, page 3.}

As with antidiscrimination, Ferguson lawmakers were bitterly divided on housing programs. One camp’s position was predicated on the stance that, “Government should keep out of private enterprise and not be getting into the real estate business.” The other camp believed, “If the city bought the house, renovated it, and found an owner, it might be the start of other people fixing up their own homes.” By August 1978, with pro-housing program legislatures still enjoying a plus one majority, Ferguson instituted a home improvement assistance program.\footnote{Excerpts of quotes taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975, page 3.}

Ferguson boasted 20 program participants as opposing legislatures pushed for addendums like requiring repayment of home improvement monies if homeowners sold
their home. By June 1983, the city had issued $270,000 in home improvement assistance to 213 residents. The following August, Ferguson instituted a homesteading program purchasing two homes in the early phase of the program. Homesteading and home improvement programs were valuable tools to defend against housing stock deterioration, neighborhood blight, and destabilization. However, they required early application and commitment to be effective.\footnote{According to City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Council Session Regular Council Session dated August 23, 1983, page 2-3; City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Council Session dated August 22, 1978, page 5.}

St. Louis city was already utilizing these measures, and places in Ohio demonstrated they could be successful. St. Louis County municipalities were not required to devise innovative funding mechanisms to implement these programs as federal dollars were made available through the county. County officials had identified north county areas for improvement projects, and home improvement was among the county’s program goals. In other words, these tools were readily accessible and proven. Nevertheless, Ferguson was embroiled in an ideological struggle which cost the municipality precious time and ensured programs would receive minimal resources and support.

This was best exhibited in Ferguson’s response to St. Louis County housing turnover maps in 1983. In reviewing the data, Ferguson officials discovered areas with high rates of turnover, distressed rental properties, and crime. Officials responded to this information by electing to, “Inspect the boundaries of these areas each year.” Contrast this with Hazelwood’s response to being told by St. Louis County, “Because of the extremely low foreclosure rate, we are not encouraged to establish a homesteading program in
Hazelwood.” Hazelwood instituted a policy for monitoring conditions of the properties despite the low number of HUD foreclosures.  

Hazelwood recognized the trajectory of FHA’s destabilizing practices and responded proactively. The housing inspector monitored and recorded the conditions of foreclosed HUD homes by performing an exterior inspection of the properties every three months. Hazelwood applied this procedure for monitoring non-HUD foreclosures as well. Although it was difficult to obtain private foreclosure information, Hazelwood utilized techniques such as reviewing trash collection records to determine if homes were vacant. While their actions did not prevent FHA activity in the city, they were better prepared to mitigate damage if FHA foreclosures increased.

No city’s process or programs were void of deficiencies. Maplewood struggled writing up their programs let alone implementing them. While officials proposed focusing on houses in most need of improvement, fights over limited eligibility, first come first serve, and per-home outlays delayed the passage of the bill authorizing the city’s participation. Critics bashed the plan because, as one resident complained, “Two-hundred Seventy-five thousand dollars isn’t going to fix all the homes in Maplewood.” Of course, officials could not satisfy everyone, and no amount of good city leadership or policies can guarantee a high-quality housing stock.

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177 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of St. Louis County Assisted Housing Coordinator presentation to the council in City of Hazelwood, MO February 27, 1980; According to City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council Session dated August 23, 1983, page 2, Ferguson made $80,000 in home improvement funds available for people to fix up their homes in 1983. See also, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council Session dated October 12, 1982, page 4.

178 For more information see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated November 14, 1984.

179 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Maplewood, Missouri archives Year 1977, Document No. 257.

Bill number 3974: An ordinance accepting the provision of chapter 353 revised statutes of Missouri Urban Redevelopment Corporation. See also, City of Maplewood, Missouri archives Regular Session dated October 14, 1980, Bill number 4173: An ordinance authorizing the mayor of the city of Maplewood to execute a
Ultimately, municipal leaders could only assess situations, utilize available information, access and leveraged resources and tools, and make decisions. While HUD played a prevalent role in impacting residential patterns and housing conditions, municipal governments possessed authority to address the phenomena. Type, timing, and level of action impacted the degree to which HUD activity affected municipalities’ housing. However, it was not a singular driver of housing stock conditions. Housing codes and enforcement determined preexisting conditions, informed officials of trends, and guided policy responses.

**Code Enforcement**

Suburbs have a long history of stringent housing codes. But no suburban city exemplified this more than University City. The municipality was known for having some of the strictest codes in the region. For some residents, housing codes were a source of extreme frustration. Families sometimes moved from the municipality because of the high costs of bringing their houses up to code. Others filed complaints accusing housing inspectors of harassment and hurling insults. Albeit, housing inspectors are seldom popular in any town as they are charged with the duty of enforcing the codes. But University City inspectors were often loathed.  

Reports outlined claims that inspectors would sometimes go through dresser drawers and open refrigerator doors as part of inspections. Following windshield surveys for the rehabilitation loan program, residents claimed citations were sent to people whose

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cooperative agreement on behalf of the city with the Maplewood Housing Authority and declaring ordinance to be an emergency bill passed and became ordinance number 4161.

180 For more information about University City’s codes see City of University City, archives Regular Session 1009: February 7, 1972, page 7. For example, of references see also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated May 13, 1971; Hazelwood, MO archive dated February 18, 1975; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated September 6, 1989.
properties were among the best kept properties in the neighborhood. According to one such homeowner, “I received the letter out of the clear blue sky.” A 1972 Washington University School of Social Work survey of 41 University City homes found most interviewees disagreed with the city’s inspection process.\(^{181}\)

The survey revealed that some residents felt the housing inspections hurt their neighborhoods rather than help rehabilitate them. They believed the council did not want certain types of modest low-income housing in University City and the inspections were a way to minimize and eliminate them. Criticism seldom affected the decisions of University City officials concerning matters related to the municipality’s aesthetic qualities. Policymakers were not open to debate on issues that might weaken the city’s housing codes and enforcement. With over 17,500 dwellings in less than six square miles, the slightest housing deterioration could mean a dramatically different looking University City.\(^{182}\)

Rigorous codes and tough enforcement resulted in nearly 45,000 repairs each year between 1970 and 1975 alone. The city consistently sought ways to fortify and expand its housing codes. For University City, Building Officials Code Administrators (BOCA) building codes simply served as a foundation upon which to build. BOCA provided regulations for the design and construction of buildings and encouraged cities to adopt uniform building codes and enforcement measures. Adoption of BOCA codes was standard practice. Archives reflect each study city adopting the latest BOCA building codes throughout the study period.\(^{183}\)

\(^{181}\) Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City archives Regular Session 1099: April 21, 1975, page 18; Taken from City of University City archives Regular Session 1009: February 7, 1972, page 7.

\(^{182}\) Density and properties count taken from University City, MO archives Session 1145: October 25, 1976, page 4.

\(^{183}\) According to records outlining the city’s code enforcement figures included in Session 1378: February 11, 1985; For example, see Jennings adopt the fifth edition of BOCA basic building codes in January 1970.
In addition to following BOCA recommendations, cities used nuisance abatement laws to regulate conditions of properties. Nuisance abatement authorized cities to levy special tax bills against property owners for costs of city workers performing property owner responsibilities such as cutting and removing overgrown grass and weeds. Adopting BOCA codes and nuisance abatement policies offered municipalities some professional credence and regulatory authority over the structural design, maintenance, and exterior appearance of the housing stock. However, they were essentially guidelines in a book and rules governing things like landscaping.

Without rigorous inspections and enforcement policies, BOCA and nuisance ordinances did little to protect the character, preserve the taxable value of land and buildings, or ensure stability of residential areas. Minimum housing standards provided cities with more powerful tools for attaining and maintaining these elements. According to Interviewee J3, “Minimum housing standards were the codes that had some teeth.” Presence or absence of minimum housing codes significantly affected housing stock conditions entering the 1970s.\(^{184}\)

As residential patterns changed and HUD activities ramped up, the degree of impact and municipal toolboxes varied. Although HUD had established certain standards for buildings constructed under its housing programs, they did little to curb deterioration. University City was the first city in Missouri to adopt minimum housing policies in the 1960s. A minimum housing code instituted new standards, enforcement measures, and

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\(^{184}\) Excerpt of quote taken from Interview J3: 07/24/2019, White / Female / 70-year Resident.
penalties for violators, and better equipped cities to prevent and address housing stock deterioration.\footnote{For information about HUD’s policies go to hud.gov, enter keywords Minimum Property Standards (MPS).}

By 1970, as in most other mature inner suburbs, a notable percentage of Jennings’ housing stock was in disrepair or exhibited some form of substandard conditions. Jennings began taking steps towards minimum housing policy. On August 24, 1971, Jennings enacted a law requiring occupancy permits. The new policy stipulated that an inspection of property be performed and approved before transfers of ownership or occupancy could be completed. The new law was an effective way for Jennings to begin addressing deterioration by interjecting required improvements at the point where seller/lessor impetus and buyer/leaser interest intersect.\footnote{City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated August 24, 1971, page 4: Bill No. 976, Ordinance No. 958.}

Then, in May 1973, the passage of Bill 1050 authorized Ordinance 1029 enacting space restrictions in Jennings. The law regulated the number of occupants allowed to live in a home based on specified dimensions. Finally, on June 24, 1974, Jennings’ building commissioner issued notice to property owners regarding the City of Jennings’ enactment of a minimum housing law governing every dwelling within the city limits. True minimum housing meant Jennings now conducted periodic inspections of every dwelling.\footnote{See City of Jennings, MO archive Regular Council Session dated June 24, 1974, page 7; Bill 1050 amending Ordinance No. 958 in Jennings, MO Regular Council Session: May 14, 1973, page 2.}

In addition to change of occupancy inspections, periodic inspections were performed at all properties and code violations had to be corrected within an allotted time. Jennings’ path to minimum housing was unique in that the process progressed rapidly after
the introduction of bills. This was caused primarily by the council’s unity and insulation outlined earlier in the chapter.

Other cities’ attempts to enact the policy involved entrenched battles. Opposing views pitted those who believed cities already had sufficient ordinances to control blight against those who argued existing ordinances were inadequate to deal with current trends. While opponents of minimum housing urged officials to do a better job enforcing existing ordinances, it was clear their principal fear was that the policy would create hardship. Consider that in the early 1970s, minimum housing laws were still regarded as a controversial issue.

Rumors abounded in neighboring municipalities that, “University City’s minimum housing hurt older residents.” Many suburbanites viewed laws like minimum housing as peculiar, unwarranted, and authoritarian mandates that placed an undue burden on homeowners. According to one citizen, Ferguson’s 1973 minimum housing bill was, “Ridiculous and unnecessary and should be thrown out.” Ferguson was a prosperous community and to many, it appeared some officials were busy looking for ways to weaken the city instead of strengthening it.188

Prevailing attitudes in Ferguson favored more traditional means such as exclusion as the best method of preserving community character and property values. Ironically, minimum codes had been criticized as methods of discrimination against the poor and people of color. Nevertheless, Ferguson detractors labeled minimum housing codes as dictatorial claiming building officials had too much power in assessing properties for

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nuisance or repair needs. They opposed the concept of inspections arguing that matters concerning conditions of properties should be handled by the buyer and seller.\textsuperscript{189}

Most notable was that Ferguson’s bill did not involve periodic inspections. Ferguson’s policy language stipulated inspections be performed preoccupancy or upon resale. The bill did not affect existing residences. Nevertheless, officials repeatedly tabled the bill until it died. Three years would pass before the city adopted Bill 4607 enacting a new housing code to become effective on March 1, 1977. However, before Ferguson’s city codebook could bear any resemblance to University City’s and Jennings’, a majority of voters needed to approve the measure in a November 2, 1976 special election. Ferguson voters rejected minimum housing by a vote of 6,398 in favor to 4,452 opposed.\textsuperscript{190}

Failing to garner constituent support for minimum housing standards in 1973 and 1976, Ferguson officials set out to construct and present more palatable alternatives. Early polling for the exterior appearance program showed residents favored this type of policy three to one. In a supplemental election held November 6, 1979, voters approved the exterior appearance program. The 3,613 to 3,164 tallies contradicted the polling numbers, and the narrow margin reflected citizen division on such issues in Ferguson. Notwithstanding, the city instituted the program on February 6, 1980. Shortly after the implementation of Ferguson’s exterior appearance program, complaints of inequitable application and targeting began to accumulate.\textsuperscript{191}

\textsuperscript{189} See City of Ferguson, MO archive dated July 28, 1970, page 5; Reference to public comments in Ferguson archive Special Session dated February 1, 1973, page 2.

\textsuperscript{190} Bill No. 4607 passed and became Ordinance No. 76-1578 filed in codebook No. 9, page 105. See, Ferguson Regular Council Meeting dated September 14, 1976, page 4: Results from special election Tuesday, November 2, 1976 from the St. Louis, State of Missouri Board of Election Commissioners; See City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated November 13, 1973, page 4.

\textsuperscript{191} According to the board of election commissioners of the County of Saint Louis, state of Missouri passed and adopted by the council of the city of Ferguson as Ordinance No. 79-1726. See also, Ferguson archive dated June 26, 1979, page 4: Bill No. 5072 passed unanimously and became ordinance number 79-1726 and
Officials maintained claims of discriminatory targeting were untrue and that all houses and properties were being inspected. However, Ferguson archives indicate that officials were in fact directing inspectors to specific areas. Closer examination also reveals more supporting evidence of discriminatory treatment. Although the program was written to apply to the entire city, Ferguson only funded the program through HUD funds. Therefore, inspections were required to be limited to low to moderate-income areas only.\(^\text{192}\)

In 1984, Ferguson instituted a change of occupancy permit requirement and density regulations. Density controls were an effective housing preservation tool. The measure also helped alleviate overcrowding in schools. However, the tool proved to be largely ineffective for Ferguson as its enactment was woefully delayed and the policy lacked the accompanying components needed to make the policy effective. Without rigorous and reliable inspection and enforcement mechanisms to compliment it, occupancy restrictions were rendered pointless. For example, absent periodic inspections, Ferguson depended heavily on sources like school enrollment to help surmise occupancy levels.\(^\text{193}\)

This method was problematic as school districts were usually not contiguous with city boundaries. In some cases, family members and friends claimed residency for students that did not physically live on the premises. Interviewee U5 explained, “Many kids lived with grandma. It became less a nuclear family than a group of people living together out of necessity.” Stereotypical assumptions disallowed legitimate, founded, and equitable

\(^{192}\) See City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session: July 26, 1983, page 1-2.

\(^{193}\) For example, see City of Ferguson, MO Special Public Hearing dated September 10, 1991, page 4.
inquiries about occupant status and encouraged overaggressive, excessive, and disproportionate use of the law instead.  

A 1992 referendum election repealed Ferguson’s exterior appearance program further weakening the city’s defenses against blight. Not only did Ferguson reject authentic minimum codes, it was now without one of the best tools it had at its disposal. The referendum was followed by a 4,773 to 2,115 defeat of a 1994 property preservation proposition. At this point, Ferguson’s overall housing stock was still in better shape than many of its neighbors. However, failure to strengthen housing codes, perform impartial enforcement, and dedicate more reliable resources helped lay the groundwork for problems to come.

Lacking the tools provided in true minimum housing policy, housing stock maintenance began to deteriorate rapidly in certain sectors of Ferguson. This was particularly true for areas containing clusters of apartment dwellings. As conditions worsened, Ferguson chose not to amend their policies. Instead, the city turned to a different source and style of enforcement to address problems. Ferguson relied on its police to monitor, control, and deter housing deterioration. However, police were trained to combat crime not housing code violations.

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195 Consider that Ferguson considered enacting an occupancy permit as early as 1974. See Regular council meeting April 23, 1974, page 2. See also, Bill No. 5400, an ordinance providing for minimum living space regulations and requirements providing for an occupancy permit. Vote of six yes to one absent became Ordinance No. 84-2032 and is filed in book number 15, page 93, See, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 8, 1984, page 3. See also, Ferguson archive Regular Council Session dated October 8, 1992, page 4; and Ferguson Canvas of Election Results dated December 13, 1994: municipal general election held on Tuesday, November 8, 1994 in the City of Ferguson. MO. Results from the board of election commissioners of the County of Saint Louis, State of Missouri.
196 See City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session dated March 11, 1980, page 5; Special Council Session February 7, 1984, page 1. Bill No. 5390 An ordinance levying special tax bills against property for costs of cutting and removing weeds as provided under chapter 12 health section 12.03 nuisance is defined unanimously passed and became Ordinance No. 84-2022 and is filed in book No. 15, page 69.
This is not to imply that police were incapable of executing fair, effective housing code enforcement. In fact, it was common for cities to utilize police, fire, and other city departments in housing code enforcement, particularly those with stringent codes and thorough inspection mechanisms. However, these measures were usually temporary assignments to augment services in response to staff shortages. University City, for example, frequently utilized employees of its fire and police departments for duties such as code inspections. Jennings even appointed a former police officer as special building inspector in 1985.\footnote{City of Jennings, MO archive Special Session public hearing dated August 21, 1985, page 2.}

In the case of Ferguson, however, police were not assigned to perform inspections, and housing codes were not what they were instructed to enforce. Ferguson failed to implement meaningful policy, delayed implementation of basic measures, and reverted to ineffective alternatives. The city relied on draconian methods to control aspects of community life having little to do with housing code compliance. Exponential growth in black residency, low-income residents, and renters introduced social dynamics that Ferguson was not only unwilling to embrace but were committed to isolating and restricting to the cities’ edges.

For decades, housing codes and enforcement proved essential to protecting the integrity of a cities’ housing stock. But acute changes in resident demographics challenged municipal officials to consider and reconsider approaches to preserving the characteristics and value of homes and the implications associated with various approaches. Growth of rental properties complicated compliance enforcement, and it became more difficult to identify property owners and occupant status. Cities implemented different methods to
evaluate, maintain, and improve housing conditions. Some policies like landlord registration were effective and well-liked, while others like family definition and policing created resentment and tension which intensified over time.\textsuperscript{198}

Early and true implementation of minimum housing did not eliminate problems for cities. Jennings and University City each implemented the tool early and completely. Nevertheless, each city still struggled with deterioration in neighborhoods. Areas contained condemn properties, vacant lots, and until cities passed ordinances requiring they be removed upon change in occupancy, aesthetically displeasing security bars on doors and windows. Housing codes and enforcement decisions, especially in the early period of suburban transformation, were difficult tasks requiring consideration of a complex array of competing and complementary factors.\textsuperscript{199}

Consider Hazelwood’s case. City officials first began exploring minimum housing ideas as early as May 1971, when they obtained copies of both Berkeley and University City’s minimum housing bills for comparison purposes. Three years later, in November 1974, the council adopted an occupancy permit requirement. However, a decade later in

\textsuperscript{198} See City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1980 Document 352; City of Maplewood Missouri archives April 24, 1990. For more information regarding the development and implementation of the city’s rental housing registration ordinance see: City of University City archives Special Session 1077: June 10, 1974. See also, Ferguson archive dated June 28, 1970, page 2; Ferguson Special Session September 19, 1989, page 2; Ferguson Regular Council Session January 24, 2006, page 4; Hazelwood Special Council Meeting dated April 14, 2014.

\textsuperscript{199} For the story on Maplewood’s minimum housing see, City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1973 document 230; City of Maplewood, Missouri Archives year 1973 document 346; City of Maplewood Missouri archives February 20 1974 Document 429; City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1974 document 59; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1981 document number 454: Bill number 4201 was approved on May 26 1981 as ordinance number 4090 , In document number 461 . City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1981 document number 454; City of Maplewood archives April 14, 1987 document 8; Bill number 4436 an ordinance authorizing the city manager to enter into and execute a contract with St. Louis County Missouri for minimum housing inspection services approved as ordinance number 4291; For more about security bars see, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated September 13, 1976, page 1: Document No. 3064; and Passage of Ordinance No. 5762 which be found in City of University City, MO archive Regular Session 1524: July 9, 1990, page 8.
May 1984, the city still did not have minimum housing and enforcement on the books as Hazelwood voters rejected the 1976 proposition.\textsuperscript{200}

Public records demonstrate low civic involvement among Hazelwood’s electorate—particularly relative to other study cities. Therefore, citizen preferences were not easily examinable. Nevertheless, in general, people want less government and the original occupancy permit issue ignited a firestorm. Hazelwood officials adopted the 1976 measure without public discussion or education. Citizens petitioned for a referendum and voted 1,400 to 904 to repeal the law. Hazelwood officials made the mistake of underestimating the controversial nature of the policy, citizens’ issue attitudes, and voter capacity to mobilize against the law.\textsuperscript{201}

Although some cities chose not to adopt minimum housing codes and some faced staunch citizen opposition to tools like occupancy permits, by 1976, 30 St. Louis County communities had housing codes with occupancy permit provisions and suggested others adopt the tool. A 1976 East-West Gateway Coordinating Council survey of the 30 St. Louis County municipalities with housing codes and occupancy permits found that 100% of the 30 communities would recommend the procedure to other cities. The report further stated

\textsuperscript{200} For more about the beginning of Hazelwood’s occupancy permit efforts see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive May 13, 1971; City of Hazelwood, MO November 6, 1974; and Hazelwood, MO archive November 29, 1974.

\textsuperscript{201} See, Referendum Petition regarding occupancy permits in transcript of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated December 1, 1976. See also, Hazelwood, MO February 18, 1975; City of Hazelwood, MO August 18, 1976; City Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated February 18, 1975; and Hazelwood, MO Regular Session August 4, 1976; Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated August 4, 1976: Bill 1220 Housing, occupancy permit provisions unanimously adopted as Ordinance 1192-76. See also, archives Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated June 22, 1976; and Hazelwood, MO dated July 7, 1976.
that 97% of cities felt the occupancy permit had a positive effect in preventing or slowing neighborhood deterioration.\textsuperscript{202}

Of all the suburbs surveyed, the only community that did not feel as though requirements had slowed deterioration was Wellston. This further reinforces the point that stringent code enforcement measures were more effective at preventing decline than stabilizing or reversing the trend. The tool was largely ineffective once an area had already exhibited a great deal of deterioration. Thirteen years after Hazelwood officials first considered the tool, they were preparing to reach out to Ferguson officials to ascertain how Ferguson managed to recently get an occupancy permit law adopted.\textsuperscript{203}

Relative to both threat level and adoption difficulty, Hazelwood faced an uphill battle from the beginning. As in some neighboring suburbs, Hazelwood contained resource rich areas where maintenance quality was superb, and the dangers of deterioration were nonexistent. Expensive homes and newer developments dawned these sections of Hazelwood’s landscape. Conversely, a significant portion of Hazelwood still consisted of properties which contained old deteriorated accessory buildings formerly utilized in farming.

Minimum housing ordinances required property owners bring buildings into compliance with new standards and for many Hazelwood residents, this was financially unfeasible. While most municipalities faced a similar dilemma, the dynamics of Hazelwood’s housing stock included an additional quandary. In addition to homeowner compliance, Hazelwood’s residents would be required to repair, maintain, or demolish and

\textsuperscript{202} According to figure referenced in transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO August 4, 1976; According to results of East-West Gateway Coordinating Council survey figures in transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated August 18, 1976.

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid
clear structures which in most cases were no longer operational. Consider these elements and it becomes obvious why the issue garnered such a high level of involvement from an otherwise apathetic electorate.\footnote{Referendum petition contained 2,000 voter signatures. See City of Hazelwood, MO archive December 1, 1976. See also, Hazelwood July 7, 1976; Hazelwood, MO September 15, 1976.}

Hazelwood officials recognized destabilization threats from their housing stock circumstance, leveraged the available tool of minimum housing codes, and authorized budget expenditures to cover the salary of a building inspector and enforcement services. However, voters rejected the tools through a successful referendum petition, and officials were back at square one. At this point, officials had several options: 1. They could elect to do nothing, 2. They could mount a minimum housing codes education campaign to try to gain more voter support, or 3. They could seek alternatives.

Hazelwood officials chose to explore other available tools for combating deterioration. Alternatives to minimum housing codes were not as effective, as they had less teeth. Nevertheless, they were usually more palatable to voters, and contained some of the elements of minimum housing. These factors made them more adoptable and much more effective than doing nothing. As one Hazelwood policymaker put it, “A half a loaf, or third of a loaf is better than none at all.”\footnote{Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO Work Session dated August 17, 1977.}

Hazelwood ordinances at the time only authorized the city to require property owners correct deficiencies posing a threat of physical injury to the public. Such a law was minimally effective at addressing the most prominent contributing factor in municipal-level decline—structural decay. Hazelwood officials needed an additional tool and they
set out to identify which tool met or exceeded both the adoptability and impact thresholds the council agreed upon.

In August 1977, Hazelwood adopted an exterior maintenance code, and began leveraging CDBG funds and other funding to support inspection and enforcement activities. The exterior maintenance code served to mitigate some of the defects in the city’s existing code. However, it was essentially an expansion of nuisance and demolition codes which were already on the books. The exterior maintenance code did little to empower the city to address the real deficiency in the existing code. Inspection and enforcement mechanisms were what needed to be addressed.\textsuperscript{206}

Nuisance orders relied on reporting or inspector discovery. Also, conditions of many properties were beyond help and would have to be demolished anyway. An occupancy permit system would provide the additional mechanisms for prompting inspections thereby expanding enforcement opportunities and multiplying impact. Hazelwood’s minimum housing proponents understood this and since the 1976 repealing of the law, officials had remained steadfast in promoting the adoption of an occupancy permit requirement.

During the preparation of Hazelwood’s 1984 comprehensive plan, disagreement emerged between two groups of councilpersons concerning reintroduction of occupancy permits. One lawmaker was especially adamant as she represented a ward in which the signs of decline were beginning to subtly show. A fellow lawmaker, also a proponent of the measure, encouraged colleagues to, “Face the future and view the effort as a challenge

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid
to make Hazelwood a little bit better. It will be difficult, but the council has to determine if the advice of the professionals is in fact for the good of Hazelwood.”

Hazelwood officials were proposing adoption of the Ferguson version of an occupancy permit which provided for inspections at the time of rental or sale of property. This new Hazelwood proposal had less controls than the one voted out in 1976. That version of the ordinance instituted ongoing inspections and enforcement procedures. Nevertheless, some policymakers remained skeptical, citing reports that other cities such as Florissant had the periodic inspection version of housing code and it increased the cost of homes in the municipality.

Hazelwood’s council had been working on the new plan since July 1983, and the issue of whether to include an occupancy permit served as the only notable source of disagreement. While the council unanimously agreed stronger codes and enforcements were warranted, several lawmakers feared they may be once again traveling the 1976 road. Proponents pointed out the weakness of the existing exterior code, citing 75 percent of citations were for beautification rather than health and safety violations. This amounted to a beautification program, and beautification was not mentioned in the established code.

Nevertheless, several officials viewed the 1976 referendum as a clear message and mandate from Hazelwood voters to their elected representatives. While the new proposal varied from the 1976 law, it was still an occupancy permit and voters had issued a resounding no to occupancy permits. Although this was a different version, some officials lacked the will to test its palatability on voters. Further, survey data revealed that more than

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207 Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City Hazelwood, MO archive Special Meeting dated May 23, 1984: Comprehensive Plan discussion.
208 Ibid
209 According to figure included in transcript of Hazelwood, MO Work Session dated June 3, 1981.
90 percent of residents favored the exterior code and did not want an interior code. Ultimately, Hazelwood’s completed 1984 plan did not include the implementation of the occupancy permit inspection and code enforcement system.\footnote{According to survey results included in archive City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated July 27, 1983.} 

Hazelwood produced a plan that included the implementation of communication techniques and instruments designed to stress the value of the existing exterior maintenance code and strengthen its effect. The program included voluntary services and free interior inspections. At the close of the 1980s, five years after the implementation of the accentuated exterior maintenance code and programs, Hazelwood officials authorized an assessment of its overall effectiveness on the conditions of the city’s housing stock.

A 1989 University of Missouri-St. Louis area municipal housing codes and housing survey looked at the conditions of Hazelwood’s housing stock for the years 1980, 1983, and 1985. The report showed the housing stock deteriorating in 1980, but years 1983 and 1985 showed Hazelwood’s housing stock to be improving. At the time of the report, Hazelwood officials still favored adoption of occupancy permits. They were still gauging voter temperature, structural atmosphere, and monitoring windows of opportunity. Nevertheless, as the report indicated, the 1984 enhanced exterior maintenance compromise garnered positive results.\footnote{For 1989 report details see, archive City of Hazelwood, MO dated September 6, 1989.}

Hazelwood’s 1984 comprehensive planning process resulted in several innovative additions to the city’s exterior maintenance code, and the city would continue seeking ways to improve and strengthen the measure in future decades. According to a December 2009 issue of the Missouri Municipal Review, the City of Hazelwood Code Enforcement
Division was the first municipality in Missouri to deploy mobile wireless software to assist in assuring code enforcement and to improve productivity.\textsuperscript{212}

The article highlighted how the city partnered with an information technologies firm to develop the module which could be integrated with other computer systems and provided code enforcement personnel access to “real time” information. The tool allowed for more instantaneous creation of post-inspection citations utilizing laptop computers. The initiative was part of Hazelwood’s efforts to create a paperless office environment which was more environmentally friendly, decreased bureaucracy, and saved taxpayer money.\textsuperscript{213}

Over the course of the entire study period, Hazelwood officials attempted to implement minimum housing and over the entire period, they failed to do so. Hazelwood entered the era as a nonprofessionally operated village equipped with outmoded codes which were powerless to affect decaying old farm properties and structures. After establishing a charter form of government, city officials set out to institute more adequate measures for controlling the city’s structural health. Voters rejected those measures, but officials never lost sight of their original objectives and goals. They reassessed, adjusted plans, instituted alternatives, and continued to improve those tools.

Exterior maintenance codes did not equip Hazelwood with the full mechanisms of minimum housing leveraged by Jennings and University City, or the inspection prompting device of change in possession permit requirements employed in Ferguson. Nevertheless, Hazelwood officials not only maximized the tools available to them, they also enriched them—making the tools more effective. Hazelwood offers an example of a cooperative

\textsuperscript{212} See, reported in Hazelwood City News and Events recorded in archive City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Session: January 6, 2010.
\textsuperscript{213} See, City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting: reported in city news and events on January 6, 2010.
approach to policymaking. Despite enjoying council consensus related to identifying and prioritizing threats, needs, and options, Hazelwood policymakers exhibited an intriguing mix of idealism and pragmatism.\textsuperscript{214}

\textsuperscript{214} Referencing City of Hazelwood, MO Special Session dated July 27, 1983; City of Hazelwood September 6, 1989.
Chapter 6. Land Use Policy

Introduction

Housing codes and enforcement were fundamental to early municipal-level stabilization efforts. Minimum housing policy proved effective in areas that utilized the complete tool in combination with other methods. Some municipalities chose to use only certain components of the tool while electing to levy various other prevention and enforcement mechanisms. Regardless of which housing preservation method officials employed, owner-occupied homes and property values continued to decline. While adjacent mature suburbs like Clayton, Ladue, and Florissant flourished, locals looked to municipal leaders to govern their respective towns to similar success.²¹⁵

Suburban governments needed to rethink land use policies, and options were limited. The unique character mentioned earlier was established before some areas were even incorporated. While some cities like Ferguson and Hazelwood grew geographically over time, annexed areas usually retained existing zone rights. Suburban boundaries and designs constrained officials to operate within the parameters set by location, historical function, and city founders.²¹⁶

Land reutilization in inner suburbs was not simply a method employed to handle deterioration, it was one of the most critical elements in suburban survival. Localities

²¹⁵ Occupancy rules served as a critical device for the city in controlling the integrity of its housing stock. See City of University City archives Regular Session 1614: April 18th, 1994, page 4 for more reference to the policy and practice.
²¹⁶ According to Hazelwood City Plan Commission minutes of June 11, 1992, Hazelwood usually adopted St. Louis County Zoning Code for annexed areas as recommended, “95% of the county zoning is comparable to our zoning and is based on the St. Louis County Master Plan.” See also, City of Hazelwood, MO July 15, 1992. Annexed land was required by law to retain the same zoning rights and could be diminished by annexation. Annexation was formally approved by the Supreme Court. Attorneys recommend cities make no extensive changes in zoning in developing plans. See City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated July 15, 1992.
competed for homeowners and businesses, and competition was fierce. Location, physical characteristics, and function defined these areas in the past, but staying competitive often required redevelopment which frequently required rezoning. Lot sizes and designations had to be amended to accommodate demographical, environmental, market, and industry changes. Consider a Ferguson resident’s 1983 perspective, “We don't need to encourage people to move into shiny new carefree houses in St. Charles because we are being too picky.”

Through land reutilization decisions, municipal leaders chose whether to reinforce their identity or redefine it for the future. For example, University City boasted a reasonable level of commercial activity, but the lifeblood of the municipality resided in residential property. Unlike commercial centers and industrial suburbs who generated revenue from economic activity, property values were especially critical to the stability of bedroom communities. University City garnered revenue primarily from property taxes paid by homeowners and did not enjoy much space for new development which further restricted options and increased dependency on property taxes.

Interviewee U1 explains, “We’re a very built out city. We have minor strips in our neighborhoods. We have the kind of neighborhoods with a corner grocery store or little pockets of commerce.” While bedroom suburbs like University City were particularly vulnerable to decline due to diminishing property values, other types of mature suburbs were also susceptible to the destabilizing activities of the era.

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217 Excerpt of quote taken from archive City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session: July 26, 1983, page 1. For an example of buildable lot changes see, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council Meeting April 22, 1975, page 7.

218 Excerpt of quote taken from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official.
Historically, streetcar suburbs like Maplewood could better afford to keep homeowner property taxes low. Enjoying a retail rich commercial sector, Maplewood relied more on revenues generated from economic activity than property taxes. However, by 1970, the mature inner suburb was no longer a commercial retail hub enjoying robust economic activity. Fairly insulated from the destabilizing activities occurring in northern areas of the county, Maplewood offered a unique opportunity to enrich my examination of post-fair housing era decline and stabilization in mature St. Louis inner suburbs.

Maplewood entered the post-fairing housing era reeling from a collapse in commercial activity and corruption in local government. Decline in commercial and retail businesses generated less tax revenue resulting in increasingly higher property tax rates for Maplewood homeowners. Poor management of city affairs and fiscal fraudulence exacerbated the city’s decline. Interviewee M3 recalls, “Maplewood really struggled in the 1970s, business was hurting, bad politicians, and all.” Fiscal stress increased, city services suffered, and conditions deteriorated.²¹⁹

Despite not facing the negative impacts of resegregating neighborhoods, discriminatory housing and lending practices, and concentrated HUD activity, the city faced municipal-level decline, nonetheless. According to HUD’s action grant criteria, Maplewood’s age of housing, per capita income, and population lag met the three requirements needed to qualify as a distressed city. Consequentially, Maplewood’s revitalization activities resembled stabilization measures being enacted in HUD-focused

²¹⁹ Excerpt of quote taken from Interviewee M2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 48-year Resident / Historian.
areas. However, with no discernible black in-migration, there was no white flight. Despite higher taxes and declining city services, most core residents remained.220

At the height of its commercial retail prominence, Maplewood never lost its small-town appeal. Residents clung to that identity, and it helped the city get through the tough times. Suburbs’ historical identity and appeal did not always remain fixed, however. As technology, transportation, and tastes evolved, some suburbs took on new identities. By the post-fair housing period, some suburbs had transitioned from their original function and were a mix of their past and present selves.

Jennings, for example, was a bedroom suburb before the arrival of two malls. The advent of two large retail shopping centers, one in 1955 and another in 1961, transformed the municipality’s function, financial fortitude, and municipal priorities. Despite remaining largely a bedroom suburb, by 1970, the city depended less on property taxes to fund city services and efforts to preserve the city’s retail activity rivaled efforts to protect property values. While some suburbs experienced a blending of functions, others experienced multiple functional transitions.221

By the time highways emerged and automobile use skyrocketed, Ferguson had become a streetcar suburb. However, by 1970, the former railroad suburb attracting wealth and affluence had transitioned yet again. Although no longer serving as a retreat for railroad commuters or a streetcar shopping destination, Ferguson’s well-established business sector

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220 According to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Urban Development action grant program: action grants provide assistance to distress cities and Maplewood is a distressed city. See, City of Maplewood, Missouri public hearing archives dated October 20, 1978: Document 77-78.
221 Schmerber 2011, p.228 and 235. Also see, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session: June 9, 1975, page 6: Document 2606. Jennings enter into contract with the Real Estate Development Corporation, a national corporation that does research and makes recommendations for HUD. The study was performed for the West Florissant Neighborhood Business District strategy.
attracted prominent clientele. While Ferguson experienced several transitions in function, the mature suburb still fared well physically and financially. The origins of its founding solidified the suburb’s identity and factored prominently into policy decisions throughout the study period.222

When Interviewee H5 moved to Hazelwood in the late 1950s, “There wasn’t much other than farmland and old Highway 66.” However, within the next 20 years, Hazelwood officials were citing “[lack of buildable land]” as their number one challenge and were considering adding more land, property, and residents through annexation. Issue positions ranged from believing the city existed at a nice community size to believing the city needed to grow by annexing areas. According to one Hazelwood policymaker, “This item should be determined by the philosophy of the city.” As such, by 1983, the city had acquired several large parcels of undeveloped land.223

Suburbs varied in size, function, and identity. There was no standard bearer one could model one’s own suburb after. Nevertheless, feasibility studies and comprehensive planning processes helped cities better understand their situation, available tools, and implications of decisions. Philosophies impacted decisions but characteristics limited options. Factors for landlocked cities differed from those with unincorporated areas bordering their city limits. Impact of rezoning residential to commercial varied between

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222 For examples of early city policy at the start of the era see, City of Ferguson, MO archive May 12, 1970, page 1.
223 Excerpt of quote taken from Interview H4: 07/24/2019, White / Male / 63-year Resident / Ex-Public Official; Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Session dated August 1, 1979; Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of Hazelwood, MO Special Meeting dated June 29, 1983.
cases. Despite these variations, however, city lawmakers’ decisions could render these unique characteristics valuable assets or costly liabilities.

**Parks**

Hazelwood assessed its conditions and produced a “very aggressive and challenging plan” for land reutilization. Utilizing land use maps of the city, Hazelwood integrated prospected annexations into existing area reutilization goals, and zoned parcels in accordance with well-defined objectives. While activity was robust, officials created and maintained an environment in which policy dictated development as opposed to the other way around. The city’s ambitious undertaking required creative methods of procuring resources and supports to implement.\(^{224}\)

Prior to the 1970s, the Hazelwood Parks and Recreation Commission actively explored various methods of land acquisition for parks. However, the Village of Hazelwood Board of Trustees continuously turned down their recommendations. By 1971, however, the city was no longer a village and Hazelwood councilpersons were in unanimous agreement that the city needed parks and facilities for recreation. Officials began affirmatively seeking to acquire land for park development by contacting landowners and collecting land availability and pricing information.\(^{225}\)

Hazelwood’s parks development began with a resident designating 13.28 acres of land for use as a city park on the condition the city properly insured and maintained the area. City officials accepted the resident’s benevolence and proceeded to add city-owned parks to the area as well. By leveraging various financing instruments including 50 %

\(^{224}\) See, City of Hazelwood, MO archives dated April 27, 1971; City of Hazelwood, MO archives Regular Session dated December 5, 1984; Hazelwood Regular Session dated December 4, 1985; Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archive June 29, 1983.

\(^{225}\) *Ibid*
matching grants, a million-dollar bond issue, a sales tax levy, and paying property owners in installments, Hazelwood transformed its landscape. And on January 5, 1974, Hazelwood became the first municipality to participate in the St. Louis County matching funds for parks acquisition program.  

By June 1980, less than a decade after beginning its parks development efforts, the suburb of 14,082 residents boasted 10 parks, over 130 acres of parkland, two swimming pools, and bike/jogging trails. Although Hazelwood officials, administrators, and city personnel changed over the study period, the city’s commitment to its parks and parks development remained steadfast throughout. The city continued to develop parks and recreation amenities through land purchases, county park acquisitions, and annexations; and CDBGs and other public funding always included allocations designated for parks and public spaces.

By the end of the study period, Hazelwood’s parks and recreation portfolio consisted of 16 community parks covering 160 acres, an 18-hole disc golf course, bike/skate park, aquatic center, sports complex, and two recreation centers. Note, the city has struggled to achieve equitable accessibility for all its wards as early investments disproportionally dedicated facilities in certain areas. Notwithstanding, Hazelwood’s

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226 For more information about Hazelwood’s early park acquisitions see City of Hazelwood, MO archives January 5, 1974; Hazelwood archive February 5, 1975; City of Hazelwood, MO April 7, 1971; Special bond issue election on November 2, 1971. See also, Hazelwood archive dated September 28, 1971: Bill 889; Hazelwood archive August 1972; Hazelwood Bill 968 unanimously adopted as Ordinance 939 on September 20, 1972; Hazelwood archive October 4, 1972; Hazelwood archive December 6, 1972.

parks development program demonstrates an example of suburban land transformation through effective goal setting, planning, and land reutilization.\textsuperscript{228}

While Hazelwood began the period with an evolution in objectives, Maplewood focused on improving and reinforcing established norms. One of Maplewood's best strengths was its walkable traffic. Maplewood historically enlisted the services of architects and planners who specialized in the creation of small-town and family-centric designs. Maplewood demonstrated continual devotion to developing and retaining its public spaces by allocating notable percentages of its financial resources to the category, appointing professional engineers, and ensuring adequate maintenance staffing.\textsuperscript{229}

Amid decline in the city’s fiscal health, governance performance, and administrative professionalism, improving Maplewood’s parks and recreation offerings became a way to curb decline and spark a renewed interest in the suburb. The city’s strong history of accentuating pedestrian friendly spaces established a reputation which transcended the difficult period and helped the city retain its attractiveness. Low intensity park developments provided natural habitat preservation, encouraged community interaction, and required modest management and maintenance. These were ideal settings for tree planting, concerts, and picnics.

Maplewood’s zoning for parks policies adhered to well-defined parameters frequently rejecting proposals which infringed on greenspace while lauding developments proposing multiuse aspects. Despite the city’s desperate need to rejuvenate its retail economy, policymakers seldom considered rezoning areas established for public use and

\textsuperscript{228} According to City of Hazelwood, MO website hazelwoodmo.org accessed on March 28, 2019.

\textsuperscript{229} See, City of Maplewood, MO Regular Session: Resolution No. 16, year 1978.
enjoyment. Instead, they focused on redeveloping existing infrastructure and revitalizing areas by incentivizing investment and supporting private efforts.\textsuperscript{230}

As an early participant in the St. Louis County Municipal Cooperation Financial Assistance Program for development of neighborhood parks, Maplewood began leveraging grants to help support its parks acquisition and development efforts in 1974. After establishing a parks and recreation department the following year, the mature inner suburb began increasing expenditures for parks and recreation. Neighborhood parks, youth programs, bike paths, senior citizens' programs, special events, inclusion specialists for individuals with disabilities, and a parks and recreation brochure followed.\textsuperscript{231}

In April 1985, the city received its first US Land and Water grant which funded aquatic improvements and continued to utilize various financing methods including a 2001 $5.6 million bond issue to improve its aquatics facilities. City officials addressed decline through a method of land reutilization which focused on protecting and leveraging its existing small-town appeal. From expansion of bicycling/walking trails to the 2002 formation of a joint parks and recreation department with neighboring Richmond Heights, Maplewood continued to improve and expand its parks and recreation selections over the remainder of the study period.\textsuperscript{232}

While Maplewood enhanced its parkland and Hazelwood transformed its landscape through parkland development, other study group suburbs boasted impressive parks and

\textsuperscript{230} City of Maplewood, Missouri archive year 1982: Document No. 59.
\textsuperscript{231} Resolution No. 139A in City of Maplewood, Missouri archives year 1974, Document No. 77; For information about Maplewood parks and recreation, see City of Maplewood, MO archive April 14, 2009.
recreation offerings and consistently sought to improve them. By June 1970, Jennings’ parks and facilities improvement fund was nearly depleted. With a surplus in the general operating revenue fund, Jennings’ council increased the parks and facilities budget. At first glance, one may ascertain Jennings was underfunding the account and needed to increase the allocation just to sustain it. However, subsequent policies challenge this notion.\textsuperscript{233}

Jennings officials demonstrated a firm commitment to parks and recreation through its land reutilization decisions. Allocations continued to increase as the advent of CDBGs, capital equipment funds, and revenue sharing provided more revenue for improvements. Jennings designated substantial portions to financing parks, playgrounds, equipment, and programs. Despite narrow defeats, officials energetically lobbied citizens to support bond issues to finance land acquisition for the purpose of constructing a community recreation center and related facilities.\textsuperscript{234}

Bond issue elections were one of the few avenues where Jennings’ citizens’ preferences were accurately portrayed. As mentioned earlier, Jennings’ mayor and council enjoyed consensus and relative policy liberty. Following the failed bond issue, officials immediately adjusted. And by 1975, a park survey for the site of the new skating rink was complete. The council authorized the park committee to proceed with installation of the rink as well as a new bicycle path. As the building commissioner prepared a bulletin displaying the new bike route to be distributed throughout the city, the street commissioner secured bids to purchase signs to be posted along the route.\textsuperscript{235}

\textsuperscript{233} Figure taken from City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session: June 22, 1970, page 4.
\textsuperscript{234} See, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated April 8, 1974, page 4: Bond Issue $2,000,000.
\textsuperscript{235} For more information about Jennings’ park and recreation investments see, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session: April 12, 1971, page 3; Jennings archive Regular Council Session dated August 26, 1974, page 3; and Jennings archive Regular Council Session dated March 10, 1975, page 2.
By the time Hazelwood began developing its first 13 acres designated for park use, Ferguson residents already enjoyed over 100 acres of parkland, and city officials were busy acquiring more through land purchases. While Ferguson benefited from the benevolence of its founder and other wealthy landowners over the decades, the municipality also enjoyed knowledgeable, skilled professionals and resource purveyors which compounded benefits. With keen awareness and understanding of opportunities and available tools, Ferguson remained positioned to secure maximum resources and leveraged the latest devices when the city so desired.\textsuperscript{236}

With its resource richness and professional fortitude, Ferguson garnered the admiration of its neighbors who considered the city an attractive partner for projects. However, with its high-level of self-sufficiency and self-containment, citizens endorsed only the proposals with the least amount of Ferguson contribution and largest returns. When Berkeley’s city manager approached Ferguson with a proposal for a joint park development in October 1970, council majority members agreed with Ferguson’s mayor that, “This joint venture is a practical idea.” Nevertheless, a Ferguson Homeowners Association petition killed the proposal in park board committee.\textsuperscript{237}

Although a significant amount of Ferguson’s parkland originated from land bequeathed prior to 1970, an examination of ongoing parks and recreation policies offer glimpses into the city’s land use philosophy. Ferguson acquired a great deal of land through tax lien acquisitions, purchases, dedications, and annexations. Officials were routinely divided, and active citizens opposed certain uses and the use of public dollars. While

\textsuperscript{236} Parkland figures taken from City of Ferguson, MO archive dated January 13, 1970. Hazelwood’s 13 acres references figures taken from City of Hazelwood, MO archives January 5, 1974.

\textsuperscript{237} Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO public hearing Regular Session dated October 27, 1970, page 2: Bill 4461- An ordinance regarding joint Berkeley-Ferguson park venture.
Ferguson’s land use policies remained consistent with their philosophy, other policy patterns reveal striking contradictions.\(^{238}\)

Despite its expressed opposition to accepting and using public funds to finance developments, the city regularly participated in public funding programs like the US Land and Water Conservation Fund and St. Louis County’s matching funds for parks program. While opposition to these programs existed in each of the study cities, Ferguson’s opposition tended to be larger, more organized, and deeply visceral. Public hearing transcripts reveal a citizenry philosophically devoted to the principals of individualism and personal responsibility, but notably selective regarding the concepts of collective goods and communal developments.\(^{239}\)

Ferguson’s land use policies demonstrated minimal collective will to finance items such as recreation centers which are designated for community use. This ideology was further exhibited through rejection of environmentally friendly efforts. When a 1979 bike route proposal met fierce opposition, one supporter said, “Ferguson has many old-fashioned residents who do not see the benefit in things like bike lanes and increasing bike usage.” By 1992, however, bike routes were more common in cities and significant transition in Ferguson’s citizenry had occurred.\(^{240}\)

Transportation improvement and bicycle education programs had become a popular tool for addressing automobile related problems in urban areas. Nevertheless, Ferguson’s

\(^{238}\) See, City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Session dated July 27, 1971.

\(^{239}\) City of Ferguson, MO archives Regular Council Meeting dated May 14, 1974, page 3; Ferguson Regular Council Meeting dated June 11, 1974, page 7; and Ferguson, MO Resolution to apply for US LWCF passed and approved by council of the City of Ferguson, MO 22\(^{nd}\) day of January 1995.

\(^{240}\) Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated May 22, 1979, page 3; According to transcripts of public hearing in City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session: October 6, 1992, page 1: A proposed three-year project intended to educate people on using bicycles for transportation and program to reduce the use of cars in the St. Louis area.
1992 proposal died. Another proposal failed in 1998 with one Ferguson citizen exclaiming, “I don't know of one person who rides their bike to work.” Ironically, in September 2009, thirty years after the reading of its first bike path proposal, Ferguson was one of three St. Louis municipalities recognized by a membership-based bike/walk association for its participation in living well programs. Two years later, Ferguson established a bicycle pedestrian plan.241

Ferguson’s journey to bike/walk paths offers one illustration of the city’s identity but fails to provide the nuances necessary to present a more complete and accurate description of that identity. As with Jennings, Ferguson’s policy patterns were misleading. However, in Ferguson’s case, policy aligned more with the citizen majority’s preferences which frequently conflicted with the council majority’s preferences. Also noteworthy was the imbalance of power. Although both groups held only slim majorities, the citizen majority wielded disproportionate policy influence over the council majority.

Results of an August 1998 parks and recreation proposition vote help demonstrate this point. Proposition two proposed a sales tax and bond issue to finance a community center. The issue attracted much more harsh criticism, well-organized, and well-funded opposition than proposition support and financing. However, the issue was defeated by only 162 votes. Of all the study cities, Ferguson provides the most intriguing blend of polar opposite ideologies and identities among residents and officials. The suburb was home to a prominent number of, what some Ferguson residents referred to as, radical social and

241 Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated August 25, 1998; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated September 22, 2009; Ferguson Regular Council Session dated December 13, 2011.
environmental activists. Yet these “radicals” enjoyed minimal influence in the policymaking sphere.\footnote{Excerpt of quote taken from Interviewee F4: 05/07/2019, Black / Male / Ex-Law Enforcement Leader; According to municipal general election results from the board of election commissioners of the County of St. Louis, State of Missouri dated August 25, 1998: Election held on Tuesday, August 4, 1998 in the City of Ferguson.}

Ferguson’s dichotomy created a confounding environment. With a broad love of parks and recreation driving interests in the category, divergent beliefs, attitudes, and resources resulted in dramatic inequity of expression and realization of preferences. This chasm splintered Ferguson along an easily identifiable line with little room for misinterpretation. Residents were either very inclusionary or very exclusionary in their policy preferences. The city park board consisted of members from both sides, but the private parks committee enjoyed definitive consensus.

While many were open to allowing nonresident use of parks, slightly more strongly opposed. This resulted in legislation allowing use by Ferguson residents only. Subsequent compromises included granting fee based and resident guest use to nonresidents, and defeat of a bill proposing the posting of signs which read, “This park and its facilities are provided by the City of Ferguson for your enjoyment. Leave it in the same condition as you found it.” Note that exclusionary preferences were not exclusively grounded in racial bigotry.\footnote{Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting dated September 9, 1975, page 8; and Ferguson Regular Council Meeting dated October 11, 1977, page 5.}

Perceived threats of increased crime and vagrancy and economic ideology fueled some citizens’ public park opposition well-before any significant number of black citizens began moving to the municipality. Racial transition in the suburb only served to bring existing phobias and philosophies more prominently to the surface. Since the early days of...
its founding, Ferguson has been home to taxpayers who often equate investment in items like public parks to inviting structural, social, and economic decline.\textsuperscript{244}

Ferguson’s parks policies evolved dramatically over the study period. The mature suburb demonstrated a lack of interest and will to commit adequate resources to parks and recreation in the first 30 years of the era. However, by the turn of the millennium, the city was investing substantial resources to parks and recreation and by 2003, the park fund totaled close to a million dollars. The city’s 2006 comprehensive parks and recreation plan and project produced new objectives, goals, guided decision making, and tasked the city to develop new park facilities, recreation programs, and services.\textsuperscript{245}

One Ferguson official explained, “It was about helping residents invest money and resources in the most effective manner possible and focusing on the quality of life for the community.” At study’s end, Ferguson parks projects had produced an impressive array of offerings. New park trails, multipurpose courts, playgrounds, aquatics center, family community center, and variety of special events and adult and youth programs now accentuate the city’s 10 parks. An examination of the 2000s’ expansion of communal amenities along with the commemorative theme park honoring Ferguson’s railroad history, completed in 1997, reveals a city delineated by two discernably diverging eras of land use for parks philosophies.\textsuperscript{246}

\textsuperscript{244} For an illustration of this see, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated June 13, 1995, page 4.
\textsuperscript{246} Ferguson Resolution passed and approved by the council of the city of Ferguson MO September 8, 1987; City of Ferguson, MO archive dated August 20, 1997; and City of Ferguson, MO public hearing transcript dated October 14, 2003; Ferguson Special Session June 8, 2004, page 3; Ferguson archive Regular Council Session May 8 2012 page 12; Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated March 28, 2006, page 5.
Despite sharing striking similarities in historical prestige, resource richness, professional competence, and citizen activism, Ferguson and University City’s land use for parks policies demonstrate intersecting trajectories. Both cities’ were established by wealth and influence, benefited from visionary founders, and emerged as desirable destinations and places of residency all while exhibiting stark contradictions of opulence and concentrated deprivation. However, during transitions in the 1960s, University City distinguished itself, not only from Ferguson, but from most mature suburbs in the country by aiming to address these contradictions.

By the start of the study period, University City’s professionalism and evolution in inclusionary policies had already empowered the city to secure resources most inner suburbs were yet to begin seeking out. In instances in which awareness of available resources was shared among neighboring municipalities, University City was usually better positioned. Officials’ and citizens’ acceptance and acknowledgment of diverse needs and interests expanded the city’s search and use of resources and tools and prepared and qualified the city to capitalize on opportunities.

Funding programs regularly required cities possess a certain professional and fiscal capacity, and University City had been leveraging funding from programs like the Land and Water Conservation Fund since its inception in the early 1960s. This put the city in a favorable position to multiply impact and leverage various streams for existing projects and provided the latitude to maximize 1970s conceptions like CDBGs. For example, city-
operated youth recreational and enrichment which offered year-round programing were primarily supported by grants.\textsuperscript{247}

Much of the city’s parks and recreation development was made possible through grants and by 1970, University City’s commitment to land use for parks was already well-established and influencing land use policy. Creative leveraging of federal, state, and county dollars empowered the city to approach land use funding project agreements already poised to expand beyond the original purpose of the funds.

For instance, the city expanded its bike paths during publicly funded street renovations by cutting shoulder aprons creating natural bicycle lanes. University City enjoyed a citizen majority which supported city investment in parks development, facilities designated for communal use, environmentally conscious projects, and increasing pedestrian friendly spaces. While there remained a steady stream of opposition to public financing of such items, particularly during fiscally stressful periods, support remained notably higher than opposition.\textsuperscript{248}

After a 1972 bond issue passed 4,090 to 2,503, officials increased revenues dedicated to parks and recreation facilities, field night lights, and approved a park complex pavilion. By the time county voters approved the 1977 bond issue establishing the municipal park area purchases matching program, University City had already acquired and developed over 240 acres of parkland and by 2012, University City boasted 18 parks including a golf course, renovated community center, and 10 bike and walking trails.

\textsuperscript{247} For more about the history of the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) go to nps.gov; According to references made in numerous city archives from 1970s-2000s, City of University, MO first applied for a LWCF grant in 1964.

\textsuperscript{248} For more information regarding the bike route issue with the county refer to City of University City archive Regular Session 1138: July 12, 1976, page 16.
However, bond issues had been replaced with increasingly higher parks use, membership, and activities fees.\textsuperscript{249}

University City’s parks and recreation selection was second to none. However, since the 2000s, the city has been embroiled in a struggle for retention of the social and economic philosophy which earned the inner suburb the moniker, “pioneer of suburban racial integration policies,” in the 1960s. While the municipality offers many of the finest amenities like a state-of-the-art recreation facility, golfing professional and pro shop, museums, and a symphony, a significant proportion of residents cannot afford to enjoy these amenities.\textsuperscript{250}

Despite University City’s allure, the suburb has always been home to a substantial population of poor people who did not have the disposable income to access fee-based attractions. Parks, recreational facilities, services, and activities programs serve as ideal enrichment options for lower-income residents. However, fiscal stress caused by increased poverty, less property tax revenue, and nominal commercial and industry challenged University City to continue supporting these resources.

Officials were effective at mitigating this dilemma by levying bond issues and other financing options to supplement resources. These strategies kept costs of accessing communal amenities low for users by dispersing expenses throughout the entire tax base. However, some contemporary officials do not favor this model and have lobbied with some success to implement policies which decrease accessibility to the city’s parks and

\textsuperscript{249} According to an assessment of impacts of developments on residential property values included in transcripts of University City archive Regular Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 5; According to figures in City of University City, MO archive Session 1147: November 22, 1976, page 5, 12; and Figure taken from City of University City archive Regular Session 1177: December 19, 1977, page 12.

\textsuperscript{250} Excerpt of quote in Interview US: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 52-year Resident / Ex-State Government Official.
recreational amenities for many residents. While these policies do result in less taxpayer spending overall, these policies could turn out to cost University City more in the end.

Through my examination of land use for parks policy in five mature St. Louis inner suburbs, I observe conditions impacting philosophy which result in era-specific policy divergence. The impact of these philosophical evolutions on city conditions in the future is unknown as consequences are usually not realized and observable for some time after implementation of policies.

Nevertheless, in examining policies of five cases over 45 years, exhibiting variations in philosophy, conditions for cases experiencing no philosophical divergence, cases which experienced philosophical divergence, and conditions at the point in which philosophy diverged, I identify planning, zoning, and redevelopment philosophy as a significant predictor of subsequent conditions.

**Planning, Zoning, and Redevelopment**

Between the 1970s and 1990s, status quo policymaking of the pre-fair housing era was no longer sustainable in mature inner suburbs. Some cities adopted more receptive attitudes towards changing demographics and demands. Officials authorized feasibility studies, planned for impending changes, and enacted relevant ordinances. Nevertheless, loss of tax revenue, poorer residents, and increasingly higher tax rates persisted. While stabilization was yet to be determined, planning and zoning policies significantly impacted municipalities’ vulnerabilities and defenses against decline.

An exponential increase in land and property redevelopment accompanied the black suburbanization era. Municipalities needed a broader tax base, so officials launched efforts to attract a bigger variety of new commercial development. However, when executed
improperly, such undertakings may result in spot zoning further decreasing property values. Additionally, commercial overdevelopment could fundamentally change the character of a city. As one University City resident asserted, “If I wanted to live in Clayton, I would have moved there.”

Adequate rezoning, on the other hand, disperses and lessens negative impacts of alterations in and around single-family neighborhoods. Some neighborhoods contained larger pre-WWII homes built in accordance with lots zoned at a 10,000 sq. ft. minimum. Others consisted of smaller post-WWII homes constructed on 5,000 sq. ft. lots. Some neighborhoods offered a variety of homes which were architecturally designed to fit together. Other areas consisted of similarly designed and virtually identical homes such as one-story ranch style dwellings.

Altering heights and mass of existing structures like adding a second story to single-family homes, building larger homes, and subdividing large lots with infill housing could also fundamentally change the character of a community. Cities utilized planning and zoning regulations to guide their decisions regarding approval and denial of redevelopment proposals. Zoning policies demonstrated as well as influenced cities’ preferences and served as a good indicator of cities’ demographic, structural, and fiscal conditions.

Some cities planned for and adjusted to the evolving environment by rezoning to accommodate certain conversions, some reinforced existing zones, and some instituted

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251 According to an assessment of impacts of developments on residential property values included in transcripts of University City archive Regular Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 5; Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City archive Regular Session 1675: August 19, 1996, page 9.

252 According to City of Hazelwood, MO dated July 19, 1974: Residents in an area had previously opposed reducing the size of the lots to permit 13 instead of the present 11. Surrounding properties were tracts of 112 acre or larger, and these would be tracts just over 10,000 square feet. The recommendation of the City Plan Commission was to approve. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated June 18, 1973: Bill 1027 was adopted as Ordinance 1066 - 74 on July 17, 1974.
stricter compatibility zoning polices restricting even the slightest deviation from surrounding home sizes and styles. While a healthy mix was good for stability, diversity in zoning did not always mean equity in real space. Disproportionately zoning for large minimum lot sizes could dwarf areas allowing smaller lots. And since subdivided residential redevelopments were prohibited in large lot areas, space for construction of more affordable homes was limited.\textsuperscript{253}

By the late 1970s, building homes on large lots had become much less financially feasible. Costs of housing had skyrocketed, and it was no longer sound business practice. Although zoning regulations did not dictate the monetary value of homes to be built, building homes consistent with the surrounding properties meant developers needed to build fewer, larger, more expensive homes. However, this would have resulted in homes costing twice as much as homes in many of these areas were garnering at the time thus creating disincentive to developers to build.\textsuperscript{254}

It was often difficult for municipal officials to come to terms with the transformation happening. One mayor shared, “I couldn’t help but feel that [Mr. Developer] was trying to put as many homes on the land as [he] could.” Locals feared a proliferation of substandard, smaller, tract homes. While there were areas in inner suburbs consisting primarily of these post-WWII type homes, some stressed such structures would stand out dramatically in other parts of communities. Public hearing discussions in each


\textsuperscript{254} According to housing price figures in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated March 16, 1977. Example: A Marketable home in the was $50,000. The new home was $90,000 or $100,000 and would not sell in the area.
study city conveyed a consensus of suburban idealism revealing distinct delineations in desirable and undesirable use of land and property.\textsuperscript{255}

City officials responded to community interests, market indicators, or both. Compromises reclassified zones as planned development districts which deemed areas suitable for specific variations in types of redevelopment or reuse. These mixed-use regulations were intended to allow more multifamily, commercial, and industrial development in and around neighboring areas zoned residential. Plans included goals to increase, preserve, and not negatively affect existing property values. Various safeguards were implemented to further extend stronger protections to neighboring properties.

Traditionally, some areas received robust attention from developers while others garnered few inquiries and requests. Multiple factors contributed to activity levels but cities’ planning and zoning policies significantly impacted types and amount of redevelopment. Some cities’ planning and zoning policies inhibited redevelopment. Others dissuaded redevelopment as vague plans and goals created uncertainty and speculation. Events of the era forced some suburbs to revisit, revise, and clarify their planning and zoning philosophies, strategies, and goals while some elected to reinforce existing ones.\textsuperscript{256}

The post-fair housing era saw an explosion in private redevelopment proposals, city-operated beautification, revitalization, construction projects, and direct-to-city federal funding of renewal programs. Meeting specific demographic, spatial, structural, and financial criteria and possessing a completed comprehensive plan qualified cities for more state and federal funding which mitigated cities’ financial obligations to projects. Strategic

\textsuperscript{255} Excerpt of quote taken from City of Hazelwood, MO dated February 2, 1983.

\textsuperscript{256} Public response to the new plan and new zoning classification was minimal. For more information regarding the new plan refer to City of University City archive Regular Session 1402: February 10, 1986, page 2; and Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 2.
meetings produced plans that included designating residential areas more economically marketable for redevelopment, use of various financing tools, and levying eminent domain.

Each study city aimed to decrease low-cost rentals and increase homeownership. However, cities employed different methods to control the impact of these low-income and subsidized homes and apartments on single-family neighborhoods. Some inner suburbs planned and zoned to isolate and restrict them to particular areas. Others prioritized spreading low-income and subsidized housing throughout the city to prevent them from concentrating in one neighborhood. Interviewee U1 says, “You don't want to concentrate it in one place. That becomes the ghetto and the walls go up around that. You have to disperse the wealth throughout the entire area.”

Maplewood municipal governance’s decision to reinforce its identity ultimately resulted in a revitalization of the suburb’s shopping district. However, it is important to highlight some notable elements of the process. By the time Maplewood officials amended objectives and plans to include parks and recreation development as a stabilizing tool in the mid-1970s, the city had undergone enormous transition. Faced with aged housing and infrastructure and insufficient revenues from retail activity, the city’s land reutilization activity expanded and accelerated rapidly.

Through the city’s housing corporation, Maplewood began negotiation, purchasing, and condemning significant combinations of both residential and commercial properties and land. Maplewood’s volume of rezoning for redevelopment grew comparable to cities facing suburban challenges more frequently associated with the era. The suburb’s past

257 Excerpt from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official.
commercial success, however, still guided policy and reaffirmed beliefs that commercial activity was the city’s best way to stabilize.²⁵⁸

Officials looked to stimulate new private investment by leveraging grants and tax increases to improve the city’s garage and commercial retail parking for a shopping mall, medical building, and clinic. Maplewood’s land use philosophy was demonstrated through numerous amendments repealing residential districts and replacing them with various commercial designations. These policy actions vested more of the city’s financial solvency in the success or failure of commercial activity than in the protection or decline of property values.²⁵⁹

While the strategy was risky, it was not surprising given the city’s demonstrable commitment to regaining its position as a retail hub in the area. More notable and surprising, however, the strategy also included rezoning large single-family districts to multifamily ones. Archives reflect, Maplewood officials beginning the decade of the 1970s unanimously approving multiple development projects consisting of large multifamily dwellings. One 1970 development involved six separate 24-unit buildings alone.²⁶⁰

Maplewood’s physical identity transformed, and the transformation would have lasting implications on the city’s landscape and homeownership rate. Nearly fifty years later, one young Maplewood resident observed, “We’re like 65% renters here in

²⁵⁸ Resolution No. 139-B; Resolution No. 140; and Resolution No. 141, City of Maplewood, MO year 1974 archives.
²⁵⁹ According to City of Maplewood, Missouri archives dated October 20, 1978: Document No. 77-78.
Maplewood which is really interesting.” While this type of activity was not unique for the time, the volume occurring in Maplewood seemed to conflict with the city’s population density and plans to revitalize commercially. The contradiction did not reside in the removal of single-family districts but instead in the districts’ new designation to multifamily.261

Upon closer examination, however, additional elements emerge which simultaneously crystalizes Maplewood’s strategy and coincides with the concept that socioeconomics replaced race as the dominant driver of suburban policymaking in the post-fair housing period. Maplewood needed revenue and was committed to generating that revenue from commercial activity. Until 1991, municipalities could tax multifamily dwellings consisting of four or more units as commercial property. Although multifamily properties were not the traditional primary source of commercial tax revenue for Maplewood, they generated commercial tax revenue nonetheless.262

Maplewood’s rezoning strategy did not place the municipality on the road to revitalization as that process would be administratively led and would not begin until the following decade. The strategy did, however, provide the suburb with ideal conditions for segregated concentrations of underserved, low-income subsidized areas. These areas accounted for less of the city’s population and land usage and were less problematic for Maplewood than its north county counterparts. Nevertheless, they presented major

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261 Excerpt of quote from Interview M1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 10-year Resident / Public Official.
262 In 1991, Maplewood’s proposed tax rate of $1.01 was $98.04 ($0.023 higher than the previous year’s tax rate) due to multifamily dwellings reclassification as residential property lowering the city’s assessed valuation and revenues. See, City of Maplewood, Missouri archive July 3, 1991: Document No. 297; and City of Maplewood Missouri archive dated June 22, 2004.
challenges to revitalization efforts and warrants an asterisk when celebrating the inner suburb’s renaissance as an eclectic, pedestrian-inviting little town.\textsuperscript{263}

While Maplewood worked to protect its image, north county municipalities were being given a new one. Between 1970 and the mid-1990s, the image of north county transformed dramatically. News coverage of north county was unfair and inequitable. Media portrayed problems in north county areas differently than issues happening in other county locations. According to one resident, “We were trying to build the image up and the newspapers seemed to be tearing it down.”\textsuperscript{264}

As conditions worsened, it became increasingly difficult for some north county suburbs to attract new private investment for development. New sidewalks, trees, public parking lots, or state-of-the-art libraries would not be enough to offset the negative perceptions emanating about north county municipalities. Consider that racist stereotypes about blacks motivated these negative perceptions, and north county was experiencing the majority of black in-migration in St. Louis County. Besides preexisting variations in city identity, no other discernable dissimilarities between north county and the rest of the county justified the evolving view of north county.

North county areas were unjustly devalued, sectioned off, and considered to be racked with toxic assets. Transformations in the suburban housing market were multilayered and introduced variables municipalities had very little experience addressing. Missouri Highway and Transportation Department’s inequitable funding and resource

\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{264} Excerpt of quote taken from public hearing transcript of City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated August 25, 1986: 1141th of meeting of the city council, page 1.
dedication for right of way improvement, maintenance, and beautification further demonstrated disparities.

North county areas experienced less frequency of road repairs, resurfacing, and landscaping. Despite thousands of travelers entering the state from Illinois via Interstate 270 and utilizing area highways, north county received less crew, equipment, and attention than other county areas, and highway quality suffered as a result. Deficiencies in county owned and maintained roads did not differ much from state-owned and operated ones.\(^{265}\)

North county municipal officials often complained the county maintained a “take it or leave it” attitude and used municipalities for its own ends and in some cases, “to the detriment of communities.” As with HUD, state and county actions served to further reinforce discriminatory treatment in the private sector. Records indicate that as early as 1972, insurers were notifying residents, “We are not able to renew your homeowner’s insurance due to changing neighborhoods.” Such practices not only compounded problems for north county municipalities but increased inequities, accelerated decline, and greatly hindered stabilization in some areas.\(^{266}\)

The county recognized the motives for opposition to certain HUD practices. However, the county administered a large HUD program. While administrators advocated by educating municipalities about implications, the agency replicated HUD’s concentrations in north county through its own public housing program. St. Louis County Housing Authority purchased a disproportionate number of units in these municipalities

\(^{265}\) See, Jennings, MO 1994 Resolution Urging the Missouri Highway and Transportation Department to be fair and equitable to all areas of St. Louis County. See also, Federal Aid for Urban Roads program in City of Hazelwood, MO archive Special Meeting dated May 27, 1975.

\(^{266}\) Excerpt of letter read into public record in transcript of City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated December 18, 1972, page 1.
for use as public housing, removing the properties from city tax rolls (although the county paid fees to the cities), and contributing to the proliferation of low-income subsidized housing in north county.\footnote{See, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated July 27, 1970, page 5; City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated February 12, 1979, page 3; City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated June 20, 1979.}

During this period, there was incredible change in the housing market. In addition to discriminatory housing practices in both the private and public sector and steady decline in land and property conditions, the county lost its CDBG funding because of poor financial reporting. Cities without housing authorities began exploring whether to form one. Jennings’ leadership expressed, “The city is not interested in forming a housing authority.” Jennings officials believed its planning and zoning policies and code enforcement system would prevent further decline in conditions.\footnote{Excerpt of quote taken from City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session No. 1511 meeting of the Jennings City Council, page 1. See also, Jennings archive Regular Council Session dated February 26, 1979, page 3.}

Jennings did not make the mistake of failing to implement best-practice property preservation methods or practical zoning laws. Instead, Jennings’ mistake was to depend too much on the tools to protect against and address decline. Officials looked to the building commissioner to execute objectives and reach goals without the tools necessary to do so. The city lacked the mechanisms for acquiring, rehabilitating, leasing or selling deteriorated properties. No land reutilization plan could be executed as there existed no city agency to execute it or sufficient revenue to finance projects managed by private firms.\footnote{For more about the formation/work of the Maplewood Redevelopment Corporation see City of Maplewood, Missouri archives year 1977: Document 257; and City of Maplewood Missouri archives dated October 14, 1980.}

In April 1981, Bill 1396 unanimously passed as Ordinance 1373 declaring the need for a housing authority to function in the City of Jennings. Nearly a decade passed before
the city-initiated activities resembling those performed by such an apparatus. By not establishing a housing corporation, Jennings officials deprived building officials effective tools and options from which to choose. Without these tools and options, Jennings’ buildings personnel ramped up code enforcement to compensate for the deficiency. Code enforcement became arduous, authoritarian, and unreasonable.270

Code violations were administered for some items inherent to the original construction of homes, and corrective repairs were expensive. Citations contained threatening language like, “If repairs are not concluded in…, the city will initiate condemnation proceedings.” Some homeowners began to feel as though they were being punished for the “changing neighborhoods” issue. Others believed elements were conspiring to condemn properties to purchase at lower prices. By the 1990s, Jennings was acquiring some of these same homes, authorizing their demolition, and donating the vacant lots left behind.271

Jennings officials worked diligently over the years to attract and promote private residential and commercial development to the area but were unsuccessful. Assessment of Jennings’ situation reveals several potential reasons for its lack of success in stabilizing the physical character of the city. As covered earlier, Jennings lacked a professional city manager to oversee the city’s daily administrative operations. The absence of a city manager in and of itself did not prevent the city from accessing the tools and resources

needed to design and execute an effective land reutilization plan. However, having the mayor serve in both the legislative and administrative leadership roles placed the city at a disadvantage.

Although the city enjoyed strong and long serving mayors, competing duties created by the dual role disallowed fulltime administrative commitment required to address the elements of municipal destabilization. Consider city border problems, for example. City limits did not necessarily delineate neighborhood designs and uses. As reviewed earlier, many of these areas had not been modernized and uses were obsolete. Some neighborhoods’ proximity to other struggling neighborhoods such as those in north St. Louis city required robust time, attention and collaboration— the likes of which part-time city officials usually cannot devote.272

Stabilizing these areas required vigorous land reutilization planning, an authority to manage projects, and administrative oversight. Without these components, Jennings zoning patterns lacked refined objectives resulting in commercial, industrial, and residential replacements that decreased the desirability of each. This placed the city in a perpetual cycle of land usage transition and continuous property value decline which led to more revenue loss making it more difficult to fund studies, finance improvement projects, and pay for marketing to attract investors.

Many of the operations the city elected not to take on in the 1970s (acquisition, rehabilitation, lease, sale, tax abatement), the city ended up performing by the 1990s anyway. However, by this time, the problem had mushroomed into a much bigger set of challenges. Many more derelict properties and vacant lots existed and were in worse shape

272 City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session 1219th meeting dated November 1, 1993, page 1.
than in the 1970s. As areas remained unimproved, physical and fiscal conditions worsened. Degeneration spread to surrounding areas further accelerating the suburb’s residential and commercial health. Former revenue generating sources became structural, social, and economic liabilities.

Confronted with such debilitating and insurmountable circumstances, municipal officials were left with few options. Any effort to reverse conditions required substantial investment of resources of which the city did not possess. Jennings turned to state redevelopment programs which authorized the city to offer incentives like tax abatement, tax increment financing (TIF), and eminent domain to attract developers. While these tools can be effective in certain situations, Jennings’ position made the city vulnerable to dependence and overuse. As one Jennings mayor frame it, “If you don't offer the abatement, you don't get the development.”

Jennings’ housing redevelopment project involved acquiring many of the apartment complexes in Jennings which were mostly county housing authority units. After the apartments were acquired, the city invited developers to rehab the properties and administer the management of the apartments. Once Jennings’ housing transformation was complete, the city was never able to recapture the homeownership and housing quality it once boasted.

Home building involved mostly low-cost houses targeting low income families. While redevelopment projects consisted of some positive exceptions, the city’s land reutilization measures were largely unimpactful in improving the overall stability of the

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municipality. This does not mean all the new homes needed to be big beautiful houses for the redevelopment program to be deemed a success. The true value in these inner suburbs rested in their mix.

All levels of homebuyer could access suburban living. Interviewee F2 asserts:

“When I came to Ferguson, there were houses for families who were just starting out and houses you couldn’t afford. You had people who worked a 9 to 5, but also those who were high level engineers, doctors, and lawyers. This was due to the diversity of homes, lots, and plots.”

Given the enormity of negative attention Ferguson garnered towards the end of the study period, one may find it difficult to fathom that for some the suburb served as one of the more peaceful, eclectic, and desirable places to reside in the area.274

Converse to Ferguson’s advantages of historical prominence, position, and professionalism were the disadvantages created by the city’s post-fair housing era planning and zoning policies. While policies saved money, processes saved time, and practices preserved treasures, the mature inner suburb’s contemporary policymakers would lose a great deal of each of these due to the inherited disadvantages. The insulation, interests protection, and policy control combined with the capitulation and caterings of 1970s to 1990s administrations provided Ferguson’s slim citizen majority disproportionate preference power, marginalized poor people, and produced a powder keg.275

By the 2000s, Ferguson’s lawmakers were producing policies that bore little resemblance to those of the previous 30 years. Over the next decade and a half, officials navigated a complicated policy arena in which the municipality suffered from a firmly embedded root problem while available tools empowered policymakers to only treat the

275 For an example of barricading streets, see City of Ferguson, MO archive Regular Council Meeting May 11, 1976; and Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting September 14, 1976, page 1.
branches. Some have referred to Mike Brown’s death and the subsequent Ferguson uprising as a culmination of decades of discriminatory policies and practices. This description is largely inaccurate as it omits important contextual elements which indicate the culmination actually occurred much earlier making the efforts in the 2000s futile.

As in many suburbs, Ferguson of 2010 exhibited stark inequities and other problems in multiple sectors. Nevertheless, the municipality had entered its second decade of enormous progress in addressing these issues through more inclusive planning processes and policies. Notable advances in proportionate representation, multivariate interests, and environmental awareness had resulted in some important accomplishments. Note that Ferguson was not only fighting an uphill battle established by its policy past, but the suburb also carried the north county identity.276

A simple contrast of 1999’s Maplewood and Ferguson better illustrates Ferguson contemporaries’ policy starting point. Although Maplewood had more multifamily dwellings than Ferguson and its own eastside segregated concentration of low-income renters, the communities surrounding Maplewood were stable and the city’s appeal and image remained largely intact. Ferguson’s eastside concentration was more challenging as the north county image, proximity to other struggling areas, and the city’s policy approach for addressing issues only intensified problems.

While Ferguson had more overall professional staff, the economic development and community relations departments operated under the same designation. Maplewood designated separate professional staff to focus on the city’s most critical area which was recruiting businesses. Maplewood exhausted all avenues of taxation, Ferguson voters

276 City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated May 13, 2014.
repeatedly rejected tax increases to finance projects and services. Ferguson implemented a change in possession occupancy permit 14 years into the period, Maplewood’s interior occupancy inspections system dates back to the early period.277

Maplewood Housing Corporation played a critical role from the outset of the city’s stabilization projects. Ferguson originally took the same position as Jennings and elected not to establish a housing authority. Nearly halfway through the study period in spring 1988, Ferguson municipal leaders approved the formation of the Ferguson Housing Corporation. Despite this scorecard however, by 1994, only a minuscule percentage of Ferguson’s over 6,700 single-family houses exhibited deterioration and there was no notable vacant lot problem.278

Towards the late 1980s, without a functioning authority to manage housing challenges in the municipality, Ferguson began to experience an increase in abandoned properties. The city’ noninterventionist policy of the post-fair housing era had allowed discriminatory housing activities to go unchecked. Besides modest home rehabilitation grants, loans, rebates, and the occasional HUD home purchase, Ferguson extended minimal resources or services related to equitable housing, dispersing low-income housing, or property ownership.279

278 For Ferguson’s formation of its housing corporation see Bill 5660 which passed unanimously and became Ordinance No. 88-2279 permanently recorded in book 17 on page 110. See also, City of Ferguson, MO Outgoing Council Meeting dated April 19, 1988, page 2; and Ferguson Regular Council Session September 26, 1989, page 3; Figures taken from transcript of City of Ferguson Regular Council Session March 22, 1994, page 4. See, also discussion regarding land clearance authority in City of Ferguson, MO October 27, 1970, page 3.
279 See archives City of Ferguson, MO January 13, 1970; Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting September 14, 1976, page 3; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting May 23, 1978, page 5: Bill 5017 an ordinance authorizing the City of Ferguson, MO to enter into a contract with the Department of Housing and Urban Development to purchase property. Passed unanimously 7 to 0 as Ordinance 78-1669
Arguing market dictation of housing as best practice, Ferguson policy drafters expressed no interest in establishing an apparatus for obtaining, rehabbing, selling, or leasing properties, opting to defer these activities to private investors. This philosophy was problematic for the era. Given the extenuating circumstances, housing market theory was turned on its head. Stabilization required intervention. Housing authorities helped cities better account for and address the most pressing factors contributing to destabilization in municipalities. Ferguson’s 1988 housing corporation establishment signaled an evolution in philosophy, but its narrow focus and targeted benefits delivery made it clear the new agency was just another reinforcement arm of the suburb’s existing philosophy.280

Ferguson officials met in 2012 to discuss the results of the West Florissant corridor study. Staff members, residents, and elected officials from neighboring Dellwood, Country Club Hills, Flordell Hills, and Jennings joined them. Ferguson’s increased need, interest, and willingness to collaborate had replaced the admiration, self-sufficiency, and self-containment mentioned earlier. The strategic meeting concerned plans for redeveloping a four and half sq. mile stretch of West Florissant.281

In 2010, the neighboring suburbs had begun exploring collaborative ways to leverage collective resources and secure grants and other financing tools to support the project. Officials established a steering committee made up of members from each community. Through public meetings, interviews, and focus groups, the committee solicited feedback from a wide range of interests. Plans included increasing accessibility,
connectivity via pedestrian friendly improvements, and making the area more suitable for walkers, bikers, and public transit.\textsuperscript{282}

New developments were to serve the community with an array of unique shopping, dining, and entertainment, provide an assortment of housing to all income levels, and create physical environments that support healthy and active lifestyles. Ironically, the 2012 collective’s plans were practically identical to Ferguson’s 1970s plans for its westside downtown district. While it was logical for the city to dedicate resources to improving its downtown, the city’s history of divesting resources from the eastside corridor lends irony to the 2012 goals. Ferguson’s 1970s westside plan was considered innovative, holistic, and proactive. The suburb’s 2012 West Florissant corridor project aimed at improving conditions on the eastside was not much more than overdue.\textsuperscript{283}

West Florissant did not only serve as the crossroads to the City of St. Louis and north St. Louis County, the road served as a clear delineator guiding Ferguson’s post-fair housing planning and zoning policies. Over the three decades leading up to the millennium, policies had sectioned the eastside off from more single-family home friendly areas by concentrating low-cost rentals, commercial and industrial developments, and further reinforcing the city’s agenda to preserve its westside.

By the 2000s, however, West Florissant was particularly important to Ferguson’s economy as it connected several major commercial centers. The city’s late 1980s and early 1990s model vested a large stake of its financial health in sales tax revenue generators

\textsuperscript{282} City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session September 11, 2012, page 4.
\textsuperscript{283} See, City of Ferguson, MO archive May 25, 1971, page 3; Focus remained primarily on the city’s downtown district as late as 1999. See, resolution passed and approved by the Council of the City of Ferguson, Mo April 20, 1999. See also, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session September 11, 2012, page 4.
located in an area where the city historically lacked the will to invest resources. Consequentially, 2000s policymakers inherited a dilemma of financial dependence on a corridor plagued with major barriers to thriving and would make a valiant effort to overcome those obstacles. The segregation, poverty, aging infrastructure, and obsolescence was not their doing. Nevertheless, 14 years into the new century, they would have to own it.284

In 2004, governing a vastly different Ferguson than their predecessors (52% black, 16% single-headed, 33% renter, 12% poverty, 30% under 18, per capita income $17,600), officials began adopting policies establishing new neighborhood goals based on residents’ visions for Ferguson’s future. Officials hired a planning and development director, instituted a community wide network of neighborhood associations and organizations, helped each neighborhood design its ideal living environment, and designated target areas for infrastructure and pedestrian improvements.285

The process resulted in neighborhood plans and strategies, implementation of improvement programs, and progress monitoring mechanisms. Officials’ expressed aim was to increase livability and quality of life, maintain high community standards, and stimulate interest and demand in Ferguson. Officials authorized the restructuring of the city’s community redevelopment financing model increasing the category’s prominence in economic development decisions and spending.286

The new neighborhood agenda targeted low and moderate-income neighborhoods for improvements and enhancements. Officials authorized redesigns and installation of

284 Ibid
285 According to US Census data. See also, Special Council Session July 13, 2004.
286 For focus of earlier neighborhood programs see, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting May 25, 1982, page 4; Ferguson, MO Resolution March 22, 1983; and Regular Council Session July 26, 1983, page 1.
various signs and monuments, initiated restoration projects, and implemented communications and PR techniques designed to repair the image, identity, and character of these neighborhoods. Lawmakers approved increased community-focused allocations, strengthen and expanded their financing toolbox to better service community redevelopment debt and capital improvement projects, and lobbied state officials to approve a special benefit districts amendment.287

Missouri’s proposed special benefit districts amendment would empower municipalities to finance local improvements such as streets, off street parking facilities, sidewalks, parks and sewers by issuing bonds in which only benefiting property owners were required to repay. The tool would help ensure more equitable financing of neighborhood revitalization and mitigate the city’s quandary of governing a bifurcated city where one half was viewed as barons and the other burdens.288

Consider by the 1990s, Ferguson’s slim citizen majority were beginning to feel the pinch created by their policy preferences. In refusing to accept, prepare, and adequately manage the inevitable, Ferguson failed to prevent their fears from materializing. In fact, policies of exclusion increased the likelihood of these fears materializing, intensified their effects on the city, and made addressing subsequent problems much more daunting challenges for future administrations. As the end of the 1990s drew near, new Ferguson homeowners’ properties were being assessed for less than they had paid for them just several years earlier.289

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287 See, City of Ferguson, MO Special Session dated June 8, 2004, page 3; Special Council Session July 13, 2004.
288 See, City of Ferguson, MO Special Session June 8, 2004, page 3.
289 Decline in assessed valuation according to City of Ferguson, MO archive Special Session August 6, 1998, page 4; and City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session August 11, 1998, page 5.
North county had transformed and even though Ferguson kept the suburban persona longer than many of its north county neighbors, cracks were clearly visible at this point. Older middle and upper-class residents, who the city had effectively shielded from the eastside degradation, had remained in their homes over the years. They were steadfastly loyal to Ferguson and its identity which did not coincide with general perceptions about north county. However, decades of policy implementations adhering to the preferences of a slim majority had created an environment less attractive to younger home seekers and had given way to new more pressing demands.

While the homeowners’ exodus was notable during the decade, population decline was not as dramatic as in the early period of the era. Owning a home in Ferguson was still relatively more attractive compared to other municipalities in the area, and a sustained influx of renters kept population numbers fairly stable. However, Ferguson’s lack of preparedness for addressing changing socioeconomic dynamics made the city especially vulnerable to losing its rank as a first-class suburb. Increasing dependence on sales tax revenues and murmurs of a property tax increase to fill the gap of slumping receipts signaled to some residents, the time had come to relocate.\textsuperscript{290}

An examination of archives revealed through early-era planning and zoning patterns, Ferguson’s post-fair housing policymakers dealt future officials a very bad hand. The city’s professional prowess and capacity to leverage expertise and additional services of planning firms made discrepancies in focus areas more prominent as implementations were executed effectively and efficiently. Policies such as Bill 4746, which passed as

\textsuperscript{290} City of Ferguson, MO archive Special Session August 6, 1998, page 4.
Ordinance 74-1444 on November 12, 1974, set in motion a chain of events that would have far reaching and lasting implications.\(^{291}\)

Revisions and updating of zoning ordinances authorized developments which transitioned working-class single-family neighborhoods as well as multifamily units into commercial uses. This in and of itself was not necessarily problematic. However, new zones failed to fully account for diminishing effects on the stability of other nearby single-family neighborhoods and the city’s continued unwillingness to commit adequate resources to this area meant economic vitality of the area would eventually be threatened. These choices created a volatile feedback loop.\(^{292}\)

Overdependency on economic generators and mushrooming threats to the bottom line had begun a generation before the formation of the 2012 collective. Historically, Ferguson used a discriminatory barometer for weighing developers’ answers to the critical question, “How will this proposed land use development interact with adjacent residential areas?” Development designs and acquisition maps from the early post-fairing housing era illuminate a city intent on preserving select sections of the city while sacrificing other sections in the name of economic development.\(^{293}\)

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\(^{291}\) For establishment of district plans see, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session dated November 24, 1970, page 3; Regular Council Meeting January 13, 1976, page 1; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting November 12, 1974, page 5: Bill No. 4746 passed as Ordinance No. 74-1444 permanently filed in codebook 7, page 139; and City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting July 22, 1975, page 6.

\(^{292}\) See, City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting April 24, 1973, page 4; Ferguson, MO Special Council Meeting October 21, 1975, page 2; Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting September 28, 1976, page 2; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting June 14, 1977, page 7; and Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session January 9, 1990, page 3: Bill 5777 Ordinance amending Chapter 32 zoning by adding a new section that establishes a new zoning district entitled planned mixed-use districts passed six to one and became Ordinance 89-2395 and is permanently recorded in codebook 18, page 1.

\(^{293}\) Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Special Council Session April 14, 1987, page 2; See City of Ferguson, MO archive Plan Commission Special Meeting April 11, 1973; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session dated April 24, 1973, page 3; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting October 12, 1976, page
Perhaps quality of developer pitches and the majority of professional opinions played more of a significant role in producing these land use patterns than my initial analysis attributes. I considered this possibility and examined Ferguson’s expressed priorities when accessing development proposals’ residential impact. I found strict minimum requirements for buffering, an extensive schedule for distancing, boundaries, and landscaping, and rigid limitations for institutional uses.\textsuperscript{294}

When comparing approval rates among similar projects in various areas, accounting for conflicting contributing factors, institutional proposals were deemed compatible with eastside residential areas disproportionately more than westside areas. Further, divergent views of areas’ value informed planning which extolled developer investments like traffic signals and new sidewalks as great improvements to some areas and inconsequential add-ons to others. Essentially, Ferguson’s post-fair housing era policymakers posed distinctly different questions for different residential areas. For the eastside, officials simply wanted to know, “Will the city receive a significant amount of income through the return of sales tax?”\textsuperscript{295}

Ferguson’s model continually exhibited instability. Nevertheless, making investments to implement improvements like those outlined in the 2012 collaborative plan did not align with 1970s to 1990s Ferguson philosophy and objectives. Ferguson’s contemporary policymakers worked diligently throughout the last decade and a half of the study period to realign land use policy to better address challenges. However, events would


\textsuperscript{294} Excerpt of quote taken from City of Ferguson, MO Special Council Session April 14, 1987, page 2.

\textsuperscript{295} Excerpt of quote in transcript of City of Ferguson, MO Special Council Session April 14, 1987, page 2. See, also City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting August 26, 1975, page 6. See also, City of Ferguson, MO dated November 10, 1970.
essentially erase many of their gains, expose the city’s policy history, and provide present
and future lawmakers even greater challenges to stabilizing the mature inner suburb.296

The Village of Hazelwood began the study period with 36% of its land area utilized
by commercial and industrial businesses. Hazelwood’s transformation from 1950s
farmland to a 1970s urbanized environment qualified the city as an ideal case study. In a
little over a decade, the city had experienced significant transitions in landscape,
population, function, and identity. Pre-era planning and zoning policies had carried the
village to its 1970 transition into a city. And given Hazelwood’s 1950s landscape, I was
surprised to discover, by 1970, “Service stations in Hazelwood had reached the saturation
point.”297

Hazelwood’s planning and zoning committee entered the post-fair housing era
considering and recommending approval of a large number of proposals. This was not
surprising as I concluded the city’s rapid growth and development in such a short period
was most likely the result of lax proposal vetting and generous granting of requests.
However, if the board of trustees’ meticulous reviews and exhaustive discussions regarding
recommendations were any indication of pre-era processes, my assumption was incorrect.

Hazelwood city officials retained this practical and methodical style of deliberation
in planning and zoning throughout the entire study period. This does not mean every
decision reaped only rewards. Hazelwood officials realized, early in the period, the
dilemma their land use policy patterns were creating. While taxpayers appreciated the low
property taxes made possible by the large volume of commercial and industrial activity in

296 City of Ferguson, MO Special Council Session April 14, 1987, page 2.
the city, businesses increased demand on city services thus siphoning services away from residents. According to one Hazelwood lawmaker, by 1972, “Commercial development had created problems as well as advantages for the residents.”

As more revenues are needed to adequately fund city services, either property taxes are raised, or more commercial developments are pursued. Since increased taxes are never popular, the more plausible decision is to rezone areas to allow more encroachment into residential areas and the cycle continues—eventually harming property values. Each study city faced some form of this predicament at one time or another during the study period. In that respect, Hazelwood was not unique. However, Hazelwood’s quandary shared many similarities with its north county neighbor Ferguson’s plight, and I found the disparities in the cities’ approaches fascinating.

Hazelwood’s 1970s comprehensive plan produced, what I found to be, standard land use permit requirements. Each study city’s policies stated some variation of language expressing prohibition of developments which “adversely affect the character of the neighborhood.” While Hazelwood’s policy language, extensive planning process, and adherence to business interests all paralleled Ferguson’s post-fair housing era characteristics, Hazelwood distinguished itself both through the goals it set, the effort to ensure equitable protections and preservations, and the subsequent land use policies that followed these objectives.

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While Hazelwood’s early period planning objectives and implementations resembled the West Florissant corridor’s 2012 goals, this was not the most notable element in the city’s plan. That label belongs to the city’s expressed goal, “We want Hazelwood to continue to be the same type of community it has been.” Since blacks represented only four percent of Hazelwood residents, a scan of archival records may lead one to conclude Hazelwood’s goal was exclusionary in nature. However, further investigation uncovers a well-defined and measured vision for the future of the suburb; one that involves specific measures for preventing the practice of exclusion.\textsuperscript{300}

According to a Hazelwood official, “We were looking for the same balance of ages, multifamily and single-family residences, and owner versus rental properties to continue in the community.” Hazelwood identified its city’s optimal mix of residential, commercial, and industry. This metric would guide planning and zoning policy for the next 33 years. This did not mean the municipality would remain the same size, and it did not. Notwithstanding, as the city grew in population, businesses, and land through annexation, the optimal metric remained the principal influencer of land use policy.\textsuperscript{301}

Utilizing demographic charts, street system diagrams, and land use maps, Hazelwood officials land use planning employed effective techniques for integrating and anticipating economic and residential needs while accounting for real time transitory factors as neighboring municipalities experienced significant change. Hazelwood’s proximity to the interstate, highways, major thoroughfares, and corridors played a prominent role in the city’s planning as it served as both an advantage and a disadvantage concerning some issues.

\textsuperscript{300} \textit{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{301} \textit{Ibid}
Leveraging and remaining dedicated to the optimal metric allowed officials to establish long-term zoning plans which increased certainty and market confidence and simplified otherwise complex harmonizing of residential and commercial redevelopment. As Hazelwood enjoyed major projects and significant business and population growth, officials continued to identify tools that further empowered the city to thrive and preserve its balance.

By the 1980s, Hazelwood’s city plan commission recommendations were aligning more with city council approval rates. Although minimum lot size remained the same at 10,000 sq. ft., amendments were instituted which allowed for new construction to have more variation from surrounding properties. A 122-acre redevelopment project including various designs and sizes of homes built on a wider range of lot sizes followed.302

This was not an indication of Hazelwood compromising its position regarding the optimal metric. Officials understood the fluidity of consequential variables. It was more helpful to prepare than deny the evolution happening around them. Subsequent approvals of previously denied rezoning requests were commonplace in each of the study cities. However, most were the result of minor technical matters that petitioners needed to correct and resubmit. Approval of resubmitted proposals which clearly conflicted with zoning laws in place during the time of the original submission indicated either a change in conditions, philosophy, objectives, or all of these.

By 1982, residents of the northwest quadrant of Hazelwood looked a lot like their 1960s’ counterparts—large families and many children under five years of age. In other

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302 For more about Hazelwood’s zoning see City of Hazelwood, MO dated February 2, 1983. Homes for $65,000 to $85,000 ranging in lot size from 10,000 to 19,000 square feet. See also, City of Hazelwood, MO August 1, 1979.
Hazelwood quadrants, residents tended to be older—over the age of 65. For Hazelwood officials, these factors denoted possible impact of the previous decade’s policies and were important to consider in the new comprehensive planning process. Hazelwood’s strategic plans consistently produced specific objectives, tools required, and implications.  

Hazelwood officials formed an industrial development authority (IDA) and bonded several apartment projects previously denied by the county’s IDA. Hazelwood’s leadership promoted the decision as an important and useful tool for development and continued growth and prosperity of the city’s economic welfare. Nevertheless, officials recognized the bonds were designed to be used for expansion of industrial resources which could provide additional jobs in the area. Further, using IDA bonds for housing projects meant more low-income housing. To qualify for the bonding, developers were required to set aside 20% of the housing units for low-income families.  

Jobs are critical to a community’s economy. Therefore, city-initiated apartment complexes requiring designated low-income housing minimums may appear to be a problematic use of the IDA tool—particularly for a north county suburb during the 1980s. However, an examination of special planning sessions revealed the projects were consistent with Hazelwood’s strategy. There was indication of transitioning demographics, fiscal characteristics, and demands. Officials planned, secured the necessary tools, and executed plans according to the metric.  

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303 See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Comprehensive Plan Meeting dated November 2, 1982. For more about Hazelwood’s IDA activities also see, City of Hazelwood, MO archive Regular Council Session: July 11, 1984; and City of Hazelwood, MO archive IDA Village Square Apartments dated March 6, 1985. This project consisted of 47 buildings containing a total of 148 one and two-bedroom units. Note: One apartment building permit netted Hazelwood $22,000 in 1984-85. See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Budget Meeting May 20, 1985.  
304 Figure taken from public hearing on public housing in City of Hazelwood, MO archive dated July 29, 1981.  
305 For examples of the city’s effort to address the north county image see, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Meeting April 27, 1983.
Consider that despite transitions, Hazelwood still enjoyed a stable per capita income, an optimal ratio of businesses to residences, and low property tax rates. At this point, neither population growth nor land expansion was a major goal for the city. Officials prioritized balancing sufficient adherence to high quality living spaces and protecting residents’ property with ensuring the business community viewed local government as a cooperative force supporting economic growth and sustainability.

Community enrichment like parks, recreation facilities, and pedestrian-friendly amenities remained just as important to city officials as infrastructure improvements that ensured adequate traffic flow and access to businesses. Hazelwood’s policymakers authorized extensive studies and performed in-depth reviews of rezoning requests, consistently applying qualifying criteria equitably and reserving original objectives for protection of adjoining properties.

Officials applied a principled approach in considering projects and programs varying in type, size, and other distinctions across a broad range of descriptors. Whether proposals requested developments in single-family residential areas, commercial or industry centers, near multifamily complexes housing low-income tenants or high cost condominiums occupied by the financially stable, specifications were clearly outlined in the zoning codes and officials were unwavering in trusting those codes to adequately assess compatibility.306

One could argue that Hazelwood was better able to maintain balance because the city did not face the acute changes like the ones occurring in suburbs with closer proximity to St. Louis city. While this argument may hold true, it does not diminish the quality of

Hazelwood’s policymaking process, policies, and impact on stabilization. In fact, the argument serves to support the notion that Hazelwood applied the highest principals in policymaking and produced quality policies as a result. Hazelwood’s planning and zoning patterns were proactive as officials monitored not only internal transitions but problems emerging in neighboring locales.

While Hazelwood did not face the acute transition experienced by other study cities earlier in the period, Hazelwood officials proactively instituted ordinances designed to combat destabilizing effects of that level of transition. It is impossible to know for sure if and how much these policies impacted the degree of transition in the city. What is discernable, however, is the city’s high level of preparedness for addressing challenges as transition threats rose in the following decades.

As late as April 1981, advisers were still dissuading Hazelwood officials from establishing a housing authority. Several years earlier, without one registered HUD foreclosure in the municipality, Hazelwood enlisted the expertise of a local forum to monitor HUD activity in the city. Despite the absence of foreclosures, officials authorized an allocation of CDBG dollars to help fund the group and lobbied neighboring municipalities to utilize the services and contribute to funding the group’s operation. When the first FHA foreclosure was discovered in Hazelwood in May 1981, officials immediately initiated proceedings to obtain, rehab, and resale the property.\(^{307}\)

With Hazelwood’s city manager concurring with the opinion that Hazelwood’s current housing situation did not warrant the establishment of a housing authority, lawmakers decided not to institute the apparatus. However, officials did not intend on

\(^{307}\) According to listings included in City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Session dated April 8, 1981; and archive City of Hazelwood, MO Special Meeting dated August 26, 1981.
letting their guard down. Officials authorized extensions of monitoring services and instituted a system for ascertaining advanced HUD foreclosures notifications. When forecasts predicted transitions challenging the metric, Hazelwood executed land growth through annexation to increase areas for future development.\textsuperscript{308}

Topically, Hazelwood’s land growth demonstrated attempts to expand its commercial and industrial pursuits. However, an examination of Hazelwood’s processes illuminated more context which warrants more admirable attribution to the city’s strategies. Consider, no policy can ensure complete achievement of goals and no policy is immune from potential unintended consequences. Forces and factors working outside of municipal governance’s sphere of influence can have significant impact on policy goals. Hazelwood officials understood this reality and approached policymaking accordingly.

One example of Hazelwood’s approach includes the 1977 property reassessment battle in St. Louis County. A recent lawsuit had resulted in a proposed reassessment of property valuations. The reassessment would most likely result in St. Louis County residents paying notably more in taxes for similar properties than the City of St. Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson Counties. Of course, this would impact Hazelwood as well. As expected, officials joined the complaint. However, Hazelwood diversified their strategy for dealing with the matter by also developing a contingency plan as reassessment could dramatically distort measures utilized in the metric.\textsuperscript{309}

Note, instead of attempting to expand the commercial footprint, Hazelwood’s plan focused on upgrading its current business recruitment and retention mechanisms. During

\textsuperscript{308} See, City of Hazelwood, MO Special Meeting dated June 24, 1981; City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Session dated February 23, 1983.

\textsuperscript{309} See, City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated October 5, 1977; and City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated October 19, 1977.
strategic planning sessions it was determined, while the city effectively secured information regarding what businesses were moving in and out of the city, officials had very little information to design measures to better understand important determinants to this activity. Officials constructed a system in which ongoing analyses could be performed utilizing specific identifiers like types, sizes, and locations of businesses and contributing factors for transitions.\(^\text{310}\)

The system improved Hazelwood’s business recruitment and retention efforts, better mitigated and predicted fiscal fluctuations, and equipped the city with more effective tools for anticipatory corrective measures and attracting new businesses. The process also helped the city improve planning and zoning policies which enhanced codes for regulating land use edges, abutting, and segued zoning districts. While many factors played a role in Hazelwood’s growth and stability, planning and zoning policies were definitely among the most influential.\(^\text{311}\)

Unrealized and failed urban renewal projects, growing clusters of multifamily complexes, and a proliferation of public housing and rental properties may not sound like an accurate description of University City. However, for parts of the city during the post-fair housing era, this was an apt account. Some residents referred to certain areas as, “the slums.” Further expounding on the situation in University City at the time, one resident recalled:

“Conditions were deplorable and overcrowded with overflowing trash dumpsters. In some cases, apartment residents were putting bulky items next to dumpsters which often stayed there for weeks. Sanitation services treated apartment

\(^{310}\) See, City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated October 5, 1977; and City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated October 19, 1977.

\(^{311}\) Ibid
complexes like they were rows of single-family homes and in many cases, multiple families were occupying single-family houses.”\textsuperscript{312}

With all the proactive and innovative policies University City adopted, the city still faced decline in neighborhoods. Residing in University City’s popular eastern-end Loop district, by the start of the study period, was no longer desirable. Businesses in the area were struggling and the housing was aged and outmoded. Residents of the time recall the apartment buildings resembling old tenements. Longtime residents asserted, “When we came back in 1971, the Loop was not nearly as good as it is now. It had gone downhill.”\textsuperscript{313}

As explored earlier, preserving property taxes was University City’s priority as a bedroom suburb. Consequentially, the city’s planning, zoning, and redevelopment policies tended to focus on and favor residential interests—often at the expense of business development. Codes regulating land use hampered growth of established businesses and discouraged emergence of new businesses and relocation of businesses into the city. For instance, University City required that alcohol serving establishments be at least 200 feet in distance apart. This made it difficult for restaurants in the area to compete for customers while making it nearly impossible to attract new establishments.\textsuperscript{314}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{313}] Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents; and Harris 1981, p.154.
\item[\textsuperscript{314}] Ibid
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Members of the business community argued, “No vibrant business strip would ever come to pass in University City unless it amends several zoning ordinances that are too restrictive.” University City officials stood by the restrictive zoning, however. Lawmakers argued it gave the city some assurance of control and avoidance of strip-type developments. There were several municipalities that did not have any distance limitations, and officials felt those municipalities were paying a significant price as they experienced proliferations in alcohol serving businesses.315

Cities like Webster Groves had a limitation of one liquor by the drink establishment for each 10,000 people. With a population of 30,000, Webster Groves had only three such establishments. Although University City officials opposed such a restrictive limitation for its city, it did value its existing distance requirement. Nevertheless, the city’s restrictive commercial zoning inhibited the ability of landowners to fill vacancies which further contributed to the decline of areas like the Loop. Vacancies increased, crime rates exploded, and citizens’ faith in their municipal leaders’ capacity to effectively manage the city’s affairs deteriorated.316

Although University City’s location insulated the suburb from the negative imaging plaguing its north county neighbors, the city’s proximity to struggling municipalities increased vulnerability and accelerated decline in certain areas of the suburb. Further

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315 Excerpt of quote taken from City of University City Regular Council Meeting Session 960: April 27, 1970. See also for more details regarding the October 1967 zoning changes implemented in the 1968 comprehensive plan see.
316 See, City of Maplewood, Missouri archive dated March 11, 1980: Document 345, Bill 4138 an ordinance repealing the code pertaining to distances between establishments selling intoxicating liquor at retail by drink for consumption on the premises were sold was passed unanimously. University City dealt with a similar issue in the loop. Figures taken from working paper Williams, N. 2019. Role of Municipal Governance in Stabilization: University City Case: University of Missouri-St. Louis: 2019.
challenging University City was its minimal access to the major interstates, highways, and thoroughfares enjoyed by their north county counterparts.

Despite receiving inequitable attention, north county roads and highways provided major arteries for transporting people and goods across the area which better supported commercial activity and economic growth and sustainability. Entering the start of the study period, University City lacked a north-south artery. As a city of over 46,000 residents, University City depended largely on Big Bend Road. The street spanned a short distance between the southern city limits and main east-west road located near the southern edge of town. At the time, Big Bend was narrow, aged, and worn.317

Exacerbating matters, the county outlined several changes along the east-west road which included prohibiting parking in certain locations. The changes were especially impactful as this was the failing Loop business and residential district near the eastern edge of town leading into the City of St. Louis. Officials hoped to revive this area as it was critical to the city’s stabilization. University City officials vigorously lobbied the county to help with the situation. After a county-wide bond issue passed in November 1970, these areas began to see road improvements.318

The suburb also benefited from a federally assisted traffic signal program resulting in improvements to important intersections. Two years later, the Missouri State legislature authorized the establishment of a county arterial road system. St. Louis County designated

318 St. Louis County, MO bond committed $16 million (AFI) to the project. For details regarding development of the arterial road system in cities and road improvements see the following University City archives: City of University City Council Regular Session 1014: April 10, 1972, page 12: Note, reimbursable federal funding University City’s share of the costs of the project was $154,000 (AFI); Regular Session 1023: July 24, 1972; Regular Session 1127: March 15, 1976, page 3; and For more information about Missouri’s arterial road system see, City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Session dated February 14,1972, page 3.
15 University City streets, including the newly renovated north-south artery and the popular east-west strip, to its arterial road system. The arterial improvements were sorely needed but did little to address the problems with shared, private, and city-owned and maintained streets.\textsuperscript{319}

Battles between neighboring municipalities over shared streets were a common occurrence. Traffic problems and street damage were usually at the root of disagreements. University City shared five streets with the City of St. Louis, and tractor trailer traffic flowing from the city repeatedly ignored the suburb’s 11-ton maximum restriction. Consequentially, University City’s new street overlays were often broken up within two years of being laid. Several of the shared streets were residential and neighborhoods often controlled their own streets. However, maintaining them was very costly.

Deterioration of the economic sector further impacted the already declining residential property values further exacerbating the fiscal stress University City was encountering. Officials began to adjust their planning and zoning policies to meet the challenges of the changing environment. They began by focusing on the Loop area. In leveraging city resources along with private interests and resources, the city developed partnerships to maximize their revitalization efforts. Partnering with proprietors organized as a business association, University City undertook various projects to upgrade the Loop area.\textsuperscript{320}

The city duplicated this multi-interest model to address decay and stabilize other areas throughout the municipality. Officials enlisted the services of various planning firms, 

\textsuperscript{319} Ibid
\textsuperscript{320} As explained by Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 52-year Resident / Ex-State Government Official; Harris 1981, p.154, 165;
conducted studies, and established plans which instituted 211 changes to the city’s zoning codes, classifications, and districts. Rezoning several districts from high density residential to arterial business accommodated new commercial development. Most industrial uses were prohibited in the new plan, and various safeguards were implemented that would extend stronger protections to neighboring properties.321

Developers were required to not only garner the approval of the plan commission and the council but also nearby property owners. The council also stressed the importance of giving all concerned parties an additional alternative when considering development requests. Areas where zoning had previously prevented the placement of businesses were now eligible for business development. Some stretches of road consisting of outmoded and deteriorated residential properties could now serve as vibrant economic corridors.

Streets that had evolved to symbolize class and racial divides were targeted for reutilization. According to Interviewee U2, “There was more of a focus on making sure that Olive was not a racially divisive area. We recognized the importance of the Third Ward for all of University City.” The era marked a period in which the city began modifying plans for old urban renewal projects. New plans involved changing proposed uses like multifamily residential to uses ranging from office research and warehousing to retail.322

Officials approved controlled mixed land use zones aimed at stimulating economic growth while retaining the overall residential character of the city. City officials capitalized on new and innovative engineering designs and mechanisms which resulted in modern renovations and new structures with more environmentally friendly aspects and functional

321 Public response to the new plan and new zoning classification was minimal. For more information regarding the new plan refer to City of University City archive Regular Session 1402: February 10, 1986, page 2; and Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 2.
322 Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official.
uses. Project financing techniques included leveraging private investments with public funds. Costs were reduced by partnering with local trade schools who provided students to work on development projects through hands-on training programs.\textsuperscript{323}

Redevelopment resulted in vast improvements in pedestrian areas, retail facilities, and office buildings. New developments proved helpful, but the stability of University City still depended on the health of residential areas. In an era of concentrated HUD activity, housing stock decay, and declining population, the city needed to address the issues of vacant homes and lots increasing by the day. With most of the city’s derelict properties consisting of non-adjourning 40-foot plots, there were few opportunities for land banking to better attract developers. Further, properties were usually located in neighborhoods no one other than nonprofits with only modest building capacity were willing to build.\textsuperscript{324}

Officials turned to the University City Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) to lead the reutilization efforts. Established in 1961 to execute the city’s general neighborhood renewal plan, the LCRA helped empower the city with the capacity to effectively manage the complexities associated with private, city, state, and federally owned land usage. Although the LCRA was a separate and independent body, the city funded the operation, and certain LCRA actions had to be approved by the council. The city’s government and LCRA collaborated effectively, operated efficiently, and vested a great deal of trust in one another.\textsuperscript{325}

\textsuperscript{323} For more details regarding the October 1967 zoning changes implemented in the 1968 comprehensive plan see: City of University City Regular Council Meeting Session 960: April 27, 1970.
\textsuperscript{324} Policy reference made during city leadership study session transcribed in City of University City archive Study Session 1802: February 12, 2001.
\textsuperscript{325} For an example of the city’s relationship with the LCRA, see funding process and measures outlined in City of University City, archives Session 977: October 19, 1970, page 20. LCRA funds were needed to pay off costs associated with three demonstration properties underway in the city.
Officials elected to use city resources to address the problems with repossessed HUD properties and leveraged the LCRA to oversee the construction of projects and redevelopment of blighted areas. The city authorized a rehabilitation and property sales and leasing program and began selling buildings rather than tearing them down. However, there were frequently no takers on buildings because of the rehabbing costs. Conditions of the buildings made it difficult for prospective owners to borrow money to rehab or purchase properties. When borrowers were successful in securing loans, they had to pay exorbitant interest rates.

Without policy change, properties could remain vacant for years. The county's policy involved selling properties for $100 while waiving all county taxes owed. Although the city was hesitant to grant tax abatement, there were several advantages in getting the lots into private ownership. 1. The owner would be responsible for all maintenance; 2. The city could bill the owner if the city performed any of these services; and 3. The property would be back on the tax rolls.326

University City enacted a charter amendment, in 1978, authorizing the council to wave back taxes. Immediately following the enactment, the city began receiving requests from buyers for the vacant properties. This was tantamount to the city basically subsidizing the redevelopment of a notably sized segment of its housing stock. The policy turned out to be largely successful in some areas. Consider that prior to policy implementation, many buildings had stayed vacant for up to five years. After implementation, similar buildings averaged less than two years vacancy.327

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326 For more information regarding results of the policy change, refer to City of University City archive Regular Session 1402: February 10, 1986, page 2; and Session 1401: January 27, 1986, page 2.
327 The city had subsidized the rehabbing of 35 apartment buildings in the Loop area over a 10-year period since the 1970s; Public response to the new plan and new zoning classification was minimal. For more
Shortly thereafter, the LCRA was selling properties at their appraised value. University City executed a five-year plan which included a 13-acre redevelopment near the city limits shared with the City of St. Louis. While the original 1964 general neighborhood renewal plan proposed an industrial redevelopment, over a decade had passed and significant market, demographic, and geographical changes had occurred.\(^{328}\)

Current demands called for clearing of some of the land, rehabilitating other sections, and redeveloping the area residential. Increased business activity, LCRA redevelopments, and supplemental funding spurred renewed developer interest in the city. Corporations and individuals began buying up more property. New, more modern single-family homes, garden homes like duplexes and townhouses of up to four-bedrooms, and high-rise apartment developments followed. Others rehabbed houses, developed multifamily complexes, and converted existing apartments into condominiums.\(^{329}\)

Zones controlled building heights as to provide buffers of low-rise buildings next to single-family homes. Designs led to an aesthetically pleasing effect of buildings becoming gradually taller toward the city’s main thoroughfare. Experts and publications lauded University City’s planning and rezoning for demonstrating ingenuity in city

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\(^{328}\) The University Court urban renewal project area received HUD funding. For more see: Special Session 997: August 2, 1971, page 5; Session 1037 February 5, 1973, page 1.  
\(^{329}\) Bill Number 6779 approving the urban renewal plan for the University Court project and the feasibility of relocation of families within the University Court project area was unanimously passed as Ordinance Number 4660. The University Court urban renewal project area received HUD funding in the amount of 1,270,000. For more see: Special Session 997: August 2, 1971, page 5; Session 1037 February 5, 1973, page 1; and Session 1041: April 2, 1973, page 10; Approval of Londe’s project signaled a significant shift in the city’s view of development. See archive Session 1674: August 12, 1996, page 2.
designs. However, the municipality was known historically as a city designs innovator, and officials recognized that praise would not stabilize the city.  

Housing conditions improved but fiscal stress remained. The city’s LCRA strategies were effective at slowing decay but did little to regain its tax base. University City’s dilemma centered on how much economic development was necessary to improve and protect the fiscal health of the city. Despite actions to address the proliferation of vacant homes and lots, property values had not returned to pre-decline levels. City officials needed to once again rethink the city’s economic philosophy.  

With minimal public backlash for certain plan modifications, officials began applying classifications more liberally. The city rezoned a seven-acre site from high density residential to industrial commercial. Over the years, there had been inquiries from developers regarding this area but nothing concrete materialized. The inactivity was partly because of the zoning. There was no way to know what would happen in terms of allowable uses in the future. As soon as the area was rezoned, developers began expressing interest in surrounding properties.  

Administrations in the 1980s and 1990s governed during a period in which the tax base transitioned notably. Officials had to decide to uphold, amend, or completely change certain policies that had served to protect and improve city conditions in previous decades. Most of the city was zoned for 5,000 square foot lots. However, the city fielded its share of infill housing requests in areas zoned for larger lots. By the time a major developer came

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330 Policy reference made during city leadership study session transcribed in City of University City archive Study Session 1802: February 12, 2001. For information about the city’s path from urban renewal to LCRA selling and leasing see.  
331 City of University, MO Regular Session 1041: April 2, 1973, page 10; Approval of Londe’s project signaled a significant shift in the city’s view of development. See archive Session 1674: August 12, 1996, page 2.
before the council to present a proposal for a multifamily development in 1996, lawmakers were staunchly divided on the issue.\footnote{332 Mrs. Vivian Jones offers a heartfelt plea to the council to consider her request for permit to build. See City of University City archive Regular Session 1643: May 22, 1995.}

The developer had been involved in the development of more than 200 luxury condominium units in Old Town Clayton. Most of the multifamily buildings were put into single-family areas. The proposed development would extend this type of housing into University City. Officials had denied the development proposal 10 years prior because of strong objections from neighborhood residents.\footnote{333 Approval of Londe’s project signaled a significant shift in the city’s view of development. See archive Session 1674: August 12, 1996, page 2.}

Heralding the Clayton developments as great successes, developers claimed adjacent properties dramatically escalated in value due to the developments in neighboring Clayton, and assured skeptics that any change in density was imperceptible. Motion to approve the new multifamily development carried four to three. Approving a high-density development located in the middle of an area zoned for single-family homes signaled a significant transition in the council’s aggregate philosophy.\footnote{334 Ibid}

Building heights, loss of trees, and other potential impacts on neighborhoods were becoming secondary priorities. Economic circumstances predominated matters in officials’ decision-making. However, some residents feared this was now happening at the expense of the city’s character. University City had fought to preserve its neighborhoods and it thrived as a residential community. Neighborhood preservation had been the council’s primary goal for decades. Now it was more concerned about the economic tax base shrinking than preserving the unique character of neighborhoods.
One such unique neighborhood was Parkview. Parkview was well-documented in local guidebooks and had numerous books written about it. The subdivision was laid out in 1905, one year before the city’s incorporation. One-third (80) of its houses was located on the St. Louis side and 2/3 (170) in University City. It was a typical city neighborhood with large houses close together, curving streets, beautiful landscaping, many old trees, and a vast variety of housing styles. The St. Louis part of Parkview received its local designation as a historical preservation district in 1978 and by 1986, all of Parkview was on the National Register of Historic Places.\textsuperscript{335}

When an increase in foreclosures led to more than 30 buildings sitting vacant in the Parkview area, the city helped fund the Parkview Gardens Association and its 35 programs designed to improve the neighborhood. Officials worked closely with the association who established itself as a property management company overseeing 60 units and purchasing at least three of the vacant buildings. When the 1990s arrived, the city’s financial commitment to the area was well-established.\textsuperscript{336}

Parkview represents only one of many stories of University City’s unique stabilization story. Often omitted from the story, however, has been one of the biggest challenges to the city’s planning, zoning, and redevelopment efforts and serves as the most consistent thread throughout every decade of the study period. Before city leaders could realize positive effects of policy implementations, an old nemesis would always make its return.

\textsuperscript{335} According to figures outlined in City of University City archive Regular Session 1572: June 1, 1992, page 3.
\textsuperscript{336} Budget and evaluation rubric outlined in record of proposal submitted in archive Session 1588: April 12, 1993, page 7; Figures taken from association records included in archive Regular Session 1604: October 18, 1993, page 4.
When planning, rezoning, and redeveloping in University City, one always had to consider proximity to the River Des Peres as an important factor. Storm sewers near developments often became clogged and flooded when it rained. Results from a July 1981 Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD) study of flood control in University City concluded that, of the more than 850 construction projects with estimated costs of $450,000,000, there were 306 areas which lie in parts of University City. Out of the 14 total watersheds located within MSD boundaries, three of them were in University City.\footnote{According to City of University City records Session 1273: April 27, 1981, page 13; According to figures in an MSD report submitted to the city council in Session 1282: July 6, 1981, page 2.}

Although MSD was responsible for all of the River Des Peres, it could not afford to do all the work. During the 1980s alone, the city along with the state, county, and MSD spent over $2,500,000 on projects associated with River Des Peres flooding. By 1988, city officials were hoping for a big breakthrough with an Army Corps of Engineers project that was supposed to stabilize the entire river up to 82nd Street at an estimated cost of $13 to $14 million. While the Corps committed to paying 80\% of the cost of the project, the city continued working on problems upstream using whatever funds were available.\footnote{According to figures submitted into City of University City record Regular Session 1469: May 18, 1988, page 4.}

For the next twelve years, there were no substantial changes in conditions of the river flooding and no notable policy changes related to sewer line maintenance. In July 1999, an emergency Bill 8437 was introduced. The bill called for an ordinance to authorize an annual fee for the repair of lateral sewer lines on residential property. The fee applied to properties having 6 or less units. The measure passed unanimously becoming Ordinance 6212 and established the sewer lateral protection fee.\footnote{Bill development, ordinance information, and initial fee figure taken from archive Regular Session 1761: July 26, 1999, page 7.}
There was only so much the city could do to address the challenges brought on by the flooding and an aged sewer system. When new officials had the opportunity to put their stamp on the way the city should address problems, some categories experienced considerable change. Nevertheless, despite numerous changes in character, composition, and philosophy of city leadership over the course of the entire study period, River Des Peres continued to serve as the one issue officials from of all walks of life could agree, no policy drafted could fix.

While each study city faced similar dynamics, sequencing of elements differed. City officials were charged with navigating challenges of structural decline and fiscal stress while trying to protect neighborhoods’ unique character. As Interviewee U2 explains, “In these neighborhoods, you have a house like this that is 50 years old or more and a developer will come in, tear this down, and build a house that’s worth $455,000.” Land use decisions could potentially move a city closer to decline for the sake of protecting the character of a neighborhood or sacrifice a city’s lifeblood in pursuit of economic gains which may never be realized.340

340 Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official.
Chapter 7. Fiscal Policy

Introduction

Missouri cities entered the post-fair housing 1970s facing financial crises which threatened significant reduction in quantity and quality of services provided to citizens. Revenue sources were inadequate, and cities needed to develop and implement creative strategies for meeting fiscal demands. However, state statutes restricted cities’ authority requiring they adhere to certain parameters. Up to that point, cities had not been successful in persuading the rural-dominated state legislature to adopt policies addressing issues unique to areas with higher populations.

Missouri courts had interpreted the state constitution to imply that home rule cities only had powers explicitly authorized by state statutes. Under this interpretation, matters of authority were often called into question. For example, when a new industry was created which had not been specifically named in state statutes, cities did not technically have the right to tax businesses operating in that industry. City officials needed greater flexibility and freedom for local governance. They advocated for more local control to determine the mechanisms by which services were delivered to residents and the power to choose the agency that delivered those services—city, county or other public authority.

A joint group of lawmakers, referred to as the Home Rule Group, put forth legislation to restore the notion that municipal home rule granted cities all powers not specifically denied by state or constitutional law. By November 1970, cities were seeking a favorable vote on the home rule amendment which would grant municipal officials privileges to express their preferences on each individual service and clarify cities’ taxing rights. Local lawmakers understood how policies at each level of government impacted
conditions and tools for dealing with conditions, and they were advocating to expand their toolbox beyond the traditional taxing measures.341

Tax levy propositions were often highly contested affairs which required expending a great deal of political capital and could culminate in voter rejection. Due to financial and taxing concerns of citizens, it was highly unlikely that cities could obtain adequate revenues through tax increases. Expanded taxing authority and state and federal funding would need to be secured to help with budget shortfalls. St. Louis County’s inner suburbs were at the forefront of lobbying for more taxing rights and other revenue generating strategies.

Missouri had taxed retail sales of tangible personal property and certain specified services since 1934 and in 1959, the state enacted a use tax to complement the sales tax. State legislators believed this model should be duplicated at the local level. The idea was that a local sales tax would help solve local financial problems. Coined “creative localism” by proponents, the tax was presented as a valuable financial tool that would empower municipalities to control their own fiscal destiny. Only cities in which a majority of residents voted favorably for the imposition could levy the tax.342

The local tax on sales and use combined with state sales taxes garnered more revenue from purchases made within municipal boundaries. While adopting a local sales and use tax empowered cities to levy additional forms of tax, it did not automatically equate to increased revenues as levels of income depended on economic activity. City officials needed to explore other options for dealing with the difficult economic environment.

341 For a chronology of home rule charters in Missouri, see Westbrook 1968.
342 Term “creative localism” referenced in City of University City, MO Special Session 962: May 11, 1970, page 2. For enactment of the 1969 local sales tax, see State of Missouri Revised Statutes 94.500 RSMo.
Advocates lobbied for a long-range financial aid to cities program to address fiscal crises in cities. One study group official served on a national committee lobbying Congress to enact a revenue sharing program. Revenue sharing would distribute a portion of revenues generated by federal income taxes to state and local governments. These funds could be used for any purpose by recipient governments. Supporters viewed revenue sharing as a long-term safeguard that would strengthen intergovernmental fiscal structures.343

On February 12, 1973, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act passed into law. Revenue sharing along with county-wide road improvements, funding for urban renewal projects, community development, and increases in matching grant programs resulted in notable enhancements to cities and increases in overall budgets. By the mid-1970s, however, cities’ dependency on aids had increased as supports did little to offset inflationary squeezes on resources or the effects of the oil crisis.344

In October 1973, only eight months after the implementation of revenue sharing, members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo. Economic uncertainty made city budget forecasting difficult as revenue streams became more unpredictable. Discrepancies in assessed valuation of properties, flattening wages, dwindling reserves, and rising costs of health insurance intensified fiscal stress for cities.345

343 See Resolution endorsing the revenue sharing program in City of Ferguson, MO March 23, 1971, page 4.
344 For more about the act, see General Explanation of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act, Public Law 92-512. February 12, 1973.
345 According to financial records and budget forecasts included in Regular Session 1173: November 7, 1977, page 6; Revenue sharing figures for the decade and projections for 1980 are listed in the following City of University City archives: Session 1135: June 7, 1976, page 6; Session 1147: November 22, 1976, page 5; Session 1162: June 6, 1977, Page 3; Session 1184; April 10, 1978, Page 9; Session 1214: April 23, 1979, page 4.
The phasing out of urban renewal projects led to more reductions in cities’ income. Policy stipulated that once urban renewal projects generated proceeds from the sale of land, those monies would be returned to the CDBG program. When federal funding through Title II of the Public Works Employment Act of 1976 began, it was a welcomed stopgap to reductions in cities’ operating forces. Title II funding involved the U.S. Department of Labor issuing grants to jurisdictions to assist with the costs of compensating public workers. St. Louis County received funds from the program and study group inner suburbs received funds through the county as sub-grantees.346

City officials were quite familiar with these types of employment programs having participated in programs authorized by the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Administration (CETA) previously. These programs allowed municipalities to receive the benefit of payroll supports which provided valuable assistance to their operating forces. Cities eagerly integrated new workers and trainees into the fold as individual workloads had balloonized following layoffs.347

Employee compensation assistance programs were much needed costs savings measures as inner suburbs struggled to protect their fiscal health amid multiple threats to their bottom line. Conversely, if Missouri’s 1976 tax cuts amendment passed, it would exempt food and drugs from local sales tax and would mean substantial reduction in revenues. Although the measure failed, funding cuts in January 1977 led to the government suspending the employee assistance and revenue sharing programs.348

346 St. Louis County grantee- sub grantee relationship taken from records included in archives City of University City Regular Session 1153 dated February 28, 1977, page 14.
347 For more information about figures and the bill see: archives Regular Session 1125: February 23, 1976, page 16-17.
348 Payroll figures taken from financial records included in archives from Session 1150: January 3, 1977, page 23; (P.L.92-54); Archived in City of University City Session 1024: August 7, 1972, page 20.
Local officials mobilized to oppose the programs’ suspensions and in June 1977, the CETA employee and revenue sharing programs were reinstated. Suburban lawmakers then set out to affect change in the way revenue sharing funds were distributed. They fought for the right of cities under 50,000 in population to receive revenue sharing funds directly. As it were, cities with less than 50,000 residents had to apply to the county for a share of the revenue. Inner suburbs’ officials were honing crisis management skills metro city officials had sharpened for decades.\footnote{Jennings Regular Council Session September 13, 1976 page 4, document 3027}

As officials worked to address inner suburbs’ problems, planners were developing exurbs further away from the core and surrounding suburbs. Increasing sprawl exacerbated fiscal strain for inner suburbs. While exurbs attracted homeowners and businesses away, inner suburbs’ dependence on public supports and tax increases intensified as many areas had very little economic diversification. Lost income intensified pressures to generate more revenues from property taxes and remaining local sales tax streams. City leaders scrambled to fill voids left by higher income earners, retail chains, and corporate offices.

Equipment, infrastructure, and service deliver further eroded as local officials lobbied for more public assistance, raised taxes, and vied for shoppers. Tax hikes, bond indebtedness, and damaged credit ratings led to more residents exiting inner suburbs in search of newer exurban developments and lower tax rates. Federal policy evolved to begin encouraging cities to develop more economic focused agendas placing a higher priority on attracting business investments and generating more commercial capital.

Tax base decline, funding cuts, resource shortages, and infrastructure challenges helped reveal some underlying inadequacies in inner suburbs’ fiscal structure. Heated
debates ensued over the causes of suburbs’ increased dependence on government aids and evolution to business-centric approaches to remaining solvent. The era marked profound change in inner suburbs’ political atmosphere and deep political divisions developed. While some citizens championed changes, other residents’ frustrations and distrust of local government intensified.

Neighborhoods were rapidly changing, and some residents blamed officials’ fiscal policies for further spurring exoduses and hindering growth and sustainability. Some citizens questioned the motives and philosophies driving officials’ fiscal policy decisions. Local governments’ fiscal policies and responses to changing economies occupied the center of passionate debate and disagreement; and increased polarization served as the primary motivator of referendums and recalls. Qualifications for public office, term limits, and conflicts of interest were all called into question. Municipalities composed charter review committees to study matters and propose charter revisions.

While study cities like Hazelwood and Maplewood struggled to professionalize their city governments during the era, Ferguson, Jennings, and University City possessed variations of governance stability and experience. Nevertheless, these cities’ well-established institutional structures did not insulate them from financial woes as officials responsible for managing their cities’ finances faced volatile environments. Declining revenues and intense pressure to increase and stretch budgets required frequent adjustments in personnel, priorities, and performance.

**Economic Environment**

Just as individuals’ incomes and expenses change over time, so did inner suburbs’. Cities were operating in rapidly evolving economic environments and for some, revenues
were not keeping pace with operating expenses. Municipal governments began capitalizing on tax laws that allowed cities to earn income through other sources of revenue. As cities began adopting new taxing laws, economic environments continued to shift. Variables influencing those shifts fluctuated. The implications of these interrelated dynamics shaped cities’ economic environments for decades to come.

By the post-fair housing 1970s, Maplewood was no longer garnering massive revenues from a vibrant shopping district and the suburbs’ citizens were paying $.80 per $100 assessed in property taxes. Maplewood taxpayers had not enjoyed a reduction in property tax rate in nearly a decade. The City of Crestwood, on the other hand, had the second largest shopping center in St. Louis County. Its city government operated comfortably on $.40 per $100 assessed paid by its taxpayers and were looking to further reduced the tax down to $.33 per $100 assessed valuation.350

Crestwood and Maplewood were not unique contrasts. Property tax rates varied between St. Louis County inner suburbs. These variations could increase or decrease in short periods of time as municipal governments adjusted rates and voters approved measures according to internal and external changes in conditions. Crestwood had instituted a local tax on sales and the suburb was reaping vast sums from retail activity at Crestwood Plaza Shopping Mall. The local sales tax revenues enabled officials to keep property tax rates low for citizens of Crestwood.

Cities could impose either a half cent or a one cent tax on retail sales occurring within their borders. About a year into the study period, local sales tax had become the norm throughout the county. The cities of Brentwood, Richmond Heights, and St. Ann had

350 City of Maplewood archives 1973 document 168 bill number 3806 certifying the assessment and rate of tax levy for the year of 1973 in the city of Maplewood;
recently adopted the provision while cities like Crestwood, Clayton, St. Louis, and Wellston entered the era already charging local sales tax. Communities with large shopping districts could set lower property tax rates as they collected more revenue through local sales taxes.\textsuperscript{351}

Local sales tax revenues could also generate substantial income for cities with no large shopping center. By 1971, a significant proportion of the budget in Wellston, a city with a population of 7,050, were revenues collected from the one cent sales tax. The advent of the local sales tax meant even bedroom suburbs like University City were impacted. Despite possessing a relatively modest level of commercial activity, and although property taxes remained the primary source of revenue, the local tax increased competition for sales within taxing boundaries, costs differentials, effects on local merchants, businesses, and consumers.\textsuperscript{352}

Declines in property tax revenues resulted in increasing reliance on sales tax revenue for bedroom communities like University City. The transition was not inherently negative, however, as local sales tax had its benefits. Unlike property taxes, local sales tax granted suburbs the opportunity to glean tax revenues from nonresidents. However, as reliance on the tool increased, events like the closing of major retail and grocery store chains became more of a threat to cities’ economic health than in previous eras.

Although Maplewood was struggling, the suburb was still home to some commercial businesses. Facing fiscal year projections indicating significant budget shortfalls, Maplewood officials could choose to continue raising property taxes and making

\textsuperscript{351} Bill Number 6675 proposing municipal sales tax was adopted as Ordinance Number 4566. Session 963: May 18, 1970, page 8.

\textsuperscript{352} Excerpt from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official.
cuts in city services or ask voters to approve a local sales tax measure. On January 25, 1971, Maplewood Bill 3765 authorizing a special election passed unanimously and on Tuesday March 16, 1971, Maplewood voters accepted the imposition of a local sales tax.\textsuperscript{353}

Hazelwood followed suit imposing the tax after voter approval in a November 1971 special election. Maplewood and Hazelwood had now joined Jennings and University City as local sales tax levying cities. Voters in those mature inner suburbs had approved adopting local sales tax with overwhelming majorities in special elections held the previous year.\textsuperscript{354}

Wide-spread adoption of the local sales tax fueled competition for attracting commercial activity and further highlighted differences in suburbs’ economic environments. Revenues generated in cities with shopping centers dwarfed cities without them, and small municipalities did not stand a chance. Ferguson officials argued against the taxing tool, citing revenue distribution as inequitable, unfair, and unrelated to municipal services rendered. Ferguson officials favored a county-wide sales tax instead.\textsuperscript{355}

Using a distribution formula, revenues from county sales tax would be refunded to cities based on population. Ferguson officials believed a population-based county sales tax would be a more just system of taxing sales in St. Louis County municipalities. Ferguson’s position on Missouri’s 1970 House Bill 141 was in direct opposition to the position held by cities like Jennings. Jennings had just instituted the local tax and a new county-wide per

\textsuperscript{353} Figure taken from archive City of Hazelwood, MO dated September 28, 1971.
\textsuperscript{354} Maplewood Regular council session January 25, 1971 Page 1; Cities of Jennings and University City, MO Special Elections Tuesday May 12, 1970: Jennings Bill Number 6675 proposing municipal sales tax was adopted as Ordinance Number 4566. Session 963: May 18, 1970, page 8; According to University City Special Session 962: May 11, 1970, page 2. City of Hazelwood, MO dated September 28, 1971: Bill 888 was adopted as an Ordinance 865 on September 28, 1971; Hazelwood June 21, 1972.
\textsuperscript{355} Ferguson January 26, 1970 Resolution; Ferguson January 12, 1971 page 4; Ferguson January 26, 1971 page 3.
capita distribution formula could mean less revenue than what the city could collect in sales tax dollars independently. 356

While smaller municipalities, municipalities with minimal commercial activity, and unincorporated areas stood to benefit from the change, cities like Jennings could be adversely impacted. Jennings had already allocated anticipated revenues from their city sales tax for municipal improvements and accommodations for commercial establishments. Jennings officials opposed a county-wide tax distribution pool and urged county government to seek legislative authority to establish their own county sales tax to garner revenues from the unincorporated portions of St. Louis County. 357

When cities’ local sales tax provision went into effect, officials were unsure how much money they would realize. Some cities’ revenues exceeded expectations, and local sales tax became the preferred target of tax relief measures as state legislators went after the tax with proposed exemptions for food and drugs. Many local officials favored the tax as it allowed them to offer their residents tax relief through property tax reductions. By 1977, the economic environment for some municipalities had improved a great deal. For others, with or without a local sales tax provision in place, conditions remained relatively unchanged or had worsened. 358

The Ferguson supported county-wide sales tax measure had failed years earlier, but support for the tool was now greater as a provision allowed cities who desired to remain independent to do so. In August 1977, Missouri Senate Bill 234 authorized a county-wide

356 Ibid
358 See, Development of the bill and subsequent ordinance authorizing the annual solicitation approval can be found in City of University City archive Regular Session 1088: November 4, 1974, page 7; Hazelwood January 21, 1976; Jennings Regular Council Session September 13, 1976 page 4, document 3027.
sales tax. Soon after installation of the county-wide tax, questions and accusation arose regarding the levying of too many taxes and cities’ handling of monies derived from sales taxes. A September 1978 Post-Dispatch editorial about over taxation in St. Louis County claimed there was a “windfall in quotes from the county-wide sales tax which municipalities [were] not sharing with the public.”

Local sales tax served as a critical economic environmental influencer throughout the study period. Although pre-era differences existed, the spread of local sales tax use and the advent of the county-wide sales tax combined with the demographic changes to provide additional complicating elements, scenarios, and implications of decisions for officials to consider. The economic environment affected economic conditions and available tools for dealing with conditions, but cities’ institutional structure determined cities’ level of professionalism, and designated roles and duties in navigating the environment.

Institutional Structure

Spending, borrowing, and investment decisions served as critical factors in determining cities’ economic health. As allowable taxing mechanisms, revenue streams, and financing tools evolved, suburbs’ institutional structure became more consequential in financial management and decision making. Stabilizing and prospering in this economic environment required advanced knowledge of economic principals and instruments.

In Jennings’ case, until 1993 and in early Hazelwood and Maplewood, neither city manager nor finance director positions existed. Jennings’ elected officials handled the city’s finances. The city collector received funds due the city, and the treasurer managed

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359 Jennings August 3, 1977; See, City of Hazelwood, MO November 15, 1978; City of University City, MO archive Board of election commissioner numbers were referenced in election and petition results in archive Session 1204: December 4, 1978, page 8; Hazelwood April 4, 1979; Excerpt of a Post-Dispatch editorial referenced in City of University City archives Regular Session 1198: September 25, 1978, page 11.
city funds serving as the city’s paymaster. However, the council had to authorize spending and borrowing actions and could also authorize the mayor to initiate financial actions on behalf of the city.  

Essentially, Jennings’ mayor-council was its own finance director. Jennings’ November 8, 1971 enactment of Ordinance 965 created the office of director of purchasing and inventory control, but the suburb operated for nearly 50 years without an official requirement for a finance professional in its government. The 32-hour a week purchasing and inventory control position would serve as the suburb’s only finance related appointment until the city instituted an official finance director in 1993. Officials also established a law which limited the term of the appointment to four years.  

A 1992 University of Missouri study recommended installation of the finance director as part of a reorganization of Jennings’ administrative structure. Findings found that the city needed to improve cost efficiency and general operating efficiency. While the city did not adopt most of the recommendations, officials agreed to implement the changes in the city’s financial structure by combining the elected offices of collector and treasurer into an appointed position. Despite the finance director appointment, archives show the city contracting multiple consultants to assist with budgeting and finance matters throughout the remainder of the study.

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360 Jennings Regular council session November 23, 1970 page 4; Jennings Regular council session April 14, 1975 page 2 Jennings Regular council session February 8, 1971 page 5; Jennings Regular council session March 22, 1971 page 2; Jennings Regular council session April 12, 1971 page 6

361 Jennings Regular council session November 15, 1971 page 2; Jennings Regular council meeting November 22, 1971 page 5 resolution; Jennings Regular council session April 12, 1993 Page 3.

362 Jennings Regular council session 1240 first meeting of the City Council February 10, 1992 Page 1; Jennings Regular council session November 23, 1992 page 2; Jennings August 14th, 2000 page 2.
Hazelwood entered the period with its chairman of the board of trustees serving as the city’s director of finance. When the village transitioned to a city in late 1970, the first question asked of the new city manager was, “When will a finance director be hired?” Hazelwood’s installment of a finance director was critical to the city’s success. Finance directors occupied an important role in shaping the suburbs’ fiscal position by researching, recommending, and calculating varying rate and fee estimates associated with the city’s robust business sector.\(^{363}\)

Before adopting the council-manager structure, Maplewood’s lawmakers worked as administrative staff. The suburbs’ finances were managed by the superintendent of the department of accounts and finance which was simply a designated councilperson. Additionally, the city clerk doubled as the city’s collector of revenue. Council-manager governments did not guarantee appointment of a finance director nor did the appointment of a finance director mean fiscal policy was significantly influenced by the director of finance. However, among the four professional study cities it did.\(^{364}\)

Finance directors were well-trained and usually long serving. However, the professional cities had strong city managers who enjoyed tremendous influence in policymaking. By the mid-1980s, this was especially true in Maplewood and University City. Although finance directors occupied an influential role, city managers set the administrative agenda and financial recommendations reflected that agenda.

Institutional structure indicated the presence or absence of degreed public administrators and certified public accountants, and designated roles and responsibilities.

\(^{363}\) City of Hazelwood Mo archives April 1, 1970; Hazelwood January 20, 1971; Hazelwood August 18, 2004 Regular Session Special Order of Business.

Differences in institutional structure demonstrated divergent levels of expertise and distribution of responsibilities. These differences were most exhibited in cities’ financial protocols, procedures, and use of best financial practices.

Financial Protocols and Procedures

Under good administrative leadership, finance departments develop effective strategies for cities to perform as responsible stewards during periods of financial windfall and to maintain solvency during lean times. City finance department’s financial protocols should be comprised of procedures designed to encourage integrity, ensure regulatory conformance, protect cities’ resources, minimize waste, and maximize returns. While economic environment set the stage and fiscal structure determined roles in navigating the environment, suburbs’ track record of protocols, procedures, and use of best financial practices did more to illuminate distinctions in fiscal policy.

Hazelwood and Maplewood began the period without professional administrations, but by the 1990s, both municipalities began being recognized for excellence in government accounting and financial reporting. The Municipal Finance Officers Association of America (MFOA) presents certificates of achievement to cities whose annual reports achieve the highest standards in comprehensive financial reporting. Once Maplewood secured its first MFOA certificate in 1994 and Hazelwood in 1998, consecutive annual recognitions persisted for both suburbs until study’s end.365

Although the State of Missouri did not require cities provide annual comprehensive financial reports, the practice demonstrated cities’ level of financial accountability and

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365 City of Maplewood Missouri archives October 25, 1994 document 204; City of Maplewood Missouri Archives approved September 12, 1995; City of Maplewood Missouri archives October 24, 2000; and Hazelwood Regular Council Meeting July 2, 2008.
indicated professionalism in city government. Ferguson and University City entered the era with respected reputations for financial accounting and reporting. For these suburbs, comprehensive annual financial reports were standard operating procedures, and consecutive financial excellence awards were common. Ferguson and University City enjoyed finance directors and city managers who earned countless MFOA awards, several JT Bell Service Awards, and served in leadership roles in local and state associations.  

According to Jennings’ city treasurer, as early as 1971, “The duties of the position was too much.” To address this issue, Jennings created a purchasing and inventory control position and assigned the duty of making out checks to the office of the city clerk. Jennings’ institutional structure exhibited several areas of weakness regarding internal procedures. The city’s controls for financial activities tended to be duplicative, loose, and poorly defined. Although officials commissioned multiple studies and implemented several key revisions during the study period, adjustments were often made too late and revisions caused little substantive improvement.  

Nevertheless, Jennings’ record of audit authorizations and filings of audited financial statements were consistent with other study cities. The suburb hired industry reputable independent CPA firms, ensured public accessibility to audited records, and made countless efforts to comply with auditor recommendations. Jennings earned a reputation for poor governance in the latter part of the study period. However, my examination revealed competent officials governing the suburb throughout the study.

366 See audit archives in City of University City Session 1311 dated July 12, 1982, page 14; Regular Council Meeting: City of Ferguson, MO June 28, 1983; and City of University City, MO Regular Session 1624: August 22, 1994, page 4; Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated January 27, 2015.  
Institutional structure limited the city’s capacity to deal with economic instability which only served to exacerbate issues and further burden the suburb with fiscal stress.  

Transitions in professional administrators in Ferguson and University City, and in Hazelwood and Maplewood by the mid-1980s influenced important changes in fiscal behavior. Archives reflect each suburb implementing new fiscal measures shortly after the hiring of new city managers and finance directors. One common recommendation involved cycling auditor teams regularly. Administrators believed cities benefitted from different perspectives. As early as 1975, Ferguson administrators recommended rotating auditors. By the time University City implemented three to five-year auditor contracts in 1987, the city had been using the same auditor for 25 years.  

Officials agreed different perspectives could be helpful, but switching auditors regularly meant increased fees and skepticism. Extended contracts and longstanding relationships with firms granted cities reduced rates for services, familiarity, and confidence. By 1980, Hazelwood was still using the firm that had been performing their audits since 1957. Although contracts were based on three-year terms, renewals were merely procedural. Hazelwood’s notable adjustment came in the form of extending audits to all phases of city operations.  

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368 Jennings Regular council meeting November 22nd 1971 page 5; Jennings Regular council session September 24 1990 Page 3; Jennings Regular council session October 11 1993 page 2; Jennings amended December 6 1993 CB per KS Document Attached to regular council session October 11 1993 page 2; Jennings Regular council session January 22 2007 page 2.  
369 City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Meeting April 22, 1975 page 4; and Figure taken from City of University financials submitted into record in archive Regular Session 1436: May 4, 1987, page 7. For more information regarding the city’s fiscal condition and effects of the proliferation of tax-exempt businesses prior to the audit see archives: Session 1311: July 12, 1982, page 14; and Regular Session 1624: August 22, 1994, page 4.  
Whether cities extended contracts or rotated firms, audits required the full cooperation of officials and staff, and reports consistently pointed out areas of needed improvement. Findings could indicate cities were relatively debt free with no substantial weaknesses, and concerns could be as simple as processes for issuing computer room keys or updating manuals to ensure continuity during staff absences. Or concerns could involve areas that cost cities a great deal of time and money like internal accounting control problems, poor monetary handling practices, and errors and delays in financial information recording.\(^{371}\)

A critical difference between professional and nonprofessional suburbs involved possessing and lacking capacity to effectively implement changes. Having professional staff enabled study cities to quickly adjust to changes in national standards for municipal accounting and advise policymakers regarding needs to amend policy to reflect changes in state law. Professional cities were better equipped to evaluate and respond to acute changes in income and expenditures and recommend appropriate, proportionate, and allowable action.\(^{372}\)

**Best Financial Practice**

Requests and recommendations included in finance director reports to city managers and city manager reports to the council could have major ramifications on fiscal policy in inner suburbs. Many fiscal decisions made in the early period established cities’ position on issues and embedded dynamics which shaped conditions, places, and policy platforms for decades to come. Without professional finance staff, Jennings lacked


\(^{372}\) City of Hazelwood MO archives annual audit Special Session dated November 7, 1984;
procedural integrity and the city’s council was disadvantaged by the absence of in-house advisement on financial matters.

Jennings did not practice generally accepted accounting principles. The city’s more simplified “cash basis” system allowed for fewer, less trained staff to perform accounting duties. However, the city had to pay accounting firms to convert records according to accepted accounting principles for reporting. While cash basis accounting provided elected officials easy to understand cash-on-hand and cash flow figures for making financials decisions, the practice limited the suburb in how it could leverage its fixed assets and various sources of revenue.373

Conversely, Jennings’ style of financial accounting helped the city remain more consistent with approved budgets and allowed for more real time comparative analyses which helped mitigate vulnerability to overextending resources and overspending based on estimates. Jennings’ lack of economic diversification and leveraging of profit earning investment tools rendered the city susceptible to acute fiscal stress from decline in tax base and economic downturns. However, budget shortfalls were rarely a result of the suburbs’ financial practices or speculation.374

Officials did not have to rely on professionals for decisions such as joining the state purchasing program which allowed units of local governments to consolidate financial resources for purchasing goods. Such an arrangement made logical sense as it increased savings through mass purchases. Administrators did not have to convince officials to participate in the formation of a self-insurance pool. Each study city joined the pool and

374 Jennings Regular council session October 11, 1993 page 2; Jennings amended December 6 1993 CB per KS Document Attached to regular council session October 11 1993 page 2
cities realized substantial savings in property, casualty, and workers’ compensation insurance. These were not the types of decisions where the lack of professional finance administrators impacted best practice.\textsuperscript{375}

Disparities in fiscal practices between professional and nonprofessional suburbs were most demonstrated in investment strategies. Professional cities aimed to be better served by financial institutions managing their investment portfolio. Administrators advised officials regarding existing arrangements and transferring of investment activities according to optimal returns. Although higher yield rates were usually the goal, administrators occasionally advised officials to authorize investments which garnered a bit less than the going rate to initiate or protect partnerships that included other forms of financial benefit for the city.\textsuperscript{376}

Establishing daily interest savings accounts were significant changes in fiscal practice for both Hazelwood and Maplewood. Implementing this strategy allowed the cities to begin earning maximum interest on idle funds. When savings account balances reached up to more than half a month's normal cash needs, excess funds were converted to a

\textsuperscript{375} State of Missouri legislation referenced in University City Council Regular Meeting Session 1043: May 7, 1973, page 6; Excerpt of letter and reference of budget conditions included in records from City of University City archives Session 1128 March 22nd 1976 Page 11-12; and Regular Session 1105: June 16, 1975, page 19; Projection figure taken from financial records in archive Regular Session: February 9, 2009; According to financial records entered into record in City of University City archive Council Study Session: May 4, 2009, page 1; For more about the development of the insurance pool see archives Ferguson Regular council meeting May 13th 1975 page 6; City Council of Jennings set up a self-insurance plan during fiscal year ending on March 31, 1976; Jennings Regular council session June 28 1976 page 5 Resolution document 3007; Ferguson Resolution Past an approved by the council of the city of Ferguson Mo first day of July 1986 ; City of Maplewood Missouri archives October 14 1986 document number 467; City of University City, MO Regular Session 1429: January 26, 1987, page 5. City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 25, 1987 document number 35; Hazelwood February 4, 1987; Hazelwood October 7, 1987; Hazelwood October 2,1991; City of Maplewood Missouri archives December 9, 2008.

\textsuperscript{376} For more information on the city's financial investments during this time see University City Council Regular Session 987: March 15, 1971, page 5; According to budget figures for FY1975-1976 outlined in Regular Session 1104: June 9, 1975, page 3.
certificate of deposit. Certificates of deposit were arranged so that at least one certificate matured each month. By using this system, cities were able to grow contingency funds which better equipped cities for unexpected expenditures.\textsuperscript{377}

With such robust commercial and manufacturing activity, Hazelwood needed additional implementations to deal with the management of special use permits, business licenses, and revenues generated from fees. The suburb established separate banks accounts to enable the finance department to split the duties of payroll check processing and reconciliation of other accounts. The city hired a fulltime accountant with audit experience to audit business license applications on a regular rotation.\textsuperscript{378}

University City established minimum reserves to cover cyclical shortfalls. Reserve funds were adequate in meeting the city’s short-term needs, but additional measures were required during economic downturns and for long-term stability. Following the recession of 2008, city administrators were accused of including sales tax money in the budget before the tax passed and adding employee pension figures to the budget in an attempt to balance it. A review of financial records revealed several discrepancies in the accounting figures.\textsuperscript{379}

In December 2009, University City’s financials received an “acceptable” rating out of a rating system of outstanding, acceptable, or unacceptable. While there did not appear to be any malicious intent, this did illuminate areas of concern for the professional cities’ financial practices. Financial pressures could be overwhelming in professional

\textsuperscript{377} City of Hazelwood Mo archives Special Counsel Session July 23, 1970; See, officials response to recommendations of this type of investment strategy Jennings Regular council session November 15, 1971 page 2
\textsuperscript{378} City of Hazelwood, MO archives special counsel session July 23, 1970; City of Hazelwood, MO archives regular session January 16, 1980.
\textsuperscript{379} See poll numbers for citizen audit petition listed in University City, MO Regular Session: December 7, 2009.
administrations just as they were in Jennings. Instead of limited financial tools, however, creative accounting and complex financing strategies could lead to problems. Flattening or declining revenues impact more than just estimates used for setting tax rates.\textsuperscript{380}

Consider that administrators advised lawmakers on fiscal policy that also affected city personnel. Pay and pensions were embedded in figures and estimates. Whether a plan was fully funded depended on fiscal strategies. If a city manager boasted, “There is plenty of money in the pension fund and it does not require any additional funding,” officials believed no additional funding was needed for the fund. When the study cities amended contribution levels, set up new investment accounts, or switched plan managers, it was usually in accordance with recommendations made by the city manager and finance director.\textsuperscript{381}

Study cities with professional administrations were more adept at securing additional funds through special grants and foundations and raising capital through various investment strategies. Ferguson leveraged their professional capacity to garner many dollars outside the traditional streams of revenue and public funding assistance throughout the study period. These skills would be especially important for Ferguson to meet the fiscal demands of recovering from the civil unrests in 2014-2015.\textsuperscript{382}

\textsuperscript{380} \textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{381} Excerpts of quotes from transcript of discussion about the pension program in archive Session 1782: May 15, 2000. Session 1775: February 12, 2000, page 2; Figures taken from financial records submitted into record in archives Regular Session: January 26, 2009, pages 6 and 9; and Rating taken from financial reports entered to record in archive Regular Session: December 7, 2009, page 32; According to financial records submitted into record in archives Session 1813: June 4, 2001, page 1; and Regular Council Meeting: September 21, 2009, page 8.
\textsuperscript{382} City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1974 document 484: bill number 3863; city of Maplewood Missouri archives 1986 document number 434; Jennings Regular council session October 9 1972 page 5; Jennings Regular council session 836 meeting of the City Council March 11 1974 Page 1; Jennings Regular council session October 13 1976 Page 1 document 3032; Ferguson Regular council meeting September 9 1975 page 7; Ferguson Regular counsel August 22nd 1978 Page 3; Ferguson Regular meeting May 22 1979 Page 3; Ferguson Regular council October 9 1979 Page 3; Ferguson Regular council session Aug twenty five 1981
While some initial funding was channeled to the suburb from various sources, funding levels were not sufficient for the city to make all the needed repairs and improvements. According to one official, “A whole lot of money supposedly came to Ferguson. However, it did not come through municipal government to work through these issues.” The city led a great streets application process and received a planning grant, but the total cost of engineering improvements along the West Florissant Avenue corridor was estimated to be about $2,000,000 alone.383

It is unknown how Ferguson will manage the acute change in its economic environment. While securing funding was one of Ferguson municipal government’s strongest traits throughout the study period, the suburb never faced this type of crisis. Such a change would have placed any one of the study group cities in a very compromising position.

Consider that Hazelwood was so successful in securing 50/50 grants from both the Missouri Division of Highway Safety and federal matching programs that the city often procured police cars with $0 city spending. Throughout the study period, the City of Hazelwood practically planned police car purchases around the funding. However, this skill would be minimally helpful if Hazelwood were in Ferguson’s end-of-study position.384

383 Excerpt of quote in Interview F2: 07/26/2019 Black / Male / 32-year Resident / Ex-Public Official; Ferguson January 27, 2015; These skills were especially important for Ferguson to meet the fiscal demands included in the city’s April 2016 consent decrees with the U.S. DOJ. See, www.justice.gov/crt/case/united-states-v-city-ferguson.

Professional suburbs enjoyed several important advantages over nonprofessional suburbs. Professionals managed cities’ daily financial affairs and provided expert consultation and recommendations for financial policy making. While there were supportive resources which were common among all the cases, and amounts varied depending on circumstance, Jennings’ structure exhibited less fiscal management capacity to ascertain certain resources and benefits from various financial practices and tools.385

My examination confirmed that differences in study cities’ institutional structure was an indication of cities’ level of professionalism and revealed that study cities’ level of professionalism significantly impacted protocols, procedures, and use of best financial practices. These differences impacted cities’ financial management, preparedness, and capacity. However, institutional structure, financial management, protocols, procedures, and use of best financial practices were themselves fiscal policy decisions. They did little to account for the fiscal policymaking process.

Although fiscal policy decisions impacted preparedness and capacity, cities’ preparedness and capacity failed to account for fiscal policy. I found that economic philosophy was more significant than fiscal structure in fiscal policy decision making. I also found that fiscal policy decisions had significant effects on municipal-level economic conditions.

Therefore, municipal governances’ role in municipal-level economic stabilization is best revealed through an examination of local governments’ economic philosophy.

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385 See Ferguson Regular council meeting November 13, 1973 page 4; Ferguson Resolution approving the special debt statement made by the director of finance and filed in the office of the city clerk in archive dated 22nd day of January 1980; and City of Maplewood Missouri archives March 8, 2011. Ferguson Resolution June 14, 1983; Ferguson Special public hearing June 13, 1988 Page 1.
Economic philosophy was revealed by examining economic environment, municipal-level conditions, available tools, and municipal governances’ choices and uses of tools in economic development.

**Point of Sale vs. Pool: A Lesson in Economic Philosophy**

By 1977, cities like Hazelwood, Jennings, and Maplewood were no longer opposed to the county-wide sales tax. The new plan allowed cities to continue receiving their own local sales tax or join the population-based distribution pool Ferguson officials advocated for years earlier. Cities could decide to join the pool in the future, but once non-pool cities joined the pool, they could not go back to collecting their own local sales tax. The local sales tax distribution in St. Louis County divided collections into two groups: 1. Group A-point-of-sale cities and 2. Group B- pool cities.³⁸⁶

The pool served to help the municipalities with less commercial activity. However, since Group A cities usually contained the major retail centers and they retained all sales taxes generated within their borders, the advent of the pool did nothing to mitigate the inequitable revenue distribution. According to 1983 distribution figures, Group A cities received approximately $115 per capita and Group B cities received approximately $50 per capita. However, in some cases, Group A cities could receive as much as 400 % more per capita than pool cities. If every city participated in the sales tax pool, each city would have received about $70 per capita.³⁸⁷

Resulting allocations allowed Group A cities to enjoy low or no property tax and low utility tax rates. Conversely, Group B cities were forced to greatly increase their gross

³⁸⁷ According to figures outline in City of Hazelwood, MO dated November 16, 1983.
receipts and property tax levels to compensate for the disparity. Unincorporated areas of the county became battle grounds as annexation by a point-of-sale city meant the area would be subtracted from the sales tax pool. The structure placed pool cities at a great disadvantage. Essentially, Group A cities were able to depend on sales tax monies, much of which was paid by residents of Group B cities like Ferguson and University City, to support services provided to their residents.

A coalition of pool city officials formed the Fair Share Coalition to call attention to the unfairness of the sales tax structure and to lobby for changes in the system. Point-of-sale cities rebutted arguing they needed all their local sales tax to cover expenses. Organized as Cities for Growth, point-of-sale cities argued they incurred additional costs connected with the roads and trucks servicing shopping centers and for providing additional city services like policing, fire protection, inspections, licensing, and community relations. Group B officials claimed this was a distortion as sales tax revenues and costs of servicing commercial areas were out of proportion.388

By 1993, the Fair Share Coalition consisted of 35 members representing more than 250,000 people. They lobbied state representatives to pass legislation that would make the sales tax distribution system fairer. A compromise was reached in April 1993 which restructured the sales tax distribution formula. Reformers pushed to add Group A cities to the pool on a “hold-harmless” basis and instituting a grandfather clause. Hold-harmless proposed including point-of-sale communities in the pool while preventing any loss of existing income. Only increases in sales tax income would go into the pool. By enacting a

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388 See City of Hazelwood, MO Resolution 9302 unanimously adopted on January 20, 1993: A Resolution Approving the membership to Cities for Growth, Incorporated; Hazelwood, MO February 18, 1998; "For more information regarding the Price Waterhouse audit see City of University City archive Regular Session 1311: July 12, 1982, page 14-15.
grandfather clause to existing boundaries, annexed areas would retain their pre-annexation status.  

Critics remained unsatisfied with the system and in later years, pool cities like Chesterfield would petition to exit the pool. While cities’ status as point-of-sale and pool significantly affected fiscal policy decisions, it did not necessarily equate to a causal relationship with municipal-level stability. In fact, too much dependence on local sales tax threatened some cities’ fiscal health, and efforts to grow the revenue stream often led to disproportionate resources dedicated to the category and decisions which compromised the quality of residential neighborhoods.

By the mid-1980s, revenue from tax on sales was far and away the largest source of income for the City of Jennings, and officials remained dedicated to protecting the Group A and B distribution formula adopted in 1978. According to a 1985 Jennings resolution:

“The City of Jennings wholeheartedly endorses the philosophy of allowing those communities which choose to endure the conveniences and costs of commercial developments to reap any benefits generated by those establishments while permitting those communities not desiring businesses to continue as bedroom communities, provided they fund their own government without jeopardizing the rights and operations of others.”

Five years later, the mature inner suburb entered the decade of the 1990s questioning whether the city would be better off becoming a pool city instead. Although FY1991 estimates indicated Jennings would lose money by becoming a pool city, continual decline in monthly sales tax collections resulted in significantly lower year-end earnings.

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389 Figures and reference to Chesterfield attempting to exit the pool were taken from City of University City archives Regular Session 1586: February 22, 1993, page 2; and Regular Session 1588: April 12, 1993, page 9.

Jennings council called for an immediate 10% pay reduction for all city employees and scheduled an August election hoping voters would approve a $.34 per $100 assessed property tax increase. The council had originally wanted to propose a $.55 increase, but ultimately put forth the $.34 proposition.\(^{391}\)

Jennings’ financial situation only worsened as effects of declining revenues further highlighted items like unfavorable refuse contracts, personnel disputes, and growing doubt that remaining a Group A point-of-sale city was in the suburb’s best interest. In 1995, Jennings officials resumed looking into the implications associated with becoming a pool city. Officials were advised not to make a change because ongoing litigation involving the county’s sales tax pool cities created uncertainty in the future of the sales taxing environment in the county.\(^{392}\)

While the point-of-sale fiscal strategy backfired for cities like Jennings’, others flourished establishing vibrant and stable sales tax revenue generating operations. These Group A cities thrived as strong commercial centers. As point-of-sale cities’ advantage in revenue generating capacity grew, so did pool city officials’ resentment of Group A’s economic philosophy. Pool city officials felt some point-of-sale leaders behaved as if their city was superior to pool cities. According to one official, “We did not think of our neighbors as an economic resource. We have other values.”\(^{393}\)

As a pool city, suburbs like University City often clashed with Group A neighbors Clayton and Ladue. Disagreements over sales tax beneficiaries drove border wars over

\(^{391}\) Jennings Regular Council Session April 8, 1991 Page 3; Jennings Budget Ways and Means meeting held January 25, 1992; Jennings, MO Regular Council Session 1250 First meeting of the City Council June 2, 1992, page 1.

\(^{392}\) Jennings Regular council session August 14, 1995 page 2;

\(^{393}\) Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of City of University City Council Meeting Session 1705: September 8, 1997, page 13.
street closures, freight truck traffic, and commercial business placement. Since University City had to bear the truck traffic and costs of maintaining roads, officials argued cities like Ladue should turn over tax revenue to the sales tax pool. One official lamented about Group A neighbors, “They were treating University City as their backyard.” Another lawmaker referred to attitudes of point-of-sale cities as, “arrogant beyond belief.”

Although the University City Loop was a popular shopping district, it was hard to compete with the shopping centers and large department stores in nearby Clayton. They provided better parking and more alluring attractions. Interviewee U5 recalls, “Clayton was booming, big corporations, a lot of high-powered executives, and a lot of money.” University City’s Loop revitalization increased retail activity and helped restore the area’s attractiveness. However, success of the project was less evident in the boost to the city’s financial chest than in the increase in eclectic shops, establishment of a new farmers market, and the pedestrian-friendly designs.

University City did not contain the bustling commercial activity observed in point-of-sale cities like Hazelwood. Hazelwood, like Jennings, worked to preserve their point-of-sale status. In fact, Hazelwood officials served as leaders among the advocates who


Excerpt from Interview U5: 07/26/2019, Black / Male / 52-year Resident / Ex-State Government Official. See also, University City archives: City of University City Council Regular Session 1014: April 10, 1972, page 12; Regular Session 1023: July 24, 1972; Regular Session 1127: March 15, 1976, page 3. The Loop was a center of historical and cultural dynamism and offered a hodgepodge of niche retail and entertainment offerings. It reflected the variety offered in neighborhoods that surround it. Now known as one of America’s great neighborhoods, the Loop had very diverse residents and provided affordable housing for young people as well as the elderly. It served as a vital element of University City’s character. In awarding the Loop “best of class” in 1987, the Missouri Department of Economic Development symbolically christened the area’s emergence as a nationally recognized tourist attraction.
successfully lobbied for the point-of-sale amendment to Missouri’s 1977 county-wide sales tax distribution bill. Hazelwood’s experience was different from Jennings’, however. Hazelwood enjoyed enormous success as a point-of-sale city. Officials not only reduced rates but also opted to eliminate sales tax on utilities.396

“We had a moral obligation to reduce taxes,” says one Hazelwood policymaker. Adding, “We felt we should cut gross receipts tax and then go even further to reduce taxes.” By 1994, while Jennings officials were being advised that decline in sales tax revenues resulted from a dip in the overall economy, Hazelwood was experiencing a 21% increase in sales tax revenues over only a five-month span. Hazelwood had become a unique hybrid city. After annexing unincorporated areas, the suburb now held both Group A point-of-sale and Group B pool city membership statuses.397

Annexations and annexation attempts carried varying implications for cities executing the annexation and for neighboring suburbs. Unincorporated St. Louis County areas were often surrounded by multiple incorporated cities. Consider that Hazelwood’s 1991 annexation involved an area surrounded by five different municipalities. While Hazelwood officials asserted neither Ferguson, Berkeley, Florissant or Calverton Park expressed any interest in incorporating the area, there were instances of conflict.398

396 City of Hazelwood, MO November 15, 1978; City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated November 14, 1979: Motion passed unanimously, and Resolution 7913 adopted; Hazelwood February 4, 1984 Special Session; See Hazelwood Resolution 8501 with exact same language as Jennings’ resolution, unanimously adopted on February 20, 1985; Hazelwood January 20, 1993: Resolution 9301 was unanimously adopted on January 20, 1993.


398 Excerpt from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official. See City of Ferguson, MO Resolution adopted November 8, 1983; City of Hazelwood, MO dated March 7, 2007. For
Hazelwood’s hybrid status is an indication of the city’s economic philosophy, but how officials responded to major manufacturing closures, commercial debacles, and dormant retail space revealed much more. Suburbs’ economic philosophy was rooted solely in self-preservation. Electing to be a point-of-sale city, pool city, or hybrid city by way of annexation depended primarily on a suburb’s economic environment. According to Interviewee U1, “University City has always been in the sales tax pool because we haven’t had much economic development.” Fergusons’ abdication of point-of-sale was less about achieving equal distribution for all and more about which status meant more revenue for their city’s coffers.399

While it made sense that each study city would exhibit this feature, stark distinctions were revealed through Ferguson’s philosophical hypocrisy and self-destabilizing decisions. By 2015, Ferguson officials were eliminating contracts, authorizing a 23 % reduction in staffing across all departments (approximately 32 employees), reducing salaries across the board by five percent, reducing the employees’ health care subsidy by 30 %, and searching for additional cuts to realize savings. The city was reeling from recent events which exposed the city to substantial financial stress, and the suburb’s point-of-sale status was no longer sustainable.400

Twenty years after Ferguson officials lobbied against point-of-sale in favor of a more equitable sales tax pool system, 1989’s Ferguson officials unanimously authorized the city’s exit from the pool to become a point-of-sale city. Twenty-five years later,

more about neighboring suburb implications, see City of Hazelwood, MO dated June 16, 1993; Hazelwood July 7, 1993; and Hazelwood July 21, 1993.
399 Ten years after the 1970 efforts against point-of-sale, Ferguson officials were still lobbying for the pool to be the taxing structure of the county: See City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session October 27, 1981 Page 3.
400 According to figures in archive City of Ferguson, MO Work Session dated December 29, 2015, page 1.
Ferguson wanted back in the pool. It was never been about more equitable distribution as 1970’s Ferguson officials claimed. “The reasoning behind becoming a pool city and no longer being a point-of-sale city,” a Ferguson administrator explained in 2015, “the revenue is greater, and the likelihood of this reversing is very low.”

Just as Ferguson’s 1970 economic environment was different from 1989’s, the mature inner suburb’s 2015 economic environment was strikingly different from them both. By inequitably rezoning, investing, and servicing neighborhoods, the city had discarded residential areas in favor of big box retailers and cordoned off sections of the city through isolation and neglect. Ferguson was not committed to the principles expressed through the city’s 1970 stance against the point-of-sale tax structure and the city’s economic philosophy backfired.

Ferguson’s 2015 return to the sales tax pool not only signified a full circle back to 1970 but helped shed more light on the fact that the very change Ferguson hoped to avoid in the 1970s, the city’s fiscal philosophy actually helped bring about, and in the worse way. The following excerpts from Interview F2 help illuminate Ferguson’s modern-day environment:

“A lot of people were moving out of Ferguson. So, all the taxes and stuff were gone. People were just abandoning the city. So, now we had to decide are we going to go to a pool city or are we going to stay a point-of-sale city?”

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401 City of Ferguson, MO Special meeting June 12, 1989, page 1; Ferguson Regular Council Session dated August 29, 1989, page 4: Bill 5753 unanimously passed as Ordinance 89-2376 and is permanently recorded in codebook 17 on page 271; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session December 8, 1992, page 6; City of Ferguson Mo 1993; Excerpt of quote taken from transcript of archive City of Ferguson Work Session Ferguson City Council dated December 29, 2015.

402 Bill 7093 an ordinance transferring the status of the City of Ferguson, MO from Group A point of sale city to Group B pool city for county general sales tax revenue distribution purposes passed and became Ordinance 2015-3596 and is permanently recorded in codebook 33, page 12. Bill passed with a vote of six to one. See Ferguson officials’ positions on the issue prior to going to point-of-sale in 1984 and 1985 in City of Ferguson, MO Resolution dated December 11, 1984; Ferguson Regular Council Session February 12, 1985, page 1; and Ferguson, MO Outgoing Council Session dated April 21, 1987, page 4.
“If you look at it from a regional standpoint, Chesterfield basically pulls all of the malls and all of the jobs out of north county. So, here I am as a resident; I don’t have these resources in my area. I have to go out to these other municipalities to shop, to work, do all this other stuff.”

“Then you have the school district that’s suffering as well. So, you don’t have the people moving in because the school district is suffering. So, all this is going on, but you don’t have that being discussed. How these fit into a larger set if issues. At the same time, the government is doing their stuff, and their coming in saying you can and cannot do this. The county, the state is coming in, doing their stuff. But we have to basically get it right.”

Maplewood officials warned against adopting a local sales tax in 1970. They believed local sales tax hurt businesses and drove more local merchants to relocate. Nevertheless, the city put the question to voters and since 1971, Maplewood has been generating substantial local sales tax revenues. By 1974, Maplewood’s budget looked dramatically different than it did just three years earlier. The addition of public dollars from programs like revenue sharing and savings realized from assistance programs combined with sales tax revenues to change Maplewood’s economic trajectory, create a revenue surplus, and ignited citizen demands for more fiscal accountability and professionalism.

Purging of Maplewood City Hall and the transition to professional local government further reinforced the mature inner suburb’s preferred position as a point-of-sale city. As a prominent member of the Cities for Growth group, Maplewood not only worked to protect their sales tax revenue interests, they demonstrated how to leverage and maximize the tool amid strife and uncertainty. While Fair Share Coalition challenges, court battles, and economic downturns threatened Maplewood’s resurgence, the city’s economic philosophy never wavered.

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404 City of Maplewood Missouri Special Session budget year June 24, 1974: Documents 3-4.
Maplewood officials authorized special elections immediately following changes in taxing laws and utilized the advent of new taxing authority to establish new sales tax revenue streams. Increased revenues allowed for capital improvements, redevelopment of the city’s business district, and new developments. The city creatively integrated incentives into marketing plans designed to attract businesses which helped to offset the disincentive to companies relocating to areas with more local sales taxes.405

University City voters were promised a $.30 reduction in property tax if they approved the half-cent capital improvement tax in a 1996 election. Voters obliged, and the city reduced the general fund tax $0.10 and debt service received a $0.20 reduction. Economic conditions had been improving in the mature inner suburb since the mid-1980s. Property tax rates had dropped below $1.00 in 1989, and University City taxpayers were enjoying a tax rate which was over 50 % less than the rate at the start of the 1980s. As the new millennium dawned, a five percent increase in revenue and a healthy reserve prompted further property tax cuts, wage increases, and loan payoffs.406

University City was enjoying the benefits of a booming economy. Property tax revenues were up from new construction in the late 1990s, there were new revenue sources from point-of-sale cities that were now going into the pool, and despite the city’s limited commercial activity, robust increases in sales at local retail outlets were occurring.

406 Fiscal conditions had improved dramatically in a short period. See archive City of University City, MO record of the city’s general fund budget in archive Session 1409: May 12, 1986, page 2; Regular Session 1440: May 20, 1987, page 4; City of University City, MO Tax figures taken from financial records submitted in archive Regular Session 1665: May 13, 1996, page 1; According to financial records in City of University City archives Regular Session 1721: May 4, 1998, page 5. See also, Supreme Court ruling, and figures can be found in records City of University City, MO Regular Session 1569: May 11, 1992, page 1; Session 1570: May 13, 1992, page 12; and Regular Session 1590: May 3, 1993, page 2;
Additions of the hybrid cities to the pool meant shopping more in one’s own community or other pool cities was no longer the only way Group B cities earned sales tax. As Interviewee U2 points out, “We were still going to get the same percentage from the pool, but overall it helped lift the pool up.”

Despite some periods of spikes in sales tax pool revenues, University City was never under the illusion they were built to depend on the sales tax revenue generating sphere. Uncertainty in the pool structure, its members, and its continued existence furthered highlighted the city’s need to plan for a time when they may have to make the change to becoming a point-of-sale city. When asked about this Interviewee U1 responded, “We're not looking to have that happen. In fact, were fighting that. But we don't know what will happen, and there may come the day when it's gone.”

Interviewee U2 believes, “If something like that happened, we get to the point where we are putting in more money than we're getting out of the pool or the pool starts to implode, we will have that discussion.” However, the suburb demonstrated throughout the study that it could not remain debt free for long and experienced notably acute fiscal wounds which threatened fiscal health. To maintain their infrastructure, meet operational expenses, replace equipment, and keep a sufficient contingency fund, the city may have to become more business friendly and more intentional in seeking more economic development and redevelopment.

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407 Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official.
408 Excerpt from Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official.
409 Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official; According to city’s general fund budget records outlined in City of University City, MO Regular Session 1595: June 7, 1993, page 5; Bond issue and reserves figures taken from financial records in archive Regular Session 1618: May 16, 1994, page 6-7: Bill 8185 bond issue in May 1994; and Session 1641: May 15, 1995, page 1;
This issue has ignited heated debate during transitions in local government seats and administrative appointments. Two diverging economic philosophies converged at the intersection where University City’s status as a bedroom suburb and the city’s fiscal dilemma meet. While each study city faced difficult economic environments with growing fiscal demands, University City provided the opportunity to examine a suburb which remained in the pool since its inception. University City was the only case in which officials were truly navigating what a January 2009 Newsweek article termed “the suburban challenge.”

A significant proportion of University City’s fiscal health remained directly tied to the fiscal health of many municipalities in a county that became home to 50% more working poor than St. Louis city. Inner suburbs like University City struggled with many of the same challenges as the metro city. “Adoption of Financial Policies,” a piece in the Missouri Municipal Review, talked specifically about the need to rethink funding strategies that focus mainly on cities. University City leaders may need to increase new developments and business activity to protect its fiscal solvency.

Nevertheless, the mature inner suburb will always retain its attractiveness as it continues to possess important advantages for luring new residents as well as developers. Interviewee U4 believes, “With University City, you are addressing a more diverse audience. If you're a developer, black money is just as good as white money.” If city administrators and officials continue to remain committed to continuing the city’s tradition of inclusion and proactively addressing concerns, the city should remain viable.

410 Reference to Newsweek and Missouri Municipal Review articles in transcript of City of University City archive Regular Session: January 26, 2009, pages 6 and 9.
411 Ibid
412 Excerpt from Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents.
University City weathered severe economic duress without compromising the city’s identity. Officials demonstrated trust in the city’s professional administration, and the city’s administration delivered quality best practice recommendations which remained aligned with the city’s economic philosophy—at least until the city’s economic philosophy began to change. Just as economic environments, conditions, and tools evolved, so did some economic philosophies. Reversal or reinforcement of each cities’ economic philosophy guided economic development decisions throughout the study period.

**Economic Development**

Environments evolved, institutional structures changed, and as officials and administrators transitioned, protocols, practices, and philosophies were either altered or policymakers and administrators conformed to preexisting norms. Early era decisions established study suburbs’ position. Suburbs’ position helped shape their economic conditions and stock their economic development toolbox. Just as economic conditions differed between suburbs, tools and use of tools varied in degrees of strength and weakness as officials tasked with identifying, developing, and diversifying sources of revenue selected, levied, and determined frequency of use.

Economic development should garner new revenues; levies need to be administrable, auditable, and acceptable; and sources need to be impactful, cost efficient, equitably applicable, reliable, and sustainable. Some suburbs’ overdependence on one source of revenue made them susceptible to acute fiscal stress by increasing their vulnerability to external economic effects from economic shifts, market fluctuations, and inflation. Others lacked economic development, reached the legal taxation limit,
underfunded pension plans, and depended on loans and bonds to stay afloat. By the end of the study period, conditions ranged from solvent to debt-ridden.\footnote{For bond election results which approved the bond issues see City archives Session 1008: January 17, 1972, page 11; Hazelwood Addendum 2 minutes of regular council meeting of January 19 1972 Page 1 of 2; City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 26 1974 Document 37Abstract of votes cast in special election at city of Maplewood St Louis County Missouri held on Tuesday August 20th 1974 proposition 2. University City was proposing a bond issue of $1,000,000 for more information regarding the city’s efforts see archives Session 1212: March 26, 1979, page 5; City of Maplewood Missouri archives approved May 22, 1979: Document 208 resolution number 49; For election results which approved the bond issue see University City, MO archives Session 1008: January 17, 1972, page 11; Figures reported in City of University City archives Session 1205: December 18, 1978, page 11; City of Maplewood, Missouri February 11, 2014: Resolution 14-11 Bill 3307 was unanimously adopted as Ordinance 3224 -00 on December 20; City of Maplewood, Missouri archives August 12 2014; Resolution 14-46A.}

Near the end of the study period, in 2014, the City of Hazelwood was the only municipality in St. Louis County not levying a residential utility tax. Until 1978, Hazelwood levied a utility tax on both residential and non-residential properties. Amid a growth boom, officials repealed the tax. Although lawmakers instituted a six percent utility tax on non-residential property in 1988, nearly 30 years had passed when officials placed a residential utility tax before voters on an August 2014 ballot.\footnote{A report on comparable communities found six cities with a residential utility tax above six percent, one at six percent, and four below six percent. Hazelwood Regular Council Meeting — April 16, 2014 Unfinished Business; Hazelwood December 21, 1988 Regular Meeting: BILL 2187 Mayor Robinson explained Bill 2187 would provide for a utility tax to be levied utility tax to be levied on all non - residential users. Bill 2187 was unanimously adopted as Ordinance 2128 -88; and Hazelwood August 15, 1990 Regular Meeting; Hazelwood May 30, 1972 Special Council Meeting; Hazelwood June 20, 1979 Regular Meeting. The loss from these former sources of revenue amounted to approximately $ 300, 000; Hazelwood January 2, 1985 Regular Meeting Citizens Hearings and Presentation of Petitions.}

Hazelwood boasted low taxes for decades, and its population growth and changes in resident demographics separated the city’s economic environment from the other study group cities. Even though the city’s average household size decreased from 3.29 to 2.59 during the early post-fair housing period between 1970 and 1980, total population remained relatively stable. And between 1980 and 1990, the city’s population and housing units went from 13,098 / 5,119 to 15,324/ 6,848. While Hazelwood’s population had actually declined
four percent since 1983 (16,178), the suburb was still the only study group city with net increase in population.\textsuperscript{415}

The other study cities operated in economic environments of steadily declining tax bases and sharp increases in renter-occupancy. Hazelwood’s path to 1,376 (38 \%) nonowner-occupied residences by the end of the study period involved more gradual and modest increases. Further, Hazelwood did not only stand out from the study group, the suburb had few economic peers in St. Louis County. Consider, in 1976, while cities like Jennings struggled with an unemployment rate above the national average of 7.8 \% and St. Louis County’s unemployment rate hovered above six percent, the unemployment rate in Hazelwood was 5.75 \%.\textsuperscript{416}

By 2000, the city’s assessed valuation ranked seventh in the county and property tax revenues only accounted for seven percent of city income. Hazelwood was home to some of the largest manufacturers in the entire region, and the suburb was economically diversified. In addition to property taxes, the city derived 33 \% of its revenue from sales


\textsuperscript{416} National unemployment rate according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics. County’s rate was used to determine eligibility for funding programs. It was figured by subtracting unemployment percentages for cities over 50,000 in the state from the unemployment rate in St. Louis County during the base period January 1 through March 1, 1976. References (P.L.92-54), archived in City of University City Session 1024: August 7, 1972, page 20. Formula and figures taken from records included in archives City of University City, MO Regular Session 1153: February 28, 1977, page 14; City of Hazelwood, MO September 15, 1976. See also, Hazelwood September 15, 1971; Hazelwood January 19, 1972; Hazelwood February 2, 1972; Hazelwood November 1, 1972; Hazelwood Special Session February 25, 1975 Page; Hazelwood April 7, 1976; Hazelwood May 13, 1976 Special Session; Hazelwood May 27, 1975 Special Session; Hazelwood October 1, 1975; According to figures in Hazelwood Special Council Meeting—April 14, 2014.
taxes, 28% from licenses, 11% from utility tax, and 21% percent from fees, fines, and miscellaneous sources.417

By study’s end, Hazelwood administrators were preparing a budget which officials assumed would not include estimated revenues from Proposition P’s quarter-cent sales tax increase. However, voters passed the proposition sending officials a clear message to undue the cuts made in city programs, services, and personnel. After the restorations along with salary and benefit increases, Hazelwood’s revised budget for FY2016 still projected a general revenue surplus and a 26% reserve. Hazelwood appeared to have stabilized its economic conditions.418

Despite the suburb’s wealth and solidity, Hazelwood did not escape the fiscal strain and uncertainty of the 2008 recession. In addition to the foreclosure crisis, county-wide sales tax had its lowest return in a decade, and cities were forced to adjust their budget downwards for loss in sales tax revenues. Hazelwood was hit from both sides. Already the largest portion of the city’s income, sales tax had grown to represent 39% of Hazelwood’s revenue sources by 2008, and property tax accounted for 15% of city earnings.419

Although a two percent increase in property tax revenue was most likely reflective of recent trends in new construction, it was clear Hazelwood’s position was shifting. The suburb had fell from seventh to 12th in total assessed valuation in St. Louis County, and derived a disproportionately large percentage of its sales tax revenue from one outlet mall.

417 According to figures taken from archive City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Session dated June 7, 2000. Financial records indicated an assessed valuation of $432.9 million; City of Hazelwood, MO May 15, 2000 Special Meeting.
418 Figures taken from archive City of Hazelwood, MO Council Budget Work Session: April 22, 2015.
419 According to figures taken from archives Public Hearing City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting June 4, 2008. See also University City, MO Council Study Session: February 8, 2010, page 5.
While figures estimated 85% of the sales tax generated at the mall came from non-resident shoppers, the suburb’s revenue sources had become less diverse.\textsuperscript{420}

The 2008 economic downturn exposed weaknesses in Hazelwood’s economic strength. Revenues had peaked and would only flatten and decline for the foreseeable future. By FY2012, Hazelwood was deficit spending. The suburb’s deficit spending increased in 2013, and despite a modest decrease in 2014’s deficit spending, the city was forced to cut city programs and services. Hazelwood was in a different position, navigating unfamiliar economic conditions, and no longer enjoying a large surplus of capital improvement funds for improvements and repairs in the commercial and industrial areas.\textsuperscript{421}

While the 2008 recession attributed to increased fiscal stress for Hazelwood, a closer examination revealed decisions made well-before 2008 had increased the city’s exposure to economic instability. The events of 2008 only expediated the process. As early as 1983, Hazelwood had already become heavily dependent on business license fees generated from manufacturers. The suburb’s business tax strategies included complex fee structures which were difficult to administer and often ignited legal disputes over double taxation related to property, tools and machinery.

Business license fees accounted for the second largest source of the city’s general fund revenue. Combined with point-of-sale local sales tax income, these two streams accounted for over 70% of Hazelwood’s total general revenue. Additionally, by not

\textsuperscript{420} According to figures taken from archives Public Hearing City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting June 4, 2008; City of Hazelwood, MO Hazelwood Budget FY2009 -2010 beginning July 1, 2009 and ending June 30, 2010;

\textsuperscript{421} See archives City of Hazelwood, MO June 1, 1988: Bill 3307; According to figures taken from City Manager’s Report City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting dated May 21, 2014; City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting dated October 1, 2014; According to figures in archives Special Order of Business City Hazelwood Council Budget Work Session May 6, 2013.
levying either form of the utility tax, the suburb further concentrated its dependence on license fees. Hazelwood officials used the utility tax tool like a zero-property tax. While this was an attractive measure, it was far less alluring than zero property taxes and the income hit outweighed the benefit. This was best demonstrated in the city’s reinstitution of the non-residential form several years later and the resident form in 2014.

Hazelwood officials were committed to keeping taxes low for residents. However, in doing so, officials hedged 70% of the city’s fiscal health in fees and sales. The strategy worked well in the 1980s and into the 1990s. The suburb’s revenues increased with fees and sales exhibiting the steadiest growth. Nevertheless, these were not only the largest and most important revenue sources for the suburb, they were also the most vulnerable to external threats.

The production expansions and facilities’ upgrades generated enormous sums of revenue, attracted scores of residents employed or seeking employment at factories, and provided thousands of local jobs. However, these benefits began to be replaced with major downsizing, relocations, and closures. The turn of events rendered the suburb’s financial projections of annexed areas useless. Although through annexations the city acquired land for a community center, parks, and easy access to main arteries, the large empty industrial areas, strained relations with neighboring suburbs, and boundary commission battles flipped the acquisitions from benefits to detriments and liabilities.423

By 1995, Hazelwood had become the fifth most populous city in St. Louis County with 26,829 residents. The suburb had maximized tools like industrial development bonds and TIF. Nevertheless, the city was borrowing money and requesting payment extensions on lines of credit in lieu of the city’s receipt of business licence revenues. Just five years earlier, Hazelwood was still enjoying steadily rising revenues and low bonded indebtedness. New economic considerations tempered the suburb’s optimism borne of consecutive decades of growth and stability. Early decisions established an

423 Hazelwood May 24, 1971; Hazelwood March 9, 1972; Hazelwood March 6, 1974: Bill 1059 was unanimously adopted as Ordinance 1027 - 74 on March 6, 1974; Hazelwood June 5, 1974: Proposition No. 1 City votes Yes 422 No – 63; Hazelwood November 15, 1978 Regular Session Annexation Petition 7456; Hazelwood February 27, 1979 Special Session Annexation Proposal; Hazelwood May 21, 1979 Regular Session; Hazelwood Regular Session Annexation; City of Hazelwood, MO June 6, 1979: Election returns for the June 5th annexation election, 364 votes in favor of annexation and 86 against. In the area outside the City, 66 votes for to116 against. Proposition required a simple majority in both the unincorporated and incorporated areas; Hazelwood June 20, 1979 Regular Meeting; Hazelwood January 15, 1981Special Session; Hazelwood April 6, 1983 Regular Session Election Results held on Tuesday, April 5: passed by a vote of 1, 489 for and 345 against 16 acre tract annexation; Hazelwood February 20, 1985 Regular Session Boundary Commission: Resolution 8502; Hazelwood May 2, 1990: Bill 2307 was unanimously adopted as Ordinance 2246 -90City of Hazelwood, MO November 20, 1991; Hazelwood May 6, 1992; Hazelwood November 18, 1992 League Meeting; Hazelwood May 4 1993 Public Hearings, Annexation Invalidation: Missouri Supreme Court ruling which invalidated Hazelwood’ s annexation was signed May 4; Hazelwood February 7, 1990; Hazelwood April 4, 1990 Regular Session Annexation; Hazelwood June 7, 1995 Population Certification; Hazelwood May 16, 2001 City Manager’s Report.
overdependence on sales and fees and resulted in mid-1990s fiscal stress. However, it may have been for the best.424

By the time the 2008 recession hit, Hazelwood had endured their first economically challenging decade of the study period. Spared the fiscal destruction of early post-fair housing era economic conditions, the suburb had little experience with acute declines in revenues. The exit of major manufactures during the latter half of the era, however, forced the city to rethink their economic model and adjust. While the city could not be expected to totally revamp, there were concerted efforts to better diversify streams. Economic development plans now focused more on business parks, commerce centers, hospitality and services, and recreation and entertainment.425

University City officials worked throughout the study period to retain existing commercial businesses, generate more commercial activity, and attract new commercial investment. Officials aimed to increase the utilization of local businesses and increase the city’s economic competitiveness. Strategies included marketing and promoting the city’s resurgence, conducting code enforcement information analyses, and evaluating areas for redevelopment. The city contracted consultants to provide in-depth reviews of existing retail and other commercial facilities to better assess existing businesses and their accessibility to neighborhoods throughout the city.426

424 See City of Hazelwood, MO March 3, 1980 Regular Session threat of General Motors Plant Move; City of Hazelwood, Mo archives interoffice memorandum, Review of business license structure August 15,1988 page 1-2, 4-5, and 13; Hazelwood August 25, 1988 Special Meeting; Hazelwood April 15, 1992 REGULAR MEETING Resolution 9202 was unanimously adopted on April 15, 1992; City of Hazelwood, MO January 15, 1994 Special Meeting;
425 See archives City of Hazelwood, MO June 1, 1988: Bill 3307; According to figures in archives Special Order of Business City Hazelwood Council Budget Work Session May 6, 2013; According to figures taken from City Manager’s Report City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting dated May 21, 2014; City of Hazelwood, MO Regular Council Meeting dated October 1, 2014;
426 See financial figures listed in City of University City, MO archives Regular Session 1135: June 7, 1976, page 6; Ordinance Number 5052. See Special Session 1168: August 22, 1977, page 1-2; see also Bill Number
University City’s approach to economic development projects involved three different type of processes: 1. Formal, 2. Informal, and 3. Quasi Formal. The city’s formal process included strategic planning sessions with policymakers, contracted consultants, and administrators such as city manager and directors of planning and finance. Boards, focus groups, and public hearings were convened to elicit citizen input. Requests for proposals were rarely issued in advance as officials usually identified potential developers through the informal process.

Inviting developers to meet informally and submit proposals was customary behavior. No written rule governed the activities, and businesspersons often approached the city unsolicited or circumvented boards and commissions review processes. The informal process often resulted in an imbalance in information and background. Policymakers and administrators, through which the project made entry onto the agenda, were usually well-informed and very much in support of the project while others were skeptical. This challenged continuity in making development decisions.

Quasi formal processes included staff involvement and boards and commissions reviews. However, policymakers were seldom aware of critical details related to how these groups arrived at their decisions to recommend approval or denial. While administrative supervisors could elaborate on staff roles and involvement, information from boards and commissions was not as readily available. Boards and commissions were comprised of non-city employed citizens, and although councilmember and citizen liaisons served as the

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7115 passed as Ordinance Number 4964. Refer to archives Special Session 1123: January 23rd, 1976, page 1. For more information regarding the firefighter’s petition see City of University City archives Session 1032: November 20, 1972, page 3.
go between, there was no rule or official process for taking meeting minutes or forwarding information to the council or administrators.

When revenue figures and finance department’s estimated projections began exhibiting substantial discrepancies in the late 1970s, officials assumed the lower than anticipated revenues were attributable to lower property assessments. However, a proliferation of tax-exempt properties within the municipality’s borders had resulted in a significant number of properties being removed from the tax rolls. The suburb had always been home to many churches and other nonprofits delivering services to residents, but most organizations usually leased space and buildings. Only nonprofit-owned properties were removed from the tax rolls.

University City had become “saturated with nonprofits,” and some officials believed the suburb was a “target for tax-exempt operations.” City officials assessed the situation and determined conditions warranted a new economic development strategy. In 1977, the city created a municipal officer position to monitor commercial and industrial development and assist those looking for properties to redevelop. Officials authorized the formation of an industrial development corporation in May of 1979. In October 1980, University City established the special business district commission and began designating special business districts.427

Special business districts permitted the city to levy a tax for exclusive use in improving taxed areas. Officials also applied an additional 50% fee to merchants’ business licenses for the same purpose. By 1984, the tool had generated enough revenue that the

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427 The formation of the IDA marked a pivotal change in the city’s development practices. For more information regarding the IDA see archive Regular Session 1215: May 7, 1979, page 8, 10. See also, development specs taken from Regular Session 1108: July 14th, 1975, page 7-8; City of University City, MO Financial Records Regular Session 1255: July 28, 1980, page 5.
city was able to begin making small loans to district merchants. Officials then began phasing out the city’s department of human resources and established a public affairs department.\footnote{Loan conditions taken from application information outlined in archive City of University City, MO Regular Session 1365: July 9, 1984, page 10; Discussion and passage of Ordinance 6050 can be found in City of University City archive Regular Session 1658: January 22, 1996, page 3: The city also established the Parkview Gardens Special Taxing District.}

By the mid-1980s, attitudes regarding economic development had shifted, and the practice of contracting outside firms “equated to buying advertising.” To initiate and sustain substantive economic development activity, the city needed in-house personnel dedicated to the category. Utilizing economic development staff instead of consultants granted administrators and officials better access to ongoing activities. The implementation of the public affairs department expanded the city’s capacity for economic development by cultivating relationships, project plans, and proposals. Nevertheless, developer interest remained lower than desired.

University City had long been credited as being a self-starter, but “It’s difficult to develop when the city is landlocked.” University City projects were often delayed awaiting interest from developers. Early period University City officials had remained reluctant to turn to tax incentives to attract developers and to finance projects. Local lawmakers believed, “The city should be very careful in matters concerning TIFs and tax abatement.” Officials remained confident, “The city could secure a developer of land without offering any tax incentives.”\footnote{Excerpts of quotes taken from City of University City, MO archives: For more information regarding the Cunningham Park development see the following archives: Session 1184: April 10, 1978, page 1-2, 5; Session 988 April 5th, 1971, page 14; and Session 1060: November 19, 1973, page 12. For more information regarding the Berger project see City of University City archives Regular Session 1101: May 19, 1975; and Interview U4: 07/23/2019, White / Male & Female / Married Couple / 44-year Residents.}
The mature inner suburb had no shortage of blighted areas that easily qualified for TIF, and University City officials’ unwillingness to authorize tax incentives drew harsh criticism both internally and externally. It was common for TIF requests to involve areas where several municipalities shared boundaries. Such occasions mandated developers secure approval from each jurisdiction. Refusals sparked contentious battles and pitted the suburb against county, state, and federal elected representatives, private developers, and neighboring municipalities.\(^{430}\)

During the city’s 1986 comprehensive planning process, however, city officials began to exhibit more favorable attitudes and views regarding the use of TIF. Although most citizen input was not as supportive, property owners and most business owners were onboard. Officials determined the increased interest from the business community warranted instituting TIF districts. Additionally, results from a 1989 market study confirmed that level of developer interest in University City was contingent upon the use of TIF.\(^{431}\)

University City established a TIF commission to field requests, manage accounts, and make recommendations. Interviewee U2 explains:

“We needed to bring some economic stability to University City. If you don't have a good healthy economy, you can't do anything. We needed to have money to be able to do these things and we needed to have a good economy to help stabilize neighborhoods. So, we started looking at TIF when a developer came to us and said I would like to put in a development in this area.”\(^{432}\)

\(^{430}\) The city’s actions related to the county’s plan can be furthered explored in archive Session 1070: April 8, 1974, page 9-10. Figure of families served taken from archive Session 1178: January 9, 1978, page 7.

\(^{431}\) See results in Harland Bartholomew market study archive Regular Session 1460: February 8, 1988, page 14.

\(^{432}\) Excerpt from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official.
Officials set a use policy that TIF would only be considered to assist in new development and rehabilitation of blighted properties with extraordinary costs. Projects were required to conform to objectives outlined in the city’s comprehensive plan and demonstrate substantial tax revenue for the city and schools during the subsidy period and result in major increases at the conclusion of the subsidy. Projects also had to provide jobs for University City citizens. Eminent domain could only be employed when it was necessary to complete projects in or immediately adjacent to designated redevelopment areas listed in the comprehensive plan.

Traditionally, University City officials discouraged the use of TIF. However, by the second half of the study period, evolving attitudes were affecting change in University City’s position, toolbox, and decision-making. The early post-fair housing era shift in University City’s fiscal health highlighted vulnerabilities in the bedroom community model and created an environment of less resistance to divergent economic philosophies and provided more opportunities for more business-centric ideologies to be politically represented, acquire more policy impact, and affect change in the suburbs’ economic development strategy.

Economic ideological disagreement reintroduced University City’s government and its citizenry to a level of divisiveness not experienced since the 1960s. Some city officials and citizens accused officials of using TIF to bribe large merchants to relocate into the city, and opponents claimed major commercial retailers put smaller stores out of business. “The TIF is corporate welfare,” exclaimed one former official. “They basically take any taxes we generate and give them to the developer. I think it's an abdication of
power.” Lack of continuity in processes and approach further exacerbated disunity in the city’s economic development strategy.433

University City’s TIF commission was often inactive and unaware of the city’s economic development goals and objectives, and city officials were unclear of the commission’s role in economic development strategy and execution. Some officials believed the TIF commission presented a “roadblock” to progress, and it was common for the economic development board and TIF commission to engage in activities which were not aligned with the council’s philosophy—some of which increased expenses for the city and delayed activities.434

While business growth did occur along the city’s popular southern strip, projects were realized despite no special planning and minimal public financing. Further, there was little economic development occurring in other areas of the city as projects were concentrated in the popular district. According to Interviewee U2:

“Young people have nowhere to go to spend their daily dollars. When they need to go to the grocery store or go buy stuff, they go to Maplewood, to Walmart, or to Target, Richmond Heights, and spend their money. That money is not in the pool. I want people to stay in University City and spend their daily dollars.”435

University City decision makers continued to push for more use of tax abatements and TIF and began advocating for the use of the Maplewood method of economic development to spur activity in the other areas. The Maplewood model included aggressive and multilayered measures of attracting businesses and investment. Like University City’s public affairs department, Maplewood established a community development department,

433 Excerpt from Interview U3: 07/23/2019, White / Female / 30-year Resident / Ex-Public Official.
435 Ibid
hired staff, and assigned personnel to contact developers and specific businesses. Personnel initiated contact, cultivated relationships, and promoted the city’s attractiveness.

Maplewood’s model, however, included incentives for businesses to relocate, initiate, or expand operations in the city. Maplewood’s pitch included business loans, grants, and access to specialists and brokers who assisted in identifying location, securing agreements, and completing requirements. University City officials felt the revival in Maplewood could be copied in their city. With a pro-business mission and the right sales broker, they believed they could develop a larger commercial retail base and stand as a point-of-sale city should the time come.

Although the Maplewood model has been lauded for its walkability, small eclectic shops, and annual events promoting the main street business district, many disagree with other elements of Maplewood’s economic development strategy. Interviewee U2 points out:

“When we do redevelopment, we don't just say ok bring us big box development projects. We say we want to do something that's really going to help people and get better jobs for the people that live over there.”

Conversely, “I don't view this as gentrification,” exclaims Interviewee U1. “I view this as an opportunity to get some better prices to shop in places.”

University City’s economic ideological debate continued through to the end of the study period. Some officials still aligned with the city’s early period view of tax abatements and TIF and preferred financial assistance sources such as special business districts (extra property tax and license fee), neighborhood improvement districts (special assessment / property tax), and transportation improvement districts (added sales tax). Additionally,

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436 Excerpts from Interview U2: 07/22/2019, White / Male / 20-year Resident / Public Official; and Interview U1: 07/22/2019, White / Female / 33-year Resident / Public Official.
where permitted by law, officials advocated obtaining tax credits and lower interests financing at no cost to the city. Other officials stood firm in the position that the only way to generate any substantial activity was TIF.

Meanwhile, the “forgotten corridor” and international district of the city became home to payday/title loan establishments, rent to own, and DWI traffic clinics. Officials were responsible for issuing business licenses and despite their expressed belief in the need to limit such operations, they continued to flourish. Although a joint redevelopment agreement between University City and the City of Olivette instituted plans limiting certain types of businesses moving forward, prohibition of car washes, resale thrift shops, tattoo parlors, drive-through food chains, and short-term lenders did not extend restrictions into much of the city’s own part of Olive.\footnote{Resolution 2010-15 was just one measure put forth by the council to address the Olive/I-170 corridor issue. See also: Regular Council Session: August 30, 2010, page 5; Regular Session: March 4, 2011, page 6; Regular Council Session: January 23, 2012, page 2; Regular Council Session: January 23, 2012, page 10-11; and Regular Session: December 13, 2010, page 3. University City and the City of Olivette had established the joint redevelopment task force (JRTF) in May 2009 to explore redevelopment opportunities and joint initiatives in the Olive Blvd. corridor on the east and west side of the intersection with I-170. On August 30, 2010, the council passed resolution 2010-15 authorizing the preparation of a joint development zoning overlay district (JDO) for the Olive / I-170 area. See figures in City of University City transcript of agreement recorded in archive Regular Council Session: March 12, 2012, page 3. See also: Council Study Session: September 10, 2012.}

As the study period neared the end, University City had multiple special business taxing districts, TIF districts, and scores of TIF-assisted properties. One TIF district alone contained nine undeveloped properties and four LCRA-owned properties. One TIF district had no money, a TIF district owed the city approximately $1,000,000, and assets of TIF districts were in the process of being transferred to the city.\footnote{According to financial records submitted into record in archive Regular Council Session: July 11, 2011, page 4.}
Other than some private investment and public-private partnership success in the city’s Loop district, University City officials struggled to spur economic activity in other areas of the suburb. The city’s Olive area was still not conducive to pedestrian shoppers and was plagued with vacant store fronts, poor street lighting, and the state-owned road lacked adequate maintenance, landscaping, and designs. Officials leveraged various tools to attract developers but ultimately only managed to improve some facades, signage, and landscaping.439

Several successful redevelopments resulted in a warehouse and business park, and entry of several large commercial retailers into the city. However, use of highly controversial financing tools such as tax abatements and TIF further divided the city and complicated its economic development process. Since attaining consensus became much harder, the city’s projects received less support, tended to be less beneficial for the city, and were often delayed or abandoned. This has resulted in perpetual periods of economic bliss routinely interrupted by increased fiscal stress.

In 2000, University City was deriving 30 % of its revenues from sales taxes, 20 % from utilities tax, 10 % from property taxes, 40 % from refuse collection and miscellaneous sources, and the suburb had six million dollars in reserves. A decade later, according to one University City official quoted in a St. Louis Post-Dispatch article, “City finances were

439 See record of resolution, and transcripts included in City of University City archives Regular Session 1656: December 11, 1995, page 5; In 20 years, the Loop Special Business District had grown from a request to self-tax to a well-organized and productive operation; and Loop Trolley’s inception in 1997, the council supported the vintage trolley line. By January 2012, the Federal Transit Administration had approved urban circulator funds and the $24.99 million project was in its final stage of design University City, MO Session 1760: June 21, 1999, page 8. Development specs and tax abatement details outlined in City of University City archive Regular Session 1416: July 7, 1986, page 5. University city was one of five cities around the nation awarded a grant. Figure taken from transcript of Loop Trolley presentation in archive Regular Council Session: September 10, 2012, page 22. Figure taken from Loop Trolley discussion in archive Regular Council Session: June 11, 2012, page 13.
in abysmal shape.” Findings in citizens’ petition-initiated Missouri State Auditor, city’s annual audit, and independent financial consultant examinations confirmed the assertion by attributing a number of issues to poor financial management.\textsuperscript{440}

The consultant’s report alone included 47 recommendations for improving the city’s finance department. University City had 22 different bank accounts that were accruing thousands of dollars in bank fees, clerks were adjusting customer bills without receiving prior approval, and financial records were disorganized which caused the city to incur additional charges for extra accounting during audits conducted by private firms. Amid financial strife, the wedge that had previously been serving as an economic ideological partition matured into a bitterly divisive tool used to identify, call out, and attack opponents.\textsuperscript{441}

Vitriolic infighting within local government was intensified by watchdog groups and citizens accusing officials of conflicts of interest and sunshine law violations and demanding more transparency. A Post-Dispatch editorial referred to what was happening as “[U City] shenanigans.” A longtime city employee described city hall as, “A hostile work environment.” Another lamented, “There was a lack of respect, common courtesy, and professionalism; [the environment] was one of distrust, suspicion, and oppression.”\textsuperscript{442}

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{441} Figure taken from transcript of City of University City archive Regular Council Session: September 10, 2012, page 20. See also: Regular Session: August 9, 2010, page 3. See also, Figures taken from budget line item recorded in archive Regular Council Session: February 27, 2012.

\textsuperscript{442} Resolution 2011-5 was a reprimand of one of the councilmembers for inappropriate behavior during a council meeting. This event garnered regional media attention. Refer to archive Regular Council Session: February 28, 2011, page 11. For more information regarding the allegations and others, refer to the following archives: Regular Meeting: November 8, 2010, page 8; Regular Council Session: February 13, 2012, page 3; and Regular Session: December 9, 2011, page 9. Excerpts of a quotes from an article referenced in transcript archive Regular Council Session: March 12, 2012, page 10. For a better understanding of the
Interestingly enough, the apex of University City’s economic ideological divide and the city’s dissent into civility deficiency coincided with the hiring of the mature inner suburb’s first black city manager. Notwithstanding, most observers attributed tensions to, “The warp speed with which changes were occurring within city government.” A reorganization of the city’s finance department and cuts in personnel and spending produced a balanced budget by FY2012. Interviewee U3 said, “One of my proudest achievements was with members of the council and our former city manager. We were able to put [U City] on a stable path.”

University City’s 2012 comprehensive financial report showed that the city’s assets exceeded its liabilities by approximately $74 million— a two-million dollar increase from the previous year. By the end of the study period, however, the city needed to levy two new special tax funds as 69% of voters said no to two bond issues, and the city’s FY2016 budget estimated only a $60,000 difference in revenue over expenditures. Interviewee U3 commented on the city’s economic future adding, “I am concerned our outlook financially is not good.”

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political atmosphere during this time, refer to the following archives: Regular Council Session: July 14, 2014, pages 18 and 22; and Regular Council Session: November 26, 2012, page 20. See also, Missouri Sunshine Laws outlines legalities in operations and public communications for government units in the state. See Regular Council Session: August 30, 2010, page 10; and Regular Session: April 22, 2010 page 2-3.


University City was established as a residential community and the suburb’s strength remains its residential offerings. However, this strength also serves as a liability for the city as revenue is vulnerable to acute changes in the housing market and officials are limited by law in terms of how high they can increase the property tax. Officials are dependent on property owners approving property tax rate hikes that exceed the maximize allowed rate. This increases the city’s vulnerability, decreases municipal government’s fiscal tool options, and further highlights the need for the city to improve its economic development strategy.

While the divide among divergent economic development philosophies in University City centered on the use of TIF to attract developers, mature inner suburbs like Maplewood were leveraging the tool to become one the largest retail shopping areas in the region. Maplewood first began using TIF as a central tool in its economic development strategy in 1990, and a decade later, officials feared changes to TIF standards could eliminate TIF from communities who could take advantage of the established standards of blight.445

In early 2000, proposed limits to the statewide availability of TIF were designed to end abuse of the “but for” rule which required reasonable justification for officials claiming developments would not take place without TIF. By redefining the term “blighted” to include some measurable, unambiguous standards, framers aimed to prevent the funneling of taxpayer money into private development in places that did not exhibited characteristics like derelict properties, loss of population, pervasive poverty, and unemployment.

Economic benefits from TIF were to be area-wide and limited to expenses that would not be covered by private investment without this kind of assistance.\(^\text{446}\)

Maplewood’s economic development model proved effective and controversial as the city received many responses from business and developers ready to take the city up on offers. Critics challenged the city’s TIFs, and courts interpreted the legalities. While the suburb’s business grants and loans program was popular among smaller merchants, large corporations wanted TIF. Controversy ensued regarding Maplewood’s 2002 agreement with Walmart when developers expressed the development would not require the $34 million TIF originally requested.\(^\text{447}\)

Walmart had not undertaken a project in the St. Louis area without the use of TIF, and the question arose, “If Walmart could construct a store in Maplewood without the use of TIF funds, should all the other Walmart projects in the area have been granted TIF?” Competing developers threatened Maplewood officials with possible legal action against the city and warned if the Walmart developers did the project without TIF, the development would not be feasible and could be closed in a few years. However, threats were ineffective as Maplewood had spent the first 30 years of the period stocking its economic development toolbox for moments like this.\(^\text{448}\)

Just a little over a decade earlier, Maplewood had lost a large sales tax revenue generator in Kmart, and abandonment and deterioration of several defunct factories had left a 62-acre cavity in the suburb’s landscape. Maplewood, not yet in the attractive position it would assume in the last decade of the period, was desperately trying to get the area


\(^{447}\) City of Maplewood Missouri archives January 8, 2002.

\(^{448}\) Excerpt of quote taken from archive City of Maplewood Missouri archives January 8, 2002.
redeveloped and secure a new tenant. Officials authorized the hiring of a consultant to assist the city in finding a tenant to occupy the old Kmart building.449

Maplewood designated both sites TIF redevelopment project areas, established boundaries, and began inviting developers to take advantage of TIF to redevelop land and properties in the designated areas. Execution of redevelopment contracts, management agreements, and construction soon followed. Maplewood’s position had not changed since the early post-fair housing era. In fact, in replacing Kmart after the retailer’s exit from the city in 1990, officials only needed to revisit Kmart’s entry into the city 16 years earlier.450

In 1974, although the municipality was not yet a professionally governed city, Maplewood’s economic philosophy and economic development strategy was already embedded. After meeting with developers and property owners regarding the Kmart development, officials still had one unanswered question: “How can it be financed?” Usually, the process involved large commercial retailers and a construction company, which serve as the developer, purchasing, developing, and leasing the property to the retailer.451

Before the retail business would commit to a lease, specific requirements for buildings, total land space, and large parking area had to be met. Parking is critical to large

449 City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 12 1990 document number 222; City of Maplewood Missouri archives May 27 1997: bill number 4942; bill number 4599 approved as ordinance number 4454 authorizing and directory the issuance and delivery of tax increment finance note; City of Maplewood Missouri archives November 13 1990 document number 247; City of Maplewood archives hello May 28 1991 document number 279 -280: Bill number 4639 an ordinance amending ordinance number 4476 authorizing indirect during the issuance and delivery of the tax increment financing notes; dated March 14 1997 approved as ordinance number 4774 . City of Maplewood Missouri archives April 8, 1997: bill number 4932

450 Ibid

retailers’ business success. Ironically, parking was also one of Maplewood’s top priorities. Early era officials identified lack of parking in the city’s business district as a major inhibitor to competing with fellow retail sales tax revenue-oriented suburbs like Crestwood. As part of the development, officials required the Kmart project developer to include a large parking facility for its downtown business.

This created a dilemma for the developer, however. To secure financing from a lender, the developer had to demonstrate the project was feasible and profitable. This model required the developer to meet the Kmart parking requirements, which were substantial, as well as provide additional parking according to the city’s specifications. Statutes prohibited a leasing arrangement between the developer and the city. Therefore, the only incentive for the developer to provide the additional parking was the original one—leasing to Kmart.

Maplewood got the extra public parking for its downtown business district in the form of a two-level parking deck under the Kmart building. Consider that the ground underneath the property was owned by the city, and Maplewood leveraged that ground and the developer’s desire to execute the development to expand the city’s parking options and strengthened its downtown. Maplewood accomplished something that was unheard of at the time and would serve as a model upon which other cities around the country based their development negotiations.452

Maplewood’s victory did not come without notable costs, however. Developers wanted certain areas containing residential properties rezoned commercial and wanted the city to secure and retain ownership of the land. Nevertheless, officials were pleased with the deal. They had successfully secured a large sales tax revenue generator and even if

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452 See City of Maplewood Missouri archives Special Session September 27, 1974: Documents 65 -66; and City of Maplewood Missouri archives year 1974: Document 144.
Kmart closed, they still would have a public parking garage for the business district. Conversely, the city’s rezoning of residential areas proved problematic.\textsuperscript{453} In addition to rezoning single-family residential to commercial, officials rezoned old historic properties from residential to heavy industrial districts. As expected, citizens opposed these decisions and petitioned the council to reconsider rezoning these areas. However, a closer examination of the issue revealed other pertinent elements to consider. The city’s decision to rezone these areas for business purposes was not only problematic because it sacrificed the character of neighborhoods, but it did nothing to address the problems facing the struggling district.\textsuperscript{454}

Unless Maplewood addressed issues of abandonment, obsolescence, and deterioration in the city’s business district, benefits of the new garage would be minimal. Many stores had closed, and if the trend of decline in the district continued, businesses would continue to exit, and buildings could remain vacant for some time. Up to that point, the city’s focus was to provide ample free parking to attract more shoppers to the area. The city’s planning and zoning commission had identified parking as the top priority in efforts to save the central business district from further deterioration.\textsuperscript{455}

With the goal of expanded parking achieved, the city needed to focus its attention on revitalizing the existing business district and making substantial improvements to the city’s infrastructure to help drive traffic to the area. Bridges needed replaced, streets needed new paving and signage, and intersections needed synchronized light signals. The city’s

\textsuperscript{453} Ibid
\textsuperscript{454} City of Maplewood Missouri archives May 1974: Bill 3820 and 3821 approved and became Ordinance number 3736; and City of Maplewood, Missouri archives approved May 30, 1974: Document 493.
\textsuperscript{455} City of Maplewood Missouri archive approved August 13, 1973; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1976: Document 195.
budget could not support these projects through recurring income and there was no significant nonrecurring capital anticipated. Maplewood began applying for public assistance, and with funds from the Missouri’s Office of Community Affairs, paid for a housing inventory and streets needs study.\(^{456}\)

To increase accessibility to the business district for shoppers using public transit, Maplewood officials petitioned the Bi-State Development Agency to relinquish right-of-way on properties at the bus loop, allocated funds for construction costs, and installed two passenger shelters. By the time Maplewood adopted its charter and professionalized its local government, in 1978, the mature inner suburb had laid the groundwork for a resurgence. All that was needed was a replenishing of resources, acquiring of new tools, and effective use of tools.\(^{457}\)

Maplewood’s first economic development decisions as a charter city established a land clearance and redevelopment authority, declared a substantial portion of the city’s land mass to be blighted, and designated the area a redevelopment zone. Bounded by the city’s eastern city limits shared with the City of St. Louis and the centrally located major north-south artery, the redevelopment zone was subject to the convenience and necessity of the Maplewood Development Corporation (MDC).\(^{458}\)

Through a contract agreement with the City of Maplewood, the MDC possessed authority to exercise the power of eminent domain, establish land use restrictions for certain


\(^{457}\) City of Maplewood Missouri archives July 14, 1975; See also, Maplewood 2003: The city established the boundaries for the Manchester road transportation development district TDD included joint representation on a TDD board to determine how monies are allocated for the district and approve the development plan of the Maplewood South Redevelopment Corporation.

property, and carry out other relevant activities outlined in the redevelopment plan. The city made the next major addition to its economic development toolbox, in 1980, when officials authorized an agreement with St. Louis County’s industrial development authority to finance the cost of an industrial development project. The partnership with the county allowed the city to leverage a financing tool which had not yet been added to its economic development toolbox.459

By 1981, Maplewood officials agreed that solely hiring economic development consultants was no longer meeting the city’s needs. To address this deficiency, officials instructed the city manager to appoint an economic development director. The original appointment involved a reassignment of internal personnel and was voted down by the council. A year later, officials approved the appointment of the same internal personnel as an officer in the department. The rejection a year earlier and the filling of the director’s role with a new hire demonstrated officials’ desire to add new viewpoints, ideas, and capacity to the city’s economic development strategy.460

The era of a bustling, self-sustaining central business district requiring only the basic services of local government had passed for Maplewood. For the mature inner suburb to have any real chance of rebounding and achieving vibrancy and longevity, Maplewood officials had to adjust the city’s historical approach to economic development. Planning, setting goals, and working with the remaining businesses would not be enough to save the district. The city needed to build on the success of landing the major retailer and parking garage in the previous decade.

459 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1978: Document 82, Resolution No. 67; and Year 1980, Resolution No. 32.
The Kmart deal came about as a result of the developer approaching the city. However, Maplewood did not have the luxury of waiting for developers to express interest in developing in the redevelopment zone. Officials needed to take an active role in promoting the area, recruiting developers and businesses, and leveraging economic development tools to incentivize projects and increase interest. Maplewood officials decided to amend the city’s approach to economic development by first establishing the central business district’s new image.

Involving local business, the local chamber of commerce, and other community stakeholders, the city established the Maplewood Community Betterment Foundation and developed a revitalization plan for the central business district which included detailed goals and specifications for the desired image of the area. The group, along with city personnel, began promoting Maplewood to the types of businesses identified as aligning with the preferred image detailed in the plan. In anticipation of new types of businesses and to ensure compatibility, officials began adjusting zoning codes and exploring relocation options with existing stores.461

By 1984, with a new administration in place, Maplewood was primed to take its economic development to the next level. The city strengthened its economic development toolbox by establishing its own IDA. In utilizing the county’s IDA, the city was at the mercy of the county’s decisions regarding projects. By establishing their own IDA, Maplewood gained the freedom to independently approve or deny industrial development projects. The city’s first independent IDA authorization involved the granting of bonds for

the redevelopment and rehabbing of the 62-acre tract of land and properties mentioned earlier.462

In continuance of the city’s efforts to revitalize the central business district, Maplewood formed special business districts which allowed the city to increase the property tax and license fee assessed on businesses in the district. The additional revenue was then used to promote businesses and create renovation grants issued directly to business owners for physical improvements to establishments. As stores’ appearance improved through accentuations like fresh paint and new facades, the city strategically expanded special business district boundaries to increase eligibility for the storefront renovation grants program.463

While improvements were notable and consumer activity began trending upward, some vacancies remained. One official recalled, “It was like throwing a party and no one comes.” To fill remaining vacancies, the city designed a rebate program for business district building owners. Property owners received 25% of the sales tax generated by new retail establishments that located to the district and remained for at least three years. The strategy further demonstrated Maplewood’s superior prowess in the economic development space. The program did not only address vacancies by incentivizing owners

462 City of Maplewood, Missouri archives 1984: Resolution 84-4, Document number 261; City of Maplewood, Missouri archives January 22, 1985: Document number 341. See also, City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 3, 1983 Document 221, Resolution 48; City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 23,1983 document number 224; Bill number 4280 approved as ordinance number 4147, Document 226; City of Maplewood Missouri archives May 8 1984 Document number 289; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1988 document number 99; City of Maplewood Missouri archives October 11 1988 document number 114, Bill 4509 approved as ordinance number 4365; City of Maplewood Missouri archives February 25 1992 document 351, Resolution 929A; and City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 22, 1993.

463 City of Maplewood Missouri archives April 24, 1984 document number 288, Resolution 84-28; and City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 14, 1984: Document number 296, Resolution 84-35. See also, City of Maplewood, Missouri archives October 27, 2009 Community Improvement District for the Maplewood Business District to develop strategies, feasibility based on the study of the special business district recommended that the city impose a one cent sales tax to provide revenues for the district.
to get the property occupied and fully leased as soon as possible, but it also incentivized
property owners to only extend occupancy leases to sales tax revenue generators.\textsuperscript{464}

By the time Kmart exited in 1990, Maplewood was still years away from achieving
its renaissance. Notwithstanding, the mature inner suburb was much better positioned,
equipped, and professionalized than it was when the retailer arrived. The unveiling of the
new business park and the groundbreaking ceremony for the next phase of the 62-acre
redevelopment demonstrated this best. In less than 20 years, the City of Maplewood had
designed and executed an economic development plan which revitalized the city by
converting an old model that left only liabilities from a bygone era to a modern major
revenue producing model.\textsuperscript{465}

Maplewood progressed through the remainder of the study period strengthening its
economic development strategy and accentuating the efforts through increased focus on
improving the housing stock and attracting younger homeowners and families.

“I never saw a 20 something parent with a stroller the first six or eight years I was
in Maplewood,” says Interviewee M4. “But in the early 90s, people started looking
for affordable housing, maybe it was late 90s, a lot of the good stuff started kind of
happening and it sort of fed off each other.”\textsuperscript{466}

Official agreements with the local chamber of commerce formalized and clarified
revitalization goals, functions, and services. This strategy significantly improved and

\textsuperscript{464} See Document number 311 city of Maplewood Missouri archives June 14, 1984; and City of Maplewood
archives September 11, 1984: City of Maplewood archives August 11, 1987: Document 57, tax rate is .843
per $100 assessed valuation for all real and personal property. This is a $.027 reduction from the previous
year’s tax rate. The city is now able to reduce its tax rate: Document number 318; Excerpt of quote taken
from archive City of Maplewood June 13, 1995: Bill number 4843; City of Maplewood Missouri archives
June 11, 1991: Document 282, St. Louis County charges one percent for the collection of taxes and payments
in lieu of taxes which is much less than Maplewood can collect the taxes for.

\textsuperscript{465} City of Maplewood Missouri archives September 10, 1991: Document number 310; City of Maplewood
Missouri archives October 8, 1991: 310; City of Maplewood Missouri archives December 10, 1991 document
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\textsuperscript{466} Excerpt of quote from Interview M4: 07/30/2019 White / Male / 35-year Business Leader.
expanded Maplewood’s capacity to promote the city as a prosperous, economically viable, and desirable locale for businesses and residents alike. Efforts resulted in further accentuation of the city’s image by attracting unique businesses like microbreweries that produced significant amounts of sales tax dollars for the city and sponsored events like art fairs.\textsuperscript{467}

Maplewood cultivated and leveraged relationships to develop partnerships which greatly increased the suburb’s ability to execute maneuvers far beyond the scope of the city’s capacity to perform independently. By explicitly promoting citizen involvement in economic development efforts, Maplewood benefitted from the wide range of expert and creative input represented on its civilian boards and commissions. Maplewood was not only effective at attracting new businesses, but the city developed innovative programs for retaining and helping grow existing businesses.

Maplewood created a pro-business atmosphere in which existing businesses helped promote the city and recruit new businesses to the area. Officials affirmatively sought out joint ventures with neighboring municipalities and worked collaboratively to develop projects and institute methods to help ensure that the adjacent and surrounding neighborhoods were not compromised by decline or traffic from redevelopments. Maplewood’s economic development model proved effective, efficient, and sustainable.

\textsuperscript{467} City of Maplewood, Missouri archives February 8, 1983: Document 133; City of Maplewood Missouri archives July 10, 1984; City of Maplewood Missouri archives April 9, 1985 document number 359, Property tax assessment almost doubled of that of previous years; City of Maplewood archives October 8, 1985: Document 403; City of Maplewood Missouri archives approved July 25, 2000; City of Maplewood archives August 12, 2003: Resolution 03-41. City of Maplewood Missouri archives November 10, 1992 document 453, Bill number 4720; City of Maplewood Missouri archives April 26, 1994 document 134; City of Maplewood Missouri archives August 12, 1997; City of Maplewood archives 22, 199; City of Maplewood archives August 28th 2001 public hearing; City of Maplewood Missouri archives September 14, 2001: Resolution 01-60A Joint Resolution.
However, as the city’s first big economic development win of the period demonstrated, Maplewood’s model contained embedded costs.\textsuperscript{468}

According to Interviewee M3, “Maplewood is the place where people want to live, but it’s a double-edge sword.” The suburb’s commercial activity ultimately exceeded levels experienced in the city’s pre-mall era success, and old nemeses reemerged. Parking shortages became more pronounced than before. Challenges with maintaining and upgrading the parking garage became a politically divisive topic. Tensions in the business sector ensued from parking lot expansions and encroachment disputes, and served as constant inhibitors to achieving economic development, preservation and expansion goals.\textsuperscript{469}

By 2000, the Kmart property was sitting idle and Maplewood’s strategic planning meetings were producing few ideas for addressing the matter. Maplewood would have to institute a tax increase to raise the money to buy the old Kmart property and demolish the parking garage. Despite vast improvements in the business sector, the city still faced the dilemma of budget concerns, increased pressure to continue expanding the sales tax revenue stream, and citizen backlash from leveraging TIFs and compromising more residential area for the sake of economic development.\textsuperscript{470}

National tragedies, busted stock market bubbles, and broken commitments served to expedite the dissolution of agreements and exacerbated anxieties regarding

\textsuperscript{468} City of Maplewood Missouri archives May 10, 1994 Document 142: Enough money was in the debt service fund to pay off the bonds the following year without having to collect additional monies to put into the debt service fund. The city could not continue to levy a debt service tax without a vote of the people; City of Maplewood Missouri archives 1996; See City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 10, 2003.
\textsuperscript{469} Excerpt of quote from Interview M3: 07/25/2019, White / Female / Resident / Business Leader.
\textsuperscript{470} City of Maplewood June 13, 1995: Bill number 4843; City of Maplewood Missouri archives March 24, 2005.
Maplewood’s financial future. The suburb’s model was built and reinforced over decades to survive, thrive, or decline on sale tax revenues. The small eclectic shops were great, but the new model required major retail chains. Officials remained committed to the model and over the final third of the study period, the city attracted a new tenant for the old Kmart building and attracted some of the biggest retailers in the industry to the area.471

Kmart’s 1990 departure from Maplewood was not a unique occurrence for inner suburbs by the early 1990s. Evolving consumer demands and economic transitions were challenging the sustainability of large-scale retailers and mall developments. The River Roads Mall had served as a dependable sales tax revenue engine for Jennings since the early 1960s. However, 30 years later, Jennings officials began the process of blighting the mall, plaza center, and surrounding properties. From 1985 to 1991, assessed valuation of the property had declined 48%, and a steady outflow of retail tenants resulted in the city’s sales tax revenues plummeting.472

The mall’s last occupant vacated in 1994, and the facility closed for good the following year. Five years later, officials blighted “St. Louis County’s first ultra-modern retail village, Northland Shopping Center in Jennings, Missouri.” By 2006, both sites were the malls once stood as symbols of suburban prosperity, modernity, and stability served as

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471 City of Maplewood Missouri archives June 8 1993 document number 25; City of Maplewood Missouri archives January 8th 2002; City of Maplewood archives August 27 2002; City of Maplewood Missouri September 28, 2004; City of Maplewood Missouri archives December 13, 2011: Bill 5844 as Ordinance number 5646; City of Maplewood Missouri archives January 24, 2012 archives; City of Maplewood archives October 12, 2004; City of Maplewood archives April 12, 2005; City of Maplewood Missouri archives March 8, 2011.
472 Figures taken from archive of financial records in City of Jennings, MO. See also, Regular Council Session 1219th meeting dated March 25, 1991, page 1.
visual and fiscal reminders of colossal failures, a bygone era, and the suburban realism that had replaced suburban utopianism.\footnote{\textit{See archive City of Jennings, MO Regular Session 1436\textsuperscript{th} meeting dated Monday July 26, 1999; and tobyweiss.com/northland-shopping-center/}}

In April 2000, the city clerk of Jennings invited business and property owners from the city’s downtown business district to meet with the city council. Prompted by a letter advising the council of “the serious situation that is rapidly developing in Jennings’ business district on West Florissant,” officials instructed the clerk to schedule a meeting. The district had long been a shell of its former self. For decades, as Jennings vested most of its economic development focus in the malls, the remnant of the district’s retail and service businesses struggled to stay afloat amid a divested environment inundated with structural deterioration and substantial vacancy rates.\footnote{\textit{Excerpt of letter filed in City of Jennings, MO archive dated April 24, 2000, page 1-3; City of Jennings, MO Regular Council Meeting 1219\textsuperscript{th} Session dated March 25, 1991, page 1.}}

Jennings’ fiscal strain began long before the decline of the malls and the business district. To fully understand how Jennings reached a financial position which prompted officials to levy the maximum property tax rate allowed by law in 1993, we must return to the start of the period. Based on the total operational costs for fiscal year April 1, 1969 to March 31, 1970, the City of Jennings established a property tax rate of $.5579 per $100 valuation. One year later, Jennings increased the property tax five cents. Combined with $.20 garbage and $.10 police and firemen’s retirement fund, by 1971, Jennings’s taxpayers were paying $.90 per $100 assessed in property taxes.\footnote{\textit{According to financial records in City of Jennings, MO Session June 8, 1970 page 3; and Jennings Regular Session April 12, 1971, page 3.}}

With projected increases in property tax revenues from higher property assessments between 1984 and 1985, officials adjusted the tax rate down from $.90 to $.84 for tax year
1985. By FY1987, Jennings tax rate was up to $.94, and to maintain the same amount of revenue by FY1991, required the tax be set at $.99 and raising the trash fee from $30 per year to $50 per year. This trend continued for Jennings as the tax rate reached $1 per $100 assessed valuation in 1993. To raise the rate any further, lawmakers needed two-thirds voter approval.476

The City of Jennings’ economic development model has never allowed the mature inner suburb to enjoy low property taxes or to achieved decades of sustained fiscal solvency. The advent of the revolutionary malls attracted scores of shoppers to Jennings and provided the city sales tax revenues but did not set the municipality on a course for wealth and sustainability. Any excitement about the modest surplus found in the city’s 1971 general revenue fund was soon tempered with the reality that the capital equipment fund was nearly depleted. Although Jennings had been populated as far back as before the emancipation of slaves, the Jennings, MO that entered the post-fair housing age was still a fairly new city.477

Up until 1947, a local volunteer fire and improvement association provided fire protection for Jennings, and a county deputy sheriff served as the area’s police protection. In late 1946, the scattered settlements of Jennings, Woodland, Jenwood, West Walnut Manor, and farms north of the railroad tracks designated the area for incorporation. Neighboring Country Club Hills and Flordell Hills had recently incorporated and began

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476 Jennings special counsel session public hearing budget Aug twenty one 1985 Page 1, Jennings Regular council session 1168 meeting of the City Council Aug 30 one 1987 Page 1: Bill 1558 passed an approved as ordinance number 1524. Jennings Regular council session 1220 fifth meeting of the City Council page one July 15 1991; Jennings Regular council session 1250 second meeting of the City Council June 8 1992 Page 1; Jennings Notice of the 1993 proposed tax rates as published in newspaper; Jennings August 22, 2000 page 2 Jennings Regular council session 2203 meeting of the City Council Aug 20 four 2009 Page 1 tax rates for 2009

477 Jennings Regular council session resolution April 12, 1971, page 2.
laying claim to the promising commercial potential on West Florissant Avenue. Property owners on and around the old James Jennings plantation quickly followed suit, formalized, and began laying their claim to the revenue engine.\(^{478}\)

By 1972, a one cent sales tax had replaced the city’s one-half cent tax implemented just two years earlier. Records reveal why Jennings doubled the rate to the maximum allowed at the time. Exactly half of the sales tax revenue received during the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1972 and ending March 31, 1973 was allocated to defray costs associated with the building of a police department building and municipal court room. The following September, officials formed a bond issue committee, commissioned a feasibility study, and began promoting a bond issue to raise funds to construct a community center.\(^{479}\)

When Jennings officials met with the new director of the Jennings Chamber of Commerce in March 1975, the first order of business was to form an investigative committee to determine the needs of the community. By November, federal and state officials were receiving letters expressing Jennings’ desire to have a federal or state government agency located in their city. By July 1976, the group included officials from the City of Flordell Hills. The group’s new focus involved a joint effort to revitalize the West Florissant Business District.\(^{480}\)

\(^{478}\) Schmerber 2011, p.128-129.

\(^{479}\) According to figures in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session April 10, 1972, page 6; and Jennings Regular council session September 24, 1973, page 4. See also, Jennings Regular council session May 13, 1974, page 5; Jennings Regular council session April 7, 1975, page 1: Document 02922.

\(^{480}\) See City of Jennings, MO archives Regular council session 866\(^{th}\) Meeting of the City Council dated March 10, 1975, page 1: Document 02915; City of Jennings, MO Regular Session dated November 24, 1975, page 7; and City of Jennings Special Session dated July 6, 1976, page 1: Document 3009.
During the 13 years between 1947 (Jennings incorporation December 1946) to 1960, the suburb experienced steady economic growth. However, beginning in 1960, Jennings began to experience gradual economic decline. While Northland’s 1955 arrival and River Road’s entrance less than a decade later provided a boost in the city’s income, they also punctured the city’s cord which funneled a steady revenue stream from the commercial strip along West Florissant Avenue. By the mid-1970s, the malls had all but driven the final death nail in the business district. Jennings officials along with their suburban neighbor Flordell Hills hoped together they could revitalize the struggling area.481

Almost 30 years to the date before Jennings blighted Northland Shopping Center in 1999, as officials prepared the city’s FY1979-80 budget, Jennings’ mayor described the mature inner suburb’s economic situation as, “Robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Jennings officials concluded the city needed to formalize its work with the Jennings Chamber of Commerce by hiring the organization to help the city develop an economic development plan, promote the business sector of the city, and attract new businesses.482

In addition to executing promotions efforts, chamber personnel coordinated the city’s business loan program, which made loans available to businesses located in HUD homestead project areas. Meanwhile, a Jennings liaison stayed in communication with the organization and reported back to the council. By September 1980, West Florissant business owners were petitioning the city to establish a special downtown business taxing

481 See City of Jennings, MO archives Regular council session 866th Meeting of the City Council dated March 10, 1975, page 1: Document 02915; City of Jennings, MO Regular Session dated November 24, 1975, page 7; and City of Jennings Special Session dated July 6, 1976, page 1: Document 3009.
482 Excerpt of quotes taken from City Jennings, MO Public Hearing dated March 12, 1979, page 1-2.
district. Officials obliged and formed a downtown special business district steering committee.\textsuperscript{483}

Jennings extended a loan to the district to develop administrative staff services, imposed the increased tax on assessed valuation of property in the district, and instituted the 50\% increase on merchant licenses. Once the additional taxes and fees reconciled the loan, the district planned to use the designated funds for the creation of a business directory and farmer’s market, renovations, installation of lighting, special patrols by the Jennings Police Department, and the sponsoring of special events like crime prevention seminars for merchants.\textsuperscript{484}

Besides authorizing loans and imposing tax and fee increases, Jennings officials had little time to dedicate to the downtown business and property owners’ efforts to revitalize the area. Jennings’ housing situation had been deteriorating for some time, and as early as midyear 1980, housing concerns demanded the lion’s share of officials’ attention. Jennings’ stock of automobile-age friendly homes were being replaced with new apartment buildings and citizens wanted to know, “If Jennings’ residents got preference in rentals and sold their homes to get into the housing, what guarantee do they have that young people will be moving into Jennings?”\textsuperscript{485}

A decade into the post-fair housing era, the City of Jennings consisted of a population comprised of 38\% senior citizens, and Jennings officials faced a serious dilemma. In an effort to increase retention of the city’s longtime residents, officials

\textsuperscript{483} See City of Jennings Regular Session dated May 14, 1979, page 6.
\textsuperscript{484} See Jennings, MO Regular Session 1009\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the City Council September 22, 1980, Page 1 -2.
\textsuperscript{485} Excerpt taken from transcript of public hearing in City of Jennings, MO Regular Session June 16, 1980, page 2; and Jennings Regular council session February 9 1981 page 2; Bill 1390 approved as ordinance number one 365.
authorized new apartment developments and apartment building rehabilitations to accommodate the senior population cycling out of their homes into smaller units. Conversely, many of the seniors’ children, who were raised and attended school in Jennings and who had purchased their own homes in the suburb, desired to continue living in Jennings but opposed the city’s proliferation of rentals.486

As Jennings officials spent the decade of the 1980s focused on housing projects leveraging newly added tools like industrial development authority and local development corporation, the city’s downtown business district faded into obsolescence, major retail occupants began abandoning the malls, and rental properties lost 47 % of their assessed value. Jennings entered the 1990s under severe fiscal stress, blighting large redevelopment districts for TIF, and found the city beholden to developers for economic development.487

Failure of the malls, housing stock decline, and tax base transitions delivered notable shocks to Jennings’ fiscal health. By the mid-1990s, the city’s financial status and economic development prospects made fiscal recovery unlikely. Interview J1 shares the following:

“When these companies started shutting down and moving due to crime or whatever, the people followed. At that point, it was probably 30/70, 30 being black African American. Groceries stores left, there were no hospitals in the area.”

“You know we make all these wonderful plans, and everything looks good. We wanted to be a bikeable and a walkable area but how can you connect your city? You know you can't go in a community or a neighborhood and tell these people with different types of communication what they should or need to be doing in their community. But if you're going to make this work not only do you have to be

486 According to City of Jennings, MO Regular Session June 16, 1980, page 2.
inclusive, you have to make it equitable. We don't want our neighborhoods to look like Chesterfield. We want our neighborhoods to look like our neighborhoods.”

The advent of the City of Jennings in 1947 reflects traits of many rapidly expanded post-WWII outposts of metro cities. By the time River Roads mall opened in 1962, Jennings’ economic growth had peaked. The housing construction that saw nearly 80% of Jennings’ homes built after WWII had slowed by 1970, and Jennings entered the post-fairing housing era already on the decline. The model was flawed from the outset and officials found themselves navigating perpetual cycles of fiscal stress and temporary periods of solvency and surplus.

Jennings’ housing stock and tax base did not evolve to become an inadequate source of revenue to support the city; the city was established with inherent flaws in institutional structure, structural design, and fiscal model. This placed the mature inner suburb in a position where economic development decisions were efforts to correct for these flaws as opposed to realize growth and sustainability. While the 1970s white flight, housing discrimination, and housing stock deterioration receives the bulk of attention, consider as late as 1990, Jennings still enjoyed 16,000 residents, 50% white / 48% black residency, 75% owner-occupied homes, and $111 million in taxable sales.

Early era economic development decisions increased the city’s vulnerability to economic decline. Decisions compromised economic diversity by concentrating the city’s financial dependency in the unproven revenue stream of retail malls and diverting

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488 Excerpts of quotes from Interview J1: 06/18/2019, Black / Female / Government Organization Leader for Community Engagement and Funding.


resources from other budget categories to accentuate the stream. The lack of direct city involvement in protecting and growing the downtown business district served as a fatal missed opportunity to strengthen and expand the stream.

Jennings’ downtown business district was not a small collection of eclectic shops. Covering 39 acres of Jennings’ landscape and offering 1.68 million square feet of real estate, the district comprised several large anchor businesses including retail and commercial service-oriented businesses, various food and industrial manufacturers, supermarket grocers, and a large Catholic church. With direct city involvement leveraging all relevant tools at the city’s disposal, attempting to stabilize and revitalize the area would not have been considered a futile endeavor in 1980. However, by the 1990s, many of the business and property owners who were attempting to save the area a decade earlier had all but cycled out. 491

Jennings had not positioned itself as a highly desirable locale for businesses or residents, and the suburb had not developed an effective economic development plan or apparatus. Consequently, business closures often resulted in long-term vacancies, obsolescence, and structural deterioration. Areas descended into low trafficked, high crime areas. Any chance of resurgence required substantial investment of dollars and resources.

Economic development investments in cities like Jennings carry disproportionately high risks and no reasonable or serious investors were willing to take those risks without substantial investment on the part of the city. The mature inner suburb was at the mercy of investors, developers, and lenders. If any one of the study cities met the “but for” test for TIF redevelopment, Jennings certainly did. In 1991, Jennings and the St. Louis County

491 According to City of Jennings, MO Public Hearing redevelopment plan January 29, 1990, page 2-9. 9
LCRA began developing a plan for attracting developers to the suburb, designating large portions of the city’s landscape as redevelopment areas, and leveraging the TIF tool as the incentive.492

Blighted for redevelopment and carrying a seven-million-dollar improvement price tag, River Roads garnered numerous proposals from interested parties. Suiters requested 100% TIF to redevelop the 57-acre tract of land. Authorized to negotiate from a starting point of 40%, Jennings had minimal leverage and the city’s fiscal condition was rapidly worsening. Debt spending was not a traditional practice. However, Jennings would become very familiar with the technique during the middle third of the period; taking out loans to cover city operations, authorizing budget transfers to pay monies owed to pension plans, and drawing upon lines of credit until depletion.493

Jennings’ fiscal health steadily deteriorated as taxable sales plummeted from $111 million in 1990 to just over $65 million by 2000. Results from the 2000 census resulted in further reductions in the city’s revenue. Jennings’ economic development during the final fourth of the study period was led by a contracted economic development consultant, financed by the taxpayers of Jennings through TIF, and resulted in the redevelopment of both malls. Developments included a mixture of retail strips, government offices, single


493 According to City of Jennings Regular Meeting 1219th meeting dated March 25, 1991, page 1; See City of Jennings, MO Regular Session April 8, 1991, Page 3; City of Jennings, MO Regular Session 1252 meeting of the City Council June 8, 1992, page 1; Jennings special council session 1247th meeting of the City Council April 22, 1992, page 1; Jennings Regular Session February 24, 1992, Page 3: Bill 1668 and 1669 approved as Ordinance 1633; City of Jennings, MO Regular Session September 27, 1999, page 2: City had been informed that River roads has been sold for $1.9 million; According to City of Jennings, MO January 24, 2000, page 3;
and multifamily dwellings, senior apartments, convenience store gas stations, and fast food restaurants.\textsuperscript{494}

Before Jennings officials entered the 1990s using the TIF tool from a position of dependence, Ferguson officials ended the 1980s wielding the tool in preparation of their exit from the sales tax pool. Scores of Ferguson citizens filed into the city’s August 10, 1987 special council meeting to oppose the city’s rezoning and use of TIF for a large Walmart development surrounding their residential subdivision. Of course, residents did not want the commercial development near their residential neighborhood, but more notable, residents disagreed with the council’s assessment of the area as blighted and insisted the target area did not meet the “but for” test.\textsuperscript{495}

Residents accused Ferguson’s local government of using TIF “because they are pro-commercial.” Another resident felt, “They’re too buddy-buddy with the business community.” According to one Ferguson Third Ward resident:

“I objected to most things proposed for West Florissant, but it was like the residents was wasting their time speaking to the council. We were being treated like second class citizens. [Councilmember] had Walmart on the same agenda.”\textsuperscript{496}

\textsuperscript{494} According to figures in archive City of Jennings, MO January 24, 2000, page 3; Jennings March 21, 2000, page 3; Jennings April 24, 2000, page 3: Ordinance 1895 approved unanimously. City had been informed that River roads had been sold for $1.9 million; Jennings September 25, 2000, page 2; Jennings Regular council session 1488 meeting of the Jennings City Council July 22nd, 2002, page 1; City of Jennings, MO Regular Session 2001 113\textsuperscript{th} meeting of the city council January 24, 2005, page 1; Jennings Regular council session February 28th 2005 page 4: Bill 2080 as Ordinance 2036, Bill 2081 as Ordinance 2037; Jennings Regular Session March 26, 2007, Page 3; Jennings Regular council session June 25, 2007, page 2: Bill 2147 as Ordinance 2103; Jennings, MO Regular Session October 22, 2007, page 2; Jennings Regular council session 2136 meeting of the City Council June 27 2005 Page 1: Bill number 2092 ordinance number 2048, 2049, and 2093; Jennings Regular Session March 23, 2009 page 2;

\textsuperscript{495} See City of Ferguson, MO Regular council session June 14, 1988 Page 1; City of Ferguson, MO Special council meeting August 10, 1987, page 2; Ferguson Regular council session September 8, 1987, Page 3: Bill S602 and S604;

\textsuperscript{496} Excerpts of quotes from transcripts of archives City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session May 23, 1989, page 1; Ferguson Regular Session December 12, 1989, page 3; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session May 22, 1990, page 3.
Unlike Jennings, Ferguson did not have failing malls, impending insolvency, or nonprofessional government. Ferguson entered the post-fair housing era already a well-established, professionally governed city. By the time Jennings and the chamber began lobbying for a government office to locate to Jennings, a Missouri State license office had already been located in Ferguson’s central business district nearly 20 years. The office attracted many people from the north end of St. Louis County and served as an anchor helping to keep Ferguson’s business district viable. Ferguson was not only more established as a city, the mature inner suburb was wealthier than its neighbor.\footnote{See Ferguson Resolution approving the special debt statement made by the director of finance and filed in the office of the city clerk on the 22nd day of January 1980 for Year January 1, 1979.City of Ferguson, MO dated March 10, 1981; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session August 25, 1981, Page 3.}

Ferguson entered the era a debt free city offering a competitive salaries and benefits package. The suburb retained quality personnel and residents enjoyed the second lowest property tax rate among study cities throughout the study period (Hazelwood was lowest). Commercial expansion and transition to a point-of-sale city flushed the city with increases in capital allowing officials to further reduce rates periodically. When the city elected to increase the merchants’ and manufacturers’ license tax and replace the fixed fee with a variable rate system in 1981, it was the first modification to the tax and fee since 1951.\footnote{Ferguson’s total property tax rate was among the lowest total property tax rate in the area in 1970. the City of Ferguson May 26, 1970 page 2; Ferguson Regular Council Meeting May 14, 1974, Page 3; Ferguson Election results November 24, 1981 from votes cast in the special election held on Tuesday November 3, 1981 in the City of Ferguson from the board of election commissioners of the County of Saint Louis, State of Missouri: Bill 5231 passed and adopted by the council of the City of Ferguson as Ordinance 81-1872 to become effective May 1, 1982; Ferguson Regular Council Session July 26, 1994, page 2; and Ferguson Regular council session August 10, 2004 Page 1.}

Consider when Ferguson began using the TIF tool in the late 1980s, the city enjoyed impressive economic diversification. Receipts from utilities taxes accounted for 28% of the suburb’s revenue while income from the sales tax pool represented 24% of earnings.
Intergovernmental services pulled in 15 %, property taxes added 11 %, and licenses, permit fees, and assessments rounded the city’s intake accounting for 22 % of total revenues. Ferguson was a highly self-sufficient, well populated, resource rich city. Like other suburbs of comparable size and history, Ferguson had its challenges and suffered economic hits. What separated Ferguson, however, the suburb was better equipped than other mature suburbs and the city’s most devastating blows were entirely self-inflicted.499

While other study cities spent the early period of the post-fair housing era developing, growing, or redefining their city’s identity, Ferguson officials adhered to the will of a slim citizen majority demanding preservation of their city’s identity through insulation and exclusion. When it became clear by the mid-1980s that efforts to preserve municipal-level racial homogeneity had failed, the modus operandi the city would become infamous for received reinforcements. As Ferguson’s black residency nearly doubled from 13 % in 1980 to 25 % by 1990, the suburb’s policies, economic development decisions, and fiscal behavior adjusted accordingly.500

Planning and zoning strategies exhibited features consistent with efforts to reinforce, establish, or support isolation and control of particular areas of the city. A failed 1983 attempt to garner voter approval of a municipal court costs hike demonstrated some early citizen pushback against the direction of city policy. However, by 1985, police and protective services expenditures accounted for 62 % of Ferguson’s spending, while transportation and streets received 15% of city dollars; general government and police

499 According to archives City of Ferguson, MO Regular Session June 14, 1983, Page 1; Ferguson Regular Session June 12, 1984, Page 1.
facility debt services got 12%; and sanitation, parks and recreation represented 11% of city spending.\textsuperscript{501}

Ferguson’s failed municipal court costs increase was not surprising. Ferguson voters rarely approved any type of tax or fee increase. Consider that by the start of the study period, it was already estimated that around 700,000 cars were traveling the roads in the St. Louis area. Ferguson officials agreed with the traffic commission’s recommendation to construct a bridge near a high traffic area where many school children had to cross and walk along the shoulders of the road as no sidewalks had been installed. However, voters defeated the bridge measure along with the alternative proposal to enact sidewalk districts to fund sidewalk installations.\textsuperscript{502}

Ferguson’s civic engagement was extremely high in the 1970s but by the mid-1980s, the political environment in Ferguson had changed dramatically. The 1984 election saw the mayor and three council members all run unopposed. Ferguson voters’ April 1985 disapproval of a half cent utility tax showed Ferguson voters still opposed raising capital improvement funds through tax increases. However, the narrow margin of 1,188 in favor to 1,207 opposed indicated Ferguson’s level of voter turnout and preferences had shifted substantially.\textsuperscript{503}

Narrow elections were common in other study cities throughout the study period. As few as a single digit number of votes could determine approval or denial of a measure.

\textsuperscript{501} According to FY1985 Budget City of Ferguson, MO dated June 12, 1984, page 1; General election held on Tuesday April 5, 1983 from board of election commissioners of the County of Saint Louis, State of Missouri Proposition 2 for an increase in Municipal Court costs: 1,751 yes 2,125 no.
\textsuperscript{502} Figures from a 1967 traffic study Ferguson January 27, 1970; Ferguson April 27, 1971 page 3; City of Ferguson, MO January 13, 1970.
\textsuperscript{503} City of Ferguson, MO General Election held on Tuesday, April 3, 1984 Board of Election Commissioners County of Saint Louis, State of Missouri; and Ferguson Special election held on Tuesday February 5, 1985 in the city of Ferguson from the board of election commissioners of the County of saint Louis state of Missouri proposition: shall the utility company taxes.
This was especially true on nonmonetary related ballot initiatives or in low civically engaged cities like Hazelwood. Hazelwood’s April 1996 half cent sales tax for capital improvements passed by only nine votes and the vote for amending the number of wards passed by only 15 votes. Narrow tax elections in Ferguson, however, were unheard of until the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{504}

Low voter turnout and narrow elections in Ferguson beginning in the mid-1980s suggest no clear consensus or mandate from citizens. At this point, the slim majority had lost a great deal of power as it related to influencing policy through voter preferences. The only way exclusionists could remain the driving force behind municipal government’s planning, decision-making, and response to the changing environment would be to gain the majority on the council.

With a lower voter influence in policy, Ferguson officials were more empowered to enact corrective, stabilization-oriented policies or they could elect to continue expanding and reinforcing poor, destabilization-oriented policies of the past. Their choices would have significant impact on the cities’ direction moving forward.\textsuperscript{505}

To refer to Ferguson’s position in the mid-1980s as a mature inner suburb poised for a resurgence would be inaccurate. Ferguson had not experienced nearly the level of structural deterioration and economic decline observed in Jennings, Maplewood, and University City. Further, Ferguson did not have to adapt to the post-fair housing era

\textsuperscript{504} Hazelwood April 3, 1996 REGULAR MEETING. Proposition 1, to amend the Charter relative to the number of Wards, passed by a vote of 1, 459 in favor and 1, 444 opposed, and Proposition 2, to enact a one-half cent sales tax for capital improvements, passed by a vote of 1, 527 in favor and 1, 518 opposed.

\textsuperscript{505} See change in administration in City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session outgoing council dated April 20, 1982, Page 3; and Note: Less than 10% of registered Ferguson voters cast votes in the 1995 rental property owner’s fee ballot issue which passed with 635 to 502 votes: Ferguson Regular Session dated November 28, 1995, page 5.
phenomenon of a major influx of blacks accommodated by a mass exodus of whites. In fact, the city’s identity preservation strategies were so effective, by the start of the 1980s even as a north county municipality, Ferguson’s black residents represented only four percentage points more of total population than black Maplewood citizens’ proportion of that suburb’s population.506

By the mid-1980s, Ferguson was poised to redefine itself, redirect its policy patterns, and make history. Ferguson would achieve the latter while becoming known around the world for refusing to pursue the two formers. Ultimately, the mature inner suburb would be forced to address the two formers by study’s end. Ferguson’s failure to capitalize on its opportunities dwarfs Jennings’ downtown central business district blunder.

In 1984, Ferguson was ripe with economic diversity, fiscal solvency, and professional financial wherewithal. The recession was over, and the economy had rebounded and entered a period of sustained growth. Ferguson business owners independently reactivated the Ferguson Downtown Business Association and were hoping to transform the district into a University City Loop-like area. With the right local leadership and support, they may have pulled it off. The license office relentlessly attracted visitors from other cities throughout north county to the westside of Ferguson. The suburb had a rapidly growing, younger, and untapped black consumer base on its eastside. And the city had a new young lead administrator with ties to Hazelwood.507

As fate, or more apropos municipal governance’s role in municipal-level stabilization would have it, Ferguson not only blew the opportunity, but officials proceeded to make administrative, policy, and economic development decisions which were direct contradictions to creating a University City Loop-like business district or a University City-like anything for that matter.

By 1988, the young city manager was out, a new finance director was in, all requests and proposals for developing an east-west connecting corridor had been definitively quashed on arrival, and Ferguson officials were putting the finishing touches on the delineation of two distinctly different Fergusons. Any attempt to calm the over 200 Third Ward residents attending the May 3, 1988 special public hearing were largely unsuccessful. Many residents in and around a subdivision designated for an Emerson Electric buyout were there to voice opposition to the city’s authorization of the project.508

Residents expressed distrust of Emerson and local government accusing the manufacturer of being a bad neighbor and officials of deceptive tactics lacking transparency, communication, and consideration of Third Ward residents. The project included the city leveraging the eminent domain tool to acquire homes identified in the plan, providing assistance in finding a new home, and paying moving expenses. Officials assured remaining residents that their property values would go up as a result of the project.509

However, the following exchange raises serious doubts to that claim as well as questions regarding the city’s ultimate goal for the project:

508 City of Ferguson, MO Special Public Hearing dated May 3, 1988, page 1, 2; City of Ferguson, Special Public Hearing June 13, 1988, page 1; See Emerson’s 100th anniversary in City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 22, 1990, page 3.
509 Ibid
Ferguson Resident: “What about vacant lots? Will the adjacent owners be required to purchase them?

Ferguson Official: “No one will be required to purchase a vacant lot. It may just sit empty.”\(^\text{510}\)

While official plans were not included in the archives, transcripts reveal many residents expressing concerns. For instance, one resident believed, “Emerson wants the area rezoned into an industrial park.” Another citizen was convinced, “Emerson just wants more streets through the subdivision for the employees to get out.”\(^\text{511}\)

Consider the Emerson project and the aforementioned Walmart TIF issue ran practically concurrently (late 1987-1988). These economic development decisions also paralleled Ferguson’s early era policies. Ferguson has two main parallel north-south running streets: New/South Florissant on the westside and West Florissant on the eastside. New/South Florissant is anchored on the north by January-Wabash Park and on the south by a S.T.E.A.M. academy high school, a space education and simulation center, and a pre-K learning center. West Florissant is anchored on the north by a Walmart supercenter and Emerson anchors the south end.

The Ferguson the world was introduced to in 2014 was fashioned four and a-half decades prior but was solidified beginning in the mid-1980s. Late 1980s and 1990s Ferguson officials spoke of improving the eastside neighborhoods through an innovative funding method. Officials expressed “great concern because the residents [were] not working together.” The following statements by Ferguson officials offer more insight into perspectives and relationship dynamics of Ferguson lawmakers and eastside residents:

\(^{510}\) Excerpts of quotes taken from archives City of Ferguson, MO Special Public Hearing dated May 3, 1988, page 1, 2; City of Ferguson, Special Public Hearing June 13, 1988, page 1; City of Ferguson Regular Council Session November 22, 1988, page

\(^{511}\) Ibid
“The project offers much more than would otherwise be received.”

“The neighborhood does not have to be forgotten and stay the same, but it will not improve unless the people pull together.”

“This council has learned a lot while working on this project, and I would like to find a way to turn around the feeling against the city and convince the residents that we do want to work with them.”

As detailed in chapter six, although some forms and tactics changed, Ferguson’s discriminatory treatment of eastside residents did not begin with the entry of black people. Before there was the 1990s “wrong side of the tracks” and “ghetto slum” monikers, “the blue-collar part of town” and “poor white trash” were used as distinguishers. Nineties’ Ferguson officials claimed, “There would be no street improvements if it were not for the TIF.” However, archives reflect disproportionately low infrastructure investment on the eastside even in the early period.

Ferguson officials complained the area’s residents were not civically engaged and did not work together or with the city. While archives do indicate a significant decline in overall voter turnout, they also show a significant decline in ballot issues for determining policies during the same period. Additionally, archives reflect public hearing attendance, number of citizen comments, and petitions remained relatively stable throughout the study.

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512 Excerpt from City of Ferguson, MO Special Council Session June 27, 1988, page 2. City of Ferguson, MO Special Public Hearing dated May 3, 1988, page 1, 2; City of Ferguson, Special Public Hearing June 13, 1988, page 1; See Emerson’s 100th anniversary in City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 22, 1990, page 3; Excerpts of quotes taken from archives City of Ferguson, MO Special council meeting August 10, 1987, page 2; Ferguson Regular council session September 8, 1987, Page 3: Bill 5602 and 5604;

513 Excerpts of quotes taken from Interview F3: 09/09/2019 / Black / Female / Public Official; Interview F4: 05/07/2019, Black / Male / Ex-Law Enforcement Leader; archives City of Ferguson, MO Special council meeting August 10, 1987, page 2; Ferguson Regular council session September 8, 1987, Page 3: Bill 5602 and 5604; City of Ferguson, MO Special Public Hearing dated May 3, 1988, page 1-3; City of Ferguson, MO Incoming council session April 20 1993 Page 1; Ferguson Regular council session January 10, 1995, page 2; Ferguson Resolution passed and approved by the council of the city of Ferguson Mo June 27, 1995, Page 1-5. See also, Ferguson Regular Council Meeting April 24, 1973, page 3; Ferguson Regular council meeting November 12, 1974 page 5: Bill number 4746; City of Ferguson Regular Council Session July 22, 1975, page 5; Ferguson Regular Session August 26, 1975, page 6.
period. Furthermore, Ferguson’s post-fair housing era local government was not the best example of cooperation.

The City of Ferguson upheld its strong opposition against any regional collective efforts, rejected invitations to joint ventures from adjacent neighbors, and other than the occasional lending of the city’s dogcatcher’s truck to Kinloch and a Municipal League membership, participated very little in resource sharing. Ferguson’s issues did not begin when the mature inner suburb deserted its county sales tax pool comrades, or five years later when the city was forced to adopt a month to month budget.514

The genesis of Ferguson’s challenges will not be found at a point of deteriorated housing stock. In fact, pre-WWII houses’ proportion of the suburb’s total housing offerings increased over two percent between 1990 and 2015. A decline in the city’s tax base will not satisfy an inquiry regarding the suburb’s transformation from a self-sufficient, economically diversified juggernaut to a city beholden to commercial retail giants as sale tax revenue dependency more than doubled to account for 57% of the suburb’s income by 2005.515

Do not be fooled by the transition, however. Despite Ferguson’s questionable economic development decisions throughout the first half of the study period, and the fiscal strain experienced in the 1990s, the municipality was economically strong leading up to study’s end. The city had 134 employees averaging 43 years of age with 12 years of service

514 City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session June 27, 1995, page 2; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 22, 2007, page 8.
to city. The city’s pension plan was over 100% funded with 95 former city personnel receiving pensions.\textsuperscript{516}

The last fourth of the study period saw Ferguson secure an intergovernmental cooperation and development assistance agreement with NorthPark in 2004; accumulate an unrestricted funds balance as high as 72% of general revenue in 2011; increase net assets nearly two percent from 2012 to 2013; generate a seven percent increase in revenue through the first quarter of 2013 alone; attract a $19 million, three-building corporate development due to be completed by the beginning of 2016; and had plans to create 100 new jobs—80% of which were to be filled by north St. Louis County residents.\textsuperscript{517}

Ferguson’s contemporary officials (2000-2015) exhibited a notable divergence in many policy patterns demonstrated by their post-fair housing era predecessors (1970-1999). This cannot be ignored. Their work resulted in some notable improvements throughout the mature inner suburb. However, contemporaries upheld the one carryover from the previous era the city could least afford to keep, and the one which would prove to be the city’s biggest self-inflicted blow to date.

Recall the seven percent boost in the city’s 2013 first quarter income? Consider that the increase occurred during a period in which the city’s sales tax receipts were down five percent. Now, consider that the Ferguson Police Department and municipal court registered a 13% increase in fines and forfeitures through the first quarter of 2013.\textsuperscript{518}

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\textsuperscript{516} According to archive City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session dated February 24, 2015.
\textsuperscript{517} Budget figures for first quarter FY2013-2014 City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 28, 2013, page 1; and City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 28, 2013, page 2; and City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 26, 2015, page 1-2.
\textsuperscript{518} According to budget figures in archive City of Ferguson, Regular Council Session January 24, 2012, page 2; City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 28, 2013, page 1; and City of Ferguson, MO Regular Council Session May 28, 2013, page 2.
\end{flushleft}
Ferguson’s taxation by citation practices did not begin in 2013. Complaints about problems on Canfield, discriminate treatment of blacks by the Ferguson police, and Ferguson’s use of various tactics to quarantine black areas did not begin in 2014. More notable, they did not even begin with Ferguson’s black residents. Every one of these elements were present at the start of the study period when Ferguson’s black residents barely accounted for one percent of the suburb’s population.

During those days, the Canfield complaints ignored by local government came from whites residing in the area. Residents of the blue-collar side of town served as the Ferguson isolates of the day, while black residents of Kinloch and later Berkeley served as the target of the city’s harsher quarantine methods. Interviewee F4 shares:

“Ferguson was a sundown town in those days. You could go over there you know, for certain stuff like work or whatever, but you better not still be in town once that sun went down. Not if you were black.”

Ferguson did not have an economic development problem. Ferguson suffered from its own refusal to end the racial and social caste system which had guided its policy long before the advent of fair housing. Ferguson’s isolationism and inequitable treatment of lower income white areas demonstrated the city’s fundamental economic philosophy. Insert a change in racial composition, and the city’s overall philosophy is fully revealed. Ferguson allowed antiquated notions of class and race to guide its economic development decisions and in doing so, the mature inner suburb committed entirely avoidable errors and forfeited its advantaged position.

Advancement and retrogression in suburbs’ fiscal health were significantly impacted by local officials’ economic planning, evaluation, toolbox adjustments, and use

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519 Excerpt of quote from Interview F4: 05/07/2019, Black / Male / Ex-Law Enforcement Leader.
of tools. Some decisions involved levying, raising, and lowering taxes. Others included increasing and reducing spending, personnel and services, and use of alternative financing instruments. Whether a city faced a revenue shortfall and mounting debt or a thriving economic sector and a growing budget surplus, municipal-level stabilization depended a great deal on municipal governances’ capacity to protect, increase, and diversify a city’s sources of revenue through economic decision-making.
Chapter 8. Conclusions

My examination of five mature inner suburbs in St. Louis County found three stabilized cases, one transitioning case, and one declined case. Consistent with existing theories of community stabilization, I found mature inner suburbs could achieve stabilization and remain stable, and I found various internal and external factors impacted municipal-level stabilization. I also found several key elements which challenge existing stabilization theories and expand on existing concepts of neighborhood stabilization. I conclude, the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization is to enact best practice policy, practices, and programming.

My conclusions do not argue a direct causal relationship between municipal decisions and municipalities enjoying stability or suffering decline. I do, however, argue that municipal governances’ policy decisions significantly impacted cities’ stability. While many other factors affected cities’ racial composition and economic conditions, stabilizing inner suburbs required good municipal governance as quality policy decisions were a prerequisite to stability. Further, I found quality policy decisions required additional support to be effective stabilization tools while poor policy decisions did not require additional support to negatively impact cities’ stability.

Stabilization literature outlines human capital in the form of talented, inclusive, and committed leadership as requirements for stabilization. Stabilized cases like University City and Hazelwood, and Maplewood beginning in the middle period, enjoyed this resource in local government. However, Jennings demonstrated that the presence of human capital absent the presence of professional management renders talent, inclusive policies, and committed leadership largely inconsequential. Ferguson demonstrated that despite
human capital, talent, committed leadership, and the presence of professional management, failure to implement inclusive policies in a timely manner can be just as consequential as the absence of the aforementioned elements.520

By the mid-1970s, Ferguson’s open housing advocates were still advocating for adoption of anti-discrimination policies, and Maplewood’s low black in-migration was not enough to divert citizens’ attention from their mission of purging a corrupt city hall. The timing of policies was important as policy determined cities’ level of preparedness for dealing with destabilizing events. Nevertheless, while early antidiscrimination housing policy was necessary, it was only effective when it interacted with other factors such as professional management and strong resident programs.

Studies posit regional collaboration and community involvement as prerequisites to sustained stabilization. However, I found these factors are not always necessary for cities to realize stabilization or to enjoy sustained periods of stability. I found very little in the way of regional collaboration in the St. Louis region. In fact, Ferguson’s municipal governance explicitly opposed the notion of regional cooperation, and there remained minimal civilian participation in boards and community efforts in Hazelwood throughout the entire study period.521

Hazelwood and University City present an opportunity to contrast the Jennings case and better understanding the impact of professional administration on stabilization efforts. All three cities aimed to combat resegregation by enacting open housing policies early, leveraging city forces to investigate, report, and pursue legal recourse in discrimination

matters, formed and promoted committee participation, and allocated city resources to support integration groups. However, University City was the only city to enjoy a robust, civilian-led integration maintenance program in the University City Residential Services.

University City’s citizen engagement was extremely high and municipal governance effectively leveraged its active citizenry. Officials funded and supported citizens’ efforts, solicited citizens’ input, valued civilian commissions and boards, and encouraged participation in city functions and events. Although for different reasons, both Jennings and Hazelwood struggled to seat full human rights boards and neither city enjoyed strong and active residential integration programs.

While Hazelwood did not experience the level of black resident influx seen in Jennings during the early and middle-era, Hazelwood’s latter-era transition rivaled Jennings’ highest level of transition as the suburb experienced acute transition in a shorter period of time. Hazelwood’s professional administration better equipped the suburb to provide ongoing support and supervision of stabilization efforts during the period of rapid transition. Despite minimal citizen engagement and support for stabilization programs, Hazelwood’s professional government helped mitigate destabilizing effects of acute change in the suburb.

Existing theories require proactive municipal governance action to compliment citizen stabilization efforts. This understanding fails to account for proactive citizen coalition building and mobilization which transforms municipal government. Maplewood contradicts the interventionist approach to stabilization. In the Maplewood case, government and citizen actions were occurring simultaneously, but efforts were in direct
conflict. Only after citizens were successful in changing the form and composition of local government were adequate resources dedicated to stabilization projects.522

Scholars have already established that institutional change is not required to improve municipal governance’s responsiveness to citizens. However, Maplewood, Ferguson, and Jennings presented variations in municipal governances’ structure and responsiveness to voter preferences which are important to expanding the understanding of the role of local government in stabilization. My examination revealed institutional change significantly improved Maplewood’s capacity to stabilize, and Jennings’ institutional structure limited its municipal government’s stabilization effectiveness.523

For University City, citizen preferences tended to favor best practice policies such as open housing, antidiscrimination, and integration maintenance policies and officials enacted these policies. For Jennings, citizen preferences tended to oppose best practice policies. Despite Jennings’ nonprofessional governance, officials usually elected best practice policies anyway.

Ferguson’s slim majority tended to oppose best practice policy in favor of avoiding integration. Ferguson’s council majority favored best practice policy but repeatedly elected to vote consistent with the preferences of the slim majority. Despite the council’s expressed belief that certain policies and failure to enact certain policies were not in the best interest of the city, Ferguson officials elected to honor the preferences of the slim majority.

Maplewood’s renaissance can be traced as far back as the citizen’s mid-1970s purging of city hall. Maplewood citizens mobilized and demanded a new form, more accountable, and responsive government. Citizen leaders collaborated to ensure their local

522 Saltman 1990; Nyden, Maly and Lukehart 1997; Ferman, Singleton and DeMarco 1998; Cashin 2004.
523 Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014.
institutions remained functional and impactful. While city officials and administrators are lauded for Maplewood’s resurgence and rightfully so, it was the well-organized efforts of the suburb’s citizens which thwarted destabilization threats, refashioned Maplewood’s identity, and set the city on the path to becoming the mature inner suburb we see today.

While Maplewood citizens’ efforts resulted in increased responsiveness to citizens and improved the quality of the city’s policy decisions, Ferguson’s responsiveness to citizens negatively impacted its municipal government’s quality of policy decisions. Jennings’ low responsiveness to citizens’ preferences resulted in best practice policies. However, Jennings did not possess the capacity needed to ensure actions complemented policies. Unlike Ferguson, Jennings did not institute policies counter to best practice. Best practice policy selection did little to affect stabilization, however. Unlike Maplewood, Jennings did not address the city’s capacity deficit created by its institutional structure.

Research indicates architectural and locational features significantly impact stabilization. University City benefitted a great deal from its mixed housing stock and its proximity to the central city and Washington University. Consequentially, the suburb attracted highly educated, civically engaged, and socially conscious professionals. Citizens organized groups, participated in various associations and projects, mobilized, and executed campaigns for a range of issues.524

While University City’s architectural and locational features provided the suburb advantages, the benefits of these advantages were often offset by costs. For example, University City’s proximity to St. Louis city and Washington University increased its attractiveness and resource richness. However, challenges to stabilization were also

significantly increased as certain areas bordered declined neighborhoods and the university’s buying of buildings removed properties from the city’s tax rolls and increased the city’s fiscal strain.

North county suburbs were surrounded by ever-present reminders of the resegregation and economic decline that can happen in previously burgeoning municipalities. Early implementation of policies and establishment of programs helped cities prepare, but stabilization depended on cities’ capacity to effectively mitigate disparities, deterioration, population decline, fiscal challenges, and polarization. Many north county suburbs lacked the capacity of a University City to stabilize.

It is also important to note that cities’ location impacted the timing of racial transition. As a consequence of their locations, University City and Jennings’ experienced in-migration of blacks before the other study cities, and Maplewood was last to experience a notable influx of blacks because of that suburb’s location. Further, location affected the amount of black in-migration into cities. North county suburbs experienced more in-migration of blacks because of their proximity to north St. Louis city. This made Jennings especially prone to tipping and Maplewood much less prone to tipping.

Timing of transition impacted city’s economic conditions as new black suburbanites’ socioeconomic strata changed over time. Early period transitions involved in-migration of middle and upper-class blacks buying homes while middle-era new black suburbanites tended to be lower-income and subsidized renters. This is best demonstrated in the cases of Ferguson and Maplewood. Both municipalities experienced low early-era
transition. These suburbs’ middle-era black population increases exhibited influxes of more low-income black renters than homeowners.\textsuperscript{525}

Traditional understanding of invasion and succession points to new inhabitants taking over an area, but Jennings offers an opportunity to expand on the theory of invasion and succession. As Jennings’ residents aged and cycled out of single-family residences, local government authorized more apartment developments to accommodate and retain its senior population and homeownership was often transferred within families. This discovery helps us better understand Jennings’ municipal government’s role in the proliferation of rental units and the city’s overall housing stock composition.\textsuperscript{526}

Municipal governance played a significant role in housing stock preservation and composition but increases in renter occupied dwellings and aged housing stock did not automatically equate to decline. University City exhibited economic and racial balance despite proliferations in rentals. Although the city’s mixed housing stock provided the suburb an advantage, policy decisions still demonstrated intentional efforts to mitigate the destabilizing effects of concentrating low-income and subsidized rentals.

When dilapidated HUD properties threatened to accelerate blight in University City, officials leveraged the city’s professional capacity to halt and reverse the trend. After Jennings’ collegial attempts to collaborate with HUD were largely ignored, city leaders from both suburbs collaborated to openly promote plans to file suit against the federal agency. However, when HUD amended its practices, the presence of an LCRA better

\textsuperscript{525} For more on how the economic status of black suburbanites differed over time and how this impacted property values and racial transitions, see Leven et al. 1976; Downs 1981; and Sugrue 1996.
\textsuperscript{526} Keating and Smith 1996. See Pitkin 2001 for overview of residential transition theories. See also, racial specific transition theory known as the “tipping model” in Schelling 1969; 1971; Goering 1978; and Anas 1980.
equipped University City to address the problems of derelict HUD properties while Jennings lacked the tool.

University City was largely successful in staving off neighborhood decline because the LCRA helped empower the city to better preserve the municipality’s housing stock. However, University City’s rehabilitating of derelict buildings, new construction, and redevelopment of blighted areas were only part of the city’s effective housing stock preservation system. With aggressive enforcement of stringent building codes and occupancy regulations, innovative strategies such as the home rehabilitation loan, adjacent lots abatement, and rental housing registration programs, the city effectively fought off deterioration in its neighborhoods.

University City was not the only study city to leverage these tools. What was unique about University City’s use of tools, however, was University City explicitly leveraged tools to encourage affordable housing throughout the city and prevent concentrations of government-assisted residents. Officials creatively utilized low-income programs like Section 8 and CDBG funds, advocated for low-income renters, and limited luxury apartment developments and conversions.

Research has established that housing segregation is not required for cities’ to experience school segregation as black-white school segregation is often present in integrated municipalities—particularly at the high school level. Further, studies have pointed to segregated schools as a precursor to economic decline and assert city-school collaboration as necessary for the effective promotion of stably integrated locales and attractive schools. However, contiguous and noncontiguous school district boundary
differences confound application of these concepts and high-performing segregated schools and noncollaborative revitalization efforts run counter to these claims.527

University City schools have been mostly segregated since the 1980s, yet the suburb remains stable and the school district continuously outperforms other districts of comparable size and racial demographics. While the city has enjoyed periods of high-level collaboration with the local school district, the city has also experienced sustained periods of adversarial relations dynamics between city and school district officials. This is also true in Maplewood. Maplewood’s renaissance involved two separate, noncollaborative efforts on the part of city and school officials. Although each entity’s work helped the other’s efforts, collaboration ensued only after both the city and school district had revitalized its respective institutions.

Through various collaborative efforts with school districts, regional forums, marketing campaigns, and programs, north county suburbs worked to counter image defamation, struggling schools, and discriminatory treatment from various agencies and industries. These factors undoubtedly affected overall conditions as the north county experience included all the destabilizing elements which made neighborhoods undesirable.

Economic development strategies served as an important determinant in suburbs’ fiscal condition over the study period. Some suburbs concentrated their income dependence, some creatively achieved an economically diversified mix of revenue streams, and others wavered between identities. Regardless of position, however, each suburb navigated multiple threats that impacted their city’s fiscal conditions throughout the study period. Suburbs’ response to events like fluctuations in the economy, discrepancies in

projections versus actuals, flooding, equipment failure, and an uprising highlighted cities’ level of preparedness and economic philosophy.

Through the use of economic tools like TIF, tax abatement, tax credits, low-interest financing, special business district taxing, neighborhood improvement, and transportation improvement taxes, municipal government occupied a significant role in shaping the landscape, function, and feel of inner suburbs. Some of these decisions were advised by in-house professional CPAs and city finance departments as a continuance of a developed strategy for maintaining financial solvency. Others lacked in-house financial advisement, investment strategies, and best practice regulatory conformance.

Financial crises in the study cities caused spending on community enrichment programs to wane as policymakers and program supporters found it difficult to justify these types of expenditures regardless of programs’ target populations. Some provisions considered imperative in strong economic times became expendable when cities experienced fiscal stress. Consequently, cities struggled to develop effective strategies and programs that endured. However, professional cities tended to continue providing certain services despite periods of fiscal strain.

Despite advantages and challenges, Hazelwood and University City’s policies and spending remained aimed at preventing areas of concentrated poor people. Hazelwood, Maplewood, and University City invested substantial resources in parks, recreation, public spaces, cultural attractions, infrastructure improvements, and pedestrian-friendly enhancements like bike lanes and bus shelters. Jennings made early investments in communal improvements, but early fiscal stress hampered efforts.
Ferguson offers the most compelling case in my study of the role of municipal governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs. As inevitable changes in racial demographics were occurring in the 1960s and 1970s, Ferguson possessed the professional capacity required to prepare for destabilizing effects of transition and to support and manage integration programs. Nevertheless, officials elected not to proactively enact best practice policy or support integration programs.

Instead of implementing zoning and land use strategies which dispersed low-income rentals throughout the municipality, Ferguson’s policies concentrated low income apartment complexes on the city’s eastside. Investment in neighborhoods and quality of service delivery favored the city’s wealthier westside at the expense of the city’s eastside citizens, housing stock, and infrastructure. Ferguson’s policy decisions eliminated and decreased desirability of certain residential areas by concentrating commercial and industrial businesses nearby, and the suburb did not start investing significant funds in the development of mixed-use, walkable environments until the 2000s.

While municipal-level stabilization is fairly easy to observe, the stabilizing process is an extremely complex phenomenon. Capturing every dynamic involved in the process is impossible. Nevertheless, examinations have provided a roadmap for better understanding elements which are essential to stabilization. We know municipal governance occupies a central role in stabilization. However, even in the best-case scenario, municipal governance alone cannot achieve stabilization and factors outside municipal governance authority limit what the body can do in pursuit of stabilization.

Except for early policy intervention, Ferguson possessed all the prerequisites for stabilization. Jennings possessed early policy intervention but lacked critical prerequisites
such as professional governance. Hazelwood and University City possessed both prerequisites, and Maplewood adopted the prerequisite most relevant to its challenges. While there are many other factors to consider, I submit that these decisions had substantial impact on the respective positions of the suburbs by the end of the study period.

Despite its fiscal soundness, sustained desirability, and professional leadership, Ferguson was a transitioning case as early as 2010. Ferguson expands our understanding of the role of municipal governance in stabilizing mature inner suburbs as it provides an example of the effectiveness of rejecting best practice policies independent of additional support. I conclude stabilization in open housing suburbs requires good municipal governance and outside support, but municipal governance needs no additional support in compromising municipal-level stabilization through poor policy decisions and nondecisions.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

**Contextualizing 1960s Population and Crime Surge in Studies of Suburban Integration**

Black suburbanization alone did not induce the palpable fear observed in suburbia in the 1970s, nor was black suburbanization the principal phenomenon challenging suburban idealism. The 1960s illuminated cities’ lack of capacity to handle dynamic societal changes and like metro cities, inner suburbs entered the 1970s with looming doubts. The country had changed dramatically in one generation since the post-WWII explosion in suburban incorporations. New Americans were being added to the population
at rates never before seen in the history of the country and by the late 1960s, the first few cohorts of baby boomers were 20 somethings with something to say.\(^{528}\)

While the exponential increases in population could account for most increases in measurable categories including crime, by 1960, the rate of increase in violent crimes began to grow at a disproportionately faster rate than the rate of population growth. Between 1960 and 1970, violent crime increased by 126% in the United States, and violent crimes attributed to the social, political, and cultural revolutions could only explain a small percentage of the increase.\(^{529}\)

The era saw the formation and expansion of countless civic groups working to change a wide range of conditions, laws, and minds. Efforts resulted in important historical achievements of which civil rights and fair housing rank among the most notable. Some groups remained active in the post-civil rights era fighting to realize the terms outlined in the legal victories of the 1960s. Citizen collectives known as integration maintenance groups occupied a crucial role in municipal-level stabilization by working to prevent resegregation in suburbs.

Much has been written about the work of suburban integration and integration groups. Studies frame successful stabilization in the context of the black suburbanization period. I posit, to better understand neighborhood and municipal-level stabilization in inner suburbs, and to better design revitalization programs for destabilized communities require

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\(^{529}\) According to Eisen, L. B. “America's Faulty Perception of Crime Rates: America’s crime rates are at their lowest point in decades. So why do so many Americans think crime is going up?” March 16, 2015. brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis.
research which contextualizes post-fair housing era municipal-level stabilization with the unprecedented pre-fair housing era surge in population and violent crime.

**Best Practice vs. Citizen Preference**

Conventional wisdom posits cities benefit from having civically engaged citizenry. Studies indicate citizens play a critical role in determining what is best for the city. According to some scholarship, cities’ sustainability is connected to local governments’ level of responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and warns local government must “never forget that you always govern for people.” However, I found, for the sake of exhibiting local government responsiveness to citizen majorities, local government may elect poor policy over best practice to the detriment of the city.530

Study cities with highly engaged citizenry were especially prone to citizen preference-based policymaking. This is traditionally encouraged and can be helpful for cities’ growth and fiscal health as engaged electorates can provide capacity building assistance and expertise by way of boards and other civic service activities. Notwithstanding, politically savvy, well-organized citizen groups may possess preferences which are contradictory to best practice. When personal perceptions are galvanized into group efforts, opposition to best practice policy can be effective.

When discontent provokes mobilization, disparagement, and sabotage instead of problem solving, polarization and gridlock occur. Consequentially, either poor policy selection or stagnation is the result. I found the relationship between citizen preferences and municipal governances’ level of responsiveness to citizen preferences significantly impact the role of municipal governance in municipal-level stabilization. I conclude, in

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cases in which municipal governance elected not to apply best practice stabilization policy, decisions were a result of dedicated adherence to the preferences of a citizen majority at the expense of best practice.

University City was not the only inner suburb to anticipate that discriminatory housing practices like blockbusting, steering, and inequitable lending would accompany black suburbanization and; the suburb’s path to open housing was not without robust citizen opposition. However, the city was one the few suburbs to proactively prepare. Ferguson was also home to a substantial population of civically engaged citizens from which lawmakers could select for committee assignments, but whose conflicting views made policy making tantamount to an allegorical civil war over the issue of integration.

By the mid-1980s, University City still enjoyed robust civic engagement while Ferguson began to experience a significant decline in civic engagement. Although University City’s citizen engagement had declined, the decline was much less notable than Ferguson’s. I posit, the significant decline in Ferguson’s civic engagement was due to the lack of economic mix in black in-migration as poorer black residents were less likely to vote, run for office, and incorporate politically.

Future research should investigate civic engagement levels of early era, middle era, and contemporary black suburbanites and compare engagement levels and policy preferences with municipal governments’ policy choices. One goal of such research would be to see if eras reflect notable differences and if so, determine if and how these differences impacted local governments’ policymaking processes, decisions, and use of best practice policy. I hypothesize, black civic engagement and black voter preferences’ policy impact decline the later black in-migration begins in a suburb in the early and middle eras.
References


Quarterly (66) 2: 346-364.


New York: Greenwood Press.


Figure 1. Municipalities with 10,000 population 1970-2015.

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Figure 2. Black population shifts - Municipalities w/10,000 population 1970-2015.
Figure 3. Regional Percent Black Shift Since 1970 / North County Concentration.
Figure 4. Bellefontaine Neighbors Percent Black Trajectory 1970-2015.

Figure 5. Jennings Percent Black Trajectory 1970-2015.
Figure 6. Hazelwood Percent Black Trajectory 1970-2015.

Figure 7. Florissant Percent Black Trajectory 1970-2015.
Figure 8. Black population shifts 1970-2015.
Figure 9. Black population shifts 1970-2015.
Figure 10. Black population shifts 1970-2015

Figure 11. Black population shifts
Figure 12. University City’s black pop. in 1970 was much higher than other suburbs.
Figure 13. University City 1970-1980

Figure 14. Jennings 1970-1980
Figure 15. University City’s black population trajectory 1970-1980.

Figure 16. Jennings’ black population trajectory 1970-1980.
Figure 17. Point at which Jennings and University City black population rate intersect.
Figures 18 and 19.

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% Poverty Rate

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<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>2015</td>
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Figure 20. Ferguson

![Graph showing percentages of single parent households and bachelor's degree or higher in Ferguson from 1970 to 2015.]
Figure 21. Ferguson

Figure 22. Ferguson
Figure 23.

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Figure 24.

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<td>2015</td>
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Figure 25. Jennings
Figure 26. Jennings

% Owner And Renter Occupied Homes

Year


% Owner Occupied

76.00% 79.00% 75.40% 69.40% 58.00% 47.70%

% Renter Occupied

24.00% 20.10% 24.69% 30.60% 41.30% 52.30%

Figure 27. Jennings

percent vacant housing

Year


10.10% 15.20% 11.20% 9.20% 3.70% 2.40%
Figure 28. **Jennings**

![Median Home Values](image1)

Figure 29. **Ferguson**

![Median Home Values](image2)
Figure 32. University City

% Single Parent

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<td>2015</td>
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% Bachelor’s or Higher

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<td>42.30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
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Figure 33: University City

% Owner And Renter Occupied Homes

Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>53.50%</td>
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Figure 34. University City

Median Home Values

Year

1980: $43,400.00
1990: $75,100.00
2000: $103,300.00
2010: $187,900.00
2015: $224,200.00

%Black
36.90% - 48.20%

Figure 35. University City

percent vacant housing

Year

1970: 3.40%
1980: 3.70%
1990: 11.10%
2000: 5.90%
2010: 11.70%
2015: 10.90%
Figure 36. **Florissant**

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Figure 37. **Hazelwood**

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<td>1980</td>
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<td>$35,354.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$10,085.00</td>
<td>$44,066.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$22,311.00</td>
<td>$35,354.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$24,651.00</td>
<td>$47,838.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$25,154.00</td>
<td>$44,067.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 38. Florissant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Poverty Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 39. Hazelwood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Poverty Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>9.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>14.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 40. Florissant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Single Parent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Bachelor's or Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>16.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>17.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>19.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>23.40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 41. **Hazelwood**

![Graph showing percentage of single parents and bachelor's or higher degrees over time.]

Figure 42. **Florissant**

![Graph showing percentage of owner and renter occupied homes over time.]

% Owner And Renter Occupied Homes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Owner Occupied</td>
<td>14.20%</td>
<td>15.60%</td>
<td>21.60%</td>
<td>23.30%</td>
<td>24.50%</td>
<td>30.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Renter Occupied</td>
<td>85.70%</td>
<td>84.40%</td>
<td>79.50%</td>
<td>76.70%</td>
<td>75.70%</td>
<td>70.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 43. **Hazelwood**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Owner Occupied</th>
<th>% Renter Occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>63.50%</td>
<td>36.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>62.00%</td>
<td>38.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>64.60%</td>
<td>35.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>62.70%</td>
<td>37.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>81.69%</td>
<td>18.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 44. **Hazelwood**

**Median Home Values**

- 1980: $42,900.00
- 1990: $57,900.00
- 2000: $79,400.00
- 2010: $28,900.00
- 2015: $106,900.00

% Black:
- 1980: 36.50%
- 1990: 38.00%
- 2000: 35.40%
- 2010: 37.30%
- 2015: 38.49%

Figure 45. **Hazelwood**

**Percent Vacant Housing**

- 1970: 4.50%
- 1980: 3.10%
- 1990: 3.10%
- 2000: 4.20%
- 2010: 6.10%
- 2015: 5.70%
Figure 46. **Florissant**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent Vacant Housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 47. **Florissant**

**Median Home Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Median Home Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$92,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$96,400.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$75,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>$181,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$582,200.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**% Black**

- 1.60%
- 30.40%
Appendix A. Consent Form

Participant Consent: Interview for Research

Dear, Community Stakeholder;

My name is xxxx xxxx. I am a xxx at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. I am conducting research on the role of municipal governance in achieving and maintaining municipal-level stabilization in mature inner-ring suburbs. I am writing you to request your participation as an interviewee in my study. You will remain completely anonymous, but your insight may prove invaluable to the findings.

This study is of great importance as inner-ring suburban communities are grappling with challenges historically believed to be reserved for disinvested portions of the inner-city. Suburban revitalization and stabilization require unique approaches to examining issues, identifying solutions, and implementing initiatives. Studies show that municipal governance can impact conditions in municipalities in a variety of ways. My goal is to better understand the relationship between the dynamic factors that impact municipal governance and the effects of municipal governance on municipal-level revitalization and stabilization of older inner-ring suburbs. Moreover, I aim to strengthen community stakeholder capacity to achieve community stability by contributing information that expands our knowledge of policy-making effects on suburban transitions.

Participation in this research is free and voluntary. You may withdraw from the interview at any time or refuse to answer any question. There is no risk of harm to participants. This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board protocol number: 1096007-4. You may request a summary of the findings. You may also request to have any part of your submission eliminated from the study. All raw data will be destroyed at the end of the study.

If you consent to participate, I will schedule a confidential interview to be conducted via the most convenient method for you (e.g. phone, video chat, in-person). With your consent, the interview may be audio taped. You will be assigned a number to maintain confidentiality. The information obtained in the interview will be coded for analysis and will be kept in a secure location. Only I and my faculty supervisor, xxxx xxxx will have access to the data. Every possible measure will be taken to ensure your anonymity. I invite you to be as blunt and candid as you wish to be. Your participation is greatly appreciated. You are contributing to important work.

Sincerely,

xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx
University of Missouri-St. Louis
xxxx@xxxxx.edu
I _____________________, agree to participate as an interviewee in the research of municipal governance in mature inner-ring suburbs conducted by xxxx xxxx, xxx at the University of Missouri-St, Louis. I understand the purpose of the study is to collect and analyze data related to experiences and conditions in St. Louis County municipalities to be formulated into policy and community stakeholder recommendations.

I understand my participation is completely voluntary. I may withdraw from the interview at any time and I may refuse to answer any question without penalty. I understand that the interview may last one and one-half hour. I understand that the interview will be audio taped unless I request it not be. I understand that the recorded audio will be transcribed and stored in a secure location until the completion of the study, at which time the transcription will be destroyed. I understand that questions and concerns regarding the study are to be directed to:

xxxx xxxx  
xxxx – Political Science  
University of Missouri-St. Louis  
(XXX) XXX-XXXX  
xxxx@xxxxx.edu

I have read the information above. I agree to participate as an interviewee in this research. Please, place an X in the spaces below that correspond with your preferences.

I consent ____ I do not consent ____ to have my responses recorded to audio.

I consent ____ I do not consent ____ to being quoted in the report.

______________________________  ______________________________
Participant signature            Date

*This project has been reviewed and approved for human subjects research by the University of Missouri-St. Louis Institutional Review Board protocol number: 096007-4 in accordance with the National Research Act (PL 93-348) implemented by Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46). Should you have any questions concerning your rights as a participant you can forward them to:

Office of Research Administration  
341 Woods Hall  
One University Blvd.  
St. Louis, MO 63121  
(314) 516-5899  
Fax: (314) 516-6759  
ora@umsl.edu
Appendix B. Interview Questions

Note: You are not expected to have insight into every topic. Open-ended questions will be asked based on relevancy and your connection to the municipality (e.g. resident, official, business owner). Below are some example questions I will utilize to help guide the interview:

1. Tell me about yourself, your connection to the municipality.

2. What were the municipality’s characteristics when you arrived (e.g. economics, racial, housing)?

3. What characteristics changed, when did these occur, what do you think caused them, and how did the community respond?

4. What is your impression of local government and civic engagement?

5. Do you have any suggestions for community improvement?
Appendix C. Guiding Questions for Data Collection

Role of Municipal Governance in Stabilizing Mature Inner Suburbs:
A Study of Five St. Louis County Municipalities
1970-2015

Stabilization Efforts
Guiding Questions

Municipal Governance

1.) Policy Decisions:
   a. Did the municipality employ integration maintenance practices (i.e. point of sale inspections, forbidding For Sale signs, door-to-door solicitations, affirmative marketing to whites?)
   b. Did the municipality pass a fair housing ordinance?
   c. Did the municipality rezone land to exclude rental housing?
   d. Did the municipality participate in federal affordable housing programs (i.e. CDBG, Section 8, LIHTC, etc.?)

2.) Policing and Code Enforcement:
   a. Did the municipality have its own police department, or did it contract out?
   b. Did the municipality have programs to specifically recruit black police officers?
   c. Did the municipality have any civilian review boards?
   d. Did the municipality have separate property maintenance and existing building codes?
e. Did the municipality out-source its code enforcement, share officers with other municipalities, or contract with the county?

3.) Engagement, Support, and Timing:
   a. Did the municipality engage residents, solicit resident input on issues, and include residents in decisions?
   b. Did the municipality appoint and hire black administrators and employees?
   c. Did the municipality establish, support, provide resources, and/or fund civic associations working to improve race relations?
   d. Did the municipality implement municipal-level stabilization strategies prior to exceeding 20% black population?

4.) Environmental and Infrastructure Investment:
   a. Did the municipality invest significant funds in mixed-use pedestrian friendly developments (i.e. parks, public spaces, recreation centers)?
   b. Did the municipality initiate, support, and/or fund land reutilization, beautification, and revitalization programs?

5.) Financial Practices:
   a. Did the municipality employ taxation-by-citation practices relying heavily on traffic fines and court fees to generate revenue?
   b. Did the municipality employ a professional CPA or contract with an accounting firm?
   c. Did the municipality participate in the county sales tax pool or did it elect to be point-of-sale?
d. Did the municipality apply for and secure grants (for training, equipment, etc.)?

e. Did the municipality use TIF and/or other tax breaks to attract businesses?

Community Groups

1.) Did a community-led stabilization effort occur?

2.) When and in what way did stabilization efforts begin?

3.) What groups were involved in the stabilization movement?

   a. How was the group formed, structured, staffed, and funded?

   b. What was the composition of the group (e.g. race, age, profession, residency)?

   c. What was the group’s goal and what activities did the group engage in?

   d. How did the group promote its efforts (e.g. brochure, media, newsletter)?

   d. Did the group form coalitions and if so, with whom?

   e. What was the group’s impact on stabilization in the community?

   f. Does the group still exist and if not, when and why did it dissolve?