Student Movements, Politics, and Policy in Chile, 2001 – 2012

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Student Movements, Politics, and Policy in Chile, 2001 – 2012

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to the two biggest loves of my life, my wonderful child, Snow (Athena John) Althen, and my mamma, Olivia Louise Rasp. I also dedicate it to my wonderful dad, John Cletus Rasp, who has happily and enthusiastically supported all of my educational adventures.
ABSTRACT

Chile has frequently been touted as an economic miracle, the “Jaguar of Latin America”. Boasting the strongest economy in South America, due to severe neoliberal economic structural adjustments made under the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, it has long been held up as the perfect exemplar of economic growth and stability, as well as the poster child for the effectiveness of neoliberal economics. After the re-establishment of democracy in 1990, political conditions improved as well; the country enjoyed a decade of stability and peace under its first two democratically-elected governments.

Yet, beginning approximately ten years after the transition to democracy, Chilean students began engaging in massive waves of protest. Discontent grew, and students manifested in larger numbers and for longer periods of time with each successive cycle of mobilization, eventually culminating in the “social explosion” of 2019. This dissertation examines three cycles of student mobilization in Chile; the Mochilazo (2001), the Revolución Pengüina (2006), and the Invierno Chileno (2011), seeking to explain the effects the protests had on public policy, laws, and political institutions in the country. It delves into how the students were able to enlarge both the number of participants and their claims with each successive cycle; their repertoires of contention; their interactions with government officials; their framing and messages; and what changes occurred as a result of each cycle. A combination of the joint-effect model and Felix Kolb’s framework are used to analyze the effects of social mobilization.

Guided by the state-movement intersection model, Marco Giugni’s joint-effect model, and Felix Kolb’s framework for analyzing the impact of social movements, I find that the students were able to affect numerous changes in each cycle of mobilization, enlarging their claims and numbers each time via transferred knowledge from previous cycles. Chilean students have come to be regarded as important political actors in the political system, and have evolved their claims to demand massive structural changes to both the political and economic systems in the country.
Acknowledgements

I am deeply indebted to so many people for the successful completion of this document. This dissertation is the product of (too) many years and would not have been completed without the love and support of many different people in the U.S. and in Chile. Please indulge me as I take the time to try to acknowledge all of them.

First and foremost, I thank my family. I am so thankful for my parents, John C. and Olivia L. Rasp, whom have supported and loved me unconditionally from day one, and who kicked up their support infinite notches while I was fighting to finish this. They instilled a love of political participation and an appreciation for education in me from my early childhood. Thank you so much, Mamita and Daddy-O! To my son, Snow Althen, who happily appointed himself my own personal cheerleader while serving as my primary inspiration for completing this degree and dissertation: I love you beyond m-e-a-s-u-r-e-m-e-n-t, Booboo! I am so incredibly proud of the amazing, intelligent, sensitive, curious, empathetic, caring person you are. Thank you so much for tolerating many years with less time together than we would have liked to have. I look forward to spending much more quality time with you now!

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projects. I presented for the first time at the Midwest Political Science Association due to David’s encouragement, and he came to support me and see my presentation. It has been a joy to work with David on finishing my dissertation. He has always been available to meet (even at short notice), encouraging, and willing to give insightful and useful feedback. I will always aspire to emulate his unflappable calm, immense kindness, and ability to get along with absolutely anyone, his diplomatic skills are unmatched. Thanks to Dave and David, who never stopped believing that I could do this (even at times when I seriously doubted whether I could), I am able to present this finished document. I am also incredibly thankful for Dr. Kenny Thomas and Dr. Stephen Bagwell, who were both willing to serve on my committee and help me see this through to the end. Dr. Farida Jalalzai, who began her career at UM-St. Louis, was always so supportive and encouraging, along with her husband, Chad Hankinson, who became good friends. I had a great time catching up with them when they came to Santiago for Farida’s research a few years ago.

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Santiago, Chile’s Metro system is incredibly clean and efficient, the most modern in the Americas, and covers much of the capital city. In 2012, it was chosen as the best underground rail system in all of the Americas by Metro Rail in London ("Metro de Santiago es elegido como el mejor tren subterráneo de América" 2012). The fare is also the second most expensive in Latin America, with prices in between $0.92 and $1.12 USD in 2019 – fares are higher during peak travel times (Find Out How Much Public Transport Costs in Latin American Countries 2019). The Santiago Metro is a government corporation, much like the United States Postal Service, thus it is expected to produce revenues.

On October 4, 2019, a planned Metro fare hike was announced. It went into effect on October 6, 2019, raising the peak time fare from $1.12 to $1.16 USD, a 30-peso increase. High school students began protesting by organizing a fare-dodging campaign, which began on October 7, 2019. The following day, the Minister of the Economy, Juan Andrés Fontaine, dismissed concerns about the rising fare, saying, "El que madrugue será ayudado" [Those who get up early will be helped] (Retamal 2019), suggesting that people could get up earlier and take the Metro at 7:00 a.m., during non-peak hours, to take advantage of the lower fare for non-peak travel times. The remarks were not unusual for the administration; President Piñera’s Cabinet was particularly gaffe-prone. It included a Minister of Education, Gerardo Valera, who questioned why schools asked the Ministry to repair leaky roofs or broken floors, saying,
“It is common to hear groups that protest demanding that the State take care of problems that belong to all of us. Every day I receive claims from people who want the Ministry to fix the roof of a school that has a leak, or a classroom that the floor is bad,” said the minister, who added: “And I wonder, why don’t they have a bingo? Why do I have to go from Santiago to fix the roof of a gym?” (Retamal 2019) [Translated by author]

Fontaine’s comments met with outrage from the general public. The high school students’, or pingüinos’, massive fare-evasion continued through October 16th, with scattered incidents of violence and closing of Metro stations here and there due to the violence.

On October 18, 2019, just after school let out, enormous groups of high school students stormed Metro stations all over Santiago. Metro staff, seeing them coming, attempted to close the stations, but the students broke down the heavy
iron gates to enter. The Santiago Metro was forced to shut down all operations just before rush hour on a Friday afternoon. The protests spilled out into the streets and others joined the students. As the numbers swelled, the Carabineros, Chile’s paramilitary national police force, arrived en masse to quell the unrest. They deployed tear gas from armored trucks, sprayed water from guanacos (armored trucks with high-pressure water spouts on top that spray water from tanks inside), and begin firing rubber bullets at protesters. As commuters left work on that Friday afternoon, they found a closed Metro and impossibly overcrowded busses. Chilean news channels began showing thousands of commuters walking home. There were barricades and bonfires in nearly every major intersection, gridlock on every major street and highway. Later, the Enel energy company’s building was firebombed and a massive fire engulfed the emergency exit staircase, from the ground to the roof. Protests continued daily, and the Piñera administration only fueled the flames, as Piñera made statements declaring war on the protesters, declaring them to be a powerful, anti-democratic enemy. On October 25, 2019, over 1,200,000 people came to demonstrate in Plaza Italia, the traditional site of demonstrations and celebrations in downtown Santiago. Twitter, Facebook, blogs, the news channels repeatedly echoed the same phrase: “¡Chile despertó!” – Chile woke up!
Thus began the largest and longest sustained mobilization in Chile since the Pinochet dictatorship ended in 1990. The protests continued for months, from thousands of people in the streets daily to tens and hundreds of thousands every Friday. President Sebastian Piñera first stated the Metro fare would be rolled back
on October 19, 2019. When that did not have the desired effect of stopping the protests, Piñera declared a State of Emergency and called the military out onto the streets to “keep order”. Santiago, and the rest of the country, as the protests had spread nationwide, saw soldiers on the streets for the first time since the Pinochet dictatorship. A curfew was implemented and enforced by the military, and all of Santiago was on lockdown for months.

‘We are at war against a powerful, implacable enemy that respects nothing or anyone and is willing to use violence and crime without any limit, that is willing to burn our hospitals, the subway, the supermarkets, with the sole purpose of producing as much damage as possible,’ (Lucero and Guerra 2019)

Piñera exclaimed as he addressed the public on October 20th, saying that the protesters wanted to affect all Chileans, that “they are at war against all Chileans who want to live in democracy” (Lucero and Guerra 2019). In fact, Piñera oversaw what would be several months of human rights violations against protesters, legal observers, and medical personnel in the streets. Massive protests continued until COVID-19 finally reached Chile in March 2020. The coronavirus pandemic first slowed, then eventually put a stop to the protests.
Photo 4: 2019 protests, Plaza Italia, Santiago, Chile. ©Reuters.

Photo 5: A protester in Santiago, November 11, 2019. Frente Fotográfico, Facebook.

Photo 6: Students kissing in front of a Metro station on fire, October 20, 2019. Frente Fotográfico, Facebook.
Students in Chile have engaged in protest as a manner of political participation since 1906, when medical students engaged in a spontaneous protest over seating at a ceremony held to honor them in the fight against smallpox. The main student organization of the Universidad de Chile, the FECH (Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile, Federation of the University of Chile's Students) was formed the next day, although mobilization was sparse until the 1920s (Cruces 2008, 13; Bonilla and Glazer 1970). Through their protests and messages during the last 22 years, high school and university students have established themselves as important political actors in the South American state. Traditionally, participating actively in a student organization in high school or
university, particularly as an officer, was viewed as training for those who wanted to become politicians. Many former student leaders serve in various positions in government: in Congress, as mayors, in the executive branch. One former leader of the Universidad de Chile's main student organization, Gabriel Boric, is currently the President of Chile. Boric gained renown as a leader in the 2011 student protests, known as the Chilean Winter, which was composed of seven months of continuous protests.

Photo 7: The largest protest ever in Chile (approx. 1.2 million people), October 25, 2019. Hugo Morales, ©Creative Commons.

This dissertation examines three major cycles of student mobilization in 2001, 2006, and 2011 with the goal of determining what impact these cycles had on public policy, laws, and institutions in Chile. It delves into how the students
were able to enlarge both the number of participants and their claims with each successive cycle, their repertoires of contention, their interactions with government officials, their framing and messages, and what changes occurred as a result of each cycle.

I gathered information about protest events and interactions with officials principally from the main Chilean newspapers and news websites. Information about framing and messaging came from newspapers, but also from interviews with former student leaders, Chilean academics, and government officials, as well as publications from student organizations and academic journal articles. Various books about the student movement in Chile provided additional information. I constructed a database with this data, and supplemented it with information that had been digitized by Chilean scholars who were generous enough to share it with me.

I performed an in-depth analysis of the data, guided by the state-movement intersection model, Marco Giugni’s joint-effect model, and Felix Kolb’s framework for analyzing the impact of social movements. Chapter Two summarizes the significant literature in the area of social movement studies and provides an overview of the theoretical approach I selected. Chapter Three details my methodological approach and hypotheses. Chapter Four contains the case study of the 2001 protests, known as the Mochilazo (Backpackers). Chapter Five continues the case studies with an analysis of the Revolución Pingüinaa (Penguin Revolution), the nickname given to the student movement in 2006 because of the teenagers’ navy blue, white, and gray high school uniforms. Chapter Six concludes the case studies with an analysis of mobilization in 2011, the Invierno Chileno
(Chilean Winter). Chapter Seven presents my findings and theories about the case studies and their impact on Chilean policies, laws, and institutions.

*Photo 8: 2019 Protests, October 25, "Mr. Piñera, go back to hell soon and leave us alone". ©API*

*Photo 9: 2019 protests, October 25, Plaza Italia, Santiago. Frente Fotográfica, Facebook.*
Chapter 2: Theoretical Approach and Literature Review

The literature in the area of social mobilization is dominated by theories that fall into two broad main categories: state-centric and society-centric. State-centric approaches argue that the state has near to full or full autonomy, and believe that the state is often more significant, causally, than societal factors. Society-centric approaches argue that the state is a reflection of society and, as a result, the state has little to no autonomy from societal forces. The major theories in the field generally fall into these two broad categories, with some variation.

There is a need for a theory that is truly dynamic, that recognizes that both Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) and state institutions can be transformed by mobilization or state action. Current state-centric theories concentrate on the transformation of movements by state action, and tend to neglect the transformation of the state by movements. Neglecting the power of movements to affect the state deprives social movements of agency and power. Society-centric theories assign the majority of power and agency to social forces, as in this view, the state is merely a conglomeration of societal structures or forces. This view does not fully account for the autonomous power and agency of the state as an institution. A truly dynamic theory of social mobilization must account for effects on both the state and movements, because the dynamic interplay between the state and movements is what effects change, while recognizing the power and agency of
both the state and social forces. Insistence on the primacy or dominance of either the state or societal actors oversimplifies the interactions between the two, and thus provides less analytical accuracy. A more accurate theory would lie somewhere in the middle, allocating agency and power to both the state and societal actors, and allowing for the ebb and flow of power between the two. Current theories do not provide a clear path for analyzing the effects of movements on the state and vice versa because the conceptions of the state and movements are too static, and do not account for agency and power on both sides.

State-centric theories assume near to full state autonomy, which presents several problems for analysts. The assumption of near to full state autonomy precludes social actors from affecting the state, due to its autonomy. If the state is autonomous from social actors, social actors cannot hope to affect the state, as it is insulated from their attempts to change it. This assumption automatically precludes many avenues of research and analysis, as it limits research questions to questions about how the state structures the actions and opportunities of social movements. The focus is on how the state allows particular opportunities for movements, or how the state and its institutional structure regulate or prevent mobilization in general. The movement is the unit of analysis in this approach, as it is assumed that movements cannot affect the state, which is completely independent of society. This limits research to an examination of the effects the state has on movements, and not vice-versa. Advocates of these theories do not acknowledge that state autonomy can fluctuate in its degrees, assuming that the amount of autonomy is a set variable. The assumption of near-total or compete
state autonomy guarantees that analysts will not find effects on the state from mobilization. This assumption puts the state in the position as a primary actor that acts, but is not acted upon, due to its level of autonomy. Assuming state autonomy and neglecting state-society interdependence prematurely concludes that social mobilization organizations (SMOs) will have no effects on the state. Accurate analysis requires an assumption of interconnectedness, and allowing for the possibility that each actor (the state or SMOs) affects the other at different times. In short, the state is not always the determinant of action, as state-centric theories generally assume.

Society-centric approaches assume that the state is simply a conglomeration or reflection of class structures in society, thus removing power and agency from the state. Proponents of these theories assign all of the power and agency in a given situation to class/societal structures, because the state is simply reflecting the organization and conflict that is already present in society. As a result, the state becomes almost irrelevant in this view, as it is composed of and subsumed by the preexisting class/societal structures, precluding the state from affecting society. These approaches encounter the same difficulties as state-centric theories, in that they do not allow for the examination of the effects of mobilization on the state, because the state is only a conglomeration of societal forces. These approaches also deflect from in-depth examinations of the interplay between state and society.

Rather than attributing the majority of the power and agency to the state or to society, I argue that an intermediate approach is most accurate analytically, one
in which the interdependency between the state and society and the constant and
dynamic interaction between the two are recognized. There is a need for blending
state-centered views with a more pluralist approach that allows for power and
agency from societal actors and acknowledges the interplay between the state and
society, rather than viewing the state as a purely autonomous entity that is separate
from, and almost immune to, pressure from societal forces. In short, there is a need
for a theory that operates within the assumption that societal forces can, and do,
impact and transform the state, examines how they accomplish those changes, and
what specific effects societal forces have on the state.

Due to the state-centric emphasis, most studies argue that the effects of
social mobilization are minimal or occur primarily in the agenda-setting and, less
frequently, in the policy implementation stages. I argue that SMOs can have a
much more profound and durable impact, that is, that SMOs can effect structural
and institutional change. I argue that many studies have not acknowledged this
possibility because the structure of our current, most popular theories in the area
of social mobilization are either too state-centric or too society-centric, and thus,
are not the best tools for examining or uncovering structural or institutional
change.

Resource Mobilization

Resource mobilization has been an enormously influential theory in the
field of social mobilization studies, and comes the closest to a true intermediate
type that incorporates both state-centric and society-centric views. However,
certain assumptions of the theory provide issues for analysts, and prevent it from
being a fully dynamic intermediate level theory. Developed in the 1960s by John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977), it is derived from economic theory, namely, rational choice theory. While the theory has dominated sociological research, other proponents adapted the theory for use in political science, and other related social sciences: Charles Tilly (1978), Doug McAdam (1982), William A. Gamson (1975), Anthony Oberschall (1973), Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1977), Bert Klandermans (1984), Craig J. Jenkins (Jenkins 1983), etc.

Prior to the mid- to late-1960s, scholars in the area of social mobilization viewed mobilization as an aberration, as a departure from politics as normal. Resource mobilization theory changed this view by asserting that mobilizers were rational actors, engaging in cost benefit analysis to determine whether to mobilize, and were, in fact, a part of politics as usual, rather than a deviation from the norm. Resource mobilization theory is based upon rational choice theory. It posits that individuals will weigh the costs and benefits of mobilization and/or participation in mobilization, and will act only if there is a favorable cost to benefit ratio. While most theories at the time explained mobilization emergence as a result of grievances, resource mobilization proponents argued that grievances alone are not sufficient to spur mobilization. Rather, the crucial factor is access to and control over resources:

The resource mobilization perspective proposed that, in contemporary society where numerous interests compete in the public forum, and where groups easily mobilize over political issues . . . those movements with greater resources have a higher likelihood of success. At the heart of this argument is the principle of grievance ubiquity: everybody has a gripe and numerous groups compete to promote their interests. Thus, it is those groups that are able to mobilize resources to their cause to promote their message and
influence public opinion and politicians that will have a greater likelihood of success (Johnston 2011, 57).

The main resources cited by authors as most important are technology, labor, capital, organizational structure (of SMOs), media, societal support, and legitimacy. Proponents universally agree that the most important resource available to a social movement organization is its people. Motivating people to contribute and/or participate in mobilization is the most important task of organization managers or officers. These resources, combined with grievances, are the key to the emergence and success of social movements, according to rational choice theorists.

Reflecting its economic origins, resource mobilization theory claims that laws of supply and demand control the flow of resources to and from movements, while individual actions are explained by rational choice theory. Differing from prior theories about social movements and mobilization, resource mobilization views social movements as a normal part of the political process, rather than an aberration from politics as usual. Thus, movements are

. . . normal, rational, institutionally rooted, political challenges by aggrieved groups. The border between conventional politics and social movements thus becomes blurred, but does not disappear altogether. Whereas established, special-interest groups have routine, low-cost access to powerful decision-makers, social movements must pay higher costs to gain a comparable degree of influence within the polity (Buechler 1993, 217).

The departure from viewing social mobilization as deviant, an anomaly, and viewing mobilization as a normal part of the political process was radical at the time. Emphasizing that groups needed more than the existence of grievances in
order to spur mobilization, that the combination of grievances with resources was crucial, was also novel.

The emphasis on resources explains why some people are able to organize while others are not. An organization must have an adequate amount of resources in order to mobilize its members. This emphasis does slant the analytical power of the theory towards explaining the emergence and/or the lifecycle of SMOs, rather than the effects of the mobilization itself, making it an awkward tool for explaining the effects of mobilization. Additionally, movements develop and act in contingent “opportunity structures,” which are external factors that encourage or discourage the movement, influencing movements’ efforts to mobilize. Examples of opportunity structures include the influence of the state, the movement’s access to political institutions, the movement’s access to the political elite, etc. Making movements’ emergence and/or mobilization contingent upon opportunity structures skews resource mobilization theory heavily towards a state-centric focus, minimizing the initial advantages of focusing on movements as a level of analysis. For these and other reasons to be addressed in the following section on critiques, resource mobilization is not an intermediate theory that can be used to explain the effects of mobilization. However, it functions well as an explanation for the emergence of mobilization and SMOs, with some caveats.

Among the various critiques of resource mobilization theory, the most important for the purposes of this analysis is that it is a poor explanation for the effects of social mobilization. However, the theory has been critiqued for a number of flaws. Primary among the critiques is that of actor motivation. The rational
choice theory limits resource mobilization to a conception of societal actors as purely rational beings who completely and logically analyze their options before deciding to act (and who act only if the pros outweigh the cons). The adherence to the rational choice model leaves no room for motivations such as ideology, habitual activism, etc.:

. . . critiques [of resource mobilization theory] focus on the theory’s adherence to economic models of human agency, or what is often called ‘methodological individualism’. This creates two main problems. First, social actors are presumed to employ a narrowly instrumental rationality which bridges a rigid means/end distinction. The careful weighing of costs and benefits implied by the means/end model fall far short of a universal or complete account of collective action, if only because action ‘may be its own reward’ (Hirschman, 1982) . . . the motives that predispose the actor to act may be not merely instrumental, but habitual, affective and, above all, expressive. Secondly, social actors are presumed to exercise this rationality without reference to their social context. They may be ‘efficient and often even ingenious and devious’ but they are ‘without a history’ (Hirschman, 1982). With no sense of context it is impossible to see how the actor’s preferences are formed, or how costs and benefits are calculated. And this sets the theory a tautological trap, for it must then define the actor’s interests in such a way that no matter what choice is made it is always seen to further those interests (Foweraker 1995, 17).

Rational choice theory limits societal actors to an extremely narrow range of motivations, and assumes rational and logical decision-making processes, when the contrary may be true. Resource mobilization provides no analytical tools for examining actor motivation when an actor decides to mobilize. This is problematic because the assumption of individual rational choice precludes analyzing other possible reasons for mobilization, thus eliminating a possible line of research, and limiting the possibilities of understanding the activism of individuals who don’t operate by the assumptions of rational choice theory. As a result, resource mobilization neglects examining the collective identities of groups, a key
component in analyzing “new social movements.” Buechler writes, “The rational actor is ‘fictive’ precisely because this concept detaches social beings from their cultural contexts of values, norms, meanings, and significations (Buechler 1993, 229).” The issue of resource mobilization basing actor motivation and action upon the rational choice theory proves to be a challenge to the core assumptions of the theory, according to Buechler:

[The rational actor] assumption makes not just a conceptual but an ontological claim about a social world of isolated, independent monads who freely enter into contractual arrangements based on self-interest. To the extent that collective action involves other foundations, RM may obscure more than it reveals about that action (Buechler 1993, 229).

The rational actor assumption strips participants of their humanity, reducing them to passive beings whom only perform cost benefit calculations, when, frequently, emotions and passion for activism are the very roots of mobilization.

Issues with the rational actor assumption are not the only critiques levelled at resource mobilization, however. Many critics have noted that it is not a theory in the traditional, predictive sense, but rather, is more of a framework for analysis. This limits its utility in an analytical sense, obviously, as the ultimate goal in the social sciences is to develop theories that are explanatory and predictive. Resource mobilization falls short of this goal, consisting more of an explanatory framework with no predictive power. It is not capable of providing a formula that explains, “When X happens, people mobilize.” Instead, it provides a general framework to analyze movements.
Specific to this analysis, resource mobilization has one large flaw: while purporting to be more of a society-centric theory, it is ultimately slanted more towards a state-centric theory. While resource mobilization uses a group level of analysis, the emergence of/success of movements is always dependent on contingent opportunity structures, which consist of the state’s institutions or of state-provided opportunities. Ultimately, it is the state or political elites that provide the opportunities groups rely upon, which calls into question the centrality of resources. As Melissa Kane writes, “Movement size makes a difference, but only when the political context is receptive to movement demands. Movement characteristics played less of a role in success, contrary to the claims of resource mobilization” (Kane 2003). Because the end result is most contingent upon these state-provided opportunities, resource mobilization is not a true intermediate theory that can account for the dynamic interplay between state and societal forces. Rather, the focus becomes how state action affects movement goals. When the research question focuses on how social movements transform the state, resource mobilization is an inadequate tool for analysis.

**Political Process Theory (PPT)**

Perhaps the most ambitious attempt at a grand theory that could explain social movements and mobilization is McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s Political Process Theory (PPT). Developed in the 1980s, PPT is based upon and incorporates elements of resource mobilization theory, in that it places emphasis on resources available to SMOs, as well as including the rational actor assumption. PPT argues that the actions of mobilizers are dependent upon the existence of a
specific political opportunity. Should the opportunity not occur, mobilization does not happen. There are many definitions of political opportunity in the literature, indeed, one major critique of the model is its lack of specificity. Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) definition is used most frequently. He defines a political opportunity as “consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics” (Tarrow 1998). The political process theory has dominated the field since its emergence because it has several key advantages, notably that it explains why movements emerge and why they increase their activity at a given point in time. It is a powerful tool for analyzing movement emergence and trajectory. Political opportunities tend to arise as a result of elements that are assumed to be static in the political system, such as institutional/regime structure. For example, democratic regimes allow more effects or progress towards SMO goals, while authoritarian/military regimes are more likely to repress mobilization, making effects or progress less likely. The model clearly views effects as a result of the response of the regime, rather than the result of action by SMOs, and is thus very state-centric, allotting little to no power and agency to movements themselves. When the political opportunities do not exist, grievances or resources alone are not sufficient to spur mobilization. The combination of all three of these, political opportunity, grievances, and resources, is necessary to spur mobilization, thus, movements are dependent upon opportunities provided by the state, placing PPT strongly in the state-centric category.
Grievances are the first necessary factor in spurring mobilization. When certain members of a polity feel deprived or mistreated by the regime, they will direct their grievances at the system they consider the source of the injustice. When a collective sense of injustice develops, people are motivated to become politically active and participate in mobilization. However, two other criteria are necessary for the emergence of mobilization: organizational strength and political opportunities. First, the movement must have leadership and sufficient resources in order to mobilize. If grievances exist and the movement has organizational strength, the remaining factor in the mobilization equation is political opportunity.

PPT attempts to explain why people mobilize. It does so via the concept of political opportunity, which indicates that the system is vulnerable to challenge. This creates an opportunity for mobilizers to issue a challenge and push for change. Generally, political opportunities come as a result of increasing pluralism, a decline in repression by the existing regime, significant division within the political elite, or increased political enfranchisement. Increasing pluralism provides more access points to political institutions, thus engaging in protest is a less attractive way to exercise influence on policy (Eisinger 1973). When one can effect policy by contacting an elected official, or by voting, protest is a much riskier option, and is thus less attractive. Johnston notes,

First, a political process focus assumes that when aggrieved populations perceive opportunities to influence political decisions through established, institutional channels, they will choose established options instead of protest. The costs are lower: they don’t run the risk of being jailed, injured, or losing time at work. In this sense, the presence or absence of social movements has little to do with strain or frustration, but rather with the availability of political channels and collective assessments that using those channels is a
rational way of having their demands heard. Second, when political opportunities are closed and groups are forced to go outside political channels to protests, they are simply engaging in politics by another means. (Johnston 2011, 34-5)

Thus, pluralism can enable groups to channel their demands through existing political channels, rather than engaging in mobilization. This is the most logical outcome, according to PPT, in a pluralist system.

However, less repression in a more pluralist society makes mobilization an attractive option, as the state is not likely to react with repressive measures. Similarly, a decline in repression by the existing regime may encourage protest and mobilization. Repressive regimes raise the costs of protest activity, and few citizens are willing to engage in mobilization if they know the state will respond with repression, particularly if they believe there is little chance of success (Meyer 1993). Significant division within the political elite can provide political opportunities, as elites may side with or provide support for protesters in order to bolster their side against the elite faction they are opposing. Increased political enfranchisement creates more political opportunities via more access points to political institutions.

Detractors say the political process theory is not very useful in an explanatory sense. Because the concept of political opportunity is so broad and encompassing, it really does not explain much. The broadness of the concept diminishes the usefulness of the model as theory because the model does not provide concrete or consistent answers, due to the vagueness of the political opportunity concept. If political opportunities can be almost any kind of influence, how is the term useful in an explanatory sense? Also, because scholars define
political opportunities differently in the literature, it is difficult to accurately compare results across studies. The result is a lack of accumulation of knowledge in the subfield, and researchers often end up covering the same ground as others before them, creating a sort of analytical circle, rather than advancing towards a causal theory. The lack of specificity is a flaw that the proponents of the PPT have acknowledged and attempted to address, yet no satisfactory solution has yet been found. Felix Kolb writes,

The political environment of social movements is often discussed under the label 'political opportunity structure,' which is one of the major paradigms in social movement research (Tarrow 1998). Regarding political outcomes, it argues that protest and other movement activities are usually insufficient for policy changes, unless the movement can capitalize on political opportunities provided by its environment (Amenta et al. 1992; Kitschelt 1986; Piven and Cloward 1977). Although most scholars today agree on this basic formula, it is not clear which factors do indeed constitute a political opportunity for political change (Meyer 2004). Part of the problem is the fact that political opportunities have been used to explain different dependent variables—in particular the development of mobilization and political outcomes. Thus, in a first step it seems to be necessary to separate 'the analysis of opportunities for policy reform from those for political mobilization' (Meyer and Minkoff 2004:1462) [emphasis added]. (Kolb 2007, 53-4)

The problem of using the same explanatory variable for two different dependent variables, as well as the vagueness of the political opportunity concept, has led to results that vary greatly when researchers are examining possible effects of movements and mobilization. As previously noted, it is clumsy at best to use the same tool to analyze the very different research questions, “How do movements emerge?” and “What effects do movements have?” The theory was constructed as a tool to examine movement emergence and life cycles, and using it to analyze the possible effects movements have provides widely varying results.
Using the vague concept of political opportunity to explain two dependent variables is not the only issue with PPT, however. It is my contention that the reason PPT does not function well as a more dynamic theory, one which accounts for the interplay between state and society, as a result of the overdependence on external factors, most of which are state-dependent. Meyer and Tarrow write,

The political process model is based on the premise that the development of social movements is dependent on political institutions, configurations of power, and other factors external to movements . . . These exogenous variables have come to be known as the political opportunity structure (POS). Three aspects of the POS that have been connected with the appearance of social protest in transitional Latin America are the opening (liberalization) of the political process, the presence of allies and support groups, and divisions within the regime. (Meyer and Tarrow 1997, 155)

Meyer and Tarrow acknowledge in this further elaboration of the theory that the focus is on the development of social movements, not the effects of social movements. The main factors accounting for the appearance of mobilization in Latin America, according to the authors, are all state-centric. This focus robs social movements of their agency and power, and neglects the more dynamic, interdependent relationship between the state and social movements. While Tarrow eventually elaborated that movements are able to create opportunities for both elites and successive movements, it is understood that the initial political opportunities are created by political elites or the state itself, thus weakening this claim (Tarrow 1998, 24). The overemphasis on political opportunities negates the role of both grievances and resources in the model, leaving a very state-centric model overall. The critical factor is always political opportunities, according to Tarrow. “ . . . groups with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in movement, while those with deep grievances and dense resources—but lacking
opportunities—may not” (Tarrow 1998, 150) Yet, due to the vague definition of political opportunities, it does not serve very well as an explanatory variable.

Additionally, the idea that increasing pluralism will decrease mobilization is tenuous. Proponents of the PPT argue that increasing access to institutions via increasing pluralism in a state make mobilization a less popular way to exercise influence on policy. Access to policymakers and thus the ability to directly influence policymakers’ decisions will make protest a much less attractive option, thus reducing the instances of mobilization in a more pluralist state. However, democracies see frequent mobilization, even in states that are highly accessible, contradicting this basic claim. Additionally, Meyer and Tarrow argue that “[t]he opening of the political process during transition is one element that has encouraged movement mobilization in Latin America. Transitional political systems, by their very nature, are characterized by a mix of open and closed elements, the most favorable situation for movement emergence” (Meyer and Tarrow 1997, 155).

However, quite often, movements emerge in response to an authoritarian regime, in an effort to topple the regime or force political change, contradicting the thesis that more pluralism equals more mobilization. Indeed, in Latin America, authoritarian regimes that engaged in widespread repression encouraged, rather than dampened, social mobilization. Outrage over the abuse inflicted on the population by authoritarian regimes builds until citizens reach a breaking point and mobilize in opposition to the regime and its abuse. Brockett writes about the eventual overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua,
Although . . . violence became increasingly widespread, brutal, and arbitrary, initially it did not deter popular mobilization but provoked even greater mass opposition. Opponents who were already active redoubled their efforts, and some turned to violence. Increasing numbers of nonelites gave their support to the growing revolutionary armies, many becoming participants themselves. Previously passive regime opponents were activated, and new opponents were created as the indiscriminate violence delegitimized regimes, on the one hand, and created incentives for opposition, such as protection, revenge, and justice, on the other. (Brockett 1995, 132)

Thus, mobilization is not always dependent upon a more pluralistic and less repressive regime, counter to PPT’s theses. In fact, quite often the opposite is true – authoritarianism and repression can encourage mobilization. These types of mobilizations occur in response to disappearing political opportunities, not in response to expanding political opportunities, which is what is expected in PPT.

Another flaw in the model lies with the idea of cycles. The concept of “cycles of protest,” (or “cycles of contention”) developed by Tarrow, states that social movements engage in waves of protest and mobilization, in response to political opportunities. Movements see the state as being vulnerable to demands for change, and thus engage in mobilization or other forms of contentious politics (Tarrow 1998, 13). But as Foweraker notes, this takes away agency and power of social movements, rendering them dependent upon state action or inaction, or the perception of such, rather than any internal movement characteristics: “But the existence of a ‘protest cycle’ finally tends to suggest that it is not so much internal as environmental developments which do most to shape the trajectory of social movements, and that such cycles express the collective responses of citizens, groups and elites to ‘an expanding structure of political opportunities’” (Foweraker 1995, 72). PPT continually frames social mobilization as a direct result of state
action, or of the perception of vulnerability on the part of the state. This leaves no
room for individual agency exercised by social movement organizations. Analytically, any changes implemented will be a result of state action and state action alone, not of mobilization. Indeed, Johnston writes,

A common criticism of political process theory is that it is overly structural, overly political, directed at only certain types of movements (Snow 2005) thereby underestimating human agency and nonstructural microlevel interpretative and cultural factors. (Johnston 2011, 35)

Hence it is difficult to use PPT as an analytical tool for examining the effects of social mobilization. Agency and power of SMOs and movements must be assumed in order to analyze the effects social movements have on policy or political institutions.

A final critique of PPT that is particularly relevant for this study is its unsuitability for analyzing states that are not Western industrialized democracies. Often, theories developed for European or Northern American cases are not applicable to Latin America, due to differences in institutional structure, culture, and variance in the level of economic development. There is a need for theory that addresses Latin America specifically, taking into account the factors that distinguish the region from Western industrialized democracies. Foweraker writes,

One of the explicit applications of the POS to Latin America criticizes the notion as ‘underspecified’ and self-consciously addressed to the political systems of the industrialized democracies. Departing from a working definition of the POS as ‘the configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group’s political environment that influences that group’s assertion of its political claims’ (Brockett, 1991:254), the study specifies its ‘best-guess’ variables of the POS as the presence or absence of allies, the availability of access points to the political system, the state’s capacity and propensity for repression, elite
Exchanging cases in Latin America with any degree of accuracy requires significant tweaking of the PPT. Because it is structured as a framework, rather than a theory, it is possible to modify PPT for use in examining Latin American cases, however, there are still many issues when attempting to apply the framework to a developing state.

**Network/Bargaining Perspective**

The bargaining model of social mobilization recognizes the dynamic relationship between states and social movements, and the value of resources in bargaining situations. This model focuses on the agency of the actors in social movements, on what they do and how they do it (Johnston 2011, 22). In this sense, the network/bargaining perspective slants towards a society-centric model, although it is heavily based on PPT’s basic structure. Thus, it is more of an intermediate model, lying somewhere in between society- and state-centric models. However, Johnson’s emphasis on the centrality of the state and its influence on movements places it closer to the state-centric side of the spectrum.

First elaborated by Marco Diani (1992), the bargaining/network perspective recognizes the need for theory that acknowledges the dynamic quality of the relationship between state and movements, as well as the necessity of recognizing movement agency and power. Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander elaborate on the dynamic character of the relationship between the state and movements:

First, social movements occur because people feel so passionately about the injustices they face, the grievances they have against others, and demands they make of the state. People join social
movements to act collectively in order to achieve their goals. They must also plan, strategize, work with others, and adapt to the political environment in ways that sometimes produce success, other times, failure. This is a perspective on social movements and protest that focuses on the \textit{agency} of the collective actor—what people do and how they do it. . . . Our main concern here are factors of a structural kind, on the enduring relationships between groups, organizations, and the institutions of state and society. (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995, 281)

Hank Johnston attempts to place social movements front and center in analysis with his conception of “social movement societies,” which are societies in which an increasing diversity of sectors have developed the ability to make claims on the state, making organization and mobilization essential parts of the normal political process (Johnston 2011). Johnston argues that the centrality of movements to modern political society results in changes and accommodations by the state as a direct result of social movement action:

. . . I will develop the theme that a complete history of the modern state must consider the actions of the popular classes that, from time to time, exerted pressure on state elites through collective violence, insurrections, protests, and social movements. Against elite interests, popular interests are given form and substance by collective action . . . The long-term effects of popular mobilizations and protests have been to force the ruling classes – slowly at first and more consistently in recent times – to consider the popular will in state politics. (Johnston 2011, 2-3)

Thus, the agency and power to affect the state are acknowledged and analyzed in this approach. This relationship between the state and movements is central in the network/bargaining perspective, which is what differentiates it from PPT.

Johnston argues that the relationship between the state and social movements is both symbiotic and dynamic: the state fears revolution and violence by the citizenry, while social groups fear overreaching power by the state. Social movements always occur within the context of the state, and thus must be
considered together. “The point is that any given movement faces not just a fixed set of opportunities or an absence thereof but rather a dynamic play of responses by the state. Moreover, this dynamism can change in a flash” (Johnston 2011, 43). The perspective focuses on the dynamic relationship between states and social movements, which he sees as contingent upon four qualities: citizenship, equality, responsiveness, and protection, represented by the acronym CERP. Johnston asserts that analysis of social movements must always take into account important characteristics of the state because social movements always occur within the context of the state. Thus, the state is still central in this analysis, despite the inclusion of more agency and power on the part of social movements. CERP and state capacity are the variables Johnston considers essential to understanding which configurations of the modern state are most conducive to mobilization, thus also placing an emphasis on process/movement emergence/lifecycle, rather than results of mobilization.

State openness is a large factor in whether movements are able to effect change or achieve their goals in Johnston’s iteration of the model. The process of change is usually incremental, he notes, and the four CERP dimensions contribute to the openness of the state, along with structural factors such as regime type and institutional configuration. Movements pressure both institutional elites and challenging elites (elites outside of the formal political institutions that are recognized as political figures that challenge politicos within the system), resulting in small changes in response to social movement demands via elite conflict and accommodation. These changes contribute to an extension of state openness through the four CERP dimensions (Johnston 2011, 26). Other factors that
contribute to state openness are regime type—Johnston views parliamentary systems with multiple political parties as more open—and institutional structure—systems with more access points to elites are viewed as more open as well. Parliamentary systems with multiple political parties provide more points of access for the citizenry, thus resulting in a more open state. The three most important factors affecting mobilization, also all determinants of the degree of state openness, are the movement’s access to elites, openings to recruit elite allies, and possible cleavages among elites (Johnston 2011, 39-40). The presence of all three results in a more open state and incremental changes as a result of social mobilization.

Johnston’s formulation of the network/bargaining perspective is heavily reliant on the state. He argues that the state is the conditioning factor in the appearance of mobilization, that movements must operate in the existing political climate, which must be taken into account in analysis:

The environments in which protest movements grow are strongly affected by the political climate and structure. By climate, we refer in part to the popular mood, which affects potential support among the populace and the attentiveness of politicians to a movement’s demands. Climate also refers to the prevailing strategies of a polity, meaning the ‘formal and informal rules of the game’ by which the state deals with social movements (Kriesi 1989:295). By structure, we mean not only relatively permanent and institutionalized political arrangements, but also the informal, sometimes unspoken, arrangements among political, economic, and media elites that can affect a movement’s success. (Johnston 2011, 32)

While Johnston’s conception of state structure is more encompassing than a traditional definition of state institutions, it still relies upon the conditioning influence of the state on social movements. This is not surprising, given that the network/bargaining perspective relies heavily on Doug McAdam’s version of the
political process theory (PPT), and also on the work of Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, and Todd Gitlin in the same area. Thus, even though the network/bargaining perspective attempts to give some agency and power back to social movements, it centers its analysis on the conditioning role of the state via political opportunities, placing it nearer to a state-centric model. Johnston argues that “state openness” is the key variable in the “success” or “failure” of social movements. The state remains front and center, and this is one of the main critiques of the model.

Another critique of the model is that it purports to be a tool for analyzing the results of mobilization, however, the focus is primarily on the process, rather than outcomes. Given that the analysis of outcomes is one of Johnston’s main goals, this is a glaring oversight. Because the model is so heavily based upon PPT, it falls prey to many of the same critiques that PPT does, chief among them the clumsiness of attempting to analyze outcomes with a model that was designed for analyzing the emergence and lifecycle of social movements. The model conditions movement “success” (Johnston’s terminology) on political opportunities provided by the state. As a result, movement results are less the outcomes of movement actions, agency, and power, and more the result of state openness and what the state will allow with regard to change. The state remains supreme in this model, albeit with some progress in accounting for movement agency, and this presents problems for analysis of outcomes.

In order to create a more dynamic model, less emphasis must be placed on the state’s conditioning role than the network/bargaining perspective allows. While the model offers some promising concepts, such as the dynamism of the
relationship between the state and movements, and the longevity of the relationships between states, groups, organizations, and institutions, it does not achieve what it initially promises. More emphasis must be placed on the interactive nature of these relationships in order to fully account for the dynamic relationship between movements and the state. The state-movement intersection perspective approximates this more effectively than the network/bargaining perspective.

The State-Movement Intersection Perspective

The state-movement intersection model approaches analyzing the effects of mobilization by emphasizing the interaction between social movements and other actors. Marco Giugni, one of the main proponents of the model, writes,

Underlying this perspective is the idea that social change results from the *interplay* of social movement activities and other social forces and structures . . . Therefore, one should look at the circumstances that lead such interplay of actors and structures to produce certain changes at different levels; *within the movement itself, in legislation, in the structure of the political system, in the society at large, and so forth.* [emphasis added] (Giugni 2004, 11)

Giugni emphasizes the interplay between the state and social actors as the cause of change. In this, he departs from the state-centric position that the state conditions all effects, that social forces have an impact only when cocooned within the structure established by the state. Focusing on the interactions between the state and social movements gets to the heart of the matter, that social movements have agency and power, and can effect change by the nature of their relationships with the state. Thus, the state-movement intersection model heavily emphasizes these relationships as the source of change, a departure from prior theories, which may emphasize some amount of social movement agency, but place the ultimate responsibility for actual change on the state establishing the general atmosphere.
In this respect, the state-movement intersection perspective is the most dynamic and flexible model examined thus far. It incorporates important variables from state-centric and society-centric models to create a midrange model that, via its concentration on the relationships between social actors and the state, is the most dynamic model yet created.

Indeed, the focus on relationships between social actors and the state as the dependent variable is what makes this approach truly dynamic. By their very nature, relationships are prone to change, and thus, this model accounts for the variation in interactions between the state and social movement actors. These relationships are the source of political, social, and institutional change, and thus, are crucial in the analysis of social movement outcomes. The model refers to the interactions between institutions of the state and social actors as the state-movement intersection. Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram note that it is important to keep the concept dynamic and remember that there may be multiple points of intersection between states and movements:

If we are to comprehend the interactions between movements and states, we need a theoretical perspective that incorporates an understanding of both movements and states as diverse entities that may have multiple points of intersection. Such a perspective must acknowledge the intersection of states and movements and analyze the effect of state-movement intersections on the development and tactics of the movement as well as on state-movement interactions and their outcomes. [emphasis added] (Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram 2005, 154)

As elaborated above, the model accounts for effects on the state by movements and effects on movements by the state, providing a truly dynamic and realistic way to analyze outcomes. Likewise, the model acknowledges that state responses can vary
widely, and that the relationship between movements and the state is also fluid, rather than the more static concept of political opportunities.

Also conceptualized in a more fluid way are the boundaries of the state and civil society. The model allows for activists to be part of the state as well, in a professional capacity. In fact, the state-movement intersection is defined not only as the relationship between social movements and the state, but also as “self-identified members of the movement who also hold recognizable positions within the state” (Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram 2005, 154). The model views the boundaries between state and civil society to be more fluid, while still recognizing that civil society has autonomy and agency. Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram write,

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\text{... to understand the tactics, strategies, and outcomes of a social movement, particularly decisions to undertake moderate tactics or to take to the streets, we must reexamine the boundaries we draw between a movement and ‘others,’ especially the state. Social movement and public policy literatures both draw strict lines between the state and social movements. In contrast, I argue that the degree to which movements have activists or organizations located within the state varies, both at the emergence of the movement and over time. [emphasis added] (Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram 2005, 150-1)}
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Thus, there is great emphasis on fluidity and dynamism in the model, which makes it more adaptable to different political systems, regimes, and institutional structures, as well as to differing social movements. This flexibility allows for greater accuracy in analysis, because the focus is on the relationships between the actors, rather than the actors themselves.

These relationships are always interactive, and constructed on a specific legal and institutional terrain which is the accumulated historical result of both popular strategy and state policy (Foweraker, 1989a, 1992). Since no form of politics, however popular, can occur in a political and institutional vacuum, social movements have little choice about setting out across this terrain, but their choices multiply
once they are there. For this is a strategic terrain where social movements find the legal and institutional means to negotiate with the state. Far from begin a zero-sum game, by definition, the politics of social movements is a politics of incremental advance and disguised retreat, of frequent failures and partial successes. (Foweraker 1995, 62-3)

The key to analyzing outcomes, according to the state-intersection model, is the focus on the relationships between the actors, as it is within the context of these relationships that strategy is formed, tactics emerge, and negotiation and change happen.

While prior theories and models conceptualized the institutional structure of the state as a static and state-constructed variable, the state-intersection model views the legal and institutional areas of the state as jointly constructed, further adding to the autonomy and agency of social actors. The emphasis on the autonomy of civil society (Foweraker and Craig 1990) makes the model society-centric, while the stress on relationships and give and take between the state and social actors make the model dynamic. In this model, both the state and social movements have power. The model recognizes that the political climate, legal and institutional structures have been created by both state policy and popular strategy (Foweraker and Craig 1990). Social movements become not only major actors in this model, but crucial political players, a part of the political process.

In short, the collective identity and strategic intent of social movements remains indeterminate until they are analyzed in interaction with the political environment, and especially with the institutions of the state. Social movements were no longer unstructured collective action, but a form of mass politics. (Foweraker 1995, 19)

This has particular salience in the cases of Latin American social movements, as it allows for the recognition of political characteristics unique to the region:
In short, the identity of social movements in Latin America is not so much formed through social relations as it is ‘constituted at the political level’ (Moises, 1981), and the recovery of civil society therefore occurs in intimate interrelation with the state . . . The political level is composed of the party system, where it exists, and clientelism, corporatism, and state-civil society relations in general. (Foweraker 1995, 30)

The emphasis on relationships, rather than structures, institutional configurations, or political opportunities, allows for the accommodation of developing countries with political systems that differ greatly from those of the Western industrialized democracies. Politics in developing countries is prefaced on relationships—relationships between civil society and political parties (clientelism), relationships between civil society and the state (corporatism), and these relationships can and do vary quite frequently. Thus, the importance of having a model that can accommodate those changes and account for them is critical.

The state-movement intersection combines the best features of state-centric and society-centric models by focusing on the linkages between the state and society. Foweraker and Craig emphasize that the concentration on these linkages, “ha[s] enriched our political analysis by providing a more balanced and complex conceptualization of state-society relations” (Foweraker 1995, 38). In addition to accounting for relationships between social movements and the state, the theory also allows for accounting for a hegemonic power, such as the United States in the case of Latin America, when analyzing elite fragmentation and conflict. The model states that when elites come into conflict with each other, opportunities for change open. Brockett notes that
First, the salient elites might not only be domestic but also include those of a hegemonic power, such as the United States when the subject is Central America. Second, elite fragmentation and conflict are dimensions that can and do vary independently with differential implications for collective action. For example, a situation of medium to high elite fragmentation would probably facilitate the mobilization of the disadvantaged, but if combined with low elite conflict there would be a low probability for significant changes in the distribution of power and resources. (Brockett April 1991, 264)

This adds to the relevance of the model for analysis of Latin American cases, as the influence of the U.S. in domestic politics is frequent and widespread. Accounting for influences not considered in previous models and theories adds much to the discussion of which effects social movements have on the state and policy.

Giugni notes that one of the main arguments of the state/movement intersection model regarding the influence of movements on states and policy is:

. . . that protest actions and the movements’ allies within the institutional arenas interact to place them in a better position to influence policy... protest and political alliances produce a joint effect that increases the chances that the movements have to reach their goals. (Giugni 2004, 5)

Thus, the combined efforts of movements and allies within the state results in a strong chance of policy change. Likewise, public opinion and social movements influence each other: public opinion favorable to a movement combined with protest actions can increase the chances of policy impacts, and an unfavorable public opinion plus protest actions lessens the chances of substantive impact on policy (Giugni 2004, 5). Giugni elaborates on this specification of his *joint-effect model*, writing that “the joint action of political alliances and public opinion is especially needed when movements address certain types of issues” (Giugni 2004, 5). Demands made by social movements differ greatly in scope and visibility, thus, results/change varies according to the type of demand and the specific area of the
policy. Demands for changes in domestic policies, for example, are more likely to result in policy change. Demands for changes in policies in foreign or international policies are less likely to be met, as the state operates under international constraints in those areas and thus has less autonomy to independently initiate policy change. Demands that address policy areas which are more crucial to the state, such as national security or defense, are less likely to result in policy change. Giugni elaborates,

...either the willingness or the capacity of power holders to meet movement demands (or both) is diminished in some situations. In both cases the ability of social movements to influence public policy should shrink [when demanding change to international policy or policy areas the state views as crucial]. (Giugni 2004, 121)

While factors such as the specific policy area do affect the likelihood of social movements obtaining policy change, the crucial component is the relationship between social movements, political alliances, and public opinion.

Giugni’s model is called the joint-effect model because it requires the presence of at least two of the following three variables: social mobilization, political allies, and public opinion. Social mobilization plus the support of political allies within the state can result in change, as can social mobilization plus favorable public opinion. However, the requirement for substantial policy reform is a combination of all three variables. Giugni writes,

According to my alternate view, political alliances and public opinion do provide movements with crucial resources for policy impact. However, I argue that, to force the power holders to engage in substantial policy reform, a movement must have the joint and simultaneous presence of mobilization and the presence of either a major political ally within the institutional arenas or a favorable
Regarding the viability of claims as a conditioning factor of effects, the presence of all three variables is crucial in policy areas that are “high profile,” such as foreign policy, and less crucial in areas that are “low profile,” such as domestic policy (Giugni 2004; Kriesi 1995b). The chances of a social movement effecting substantive change are higher with low profile issues, and lower with high profile issues. The longevity of a social movement, and its ability to sustain mobilization, also affects the possibility for substantive change, with greater longevity and ability to sustain mobilization resulting in a greater chance of substantive change. Giugni focuses on the interaction between the three variables, and allows for significant amounts of power and agency for the social movement, as he acknowledges the ability of the movement to effect change. The focus remains on the relationship, on the interaction between social movements, allies in the state, and public opinion. He writes,

I propose an alternative, though not necessarily competing view, that social movements, political alliances, and public opinion interact to produce policy change. In the theories discussed above, the impact of social movements on public policy occurs in two steps: movement claims first affect either political allies or public opinion; then these two intervening factors translate movement claims into policy changes. According to my alternative view, political alliances and public opinion do provide movements with crucial resources that help them to succeed. Yet, in order to force the power holders to engage in substantial policy reform, I argue, it is necessary to have the joint and simultaneous presence of a strong social movement and either the presence of a major political ally within the institutional arenas or a favorable public opinion, or both. (Giugni 2007, 55)

Giugni distinguishes between the joint-effect models and indirect-effect models by arguing that, in the joint-effect model, either public opinion and elite allies, or both together, combined with mobilization have a simultaneous effect, while in the
indirect-effect model, movements affect public opinion, which encourages elites to enact change in policy. The acknowledgement that effects can happen simultaneously focuses the analysis on the relationships between the three actors. Giugni emphasizes this focus because change is a result of the interplay between social movements and other social actors. He writes,

"Therefore, one should look at the circumstances that lead such interplay of actors and structures to produce certain changes at different levels; within the movement itself, in legislation, in the structure of the political system, in the society at large, and so forth." (Giugni 2004, 97)

This emphasis on the interrelatedness and connections between the different actors is what allows for the analysis of institutional change. We must first acknowledge that change is possible in order to analyze change. Next, we must assume that social actors are able to affect the state and vice-versa. Lastly, we are then able to analyze the effects of mobilization on the state. Because my analysis focuses on institutional change in the main, the state-movement intersection perspective is the logical choice to use for analysis of the Chilean student movement and its effects on the political system in Chile.

The state-movement intersection model is particularly useful when engaging in analysis of social mobilization in Chile. Other models provide some difficulties when they are applied to non-Western industrialized democracies. Many models rely heavily on the institutional or regime structure, which can be problematic for Latin American countries in particular. The emphasis on the particular institutional structure does not account for how the institutions relate to each other and to society. Even though institutional structures or regimes in Latin America may be similar to Western industrialized democracies on the
surface, they generally function very differently. Thus, a state with a regime configuration of a presidential republic has very different political procedures and functions, de facto, than the same or a similarly structured state in the Western industrialized world.

Political parties in Latin America exemplify these types of differences between the Western world and developing states. Political parties penetrate almost all facets of life in Latin American states -- political, economic, and social - and are the lynchpin of politics in many states. In contrast, the United States has a much shallower penetration of political parties; while they full penetrate the political realm, their power and influence does not extend as far into the economic or social realms. This penetration of political parties into Latin American societies is a large part of the reason why it is crucial to study the relationships and interactions between the actors, as social forces interact frequently with political parties and vice versa, causing effects on both sides. Foweraker notes that the very identity of social movements is constructed at the political level, in particular via the relationship of social movements and political parties (1995, 30). Neglecting the interactions and relationships between social movements and the state in Latin America would be a critical mistake.

*Kolb’s Framework for Substantive Political Outcomes and Institutional Outcomes*

While the state-movement intersection perspective provides a crucial jumping off point for this analysis, Felix Kolb developed a variant on the model that will prove to be particularly useful for my analysis. Kolb accepts the state-movement intersection perspective as the base of his typology, acknowledging that
analysis of interactions and relationships is crucial when attempting to account for change effected by social movements. Kolb recommends beginning analysis with an assessment of the outcomes of a given social movement. He then recommends a second step, the evaluation of these outcomes/changes in terms of “the success and failure of the movement” (Foweraker 1995, 30). He argues that scholars have rejected the labels of “success” and “failure” in analyzing change as a result of mobilization not because the terms are overly normative and unspecific, but because the benchmarks scholars have used to determine success or failure are flawed. Thus, Kolb believes that the weakness in using these terms can be lessened by selecting appropriate benchmarks, and by comparing the outcomes of the social movement with the outcomes of the same or a similar movement in other countries, or to compare “the outcomes of a social movement over time, in order to identify the determinants of its success” (Kolb 2007, 25). I will analyze the outcomes or effects of the Chilean students’ mobilization over time, comparing it to the stated goals of the student movement, following Kolb’s suggestions.

Kolb suggests a framework with five classifications for substantive political outcomes: “agenda impact,” “alternatives impact,” “policy impact,” “implementation impact,” and “goods impact.” The agenda impact accounts for effects on the policy agenda, the alternatives impact accounts for effects on the content of policy proposals, the policy impact refers to effects such as the actual adoption of laws or other “binding political decisions” (Kolb 2007, 28), the implementation impact measures the movement’s influence in speeding up, slowing down, or stopping the implantation of policies, and the goods impact refers to effects that influence the distribution of collective or public goods (Kolb 2007,
Effects of social mobilization may be analyzed by concentrating on one, a few, or all of these impact areas, each of which lends itself easily to concrete, measurable variables.

Institutional outcomes are also addressed in the typology. Kolb specifies three possible types of institutional outcomes as a result of social mobilization: “procedural change,” “intra-institutional change,” and “state transformation.” He writes,

I argue that social movements can cause three principal types of institutional outcome[s]. First, social movements can cause procedural change by altering their relationship with a political sub-institution. Second, they can cause intra-institutional change by altering the internal structure of a political sub-institution -- for example, by modifying the formal arrangements through which it aggregates and regulates individuals. Third, social movements can cause state transformation by altering the relationships between political institutions, or through the creation of new sub-institutions. (Kolb 2007, 28)

I will briefly address each type of outcome.

Kolb notes that procedural change is the simplest and least durable form of change. Because examples in this category deal with matters such as change in how the government deals with a particular social movement, these matters are prone to change as the political dynamics of the system changes. A new government may reverse a former government’s stance on how the state should deal with a social movement, thus rendering the change moot. However, these types of changes can set the stage for future impacts or more substantive institutional change.

The second type of change, intra-institutional change, involves a more durable change, such as a change in the purpose or the formal structure of a sub-institution. Naturally, this type of change is more difficult to effect for social
movements, however, it is also more difficult to reverse once implemented. There is a path dependency characteristic present in this type of change which renders it much more substantive than the first category.

The third category, state transformation, is the most difficult type of change for a movement to accomplish, and the most durable. State transformation involves the creation of new sub-institutions or a restructuring of authority among current sub-institutions. Kolb cites the New Deal programs in the United States as an example of this type of change. The New Deal created many new sub-institutions in the government, many of which are still in existence today. State transformation is often the goal of social movements.

How do social movements achieve these types of changes? Kolb specifies five causal mechanisms for political change: the “disruption mechanism,” the “public preference mechanism,” the “political access mechanism,” the “judicial mechanism,” and the “international politics mechanism.” These mechanisms encompass the strategy and tactics social movements use in an attempt to effect change. I will review each in turn.

The disruption mechanism indicates that social movements have the power to cause change due to their power to cause disruption. This notion has a great deal of support in the literature -- many studies support the hypothesis that movements are most effective when they are disruptive. Kolb notes that the power of disruption lies in the ability of movements to cause disruption in the normal, day-to-day functioning of institutions. The degree of influence or change depends on three factors: which institution is being disrupted -- if the institution is crucial to people’s daily lives, the greater the effect --, whether the people who are affected by the
disturbance are able to bargain with resources, and whether the mobilizers can protect themselves from retaliation. Kolb writes, “Institutional disruption is more likely to be ignored when the disrupted institution is not central to the society as a whole and is not threatening to other powerful groups” (Kolb 2007, 74). When the political alignments are unstable, or during periods of electoral instability, governments do not have the options of ignoring or repressing movements. In these cases, the government will negotiate with and concede to demands of the protesting groups, resulting in political or institutional change (Kolb 2007, 77).

The second mechanism, public preference, encompasses public opinion. Logically, if a movement can manage to persuade the public of the justness of their cause, elites are likely to respond. Social movements activate this mechanism by informing elites of new public opinion, a technique called signaling (Kolb 2007, 77). Policymakers have two main options when this mechanism is activated: they may respond to public opinion, or they may attempt to change public opinion. Naturally, substantive change only occurs if elites choose to respond to public opinion.

The political access mechanism captures the majority of the insights provided by the state-movement intersection model. The mechanism specifies that “[p]olitical change through the political access mechanism occurs via a two-step process: the struggle to gain access to a specific domain of the polity, followed by the struggle from within for substantial political change” (Kolb 2007, 81). Kolb notes that these changes occur gradually, often with a lag in time in between the mobilization and the change. The political access mechanism incorporates the state-movement intersection: it is shaped by the number of movement activists
who also hold positions within the state. Logically, the more activists that hold state positions, particularly positions of political influence and power, the greater the effect of political success. The location of the activists, their institutional position, will determine the type of changes possible via this mechanism.

The fourth mechanism, the judicial mechanism, is an extremely effective vehicle for change. When movements choose to use the courts to pursue substantive change, the odds of being able to effect change rise. Courts are immune to public opinion, for the most part, because they are not elected bodies. Therefore, they can make decisions that may be more controversial or may include more sweeping change, as they do not have to be overly concerned with the backlash. Activists can access the court system without allies, and the judicial process “guarantees that arguments cannot be ignored or dismissed without justification and provides powerful tools for gathering and accessing information” (Kolb 2007, 86). Most litigation pursued by social movement activists via the judicial mechanism uses rights-based arguments, arguing that individuals are being denied basic constitutional rights. The more effectively activists are able to utilize this argument and frame the issues as violations of constitutional rights, the more likely the judicial mechanism will result in substantive change (Kolb 2007, 87). This will be particularly relevant in the Chilean case, as the students have framed education as a basic human right.

The fifth and final mechanism, the international politics mechanism, is not present in every social movement strategy. It is context-dependent: if the issue does not involve international matters, it is not likely that a movement will utilize the international politics mechanism. Kolb specifies four main ways movements
utilize this mechanism: 1. boycotting, using leverage via international markets; 2. using international organizations or treaties that require their state to adhere to certain rights or norms specified in treaties or as conditions of membership in the international organization -- movements use the international organization to pressure their own state into adhering to the agreement; 3. normative discourse on an international scale -- this technique involves the use of moral discourse that causes international pressure on the state, forcing a change that is eventually institutionalized; and 4. formal social movement organizations of a transnational/international character can change the political context in the target state via participation in the state’s policymaking process (Kolb 2007, 91-2).

Having specified these causal factors, Kolb cautions against assuming that success is due to one causal factor. Rather, it is better to look for the particular combinations and interactions of the characteristics of social movements and political environmental variables that result in change. Kolb’s basic formula is the profile level of the policy that the movement wants to change, plus the quantity of public opinion support, plus the amount of state autonomy equals the probability of success. Lower profile policies, higher levels of favorable public opinion, and high state autonomy regarding the particular policy/change all increase the chances of a movement’s having a bigger impact on the issue (Kolb 2007). Rigorous analysis of these factors should reveal which factors, combinations, interactions, and relationships were most important in the Chilean case, regarding the ability to effect change.

In that vein, I will use a comparative method, comparing the tactics and strategies of the Chilean student movement over time, from 2001 to 2012. Because
I argue that change is a result of the relationships between the actors, I will focus on the interactions between the student movement, the Chilean government, and public opinion. I believe that, as Giugni wrote, “... one should look at the circumstances that lead such interplay of actors and structures to produce certain changes at different levels; within the movement itself, in legislation, in the structure of the political system, in the society at large, and so forth” (Giugni 2004, 11). My goal is to determine the political, structural, and tactical conditions that result in substantive institutional change, while also analyzing lesser effects engendered by the student movement.

The major theories reviewed here all have various levels of explanatory power regarding the student movement in Chile. Giugni’s state-movement intersection model provides great insight into social movements in developing states, as it doesn’t assume state supremacy and incorporates the agency of movements. It is flexible enough to accommodate institutions that do not adhere to the industrialized, Western, Global North model of democracy. Its concentration on interactions between movements and the state allows for a dynamic approach to analyzing social mobilization. Kolb’s typology, based upon the state-interaction model, provides a road map for analysis. Because I was interested in examining outcomes of the three cycles of mobilization, Kolb’s typology provided the best structure for my research and analysis. Many of the other major theories concentrate on analyzing the emergence or life cycle of movements, which, while interesting, was not what I wanted to study. I wanted to know what effects the students’ mobilization had, and how their interactions with the government aided or discouraged them in achieving their goals. Kolb’s framework is dynamic and
flexible, reflecting its basis in the state-movement intersection model, while providing concrete categories for classifying and analyzing different outcomes. The framework aids in organizing data from social movement outcomes in a systematic manner, allowing for classification of outcomes and a more robust analysis.

The state-intersection model provides the most insight into Chilean student mobilization, and will be the theoretical approach used in this study, aided by Kolb’s framework for the analysis of effects of mobilization. As Foweraker observes, “[f]ar from begin a zero-sum game, by definition, the politics of social movements is a politics of incremental advance and disguised retreat, of frequent failures and partial successes” (Foweraker 1995, 63). The Chilean student movement has experienced incremental and mid-range advances, frequent “failures” and partial successes. Additionally, students have come to be regarded as important political actors in Chile, as they practice politics in the streets. Foweraker points out, “[s]ocial movements were no longer unstructured collective action, but a form of mass politics” (Foweraker 1995, 20). Indeed, for Chilean students, the most popular form of political participation is protest. Giugni’s joint-effect submodel of the state-movement intersection theory is particularly emphasized in this study. Giugni specifies that, in order to see policy reform, at least two of the following three variables must be present: social mobilization, political allies within the state, and positive public opinion. For substantial policy reform, all three variables must be present. The three case studies contained in this work demonstrate the explanatory power of the state-movement intersection model and Giugni’s joint-effect submodel. This dissertation presents the results of
Chapter 3: Methodology and Hypotheses

This chapter discusses the methodological approach and research methods used in the study. This analysis uses qualitative evidence, supplemented with quantitative data. Overall, Comparative Qualitative Analysis is utilized, with a Most Similar Systems Design, the unit of analysis consisting of a cycle of mobilization, and thus consisting of comparative historical analysis. The state-movement intersection model, the joint-effect sub-model, and Kolb’s framework for analysis of effects guide the analysis. Three cycles of mobilization are investigated as case studies: the Mochilazo in 2001, the Penguin Revolution in 2006, and the Chilean Winter in 2011. These three cycles of mobilization represent sustained instances of mobilization and interaction with government over time, under both leftist and conservative governments, thus, they provide rich material for comparison.

Methodology

The comparative qualitative analysis consists of comparing and contrasting the three cycles of mobilization and their components, namely: instances of student mobilization; communication and interaction between students/student organizations and government officials; the presence or lack of allies in government positions; the type of government in power; agreements between students and government officials and/or other relevant parties; and public opinion. Effects of mobilization are also compared and contrasted. Evidence is
drawn from a variety of sources, including: approximately 30 interviews with
government officials, academics and other experts, students, and student leaders;
newspaper, news magazine, and news wire accounts of mobilization; profiles of
student leaders, editorials, and articles about government officials and their
stances and approaches to mobilization and student organizations; articles from
scholarly journals; communication between student organizations and the
government; and books.

The analysis of student mobilization follows Sidney Tarrow's research
method of Protest Event Analysis, whereby a database with detailed information
about each mobilization event is created. Event data is compiled from Chilean
newspapers, such as *El Mercurio, La Segunda, La Nación, El Mostrador*, and *La
Tercera*, as well as the archives of student organizations and government archives.
Over the course of two years, I spent approximately thirty to forty hours per week
over the course of eight months examining every issue of the major national daily
newspapers on microfilm at the *Biblioteca Nacional* in Santiago, Chile. I
researched the dailies during the cycles of mobilization, one to two months before
the cycles of mobilization, and one to six months after the cycles of mobilization,
in an attempt to get the most complete and accurate data possible. For the
Mochilazo, I examined daily coverage from November of 2000 through July of
Coverage of the Chilean Winter in 2011 was available for most major newspapers
online, as most articles after 2007 have been digitized and archived on the
newspapers’ websites. Thus, the majority of the news coverage for the 2011 cycle
came from online news websites that had archives available, including major Chilean, regional, and international news sources. I gathered, compiled, and analyzed data about mobilization in 2011 from March to December of that year.

If the cycle of mobilization garnered international coverage, as happened with the Penguin Revolution in 2006 and the Chilean Winter in 2011, I also used international news sources, such as Reuters, The Associated Press, The New York Times, The Chicago Tribune, Newsweek, Time, The Guardian, The Christian Science Monitor, The Atlantic, The Washington Post, El País, Le Monde, etc. Online sources, such as CNN and MSNBC, Chilean online news sources, such as Emol, El Mostrador, Soy Chile, 24 Horas, CNN Chile, and Hoy in addition to the student organization websites and government websites, are also used, when they covered the mobilization or the student movement in general.

The variety of sources, national and international, print and online, helps to minimize selection bias as much as possible. Because the three main newspapers in Santiago (El Mercurio, La Segunda, and La Tercera) are published by the El Mercurio publishing company, which has a demonstrable conservative bent, they have a conservative bias and often publish articles that portray student mobilization negatively. La Nación leans left, tends to have a more leftist bias, and publishes articles about student mobilization that place less emphasis on negative aspects. The news wires are generally regarded as neutral overall, as are most of the remaining U.S. or international sources—neutral to slightly leftist, except The Guardian, which is also considered leftist. With this wide selection of news
coverage, I gained a more complete view of the mobilizations and their effects, and mitigated the dominantly negative coverage of the mainstream Chilean press.

In addition to the significant amounts of information I gathered from the previously mentioned sources, I supplemented my own data with datasets shared by Chilean researchers that cover the Penguin Revolution and the Chilean Winter. These datasets share most of the same basic categories as my own datasets, and I have added additional categories/variables, searching and adding additional information for each instance of mobilization to adapt them specifically for my analysis.

The data are coded according to type of event (paro/toma, marcha, protesta, evento cultural—paralyzation/takeover, march, strike, protest, cultural event); what prompted the mobilization; the main actors and organizations participating; category and content of students’ demands; public opinion measures; and initial government responses/statements to the press. Also included are data about meetings between government officials and students, and between officials, students, and the microbuseros’ (bus drivers/owners) union, when available. Because data about meetings and contact between these groups and government officials was not consistent, I relied less on this variable in my analysis. I coded my interviews and the databases by category and theme, which allowed for quick and easy grouping and comparison of most similar situations in the analysis stage.
Important Concepts and Terms

**Student mobilization** will be defined as any action by students, ranging from protests and marches to strikes and paralyzations to cultural events to *tomas* (where students “take” the campus and shut it down in order to achieve some goals), wherein the students advance demands of the government or the university/school administration.

Student groups will be said to have **allied** with other groups in instances in which students are joined by other social or political groups, such as teachers’ unions, workers’ unions, or political parties, via a public statement of support or through actual participation by members of the non-student group in the chosen movement.

**Allies** are organizations or individuals who publicly express support for the students. They may or may not engage in mobilization with the students, and/or they may provide material support, such as supplies, locations to hold meetings, or funds. Allies can be governmental or non-governmental, the defining characteristic is public support of the students and their mobilization.

**Types of mobilization**: There are several commonly-used types of social mobilization in Chile. The first, the *marcha*, or *march*, is just that, a protest march. In Santiago, these often happen in *el centro*, the downtown historical area where most of the government offices, as well as the presidential palace, *La Moneda*, are located. The second type, the *protesta*, or *protest*, can be a public demonstration of various kinds. The students have been quite creative with their
protests, and examples range from recreating the dance from the video of Michael Jackson’s song, *Thriller*, with hundreds of participants dressed as zombies to illustrate the death of Chilean education, to an 1800-hour marathon, the 1800 hours representing the amount in U.S. dollars it would take to finance free higher education for all, to a kiss-a-thon in front of the presidential palace. Innovation in forms of protest has been one of the major strengths of the student movement in Chile. The third kind of mobilization is very common, the *paro*. It literally translates to “stop,” but a *paro* is really a type of *strike* wherein the students do not attend class, and usually take over the campus of the school or university, barring the gates, fences, and doors with desks and chairs to prevent entry by administrators or authorities. They engage in a *paralización*, or *paralyzation* of the activity of the educational institution in an effort to persuade the authorities to meet their demands. *Paros* and *paralizaciones* are grouped together, because it is incredibly rare for one occur without the other. Another common mobilization tactic for students is the staging of *eventos culturales*, or *cultural events*. The students will arrange an event, usually a concert, a theater presentation, or another type of arts event or public performance, to draw attention to their demands and cause. The fifth type of mobilization is less common, but often effective. It is the *toma*, or *takeover*, wherein students literally take over the campus of their school, blocking the gates, fences, and doors with desks and chairs to prevent entry by administrators or authorities. Students stay and live in the school until the end of the *toma*, arranging to feed themselves, care for the common living areas, etc. It is an incredibly complex, coordinated effort. *Tomas* always happen in concert with *paros*, thus, they are coded as one category for this study.
A cycle of mobilization is a sustained series of mobilizations, lasting longer than one day, that involves more than the initial mobilizing group, meaning the cause has spread to the larger society. Sidney Tarrow defines a “cycle of contention” as

A phase of heightened conflict across the social system: with a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention; the creation of new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities (Tarrow 1998, 142).

I follow Tarrow’s definition in this study, keeping with his concept of a cycle consisting of the spread of mobilization and innovation in its forms in particular. These three major periods of mobilization in Chile, during 2001, 2006, and 2011, demonstrate all of the factors in Tarrow’s definition of a cycle of contention.

A social movement consists of “those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents (Tarrow 1998, 2).” A Social Movement Organization (SMO) is a formally organized component of a social movement that participates in the movement and usually groups together participants with some interest or characteristic in common, such as students, parents and guardians of students, workers, etc. In this study, the student organizations, labor unions, teachers’ organizations, and university rectors’ organizations are examples of SMOs.

Hypotheses

H1. I argue that students will see more outcomes favorable to the movement when the student movement’s demands concentrate on the area of educational change, versus economic, or political change.
This hypothesis is based upon Giugni’s joint-effect model, which specifies that substantive policy change is more likely in “low profile” areas, such as domestic policy and less likely in “high profile” areas, such as foreign policy (Giugni 2004; Kriesi 1995a). Generally, the students did not protest about foreign policy, so I adapted this concept to apply to domestic policy. The students are less likely to effect substantive policy change in an area the state considers crucial (high profile), such as national security or economics, and more likely to effect substantive policy change in areas that are less crucial to the state (low profile), such as education.

**H2.** Students will see more outcomes in the political or economic realms when they ally with other actors, such as unions, professionals, or government officials, and when public opinion is favorable to the student movement.

This hypothesis is based upon Giugni’s joint-effect model, which specifies that in order to effect substantive policy change, all three of these variables must be present. Building upon this claim, I estimate that there will be more changes overall as well if these variables are present. The joint-effect model does not include allies overall, simply allis in the state. I believe that having allies in the social sphere would help as well, even if the students don’t have allies in the state. In that scenario, the policy changes are likely to be fewer and less substantive in comparison to having allies in the government.

**H3.** Powerful allies are always important, and there is no exception in the realm of social mobilization. The more allies students/SMOs have in government, the more likely they are to have effects on policies or institutions. I anticipate that the likelihood of outcomes favorable to the movement will increase with increases in the number of supporters and allies in the government. The more supportive governmental allies are publicly, the more likely the students are to have their demands met.
This hypothesis was based upon different theories in the social movement literature claiming that movements see more effects when they challenge an ideologically-friendly government. For example, most movements are likely to find that leftist governments are more likely to interact with them and hear their demands, increasing the likelihood that the movement will see more policy or institutional effects as a result. The opposite would be true with a right-wing government, which is likely to be less receptive to social movements. I removed the ideological component, surmising that students would have more effects realized if they had allies in the government that are willing to publicly state their support for the students’ cause. Because allies that do not express their allyship are particularly difficult to measure, I qualified this hypothesis by stating that the allies must be publicly supportive of the student movement.

H4. Students will have the most impact on policy (formulation, proposals, implementation) when they are able to use multiple methods of influence, e.g., disruption, persuasion, and/or bargaining.

The social movement literature repeatedly expresses that disruptive manifestations are usually the most effective. This is true, but it is not always true. I estimate that a mix of tactics, such as disruption, persuasion, and/or bargaining, are likely to show impacts on policy more consistently.

H5. Stressing the interrelatedness of government and social organizations, I believe that the more contact students have with government officials, the more likely they will be to gain outcomes that coincide with their demands.

This hypothesis is derived from the state-movement interaction model, which stresses the interactions between governments and movements as the most important variables to study. Interactions and relationships between activists/movements and government officials are incredibly important in this
model. Thus, I chose to focus on frequency of interactions for this hypothesis, surmising that the more interactions between the state and the students there were, the higher the chance that the students would have more demands met. The different cycles vary in how many demands are met by the government, and in whether the students consented to negotiate with the government. I thought this could be an explanation for the difference in the government acquiescing to demands.

H6. I anticipate that innovation in protest tactics/techniques will be more likely to result in outcomes favorable to the movement.

The literature supports the idea that disruptive actions are more likely to have an effect. Thus, innovation in protest tactics and techniques should result in a new repertoire of disruptive actions, which will be more likely to result in outcomes favorable to the movement. If the actions are successful in disturbing the status quo, they will generally result in outcomes favorable to the student organizations’ goals, as a result of garnering more attention, both from government officials and news media. The 2011 Chilean Winter cycle showed significant innovation, which I believed helped their cause.

H7. I argue that each cycle of mobilization enlarges the sphere for public debate, enabling the successive cycles to enlarge their demands and scope via knowledge transmission.

This hypothesis is based upon the idea of transmitted knowledge across cycles of mobilization or organizations in social movements. There is a general consensus in the literature that knowledge is often transmitted from one cycle to another or from one SMO to another, however, there are few studies researching the production or transfer of knowledge. Donatella della Porta and Elena Pavan wrote
about “repertoires of knowledge practices” in 2017 (della Porta and Pavan 2017) and Pavan and Felicetti utilized the concept of repertoires of knowledge to study the production and transmission of knowledge by Transition Italia on digital media, observing that “social movements enact practices of ‘knowledge transmission’” (Pavan and Felicetti 2019). During my early exploration of the student movement in Chile, I noticed that demands and debate grew larger and broader with each successive cycle. I wondered about the mechanisms that expired this expansion and growth of demands and predicted that there must have been knowledge transfer between the cycles.

Data collected from all of the sources mentioned above will be analyzed in order to prove or disprove the hypotheses mentioned above.
Chapter 4: *El Mochilazo*: The First Chapter in Post-Dictatorship Chile’s Social Mobilization

Introduction

In 2001, Chile seemed to be the ultimate success story for democratic transition and stable governance. Eleven years after the end of the Pinochet dictatorship, Chile possessed a functioning democracy and a thriving economy. The governing coalition, the *Concertación*, had established political stability, encouraged foreign investment, and presided over a steadily-growing economy. However, all was not as stable and peaceful as it appeared to be to the outside world. Enduring legacies of the dictatorship, enshrined in laws in the area of education and in neoliberal economic reforms and ideology, inspired the largest mobilization since the transition to democracy. Secondary students engaged in the longest and biggest mobilization post-dictatorship, prompted initially by disagreement over the charges for and the administration of the student transportation pass.

After Chile’s transition to democracy in 1990, there was a relatively low level of social mobilization, particularly among the student population (secondary and university), which, prior to the coup d’état, had been one of the most active demographic groups with regards to protest activity (Crucés 2008). The populace seemed to understand that the new democratic government needed time to settle
in and solidify the transfer of power and the re-establishment of democratic norms, and granted the government a grace period as a result. Likewise, the government discouraged any type of mobilization, fearing that it would cause the military to engage in another coup d'état. However, there was yet another reason for the lack of mobilization at the time, the presence of what many scholars have called a “culture of fear,” (Oppenheim 2007) a remnant from the Pinochet era. Citizens who engaged in protest during the years of the dictatorship were repressed, arrested, tortured, disappeared, and killed, and students were prime targets for the regime. The fear engendered from the brutality of the dictatorship carried over through the first decade of democratic rule. Students during the 1990s were old enough to remember the brutality of Pinochet’s regime. Thus, both the general population and students were relatively quiet during the 1990s with regard to mobilization (Manuel Antonio Garretón 2001). While there were manifestations in the 1990s, which were important, they were not as large and as sustained as the mobilization that began in the 2000s.

This began to change with the advent of the 21st century, which ushered in the rebirth of social mobilization in Chile. The two cycles of mobilization that often draw the most attention during the early 21st century are the 2006 Revolución Pingüina and the 2011 Invierno Chileno. While these two cycles of mobilization have been incredibly important in the trajectory of the Chilean student movement, I argue that the 2001 mobilization has been underestimated in the influence it had on social mobilization in Chile. The secondary students’ Mochilazo established a foundation that the Revolución Pingüina and the Invierno Chileno subsequently built upon. As a result, I believe that the Mochilazo is worthy of further study,
particularly in relation to the 2006 and 2011 cycles of mobilization, as there has not been much scholarly investigation into the *Mochilazo* in comparison to the amount of attention given to the *Revolución Pingüina* and the *Invierno Chileno*.

The *pingüinos*, high school students called as such because of their distinctive navy blue, gray, and white uniforms, began mobilizing in late March of 2001, protesting a rise in the price of the student transportation pass. Their demands would later expand to encompass anti-neoliberal arguments, as well as framing education as a right to which all citizens are entitled and which the state must guarantee and protect. This chapter examines the effects and impact of the 2001 *pingüino* movement, guided by the following questions: What prompted the mobilization of the *pingüinos*? How many and which of the students’ demands were met? What effects did they have on laws, policies, and political institutions as a result of their sustained mobilization?

*Photo 10: High school students’ uniforms, 2006. Frente Fotográfico, Facebook.*
The effects of the 2001 cycle of mobilization have been underestimated by previous analyses, and that the *Mochilazo* provided the foundation that the *Revolución Pingüina* and the *Invierno Chileno* later built and expanded upon. The students accomplished this via the creation of new and innovative social movement organizations (institution building), by framing education as a right, by insisting that the state has an obligation to protect that right, and by organizing and engaging in the largest sustained mobilization in the post-dictatorship period up to that year (Cornejo et al. 2010). Students also transmitted knowledge gained during this cycle of mobilization, from both their protest activity and their interactions with government officials, to students who participated in successive cycles of mobilization (Pavan and Felicetti 2019a; Cornejo et al. 2010). The students participating in the 2006 and 2011 cycles used the knowledge gained and transmitted by the *pingüinos* to develop new framing and protest techniques, helping them to gain greater public support and more effects as a result of their efforts. The *pingüinos* reinvigorated social mobilization, a longstanding tradition in Chile, in the fledgling democracy in 2001. The initial demands made during the *Mochilazo* established path dependence, wherein the following cycles of mobilization established a process of positive feedback, building upon the base of the anti-neoliberal, rights-based demands the *pingüinos* began to explore in 2001.

As Paul Pierson writes,

. . . the crucial feature of a historical process that generates path dependence is *positive feedback* (or self-reinforcement) . . . In the presence of positive feedback, the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path. (Pierson 2004, 21)
Establishing the claim that education is a right the government is obliged to protect and guarantee in 2001 allowed the pingüinos to begin their movement in 2006 with the rights-based argument and augment it with anti-neoliberal and anti-profit arguments. The demands made and framing used in 2006 helped the universitarios begin with anti-profit, rights-based frames in 2011 and expand them to demands for significant change in the political and economic systems in Chile.

Following the theoretical approach of Felix Kolb’s typology (Kolb 2007) within the framework of the state-movement intersection model, which emphasizes the interplay between the state and social actors as the cause of change, this chapter examines the penguins’ mobilization in 2001. It examines the demands put forth and the effects engendered, paying particular attention to movement-state interactions. I begin with a brief examination of the background and setting in 2001, then continue with an overview of Santiago’s unusual public-private hybrid public transportation system. Next, I discuss the students and their issues with public transport, which prompted the mobilization of the pingüinos. I subsequently present my analysis of the Mochilazo, examining the new form of social movement organization students created, the issues surrounding the student transportation pass, the mobilization with its demands, tactics, and processes, and government responses to the students’ mobilization. The conclusion summarizes the effects achieved by students and my findings.
History and Factors That Led to the Social Conflict

The Legacy of Dictatorship: A Pacted Democracy

Chile’s transition back to a democracy in 1990 was carefully negotiated and pacted between the Concertación de las Partidas para la Democracia (hereafter referred to as the Concertación, a coalition of leftist and left-center political parties), and Pinochet and his loyalists. The political leaders of the Concertación trod carefully, as there was a very real fear and possibility of another military coup, should Pinochet or his loyalists object to either the direction or the pace of the process of democratization. Pinochet and his followers hurriedly rewrote and pushed a new version of the constitution through Congress before they relinquished power, ensuring that the dictatorship would maintain an enduring legacy of influence in many areas for decades to come (Oppenheim 2007; Zald 1996).

The Concertación, intent on overseeing a peaceful transfer of power, did not strongly challenge the actions of the outgoing dictator, preferring to attempt to change things later, once they believed they had a more solid hold on power. Political leaders negotiated with the outgoing junta, coming to a consensus about changes that needed to be made and things that would remain unchanged. Pinochet had a significant influence over the type of democracy Chile would have, as a result of writing the new constitution and negotiating with the incoming democratic leaders. Thus, Chile’s re-democratization began and continued on a tentative and hesitant path. Political leaders often tested the water before attempting any significant (and sometimes even insignificant) changes. Hesitant
steps forward were often met by decisive steps backward, and the economy took precedence over all other issues. Lois Hecht Oppenheim has written that Chile is a “market democracy,” (Oppenheim 2007) emphasizing the importance of the free market, neoliberal economic policies implemented during the dictatorship and their influence on the burgeoning democracy. Thus, democracy was restored in 1990, but it was a pacted, market-based, neoliberal democracy. Progress was halting, and changes were met with strong opposition from the military and politically conservative sectors of the population, particularly while Pinochet was still alive (Torres 2010).

Similarly, social movements and organizations took some time to rebuild after the fall of Pinochet’s rule in 1990 ("FEUC: Historia" 2016; Fernández 2002; Masoliver and Tarud 2014a; A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c; Cruces 2008). For the previous seventeen years under the dictatorship, citizens who engaged in social mobilization, or who were members of unions or other organizations seen to be working at counter purposes to the state, were brutally repressed, and often tortured, disappeared, or killed. The majority of the student organizations were outlawed during the dictatorship (only state-created and sanctioned organizations were permitted to exist and were closely monitored), and student leaders were frequently captured, tortured, killed, disappeared, or exiled. Chile lost much of its crop of young leaders of that generation during this period, and post-Pinochet, this sector of the population had to be rebuilt. It was also necessary to overcome what many scholars of Chile call the “culture of fear,” a fear of mobilizing or becoming involved in political causes, instilled by the horrific events that transpired during the dictatorship, that lingered for many years after the regime relinquished power.
Thus, for the first ten years after the 1990 transition, there was little social mobilization, and certainly no sustained social mobilization campaigns, by any group in society.

The situation changed in 2001, with the uprising of the pingüinos, the high school students. A conflict over the cost and the mishandling of the administration and delivery of the student transportation pass spurred the largest mobilization since the end of the dictatorship, and the first sustained mobilization campaign, led by the high school students. Students voiced their complaints over the inefficient administration of the new “smart card” student transportation passes, ones that had a magnetic strip to be used with the automatic fare collectors in the metro and in buses. Later, their claims about the transportation system would expand to include other school-specific issues, eventually ballooning to encompass the first complaints about the political and economic systems overall, which set the scene for later mobilizations that demanded significant political and economic change. In fact, the two most significant sustained campaigns of student mobilization that followed, in 2006 and 2011, have ideological roots in the campaign of 2001, which established the foundation for later students to continue and enlarge their critiques. Eventually, the students of the Mochilazo would begin to criticize the existing economic system. However, before addressing the issue of neoliberalism and its interference in state obligations and functions, the Mochilazo commenced with issues related to students’ use of public transport, many of which are a result of the public-private hybrid nature of the public transportation system (Cruces 2008).
Santiago and Public Transport: A Public-Private Hybrid

Santiago’s public transportation system has undergone many changes over the years. Partially privatized in the early 1970s, and strongly deregulated and maintained as a half-private, half-state-owned system under Pinochet, the system consisted of a bus network run by over 3,000 private companies and a publicly-owned and run high speed rail system, the Metro (Julie McCarthy 2007) (Transportation Planning Casebook/Transantiago 2012). The hybrid system caused a number of problems, both political and logistical. First, the private companies were organized in very powerful guilds, or cartels, that often resisted any government regulation or proposed changes, making any improvements or changes to the system incredibly difficult to achieve. Any successful changes were the result of significant amounts of negotiation between the government and the transportation guilds/cartels, often with significant concessions made on the part of the state. The government also had to negotiate with several different guilds, adding to the difficulty of finding solutions to any transportation issues that arose. The agreement of all the guilds was necessary to solve issues, and as with any group, it was difficult to gain the agreement of all of the members, much less achieve agreement with all of the guilds. Thus, the nature of the system produced political problems, in that any issues with the public transportation system signified a long, drawn-out, and difficult process of negotiation for the government.

Logistical problems abounded as well. The bus system, dominated by the law of profit, was frequently chaotic and dangerous. Drivers were paid for the amount of money they brought in, meaning they earned higher amounts for
transporting more passengers. Competition among drivers to gain the most passengers encouraged dangerous driving (driving very fast, passing other buses) to beat other drivers in the quest to pick up the most passengers. Other problems in running bus routes safely and efficiently related to this issue existed as well, such as: skipping stops that had fewer passengers, disabled passengers (who took time to board busses and thus impacted the ability of drivers to pick up more passengers), or that had children or students waiting (children and students paid lower fares, thus the bus drivers earned less for these passengers), and waiting at busy stops to capture more passengers, which left passengers waiting for long periods of time further down the routes. Oversaturation of routes was common, up to 85 percent of the bus routes passed through the central business district, as it was the most profitable area (*Transportation Planning Casebook/Transantiago 2012*). Poor distribution of service to outlying areas and few to no buses during the early morning or late-night hours were also common, as providing these services were not profitable for the bus companies. Passengers often had to pay their fare more than once, as companies were not required to honor transfers from other private bus companies (*Transportation Planning Casebook/Transantiago 2012*). The system was disorganized and inefficient, and presented multiple inconveniences and dangers for both pedestrians and passengers.

Problems with drivers competing with each other for passengers were not the only issues. A lack of coordination and difficulty coordinating between the bus companies and the government also caused problems: many bus operators directly competed with Metro lines, with nearly identical routes, thus taking revenue away from the state-run system. As the government was prohibited by law from
competing with the bus companies, it could not solve this issue by running its own bus lines until 1987, when the law was changed and it began the Metrobus system, running bus lines to directly service the Metro rail system (Transportation Planning Casebook/Transantiago 2012). In summary, the hybrid public-private system presented a plethora of political and logistical problems that required a complex solution.

The Chilean government began to address the problems inherent in the public transportation system under the administration of Patricio Alywin, the first democratic president after Pinochet’s dictatorship. Alywin’s administration began to assign routes to private operators, accepting bids for the routes from private operators who met certain criteria (e.g., buses could not be over a certain age, operators had to run their routes under a maximum operation cost level, and areas serviced – operators who ran routes in underserviced areas were given priority), introducing much-needed regulation into the system. Three years of negotiations with the government resulted in the private bus operator unions agreeing to the necessary changes, after repeatedly insisting they could not adhere to the new regulations and make a profit (Transportation Planning Casebook/Transantiago 2012). Santiago’s rapid population growth complicated matters, as there continued to be high and increasing demand for public transportation. However, Alywin’s reforms did not solve the major issues for passengers (dangerous driving by bus operators, skipping stops, waiting at busy stops for more passengers, oversaturation of routes through the central business district, having to pay for transfers) because the bus companies continued to pay drivers by profit/number of passengers transported (Transportation Planning Casebook/Transantiago 2012).
Santiaguinos continued to endure a poorly-run, inefficient public transportation system under the Aylwin and Frei governments.

Ricardo Lagos became the third president under the new democratic system in 2000, and his administration made an overhaul of the transportation system a high priority on the policy agenda. Christened Transantiago, planning for the reformulation of the transport system began in 2000, and was “the most ambitious transport reform ever tried by a developing country” (“The slow lane: Fallout from a botched transport reform” 2008). However, the Transantiago plan was not implemented until 2007 and also suffered many issues during its implementation, thus, it was not the comprehensive fix officials had hoped it would be. Students would later target the inefficiencies inherent in the new Transantiago system. In 2001, however, high school students continued to struggle with a clumsy and inefficient public-private hybrid system, which would eventually trigger massive mobilization.

The **Mochilazo**: Basis of and Progression of the Conflict

**Building Institutions: A Crisis of Representation**

Prior to October 2000, the secondary students in Santiago were represented by three main organizations, the *Parliamento Juvenil* (Youth Parliament, YP), the *Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios de Santiago* Santiago (Federation of Secondary Students of Santiago, FESES), and the *Asamblea de Centros de Alumnos de Santiago* (Assembly of Student Centers of Santiago, ACAS), and also by the individual Student Centers in each school (Cruces 2008). In late 2000, the
student members of FESES held a congress to discuss how to reform the organization, which they believed had become antiquated and ineffective. FESES was the oldest of the three, having been formed in 1948, repressed during the dictatorship, and re-established in the 1980s under close government supervision. ACAS was an umbrella organization that coordinated the individual Student Centers on a charge (legal decree) from the dictatorship, which created the organization. Students critiqued ACAS strongly for its origins in the Pinochet regime, for its hierarchical structure, and for being dominated by students who were members of the political parties that composed the Concertación. The YP was created in 1997 by the government, as a way to teach young people about politics, government, and civic culture, a sort of training ground for future political leaders (Masoliver and Tarud 2014b). All of the organizations had their shortcomings, and the students had legitimate complaints about them, which they attempted to solve by creating a new organization that had a very different structure from the existing organizations. The pingüinos would eventually replace FESES with the Asamblea Coordinatoria de Secundarios (Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students, ACES). A brief discussion of the organizations’ histories, and the grievances students had with each organization follows.

FESES had a long history in the country, established in 1948, interrupted by the dictatorship, then re-established in the early 1980s. The umbrella organization, which grouped together representatives from the schools’ individual Student Centers, was hierarchical, with officers such as a president and vice president, and structured. It was also heavily influenced by the political parties, as many of the students were avowed party “militants.” While FESES claimed to be a
regional organization, in reality it only represented about 8 to 10 high schools in total in the Santiago metropolitan area (A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c). Secondary students in 2000 believed that, while FESES had served a useful function for many decades, it was an inadequate tool to address the needs of the students at that time. Students claimed FESES was outdated, controlled by political parties, overly hierarchical, and not adequate for representing the students’ everyday needs (Cruces 2008). At the time, FESES was suffering from a lack of participation, which prompted students to further question its utility and begin to think about creating a replacement organization (A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c). As the organization which actually called for and organized mobilizations of the pingüinos, FESES was inadequate for representing the students and their needs, and students advanced several critiques of the organization in this vein.

First, the secondary students argued that FESES was too easily politicized, and that it was merely a tool of the political parties that led it. They noted that it was often a “den of leftist political leaders, just as the . . . [Youth] Parliament only consisted of . . . Concertaciónistas [people loyal to the ruling coalition, the Concertación]” (A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c). The students wanted to create an organization free from the control of the political parties, which they saw as a negative because they believed the parties manipulated the student organizations into doing what the party wanted, not what was in the best interests of the students themselves. While they appreciated that FESES was more autonomous than the YP, they believed that it was still too susceptible to control and co-optation by the political parties. Students levied similar charges against the Youth Parliament, which was clearly utilized as a tool by political parties and politicians, “[i]n
practice, the Youth Parliament served as a place of coercion – or at least control – by political parties sponsoring their activities.” (Masoliver and Tarud 2014b; Cruces 2008) The students sought to create an autonomous organization, one that would not be so easily coopted by political parties or government, and one that would represent them and fight for their day-to-day needs.

Second, the students argued that FESES had an outdated, hierarchical structure, based on the structure of the social organizations of the 1960s, which was inadequate to handle their needs in 2000. This outdated and ineffective organizational form needed to be changed in order to increase its representativeness. The loss of representativeness in the organization resulted in apathy among the pingüinos; the students believed the organization was not representing them well, thus, they didn’t show up to participate or mobilize. The creators of ACES believed that the best way to deal with the apathy they saw among their peers was to create a more democratic and inclusive organization. They wrote, “. . . the deficiencies of [FESES] were structural, so the necessary changes to be made should be profound. The hope was to achieve an organization for secondary students, beyond the differences, because the problems that afflict education are problems of all the students, beyond political creeds” (A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c). Students believed that the hierarchical, top-down structure hindered both participation in general and democratic participation in FESES. Thus, they sought to create an organization that was less hierarchical, organized from the bottom up, more democratic, and more representative.

Finally, the students believed that FESES was not adequate for representing their everyday needs. Because of its structural deficiencies, the pingüinos asserted
that FESES could not represent the day-to-day issues and problems of the students to the government and school administrators. The hierarchical structure did not allow for much feedback from below, from the pingüinos themselves. The involvement of the political parties meant that FESES was easily co-opted to serve the needs of the parties, rather than the students. Thus, FESES had trouble mobilizing students because it did not have the everyday issues of the students on the agenda (Donoso 2014b, 20). The pingüinos wanted to solve the problem of demobilization that FESES had created, as well as to create an organization that would be more representative and would address the day-to-day concerns of the students. These strong critiques were echoed by the great majority of the students, who were frustrated with the lack of representativeness of FESES. Students were frustrated with the two other main organizations meant to represent them as well.

The pingüinos also strongly critiqued the Youth Parliament (YP) and ACAS for similar reasons. ACAS, established by the dictatorship to control the individual Student Centers of each school, was unrepresentative of the students, and was generally dominated by concertacionistas (loyalists of the center-left ruling coalition, the Concertación) (A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c). ACAS’ membership was composed of the presidents of the Student Centers at each individual high school. There was great distrust among the pingüinos for ACAS, due to its nascency during the dictatorship as a tool for containment and control of the pingüinos. Its authoritarian roots made it illegitimate in the eyes of many of the students (Donoso 2014b, 20). This was sufficient to discredit the organization completely for the majority of the students, who generally did not participate in ACAS-organized events.
While it did not originate under an authoritarian regime, the Parlamento Juvenil (Youth Parliament, or YP) was also established by the government, and engendered similar distrust among the students. Its creation by the Camera de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies, the lower house) of the Congreso Nacional (National Congress) in 1998, imparted an elitist quality to the organization (Cruces 2008). The YP was envisioned, de jure, as a training ground for future political leaders, a mock Congress where the students could learn about civic culture, as well as legislative and governmental processes. De facto, the Parlamento Juvenil was controlled by the political parties that sponsored it (Masoliver and Tarud 2014b). Masoliver and Tarud explain,

Early on, the minutes of the sessions of the Parliament demonstrated the inherent tension of a student leader sympathetic to a political party. On the one hand, there is the idea that the member must represent the sectoral demands of the students that chose him as representative of the corresponding district; on the other hand, there is the complex pressure of partisan ideology. Youth parliamentarians showed from the first sessions that their role in that organization was meaningless if there was no degree of autonomy for young people to carry out their own projects or to prioritize their own needs. In short, the parliamentarians sought to use this device to create a history of the youth with the intention of creating effects in the public space, although they were not successful. (Masoliver and Tarud 2014b)

Structured as a mirror image of the National Congress, the YP consisted of 120 representatives, elected by the Student Centers of the schools, two per district. The YP convened twice a year.

The creation of the YP by the political elite and its control by political parties was unappealing to the pingüinos and served to delegitimize the YP in the eyes of the secondary students as well. One student leader at the time referenced its elitist
and hierarchical nature, saying, "the [YP] was just like the Jota [Communist Youth] but with state money" (Donoso 2014b, 20). In sum, secondary students did not feel that the YP represented their interests either, and they did not trust the organization, as it had been created by political elites and was controlled by the political parties.

Out of these critiques rose a desire to create a more egalitarian, democratic organization that would better represent the needs of the pingüinos. Thus, ACES was born from the desire for autonomy and the frustrations of secondary students with existing organizations meant to represent them. Inspired by the horizontal structure of the Frente Anti-Alzas (Anti-Fare Increase Front, FAA, a loose network of students formed in 2000 specifically to oppose student public transportation fare hikes), and its grassroots origins, the students sought to create a less hierarchical, more representative organization. Victor Orellana, one of the students who helped create ACES, explains,

We were really against [a strong, presidential hierarchy], [we wanted] collective leadership. When the press asked for our leaders, . . . we speak about . . . the [spokesperson], el vocero, and not the President. And the press asked, “Where is the President?” and we have no president. I speak [as the spokesperson], but I [say] what the students tell me to [say]. I am not the President, I don’t want to be a politician, I just have a function inside an organization and it’s more complex. (Orellana 2014a)

Structured from the bottom up, the students encouraged grassroots organization first in individual schools, then gathered representatives from each school, as well as students from the colectivos sociales (social collectives, like the FAA), under the umbrella of ACES. The social collectives were autonomous groups, often of an anarchist ideological character, that served as an unstructured and informal form of organization for the students. The collectives rose out of the search for more
autonomous representation and participation during the 1990s. Their inclusion in ACES demonstrates the breadth of the representative character the students aimed to create with the new organization. There were no officers, only committees that handled administrative details, and designated spokespersons who dealt with the media and the government. Orellana explains, “leadership was not the key element, the collective was” (Orellana 2014a). An official ACES document about its history elaborates that the students did not want the organization to be a coordinator of the presidents of the student centers from each school. Rather, they wanted the organization to be

. . . one of organized students, which highlights the importance of building micro movements in high schools as a basis for what is above. Only a real grassroots organization will make it possible at some point to speak of a representative federation, and the construction of that fundamental fabric will be the task of all of those who work in ACES (A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c).

The emphasis was heavily on egalitarianism. Each organization in ACES has equal weight, no single school’s organization is more important than another’s. Students at each high school would decide who to send to the ACES assemblies, there was no requirement that it would be the president of their school’s student center. The structure follows many anarchist principles of organization, but the students claim they were aiming for a mix of the “republican tradition with anarchism” (Orellana 2014a). The work is divided between topical committees, such as a coordinating committee, a press committee, a mobilization committee, a propaganda committee, and a spokespersons committee. The coordinating committee handles the administrative work, such as arranging for assemblies, communication with
the various schools, etc., and the other committees handle the work in their respective areas.

Decisions are made in full assemblies, in order to reach decisions in the most democratic and egalitarian manner. The students organized ACES as a form of direct, participatory democracy, rather than basing it directly on anarchist principles, although it does share some organizational principles with anarchism. In explaining their goals, the students of ACES elaborated,

We are interested in making people a social force, an alternative power that alters the established conditions [in society]. This power is constructed, it is the social fabric that needs a new regional and national federation, it is an active social movement, which does not depend on parliamentarianism or systemic politics as a solution. Many confuse direct and horizontal action with anarchic order, and they are the same ones that are lost trying to compose spaces legitimizing representative-bourgeois democracy, denying participatory democracy as a socialist political form (J. Reyes 2001). Thus, with the organization of ACES, the students attempted to ensure that, as Orellana said, “leadership was not the key element, . . . the collective was.” (Orellana 2014a)

The students placed so much emphasis on the horizontal organization and the participatory democracy form of participation because of their goals for ACES. The central aim was to address students’ real, concrete problems, rather than being an ideologically-centered organization. Orellana notes that the students were looking for an organism that could address their day-to-day problems, “we had this idea that we had to moralize for problems that were so concrete, so real that students can touch them with their hands. Not for ideology, not for our sense of democracy—that was not concrete to them.” (Orellana 2014a) The pingüinos
believed that if they created a truly participatory organization that addressed students’ every day, real-life concerns, they could encourage students to participate more, mobilize more, and demand more. They were later proven to be correct. Participation rates in ACES were much higher than what FESES could muster. Students embraced the participatory character of the movement of the new organization, and began to participate more frequently and to make demands. The first real test of how ACES would function was the Mochilazo. Students began the cycle of mobilization with demands about the student transportation pass.

The Basis of the Conflict: Students and Their Issues with Public Transport

Issues with the public transportation system spurred the cycle of mobilization known as the Mochilazo. University and secondary students in Chile are charged reduced fares on public transport in Chile. Prior to the year 2000, students used a paper card that identified them as students and allowed them to ride public transportation with a reduced fare, which they paid ahead of time as a lump sum when they received the card at the beginning of the school year. In 2000, microbus operators announced that they would be issuing smart cards for students beginning in the 2001 school year, which would work with automated fare collection machines on the buses. The introduction of the automatic fare readers resulted in a considerable fare increase across the board in 2000. The main professional guild for the microbus owners, the Consejo Superior de Transporte Terrestre (CSTT, the Superior Council of Land Transport) overestimated its ability to produce and deliver the new magnetic cards. Along with severe delays in delivery for approximately 120,000 students’ cards (out of 420,000), students would later
discover that the CSTT had delivered several thousand cards that had the data of two students on them ("Estudiantes Secundarios: Estancado Conflicto por Pase Escolar" 2001). They had originally been printed with the name of one student, then another student’s data had been printed over the original printing. The students called these “raspe-passes,” or “scraped passes.” The CSTT originally charged students $1,500 pesos for the pass in 2000, then attempted to charge an additional $3,500 pesos in 2001 (El "Estudiantes Secundarios: Estancado Conflicto por Pase Escolar" 2001). This raised suspicions and accusations of corruption and graft. Students proposed paying another $2,250 for the pass, while the CSTT insisted on $4,570 pesos in total (El Mercurio 2001). The students expressed their concerns, loudly and repeatedly, to no avail. In late March of 2001, shortly after the school year started, they began to take action.

**The Paro and Subsequent Mobilization**

The first demonstration, on March 28, 2001, drew more than 200 students, who marched through the downtown area of Santiago, ending at the offices of the Ministry of Education, to protest the CSTT’s charging them an additional $3,500 pesos for the magnetic cards for which they had already paid $1,500 pesos during the previous year. The students also complained about the automatic fare collecting machines, saying they did not work with the new cards. If a student’s card did not work with an automatic fare collector on a bus, the bus driver would not permit the student to ride the bus. Frustrated by the CSTT charging them twice for the student transportation pass, and compounded by the length of time the government was taking to resolve the issues with the CSTT, the pingüinos took to the streets, in the hopes of pressuring both the government and the CSTT to find a
solution. The students marched for the following two days as well, with similar numbers, for the same reasons ("Pase Escolar: Problema Se Amplía a Buses Rurales." 2001).

The next mobilization would be the largest social mobilization in Chile since the end of the dictatorship in 1990. On April 3, 2001, the Youth Parliament called for a demonstration of a cultural character and a general strike/paralyzation for the following day, April 4th (Emol 2001). Announcing the demonstration for the following day, Daniel Manouchehri, president of the YP, “invited the young people to unite in a peaceful mobilization, of a cultural character and whose purpose will be to ‘demand the right to an education.’” (Emol 2001) Ten thousand students marched from Parque Forestal through downtown Santiago to the offices of the Ministry of Education. The turnout surprised both authorities and students. With this first major mobilization, the pingüinos began to form the ideological base that later student movements would use and build upon. In framing a free, quality education as a right that the state must protect and guarantee, the students rejected the market democracy model that was in place, along with the neoliberal reforms that had partially privatized the educational system in Chile. Their initial demands reflected this rejection, yet also concentrated on practical, everyday matters.

**Demands**

The pingüinos had several initial demands. First, they demanded that the student transportation pass be administered and distributed by the state. The Department of Education (MINEDUC) had administered the pass until 1982, when
the responsibility for the administration and delivery of the pass was given to the CSTT, a private entity ("Rebelión de las Mochilas: Quiénes Son los Escolares Que Sacuden Santiago" 2001). The students wanted the state to reassume responsibility for the administration and delivery of the pass, and they framed this demand as an obligation of the state, insisting that the state must serve as the guarantor of the right of access to a free and quality public education. The students argued that if pingüinos could not get to school in the first place, they could not receive an education, thus, they framed the issue of the school pass as part of an essential right to education that the government must guarantee and protect. Second, students wanted the student fare to be determined more by social, non-market criteria, in relation to the minimum wage, and they wanted it to be limited to one-third of the adult fare (it was one half of the adult fare at the time). Third, they demanded that the hours the pass could be used be extended to 10:30 PM Monday through Friday, and that the pass allow for Saturday use as well. Fourth, students insisted that those who had already paid the CSTT in 2000 for the 2001 pass not be charged again, or, if this demand were not met, that the students only be charged an additional $2,500, rather than the $3,500 the CSTT was demanding they pay (Cuadra 2012). Fifth, the pingüinos wanted the government to establish an 800 number that they could call in case of abuses, e.g., if a bus driver would not permit a student to ride the bus because the automatic fare collector didn’t recognize the card, etc. The sixth demand stipulated that the government should establish a mesa de trabajo (a working committee) to evaluate the current system of administration for the pass, on which student representatives would be included. Seventh, the students demanded that all late passes be delivered to
students who had paid for the pass, but had not received it ("Parlamento Juvenil Pretende Instalarse Como Fuerza Representative de los Escolares" 2001).

**Mobilization Continues; Interaction with Government Officials**

The massive march inspired an almost immediate reaction from and interaction with the government. The government contacted Daniel Manouchehri, president of the YP, and other student federation representatives for a meeting. In this meeting, which began in the early evening and continued until 1 AM, Manouchehri, the student representatives, the government, and the CSTT came to an agreement on terms, and Manouchehri and other student leaders signed on behalf of the students. The YP president negotiated an extended use of the pass, until 10:30 PM, Monday through Friday, and on Saturdays until 6 PM (the pass had previously not been valid for use on Saturdays at all). Students who paid for their cards in 2000 would be charged $2,500 pesos now, instead of $3,500, and the CSTT would deliver all late passes that had been paid for the prior year before April 30th. The student fare (applicable outside of the hours the school pass could be used) was maintained at 100 pesos. The government agreed to set up an 800 number that students could call in case of abuses, and to set up a *mesa de trabajo* (working committee) to investigate and evaluate the CSTT’s administration of the pass which would include student representatives ("Daniel Manouchehri, Presidente del Parlamento Juvenil: “Estamos Cansados de Ser el Ultimo Eslabón”" 2001). Because the primary cause of the mobilization had been the school pass, this was the subject addressed in the meeting, where students had four of their seven major demands met.

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Regarding student and government interaction and the response of the administration, the government’s reaction to the march was swift. Mariana Aylwin, the Minister of Education, rapidly summoned the student leaders to a meeting after the march, as noted above. Additionally, while the march was still happening, members of Congress were expressing their support and willingness to meet some of the students’ demands. A member of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, DC), Zarko Luksic, stated to the media at about noon, “that the Ministry of Education is ready to directly administer the school pass, that up to now was left in the hands of the bus entrepreneurs” (“Violentos INCIDENTES en Alameda Cometieron Liceanos por Pase Escolar” 2001). Other allies showed their support of this particular demand as well. Jorge Pavez, president of the Colegio de Profesores (Teachers’ College, the PK – 12 schoolteachers’ union), came to the march personally “to show his support for the students’ demands, which include” returning the school pass to be administered by the government (“Violentos INCIDENTES en Alameda Cometieron Liceanos por Pase Escolar” 2001).

However, despite the initial promising results of the mobilization, the agreement between the students, the CSTT, and the government infuriated students who were represented by ACES. Lucas Castro, a student leader, expressed the outrage of students over not being included in the negotiations and the YP assuming that it could speak for all of the students:

The Youth Parliament disregarded the authority of an assembly where we have secondary student federations from Puente Alto, La Florida, Macul, La Reina, Recoleta, Providencia, and Santiago Center. The position was not to pay anything and they negotiated
otherwise. The Youth Parliament is an organization dependent upon the State and we do not feel represented by them, the students do not even know those leaders. We feel betrayed and passed over. That is why the Liceo de Aplicación went on strike this morning ("Parlamento Juvenil Pretende Instalarse Como Fuerza Representative de los Escolares" 2001).

Indeed, the Liceo de Aplicación, a high school located in the comuna (municipality) of Santiago, completely rejected the agreement reached by the YP representatives. On the day following the massive mobilization, April 5th, 1500 students at Liceo de Aplicación held a protest against the agreement on the school grounds for two hours. Students at the high school rejected the agreement primarily on the grounds that the YP did not have the authority to represent them in the negotiations with the CSTT and the government. They also rejected paying for the pass, as the goal was to obtain the pass for free for 2001. Martín Lopendíaz, president of the school’s Student Center, told the newspaper La Segunda, "the Youth Parliament does not represent all secondary students and we will not pay the $2,500 pesos . . . We are in conversations to coordinate and request an interview with Minister Aylwin to discuss the issue." ("Aplicación Rechaza Acuerdo" 2001)

On the same day, both Minister Aylwin and the Minister of the Interior, José Miguel Insulza Salinas, signaled that they were willing to make policy changes as a result of the students’ demands. Speaking to El Mercurio, Minister Insulza noted that the government had reached agreements with the CSTT about the school pass in January of 2001 that stated that the CSTT must have fulfilled its commitments outlined in the agreements by April 30th. In the case of non-compliance, the government would remove the responsibility for administering and delivering the
school pass from the CSTT and take it on under the Ministry of Education. Insulza would meet with the leaders of the Youth Parliament the following day, in an attempt to reach a better agreement than the one signed with the CSTT on April 5th. For her part, Minister Aylwin expressed her opinion that the students had legitimate and just grievances, as they had paid for a pass in the previous year, 120,000 of which had not yet been delivered ("Pase Escolar Requisito: Ofensivos Violentos en Marcha del Secundarios" 2001). On the same day, more unexpected allies emerged as Insulza announced that the government was investigating the involvement of several mayors of different comunas around Santiago in the student protest. He stated that the mayors provided materials and transportation to some students to enable them to attend and participate in the mobilization ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Amplio Rechazo a Violencia Desatada por Secundarios" 2001). Additionally, the Mayor of Santiago, Joaquin Lavín, spoke out forcefully against the government as he bemoaned the cost of the damages caused by protesting students. Lavín told El Mercurio that the government had taken too long to address the problems with the school pass. He noted that the government ignored the conflict between the CSTT and the students for too long, which resulted in the protests and damages to Santiago Centro ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Amplio Rechazo a Violencia Desatada por Secundarios" 2001). Deputies from the Concertación ruling coalition also expressed support for the students, in very strong terms. El Mercurio writes, “Parliamentarians, with the exception of vandalism, said that the student mobilization was fully justified, while condemning the inefficiency with which the Higher Council of Land Transport (CSTT) has handled this situation, which they attribute as the main cause of the protests”
The students participating in ACES were not appeased by the show of solidarity from allies. On April 6, 2001, ACES announced that students would go *en paro* (on strike, completely taking over their school campuses) indefinitely, starting on April 9th, in protest of the current agreement, to demand a free pass and that the government take over the administration of the pass from the CSTT. Ten different high schools would participate in the strike, according to ACES spokespersons. Students from *Liceo de Aplicación*, along with students from a few other high schools, emphasized the announcement of the pending *paro* by staging a small protest in Alameda, the main thoroughfare in the downtown area, where the Ministry of Education’s offices are located. Approximately 700 students staged a protest, demanding a free pass and the assumption of the administration of the pass by the government ("Pase Escolar Requisito: Ofensivos Violentos en Marcha del Secundarios" 2001).

Government officials continued to indicate their willingness to reassume administration of the school pass and support for the students’ demands in that vein. The following day, April 7th, Carolina Tohá Morales, Undersecretary of the Government, stated that the current system was inefficient and must be modified. She noted that the working committee referred to in the agreement would begin work in May, and said that they wished to do in-depth and serious work together with the students on the school pass topic. "The Ministry of Education is willing to take responsibility for this, if the rights of the parties are better guaranteed in a
different system," said Tohá, signaling her support for the students’ cause ("Formulo Ministra de Educación a Secundarios; Llamado a “Ponerse de Acuerdo”. " 2001). While Tohá was communicating the government’s desire to work with the students, Minister Aylwin qualified the government’s support by reiterating that the students needed to decide who would represent them. The Minister indicated that she would like to sit down with them and talk before they go on strike, and that she would not negotiate with students who were on strike ("Formulo Ministra de Educación a Secundarios; Llamado a “Ponerse de Acuerdo”. " 2001), while at the same time insisting that there was no chance of obtaining a free student pass, "because in Chile that document has always been paid and this government will not make a change in that sense" ("Gobierno: No permitirán Más Desmanes Estudiantiles" 2001).

However, many government officials were doing their best to avoid a strike. While Minister Aylwin chose to go for the stick rather than the carrot in continually stating that she would not negotiate with students on strike and insisting that students designate official representatives, other authorities were negotiating with the students. In fact, government officials from the Ministry of Education spent a good part of Saturday, April 7th meeting with students in the offices of Alejandro Traverso, the Secretaria Regional Ministerial de Educación (Regional Ministerial Secretary of Education/SEREMI of Education), attempting to talk the students out of going on strike.

While officials were stating their support for the students’ demands and grievances, Deputy Waldo Mora expressed the discontent many other officials felt
with the students of the Youth Parliament. Mora noted that several deputies wanted to dissolve the YP as a result of the large demonstration in the prior week. He stated that they will investigate the role of the YP and carry out "an evaluation of what this body has meant" ("Gobierno: No permitirán Más Desmanes Estudiantiles" 2001). Perhaps due to this threat to disband the YP, its members decided not to support the call to strike, saying that the agreement they negotiated and signed was a good agreement, and while they still wanted the question of the administration of the pass to be addressed, they did not condone the strike and did not encourage any street protests ("En Región Metropolitana Paro de Estudiantes Desata Fuertes Críticas a Gobierno." 2001).

Simultaneously, another ally stepped to the forefront to publicly declare their support. The Asociación de los Centros de Padres y Apoderados del Región Metropolitano (The Parent and Guardian Centers and Representatives of the Metropolitan Region Association) stated publicly that they supported the students in a paro/strike. Representatives from the group went to the offices of the Ministry of Education to inform officials about their support for the students’ upcoming strike. The parents specified that they preferred a strike to public protests because they did not support the violence and property damage that is frequently the result of mobilization in public spaces. Parents insisted that the president himself, Ricardo Lagos, must directly intervene since the Ministry of Education did not have the legal power to resolve the conflict. "It is necessary that this abuse ends and that the school pass is administered by the State. It is not possible for children to negotiate this matter with the bus guild, since we are the ones who have to pay
for the school pass," said the president of the Entity, Ismael Calderón ("En Región Metropolitana Paro de Estudiantes Desata Fuertes Críticas a Gobierno." 2001). The parents' statements were foreshadowing of what would eventually be a very positive public opinion of the students' cause.

Despite the parents' association’s stated lack of support for mobilization in the streets, the students took to the streets to protest once again. On April 9th, lacking an agreement with government officials, ACES called for and organized another massive mobilization, as well as declaring an indefinite strike by the pingüinos. Approximately 3,500 to 5,000 students marched in the streets, starting with smaller groups at various points around the downtown area, later uniting, then breaking up into smaller groups after a while to thwart the interference of the carabineros, Chile's police force. The students showed impressive participation in the strike as well, with an average 80 percent absentee rate from the high schools in the comuna (municipality) of Santiago. Absentee rates at individual schools in Santiago ranged from 40 to 96 percent. A final count revealed that, out of 15,000 total high school students, only 2,963 attended on April 9th, a little over 19 percent ("Pase Escolar: Estudiantes Se Declaran en Paro Indefinido" 2001). Students demanded more than what the Youth Parliament had accomplished in their negotiations with the government, including: providing the student pass for free, that the Ministry take over administration of the pass and keep it out of the hands of private entities, and freezing the general student public transport fare at 100 pesos ("Pase Escolar: Estudiantes Se Declaran en Paro Indefinido" 2001). Students encountered different treatment from the carabineros during this mobilization, as
the police had attempted to interfere as little as possible during the first major march, due to the fact that the majority of the participants were minors. The police seemed to have no such hesitation or qualms this time, perhaps as a result of the significant property damage caused during the last march, and used force against the students, including *guanacos* (water trucks), tear gas, and beatings.

The government not only allowed a stronger response from the *carabineros* this time, but also signaled a tougher stance from the state itself. Regional Secretary of Education (SEREMI) Traverso noted that schools would likely lose government subsidies as a result of the strike, saying the municipality of Santiago might receive as much as 20 million pesos (about $30,000 USD) less per month for its schools, as the subsidies are based upon average attendance rates ("Pase Escolar: Estudiantes Se Declaran en Paro Indefinido" 2001). The Minister of Education echoed this warning, confirming that the government would follow the laws which allocated funds based upon attendance rates. Taking a hardline stance, Minister Aylwin definitively stated that the school pass would never be free, indicating her unwillingness to entertain one of the students’ primary demands. Stating that the pass has always been paid for by families, Aylwin flatly rejected this demand, while also stating her belief that the protests may be politically motivated by radicals from the Communist Youth, because of the violence ("Pase Escolar: Estudiantes Se Declaran en Paro Indefinido" 2001). Other government officials also took a more hardline stance as a result of the damages that students caused during the march. Jose Weinstein, the Subsecretary of Education, strongly condemned the damages and petty crime, prescribing “the urgent necessity to improve the civic education of our young people, so that they can differentiate that
it’s one thing to participate in manifestations and another to be part of vandalism and risky behavior.” ("Subsecretario Reprobó Actos de Pillaje de Algunos Escolar" 2001)

The following day, April 10th, saw mixed reactions from Congress and another protest. An estimated 1,500+ students (an “ample presence,” according to La Segunda) marched through the downtown area, again vandalizing some property and occasionally stealing from nearby stores and kiosks ("Subsecretario Reprobó Actos de Pillaje de Algunos Escolar” 2001). The president of the Chamber of Deputies announced that he would be meeting with leaders from the YP to investigate the recent violence that occurred during the demonstrations. A member of the far-right party UDI filed a complaint in Congress to start an investigation of the YP. Members of the Chamber of Deputies made statements indicating that it was not their intention to dissolve the Youth Parliament, but to remind them of their “true role,” which the deputies viewed as representing the youth of the country, rather than instigating demonstrations. Members did note that the leaders of the YP had made an effort to address the problems ("Parlameto Juvenil en la MIRA: Duras Críticas de Diputados; Cámara Revisará Sus Funciones" 2001).

Not all reactions in Congress were negative, however. Other members of Congress were officially signaling their support and allyship for the students. Three Christian Democratic deputies, Jaime Jiménez, Andrés Palma and Gabriel Ascencio, filed suit in court against the CSTT and the Chilean government, saying that they were responsible for the “crimes of fraud, misappropriation, and injury to the public faith on the topic of the school passes” ("Anuncian Querellas:
Deputy Jiménez said that the purpose of the suit is to “determine why the school pass passed into the hands of the private sector and where the money raised by this concept is.” ("Anuncian Querellas: Polémica de los Pases Escolares a la Justicia" 2001) The deputies noted that the entire process was severely lacking in transparency, and questioned the receipt of funds from the students into the personal bank accounts of two of the board members of the CSTT. The deputies confirmed that they strongly supported the students’ demonstrations ("Anuncian Querellas: Polémica de los Pases Escolares a la Justicia" 2001).

After the April 10th protest, SEREMI Traverso sent a proposal to the students via ACES. The pingüinos considered the proposal in an assembly on April 11th, and announced that evening that they were rejecting the proposal. Traverso had proposed giving free transportation passes to students whose families were in a difficult economic situation, with both parents unemployed. Students with one unemployed parent would receive a 50 percent subsidy, while those whose parents both had jobs would have to pay the remaining total in full, $2,500 pesos. The proposal was similar to solutions proposed by some municipalities in the area, including La Reina, Macul, and Santiago, which the students had also rejected. ACES continued to insist that the pass be free for all students, and the Ministry of Education reiterated that it would not negotiate with students that were actively striking ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Secundarios Llanman a Otra Protesta Hoy" 2001). Students announced another mobilization for April 12th, which took place in downtown Santiago with an unknown number of participants, and during which they delivered a letter to the presidential palace, La Moneda, for President Lagos.
The letter asked Lagos to take charge of the situation and stop delegating tasks to Minister Aylwin.

During April 12th and 13th, the students formulated a counterproposal for the SEREMI, and submitted it to an assembly of ACES for approval. They promised to continue the strike the following week if the proposal was not met with a positive response ("Transporte Colectivo: Secundarios Endurecen Exigencia de Pase Gratis" 2001). Many municipalities offered to fund the pass out of their own coffers, but students rejected these offers as they began their direct critiques of the neoliberal policies that created the transportation system. After an assembly, the students remarked,

The spokesperson of ACES and leader of Darío Salas, Lucas Castro, said that “we assembled for one hour and the decision was quite fast: continue the strike because the subsidy is not the solution we seek. With this money, the municipalities could improve the quality of education and infrastructure. It is outrageous that they delivered that money to the micreros [bus operators] to continue filling their pockets." ("Asambleas Matinales de Escolares Marcaban Tendencia de Rechazo a la Fórmula Lavín" 2001)

Thus, the students began to more specifically critique the transfer of government funds, meant to fund government institutions, to private businesses, as is common in neoliberal economics via systems such as school vouchers, etc. This theme would become central in the movement, frequently voiced alongside the claim that education is a right that the state has a duty to protect.

Minister Aylwin reacted to the rejection of the SEREMI’s proposal on April 13th, noting that winter holidays may be reduced if the students continued their strike. At the same time, she reiterated her willingness to work on a solution together with the students, saying, “We are available to make a work schedule, to
evaluate the current school pass administration system to find a system that is more transparent and reliable. Today there is no reliability in the system and here are two possibilities, we change it with students or without students, but we will have to change it anyway.” ("Ministra Aylwin no descarta “recorte” en vacaciones de invierno" 2001) With this approach, the Minister gave a bit of the carrot and the stick, offering to work with students if they gave up the strike, while implying that they will change the system without their input, if necessary. Aylwin would continue to stridently reiterate this position, that the students must be unified and must not be striking in order to negotiate, as the two main groups that represented students began to discuss their differences and ways to proceed. She echoed this sentiment again with the press as the students began discussing other changes they wished to see happen.

At this point, the protests and the strike had been going on for a little over a week, and the secondary students were beginning to realize that they could gain responses from the government. The students were starting to recognize their power as a collective, and they began to think about how they could achieve more and bigger changes. Victor Orellana elaborates,

[The Mochilazo] was not only the first mass demonstration, because in the 90s, late 90s, there were some mass demonstrations, but [that was] the old student movement, it [was] the old working-class movement, the old teacher’s movement. This is the first new movement. And people, normal people, embraced this movement as a representation of their discomfort, their critiques, not [of] democracy as a global thing, as an abstract thing, as an abstract concept, but [of] neoliberalism as a reality, as a concrete aspect. (Orellana 2014a)

Students recognized what Tarrow and Tilly call a “political opportunity,” that they had the perfect setting in order to demand more and deeper changes. It was at this
point that the YP and ACES began to have discussions about how they could unite and pursue the larger changes they wished to see happen. Leaders from the YP and spokespersons from ACES began telling the press about their plans for the future, which entailed plans for “the short term, [seeking] to put on the public agenda . . . issues such as discrimination in schools, the situation of pregnant students, and even the fee for the Academic Aptitude Test (PAA).” ("Tras Pase Escolar: Secundarios Ampliarán Sus Exigencias" 2001) The leaders and spokespeople told *El Mercurio* that they recognized that many students in the metropolitan area did not identify with either the *Parlamento Juvenil* or ACES. They spoke about the possibility of merging the YP and ACES to form a larger and more representative organization, noting that both sides would have to compromise in order for this to happen. During this interview, they articulated several new demands they wanted addressed, after they had resolved the issue of the school transportation pass to their satisfaction.

Among those demands were the fees for the *Prueba de Aptitud Académica* (Academic Aptitude Test, PAA), which were prohibitively expensive for many students, particularly those from lower economic strata. The students wanted to drastically reduce the fee for the test overall, ideally making it free of cost, which would remove an additional economic barrier for teens from the lower economic classes that wanted to attend university. They spoke of freedom of expression in school, and eliminating the discrimination some students faced in the schools because they chose to dye their hair, get piercings, or grow their hair long (for boys). They also noted that they wanted to rid schools of discrimination against their peers that became pregnant. At the time, pregnant students had to transfer
from their current school to a school specifically for pregnant girls. The students recognized the unjustness and discrimination inherent in this policy, and expressed the wish to eliminate it. They also expressed concern over an existing bill in Congress that sought to eliminate economic discrimination in schools, by requiring schools to supply students with requested or required documents at the end of the year, even if the students had not paid their educational fees. ("Tras Pase Escolar: Secundarios Ampliarán Sus Exigencias" 2001)

Minister Aylwin acknowledged the validity of these newly-expressed demands, noting that a commission of Ministry of Education personnel, students, officials from the municipalities, parents, and teachers had worked extensively on an analysis of discrimination in schools, and had a document ready to present. The presentation was delayed once the mobilization began. Aylwin repeated her desire that the students be unified, presenting one set of representatives in order to make negotiations simpler, and again demanded that they end the strike before she would be willing to negotiate. She noted that she was willing to set a “joint agenda” to work on and address these issues, given that the students returned to school. The students would thus be able to achieve a modification at the agenda stage of the policymaking process, if they agreed to end the strike and begin negotiating with the Ministry of Education. ("Tras Pase Escolar: Secundarios Ampliarán Sus Exigencias" 2001)

Students met in their respective schools on April 16th to consider ending the strike. Schools in the municipality of Santiago would also consider a proposal given to them by the Mayor of Santiago, Joaquin Lavín, which proposed that the Municipality of Santiago would subsidize $1,500 pesos of the $2,500 additional
cost, leaving the students to pay $1,000 pesos each. Twenty-two additional comunas submitted similar proposals to the students for their consideration. Families with economic hardships would have their students’ passes subsidized completely. While students agreed to consider the proposal, many expressed the idea that the solution was problematic, as it only addressed the comuna of Santiago, and the idea of the protest was to achieve change for all of the students, not simply for students in one’s own community. ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Alumnos Evaluarán Propuesta de Lavín" 2001) The students rejected the proposals in their assemblies, called to continue the strike, and decided on a mobilization in the streets the next day.

Students rejected the proposals of the various mayors on the grounds that accepting subsidies for the pass from the municipalities would simply transfer the blame from the CSTT (the microbuseros’ union) to the state. Students expanded upon the rejection, explicitly stating it would be unjust to force the state to take the responsibility, when the fault lay with a private entity, a definitively anti-neoliberal statement. After the proposals were rejected via votes in the assemblies, students planned for a full day of protest on April 17th. Beginning at 8:30 in the morning, students would engage in peaceful protests at their respective high schools. At 6:00 pm, students would proceed to Parque Almagro, where they would hold a “massive cultural event,” which would include music and bands, speeches, and other types of cultural activities. ("Pase Escolar: Alumnos Salen A Otra Protesta" 2001) The pingüinos began the day with the protests at their individual schools, and groups of varying sizes engaged in protests and vandalism throughout the metropolitan area. Students had “sit-ins” in the streets, protested in various parks
and in the main thoroughfare, Alameda, burned tires and attacked automatic
collectors on buses. The day of protest finished in Parque Almagro, where the
students held a successful cultural event, with ten different rock bands playing.
Attendance at various events during the day and the cultural event was estimated
to be approximately 5,000, with 160 arrests made for various acts of vandalism.
("Vicepresidente de la República: El Gobierno Descarta Pase Escolar Gratuito"
2001b) Both students and government officials were surprised by the large
numbers of attendees, again demonstrating the power of ACES to mobilize the
student population.

During the cultural event, spokespersons for ACES advanced two new
demands, that the microbusero guild return the money they collected the prior
year for the 2001 passes, and that President Lagos negotiate with them directly,
bypassing the Minister of Education, Mariana Aylwin. Students were angered by
Aylwin’s statements about the impossibility of providing a free pass, and wished to
negotiate directly with the president as a result. Government responses that day
were varied. The Minister of the Interior (equivalent in rank to a Vice President),
José Miguel Insulza, commented extensively to the media, saying that the students
would not be granted the transportation pass for free because many people their
age that are not students, but work for a living, do not receive the benefit of a
reduced fare, even, but have to pay the full fare to travel to their jobs. In this
comment, he framed education as an opportunity, rather than a right, saying,
"There are many young people in this country that don’t go to school, and I don’t
see why you should continue giving a super special deal for those who have the
opportunity to study, above those who are employed as laborers, domestics, and
sellers, who pay 280 pesos per day by going to their jobs." ("Vicepresidente de la República: El Gobierno Descarta Pase Escolar Gratuito" 2001b) Insulza predicted that the conflict would continue until the students reexamined and accepted the invitation from the government to take part in a mesa de diálogo (a working committee) to examine options for the school pass on a permanent basis in the future. He acknowledged that the current system was not working, and that the government was willing to take back the responsibility of administering the pass. ("Vicepresidente de la República: El Gobierno Descarta Pase Escolar Gratuito" 2001b) The General Secretary of the Communist Party, Gladys Marin, met with Mariana Aylwin, to express her support for the students and their demands, and to deny that the Communist Party was exercising any influence over the students, as Aylwin had previously claimed. ("Vicepresidente de la República: El Gobierno Descarta Pase Escolar Gratuito" 2001b) Aylwin would make an announcement the following afternoon regarding one of the students’ main demands.

On April 18th, 2001, the Minister announced that the state would assume the responsibility for administering the student transportation pass, beginning in 2002, over the strong objections of the CSTT. She also called the first meeting of the mesa de diálogo to discuss the future of the transportation pass. Invited were representatives from the CSTT and the Ministries of Education and Transport, officials from the different municipalities, parliamentarians, heads of parents’ organizations, the teachers’ union, representatives from semi-private and fully private schools, student organizations, and ACES. After extending the invitation, Minister Aylwin specified that the representatives of ACES would not be allowed in the meeting if they did not decide to end the mobilization. In response, the
representative from the teachers’ union left the meeting. The representatives from the various university student organizations also withdrew from the meeting, in part because they were told only one person could attend to represent them all, and partially in solidarity with ACES. ("Conflicto Estudiantil: Estado Vuelve a Administrar Pase Escolar a Partir de 2002" 2001)

On the same day, students discovered yet another issue with the transportation passes. Both university and high school students realized that there was another photo beneath their photo on their passes. When they scraped off the top layer with a coin, it revealed the data of a completely different student on a card from the 2000 school year, indicating possible fraud. ("Pases Escolares Reciclables: Microbuseros Dieron Credenciales Reimpresas" 2001) Now the students had several legitimate complaints against the CSTT: additional, unexpectedly higher charges for the pass; late or no delivery of passes; money for the passes being collected and deposited into the private accounts of two of the officers of the CSTT; and what appeared to be passes recycled from the previous school year. The CSTT strenuously objected to the government’s statements that it would resume administration of the pass for the following school year, saying that they had a contract through the following year to administer the pass, threatening legal action against the government, and claiming that the state should not interfere in the affairs of a private business, a strong neoliberal argument. ("Nueva Protesta Callejera: Universitarios Se Suman Al Conflicto por Pases" 2001)

The Undersecretary of the Ministry of Transportation, Patricio Tombolini, said that the Ministry expected to file formal denunciations in court to initiate an investigation into the CSTT’s responsibilities. Tombolini also defended the
government’s decision to reassume administration of the pass, stating, in a reflection of the students’ arguments, "We will have to discuss if the school fare is a benefit or a right. And if it is a right, we must see how Chilean society is going to finance this pass." ("Nueva Protesta Callejera: Universitarios Se Suman Al Conflicto por Pases" 2001) Minister Aylwin echoed the intention to file a complaint in court that day to spur an investigation into the actions of the CSTT with the recycled passes, stating, after a meeting with Insulza and Tombolini, that the government would file a complaint to prompt the courts to investigate if the situation constituted fraud, as the students paid for and believed they were receiving new passes. Aylwin stated that she felt personally “swindled, deceived,” because the CSTT stated several false rationalizations for the late/lack of delivery of passes ("Ministra AYLWIN: “Me Siento Engañada y Estafada” por los Pases Escolares Reciclados" 2001).

In response to the new charges of fraud with the recycled passes, ACES announced another mobilization for April 20th, a demonstration to take place in three major plazas in the downtown area. They would be joined by university students in solidarity. ACES assembled in between 1,500 and 3,500 protesters at different times during the day. The mobilization included allies, such as university student organizations, and even mayors of various municipalities in the Santiago Metropolitan Region who came to show their support. ("CLIMA DE PROTESTAS CIUDADANAS: Hasta los Alcaldes Están Saliendo a Desfilar" 2001) Minister Aylwin met with students on April 22nd to discuss how to end the conflict and the strike. During the meeting, the Minister offered to create a monitoring commission that would include all actors (students, government officials, microbusero
operators, and parliamentarians) to oversee the process of delivering the transportation pass. Aylwin also discussed how to refund money to students who paid for their pass twice, although the mechanics of how exactly this could be accomplished were not settled. ("SE ACABA EL PARO: Microbuseros Darán Pase Gratis a Escolares Que Los Recibieron Atrasado" 2001)

Students met in assemblies on April 21st, and spokesperson Loreto Solís spoke with the press afterwards, saying that there was a 50/50 chance the students would end the strike and return to classes on the following Tuesday. Solís stated that the end of the conflict would depend on the establishment of a real mesa de trabajo, in which academics, secondary students, teachers, attorneys, and authorities would participate in order to agree upon the changes needed to ensure a transparent administration process for the pass and regularization of the process. ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: El Martes Volverían a Clases Alumnos en Paro" 2001)

The Youth Parliament called for a referendum for April 23rd to discuss the terms for ending the conflict and returning to classes, but Solís said that ACES would hold their own referendum, declaring that "[the YP’s] referendum is not democratic and if we participate, we would be legitimizing Youth Parliament. We are the ones who have raised the real demands of the students." Solís stated that ACES would hold a referendum the following Monday to determine whether the students would resume classes. ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: El Martes Volverían a Clases Alumnos en Paro" 2001) The public signals of a willingness to negotiate on the part of ACES spurred action not only from government officials, but from the CSTT as well. Having endured significant public and private criticism, the CSTT was under pressure to resolve the conflict quickly.
Reflecting the public criticism and disapproval of its handling of the conflict, the CSTT held its biannual election on April 21st. Demetrio Marinakis, the embattled president of the guild, was handily defeated by Juan Pinto, a teacher and bus owner who ran for the office on a platform of ending the student conflict, improving service to the community, and switching the pay scheme for drivers from a purely commission/per ticket remuneration to a base salary plus commission ("Juan Pinto es el Nuevo Presidente de los Micreros" 2001). Pinto arranged a meeting with student representatives of the ACES and some Deputies from Congress for April 23rd. During the meeting, Pinto offered to provide the pass free of charge to all students who received the pass late, and to exchange all of the recycled passes, saying the guild would assume all associated costs. Students reacted positively to Pinto’s willingness to compromise and attempts to rectify the errors made by the CSTT. Pinto and other guild representatives proceeded to meet with authorities from the Ministries of Transport and Education in order to fine-tune a proposal to submit to the students for review. ("SE ACABA EL PARO: Microbuseros Darán Pase Gratis a Escolares Que Los Recibieron Atrasado" 2001)

Pinto’s approach garnered favor with the students, who voted in an ACES assembly on April 24th to accept the new agreement proposed by the CSTT and the government. The agreement stipulated that students would pay a second charge of $2500 pesos instead of the initial $3500; the situations of students who had already paid the higher fee would be resolved on a case-by-case basis in the mesa de diálogo; recycled passes would be replaced free of charge; and 70,000 passes that had been delivered late, after the August 1, 2000 deadline would be free of charge. Minister Aylwin said that the mesa de diálogo would resume on Friday,
with the participation of ACES. ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Secundarios Aceptaron Retornar Hoy a Clases" 2001) Students agreed to put the strike on hold and return to classes the following day.

While ACES voted in assembly to ratify the agreement, seven of the “emblematic” high schools in Santiago Centro rejected the agreement, stating that they were hoping to obtain a free pass for all students. Students in these schools agreed to return to class, but claimed they would remain “in a state of alert” until the following week, with the hopes of achieving a final agreement. ("Propuesta Micrera No Satisface a Liceos Históricos" 2001) While the majority of the emblematic high schools attended classes, two continued to have high percentages of absent students. These two high schools, the Instituto Nacional and the Liceo de Aplicación, met with officials from the municipality of Santiago to sign an agreement in which the municipality would subsidize the cost of the passes for the 16 high schools under its administration. ("CONFLICTO DEL PASE ESCOLAR: Mejoran las Perspectivas para la Normalización de Clases" 2001) After the agreement was signed with the municipal officials, students at the emblematic schools also returned to classes.

**Negotiations and End of the Conflict**

Students attended class normally, while waiting to engage in the *mesa de diálogo* with government officials, representatives from the *microbusero* guild, university students, parents, and teachers. The goal of the *mesa* was to agree upon a transparent, normalized process for the administration of the passes in 2002. The *pingüinos* continued to press for free passes for all students, a demand that was continually denied by both government officials and representatives of the bus
operators’ guild. Things were quiet for about a week, when the spokespersons of
ACES began talking to the press again, saying that the government was stalling on
beginning the *mesa de diálogo*, and that not even the promises made in the initial
agreement with the Youth Parliament had been adhered to. ("Conflicto por Pase
Escolar: ACES Amenaza Reanudar Paro" 2001) Student spokespersons informed
the press that they were ready to mobilize again, if the authorities and the CSTT
did not display a willingness to adhere to the prior established agreements.

While students were meeting with government officials and CSTT officers
and attempting to iron out details at that time, decisions were made as to which
official would handle different matters. The regional education secretary, or
SEREMI, of the Santiago Metropolitan Region, Alejandro Traverso, would head up
the negotiations and resolution to the issue of the 2001 pass, while the
Undersecretary of Education, Jose Weinstein, would lead the committee
investigating how to proceed with the 2002 pass. After an initial meeting with
Weinstein, it was agreed that both the students and the government would bring
proposals to the next meeting, in two weeks’ time, addressing five topics: the
characteristics of the pass, the administration of the pass, the population group
impacted, the fare rate, the hours the pass can be used, and the current passes.
Weinstein promised to address all of these issues with the student groups,
secondary and university, at the following meeting. ("Estudiantes Secundarios:
Estancado Conflicto por Pase Escolar" 2001) Despite the progress of the committee
addressing the 2002 pass, the *mesa de trabajo* for the 2001 pass to be headed by
Traverso had not materialized, and the students were agitated.
When the *mesa* had been scheduled after many postponements, but not convened, by May 11th, ACES took action, engaging in a small demonstration downtown, as a warning to the government. Approximately 200 student leaders gathered downtown in the afternoon, forming a caravan, and demonstrated in various parts of the historic center of Santiago. The student leaders demanded that the *mesa* actually convene the following Tuesday, May 15th, as scheduled, and not be postponed again. The students tempered their demands slightly, saying that if officials and the CSTT agreed to give 70% of the students free passes to compensate for the difficulties that year, they would be satisfied. If this demand were not met, the students would resume mobilization that week. Loreta Solís stated that the demonstration was a “warning,” to let the government know that the students were still paying attention, and still had the power to mobilize quickly. ("Pase Escolar: ACES Realizó Protesta de “Advertencia”" 2001)

Traverso did convene the *mesa* on May 15th, and the CSTT offered more free passes. The students took the offer back to their assemblies for a vote, and the agreement was approved and finalized on May 18th. Thus, the conflict was ended, although the strike had officially terminated on April 24th, 19 days after it had started. The final agreement contained the following stipulations:

1. All students who wished to exchange double-printed passes (passes with the data of two students) were able to do so before June 30, 2001 in the offices of the CSTT.
2. The CSTT offered passes delivered after the first of August of 2000 (81,000 passes) gratis.
3. The Ministry of Education would arbitrate the measures for increasing the number of free passes, making arrangements with the pass holders and the CSTT. The goal was to increase the number of free passes by 30,000.
4. The final goal was 111,000 free passes in the future, a figure accepted by students to end the conflict, although the Ministry of Education promised to make an additional effort to provide more free passes.

5. Under these conditions, students promised to make up all classes lost due to the strike.

6. The hours for using the school pass were to be extended: weekdays until 10:30 PM and on Saturdays until 6:00 PM. The charge to refill the pass for the year would be $2,500.

7. Finally, compliance with these agreements was to be fulfilled by June 30, 2001, when the involved parties will evaluate compliance. (A.C.d.S. ACES 2001b)

Thus, the students were not only able to hold the government and the CSTT to the stipulations of the original agreement with the Youth Parliament, but they were also able to add additional points to the final agreement. The principal demand of the students, that the school pass should not be administered by private businesses, but by the government, as part of guaranteeing the right to education, was acknowledged and met by the state, adding credibility to the students’ anti-neoliberal argument. The Chilean government agreed to take back the administration of the school pass for the 2002 school year, despite threats by the CSTT to sue the government, again validating anti-neoliberal complaints. The other initial demands of the students were:

1. Student fares for public transportation should be determined by social and non-market criteria, in relation to the minimum wage.

2. The student fare should be limited to one-third of the adult fare (At the time, it was one half of the adult fare).

3. There should be no additional charges in 2001 for those students that paid for their passes in 2000.

4. The state should establish an 800 number for complaints about abuses by bus drivers and problems encountered when attempting to use the school pass.
5. The hours the pass can be used should be extended until 10:30 PM on weekdays, and should include use on Saturdays as well.

6. The pass should be completely free for all students.

As the strike progressed, the students added or modified demands, including asking for a lower charge for the new card, $2500 pesos instead of the initial $3500 demanded by the CSTT. They also demanded that students who had paid the full amount the CSTT asked for and students who had received their passes late be given their passes for free. Once the recycled passes were discovered, they demanded that students who received recycled passes also receive their passes for free.

During the negotiations for the final agreement, students compromised on a few demands. The goal of free passes for all students was not achieved, however, students won significant amounts of free passes. The CSTT agreed to provide all passes that were delivered late, a total of 81,000, for free in 2001. Students asked for an additional 115,000 free passes when it was clear that the state would not grant free passes for all students. This amount would ensure that the most economically vulnerable students would be covered with the provision of free passes. The CSTT balked at the 115,000 number, but eventually agreed to provide 111,000 additional free passes. The Ministry of Education promised to work towards an eventual goal of 141,000 free passes in total. The *microbusero* guild was unwilling to provide the students who had received recycled passes with free passes, but they agreed to allow students with recycled passes to exchange their passes for new ones at no additional cost. All of the students’ demands over times when the pass could be used were met.
Analysis and Conclusions

With their mobilization, the students of 2001’s Mochilazo broke the “culture of fear” that had existed since the dictatorship. While there were smatterings of protests during the 1990s, most notably in 1997 at the University of Santiago, there were no sustained mobilizations like the Mochilazo. Prior mobilization since the end of the dictatorship had been sparse and brief, while important, and there was still evidence of the culture of fear amongst these older students. The pingüinos, the first generation born after the end of Pinochet’s rule, overcame the prior restraint their parents and prior generations had about protesting, as they did not have the same psychological scars that those who had lived through the dictatorship had. Free of the fear of brutal repression and reprisal, the students boldly marched and took over their schools, thus ushering in a new, more open era in Chilean politics and social mobilization. In so doing, they also established a strong collective identity, la generación sin miedo (the fearless generation) and hijos de la democracia (the children of democracy) (Cummings 2015).

The most important effect of the Mochilazo was the establishment of a new form of student organization, ACES. Students developed an organization that, while not perfect, proved to be much more representative than any type of organization they had in the past. Its horizontal structure was cumbersome at times, and some students disagreed that there were no real “leaders,” as many of the spokespersons or more active members came to be seen as leaders of the organization and the movement. Alexis Cortés Morales, a participant in the Mochilazo, elaborates:
. . . we cared about the organizational logic of the ACES because we found that it was very spontaneous, [but] the assembly logic that sought horizontality in general left few control mechanisms over the spokespersons, of course one could say, ‘we are in the assembly, we are all the same’, but the truth is that those who founded the ACES were the ones who had the lead. Then, how do you dismiss a leader who has not been elected but who has consecrated himself as [a leader]? One cannot challenge the trajectory. [You can’t] say, well, this person should not be the leader, you couldn’t say that because the discourse was that there were no leaders . . . ¹

The lack of official leaders made it difficult to engage in negotiations with government officials, as the Minister of Education continually insisted that they must select their representatives, refusing to negotiate with all of the spokespersons of ACES. Conversely, the new form of organization guaranteed better representation of students’ needs and wants, and an improved ability to mobilize students to make demands of the government and educational establishments. ACES made good use of their newfound strength in convoking marches and protests, celebrating the new era of social mobilization.

With this new era came a redefinition of the relationship between political parties and student organizations. The secondary students that formed ACES recognized the importance of divorcing themselves from the influence of political parties, as many of the then-existing organizations were heavily influenced by parties. As a result, ACES was envisioned as an influence-free zone, and every meeting and protest led by ACES strictly forbade advocating for specific political parties or candidates. In this manner, students maintained their agency and

¹ Interview with Alexis Cortés Morales and Julio Reyes Ávila by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, December 21, 2017.
independence, free of the influence of political parties. This allowed students to fully discuss issues in an atmosphere with diverse ideological viewpoints.

Perhaps it was the input of a variety of ideologies that helped the students to eventually develop what became an anti-neoliberal discourse. Initially, there was the barest hint of this bent, in that the students framed education as a right, and argued that the state should not contract out the administration of the school pass, because in order to utilize their right to education, students had to be able to travel to school. Thus, they began to develop a discourse that would eventually become anti-neoliberal in character, a discourse that would provide the base for later mobilizations to build and expand upon. Indeed, the strong framing of education as a right and the beginnings of anti-neoliberal claims and sentiments provided a strong foundation for the 2006 Revolución Pingüina and the 2011 Invierno Chileno. The importance of this cannot be overstated, as this impact is frequently overlooked or downplayed by scholars (Elacqua 2012; Bulow and Ponte 2015; Pousadela 2013a). The Mochilazo provided the foundation for the expansion of claims and mobilization by the student movement in later years. It also provided evidence that students could effect change via mobilization and negotiation.

In that vein, the 19-day-long mobilization certainly effected change, according to Kolb’s framework. Kolb outlines five major areas in which movements can effect substantive political outcomes: 1. Agenda Impact – effects on policy agendas; 2. Alternatives Impact – effects on the content of policy proposals; 3. Policy Impact – effects such as the adoption of laws or other “binding political decisions”; 4. Implementation Impact – having an influence in slowing, speeding
up, or stopping the implementation of policies; and 5. Goods Impact – effects that influence the distribution of collective or public goods (Kolb 2007). The Mochilazo had effects in all five areas, which will be explained below.

First, the students had a large impact on the policy agenda. They forced the issue of the school pass to the top of the priority list for the Lagos administration. Because of the continued pressure of the strike and the protests, the students were able to force the Ministries of Education, Transport, and the Interior to pay immediate attention to their demands, and to elevate the subject of the school pass to the top of the agenda. By maintaining pressure throughout their sustained mobilization campaign, they were able to keep the issue of the pass at the top of the policy agenda and in public discourse. There it remained until the final agreement between the government, the CSTT, and the students was reached.

Second, students also had an effect in the area of alternatives impact. They were able to force modifications of the contents of policy proposals. They ensured that their demands were incorporated into the administration of the pass, by forcing the state to take over administration of the pass, and the regulations about the use of the pass.

Third, students had a large effect in the area of implementation impact. They had a noticeable influence on speeding up the implementation of policy, forcing the government to action before it had preferred to act. They stopped a policy, in essence, when they forced the government to administer the pass again, as the government took the power to administer the pass away from the CSTT and
resumed it itself. The government was forced, on several occasions, to take action earlier than it had planned, due to protests.

Fourth, the students definitely had an impact on the distribution of public goods. They obtained many more free passes for students, affecting the distribution of public funds towards students in lower-income families. The students in the comauna of Santiago obtained subsidies from the municipality to cover all students’ passes. Additionally, when the government assumed administration of the pass in 2002, the price was lowered substantially, from the $5000 the CSTT charged in 2001 to $1500 in 2002. Thus, the government was able to subsidize the production and administration of the pass, redistributing public goods by allocating the funds to reduce the price of the pass for students.

Kolb specifies five causal mechanisms for political change: 1. Disruption Mechanism – social movements have the power to cause change because of their power to cause disruption in the day-to-day functioning of institutions and people’s daily lives; 2. Public Preference Mechanism – If a social movement can convince the public of the justness of their cause, elites are more likely to respond. Movements activate this mechanism by informing elites of new or changed public opinion (signaling); 3. Political Access Mechanism – a two-step process for change, the first step is gaining access to a specific political domain and the second is attempting to effect change from within that domain; 4. Judicial Mechanism – using judicial decisions to effect change; and 5. International Politics Mechanism – involves putting international pressure on a state to spur change.
During the *Mochilazo*, the students achieved changes by using the disruption mechanism, the public preference mechanism, and the political access mechanism. The sustained strike/paro, combined with many marches and demonstrations succeeded in disrupting the functioning of educational institutions and the ministries that needed to interrupt other work to address the students’ demands. Kolb notes that the degree of change that can be achieved depends on three factors with this mechanism: 1. The more crucial the institution that is being disrupted is to people’s everyday lives, the greater the effect will be; 2. Whether people affected by the disturbance are able to bargain with resources; and 3. Whether mobilizers can protect themselves from retaliation (Kolb 2007). The largest disruption was the strike itself.

When high school students go on strike, they not only disrupt the normal operation of the educational institutions, but people’s everyday lives as well. First, students not attending classes are generally free to roam the streets and possibly cause trouble during the day. They add to congestion in the public transportation system and hence make morning and evening commutes more difficult for workers. Parents of secondary students must arrange for child care, an additional expense and task. The state is affected as well, in that it must keep the schools open for the students who do attend. Thus, the state is paying the salaries of professors, administrators, janitors, etc., as well as utilities for the schools, for a small percentage of students. Because the Ministry of Education distributes funding to schools based upon attendance, the schools lose a lot of funding when large amounts of students are absent. Officials estimated that the *comuna* of Santiago
alone lost approximately twenty million pesos, about $33,000 U.S. dollars, per day due to absences. Finally, lost classes have to be made up, and the schools must negotiate payment with the teachers for their additional work to recoup the lost classes. Therefore, the financial impact is considerable, not to mention the smaller impacts it has on the daily lives of parents and residents of the city in general.

In large part, the pingüinos were able to protect themselves from retaliation. During the first large march, the carabineros, Chile’s police force, kept a good distance and did not respond unless they saw severe acts of vandalism occurring. The police were well aware that the majority of participants in the march were underage, and they adjusted their normal tactics accordingly, taking an extremely cautious approach. As the mobilization continued, the carabineros took a less reserved approach, which quickly backfired. In general, the public does not like the inevitable acts of vandalism that accompany student protests. Groups of encapuchados (students that wear hoodies and bandanas to cover their faces) come out during marches and protests to engage in a variety of illegal activities, mostly vandalism and theft. These acts meet with strong disapproval and condemnation from the public, however, using harsh repressive tactics with underage children turned out to be a greater concern for Chileans. The police and the administration were heavily criticized for using crowd control techniques such as the deployment of tear gas or the use of water trucks (guanacos) against the underage students. As a result, the police scaled back their responses, generally opting to attempt to contain and corral the students, rather than using techniques more commonly used for crowd dispersion. Hence, the students were able to
effectively utilize public opinion to protect themselves from retaliation and repression.

Students used the public preference mechanism quite effectively as well. As noted above, they were able to utilize public opinion to provide themselves with some protection from the police during marches and demonstrations. However, they were also able to employ public opinion and allies to support their demands about the pass during the entire strike. The students were very publicly supported by parents’ organizations, university students and their organizations, teachers’ unions, workers’ unions (including the main workers’ union, CUT), and others. Prominent deputies in Congress, mayors of municipalities, and other government officials publicly expressed support for the students. Minister Aylwin was even quoted several times, saying that she believed the students’ cause was fair and just. Public opinion was favorable, as the majority of people thought that the students’ cause was just, and agreed that students whose families were having economic hardships should receive the pass for a greatly reduced or free price. Events during the strike increased the favorability of public opinion, such as the discovery of the recycled passes. Students were able to utilize this, communicating to elites that they had the support of all of these allies and public opinion in general.

Similarly, the judicial mechanism was used during the strike. However, the students did not utilize it, the government did, on their behalf. Three deputies from Congress filed against the CSTT in court over the irregularities in the money collected for the passes and the recycled passes. The Lagos administration also filed a request for a judicial investigation of the recycled passes. Thus, the judicial
mechanism was indirectly used, as the students did not file in the courts directly, but at least two filings were made on their behalf.

Many scholars have dismissed the *Mochilazo* as irrelevant or unimportant because the students did not achieve their main aim of a free school transportation pass for all students. Frequently, studies about the largest cycles of mobilization in the 21st century simply omit the *Mochilazo*. However, this view is short-sighted and neglects to account for the many changes the students did achieve. The government and the CSTT met a majority of the students’ demands, and negotiated compromises on the rest. In great part, the changes fall under the umbrella of procedural change, which encompasses how the government deals with a particular social movement. Kolb says this is the least durable type of change, but notes that changes in this area can set the stage for future impact or for more substantive institutional change in the future. I argue that the *pingüinos* not only achieved the majority of their goals, but also established themselves as a powerful social actor in the eyes of the government, setting the stage for future cycles. With the strike and protests, the high schoolers were able to prove that they were a force to be reckoned with. This conditioned the government to be more willing to address their problems in a timely manner in the future, as well as to listen to and negotiate with secondary students in the future. Some of these effects will be seen in the following examination of the 2006 secondary student mobilization. However, students achieved change in other areas as well.

Students also achieved intra-institutional change as well. Kolb notes that this is change in the purpose or formal structure of an institution or sub-
institution. As it resumed administering the school pass, the Ministry of Education had to make small changes to its internal structure to accommodate the administration of the pass. Employees had to be assigned to do the work for the pass, processes for its creation and administration had to be established, etc. The Ministry of Education had not handled the pass itself since the early 1980s, so significant procedural changes had to occur in order for the government to take on these duties once again. While these are not enormous changes, they are institutional changes, and are therefore more durable. Kolb notes that intra-institutional changes are harder to reverse once they are implemented. These changes are made more substantive by some path dependency: once the changes are made, they are difficult to reverse, thus we see evidence of path dependency, following the trajectory of the initial changes. In this case, the Ministry of Education was much more likely to keep the duty of administering the student pass once it took it back from the CSTT.

In sum, I argue that the effects and impact of the Mochilazo have been underestimated by some scholars, who have concentrated on analyzing the 2006 and 2011 cycles of mobilization, simply leaving 2001 out. One of the most important impacts the students had was to begin demolishing the existing culture of fear, an artifact from the dictatorship. The mobilization of 2001 was the largest and longest sustained mobilization since the end of Pinochet’s rule, and it had a very important collective psychological effect on the population. While it did not immediately eliminate the culture of fear, it greatly reduced the hold it had on the public in general. Social mobilization began to increase rapidly after the
Mochilazo. People were less afraid of reprisals and repression, and began to organize and mobilize more. In this manner, the students had an impact not only on the two following large mobilizations of 2006 and 2011, but on Chilean society as a whole. This impact cannot be stressed enough, it is enormously important.

Another important impact is the creation of ACES and the concept of a new form of organization for students. The horizontal, democratically-oriented structure of ACES had a large impact on students then and in successive years. The development of a uniquely structured organization that could more fully represent their interests was crucial for the pingüinos. With the creation of ACES, the students provided themselves with greater agency and, in particular, independence. The construction of ACES allowed the students to divorce themselves from the substantial influence the political parties had on existing student organizations. Thus, the high schoolers created a space free of overwhelming adult political influence, a space where they could freely discuss their own ideas and demands, irrespective of personal ideologies. This impact was crucial for the accurate representation of the students: assemblies and collective decision-making ensured that the voices of all of the students were heard and represented. The students shaped the trajectory of future mobilization and representation with ACES, ensuring that, as long as the organization existed in the same or a similar form, they would be well represented and would mobilize over the issues most important to them, versus issues that political parties wanted them to mobilize about. The impact of the increased representation and independence can be seen in ACES to the present day.
Additionally, the students began to formulate some of the arguments against the neoliberal system that had been established under Pinochet. The movement made good use of framing, which would help to shape public debate in the area of education for years to come. This would have a grand impact in the future, particularly for the following two large student mobilizations in 2006 and 2011. Particularly effective was the argument that education is a right, and thus, the state protecting and administering the transportation pass was crucial, as a means to guarantee that students could take advantage of the right to education. The criticism of giving state funds to a private entity (the CSTT) to administer the pass was the very beginning of the neoliberal critique that would develop and explode in future social movements. These and preceding ideas will be explored further in the chapters on the Revolución Pinguina of 2006, the Invierno Chileno of 2011, and the conclusion.
Chapter 5: The Second Major Cycle of Mobilization Post-Dictatorship: The Revolución Pingüina

Introduction

While the Mochilazo demonstrated the power of the secondary students to gain concessions and policy reform from the government, as well as establishing an ideological base for successive movements, the Revolución Pingüina would demonstrate how much the power of the secondary students had grown in all of these aspects. Using the horizontally-based organization they had established in 2000, the Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students, ACES), high schoolers convoked what would eventually become a nationwide movement against the existing education law, the Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza (Organic Constitutional Law of Teaching, LOCE). The Bachelet administration sent a bill to Congress in 2007 which became the Ley General de Educación (General Education Law, LGE). The pingüinos had learned much from prior mobilizations, such as the Mochilazo. They used the knowledge gained from prior mobilizations and cycles of mobilization both to increase the number of participants in protest events and to gain additional concessions from the government.

Students began the Mochilazo with demands for public transport fees, but the demands gradually escalated, and as noted in the previous chapter, eventually included the beginning critiques of the neoliberal economic system itself, as well as the framing of education as a right to which all citizens were entitled. The
pingüinos of 2001 established the foundation for the pingüinos of 2006, by creating a novel student organization that helped them to mobilize students more rapidly and effectively, by framing education as a basic right, by insisting that the state had an obligation to protect that right, and by organizing and engaging in the largest sustained mobilization in the post-dictatorship period up to that year. The introduction of a larger frame of demands paved the way for both the 2006 and 2011 cycles of mobilization, each of which heavily criticized and challenged the educational system (which is based upon neoliberal economic principles) and emphasized the right to an education for all citizens.

This chapter examines the impact and effects the Revolución Pingüina had in Chile, guided by the following research questions: What prompted the mobilization of the pingüinos in 2006? How many and which of the students' demands were met? What effects did they have on laws, policies, and political institutions as a result of their sustained mobilization? I argue that the 2006 cycle of mobilization was made possible due to the efforts of the pingüinos in 2001, during the Mochilazo. The foundation built by the students in 2001 enabled the pingüinos of 2006 to easily expand upon the smaller-scale demands that were advanced by the students of 2001, advancing the political conversation to a discussion about the very structure of the educational system itself and the provision of rights in Chile; as well as the beginning of a serious critique of the neoliberal economic system, which would be greatly expanded during the 2011 mobilization.
Following the theoretical approach of Felix Kolb’s typology (Kolb 2007) within the state-movement intersection model, which emphasizes the interplay between the state and social actors as the cause of change, this chapter examines the Revolución Pingüina in 2006, analyzing the demands it puts forth and the effects it engenders, paying particular attention to movement-state interactions. I begin with a brief examination of the background and setting in late 2005 and 2006. Next, I discuss the students framing of issues as byproducts of the neoliberal system, their strong critiques of the Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza (LOCE, the Organic Constitutional Law on Teaching) and the state’s management of secondary education, and their demands for greater inclusion in decision-making regarding education, which prompted the mobilization of the pingüinos. I subsequently present my analysis of the Revolución Pingüina, applying Kolb’s typology to examine the novel social movement organization students utilized; the new alliances with university students, workers’ organizations, the state, and the public at large; the issues surrounding the state of secondary education at the time in Chile; the mobilization itself with its demands, tactics, and processes; and government responses to and interactions with the students. The conclusion summarizes the effects achieved by students and my findings.
Background and Setting

The Chilean Educational System: An Experiment in Free-Market, Neoliberal Education

The Chilean educational system, as it existed in 2005-2006, was the product of reforms implemented by the Pinochet regime in the 1980s. Taught and inspired by Milton Friedman, Pinochet’s “Chicago Boys,” a group of technocrats who had all attended graduate school at the University of Chicago, formulated a plan to implement a voucher system in Chile. Following the principles of free-market, neoliberal economics, the technocrats proposed implementing a hybrid system, keeping state-funded (public) schools, while allowing the state to subsidize private and semi-private schools as well, theoretically providing more choice for parents and students. The military junta introduced two major reforms, vouchers and an overall decentralization of the educational system itself. The voucher program established a system wherein the government (via the Ministry of Education, MINEDUC) would pay a subsidy to schools, based upon the average monthly student attendance. This established three types of schools in Chile: público (public, fully state-funded schools), the subvencionado (partially private schools, partially state-funded via the voucher program), and particular (fully private schools). After the introduction of the voucher program, private and subvencionado schools proliferated, as many companies were formed to take advantage of this new money-making opportunity. (Donoso 2013; Kubal 2010; Bellei and Cabalin 2012)
The dictatorship also introduced the concept of decentralization to the educational system. Whereas prior to Pinochet’s rule, schools had been administered and managed centrally by the Ministry of Education, the regime turned the management of elementary and high schools over to individual municipalities. MINEDUC kept control of overall curriculum, oversight, and assessments, while the municipalities handled day-to-day administration and infrastructure maintenance (Kubal 2010). Naturally, different municipalities have varying levels of resources, and this change introduced even more inequality into the public school system in Chile. Leonora Reyes Jedlicki writes,

> The new model of school administration and financing installed in the late 1970s, in fact, implied restriction of social participation, reduction of curricular demands, loss of the old social guarantees of teachers and the impoverishment of school infrastructure. The school system . . . once again played a leading role in the reproduction of social inequalities, with the difference that the goals of effective incorporation of the population into the school system were practically solved. (L. Reyes 2014)

Richer municipalities have better-funded schools, while poorer municipalities struggle to fund their schools. As a result, inequality has increased exponentially since introduction of these reforms.

All of the reforms introduced by the Pinochet regime were codified into the constitution once it was clear that the dictatorship had lost its legitimacy and would be forced to hand over power to a new democracy. Knowing that he had to cede power after he lost the referendum on staying in office, Pinochet began to work with his loyalists to cement as much power as possible in the system before leaving office. With regard to education, the regime wrote an in-depth law, the *Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza* (LOCE, the Organic Constitutional Law on Teaching), a specific type of law that has the same power as the constitution,
along with other measures meant to ensure that regime members or trusted conservatives and loyalists could maintain power once the new democracy had been established. Making the LOCE a constitutional law made it incredibly difficult to modify or annul—a supermajority of $4/7$ths was required to modify Organic Constitutional Laws. In this manner, Pinochet ensured that the neoliberal modifications to the educational system would be maintained after a legitimate, democratic government took over, thus ensuring that the educational system would be run according to the dictatorship’s wishes for decades after it was out of power (Kubal 2010; Donoso 2013; Matear 2007).

The Concertación: Educational Policy Under the Fledgling Democracy

The newly elected government of Patricio Aylwin took the reins of government in 1990, and formed a center-left parliamentary coalition called the Concertación. Primary among the coalition’s concerns was consolidating the new democracy, strengthening the economy in the midst of several regional and worldwide economic crises, and minimizing the chances of another military coup. The desire to maintain a stable, consolidated democracy was the primary priority for all administrations in the immediate post-Pinochet era. As a result, the new administration concentrated mainly on maintaining a stable economic environment, in order to minimize the threat to the fledgling democracy via another coup as much as possible. An unstable economy was thought to be a primary motivator for coups, it delegitimized democratic governments and caused instability. Progress under the new government was hesitant and halting, due to the fear of another coup, the desire to maintain stability and consolidate the new
democracy, and the need to maintain a strong economy over all else. Thus, major changes to the LOCE were not even on the radar during the first couple of Concertación governments. Due to the institution of senators-for-life and a binomial electoral system that greatly benefited parties on the right under Pinochet’s regime, the overrepresentation of the political right in Congress guaranteed that no supermajority would be reached. Thus, the Concertación attempted small changes, mainly via executive orders. The reforms in the educational sector during the 1990s and up to 2005 focused on working within the system Pinochet had established, by improving the quality and equity of education (Kubal 2010, 122; Matear 2007). The first few Concertación governments would make some progress yet fall far short of implementing any major changes to the educational system as a whole.

Ernesto Ottone, Lagos’ primary political advisor (the equivalent of the Chief of Staff to the U.S. President), expressed his frustration over the inability to make substantive changes to the overall educational system during an interview in 2014. He noted that their administration entered into office with the intent of making changes in both the educational and social realms, but due to the economic crisis, they were forced to put more emphasis than they had originally intended on stabilizing the fledgling democracy and economic matters. Ottone states that after several economic crises (Asia in the late 1990s, Argentina in the late 1990s, and the dot com crisis in the early 2000s) hit, many countries in South America had seen poor economic growth or negative economic growth,

... we had to change our plans. We arrived [in] the government, and we ha[d] a lot of plans [about] education or a lot of social [issues], [but] in this situation, we were obliged to rethink our policy. So, we
put the most important efforts to make this change [in] the democratic system, to use all our effort to make this [succeed].

Without a majority in Congress, the Lagos administration was forced to streamline the changes it initially envisioned making, and reprioritize, similar to all of the other administrations which directly followed the Pinochet regime, considering which initiatives were more likely to pass in Congress.

The Aylwin, Frei, and Lagos administrations, the first three democratic governments, did manage institute a few changes in educational policy despite this need to accommodate the lack of a majority in Congress. Patricio Aylwin Azócar’s administration, the first democratic administration following the dictatorship, faced demands from the Colegio de Profesores (CP, the main union for elementary, middle-school, and high school teachers) to de-municipalize the educational system. The CP wanted the Ministry of Education to take over the administration of elementary and secondary education. Aylwin refused these demands, reiterating his support for municipal administration of primary and secondary schools (Kubal 2010, 121). The administration was aware it could not force such a large systemic change with the supermajority required to modify the LOCE in Congress. Aylwin was able to pass a new Estatuto Docente (Teachers’ Statute), in an effort to appease the teachers’ union. The statute allowed for the central government to take over regulating teachers’ salaries and working conditions, which had previously been in the hands of individual mayors of municipalities. The administration also worked with the World Bank to institute the Mejoramiento de la Calidad de la Educación Primaria y Secundaria (MECE, the Program to Improve the Quality of Primary

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2 Interview with Ernesto Ottone Fernández by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, July 2014.
and Secondary Education), as well as the P-900 program, a program aimed at improving education in poor areas in the country (Borri 2016).

The P-900 program was meant to primarily address infrastructure issues, as various municipalities didn’t have the funding to fix issues with school infrastructure. The program provided funds from the government to municipalities that struggled to fund infrastructure repair and maintenance. It also addressed evening the levels of learning of children who came from poorer families. García-Huidobro explains “The objective [of the P-900] is to improve the learning gains of children from first to fourth grade in reading, writing, and mathematics, considered the fundamental base of further learning” (García-Huidobro 2000, 166). The program also includes workshops for teachers that help identify pitfalls in learning and how to overcome them, how to understand and address students’ cultural environments, and developing relationships between families, the community, and schools. Workshops for children who are not performing at their current grade level are also provided, and materials such as textbooks, library materials, and copying machines are distributed through the program (García-Huidobro 2000, 166). Small changes to the quality and equity of education, such as those provided through the P-900 program, dominated during Aylwin’s administration (Ricardo Lagos, who would become President in 2000, served as the Minister of Education under Aylwin).

Eduardo Alfredo Juan Bernardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, a Christian Democrat, took office on March 11, 1994. Frei placed great importance on educational reform, making it one of his primary goals in office. They called their educational efforts *La Reforma Educativa* (the Educational Reform), making it a central pillar of their
administration’s policy initiatives. Included within *La Reforma Educativa* were expansions of the MECE and P-900 programs, as well as the beginning of the *Jornada Escolar Completa* (JEC, the Full School Day) for all students. Previously, most public schools held morning sessions and afternoon sessions, rather than full school days (Kubal 2010, 122; Borri 2016, 145). Frei also attempted to improve the planning and administration efforts of municipalities by instituting required municipal education plans. The municipal education plans had to be submitted by every municipality in the country and needed to include specifics about how all actors in the educational system would participate, including teachers, administrators, parents, and students (in the case of secondary schools). The administration also attempted to decentralize curriculum decisions, which were under the control of the Ministry of Education. These efforts were limited and mostly unsuccessful (Kubal 2010, 122). Despite his administration’s emphasis on educational improvement, Frei’s initiatives were not major changes to the system, and indeed, he attempted to decentralize educational decisions even further. The system continued functioning as defined under Pinochet, with minor changes to quality, mainly in the areas of infrastructure maintenance, overall access to primary and secondary education, and the initiation of full school days.

The trajectory of minor, incremental changes continued when Ricardo Froilán Lagos Escobar won the presidential election and took office in 2000. The Lagos administration continued most of the initiatives and programs begun by its predecessors, without any significant changes. During his term, Lagos finalized the transition to the full school day, and expanded the P-900 program as well. A principal Lagos initiative was the expansion of the years of required schooling in
Chile. Previously, eight years of formal schooling had been required, and the Lagos administration expanded this to twelve. Lagos also oversaw the implementation of the Full School Day initiative, which was gradually phased in throughout primary and secondary schools, and would be finally completed under the presidency of Michelle Bachelet (Borri 2016).

Thus, the immediate post-dictatorship era was characterized by minor changes within the existing system, and a lack of effort towards making larger changes to the Pinochet-era system. Indeed, as previously noted, Peter M. M. Cummings writes, “A central goal of the first three governments of the Concertación was governability and stability” (Cummings 2015, 59). Bellei and Cabalin write that the “structural elements of the marketized system have been deepened, rather than modified” (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 111). They describe the “shared funding” system that was instituted in 1993, which allows both private and public schools at the secondary level to charge a tuition fee, without losing their state funding. While spending as a percentage of GDP had risen, Concertación governments increased spending on education from 2.25 percent of GDP in 1990 to 3.26 percent of GDP in 2005, it had negligible effects on equity and quality within the educational system (United Nations Educational 2016). Overall, change was plodding, halting, and inconsistent.


During the presidency of Ricardo Lagos, students began larger-scale protests, beginning with the 2001 Mochilazo, discussed in the last chapter. Various
sub-agencies had been established since the decentralization of the educational system, and each region in Chile now had a SEREMI (Secretaría Regional Ministerial de Educación, the Regional Ministerial Secretariat of Education). The SEREMI for the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Alejandro Traverso, decided to initiate a mesa del trabajo (literally, a work table, a committee for dialogue) with secondary students in 2005, as he was tired of starting from scratch when negotiating with students every year. Every year, without fail, students took to the streets for one reason or another at the beginning of the school year. Traverso hoped to avoid some protests and to solve some of the issues that students were frequently protesting about. The mesa met weekly, from April 2005 to December 2005, and involved the two major student organizations at the time, ACAS (Asemblea de Centros de Alumnos de Santiago, the Assembly of Student Centers of Santiago) and ACES (Asamblea Coordinada de Estudiantes Secundarios, the Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students), as well as technocrats from the Ministry of Education and the SEREMI himself. The mesa produced a thorough proposal of changes and requests, which was submitted to the Lagos government in December of 2005, with both short- and long-term goals (Borri 2016, 146; Kubal 2010; Silva Pinochet 2009). The short-term goals included the price of the student public transport pass and food allowances for students from poorer households. The long-term goals included reforming the LOCE and the structure of the educational system itself (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005).

From this long-term interaction with government officials, students learned much about the educational system itself, about the LOCE, and about how to effectively interact with government officials to have their demands heard and met.
This interaction focused the students’ attention on the neoliberal reforms made to the educational system under the dictatorship, as the government officials explained why it was difficult to make changes to how schools were run and administrated, and fine-tuned their demands to include addressing the inequality inherent in the educational system and reforming the structure of the system itself. Regular interactions with government officials taught students to broaden their views and goals, and how to successfully negotiate with authorities. Additionally, students regularly interacted with students from different student organizations, thus cementing networks and new connections, which they would also use in future organizing (Donoso 2013, 8-9; Borri 2016; Pavan and Felicetti 2019). Students worked together with the SEREMI and the government technocrats and submitted a document with their short- and long-term goals and demands to the Minister of Education under Lagos, Sergio Bitar. Unfortunately, due to the excitement of the presidential election, the students’ proposal was put aside and forgotten, and was not addressed under the Lagos administration. Bitar left it for Bachelet and her Minister of Education to take on when they entered office, angering students by saying there was nothing he could do. Student spokesperson Maria Huerta said in an interview,

In 2005, our leaders wrote their problems down on paper, twelve issues in total: from recreation and sports to the LOCE laws, and from information technology [to the] centralization of the educational system . . . And in 2005 nobody answered the petition. Sergio Bitar said he couldn’t do anything because he was about to leave the ministry . . . And at the start of the year, Michelle Bachelet didn’t know about the petition so we gave her until the end of March. There was no response. So we gave her two more weeks. (“Student Strike Leader: Private Schools Should Be Abolished.” 2006)
Thus, Bachelet took office amidst growing frustration on the part of the students, as a result of unaddressed claims and demands. Her initial inaction in response to the situation would aggravate the relationship between the students and government, and the protests, tomas, and paros would balloon in number and size before the administration paid the movement proper attention.

Michelle Bachelet, a Socialist, included some educational reforms in her campaign promises, but had concentrated mainly on expanding preschool education. Her platform had not included any proposed policies for addressing inequality in the educational system or for modifying the LOCE at all. Shortly after taking office in 2005, her administration released a “Programa de Gobierno,” a plan for government, outlining the major initiatives they wished to accomplish (Bachelet 2005). The plan details major educational initiatives, mainly concentrating on early and pre-education stages. It specifically states “we will set a fundamental priority on early childhood” (Bachelet 2005, 4). The administration proposed instituting a preschool system for children ages 0 to 4, and guaranteeing access to pre-Kindergarten for all children via an educational grant system (Bachelet 2005, 15). A system of subsidies for the most vulnerable children between pre-Kindergarten and fourth grade would be enacted. Bachelet promised to demand more from schools in the areas of progress reports, non-discrimination, strategies for educational improvement, and goals of educational outcomes based upon national learning standards. Specifically, at the elementary and middle school levels, the administration proposed to improve educational quality by reducing class sizes from 45 to 35 students per class and expanding and applying the Full School Day to all schools in Chile (Bachelet 2005, 15-16). Bachelet
proposed improving educational quality at the secondary level by emphasizing key competencies in the areas of math, science, computer science, and English (Bachelet 2005, 16).

In an effort to hold schools accountable and improve transparency, the government plan outlined a system of school “report cards” it planned to create. Each school would have a report card that showed its performance and background, including comparisons to other schools, which would be available to the public. The goal was to provide better information about schools and their performance to communities and parents, to help with school choices. Additionally, the administration proposed additional evaluations for teachers and administrators (teachers would evaluate administrators), and a program of continuing education and job training for teachers (Bachelet 2005).

In the area of higher education, the administration proposed improving the accreditation system and providing more information and transparency about universities and technical schools. Bachelet wanted to improve equity of access by providing more scholarships, tuition credit, and university credit for the neediest and middle-class students. The administration proposed holding universities accountable for quality by analyzing university performance according to fiscal resources allocated by the universities. Additionally, Bachelet proposed requiring periodic accreditation for universities that received direct contributions from the state, noting that unaccredited universities would not be eligible for state funding (Bachelet 2005, 18-19). Allocating more funds for infrastructure for state universities was another recommendation. Finally, promoting technical education
was listed as an initiative, requiring accreditation of technical schools and competency certification (Bachelet 2005, 19).

While ambitious, the government plan concentrated on the early years, with few proposals for secondary and post-secondary education. This echoed promises Bachelet had made on the campaign trail, where she had repeatedly emphasized the importance of early education. Bachelet’s main campaign message of inclusion and citizen participation in government was what had appealed to students, leading them to see her as a possible ally in their fight to change the educational system.

The high school students had learned much during the mesa de trabajo with the SEREMI of Santiago. The meetings brought the two main student organizations, ACAS and ACES, together on a weekly basis. Students made intra-network connections, and worked together to craft a thorough proposal (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005), which, as previously mentioned, was forgotten amidst the presidential election and change of administrations. Students were furious that their demands and proposals had been forgotten and not addressed, and they decided to mobilize to draw attention to their demands. The pingüinos decided to join forces and pool their resources, creating a new organization called Asamblea de Estudiantes Secundarios de Santiago (the Assembly of Secondary Students of Santiago, AES). They based the new organization on the horizontal model of ACES, replicating the structure of the previous organization. Students had learned that “the more democratic the organization got inside the schools, the more people joined . . . the assembly as a mechanism of participation was extremely valued by the average student” (Donoso 2013, 9). Four spokespersons were elected, all
adherents of different political parties, in order to minimize any possible influence individual political parties might have on the students and their mobilizations. This also provided a breadth of opinion, as parties from the entire political spectrum were represented (Donoso 2013, 9-10). Armed with their new knowledge, gained from sustained interaction with government during the mesa de trabajo, and their new organization, the pingüinos prepared to demand answers.

Surprisingly, la Revolución Pingüina began with a protest outside of Santiago. Students in Lota, a city in the south-central area of Chile, began protesting over infrastructure issues. The region had seen a lot of rain in recent months, and the roof of one public school completely collapsed, triggering a large protest. On April 23, 2006, the pingüinos in Lota held a protest, and were repressed by the police. Due to the violence they encountered from police during the protests, the Lota students decided to engage in a toma instead, in which they take over the school and physically occupy it. Lota pingüinos began their toma on April 24th. In Santiago, AES organized a march in solidarity with the students of Lota, protesting the poor state of infrastructure in public schools around the country. On April 26th, AES carried out a march in downtown Santiago, in which 4,000 students participated. Students in Concepción followed suit on April 27th. Delays in the delivery of the student transportation card, and a rise in the price of the PSU (the college entrance exam) prompted more protests (Bellei and Cabalin 2012).

During the month of May 2006, the protests and tomas increased in both intensity and number of participants. Protests spread from Santiago to various
regions across Chile. On May 10, 2006, two thousand secondary students held a march in Santiago. 930 students were arrested, and four police officers were injured. Marches were held on the same date in other regions of the country as well, and 357 arrests were made during demonstrations outside of the capital city. The media coverage focused on the violence of the protest, condemning the students for clashing with the police, which resulted in widespread negative public opinion about the demonstrations (Bonner 2014, 182). Negative media coverage and negative public opinion increased after a few more street protests, in Santiago, Temuco, Concepción, and in various other regions around the country. On May 18th, students engaged in another march in downtown Santiago, where they were met with repressive tactics by the carabineros, the national police force. Whereas previously, the police had exercised restraint, cognizant of the fact that the majority of the protesters were minors, on this occasion they utilized guanacos (water trucks), tear gas, and other methods of repression, arresting approximately 700 students. The violence and repression used against the students forced President Bachelet to acknowledge the mishandling of the demonstration. She denounced the overly repressive tactics of the carabineros, the national police force, in dealing with the protesters (Kubal 2010). Yet Bachelet also condemned violence by student demonstrators, which had been highlighted particularly by the conservative media. The pingüinos realized they needed to discuss a change of tactics, to protect themselves from police repression, and to gain public sympathy for their cause.

Strategically, the students regrouped, deciding in meetings to avoid clashes with the police and any possible further violence by shifting their strategy to
emphasize school takeovers (*tomas*), rather than street protests (Kerfoot 2015). Students also nominated several spokespersons to liaise with the media and government officials, and outlined official talking points, further refining their message and tactics (Bonner 2014, 182). On May 19th, students at the emblematic school *Instituto Nacional* in Santiago began the first *toma*, taking over their school and occupying it in protest. At this point, the students began to emphasize the structural inequality of the system itself, re-framing their demands to encompass deeper reform of the educational system, encompassing a critique of the neoliberal economic system that had prompted the reforms which resulted in the severely unequal educational system. Kubal writes,

> The period around the May 18 protest and the May 21 presidential address appears to be a critical juncture . . . student spokespeople began to emphasize larger social justice issues. While not backing away from ‘short-term’ demands, they began to criticize the structural inequality of the system and demand deeper reform. The ‘long-term’ demands, such as the abrogation of the LOCE and an end to decentralization, had been set out earlier, but were not emphasized initially by spokespeople or in the media. Student rhetoric in mid-May began to focus on the need for more sweeping changes. (Kubal 2010, 8)

The *pingüinos* were optimistic that Bachelet would address their demands. Encouraged by the emphasis placed on citizen participation in government during her campaign, students eagerly awaited President Bachelet’s annual address to Congress on May 21st, expecting that she would refer to their demands and put forward some sort of concessions (Donoso 2013, 11).

The students’ optimism about Bachelet’s response was misplaced, however. The Bachelet administration had decided to ignore the growing student discontent and mobilization, and the president did not mention the students’ demands or activism in her address to Congress. Coupled with the previous frustration over
their formal proposal still being ignored by the administration, Bachelet’s speech and her lack of acknowledgement of the students’ demands and mobilization prompted secondary students to engage in school takeovers all over the country. By May 29th, over 130,000 students were participating in tomas in many different regions in Chile (Donoso 2013, 11). Fourteen schools in Santiago alone had been taken over (Kubal 2010). The public-school students were joined by private and subvencionado (semi-private, partially subsidized schools) students. Finally, the administration took some concrete steps to address students’ concerns, inviting representatives from the student organizations to meet with officials at the Ministry of Education. Students arrived at the meeting on May 29th and were deeply offended that only the Subsecretary of Education was present. They had expected to meet with Minister Martín Zilic himself, and believed that the Minister was attempting to force them to debate with technocrats so that the opinions of the government officials would have more weight than those of the students. Spokespersons for the student organizations stated that the solutions needed were political, not technical, and walked out of the meeting with the Subsecretary of Education, refusing to participate (Domedel and Peña y Lillo 2008). The following day, the students’ frustration boiled over into the largest demonstration to date, since the re-establishment of democracy in 1990, even surpassing the numbers of the Mochilazo.

On May 30, 2006, high school students gathered one million protesters in Santiago for a national strike. Demonstrations occurred in concert around the country. With this march, students demonstrated how much public support they had gained via their strategic use of tactics. The pingüinos from public schools
were joined by secondary students from private schools, university students, teachers, parents, and labor organizations. Even the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Education joined the students, either striking for the day and not going in to work, or actually joining them in the streets. The high school students had managed to successfully re-frame their demands, gain public sympathy, and gain powerful allies for their cause (Domedel and Peña y Lillo 2008; González 2006).

Faced with the massive demonstrations across the country and calls from the students for more mobilization, the administration was forced to respond directly. The unexpected turnout and the widespread nature of the protests forced the administration to pay attention to the students’ demands. Out of an estimated 1,200,000 secondary students in the country, more than one million mobilized during national paros from May 30th to June 5th. (Cornejo et al. 2009, 3) The government could not ignore such massive mobilization any longer. Additionally, the students were putting forth concrete demands, with proposed policy changes that were resonating with the public as well. One policy advisor in the Bachelet administration stated, “...[the students’] demands had a certain level of legitimacy... To abolish the LOCE became inevitable; how and how much we had to discuss ... the movement was the impulse that we did not have; the strength that we needed to pursue the reforms” (Donoso 2013, 23). Spurred by the students to take actions they previously thought were impossible, the administration at last publicly addressed their demands.

Bachelet addressed the nation on television on June 1st, outlining several specific proposals that were a direct response to the students’ demands. Kubal writes,
Among the measures announced by Bachelet were: an increase in the number of free school lunches by 500,000 in two years, improved infrastructure for 520 schools and new furniture for 1,200, unlimited use of the student transportation pass and free PSU exams for all students qualifying for financial aid, increases in family welfare benefits, and paid internships for technical students. She also announced that her government would introduce legislation to modify the LOCE in order to ‘ensure the right of all citizens to a quality education, while at the same time not impeding the freedom to create educational establishments.’ Significantly the president reaffirmed support for decentralized education administration, focusing on ending discrimination in admissions and improving funding for disadvantaged students. She also announced the creation of a Presidential Advisory Council for Quality Education (Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Calidad de la Educación) charged with the task of formulating proposals for education reform, including the reform of the LOCE. (Kubal 2010, 8-9)

The government’s proposals and the invitation to participate in the Advisory Council led to a fracturing within the pingüino movement. Pro-Concertación forces believed it was time to call off mobilizations and engage in dialogue with the government. Donoso writes that, while the students all strongly believed the LOCE needed to be reformed, they did not have a shared agenda for exactly how to reform it. Students farther left on the political spectrum, including students from the loosely-organized Social Fronts (which tended to be far-left organizations), declared that they would hold another general strike on June 5th. This call for additional mobilization split the movement, alienating students who were more sympathetic to the Concertación. Two spokespersons for AES resigned in protest. Donoso writes,

... the radicalization of the protests and the government’s efforts to channel the conflict through the creation of the Commission [Council] contributed to a gradual process of delegitimization of both the Pingüinos and the protests as a mechanism to vent their discontent. Yet, while the movement had lost momentum, education had become a central issue on the public agenda and a policy priority for the government. (Donoso 2013, 13)
Bachelet’s choice to finally publicly address the students and their demands, and the administration’s choice to form an advisory council in which the students would participate were successful in defusing the mobilization. While two smaller protests occurred in Santiago on June 5th and 6th, the students formally voted to end the mobilization and participate in the Presidential Advisory Council on June 8th, in an assembly (Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011). The Revolución Pingüina officially came to an end.

**Students’ Demands and Their Evolution**

The Mochilazo set the stage for the Revolución Pingüina, in that by the time it was winding down, students had learned a bit about the neoliberal economic system and had begun to include it in their main critiques of the educational system. As was the case during the Mochilazo, repeated interaction with government officials, politicians, and technocrats during the Revolución Pingüina helped to educate the students about the political and economic systems in Chile. Through meetings with policymakers, students learned much about the structure of the political and economic systems, and the constraints government officials were under as a result of these systems. Students that participated in the Mochilazo passed on the knowledge they gained through the processes of mobilization and negotiation to younger students, who later participated in the Revolución Pingüina. Cornejo, González, Sánchez, and Sobarzo write,

> It is remarkable, the transfer of the experience accumulated in [the Mochilazo] from the year 2000, towards the younger students, who
would lead the mobilization of 2006. Most of these [younger] students had not even begun their secondary education in those years. It was a process of oral and informal transmission. There are very few written records circulating among students regarding the mobilization process [of 2000-2001]. (Cornejo et al. 2009)

Despite the lack of formal written records, the students passed down much practical and theoretical knowledge they gained in the process to their younger cohorts. These younger students would go on to lead the Revolución Pingüina, starting with the knowledge imparted from their colleagues who led and participated in the Mochilazo. The Revolución Pingüina reflected and expanded upon these initial critiques of neoliberalism. The main participants in the Mochilazo began their mobilization due to more practical issues, such as transportation fares, individual school administrative policies, and uniform/dress codes, and these demands remained the primary focus during 2001. The Pingüinos of the Mochilazo only begun to critique the neoliberal economic policies that had resulted in the decentralization of the educational system towards the very end of their movement. The movement in 2001 wound down before these critiques were expanded upon.

In 2005 and 2006, however, the actions of the SEREMI of the Santiago Metropolitan Region, Alejandro Traverso, resulted in sustained, regular interactions between students and government officials over a period of eight months that would result in direct demands for change to the neoliberal economic system. These meetings, which took place within a mesa del trabajo, or working group, were Traverso’s attempt at avoiding large-scale mobilizations. He had dealt with student mobilizations at the beginning of every school year, and he was frustrated with starting from scratch every year with the newest crop of students.
Traverso believed that if he, his staff, and other government officials could work with the students to develop a solid plan with concrete policy proposals, he might be able to avoid large-scale mobilizations, and at the very least, he would have a better understanding of the students’ needs and demands. With a formal proposal, he hoped the students and government could work together to solve the issues in education.

Traverso’s mesa del trabajo served as an incredibly important educational experience for the students. The students met weekly with government officials, from April through December of 2005 (Donoso 2013, 8). The Pingüinos gained an in-depth knowledge about the structure of the educational system, as well as the LOCE (the Constitutional Law of Education that was in effect at that time) and the difficulties in modifying or eliminating the LOCE due to the political structure of the Chilean system. They learned about the reforms Pinochet implemented to the educational system, all based upon neoliberal ideology, which privileged neoliberal ideals and private enterprises through the promotion of “school choice” via a voucher system, and the decentralization of education administration to municipalities. Indeed, an OECD report in 2004 noted that the Chilean educational system “is influenced by an ideology that gives undue importance to market mechanisms to improve teaching and learning and appears to be consciously structured by social classes” (Económicos 2004). The mesa de trabajo provided the secondary students with a relatively in-depth education about how neoliberalism had influenced the entire educational system in Chile. This “on the job” education led the Pingüinos to more closely examine the economic and
political systems in the country, analyzing the effects that neoliberalism had on the educational system.

While students participating in the Mochilazo had recognized the inequalities inherent in the system, they were less informed about neoliberalism and the effects that neoliberal economic ideology had on the educational system. Victor Orellana, a Chilean academic who studies social mobilization and who was a first-year university student in 2001 and had been active as a leader in ACES during his secondary education, noted that there was less understanding among students in 2001 about the economic and political aspects as the causes of their principal issues. Orellana believes that the demands of the Mochilazo were more the result of a basic class instinct, of feelings of injustice and the perception of inequality:

We knew at the time that we had to get some dialogue process with the government because we wanted to win . . . and we won. The student [transportation] pass was the property of entrepreneurs, and after 2001, it was a right, it was state property. A localized service, not [national], we wanted a universal student pass, but it’s [administered by the] state . . . At that time, the Communist Party had, before the mobilization, had embraced the subsidiary state. The party told us that the state has to develop [economically], has to assign subsidies, to give vouchers to transport owners that would allow them to reduce the price of the transport pass. [In 2001], without those [theoretical] readings, without learning, without knowing, I think it was a class instinct, we said, ‘We don’t want that money or taxes to go to private business, this is a social right, we don’t want the state to subsidize it [through private businesses].’ [Today the government doesn’t] understand yet that we don’t want free university by vouchers. We don’t want Mr. [Milton] Friedman’s ‘paradise’ of public money going to private business because that is the key element that makes education go from a use/value, like Marx thought, change value and commoditize and present in front of society the forms of a generic value that is human capital. It’s one of the key elements [of the student movement today].3 (Orellana 2014b)

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3 Victor Orellana interview, conducted by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, August 2014.
As Orellana elaborates, the students in 2001 had a basic understanding of the injustice and inequality present in the system, while not really understanding the economic and political issues/philosophies undergirding the system itself. They focused on the effects of the policies, namely the privatization of the student transportation pass. As the students met more frequently with government officials about their claims, they learned more about the neoliberal basis of the system and began to critique this as well. Yet, this was towards the end of the 2001 mobilization, and these claims never really took root. Instead, they served as the basis for the 2006 movement.

In 2006, the younger generation of secondary students supplemented the knowledge shared with them by participants in the Mochilazo with the knowledge they gained by participating in the mesa del trabajo organized by the SEREMI of the Santiago Metropolitan Region. Through regular, sustained interaction with government officials, the Pingüinos learned about the structure of the educational system, about the neoliberal ideology underpinning it, and about their political system in detail. This knowledge was incorporated into the document with their claims and demands, submitted to the government in late 2005, after the mesa del trabajo had finished its work.

The 2005 Mesa de Trabajo Proposal

The document resulting from the work of the secondary students and government officials in the Ministry of Education in the mesa de trabajo was submitted to the Minister of Education, Sergio Bitar, in November 2005 (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005). The proposal engages in a sophisticated critique of what
the students saw as the system’s main issues, and subsequently suggests possible solutions for each issue. As previously noted, it is critical of many of the neoliberal reforms made to the educational system under Pinochet, most notably that of the decentralization of the school system.

The proposal begins with a critique of decentralization, noting that there is a direct link between municipal education and poverty, which results in massive inequality in the educational system. Municipalities with fewer resources cannot provide a quality public education to students, resulting in large differences in the quality of public schools across the country. The students also address private schools, noting that the only legal requirement to open a private school in Chile in 2005 was that the person opening the school must be of legal age. Subsidized schools are also addressed, the schools that are a mix of private and public funds, noting that many are run by corporations which receive funds from the government for both enrolled students and infrastructure, yet do not account for students’ actual attendance, and do not show improved conditions in the schools. The main critique of the private and subvencionado schools is that they are operated for profit. The students argue that the operators of many of these schools are more interested in profit than running a quality school. They directly fault the neoliberal policies of Pinochet for these issues in the educational system, writing, “[t]he Organic Constitutional Law of Education [LOCE], dictated during the government of Augusto Pinochet, introduced the logic of the free market to education” (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005, 1).

In order to solve these immense inequalities in the educational system, the students propose the demunicipalization of schools. Insisting that centralizing
school administration is the only way to ensure quality and consistency across different municipalities’ schools, the students also insist upon transparency regarding state funds and their use, arguing that schools, particularly semi-private, subsidized schools, should be forced to account for how they handle state funds. Additionally, the students insist that the local school boards should also have a role in the use of funds, that the school boards should be responsible for preparing an annual budget and providing oversight for the use of funds at individual schools. The Pingüinos proposed that the only roles municipalities should play is that of technical advisors to MINEDUC (the Ministry of Education) about individual conditions and needs in their communities.

The secondary students also addressed the difficulties in changing the LOCE, noting that they now understood the legislative issues in changing or modifying the law. They demanded a Constituent Assembly, with the specific goal of restructuring the LOCE. As a result of this newfound understanding, they also demanded an end to the binomial voting system, writing:

In the course of the debates of the commission we came to the conviction that the Binominal System prevents the real participation of society and generates a practical impossibility of the parliament’s ability to modify a Law by a qualified quorum. For this reason and in the spirit of the Constituent Assembly that we propose, we consider explicit the rejection of the binominal voting system for being undemocratic and constraining participation (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005, 2).

Thus, not only were the students demanding an end to certain structures instituted because of the neoliberal ideology of the dictatorship, they were also demanding significant changes to the structure of the political system. While the demand to end the binomial voting system would not be realized during the Revolución
Pingüina, it would begin a public discussion about how the political system could be changed (Chile did eventually end binomial voting in 2015).

Thus, the document produced by the participants in the mesa del trabajo began with large-scale critiques of economic and political structures in the country. The students continued on to matters which were more practical and smaller-scale, such as the Full School Day (Jornada Escolar Completa, JEC), Student Centers and the obstacles they encounter with participation, discrimination against students with behavioral issues and segregation of these students, the neglect of arts and sports education, the lower quality of professional/technical education, the non-comprehensive sexual education available in schools and the neglect of sexuality and violence/abuse issues in the program, and transportation issues. For each topic, the students provided well-reasoned critiques and proposals to solve what they believed the most pressing issues in each area were. The document demonstrates a clear evolution from the Mochilazo, with its concentration on very practical, concrete issues, such as the transportation pass and dress codes. The proposal from the mesa del trabajo demonstrates a clear advancement in the students’ understanding of both the issues inherent in the educational system and of their political and economic systems (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005).

The mesa del trabajo was an incredibly educational experience for the student participants, and demonstrated that sustained, regular interaction with government officials resulted in learning and advancement in the sophistication of the students’ demands. Students were empowered and encouraged by the willingness of government officials to work with them, rather than “talking at” them. The proposal ends with a strongly expressed desire to continue to work in
conjunction with the government: “. . . this is only the beginning of a larger process that involves the possibility of walking together, learning and constructing facts that make a difference” (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005). In fact, the students proposed continued work together with the Minister of Education and MINEDUC (the Ministry of Education), writing:

That is why we invited the Minister, Sergio Bitar Ch., to assume, jointly with the Ministerial Secretariat of Education, systematic and sustained work during the year 2006, which has as its foundation the proposal that we are presenting today. This is not an impediment for initiatives emanating from MINEDUC to be accepted by the student body, quite the opposite, because together we can enrich both the work of the Ministry and the constitution of a Student Movement that contributes to the deepening of democracy in our country. Additionally, we propose that during the summer months a team composed of student leaders and Ministry of Education officials can work to fine-tune a joint agenda, based on our proposal and the ministerial points of view, so that it can be developed during the year 2006. (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005)

The students viewed the mesa del trabajo as an excellent starting point for a more participatory system, in which they would have more input and government officials would involve students in the planning process. During the 2006 protests, students would expand upon the demands outlined in their initial proposal, as well as enlarging the critiques of the economic and political systems even further.

**Learning Leads to Larger Demands**

During the course of the 2006 mobilization, the students would consistently articulate their critiques of the entire system, not limiting themselves to critiquing only the educational sector. Cornejo et. al. write,

. . . extensive student sectors mobilized to articulate, in their discourse and practice, a radical critique of the hegemonic ‘way of life’ in Chilean neoliberal society, which they associate with individualism, consumerism, competition, accommodative behavior
and a lack of social awareness and willingness to mobilize. (Cornejo et al. 2009)

This evolution of the students’ knowledge about their economic and political systems would also inform the Chilean Winter mobilization in 2011, the critiques being further developed by the university students that would lead this later movement. Cornejo et. al. make note of this transference of knowledge, writing,

The construction of these levels of consciousness and criticism of the ‘neoliberal way of life’ is one of the elements that became accumulated knowledge thanks to this movement. The subsequent three years have involved systematic mobilizations to show that the educational crisis goes beyond a mere matter of institutional reorganization: that is only the symptom. The disease is called capitalism and in Chile it operates in education, giving more rights to students as consumers than citizens. (Cornejo et al. 2009)

Thus, the students demonstrated a clear path of learning and application of knowledge as they expanded their demands and critiques, which would eventually encompass the entire economic and political system in Chile. Once the students had gained this level of knowledge about the system and the possibilities for reform and change, path dependence ensured that future mobilizations would be based upon a more advanced understanding of the possibilities than prior mobilizations had, leading to broader, larger demands for change (Pierson 2004; Pavan and Felicetti 2019).

The proposal submitted by the pingüinos in 2005 had the core long-term demand of eliminating the LOCE. The students’ justification for this demand was that the LOCE and its decentralization of education had opened the door to the privatization of education, following neoliberal ideology. The voucher program included in the LOCE resulted in the proliferation of private and semi-private schools, greatly increasing the inequality between schools. Poorer municipalities were not equipped to fund their schools, and this resulted in other issues, such as
massive problems with improperly maintained infrastructure in public schools. The students argued that education was a right, and that all Chileans had the right to a quality education, regardless of class, ability, or spending power. One very popular slogan during the 2006 mobilizations was, “Somos estudiantes, no clientes” (We are students, not clients) (Kubal 2010). Once the students, via their work on the mesa del trabajo, had identified the neoliberal educational system as the problem, they demanded that the LOCE be abolished, a Constituent Assembly be convoked in order to abolish it, and that the educational system be replaced with one that supported public education (Donoso 2014a, 20).

The pingüinos disseminated the knowledge they had gained to their cohorts. “Awareness committees” were created at schools that were en toma, communicating information about the LOCE and the inequalities of the educational system that resulted from the law. The committees educated the secondary students about the law, the inherent inequalities in the system, and the neoliberal reforms that created the system and its imbalances (della Porta and Pavan 2017; Pavan and Felicetti 2019). The students clearly identified the “neoliberal framework of the educational system as the cause of their failure . . . part of the solution was to abolish the LOCE and replace it with a legal framework that reinforced public education.” (Donoso 2014a, 23). Donoso writes, “The common diagnosis [among the students] was that the neoliberal principles that guided the education system contributed to the segregation of students according to their capacity to pay for private education” (Donoso 2013, 17-18). The pingüinos enlarged their frames to encompass critiques of the neoliberal reforms that had greatly contributed to the large amount of and rapidly growing inequality within
the educational system and the overall degradation in the quality of education. “We are students, not clients,” and “Education is a right, not a privilege,” the pingüinos often chanted, decrying the voucher system and the partial privatization of the system (Vogler 2006). Students amplified the existing frames, with their demands for smaller- and medium-range reforms, to encompass a demand to reform the entire system at large, and the Constitution of Chile, as it was necessary to reform the constitution in order to eliminate the LOCE. This frame amplification would prove to be an intelligent and well-considered strategic move.

Indeed, the students were very strategic during this cycle of mobilization. Choosing to do tomas rather than risk violence in marches, expanding the initial frames of the Mochilazo and the proposal from the 2005 mesa del trabajo, and targeting the issues inherent in the educational system as the result of neoliberal reforms gained them enormous public support and many alliances. The strategic choices of the students, combined with their anti-neoliberal framing, had significant results in impacts from the protests, of which there were many.

**Effects/Impact**

The pingüinos had impacts in several areas, according to Kolb’s typology. Kolb specifies five main areas to analyze for impact of mobilizations: the agenda impact (effects on the policy agenda of the current administration), the alternatives impact (effects on the content of policy proposals), the policy impact (the adoption of laws or binding political decisions), the implementation impact (influence of the movement on speeding up or slowing down the implementation of policies), and
the goods impact (effects on the distribution of public goods) (Kolb 2007). Although effects can be seen in all five of Kolb’s impact areas, the largest effects from the Revolución Pingüina can be seen in the areas of agenda impact and policy impact.

Secondary students’ actions had massive and direct impacts on the policy agenda of the Bachelet administration. As previously noted, Bachelet did not have plans to restructure the LOCE, the educational law from the Pinochet era. Her governmental plan involved much emphasis on preschool and daycare options, and had minimal specific plans for education beyond daycare, preschool, and elementary levels. Regarding secondary education, Bachelet’s plan made vague promises about encouraging innovative pedagogical approaches; holding schools accountable for performance by instituting a school report card that would be available to the community at large; improving the school supervision system; encouraging more extracurricular activities; and adding a community service requirement for secondary students (Bachelet 2005, 16-19). The overwhelming majority of the plan, however, focuses on daycare programs, preschools, and elementary education up to the fourth grade. Thus, Bachelet’s focus was strongly on these lower levels of education, and her government’s proposals did not involve many planned changes to secondary education.

The Revolución Pingüina would result in many effects on the administration’s policy agenda. While the Presidenta initially ignored the protests, and chose not to mention the students’ demands during her national address to Congress, this was a short-sighted move that cost the administration dearly in concessions later in the process. As a result of the administration’s refusal to
acknowledge their mobilization and demands, the students were outraged, and
they increased the scope and size of the tomas and marches. The protests rose to
such a level that Bachelet was forced to make a special, televised speech on June 1,
2006 to specifically address the students’ demands. Bachelet made many
concessions, meeting the majority of the students’ short-term demands. Orlando
Sepúlveda writes,

[Bachelet] offered grants for the poorest 80 percent of high school
students to pay for the PSU; free transportation passes also for the
poorest 80 percent of the students, benefiting about 1.5 million
students; a 25 percent increase to the family subsidies to help to pay
the transportation fee, benefiting almost a million people; half a
million more school meals; some other grants to sugarcoat the deal;
and the creation of a Presidential Advisory Committee, with student
participation, to review the JEC [Jornada Escolar Completa] and the
LOCE. The president told the nation there was just not enough
money to completely abolish fees for student transit. (Sepúlveda
2006, 5)

Additionally, the president promised to improve infrastructure in 520 schools and
to purchase new furniture for 1,200 schools. She agreed to unlimited use of the
student transportation pass, and promised paid internships for students attending
technical schools. Most importantly, she announced that she would introduce
legislation to change the LOCE, echoing the students’ arguments and slogans as
she stated this was necessary to “ensure the right of all citizens to a quality
education . . .” (Kubal 2010, 8). The only short-term demand Bachelet did not meet
was providing the student transportation pass free of cost for everyone, insisting
that the government simply did not have the funds to cover this demand.

Bachelet also announced the creation of a Presidential Advisory Committee
for the Quality of Education (Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Calidad de
Educación, PAC), to be composed of 81 members (twelve of whom were students),
including “education experts, current and former [education] ministry officials, secondary and university students, parents, education support workers, private school administrators, and municipal representatives among others” (Kubal 2010, 10-11; OPECH 2009). The PAC was charged with analyzing the current state of the educational system and the laws governing it, and with recommending changes for reform.

While this was obviously a massive change in the policy agenda for the administration, the specific language used by Bachelet also indicated receptiveness to the larger, more profound demands made by the pingüinos. Bachelet acknowledged in her speech that all citizens have the right to a quality education, the cornerstone of the students’ arguments against the neoliberal educational and economic systems. The students had not only obtained significant concessions and managed to change the policy agenda, they had also put reform of the educational, economic, and political systems at the top of public discourse.

Successfully putting educational reform at the top of the policy agenda and public discourse had significant effects on the policy impact category as well. Here, very concrete results can be seen as a result of the 2006 protests. The PAC, after meeting regularly from June to September 2006, issued a progress report in September, and a final report in December 2006. The report detailed the current regulatory framework of the system (and the discrimination and inequality inherent in it), educational quality, the administration of the educational system, funding, teaching and curriculum, teachers (including their status in the system and remuneration), school climates, technical-professional education, and higher

Garretón et. al. write that there was “great consensus in the recognition of the serious problems that exist in the Chilean educational system and the [Council members] agreed on the need to specify the goals or purposes of a quality education, the obligations of the State and [those] of the educational institutions” (Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011, 10). The PAC recommended re-centralizing the educational system, returning full oversight of policies and institutions to the Ministry of Education; supporting and reinforcing the Superior Council of Education, enabling it to ensure policy continuity, a strong curriculum, and evaluate the system’s performance as well as setting requirements for passing each grade level; and recommended creating a Superintendency of Education, which would be charged with

evaluat[ing] compliance with quality standards through inspections, the administration of national standardized tests and international comparisons, provid[ing] citizens with complete information on the school system’s achievements, and suggest[ing] the exit from the system or intervention for schools and colleges that do not fulfill their roles” (Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011, 10).

The majority of the committee members agreed that the LOCE must be eliminated and replaced with an educational law that emphasized the quality of education, and each citizen’s right to a quality education. The PAC recommended that schools which receive government funding must be held to higher standards than those that were in place at the time, including not discriminating in their selection of students. Suggestions about creating a comprehensive curriculum for teacher training at the university level were put forth as well.
Perhaps the most controversial topic addressed by the PAC was that of profit in education. The majority of the committee members argued that private educational providers should not be able to gain a profit from providing educational services. They argued that education is a collective good, and should not be commercialized for that reason, as the need to make a profit could easily conflict with the provision of quality education. Other committee members argued that for-profit schools expand the options and choices available to families for education, and that with proper regulation, the conflict between turning a profit and providing a quality education could be avoided (Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011, 11-12). As a result of this conflict, there were mixed recommendations about how to improve the financing of the system.

One financing recommendation was to strengthen the voucher/subsidy system, ensuring that the subsidies were distributed according to need, providing more state funding for needier schools and students. The other recommendation, given by the members that opposed for-profit schools, suggests a system of fixed funding for state schools, based upon the socioeconomic characteristics of the school population and the physical/infrastructure needs of the school itself, and a fixed funding system for state and private schools dependent upon meeting certain requirements (no discrimination in selection of students, no arbitrary expulsions, etc.), with more funding allocated to schools that serve more at-risk students (Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011, 11-12). Garretón et al. observe that conflicts such as this illustrated the classic state-market dichotomy within the CAP. Private school directors on the committee naturally pushed for more neoliberal-oriented solutions, while students and employees of the state system pushed for rights-
based solutions. While there was great consensus on what the issues in the system were, agreement on which measures would solve the problems was difficult to achieve.

Despite the ideological disagreements, there was a strong consensus that the LOCE must be changed. The majority of the committee members agreed that the law was a legacy of the dictatorship that had had many negative consequences, and it must be replaced (C.A.P.p.l.C.d. Educación 2006). The final report of the CAP reflected this consensus, and many of its recommendations were accepted by Bachelet’s administration. Thus, via their mobilization, which resulted in the creation of the CAP, and the recommendations of the CAP (in which the students were active participants, even if they disagreed with the recommendations at the end, believing the reforms were not strong, specific, and/or deep enough), the pingüinos saw effects from their efforts in the policy impact area as well.

After receiving the final report from the CAP, Bachelet decided upon three main areas for reforming the educational system. The first was replacing the LOCE and creating a Superintendency of Education, to better oversee the system and monitor its quality. The second was funding. The administration proposed more funding for needier schools and students, as well as eliminating profit in the partially private (subvencionado, partially state-subsidized, partially private) schools. These schools could continue to receive state funding, if they became non-profit organizations. Bachelet also proposed a measure to eliminate discrimination related to funding: schools that received state funding, be they state schools or semi-private schools, could not select students for enrollment, thus eliminating selection discrimination. The third area involved strengthening the system of
public education with "an adequate system of school management and institutionality" (Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011, 14). The administration sent a proposal to Congress, the “Acuerdo por la calidad de la educación,” (the Quality of Education Agreement), which became the new Ley General de Educación (General Law for Education, or LGE). The LGE passed Congress in September 2009 (OPECH 2009; Silva Pinochet 2009).

Students and teachers were disappointed with the LGE and its contents, as one of their main points of contention, the existence of for-profit schools, was not a part of the new law (Rothe June 17, 2008). Opposition to this point in Congress by both conservative factions and members of the Concertación (many of whom invested in or owned private schools) had resulted in its defeat. The new law still allowed for educational institutions to operate on a for-profit basis. Students were also disappointed that the recommendations of the commission did not reflect their more sweeping demands for reform, including de-municipalization of schools and a greater representation for students in the policymaking process (Kerfoot 2015). However, there were significant concessions in the proposal Bachelet sent to Congress, which eventually became the LGE. Notably, “…the bill contained some significant changes. Two of its most controversial points – the elimination of government subsidies to for-profit schools (though not to private, non-profit entities) and the elimination of school selection of students at the elementary level…” were included (Kubal 2010, 11). Indeed, as Kubal notes,

While the LGE falls well short of the social block’s demands for the reversal of decentralization and an end to a segmented educational system, it contains significant challenges to the market-orientation of the system institutionalized in the Pinochet-era LOCE. In particular, the elimination of subsidies for profit-oriented schools as
well as an end to schools’ ability to select students based on socioeconomic criteria would deeply alter the competitive nature of the current system (Kubal 2010, 11).

Thus, via the policy impact area, the students were able to mount a significant challenge to the neoliberal ideology undergirding the educational system.

Effects from the mobilization were also seen directly in the goods impact area. Kolb defines effects in this area as effects that influence the distribution of public goods. As the both the LGE and Bachelet’s speech in June show, students had a significant impact on the distribution of public goods. Changes were made to the financing system for schools, eliminating funding to private, for-profit schools, and a formula for financing was enacted that privileged needier schools based upon socioeconomic factors. Additionally, Bachelet promised and provided scholarships for all students receiving financial aid that would cover the cost of the college entrance exam. State funds were also redirected to increase the number of free school lunches provided, to improve infrastructure and buy furniture for schools, and to give students unlimited use of the student transportation pass. Bachelet also increased welfare benefits for families and introduced paid internships for students at technical schools (Kubal 2010, 8). Thus, many concrete effects can be seen as a direct result of the students’ mobilization in 2006.

**Institutional Outcomes**

Kolb writes that institutional outcomes tend to be the most durable, as they are more difficult to achieve and more difficult to change, once implemented. The pingüinos also saw effects in this area, however, effects can be seen in the area of intra-institutional change, however, many of these changes were minimal, in that they consisted of firing Ministers of Education and the Interior, as well as the head
of the Carabineros’ Special Forces (Silva Pinochet 2009). While the students did not effect changes in the formal structures of political institutions, they were the direct cause of the creation of a Presidential Commission, which had significant influence on the content of bills sent to Congress, as noted in the previous section. However, the PAC was a temporary institutional body, and was dissolved after it finished its work of several months’ duration. While two administration members at the ministerial level lost their posts as a direct result of protests and claims made by students (Interior Minister Andrés Zaldivar and Education Minister Martín Zilic), and the head of the Carabineros’ Special Forces also lost his position as a result of repression against students during a march, these cannot be considered to be enduring institutional changes. Thus, it would be specious to claim that the students were able to effect lasting change in the institutional outcomes area.

**Conclusions**

While many scholars tend to downplay the effects of the *Revolución Pingüina*, principally because the students were not able to effect systemic change to the political and economic systems as a result of their anti-neoliberal claims, it is inaccurate to claim that the students did not effect lasting change. Yet this claim was relatively common, even into the 2010s. Gregory Elacqua writes,

> Adept at shaping public opinion, the students have been much less successful at influencing policy . . . The challenge for the students is to convert their specific demands in to policy. While the students have changed the national conversation on education, the route to reform has to run through the politics of Chile’s heavily criticized and non-representative two-bloc binomial electoral system. (Elacqua 2012, 2)

Marisa von Bülow and Germán Bidegain Ponte echo Elacqua’s sentiments, noting:
The “Penguin Revolution” was not even close to really being a revolutionary movement. Its name has less to do with impacts on public policy and more with the surprising entrance of junior high and high school students on the political scene, an actor that nobody thought had an extensive mobilizing power. (Bulow and Ponte 2015, 186)

Inés Pousadela, while arguing that the students had more impact than has generally been acknowledged, recognizes the common idea shared by most students, “[the LGE] is the reason why the 2006 protests are now considered to have ended in ‘defeat’” (Pousadela 2013a, 3). I argue that this is too simplistic a view which is based upon a surface examination of the students’ demands and immediate effects, rather than taking a long-term view or a multifactorial view, as Kolb’s typology advocates.

Using Kolb’s typology, I have demonstrated how students were able to effect several significant changes, particularly in the areas of policy impact, goods impact, and agenda impact. The largest effects were seen in the area of agenda impact: the pingüinos changed the public discourse about education for the entire country. As a direct result of their mobilization, framing, and messaging, the secondary students got the entire country talking about the legacy of Pinochet’s changes to the educational system, and their basis in neoliberal ideology. A strong public discourse about the very nature of the economic, political, and educational systems began because of the students’ efforts, and continues to this day. The students of the Mochilazo set the stage for this discourse and paved the way for the secondary students of 2006 to build upon the initial critiques of 2001, expanding and deepening them as they learned more about the economic, political, and educational systems of the country.
The *pingüinos*’ sustained interaction with government officials greatly influenced their mobilization and demands in 2006. The *mesa del trabajo* involving Ministry of Education officials and students provided a much deeper understanding of the structures of the economic, political, and educational systems. Students gained significant knowledge about the problems officials face when attempting to make changes to the educational system, or when they attempt to improve the quality of education overall. Armed with this knowledge, the *pingüinos* formulated a coherent set of demands that not only resonated with students, but with the Chilean public at large. Due to the combination of their chosen tactics (*tomas*, peaceful occupations versus marches and protests in the streets that could become violent or result in repression), the framing of their demands (education is a right all Chilean citizens are entitled to, many of the problems stem from the neoliberal reforms and are legacies of the dictatorship that impact rights), and their savvy use of a horizontally-based student organization to organize mobilizations and to represent themselves, the students were able to effect many changes in the policy and agenda impact areas, eventually resulting in the replacement of the dictatorship-era LOCE. In the process, they enjoyed widespread public support, and began a conversation about the suitability of the neoliberal economic system and parts of the political system that are legacies of the dictatorship that continues in the present day.

This second major cycle of student mobilization, in the post-Pinochet era, clearly shows a growth in scope, breadth, length, and depth of the overall protests. This expansion of scope, depth, breadth, and length of time continues in the third
major cycle of protest, the Chilean Winter of 2011, which is addressed in the next chapter.
# Table: Mobilization, 2006

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Manifestation</th>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Location (City)</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Number Arrested</th>
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<td>Lota</td>
<td>unknown</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Motive</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Location (City)</td>
<td>Number of Participants</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Motive</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Location (City)</td>
<td>Number of Participants</td>
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<td>students</td>
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<td>Number of Participants</td>
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<td>Participants</td>
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Chapter 6: The Third Major Cycle of Mobilization Post-Dictatorship: The *Invierno Chileno*

Introduction

While the previous two cycles of mobilization had demonstrated impressive numbers of participants and protest events, the largest and longest post-dictatorship cycle occurred in 2011. Chilean students gained international fame during the *Invierno Chileno* (Chilean Winter) due to their innovative protest techniques and their savvy use of both social media and traditional media to draw attention to their cause. University students -- the primary protagonists -- created a cycle of mobilization that they sustained for seven months, maintaining near-constant mobilizations with high numbers of participants and public support. Frequently harnessing the power of social and traditional media, leaders of this cycle of mobilization conducted a broad public relations campaign, gaining much
positive international media coverage and notoriety in the process. Utilizing knowledge gained from the prior two major cycles of post-dictatorship mobilization, the universitarios (university students) employed a conscious strategy of positive framing, always expressing their demands as the demands of society as a whole, not solely of students. Knowledge gained from prior mobilizations contributed much to their strategy in 2011, garnering the participants support not only from the Chilean public, but from international intergovernmental organizations and the international community as well. Varying and wide-reaching effects can be seen as a result of this cycle of mobilization, including policy changes, new laws, sub-institutional changes, and eventually, the election of several former student leaders to Congress.

As discussed in the previous two chapters, the 2006 Revolución Pingüina demonstrated a process of learning and adaptation from the prior cycle of mobilization, the 2001 Mochilazo. In this chapter, I argue that the 2011 mobilization cycle, the Invierno Chileno (Chilean Winter), demonstrates similar patterns of learning and adaptation, using strategies, demands, and slogans from those of the prior two major cycles of mobilization that were adapted to fit the situation in 2011. Participants in this cycle implemented the knowledge they gained from the previous student protests, utilizing a horizontal organization similar to that of the pingüinos (ACES), the Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH, Chilean Student Confederation), and expanding and building upon arguments made by the secondary students in 2006. The main protagonists of this cycle of mobilization were university students, many of whom were high-school
students during the Revolución Pingüina and had also participated in the 2006 protests. Camila Ponce Lara writes, “Many young people participating in [the 2011] mobilizations had previously participated in the 2006 Penguin protests, when they were high school students” (Ponce Lara 2022, 22). The students utilized knowledge gained during the prior cycle of mobilization, particularly knowledge gained from interactions with government officials and innovations in protest tactics and strategies, to adapt strategies, tactics, and framing to fit the situation in 2011, adapting and revising along the way.

University students differentiated themselves from the prior two post-dictatorship student movements by purposely allying with unions, teachers, workers, and families. In framing their demands as a social movement and involving many different societal groups, students presented their demands as ways to promote equality of opportunity that would benefit the whole of society, which had been made inequal by neoliberal reforms (Kerfoot 2015; Salinas and Fraser 2012). This chapter examines the 2011 Invierno Chileno, first outlining the important historical events that led to this cycle of protest, then analyzing the mobilization itself, including demands, framing, and methods of protest and mobilization, and concludes with an analysis of the movement’s interactions with state actors and effects of the mobilization, using Kolb’s framework.

The System: Higher Education and Changes Under Pinochet

Not only did the Pinochet dictatorship make many changes to the educational system in elementary and secondary education, it also made
significant changes to higher education that would be long-lasting and resulted in increasing inequality in the country. Following neoliberal ideology, Pinochet decentralized the state university system and instituted tuition. Whereas prior to the dictatorship, state university education had been free to all, the Chicago Boys and Pinochet instituted a tuition-based system. The Universidad de Chile (University of Chile, the state university system) was broken up into regional units across the country (Fried and Abuhadba 1991). Additionally, in line with free market ideology, the requirements for establishing and running private universities were reduced dramatically, allowing for more players to enter the higher education market by establishing private universities. Fewer regulations on private educational institutions allowed for the rapid proliferation of said institutions, with an accompanying decline in quality due to the lack of oversight and regulation (Torche 2005). The rapid growth of private universities resulted in greater access to higher education, as well as greater debt for students as they took out loans to pay the higher tuition rates at private universities (Pousadela 2013a, 686; Bellei, Cabalin, and Orellana 2014; Fried and Abuhadba 1991).

Private universities emerged rapidly after these reforms, 30 new universities in the first twenty years after liberalization, and today compose half of the 60 total universities in Chile. Likewise, higher education access increased, with enrollment rising from 250,000 in 1990 to a little over one million students in 2010 (Pousadela 2013a, 686). Effects of the liberalization of higher education were similar to those seen in elementary and secondary education: greater inequality in access and a large variation in the quality of education among universities are
deeply-rooted, widespread problems (Torche 2005). Pousadela notes that 60 percent of university students attend private universities known for poor quality in academics, and among these students are those from the poorest sectors of the population, who usually do not perform as well on university entrance exams due to the inequality of education in the elementary and secondary institutions they attend (Pousadela 2013a, 686; Torche 2005). Along with decentralizing the state university system, Pinochet also drastically cut funding to the system, transforming Chile’s state universities into the most expensive state universities in Latin America, as universities were forced to raise tuition to compensate for the loss of state funding (Torche 2005; Fried and Abuhadba 1991). As a result of the proliferation of more expensive private universities and the drastic increase in tuition at state universities, students have become massively indebted. 70 percent of university students take out loans to pay for their education (Pousadela 2013a, 686). Salinas and Fraser write,

In 2011, 85% of general investment in higher education in Chile came directly from family resources while public funds covered only the remaining 15% . . . Chile has the largest ratio between the average tuition fee and the average income per person within the OECD countries; the average tuition fee in Chile is 41% of the gross domestic product per capita . . . The levels of debt for students with middle and lower socioeconomic backgrounds increased dramatically in the last two decades. In 2009, over 60% of students in the three lowest income quintiles financed their educations through loans. The average graduate’s debt represented 174% of her projected annual income, compared to a rate of 57% of annual income in the United States. (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 20)

Naturally, the increase in expenses for a university education strongly impacted families in Chile, who found it difficult to pay for a university degree for their children without going into massive debt. Universitarios capitalized on the
frustration and hopelessness many Chilean families felt over paying for a university education, appealing directly to society as a whole with their demands for relief (Borri 2016). Their framing would appeal to the Chilean families who were becoming increasingly indebted, insisting that a citizen should have a right to an education without putting themselves into such deep levels of debt (Somma 2012, 305). This framing resonated deeply with Chileans, and garnered strong public support for the student movement overall, which the students framed as a “social movement.”

**Chronology of the *Invierno Chileno*: the Progression of the Movement**

The *Invierno Chileno* began in late April of 2011 at *Universidad Central* with a *toma* (a takeover of the university campus) in protest of university stakeholders’ illegal profitmaking operations. The principal educational law at the time, the *Ley General de Educación* (LGE, General Law of Education) prohibited institutions in higher education which received any public funding from being for-profit. However, many private universities found loopholes, allowing them to distribute surpluses in funding to owners and stakeholders of these institutions, counter to the law (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 21). The owners of *Universidad Central* wanted to sell it to a for-profit company, in direct violation of the law. Students at the university began their *toma* by bringing “the chain of problems linking weak regulation, illicit profit-making, and the lack of quality-assurance mechanisms in the private higher education sector to the fore.” (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 21). The *toma* at *Universidad Central* and a new government proposal
prompted the national student organization, the CONFECH, to take action on behalf of all university students in Chile. The CONFECH called for the first national mobilization in late April. Students engaged in four marches, two tomas, and one protest during the month of April, and activity would escalate rapidly in May.

The CONFECH’s initial responses during April and May were inspired by the toma and the anti-profit, pro-quality, anti-neoliberal demands of the Universidad Central students. After the initial national strike in April, President Piñera’s administration responded with a proposed “New Deal” for education, suggesting a funding increase for the 25 “traditional” universities, yet making “the allocation of funds more dependent upon performance indicators and upon increased competition with nontraditional, private-independent universities” (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 20). CONFECH called for another national strike in May, this one officially supported by the Central Única de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT, the National Workers’ Council, the largest workers’ union in Chile) and the Unión de Profesores de Chile (UPCh, the national teachers’ union) (Somma 2012). The May 12th protest drew over 25,000 people in Santiago alone, and concurrent protests were held all over the country on the same day, as far north as Iquique and extending to the far south in Puerto Montt. Students demands included more equity in access to higher education, more funding for public universities, and democratization of decision-making within universities, in addition to the

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4 Information about specific protest events and numbers of events per month comes from the author’s database, which contains data from news media at the time, as well as data collected by Chilean scholars.
demands of no profit in education and critiques of lax regulation of institutions of higher education (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 21).

Mobilization increased dramatically in May. April saw four marches, two tomas (occupations of campuses), and one protest, seven events in total. In May, 29 marches, one paralyzation, one hunger strike, and two street demonstrations occurred, for a total of 33 events. As allies warmed to the message the students were sending -- of the inadequacy of the economic system and the injustice of the inequality present in the educational system -- they joined with students to demonstrate (Somma 2012). The number of marches and protest events in June reflected the addition, enthusiasm, and support of allies, 115 events in total. Piñera helped to spur action in June after his yearly address to Congress on May 21st didn’t address the students’ demands. In his speech, Piñera proposed creating a Superintendency of Education and an Undersecretary of Higher Education, but did not mention any measures to be taken to address quality, debt, profit in education, equity of access to education, and more funding for public universities (Piñera 2011, 12). Students were infuriated by the president’s dismissal of their mobilization and demands, and began “widespread mobilization”, resulting in a proliferation of occupations of schools (tomas) and paralyzation of activities (strikes) in schools (Espinoza and González 2013, 240). With little response from the administration, the CONFECH and the Colegio de Profesores (a teachers’ union) called for a national “social strike” on June 16th, to demand quality and free higher education for all (Pousadela 2013a, 688). 80,000 people marched in Santiago, with marches occurring across the country in solidarity. The government
responded with several proposals, none of which addressed the students’ most crucial demands (Espinoza and González 2013, 240).

The students carried on in July, which passed with 34 marches and 27 other protest events, for a total of 61 events. Sebastián Piñera’s administration had announced a “new deal” reform project for higher education in late 2010, and the Gran Acuerdo Nacional por la Educación (Great National Agreement for Education, or GANE) was presented by Joaquin Lavín, the Minister of Education, on July 5, 2011. The proposal established a new scholarship fund for students from the lowest two income quintiles, and reduced student loan interest rates (MINEDUC 2011). It also included a funding increase for “traditional” universities (universities founded before 1981 that form the Universidades del Consejo de Rectores – Universities of the Rectors’ Council: a combination of public universities, Catholic universities and private universities), while seeking to make state funding dependent upon performance indicators and also upon “increased competition with nontraditional, private-independent universities.” (La Segunda, "Reforma a la Educación Superior: Lavín Detalló Propuesta a Rectores de Ues Tradicionales” 2011, C1).

The CONFECH immediately rejected the proposal, critiquing the government for not addressing the neoliberal, market-oriented character of the educational system itself and for not addressing their demands, specifically the demand for a solid, enforceable ban on profit-making in higher education. The CONFECH responded to the announcement of the GANE by releasing a statement and calling for nationwide mobilization to counter the government’s proposal. The
The anti-neoliberal nature of the coming mobilizations was evident in the CONFECHE’s statement, as was the recurring theme of education as a right, taken directly from prior cycles of mobilization:

Education is in a deep crisis. This is evident in the dreadful quality of many higher education institutions, the limited access to the system for the most vulnerable social sectors, the excessive indebtedness of families, the weakening role of the State and its institutions, the illegal profit-making by many private institutions, and the explicit prohibition of participation of the university community in the development of higher education policy... The students grouped in CONFECHE accuse the nonexistence of the right to education and the false notion that higher education is serving as a real tool and guarantee of social mobility... (CONFECHE 2011a, 1)

Thus, from the very beginning of this cycle of mobilization, students framed the protests as anti-neoliberal and as a fight for the right to education. Framing the movement as a social movement, rather than a student movement, earned the students strong public support, as Chileans believed that students were fighting for society as a whole, not simply for the rights of privileged university students. The broad message was echoed in the number of groups that eventually allied with the university students, beginning in June of 2011.

Students rejected the GANE for several reasons: it did not address illegal profit-making, it didn’t propose any adjustments to the market orientation of the system, and it failed to address the key demands about quality of education and free university education for all. Additionally, students and teachers critiqued the proposal, saying that it was not complete with timelines, and did not specify the resources to be utilized and procedures to be implemented (Espinoza and González 2013, 240). At the same time, students publicly critiqued the Minister of Education, Joaquín Lavín, for being a financial stakeholder in two private
universities (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 22). Lavín, a former Chicago Boy and a veteran of the Pinochet dictatorship, resigned as a result of the rejection of the GANE proposal and the criticism of his profit from private universities (Espinoza and González 2013, 240). Lavín was replaced by Felipe Bulnes, who had been serving as the Minister of Justice. The change in ministers can be directly attributed to the students and their mobilization.

Protests, takeovers, and strikes continued throughout July, as the government attempted to negotiate with students’ and teachers’ organizations. All of the government proposals were rejected for not meeting the core demands of the students (Pousadela 2013a, 688). The CONFECH, the Coordinadora Nacional de Estudiantes Secundarios (CONES, National Coordinating Body of Secondary Students), and the Colegio de Profesores (the teachers’ union for elementary and secondary teachers) presented the government with formal demands in a document called “Acuerdo Social por la Educación Chilena” (Social Agreement for Chilean Education) (CONFECH, Profesores, and (CONES) 2011). Key demands included: an end to profit in education; the state should be responsible for guaranteeing free, egalitarian, quality education at all levels; and a tax reform proposal, the institution of a progressive income tax that would finance free university education (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 22).

The government continued to issue new proposals, and came out with two in early August: the “Basis for a Social Agreement for Chilean Education” and “Policies and Proposals of Action for the Development of Chilean Education” (Espinoza and González 2013, 240; Somma 2012). Students and teachers rejected
both proposals for not addressing their core demands, saying the government was “papering over the cracks” rather than addressing the need for structural change (Pousadela 2013a, 688). Frustrated by the lack of progress in communicating with the government and the redundant proposals that did not address their primary concerns, students ramped up mobilization in August. There was an enormous increase in the amount of protest events in August as a result of the dissatisfaction with the government’s responses. August was the month with the most overall activity in this cycle of mobilization, 93 marches and 31 other protest events, a total of 124 mobilizations. The other protest events included: marathons, barricades in the street, candlelight vigils/funeral processions for education, carnivals, choreographed dances, cultural acts, flashmobs, traditional house building in the south, kiss-ins, open-air classes in streets and plazas, national strikes, occupation of television stations, road occupations, pot-banging protests, an umbrella march, and a walk from Santiago to Valparaíso (Author’s Database). One national strike, organized by CUT and the Confederation of Copper Workers, amongst other allies, drew 150,000 people in Santiago alone. Marches were held concurrently across the country (Pousadela 2013a, 688).

The government, overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of protests occurring across the country and the increasing number of participants, attempted to establish a direct dialogue with the students. It extended an offer to create “mesas del trabajo,” working committees composed of student leaders, representatives of teachers’ unions, parents, and other stakeholders, as well as government officials and technocrats. The students rejected the offer to engage in “mesas del trabajo,”
stating they wanted transparency and will not make deals behind the backs of the people (Pousadela 2013a). Meanwhile, the elementary and secondary teachers’ union, the Colegio de Profesores, mobilized citizens in a “civic plebiscite” and presented the results to President Piñera (Pousadela 2013a, 688). In response, Minister of Education Bulnes presented another, improved proposal, called “Government Measures on Education,” which was also rejected for failing to address key concerns (Borri 2016). The CONFECH responded by calling on the government to address all twelve essential pillars in their proposal, and by inviting the government to dialogue with the students, teachers, and parents (El Mostrador "Las Propuestas Para la Educación Que Se Han Debatido en Más Que Tres Meses de Manifestaciones" 2011; Espinoza and González 2013, 240). The government failed to respond in a timely manner, and began denying permits to march on Alameda, the main avenue in downtown Santiago, where most marches are held. The CONFECH responded by calling for marches anyway, which resulted in violence and repression by the police force (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 23). Mounting student, teacher, and parent frustration resulted in the most-attended protest event of this cycle, the Family March, held in Santiago on August 21st. Student organizers advertised the march as a protest for all families indebted by the costs of higher education in Chile, and attracted more than a million attendees (Author's Database 2019, Pousadela 2013a, 688). This march had the highest attendance of any protest event since the end of the dictatorship up to that point in time.
Mobilizations with high attendance continued into September. In early September, a 2-day “National Citizen Strike,” organized by student organizations, teachers’ unions, and family supporters, and even attended by a few political parties, drew 400,000 people in Santiago (Pousadela 2013a, 688). Forced into action, President Piñera called for a meeting between all actors involved in the manifestations and the government to “review the points demanded by the CONFECH [to determine if] it was possible to reach an agreement, and [to] bring the discussion to the Congress [for] those issues on which there was dissent” (Espinoza and González 2013). A meeting was held at La Moneda, the presidential palace, between government officials, parents, teachers, deans, and students on September 4, 2011. The government proposed mesas del trabajo, which students rejected because they “did not offer minimal guarantees for a negotiation on an equal footing to take place” (Pousadela 2013a, 688).

Meanwhile, students and their allies continued mobilizing, holding several “silent marches” in Santiago. Protesters dressed in black and carried candles, mimicking funeral processions for education (Pousadela 2013a, 688). Student and teacher organizations presented four conditions for dialogue with the government: 1. Deferment of the debate of the education bills that had already been sent to Congress; 2. Postponing the end of the first semester of the school year; 3. Broadcasting the debates of the mesas del trabajo live; and 4. Halting state funding to private universities that made profits (Pousadela 2013a, 688). The Minister of Education made a counterproposal for dialogue, rejecting the first two conditions and only agreeing partially to the other two conditions (Pousadela 2013a, 688).
Piñera, who was at the UN General Assembly in New York City, made a speech saying that the student movement was “a noble, big, beautiful, and legitimate cause” that his government shared (Pousadela 2013a, 688). In Chile, his remarks sparked outrage, with students, teachers, and allies criticizing Piñera for validating abroad the very demands he was denying at home (Pousadela 2013a, 688).

Students decided to internationalize the movement in October. Due to innovative protest tactics and charismatic leaders, the student movement had attracted much international press. Student leaders, including Giorgio Jackson (President of the student federation of the Pontifical Catholic University (FEUC)), Camila Vallejo (President of the student federation of the University of Chile (FECH)), Francisco Figueroa (Vice-President of the FECH), and Gabriel Iturra (representing secondary students)...

...traveled to Paris to hold meetings with representatives of the OECD, the United Nations (UN), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the European Parliament, among other actors. Upon their return, student leaders claimed a new legitimacy based on the support of these international organizations (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 23).

This was the first cycle, post-dictatorship, that deliberately sought to internationalize their movement. Student leaders argued that Chile’s discrimination in education violated international treaties the country had signed (López 2011).

October also showed significant amounts of mobilization at home in Chile: 46 marches and 26 other types of protest happened that month, 72 events in total. The other types of protests included road barricades, attacks on municipal education offices and the offices of MINEDUC, cultural days, dance-a-thons,
protests denouncing violence during the Pinochet regime, storming a business meeting, artistic presentations, occupations of various locations, a paint-a-thon, and pot-banging protests.

While students continued pressure on the government via marches and protests, the Piñera administration announced the creation of a bill that would impose jail sentences on students who were occupying schools. Two days later, 40 demonstrators who had taken over their technical-vocational schools were arrested (Pousadela 2013a, 689). The government’s next attempt to put pressure on students to stop mobilizing, refusing to deliver government-provided scholarships to some universities amongst the group of the traditional 25 that were on strike. The administration was attempting to use the scholarship money as pressure and a bargaining chip to force students to discontinue occupations and protests. Camila Vallejo, the spokesperson for the national student federation CONFECH, condemned the government’s proposed law and denial of the scholarship funds as “provocation mechanisms . . . where social movements are criminalized” (Emol "Pleno de la Confech Ratificó Que No Continuará Dialogando Con el Ejecutivo" 2011). Students also condemned the repressive techniques of the carabineros, Chile’s police force.

In response to the government’s attempts to quash the movement, the CONFECH announced that it would not continue to participate in mesas del diálogo (dialogue committees) with the administration, after nine hours of negotiations. Vallejo, as the CONFECH spokesperson, emphasized to the media that the breakdown in negotiations was due to the intransigence of the Piñera
administration. Students complained to the press that Minister Bulnes had been hostile to participating student representatives, and had flatly refused to consider free higher education from the very start of the dialogue. Secondary student representatives from the ACES and the CONES decided to abandon the dialogue, soon followed by the CONFECH (Emol "Mesa de Diálogo Se Quiebra Por Diferencias Sobre Gratuidad" 2011). Vallejo clarified that the government had no desire for the mesa de diálogo to succeed, noting that the administration did not have “the political capacity or the will to meet the demands of the vast majority of the country,” (Emol "Pleno de la Confech Ratificó Que No Continuará Dialogando Con el Ejecutivo" 2011). The last straw for the CONFECH representatives was the presentation of the same proposal they had rejected three months ago, which Vallejo classified as “a provocation and a clear manifestation of not wanting this table to [continue] and come to fruition” (Emol "Pleno de la Confech Ratificó Que No Continuará Dialogando Con el Ejecutivo" 2011). Minister Bulnes accused the students of being intransigent (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 22). The CONFECH then called for delaying the start of the second semester and for a national strike on October 18th and 19th (Pousadela 2013a, 689). A march on October 19th in Santiago drew more than 200,000 people, and marches occurred around the country on the same day (Author's Database 2019).

As the mobilizations continued, universities began to hold assemblies, plebiscites, referendums, and consultations in October and November to decide whether to begin the second semester of the academic year. Some universities returned to classes, with “protected schedules” that allowed the students to
continue assemblies, demonstrations, and protests (Pousadela 2013a, 689; Borri 2016; Somma 2012). Other universities decided to remain on strike. Deans and rectors of some universities attempted to force students to return to classes, with varying degrees of success (Pousadela 2013a, 689). By the end of November, most universities had returned to classes. The change of strategy was justified by the students, who reasoned that it wasn’t incompatible to attend both classes and mobilizations, because achieving free education for all was a long-term goal (Pousadela 2013a, 689). Students had recognized the intransigence of the Piñera administration and were not optimistic about achieving their primary goals while that government was in power. The pingüinos continued occupations of schools until January of 2012. The government retaliated against the high school student activists, saying they were “agitators,” expelling many of them from school and requiring court orders for the students to be reinstated at their schools (Pousadela 2013a, 689). The cycle of mobilization came to an end in November, when most university students decided to resume classes because they did not believe they could achieve their goals with the current government in power. Minister of Education Felipe Bulnes resigned on December 29, 2011 and was replaced by Harald Beyer, a result of his failure to contain the manifestations and come to an agreement with the students. A table showing the amount and type of mobilization by month appears below.

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**Innovation: New Tactics, Public Support, and Framing**

**New Tactics: Innovation in Protest and Planning**

Students came up with many new and inventive ways to protest during the Chilean Winter, drawing much media attention, both national and international. Events were generally planned using social media, such as Facebook and WhatsApp, enabling students to organize larger gatherings on short notice.
The variety and number of events demonstrated the creativity of the universitarios (Ponce Lara 2022, 22). A group from the School of Medicine at Universidad de Austral de Chile even broke two Guinness World Records by having over 1,000,000 comments in 24 hours on Facebook, and they broke the record for most Facebook comments in an hour, with more than 100,000 comments on a post in 45 minutes (UACh 2011). Many of the events emphasized death and funerals, as students attempted to stress the idea of the death of Chilean education. Many silent marches/candlelight vigils were held, mimicking funeral processions for education. A massive collective “suicide” was held in Valdivia in June by Universidad de Austral students (Author’s Database 2019). One particularly memorable protest event that gained international attention in the press was the recreation of Michael Jackson’s “Thriller” video. Students, dressed in full zombie regalia and makeup, performed the dance from the infamous video from the 1980s in the Plaza de la Constitución, in front of La Moneda, the presidential palace in downtown Santiago. Students engaged in several similar choreographed dance protests over the course of the seven months of mobilization, which always garnered much press coverage (Ponce Lara 2017).

Photo 12: "Thriller por la Educación", June 24, 2011. ©UPI – Agencia Uno.

Kiss-ins were popular, wherein students would meet in a specified area and couples would kiss for a predetermined amount of time. Students held “carnavales,” based on the Brazilian carnaval, and had an entire day’s worth of activities planned for their fellow protestors and members of the community. Similarly, many students planned “recreation days” or large cultural events that were open to the community at large, in a calculated strategy to win support and allies in the local communities (Pousadela 2013a, 692). They held classes in the open air, in streets and in plazas, bike-a-thons, and a march that consisted of a soccer (football) game between Team Education and Team Profit (Pousadela 2013a, 693). One protest event involved installing a giant mailbox in Plaza de Armas in Santiago, a central area in downtown. The public was encouraged to put “Christmas wishes” for education into the mailbox (Pousadela 2013a, 693). More typical actions, such as road and highway ramp blockades, were also utilized. Flashmobs were a regular occurrence. Students ran a marathon around La Moneda for 1800 hours, to signify the 1.8 billion dollars required to finance free education for all in Chile (El Mostrador "Finaliza Maratón Por la Educación Tras 1,800 Horas Corriendo" 2011). A walk from Santiago to Valparaíso was arranged and carried out. Three hunger strikes occurred. Students staged events with music in the streets, held events with 24 hours of music for education, and karaoke events with songs related to the protest. An event where participants loudly shouted “EEEEEE!” for education was held. In Concepción, students drew the slogan “No Más Lucro” (No More Profit) on the ground large enough to be seen from an aerial view. Students engaged in several tomas (occupations) of government offices and political party offices. 200 students took over several Chilevisión offices, in protest.
of the TV network’s coverage of the mobilizations. They chained themselves to the doorway of the MINEDUC (Ministry of Education) office in Santiago. In Ancud, students held a *minga*, or a traditional communal house building, as a form of protest. Students in Santiago interrupted a business meeting, demanding why the businesspeople did not pay more taxes to support education in Chile. (Pousadela 2013a, 693). Giorgio Jackson, the president of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile’s student organization, FEUC, believes that much of the movement’s success was due to its ability to come up with non-violent, creative forms of protest. In an interview in 2014, Jackson said, “I think when the demonstrations are more decentralized, when they are more grassroots-based, and for example, with more creativity and more links to citizenship, not only for the students, but for citizens [as well], I think that they prove to have more outreach [and effectiveness]”

*Photo 12: Kiss-In, July 8, 2011, ©Matador Network.*

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7 Interview with Giorgio Jackson by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, October 10, 2014.
While the students displayed great creativity in the selection of their protest methods, they also resurrected two methods of protest that were quite traditional and meaningful in Chile. The first, called *cacerolazo*, is a protest made by banging pots, in locations scattered around the city in order to evade the authorities. Often people will simply step onto their balconies or into their yards to bang pots. This particular form of protest arose during the Allende administration in the 1970s, and gained popularity again as a form of protest against the Pinochet dictatorship in the 1980s. Pousadela writes,

> Since democracy was restored in 1990, pot banging was not used until August 2011, when Camila Vallejo called on Twitter for a pot-banging protest to condemn the repression of demonstrations. Thousands of people banged their pots and pans from balconies, front doors, and windows that very night, thus evading the government prohibition of street protest after the disorders (Pousadela 2013a, 692). This was a particularly shrewd form of protest, in that it invoked resistance against the dictatorship, implying that the Piñera administration was also a repressive government. Because of the strong emotions attached to the dictatorship and protesting against it, *cacerolazos* were a particularly wise choice as a protest tactic. The use of this tactic fomented strong emotions in the populace and garnered more support for the student movement. It also reiterated the constant refrain of the students, that they were engaged in a social movement, not only a student movement, because these were issues that affected everyone in Chilean society.

Another very strategic choice was the tactic of exposures. This form of protest was also connected to the Pinochet dictatorship. Pousadela explains,

> The strategy of exposure was first used to unmask, with noisy demonstrations at their homes or workplaces, the Pinochet-era
repressors and torturers who had remained free and anonymous. In the absence of judicial sanctions, its aim was to arouse social punishment as a result of knowledge of the target’s past . . . The student movement broadened the reach of exposures to individuals seen as violators of the right to education, including mayors who ordered repression of the movement (Pousadela 2013a, 692).

Similar to the effects of resurrecting the cacerolazos, the exposures were meant to highlight repressive tactics and underscore the students’ claim that education was a right and the state was obligated to protect that right for every member of society. Utilizing a protest technique that had been created to expose people who had deprived others of their rights during the dictatorship proved to be a very effective way to emphasize the students’ message and claims.

Another particularly effective tactic that was new in the 2011 protests was the deliberate tactic of internationalization of the movement. In October, student leaders traveled to Paris to meet with representatives from the UN, UNESCO, OECD, and the European Parliament. The meetings were covered by the Chilean and international press, and garnered much attention for the students’ cause. Salinas and Fraser write, “Upon their return [to Chile], student leaders claimed a new legitimacy based upon the support of these international organizations. They cited the example of Nordic countries, where high-quality public education, including higher education, is free” (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 23).

**Framing**

In addition to engaging in various creative forms of mobilization, students also engaged in creative framing of their demands. The 2011 movement clearly identified neoliberalism as the primary problem with fixing the issues in the Chilean educational system, and structured their slogans and framing around the
need to restructure the neoliberal system. As Camila Vallejo wrote, “The people of Chile realized that what was presented to them as truth was only a myth, and they are realizing that this myth is called neoliberalism” (Vallejo 2012, 123). All of the framing constructed by the students followed this anti-neoliberal theme, emphasizing the need for structural change in the political and economic systems of Chile.

Continuing in the same vein as the 2006 cycle of mobilization, the universitarios claimed that education is a right, that all citizens are entitled to a free, quality education. Expanding upon the claim initially articulated by the pingüinos in 2006, the students argued that education is not only a right, but a public good. As Giorgio Jackson commented, education is a “platform for fairness” and the “integrative core of our society” (Pousadela 2013a, 692). Pousadela writes, “If education is a right and a public good, [students] reasoned, then the government has a duty to advance and protect it” (Pousadela 2013a, 693). Camila Vallejo, another prominent student leader, expanded upon the concept, writing, “The true dialogue that higher education needs is built on the paradigm of recognizing education as a universal right and as a fundamentally social investment, a strategic axis for the just and harmonious development of the country and for its democratic strengthening” (Vallejo 2012, 102).

Framing education as a universal human right conflicted with the government’s conception of education and its purposes. While the students insisted that education was a public good, Piñera’s administration viewed education as an “investment” and a “commodity” (Somma 2012), an unsurprising
view from an administration with a billionaire businessman at its head. Pousadela observes that the government viewed education more as a luxury than a consumer good, and that education was “placed within the logic of the market: its delivery, it was argued, should be left to the interactions between supply and demand, and profit should be embraced as its driving force” (Pousadela 2013a, 693). Not only did the state’s conception of education and its purpose differ fundamentally from that of the universitarios, it was at odds with the opinion of the Chilean public as well, 75 percent of whom believed that universities should not be allowed to be run for profit. This crucial, fundamental difference in perception resulted in the prolongation of the conflict. It was very difficult to reconcile these two wildly divergent views, because, as Pousadela explains: “. . .[they] implied different roles for the state: those of a regulator of the education market, on one hand; or a guarantor and provider of education, on the other” (Pousadela 2013a, 694). The divergent conceptions of the role of the state in education and the purpose of education complicated interactions between student activists and the government, greatly complicating efforts at compromise (Somma 2012; Borri 2016).

Following from the idea of education as a fundamental right, the framing of profit having no place in education was critical for the movement. Giorgio Jackson, President of the student organization at the Pontifical Catholic University, noted in an interview, “So, everything that tried to put in the common sense the idea of free education, non-profit, I think that [had] good results, [a] good response from the people”.8 The students justified the demand for free education by basing it on

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8 Interview with Giorgio Jackson by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, October 10, 2014.
another claim, that education is a fundamental right and should therefore be free. The government responded to this argument by claiming that this would amount to “the rich [being] subsidized by the poor”, because taxes used to pay for free education are paid by all citizens, be they rich or poor (Pousadela 2013a, 694; Borri 2016; Somma 2012). The students responded by advancing a claim for progressive tax reform. Pousadela writes, “This argument led the student movement to focus on tax reform. The rich, they claimed, should support the education of the poor by paying higher taxes” (Pousadela 2013a, 694). The demand for progressive tax reform had very high public support, about 80 percent of the public supported this reform (CERC 2011, 10). The students argued that Chile had sufficient resources to fund education due to the high economic growth rates the country had experienced in recent decades. Pousadela notes, “From this perspective, the calamitous situation of education was the result not of poverty but of political decisions regarding income distribution in a quite prosperous land” (Pousadela 2013a, 694). Thus, the students expanded upon their critique of neoliberalism and the inequality it engendered to encompass demands for progressive tax reform, framing this argument as a necessity due to the negligence of the political elite.

Students utilized the negative effects the neoliberal economic system had had on society as a whole to frame their movement as a universal movement, not simply a student movement. They argued that free, quality public education was “an opportunity equalizer in an extremely unequal society . . . [their demands] potentially benefitted everybody; therefore, they argued, their movement was not just a student movement, but, more exactly, a social and citizen movement”
Unlike the 2001 and 2006 cycles of mobilization, students made very conscious choices to frame the 2011 movement as not just another student movement, but a movement that was fighting for benefits for all of society (Somma 2012; Salinas and Fraser 2012). Broadening their goals and the appeal to be seen as a broad social movement won the students many allies, which is addressed in the next section of this chapter.

The result of learning from prior cycles of mobilization, innovation in protest tactics and unique framing resulted in massive public support for the student movement in 2011. Salinas and Fraser write,

By framing those grievances in a way that resonated with the largest population, the student movement produced massive participation in protests and strong public demand for education reform in Chile. The movement’s frames . . . highlighted clear educational problems, were displayed through innovative repertoires, and were communicated by highly articulate and critical leaders. These frames were not sudden interventions but rather the emergent results of an accumulation of narratives, ideas, and claims from previous waves of mobilization . . . claims changed over the course of the conflict, gaining discursive complexity and transformative scope over time. To the previously known ‘historical demands’ of equality of access, more funding for public education, and university democratization, students added new demands, such as free university education, improved quality, and the notion that educational reform was not a benefit for a narrow interest group, but was for the country as a whole (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 29).

While the pingüinos had emphasized many of these demands during the 2006 mobilization, the universitarios in 2011 expanded upon and re-framed the demands originally advanced during the Revolución Pingüina. High schoolers had emphasized quality education, inequality of access, and the need for more funding for public education at the elementary and secondary levels. University students targeted the neoliberal economic system more specifically, in order to broaden the
appeal of and the scope of the movement (Bellei, Cabalin, and Orellana 2014). Students in 2011 used lessons learned during prior cycles of mobilization to enact a very savvy and inclusive framing strategy that won the movement large amounts of public support. Salinas and Fraser note,

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\ldots \text{the student movement enjoyed strong approval from the Chilean population throughout the year, with approval rates between 67\% (October) and 79\% (September) according to nationally representative surveys (Adimark Survey, 2012). By contrast, approval of President Piñera's administration declined from 41\% in April 2011 to 27\% in August 2011, maintaining consistently low approval during the months to come (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 22). As the public opinion surveys demonstrate, the students' savvy use of framing gained strong and sustained public support for the movement. This, in turn, led to the next large sustaining factor for the movement, the participation of allies.}
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**Allies**

During the following months, the *universitarios* attracted many different groups of allies. First to lend support to protests in May 2011 were the National Workers’ Council (CUT), and the Teachers’ Federation (Pousadela 2013a, 687; Somma 2012). Next to join in the protests in June were student organizations from private universities, who were not a part of the CONFECH (Ponce Lara 2022, 22). The CONFECH was composed at that time of student organizations from the 25 “traditional universities,” that is, the state universities and private universities that were incorporated prior to 1981 that form the *Universidades del Consejo de Rectores* – Universities of the Rectors’ Council. Private universities founded post-1981 were not members of the CONFECH in 2011. Student organizations from these universities joined the protests, along with teachers’ unions, high school
students, the public employees’ union, various politicians from the *Concertación* (the center-left governing coalition that held a majority in Congress), individual left-wing political parties, and eventually, rectors of public universities.

Bellei and Cabalin observe that recruiting allies was a central part of the political strategy of the students: “students organized a comprehensive political strategy, extending their collaborative networks and involving additional stakeholders, such as the teachers’ union, workers’ unions of various labor sectors, and several civil society organizations” (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 115). Somma cites the wide variety of allies involved with this cycle of mobilization, including “not only students but also their families, workers, environmental activists, indigenous peoples, and a heterogenous mass of citizens disgruntled with the political and economic system” (Somma 2012, 296). Over the course of the year, the university students were able to recruit allies and sustain alliances, greatly broadening the scope of demands and enlarging the number of participants in protest events.

Arguably, the most important alliance was the alliance between the student organizations themselves. Every university has its own student organization, meant to represent the interests of the students at that particular university. The university student organizations are grouped under an umbrella organization, the CONFECH, a horizontally-structured organization that represented all of the traditional 25 universities at the time. Students strengthened alliances with the secondary high school students’ organizations as well once the high school students joined the mobilizations. This base of strong alliances between student organizations across the country served the students well, it allowed them to make
use of the broad variety of resources each individual student organization brought to the campaign.

Several student leaders cited the alliances with the teachers and rectors as being most important to their cause. Giorgio Jackson, president of the FEUC, the student organization of the Pontifical Catholic University in Santiago, stated in an interview:

>. . . the Teachers’ Federation, on the one hand, the secondary students, and also the rectors, give different types of benefits to the student movement as a whole. The teachers because they have a national scope, it is extremely important, they are [working] in the schools, they can lead discussions. The rectors because they helped us in terms of mainstreaming, when a rector is mobilized it is when there is something wrong, it is not common for a rector to mobilize. With the secondary students, because they give us strength, they are the ones who took the most people out into the streets, by far”. 9

Camilo Ballesteros, president of the University of Santiago student federation in 2011, concurred about the importance of these alliances:

Another alliance that rescued us a lot is the one with the rectors . . . With the rectors, generally all federations had full agreements, the most radical [students] were the ones had a closer relationship with the rectors . . . and finally I value (although sometimes it is seen as a weakness) the relationship with the College of Teachers [the teachers’ union] very much, firstly because it has money, it is able to finance a march, a performance, etc. And second, the College of Teachers allowed us to make a qualitative leap, from student marches to marches for education. 10

Indeed, the government often contacts the Teachers’ union and the Council of Rectors when attempting to engage in dialogue and negotiations with students and teachers. They are respected organizations with resources and a clear hierarchy, and government officials know that they can contact these organizations and rely

9 Interview with Giorgio Jackson by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, October 10, 2014.
10 Interview with Camilo Ballesteros by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, October 7, 2014.
on the organizations representing the demands and opinions of the teachers and rectors. Thus, these two organizations are important allies for the students, as they are respected and recognized by the government as legitimate organizations and the government is willing to engage in negotiations and dialogue with them.

Other important alliances were with the labor unions, and these were alliances that student organizations, the FECH (University of Chile) in particular, purposely cultivated. Fabián Arenada served as the Vice-President of the FECH in 2012. He spoke about the deliberate strategy of the organization to strengthen ties with the unions, a strategy that was continued from prior years:

Then particularly my role, understanding that I was the second in charge was to make a direct link between the Federation and the world of work, i.e., unions ... what we call multisectorality (...) I did much of this fieldwork, going to protests by unions, accompanying the workers for their disputes, making myself present and participating in local territorial conflicts, with the people, that role is that we wanted to give the post [of the Vice-Presidency] (Areneda 2014).¹¹ Thus, students displayed learning from prior cycles of mobilization and purposely cultivated allies that they believed would be best able to help them advance their cause.

**Analysis**

Many scholars that study the student movement in Chile underestimate the effects the Chilean Winter had on Chilean politics and political institutions. Frequently, the mobilizations are seen to have been ineffective or minimally effective if all of the students’ demands were not met. The 2011 student movement

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¹¹ Interview with Fabián Arenada by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, October 20, 2014.
has been evaluated in a largely negative manner in the academic literature because the largest demands, those demanding structural economic and political change, were not met.

Some scholars, Salinas and Fraser among them, acknowledge some effects from the 2011 movement, such as Congress passing a budget for 2012 that “included a substantial increase in education funding . . . scholarships for 40% of the most vulnerable students and increased student loans at lower interest rates” while negating the overall effects of the changes, arguing that “[t]hese were minor, last-minute victories for the students, still far from the structural policy changes for which they had aimed” (Salinas and Fraser 2012, 23). Pousadela also takes a more pessimistic view of the effects of the 2011 mobilizations, writing, “. . . it can be argued that the student movement moved beyond pure protest in order to advance a few (admittedly underdeveloped) proposals – including that of a tax reform that would allow for funding to materialize in the quantities needed for a deep educational reform to take place” (Pousadela 2013a, 698).

Gregory Elacqua also subscribes to the idea that the students’ protests have not been very effective, writing, “Adept at shaping public opinion, the students have been much less successful at influencing policy” (Elacqua 2012, 2). Yet, Elacqua continues on and notes in the same article that several demands have been translated into bills in Congress, “Congress has undertaken a number of initiatives to try to translate the movement’s demands into legislative actions”, including initiatives to end for-profit universities, expanded student grants and lower interest rates for student loans. Espinoza and González write, “. . . because many
of the changes proposed by the students were systemic in nature (e.g. free education and end to profit) and implied a substantive change in the current economic model in front of [which] the government wasn’t willing to compromise” (Espinoza and González 2013, 13). This grim view of the effects the movement has had is quite common in the literature about the Chilean student movement, and it can be argued that placing responsibility with the student protesters to formulate alternative policies and systems is not a very accurate way of analyzing the effects of the mobilizations. Responsibility for crafting policy lies with policymakers, and holding the students responsible for providing alternative policies that are thorough and complex as part of their demands for change is not a realistic expectation. Nevertheless, students did have some basic policies formulated as suggestions for the government. These policy suggestions have been critiqued as underdeveloped, for the most part.

A careful analysis shows that the effects of the 2011 student mobilizations were greater than the overly-pessimistic evaluation common among academics. First, perhaps most importantly, students and student leaders became significant political actors in their own right. Bellei and Cabalin observe,

[a]fter months of public demonstrations, students became more than protesters in the streets; they became political actors with a clear agenda of transformation and a coherent discourse about justice in education. Consequently, leaders of the students’ movement were recognized by policy makers as relevant players in the educational policy debate. For example, the Minister of Education negotiated directly with these leaders to create a first set of policies to answer their demands; then, the Chilean Congress invited them to discuss the 2012 National Budget Law (Bellei, Cabalin, and Orellana 2014). Comparatively speaking, it is difficult to think of another country whose government considers high school and university students as actors who should be
consulted about educational policy. Student leaders are viewed as important actors by the government, which meets with and negotiates with them. Student organizations frequently interact with the government, which makes proposals in an effort to meet the students’ demands. The transformation from merely student activists to key players who are consulted and negotiated with in the policymaking process should not be underestimated. Through their activism, students have increased their power and input into the system itself, becoming crucial actors in the areas they seek to influence.

In addition to being regarded as serious actors in the political arena by the government, the students converted their activism into concrete political action. Many of the student leaders became players in the government, running successful campaigns for various offices. A few former student leaders won seats in Congress, utilizing the skills they learned as leaders of their respective organizations and mobilizations to create successful political campaigns. Giorgio Jackson, president of the Pontifical Catholic University’s student organization in 2011, ran a successful campaign for Congress and was elected to the House of Deputies in November 2013 with 45.54% of the vote (S.E.d. Chile 2019). Jackson founded his own political party, Revolución Democrática, in January of 2012, shortly after the end of the 2011 mobilizations (Ponce Lara 2023, 67). Camila Vallejo, the president of the University of Chile’s student federation in 2010 and 2011, had always been an active member of the Communist Party, holding several leadership positions in the party’s youth division. Vallejo also ran a successful campaign for Congress, and was elected as a Deputy with 41% of the vote in 2013 (S.E.d. Chile 2019). Gabriel
Boric, president of the FECH (University of Chile) in 2011 and 2012, was elected to the House of Deputies as an independent, representing a district in the Magallanes region in the south of Chile, with 26.18% of the vote (S.E.d. Chile 2019). A student leader from Concepción, Karol Cariola, who was president of the University of Concepción’s student organization, was also elected to the House of Deputies in 2013, with 38.47% of the vote (S.E.d. Chile 2019). Camilo Ballesteros, the president of the University of Santiago of Chile’s student federation, ran an unsuccessful campaign to become mayor of the municipality Estacion Central in the Santiago Metropolitan Region in 2012, losing by fewer than 1,000 votes (S.E.d. Chile 2019). Ballesteros worked for Bachelet during her second presidential campaign, as the representative of her Youth Branch. This work would later result in a government position – Ballesteros served as the Director of the Division of Social Organizations during Michelle Bachelet’s second term. Hence, one of the major effects of the student movement in 2011 was to ensure that students had several voices in government, with the election or appointment of many former student leaders to official government positions.

Perhaps the most far-reaching effect of the 2011 cycle of mobilization was that the students completely changed the public political discourse, and thus, the policy agenda for future governments. Students brought the issue of social justice in education to the forefront. Bellei and Cabalin write,

Moreover, [the students’] discourse reflected notions of social justice in education, by rejecting the subsidiary role of the state in education, promoting universal non-discriminatory access to free education, and requesting progressive tax reform to publicly fund education (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 115).
Displaying learning from prior cycles of mobilization in 2001 and 2006, the students completely reframed the public debate over education, emphasizing the neglect of the state in protecting education as a right all citizens should enjoy. This reframing was crucial, as it put the responsibility for educational reform squarely on the state, and putting the onus on government officials to directly address the issues the students were raising. The students effectively “re-politiciz[ed] public discussion about issues related to education and social equality” (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 115). Not only did the students force the issue of educational reform to the forefront of public political debate in Chile, they also enlarged the debate, expanding upon their rights-based framing to include a wider critique of the political and economic systems themselves. “The political strategy of the movement allowed for the integration of different social demands in a national movement for education” (Lustig, Mizala, and Silva 2012, 223). The expansion of the student movement to a nationwide, citizen movement was a significant accomplishment.

The critiques of the neoliberal economic system and the political system that were integrated into the students’ demands were integrated fully into the policy debate. Structural changes became a critical issue for Congress and the executive at the time, and debates about structural changes continue to the present day in Chile. Neoliberalism, once thought to be Chile’s saving grace, was swiftly put on trial in the court of public opinion and judged to be the cause of many issues in the country. Debates centered around the issues the neoliberal economic system caused, such as severe inequality in incomes and educational quality. Students introduced a debate about structural issues that had not been fully parsed in the
public eye as of yet, and these debates and the changes that are necessary to lessen the effects of severe inequality in Chile continue to this day and have spurred countless subsequent mobilizations.

... students asked for structural changes, such as a stronger state role in regulating and controlling educational institutions, a new system of public funding for education, reinforcement of the public universities, and the effective exclusion of for-profit organizations as educational providers at all levels. All these issues because part of the educational policy debate in Chile, and both the Government and the Parliament have discussed different proposals to tackle them (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 115).

Neoliberalism became a central focus of the public political dialogue, and issues of equality in education took center stage after 2011. Michelle Bachelet made education the cornerstone of her presidential campaign, and she adopted all of the demands made by the student movement as campaign promises (Guzmán Concha 2017). Bellei and Cabalin argue that the ability of the student movement to strongly affect the policy debate and policy decisions was a significant change for Chile. The authors claim that the students had an effect far beyond the field of education, “[t]he debate about education in Chile has been linked to larger social concerns, such as Chile’s unequal economic model and the country’s lack of participatory institutional structures” (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 118). Espinoza and González agree, noting that “... it is clear that [the students] planted a seed of transformation in actual society that could take place most likely in the midterm under a more democratic government that understand[s] education as the main vehicle for social mobility and cohesion in the contemporary world” (Espinoza and González 2013, 13). In fact, the demands would spiral into coherent critiques of the neoliberal economic model, the inequality it created, and the lack of participatory
and democratic institutional structures. Subsequent cycles of mobilization would emphasize these issues throughout the decade.

In order to expand the critique from a focus on educational policy to a critique of the system as a whole and the inequality it creates, the students engaged in significant planning, formulating strategies to help them achieve their goals. Bellei and Cabalin write,

... students organized a comprehensive political strategy, extending their collaborative networks and involving additional stakeholders, such as the teachers’ union, workers’ unions of various labor sectors, and several civil society organizations. Student organizations and some of the leaders of the movement published brief policy documents and disseminated information extensively through traditional and new media (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 115). Students engaged in deliberate and savvy political strategies to expand their claims in order to include the majority of societal actors, strategies that were largely successful as the complaints resonated with the majority of Chilean citizens. While most analysts evaluate the movement pessimistically based on a lack of large-scale structural changes, students did lay the groundwork for a national conversation in which the structures of both the economic and political systems were called into question. By deliberately cultivating support from a wide swath of social and political actors, the students laid a foundation for demanding more structural change.

Demands vs. Changes

While the students were unable to achieve their ultimate goal of structural change, many of their demands were addressed via policy and institutional changes. Free higher education was not a demand that was immediately met,
however, when Michelle Bachelet ran for president for the second time in 2013, her main campaign promise was free higher education, a direct result of the 2011 mobilizations. When she took power for the second time in 2014, Bachelet immediately put forth a set of 10 proposals to modify education (Guzmán Concha 2017; Seiler and Raderstorf 2018). In this package were a proposal to make higher education at state universities free within six years and a plan to end profit in education, both demands frequently made by the students in 2011. Bachelet passed a corporate tax reform, enabling her to fund free higher education for the poorest 60%, with an eventual goal of covering 100% of students (Hurtado 2018). The same bill that established free higher education also established two new governmental institutions, a sub-secretariat for higher education, charged with overseeing the new system of free state higher education, and a Superintendency of Higher Education. The Superintendency was created to oversee accreditation of higher education institutions and is also “empowered to supervise and penalize institutions which do not provide quality of education or have for-profit operations” (Hurtado 2018). Thus, the law directly addressed another of the students’ demands: better oversight of universities, including monitoring quality and accreditation. The bill also included increased funding for state universities, meeting yet another student demand. While the students did see delayed effects, such as these, there were also many effects that were more immediate.

**Demands**

The students’ principal demands can be put into four broad categories: equal access to higher education; better funding of higher education, democratization and regulation of higher education, and a catchall category of
other demands. All demands were made with the CONFECH’s principal objective in mind:

To build an educational system guaranteed in the constitution as a universal social right in all its levels, based upon a system of public education that is democratic, pluralistic, free, and of high quality, oriented towards the production of knowledge for an integral and egalitarian development and to the satisfaction of the needs of Chile and its people (CONFECH 2011c, 1).

Regarding equal opportunities in access to education, students called for a better, more equitable admissions process, which involved retiring the university admissions standardized test and adding additional considerations to the admissions process in order to level the playing field (CONFECH 2011b).

Admission to university in Chile in 2011 depended on the results of the PSU, the *Prueba de Selección Universitaria* (University Selection Test). The standardized test, meant to measure general knowledge and given only once a year, is used along with high school grades and class rankings to determine admissions to all of the 25 traditional universities and to some private universities as well. Until 2012, the test was the only determinant of admissions, grades and class rank were not considered (another change spurred by the protests, albeit this change was implemented by the Consejo de Rectores, the Chilean university chancellors’ organization, as the government does not determine admissions standards). The test has been widely criticized for starkly reflecting the quality of education in Chile, in that the students who score in the lower ranges on the test are generally from lower-middle to lower economic classes, and live in poorer comunas with fewer resources for schools. Universities weight the test and high school grades differently in the admissions process, depending on the university and on the
major the student intends to pursue. Thus, different universities and different undergraduate programs within universities assign varying importance to the test scores for admission. The test had been considered problematic for years, and had been changed slightly in an attempt to address critiques, but until the change instituted by the chancellors in 2012, it was the sole determiner of admissions, and this was the case in 2011. Students demanded fairer criteria for admissions, primarily that the PSU was not the single determinant of admissions and choice of majors in universities (Bustamante 2011).

The last demand in the category of equal opportunities in access to university education was that the state guarantee access and adequate study conditions for people with disabilities. Chile has been slow to accommodate people with disabilities in general, but a law was passed in 2010 (Law 20.422) that specifically states, “It is the duty of the State to promote equal opportunities for people with disabilities” (G.o. Chile 2010). The law outlined measures to address discrimination, accessibility, and harassment in the country.

The second category of demands relates to the financing of higher education. The main demand was to “[r]aise public spending on Higher Education as a percentage of GDP to meet demands, without detriment to existing social benefits . . .” (CONFECH 2011c, 1). CONFECH was very specific about how they wanted to see this accomplished, including increasing baseline spending of funding that fell under the category of “free disposition,” meaning that the funding was not connected to performance indicators. This demand included an insistence on priority for state universities, and a request to include funds dedicated
exclusively to wage readjustments of state university workers as civil servants (CONFECH 2011c, 1).

In addition to funding that was not dependent upon performance indicators, students emphasized the need for a “revitalization fund” for the 25 traditional CRUCH universities, adding that priority must be given to state universities and universities that serve vulnerable student populations. The universitarios also requested a restructuring of the student loan and scholarship systems. The Petitorio Final (Final Petition) released by CONFECH in late June 2011 stipulated that the system’s method of allocating scholarships and loans should be changed from the current method, which measured economic status in quintiles, to a system that uses deciles, and that the system should cover the costs of those in the first six deciles completely, and adjust funds to the top four deciles according to their ability to pay (CONFECH 2011c). Other suggestions for the scholarship and loan system included: adjustments for CPI, incorporating family expenses as a part of the qualification for benefits, that allocation of benefits be done solely according to economic (not academic) criteria, increasing the amount of food and housing benefits, and accounting for the differing costs of living in all of the areas of the country (CONFECH 2011c, 2). Other demands in the area of financing was a more general demand to ensure free higher education and end the self-financing of higher education, putting an end to the indebtedness of Chilean families. They also called for an end to the government-backed private loan system, requesting that the government create a system of “Solidarity Funds” for all higher education institutions that operate as non-profit entities, and eliminating private
banks from the equation completely. Yet another demand was that the state create a national state network for technical education and address the lack of quality in technical and professional training in Chile.

Students proposed tax reform to finance these demands, insisting that the government should renationalize the copper industry and that the income tax law, particularly taxes on profits made by businesses, be reformed to increase the contributions of businesses to the state’s coffers. Finally, the students demanded that the government make the student transportation pass valid on a national level, at a set and frozen student fare level, and free for secondary students. The students wanted the transportation pass to be valid 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, with no further restrictions on it being used solely for trips with educational purposes. They also wanted the card to be valid for use for intercity travel (CONFECH 2011c, 2).

Regarding the democratization and regulation of higher education, CONFECH demanded the repeal of specific articles in a 2010 law, which prohibited students and officials from participating in administrative (decision-making) bodies in universities. The students demanded that the state assure their right to participate in their collegiate bodies, in the election of individual university authorities, and in the overall decision-making process. Lastly, they demanded that the state ensure “the freedom of expression, professorship, and association for students, professors, and workers in all institutions, so that constitutional rights are not further violated” (CONFECH 2011c, 6).
Another principal demand in the area of democratization and regulation of higher education was that of the accreditation of universities, including institutional transparency, professorial freedom, tolerance, and pluralism (CONFECH 2011b). Accreditation in Chile has been inconsistent and plagued with accusations of bias and bribery. The Ministry of Education is responsible for approving new universities via Recognición Oficial (Official Recognition), which is conducted by the Consejo Nacional de Educación (National Education Council, or CNE), an arm of the Ministry. Two national commissions oversee the process of accreditation: the Comisión Nacional de Acreditación (National Accreditation Commission, or CNA), which is responsible for undergraduate programs and institutions, and the Comisión Nacional de Acreditación de la Calidad de Programas de Postgrado (National Commission for the Accreditation of Quality of Graduate Programs, or CONAP), which handles graduate programs and institutions. The CNA was created in 2006 to replace an earlier version of the commission created in 1999. University accreditation in Chile is voluntary (with the exception of the fields of medicine and teacher training), and can be sought at the academic program or the institutional level. While private universities were authorized by decree in 1982, the accreditation bodies have only existed since 1999. Initially, only academic programs could be accredited, and institutional accreditation began in 2003 (World Education Services, Education in Chile 2013). Students may only receive government-backed or guaranteed student loans if they attend an accredited institution, thus accreditation status is of critical importance to students who must borrow to attend university (the majority of students in Chile must take out loans, Chile’s universities are among the most expensive in the
world, relative to average incomes). Therefore, accreditation also affects students in the area of equality of access to higher education.

The CNA is composed of academics appointed by various entities (the president of Chile, the Council of Rectors, private universities, technical universities, the social welfare institute, the scientific research institute of the government), one business professional selected by the commission, two students selected by student organizations, the head of the higher education division of the Ministry of Education, and an executive secretary (CNA-Chile 2018). The student members were added after the 2011 protests, as was the head of the higher education division of MINEDUC (the Ministry of Education), whose governmental position was created as a result of the 2011 protests (Pousadela 2013). The accrediting body has been plagued by accusations of conflict of interest, corruption, and bribery, and a former president of the CNA was imprisoned for corruption and bribery related to deals he made to consult for universities that were later accredited (Gonzalez 2012). Students demanded more transparency in the accreditation process, and that the CNA account for things such as professorial freedom, tolerance, and pluralism in the process (CONFEC 2011b).

One central demand that was carried over from the 2006 Revolución Pingüina and expanded upon was the demand to end profit in education. Students argued that they have a right to education, and that they are students, not consumers. Many private universities were known for having a poor-quality education, and this was evident throughout elementary and secondary institutions, as well. Students demanded stronger oversight and regulation of private
educational institutions, and demanded that the law against profiting from an educational institution be enforced (CONFECH 2011c). Many universities and other private educational institutions operated using loopholes to distribute profits to their stakeholders, a well-known “secret.” Students demanded that the law banning profit in education, which already existed, be enforced in reality. Additionally, CONFECH specifically proposed the creation of a Superintendency of Education, which would have the power to sanction universities and educational institutions that did not comply with the anti-profit law.

Continuing their tactic of internationalizing the movement, CONFECH called upon the government to abide by the international treaties that Chile had ratified. In the Petitorio Final, CONFECH elaborated their demand that the government “[c]onstitutionally guarantee the right to education under the international treaties ratified by Chile that are in force, such as the agreement about economic, social, and cultural rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, among others” (CONFECH 2011c, 6). This demand was purposeful framing of the students’ demands as lawful and rights-based; a tactic that has been demonstrated to be quite effective for social mobilizations in the past.

The second demand in the other/catchall category was a call for a constituent assembly to reform the constitution. The constitution in Chile was written by Pinochet’s administration and was approved in 1980. It is widely acknowledged to have many antidemocratic elements, and has been revised at least twenty times since the end of the dictatorship, but revisions require a supermajority in Congress (4/7ths) and are difficult to achieve. There have been
strong drives in the past to replace the constitution completely, which had strong public support and strong opposition from political parties on the right. Michelle Bachelet expressed plans for a constitutional convention, to begin the process of writing a new constitution, during her second term as president in April 2015 ("Bachelet Anuncia Que en Septiembre Iniciará "Proceso Constituyente" y Da a Conocer Medidas Anticorrupción" 2015). An in-depth public process was conducted, input was solicited and received from citizens, and the administration wrote and submitted a draft of a new constitution to Congress. The draft was submitted only days before Bachelet’s second term ended, thus, there was nobody in office to follow up on the project and push it through to approval (Muñoz and Román 2019). It subsequently floundered and died in Congress. Students pushed for the vision of a new constitution to be made a reality.

Secondary students also submitted demands to the government in 2011. These included: constitutional reform to guarantee the right to education and equal, secular, free, and quality education in all educational institutions in Chile; the recentralization (de-municipalization and nationalization) of education; a standardized and equal curriculum for all public schools; the repeal of the LGE (General Education Law); make the student transportation pass valid nationally for 365 days a year; establish a concrete plan to reconstruct schools damaged by the 2010 earthquake with priority given to schools that suffered the most damages; and give greater protection to students at technical/professional high schools, supervising their internships and apprenticeships, and guaranteeing a minimum
Principal Responses and Changes

In the area of financing for higher education, students demanded free higher education, that the government put an end to the student loan system and increase direct public subsidies to universities in the CRUCH system until the state was funding at least 50 percent of the universities’ costs. The government proposed several things in response, including reducing interest rates on loans, rescheduling of payments for loan defaulters, creating a solidarity fund for higher education, and establishing three competitive funds (Secundarios Entregaron Petitorio al Subsecretario de Educación 2011).

First, the Piñera administration proposed a reduction in the interest rate of student loans, from 5.6 to 2.0 percent. Espinoza and González argue that this was the most visible result, however, they also point out that this measure mainly benefited students at private universities, and not the students who attended the 25 traditional CRUCH universities (Espinoza and González 2013, 10). Most students who attend private universities have government-backed loans, and thus, these students would benefit most from a decrease in the interest rate. The government proposed that the state would cover the 4.6 percent difference in interest, paying the banks that supplied the loans directly. The government also changed the administration of the student loan program, deciding to transfer administration of the program from private banks to a state agency, starting in 2012 (Espinoza and González 2013, 10). The interest rate reduction was financed
via a partial tax reform that allowed the government to raise in between $700,000,000 and 1,000,000,000 USD at once (Espinoza and González 2013, 10).

Another government proposal was to reschedule debt repayment for students who had defaulted on their loans, which would benefit approximately 110,000 former students (Espinoza and González 2013, 10). Additionally, the government proposed creating a fund of $4,000,000,000 USD for higher education and establishing three competitive funds (one to improve teacher training quality, one to support centers of innovation in science and technology, and one to reinforce regional universities) (Espinoza and González 2013). There were no immediate proposals to significantly change the regulation and oversight of universities to prevent them from profiting. However, a law passed in July 2018, discussed later in this chapter, established more rigorous oversight and accreditation requirements.

Overall, the government’s changes maintained the neoliberal ideology of market competition, greatly favoring the privatization of education. Espinoza and González write,

In synthesis, the government, despite student protests, has continued to promote the logic of privatization, of financing, postponing both the needs of the most deserving students who attend the best public universities, as well as the needs for investment in academic bodies, infrastructure and equipment at the institutional level (Espinoza and González 2013, 11).

There were no items in the budget of 2012 to finance the reconstruction of CRUCH universities after the 2010 earthquake and the direct public subsidy for CRUCH universities did not increase significantly in the 2012 budget, either. Scholarships available to be used at any university increased by 373 percent, a significant
amount, yet CRUCH universities only saw an increase in scholarships of 6.5 percent (Espinoza and González 2013, 11). Institutional development funding increased by about 12 percent and funds earmarked specifically for science and technology increased by 22 percent. Institutional and science and technology funds are open to both CRUCH and private universities (Espinoza and González 2013, 11).

Regarding the quality of education, the government made several significant changes. First, a new governmental institution was created, the Superintendency of Higher Education, meant to ensure quality in the educational system as a whole and to verify any reported irregularities in higher educational institutions (Espinoza and González 2013, 12). The National Accreditation Commission (CNA), implemented greater requirements to accredit universities. Two private universities were not re-accredited in the second half of 2011 in the first round of accreditation review (UNIACC University and SEK University), which is counter to the trend of easy and relatively quick accreditation seen before the protests. In July of 2012, the Minister of Education proposed making changes to the CNA, including designating commissioners who were totally independent from the institution. The CNA also proposed creating an ethics committee for itself (Espinoza and González 2013, 11).

In the area of equality of access, the government proposed establishing scholarships for the poorest 60 percent of students (quintiles one, two, and three); the integral restructuring of the scholarship and student aid/grant system; and promoting the use of the class ranking of graduates by secondary schools as a
criterion for higher education admissions (thus eliminating the reliance solely on the PSU) (Espinoza and González 2013, 12). A concrete result was that state resources for scholarships were increased. In fact, scholarships given to students who scored higher than 550 points on the PSU were increased by 523 percent. This change favored students from the third economic quintile, but it did not permit coverage of full tuition. Students still had to seek loans to cover the difference between the scholarship funds and the full cost of tuition (Espinoza and González 2013, 12).

Some changes were also made with regard to the state’s direct role in education. First, the government proposed creating a new Undersecretary of Education, an institutional change. This position would fall under the Ministry of Education, and had not existed prior to the 2011 mobilizations. Additionally, as previously noted, a new Superintendence of Higher Education was created, another institutional change. As Kolb notes, institutional changes are more permanent and more difficult to reverse, thus are more durable results. The administration also proposed creating a single scholarship agency, charged with administering all scholarships and grants for students. Previously, several different institutions in the government handled these programs. Additionally, the government proposed creating a system in higher education with four types of institutions: state universities, non-state “traditional” universities (created before 1980), non-traditional for-profit (private) universities, and non-traditional non-profit universities. However, out of these proposals, the only ones that were actually implemented were the Higher Education Superintendency and the
Undersecretary of Education. The bill approving the establishment of the Higher Education Superintendency was sent to Congress in late 2011 and approved shortly thereafter (Espinoza and González 2013, 12), while the bill establishing the Undersecretary of Education was sent to Congress in July 2016 and approved in May 2018 (M.d. Educación 2018).

What Influence Did They Have?

An analysis of how students gained attention and utilized different methods to achieve changes demonstrates a strong pattern of learning from prior cycles of mobilization, savvy use of framing to disseminate their message, and successful efforts to recruit powerful allies that could aid them in achieving their goals. Utilizing Kolb’s framework (Kolb 2007), we can see that students very effectively used the disruption mechanism, the public preference mechanism, and the international politics mechanism to good effect. The innovative forms of protest and the continuity of the manifestations caused much disruption to the system and garnered a lot of attention for the students and their cause. The students were very savvy with their framing, constantly portraying their fight as a fight for all of society, not just for students. This framing resonated strongly with the public, which showed very high support for the students throughout the eight months of mobilization. Later, students used the political access mechanism to great effect, four former leaders led successful campaigns for Congress, and one former student leader began working for Bachelet in the executive branch after she was elected to her second term as president.
In all of these aspects, the university students displayed learning from prior cycles of mobilization, particularly in expanding upon the message the pingüinos first communicated during 2006. They created a very specific frame, based upon rights and the need for systemic change, in order to garner public support. They were incredibly consistent with their message, that this fight was for all of Chile and its citizens, not just for students. They emphasized wanting to solve the problems of family indebtedness, of the right of all citizens to obtain a free and quality education even at the level of post-secondary education. They repeatedly and consistently stated that their movement was a social movement, not a student movement, and they gained tremendous public support as a result.

Students also purposely cultivated allies, seeking out working partnerships with those they knew would be more powerful and of more help to their cause, such as the CRUCH (University Chancellors’ organization), the Teachers’ Union, and labor unions. They worked diligently to secure help and resources from these allies, organizing many meetings and opportunities to collaborate.

In 2011, the university students also made an effort to internationalize their struggle, a tactic that had not previously been used and which was very effective. Using normative discourse on an international scale to put pressure on the administration proved to be an effective tool to use against an administration that was greatly concerned with international trade and foreign relations (because these factors had a large influence on the economy, which was the primary concern of Piñera’s administration). The students carefully analyzed what had worked and
what had not worked well for the high school students in 2001 and 2006, and crafted strategies accordingly.

The biggest effect seen falls under Kolb’s classification of the agenda impact. The mobilizations forced Piñera’s government to concentrate on educational policy and reforms, neither of which had been a priority for the administration prior to the manifestations. The government was forced to change its policy agenda to deal with the protests. The agenda was also impacted by the (forced) resignation of two education ministers. Joaquín Lavín was part of a large cabinet reshuffling by Piñera in July 2011. Lavín, the Minister of Education, had seen a 24-point drop in the approval rating of his ministry as a result of the student mobilization. Students had strongly critiqued Lavín, who founded the *Universidad de Desarrollo*, a private university known to redistribute profits to its stakeholders. Students argued that Lavín had strong conflicts of interests, as a principal stakeholder in a private university, and demanded his resignation. As a result, Piñera transferred Lavín to the Ministry of Social Development and put Felipe Bulnes in as Minister of Education (Canales 2011). Bulnes lasted until December of 2011, when he resigned, stating that he was resigning due to his

personal conviction, [and] politics, that a stage has been concluded. A cycle has been concluded, where we have advanced in very important thing . . . we have created an agenda that will [make] substantive improvements [in] education, and we have also supported this with a budget that . . . makes it possible for [these improvements] to become facts (Vargas 2011). Bulnes had enacted a strategy of transferring the debate over education to Congress, attempting to transfer the responsibility of negotiating with the students to parliamentarians. Piñera later contradicted Bulnes’ strategy, inviting students
and leaders of social and labor organizations to talks at La Moneda, demonstrating disagreement in the executive branch about how to best handle the social unrest (Montes 2011). There is a general consensus among academics that the conflict about the best way to negotiate with the students and end the protests led to Bulnes’ resignation from the Ministry of Education.

The government also made changes that reflected the alternatives impact, as defined by Kolb: effects on the content of policy proposals. Primary examples of the alternatives impact are lowering the student loan interest rates and transferring the administration of the loans to a government entity. These had not been possibilities in policy proposals before the demonstrations. Additionally, increasing funds to scholarships and student aid grants, as well as to state funds for higher education institutional development funds had not been policy proposals prior to the eight months of protests. These can be interpreted as direct results of the protests, meant to appease the students and end the social conflict.

Kolb defines the policy impact category as effects that include adoption of laws and policies or “other binding political decisions.” I argue most academics underestimate the effects the student movement of 2011 had in this area specifically. First, two institutional changes occurred: 1. the Superintendency of Education was created, via a law sent to Congress in late 2011; and 2. a new governmental position was created, the Undersecretary of Higher Education in the Ministry of Education. These are durable, lasting changes, and are difficult to reverse, as they involve institutional changes. These effects are not widely acknowledged as effects of the student movement, most likely because some of the changes were not implemented fully until years later, but they are, in fact, direct
results of the protests and have proved to be lasting changes in the Chilean political system.

The other category which saw large changes was the goods impact area, which displays effects that influence the distribution of collective or public goods. Effects in this area include: more scholarships and more funding for scholarships and student aid/grants, state funds dedicated to lowering the student loan interest rate by 4.6 percent, and additional funding for institutional development funds. This is another area in which effects from the protests are generally underestimated by scholars. Many researchers discount the actual effects because the students did not achieve free higher education for all during Piñera’s term. This demonstrates why it is important to examine effects in all impact areas, and why it is crucial to recognize that all effects from mobilization are not immediate. Bachelet made education the cornerstone of her presidential campaign and implemented a plan to make higher education at CRUCH universities tuition free by the year 2020 (Bachelet 2005; Guzmán Concha 2017; Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011; Montes 2014).

Regarding outcomes, the 2011 manifestations prompted several effects in the area of institutional outcomes. In reference to procedural changes, the sustained mobilization campaign distinctly changed how the government chose to deal with protesters. As mentioned previously in this chapter, the government was forced to take the students and their demands more seriously after months of sustained action on the part of the public. Students were invited to negotiate directly with government officials and were included in the policymaking process, even being invited to take part in the debate about the national budget for 2012.
when it was presented before Congress. Also noted previously, the higher education accrediting institution made some changes to its structure, proposing the creation of an ethics committee. The accreditation process was changed, as detailed below, and institutions were required to apply for accreditation at the institutional level. Quality assurance factors were also integrated into the requirements for accreditation.

Some changes that were more temporary, but nevertheless were effects of the movement, were the resignations of two Ministers of Education. Minister Joaquín Lavín, Piñera’s first Minister of Education, was forced to resign when students repeatedly demanded his resignation after it came to light that he was a co-owner of a private university that illegally distributed profits to its stakeholders. Students noted his conflict of interest in dealing with their demands about enforcing the no-profit law, and the pressure eventually resulted in his resignation. Lavín was replaced by Felipe Bulnes in mid-July 2011. Bulnes submitted his resignation in late December, citing personal reasons. Most analysts speculate that Bulnes resigned due to Piñera’s disappointment in his handling of the manifestations and due to his clashes with Piñera over how to deal directly with the students, which can be considered an indirect effect. Harald Beyer replaced Bulnes, and held the position until April of 2013, when he was impeached via a Constitutional Accusation in Congress. Beyer was found guilty of neglecting his duties due to a failure to uphold the law against profiting from higher education institutions (Emol 2013). Students had maintained pressure on the government about the law against profit since the end of the 2011 cycle of mobilization, thus, they can be said to have had some influence in the impeachment of Beyer, although
it would be erroneous to give students complete credit for this action, which prevented Beyer from holding elected office for five years after his impeachment. While this effect cannot be wholly attributed to student mobilization, the pressure that students maintained on the government and on politicians in Congress certainly contributed to the filing of the Constitutional Accusation against Beyer.

The most striking examples of outcomes, however, fall in the area of state transformation. As Kolb notes, these types of effects and changes are the most difficult to achieve, but are the most durable. Kolb notes that certain types of changes/effects that fall in this category constitute state transformation, writing, “social movements can cause state transformation by altering the relationships between political institutions, or through the creation of new sub-institutions” (Kolb 2007, 34). One particularly significant effect of the 2011 mobilizations was the creation of the Undersecretary of Higher Education, a new sub-institution in the Ministry of Education. The creation of this sub-institution was a direct result of the mobilization, as stated by the Piñera administration. This effect was another delayed effect, the proposed law was sent to Congress in July 2016, and finally approved in May 2018 (M.d. Educación 2018). Additionally, Law 21.091, which established this position, contained additional modifications to the accreditation system and greater oversight of universities with the aim of preventing profitmaking in higher education.

Law 21.091 defines education as a universal right, “the provision of which must be available to all people, according to their abilities and merits, without arbitrary discrimination” (M.d. Educación 2018). It specifically creates the position of the Undersecretary of Higher Education, with separate subdepartments
for both technical and university education. Additionally, the law creates a “System for Access to Higher Education,” charged with establishing processes and tools for the admissions application process. This area was developing processes, policies, and instruments to apply to the university admissions process in 2021. The law also addresses developing a specific set of qualifications for technical training programs, another demand advanced by students. Perhaps more significantly, the law stipulates specific changes to be made to the accreditation process conducted by the CNA, making university (institutional) accreditation mandatory for all higher education institutions in Chile. As previously noted in this chapter, institutional accreditation was optional before the passage of Law 21.091, and students could not apply for scholarships or grants backed by or funded by the government if they chose to attend a private university that was not accredited. The law adds another component to the accreditation process, that of Internal Quality Assurance, an attempt to address the students’ concerns about widely varying quality of education at different institutions. Regarding specific academic programs, the accreditation of several programs was changed to be mandatory (doctoral programs, education, medicine, and dentistry programs). The remaining academic programs continue to be voluntary accreditation, however, the programs are unable to receive state funds if they choose not to accredit (M.d. Educación 2018). The law also strengthens the oversight capabilities of the previously established Superintendency of Education, in an effort to combat profitmaking in higher education institutions, one of the principal demands of the students in 2011.
Conclusions

The student mobilizations of 2011 were the largest and most sustained mobilizations since the return to democracy in 1990. While many scholars tend to evaluate the effects of the mobilizations negatively because the students did not achieve the significant changes to the political and economic systems that compromised the foundation of their critiques, the overly-negative analysis is unwarranted. Examining the effects of the mobilizations over a longer term, and analyzing the changes made in greater detail reveals that the mobilizations were more effective in having their demands met than prior academic analysis would suggest.

Students saw more outcomes favorable to their cause when their demands fell in the area of education, as one of my hypotheses suggests. Many effects in the area of educational policy and processes have been observed, including: changes in scholarships and grant funding that expanded access to both; changes to accreditation processes; the establishment of new governmental sub-institutions and government positions within institutions to improve oversight and development of higher education; and the eventual passage of a law guaranteeing free higher education during Michelle Bachelet’s second term. Granted, the students were more successful in having effects on lower-level policies, such as interest rates for loans and available amounts for government-backed or -provided funding. However, Bachelet’s adoption of the goal of free higher education for all was also a very powerful effect that eventually resulted in free higher education at
the 25 traditional universities. Many academic articles were written shortly after the end of the 2011 protests, and thus were unable to account for these changes.

Students did not have many allies in Piñera’s government, which was conservative and which contained Ministers who also held ownership in private educational institutions. Opposition politicians in Congress supported the students’ cause, however, and were instrumental in effecting certain changes, such as the impeachment of Minister of Education Harald Beyer. Concurring with the hypothesis that the more allies social movements have in government, the more likely they are to have effects on policies and institutions, the student movement had many allies in Bachelet’s government, and saw large changes enacted after she took office for the second time. Also supported by this hypothesis, Bachelet was publicly supportive of the students and their demands for change, making it more probable that their demands would be met. In fact, she adopted many of the principal demands for her campaign and policy agenda in her second term.

Another hypothesis, that students will see more effects in the political and economic realms when they ally with other actors, such as unions and professional organizations, and when public opinion is favorable to the student movement, is not well supported by the 2011 mobilizations. While students enjoyed overwhelming and consistent public support, and while they carefully cultivated powerful allies from labor unions and teachers’ and chancellors’ unions, they were less successful in effecting change in the political and economic realms. Effects in this realm included planting the need to restructure the political and economic systems in the public consciousness, and informing the public about the extensive damages neoliberal economic policies had caused Chile and its citizens. While the
government did not take action to change the economic and political systems during the mobilizations of 2011, changes to the voting system were made in 2015, when a bill was passed to reform the electoral system (Interior 2015; Gamboa and Morales 2016). The law eliminated the binomial electoral system, implementing a proportional system, and also increased the numbers of Congressmembers in both chambers (Interior 2015). While the change cannot be directly attributed to student mobilizations, the students were certainly responsible for bringing issues with the political system, such as the binomial electoral system, to the forefront of public debate.

In fact, the issues raised by the students in 2011 have had long-lasting effects on public discourse. Debates about the negative effects of the neoliberal economic system continue to the present day in Chile, and in October 2019 high school students began protesting a rise in the public transportation fare, prompting a subsequent massive explosion of social unrest. The public at large took to the streets en masse, questioning the economic system, inequality, the pension system, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a very small sector of the population, the quality of health care and private insurance, equality of access and quality of education, the failure of the political elites to listen to the concerns of the public, etc., all themes related to the neoliberal economic system and underrepresentation by politicians. As of March 2020, the government has agreed to hold a plebiscite on whether Chile should write and enact a new Constitution, a proposal supported by an overwhelming majority of Chileans. Protests continued even after the arrival of COVID-19, only finally dissipating when the government instituted quarantines as a public health measure. A public opinion survey conducted in November 2019
showed that 80 percent of Chileans were in favor of creating a new Constitution (Desconcierto 2019). Again, while these changes are not directly attributable to the student mobilizations of 2011, it is certain that the students raised these topics in public debate, and continued to push for action in these areas. Continued cycles of mobilization, post-2011, kept the topic in the center of public debate, which undoubtedly contributed to the current surge in social unrest.

Three hypotheses address the manner of protest and negotiations that students employ. One argues that students will have the most impact on policy implementation when they use multiple methods of influence, e.g., disruption, persuasion, and bargaining; and the second, related hypothesis states that innovation in protest tactics and techniques will result in more favorable outcomes. As previously discussed, students used a wide variety of disruptive techniques in their manifestations, employing great creativity in implementing new forms of protest that were peaceful and garnered much public attention and support. The ability to keep the public interested, engaged, and invested in the outcomes of the protests was a large effect for the students. The variety in and creativity of protest events significantly contributed to maintaining public interest during 2011, and contributed to much public pressure on the government to address student demands (Ponce Lara 2017, 2022). The second hypothesis argues that students will see more effects when they use disruptive tactics, such as protests, demonstrations, takeovers (paros), parlayzations, and strikes. Students tactically used a wide variety of disruptive tactics, the majority of which were marches, paralyzations, takeovers, strikes, and protest events. Tactics such as street or highway barriers were also used to good effect.
The third hypothesis deals with negotiation and contact with government officials, arguing that the more contact students have with government officials, the more likely the officials will be to meet their demands. Direct contact with government officials varied over the course of the eight months of protests. Initially, the Minister of Education, Lavín, was willing to negotiate with the students and to consider significant reforms. However, an article from El Mostrador entitled, “Lavín Caught Between La Moneda and the Crushing Force of the Student Movement,” is typical of the press coverage at the time. The proposals of the Minister of Education must be approved by the President before a decision is reached, limiting the autonomy and possible action by the Minister. It was widely reported that Lavín and Piñera had fundamental disagreements about which reforms were necessary, and how much reform should be implemented. El Mostrador expounds,

Lavín is ready for deep reform but the President is not. Piñera wants to do what he promised and nothing else, it is his way [or the highway]. That’s why Lavín is in a bad political position, [the administration doesn’t allow him to] choose the necessary path to get out of the crisis. The option to [exit the conflict] is to be authorized to make a serious reform, that is, to give [Lavín] the mandate to move forward. And Piñera is not in that position today. And the worst part is that it is not known how much further Piñera is going to have to fall [in popularity] to enter into political sensibility (Schnitzer 2011). The press reported on this conflict between Piñera and Lavín, noting their differing views on how to approach the students and about what level of reform was necessary. Lavín did meet with students many times, and put forth proposals. However, as a result of the conflict between him and Piñera about which reforms were necessary, the proposals Lavín gave the students were watered-down versions of the reforms he believed to be necessary. The
students, naturally, took offense when the proposals were, in their opinion, woefully insufficient. Additionally, Lavín was not authorized to negotiate in good faith, in that Piñera insisted that he approach the students a second time with essentially the same proposals he had put forth the first time, a move the students saw as negotiating in bad faith. Thus, while the hypothesis suggests that more contact with government officials will result in a greater probability of demands being met, this particular situation was complicated by the dueling opinions of the President and the Minister of Education. As a result, even though Lavín was willing to meet with students and have significant contact to negotiate, students lost faith in his ability to extend meaningful proposals as a result of the restraint he was forced to show due to Piñera’s unwillingness to engage in deeper reforms. Students eventually refused to meet further with Lavín because they believed him to be negotiating in bad faith.

Felipe Bulnes, who followed Lavín as Minister of Education, attempted to deal with Piñera’s reluctance to compromise by re-centering the negotiations and debate around the issues raised by the students. He also met and negotiated with the students, and did propose 21 measures to address the demands, in which was included the proposal to establish the Secretariat of Education. When this set of proposals was also rejected by student activists as not sufficiently addressing their demands, Bulnes accused the students of being “intransigent” and “uncompromising,” and sought another way to channel the negotiations and demands (Cooperativa.cl 2011). Bulnes invited the students to debate and negotiate
in Congress, attempting an alternative strategy for quelling the manifestations (Bustamante 2011).

Congress issued an invitation to the students to participate in a dialogue table, which was refused by the CONFECH. Students did appear before the National Congress in Valparaíso, participating in the debate about the educational budget for the year 2012. Students also accepted an invitation to participate in debate in front of the Senate’s Education Committee, about a proposed law to prohibit state funds from going to educational entities that pursue profit (Guzmán 2011). Further evidence of conflict within La Moneda emerged about two weeks later, however, when President Piñera invited the students to negotiate with him at La Moneda (Montes 2011).

Therefore, during the 2011 mobilizations, students did not necessarily have many allies in the executive branch. However, they did have two Ministers of Education who were more willing to enter into negotiations and compromise about necessary reforms. The efforts of those ministers were thwarted by Piñera’s unwillingness to compromise and engage in significant reform, which brought most negotiations to a stalemate. As a result, this hypothesis was not supported with regard to the 2011 mobilizations, primarily due to a lack of allies in the executive branch. Partial allies, such as Lavín and Bulnes, who both agreed that deeper reforms were needed, were constrained by Piñera’s unwillingness to compromise. Students did have allies in Congress, who were in opposition parties, and while this may have helped in passing certain items that
students argued in favor of during the education budget process, the effect of having allies in Congress was not significant, mainly due to the students’ firm rejection of involving political parties in the protest movement.

In sum, students in 2011 did see many effects from their mobilization campaign, although those effects have been largely minimized by scholars because they did not achieve the large, systemic changes to the economic and political systems in Chile. However, a careful analysis of effects demonstrates that students were able to effect a number of changes, most notably to education financing, oversight of institutions in higher education, the accreditation and university admissions processes, and institutional changes, such as the creation of a new sub-institution in the Ministry of Education dedicated to higher education.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Introduction

The analysis of the three case studies shows that all three cycles of student mobilization had demonstrable effects, and more effects than many previous analyses suggest. One possible explanation for this is that many academic articles were written shortly after each cycle of mobilization ended, thus, the authors were unable to account for longer-term effects that are directly attributable to the protests, such as Bachelet’s adoption of the principal demands of the pingüinos in 2006 for her presidential campaign in 2013. My analysis has accounted for longer-term effects such as these and the subsequent proposals that Bachelet was able to implement during her 2014-2018 presidential term. Taking into account the delayed effects that can be demonstrably attributed to the prior cycles of mobilization is a unique contribution of this work, as is expanding the areas under examination for effects – previous analyses tended to concentrate on policy and institutional effects. There is a noticeable lack of predictive theory in the study of social mobilization. A long-term approach that takes delayed effects that can be demonstrably attributed to prior mobilization is a strong step in the direction of developing predictive theory in the field.

I initially believed that interactions between government and students would be the most important variable in whether I would see effects as a result of student mobilizations, as the State-Movement Intersection perspective suggests, however, interaction between students and government officials ultimately played less of a role than anticipated in some cycles. While cycles with significant amounts
of interaction between students and government officials support the initial hypothesis in that they did show more effects overall, and cycles with less interaction showed fewer demonstrable effects from mobilization, other factors, such as the political ideology of the current presidential administration, and the level of trust students had in the government regarding negotiations played a greater role in how much students were able to achieve.

Interaction certainly played the biggest role during the 2006 Penguin Revolution, when students participated in a nearly year-long mesa de trabajo with government officials leading up to the 2006 school year. This significant period of interaction contributed to the 2011 mobilization as well, as many of the students who participated as pingüinos in the 2006 cycle were in university when the 2011 uprising began. The students who were pingüinos in 2006 brought significant amounts of knowledge from the mesa de trabajo they joined in 2005, and this knowledge served to educate other students. The former pingüinos had gained significant knowledge about the educational, political, and economic systems, as well as in-depth knowledge about the educational system in Chile. They had learned what the government could do in response to their demands, and what the limits of government power were. This knowledge, gained from prior intensive interactions with government officials, was a significant contributor to the selection of frames and tactics used in 2011, and thus an indirect contributor to the students’ successes in 2011.

The mesa de trabajo established by the Santiago Metropolitan Region’s SEREMI (regional secretary) for education, Alejandro Traverso, was an invaluable
learning experience for the student activists. During the many months they worked with government officials, meeting once a week, students learned about the political and economic systems, as well as the educational system in Chile and how it was structured and about the LOCE, the constitutional law for education and how it restricted possible changes to the system. Most importantly, students learned about how to interact with government officials effectively to have their demands heard and met. It was through this working experience that the students learned about the neoliberal economic system, the reforms enacted during the Pinochet dictatorship, and how the system and the reforms restricted government officials from making extensive changes to the educational system. This knowledge about the political and economic systems of the country, as well as the knowledge gained about interacting with government officials in an effective manner, would form the basis of demands during the 2011 Chilean Winter cycle of mobilization.

In this chapter, I summarize the key points of each cycle, noting the allies, interactions, and effects resulting from the mobilization during 2001, 2006, and 2011. I note which variables played the biggest role in each cycle, and analyze the effects seen as a direct result of the mobilizations, as well as later effects that are directly attributable to the protests. I then conclude with an analysis of my hypotheses and the data, and explain my main findings.

**2001: The Mochilazo**

The 2001 cycle of mobilization began as a protest against a rise in the fare for the student public transportation pass, and grew into the beginnings of a critique of inequality in education and the neoliberal economic system itself. These
First, tentative critiques would provide the foundation for the cycles of mobilization in 2006 and 2011. The *Mochilazo* has frequently been acknowledged as being important in overcoming the “culture of fear” that was present from the prior decades under the dictatorship and can thus be said to have contributed much to the willingness of students to mobilize in the future (Oppenheim 2007; Borzutzky and Oppenheim 2006). However, it has been dismissed in the literature by some scholars as not being important in other aspects (Elacqua 2012; Pousadela 2013a). I argue that its primary importance lies in establishing the foundation for demands made by the subsequent two cycles of mobilization, which had greater effects overall because they didn’t have to begin on a smaller scale. Because the grievances with the educational system overall and the neoliberal economic system had already been established, the cycles of 2006 and 2011 could begin with those grievances, broadening and deepening them as their cycles continued.

**Allies**

Students had several allies during the 2001 cycle of mobilization, some more significant than others, and some more constant or reliable than others. President Ricardo Lagos made a comment to the media when informed about a large protest in the downtown area of Santiago, saying, “The kids also have to go out once in a while. Has it been a year since we’ve seen the young people in the streets? We are still not accustomed to a democratic system.” (“Pase Escolar Requisito: Ofensas Violentas Durante Protesta de Secundarios” 2001). Lagos indicated with his comment that high school students protesting was a sign of a healthy democracy, was to be expected, and that it was not a large concern for him. Following his lead throughout the cycle, there was very little police repression of
the protests, save minimal use of tear gas and water cannon trucks on occasion (the carabineros routinely use water cannon trucks and tear gas on demonstrators). The initial support for the students was not surprising, coming from a center-left administration.

Similarly, Lagos’ Minister of Education, Mariana Aylwin, was initially supportive, particularly in her public comments about the protests. In early April, she was quoted in the newspaper as saying that “the students’ grievances were legitimate and just, because they paid in 2000 for a product that didn’t arrive for 120,000 young people, provoking a series of complications” ("Pase Escolar Requisito: Ofensas Violentas Durante Protesta de Secundarios" 2001). Aylwin also publicly strongly critiqued the bus owners’ guild, stating frequently that they had not held up their side of the agreement in producing the passes and that the government would take away the administration of the passes from them if they did not meet deadlines ("Estudiantes Secundarios Paran por Carné Escolar" 2001). In her negotiations with the bus owners’ guild, Aylwin took a strong stance on behalf of the government, actively fighting for fairness and transparency for the students, demanding that the microbuseros deliver the passes as promised and handle the administration of the passes responsibly. She made statements to the press in support of the students in this particular instance, telling El Mercurio that “the students’ grievances were legitimate and just, because they paid in 2000 for a product that didn’t arrive for 120,000 young people, provoking a series of complications” ("Pase Escolar Requisito: Ofensas Violentas Durante Protesta de Secundarios" 2001). Aylwin also specifically negotiated with the President of the
Metro, managing to reach an agreement about lowering the price of Metro tickets for students and senior citizens after students had requested in a meeting with the Minister that she try to get the price lowered ("Reevaluara Proyectos: Metro Rebaja a $100 Pasajes para Estudiantes y Adultos Mayores" 2001).

However, as the protests, strikes, and occupations continued, Aylwin began to use more sticks rather than carrots in her approach to dealing with the students. Frustrated by the inability to negotiate with one representative student organization and the students’ seeming inability to agree upon which organization was officially representing them, Aylwin began to communicate to the students that they must agree on who was representing them, indicating her preference for the Youth Parliament (YP) in statements to the press. Aylwin had reached an agreement with the YP that was rejected by the ACES, the student organization representing a greater percentage of students. Aylwin also began to take a hardline position, saying that she would not negotiate with the students if they were on strike. While repeatedly indicating her willingness to negotiate with students, Aylwin also strongly emphasized that she would only negotiate with designated student representatives, and only if the students were not on strike while negotiations occurred. Her public statements in this regard became more strident as the protests and strikes continued. Conversely, throughout the entire cycle, Aylwin continually indicated her willingness to work with students to find solutions to their grievances. In sum, Aylwin can be considered a partial ally, in that in general, her statements were in support of the students and indicated agreement that their grievances were just and fair, in addition to her many
statements indicating that she wanted to work with students to find solutions. However, her many supportive statements were couched alongside statements that indicated strict conditions under which she would give her support and allow for negotiations, demanding that students stop mobilizing, making her allyship conditional.

Other significant allies included Carolina Tohá, the Subsecretary General of the Government, who made strong statements to the press, saying that the system that was in place for administering the student transportation pass at that time was deficient and needed to be modified. Tohá indicated the willingness of the government to work together extensively, over an extended period of time, with the students to find solutions to the issues ("Formulo Ministra de Educación a Secundarios; Llamado a “Ponerse de Acuerdo”" 2001). Additionally, the Minister of the Interior (the second-highest position in the executive branch of government in Chile, equivalent to a Vice President) José Miguel Insulza met many times with students in an attempt to negotiate and resolve problems and demonstrated a willingness to work together with the students in discovering solutions. However, Insulza approved of Aylwin’s carrot-and-stick approach, and as the protests continued, he began to make statements to the press, chastising students for not agreeing to stop their protests in order to participate in a mesa de trabajo with the government. Insulza also made public comments expressing his view that the demand for a free transportation pass was not reasonable, that students already receive a benefit (the reduced-price pass) that other young people their age who are not students do not receive. The Minister firmly rejected the demand that the
government provide the pass for students free of charge from the beginning ("Vicepresidente de la República: El Gobierno Descarta Pase Escolar Gratuito" 2001a).

Other government officials in the executive branch, as well as local officials, also proved to be allies of the students and their cause. Patricio Tombolini, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Transportation, also signaled that he was an ally. Tombolini announced that that the Ministry of Transport expected to file formal denunciations in court to initiate an investigation into the CSTT’s (the bus operators’ guild) responsibilities. Tombolini also defended the government’s decision to reassume administration of the pass, stating, in a reflection of the students’ arguments, "We will have to discuss if the student fare is a benefit or a right. And if it is a right, we must see how the Chilean society is going to finance this pass." ("Nueva Protesta Callejera: Universitarios Se Suman Al Conflicto por Pases" 2001). An ally from an unexpected quarter, Joaquín Lavín, the mayor of Santiago and a member of the ultra-conservative Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, or UDI) political party, emerged in April. Lavín critiqued the center-left government for being too slow to find a solution to the conflict between the students and the bus operators. He commented extensively about the protests to the press, saying the students were justified in their grievances about the transportation pass, which they had paid for and had not received. Lavín, frustrated by the damages sustained in Santiago during protests and the slow actions of the government, proposed that the municipality of Santiago would subsidize the cost, paying for $1,500 pesos of the pass, leaving students and
their families to pay for the remaining $1,000 ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Alumnos Evaluarán Propuesta de Lavín" 2001). He was joined by proposals from the mayors from ten other municipalities in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, whose proposals offered to subsidize from 70 to 100 percent of the student transportation pass ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Alumnos Evaluarán Propuesta de Lavín" 2001). Mayors from various municipalities in the region also supported students’ protests monetarily, providing materials for signs and banners and transportation to Santiago Centro for students who wished to go march earning strong condemnations from the Lagos administration ("Conflicto por Pase Escolar: Amplio Rechazo a Violencia Desatada por Secundarios" 2001).

In addition to mayors of municipalities in the Santiago Metropolitan Region, students also had allies in Congress. Three Christian Democratic deputies, Jaime Jiménez, Andrés Palma and Gabriel Ascencio, filed suit in court against the CSTT and the Chilean government, saying that they were responsible for the “crimes of fraud, misappropriation, and injury to the public faith on the topic of the school passes” ("Anuncian Querellas: Polémica de los Pases Escolares a la Justicia" 2001). Deputy Jiménez said that the purpose of the suit was to “determine why the school pass passed into the hands of the private sector and where the money raised by this concept is” ("Anuncian Querellas: Polémica de los Pases Escolares a la Justicia" 2001). These allies, with their suit in court, echoed the beginnings of the anti-neoliberal arguments the students were advancing. Similarly, other Deputies of the Concertación made many public statements supporting the protesting students, and attempted to persuade government
officials to negotiate with the students without preconditions. Additionally, The General Secretary of the Communist Party, Gladys Marin, met with Mariana Aylwin, to express her support for the students and their demands, and to deny that the Communist Party was exercising any influence over the students, as Aylwin had previously claimed ("Anuncian Querellas: Polémica de los Pases Escolares a la Justicia" 2001).

Students also gained support from allies in civil society groups. Parent organizations, specifically the Association of Parent Centers and Representatives of the Metropolitan Region, demanded that President Lagos intervene in the conflict because the Ministry of Education was not empowered to solve the issue ("En Región Metropolitana Paro de Estudiantes Desata Fuertes Críticas a Gobierno" 2001). The organization stated that they publicly supported the strikes and paros, and demanded that the state take over the administration of the pass, saying that the abuses were occurring because the pass was being administered privately ("En Región Metropolitana Paro de Estudiantes Desata Fuertes Críticas a Gobierno" 2001). Other student organizations, such as the FECH, joined the high school students for protests and negotiations with the government. The CUT, the country’s largest labor union, also expressed support for the students. Teachers from elementary and secondary schools also joined the students in protest, and their union, the Colegio de Profesores, also supported the students and their cause (Ferrari 2007).

Thus, the students had several allies within the central and local governments, as well as civil society groups, during this cycle of mobilization.
While some wavered in fully supporting the students, such as Aylwin, due to her desire to put an end to the protests while negotiations were happening, the pingüinos had a relatively high level of allies in government positions in 2001, mainly due to the political orientation of the Lagos government, which was center-left.

**Interactions**

Students had some significant interactions with government officials during this cycle of mobilization. Many meetings were held with Minister of Education Aylwin and the microbuseros’ guild. Additionally, students met and negotiated with several other government officials, such as Insulza and the SEREMIs (regional secretaries) of Education and Transportation. Aylwin arranged for a mesa de trabajo with the primary stakeholders: bus owners, students (representatives from the ACES and Youth Parliament), university students, parents, teachers, and government officials, although she insisted she would not negotiate with any student representatives whose schools were striking. Students also met with the mayors of different municipalities to negotiate about possible subsidizing of the pass by the municipalities. Various random interactions occurred when students attempted to deliver letters to President Lagos at La Moneda, the presidential palace, or when they showed up at the palace to request a meeting with the president, but these interactions were generally not significant. The most significant interactions were the many meetings with various government officials from the executive branch and the mesa de trabajo that was organized to negotiate and find solutions to the students’ grievances.
Effects

General Effects

One of the most important effects from the Mochilazo was the beginning of the end of the “culture of fear” that had carried over from the era of the dictatorship. This was the first large-scale, sustained social mobilization since the end of Pinochet’s reign, and it was significant in that the students demonstrated to the public at large that it was safe to demonstrate publicly again. The government did not engage in repression, save a couple of incidents during marches when the police used tear gas or water cannon trucks against the students. The president and other government officials made many public statements in support of the students’ right to protest in a democracy, given that the protests remained peaceful. This signaled to the Chilean public at large that it was safe to protest again, that taking to the streets would no longer result in severe repression, torture, murder, and the disappearance of protesters. Protests would increase in number in the years to come as a result.

Another significant effect is that the students began to formulate the arguments against the neoliberal system that had been established under Pinochet. Students developed the framing of education as a right, a crucial argument in this and the two subsequent cycles of mobilization. Because education is a right, they argued, the government has an obligation to protect it. Therefore, the state had a responsibility to administer the student public transportation pass, to ensure that students could travel to school and exercise their right to education. As Daniel Manouchehri, President of the Youth Parliament, said, “We believe that the role of
the State is to be the guarantor of the right and access to education” ("Daniel Manouchehri, Presidente del Parlamento Juvenil: “Estamos Cansados de Ser el Ultimo Eslabón” 2001). They critiqued handing the administration of the transportation pass over to a private bus owners’ guild, saying that giving state funds to a private entity to administer what the state had an obligation to administer had affected their ability to exercise their right to education. This argument and its framing were the foundation of the anti-neoliberal arguments that would form the basis of the following two cycles of mobilization. The formulation of this argument in 2001 created a path dependence that the 2006 and 2011 cycles of mobilization followed. The 2006 and 2011 cycles began with the anti-neoliberal framing and critiques, versus starting from grievances about policy changes. This path dependence allowed for the evolution of students’ critiques into grievances the economic and political systems as a whole, greatly expanding from the initial demands during the 2001 protests. As a result of the Mochilazo participants establishing the beginnings of this anti-neoliberal framing, the Revolución Pingüina and the Invierno Chileno were able to expand the framing and grievances, thus allowing the students of 2006 and 2011 to make larger, more profound demands for systemic changes.

**Effects: Agenda Impact**

Students had a significant effect on the policy agenda. Their demonstrations forced the Lagos administration to move the issue of the transportation pass to the top of the priority list. Students forced three ministries, Education, Transport, and the Interior, to pay immediate attention to their demands, and to elevate the subject of the school pass to the top of the policy agenda. While the ministries were
prioritizing the issue, the high schoolers maintained pressure on the government via ongoing strikes and protests, which kept the subject active in public discourse, ensuring that the transportation pass remained a top priority for the administration. Lagos’ government continued to give the issue top priority until an agreement was reached.

**Effects: Alternatives Impact**

The alternatives impact area also showed effects. Secondary students were able to force modifications of the content of policy proposals, and ensured that their demands were incorporated into the administration of the pass, by forcing the state to take over administration of the pass, and the regulations about the use of the pass. Because of the continuous pressure of their mobilization, the government was forced to reassess existing policies and choose alternatives that helped resolve the issue.

**Effects: Implementation Impact**

The force, spread, and sustained character of the movement had a large effect in the area of implementation impact. The pingüinos successfully forced the government to act before it had preferred to act. The Lagos administration had not expressed any intention of reassuming the administration of the school pass and there was no indication that doing so was on the agenda. The mobilization forced the government to act much more quickly than it would have preferred to do so in assuming the administration of the pass again.

**Effects: Public Goods Impact**

Another area with significant effects is the public goods impact area. The students forced the national government and local governments to allocate public
funds towards the transportation pass and its costs, where funds had not been previously allocated. First, Minister Aylwin negotiated with the President of the Metro in Santiago (the fully state-run part of Santiago’s public transportation), achieving her goal of lowering the price of senior citizen and student fares by 30 pesos for the Metro. Additional state funds would go to cover the cost of the fare reduction. More significantly, Aylwin negotiated with the CSTT (the bus owners’ guild) and was able to convince them to lower the price of the pass for 2001, from $3,500 pesos to $2,500 pesos. Additionally, the hours in which the pass could be used were extended – students could use the pass on Saturdays until 6 PM, when they were unable to use the pass at all on the weekend, and the hours for weekday usage were extended to 10:30 PM ("Daniel Manouchehri, Presidente del Parlamento Juvenil: “Estamos Cansados de Ser el Ultimo Eslabón”" 2001). Extending the hours of usage meant that both the private bus operators and the state-run Metro would lose money. Joaquín Lavín, the mayor of Santiago Centro, agreed to subsidize or fully cover the cost of the pass for students living in the comuna, as did the mayors of twenty other municipalities in the Santiago Metropolitan Region ("Pase Escolar: Asambleas Estudiantiles Evalúan Paro" 2001). 81,000 students who received their transportation passes after August 2000 would be refunded the pass or have it provided free of charge. The Ministry of Education agreed to increase the number of free passes available by 30,000, ultimately reaching 110,000 free passes, with a promise to try to provide more free passes as they were able to do so (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2001a). Thus, the government committed additional funds for increasing the free number of passes provided to students, a significant effect from the mobilizations. The government also
committed to establishing an 800 number that students could call to report abuse by bus operators when trying to use their passes ("Daniel Manouchehri, Presidente del Parlamento Juvenil: “Estamos Cansados de Ser el Ultimo Eslabón”” 2001), which would require additional funds from the state. Estimates of the full cost to the state are not available, however, they can be assumed to be significant. The government would have to establish an office and hire employees to administer the transportation pass and the complaint number, as well as dedicating an increasing amount of funds each year to providing more free passes to needy students.

Main Findings
While the Mochilazo is not widely regarded as being very influential with regard to the goals it achieved, I argue that it had other, more significant effects. Many aspects of this first, more tentative protest resulted in path dependence that allowed subsequent cycles of mobilization to achieve more of their goals.

As the first major, sustained protest in the post-dictatorship age, the Mochilazo contributed much to the dismantling of the culture of fear that was a remnant from the Pinochet era. Demonstrating to other students, activists, and to the public at large that Chile was able to sustain protests without widespread oppression was a contributing factor to the rise in student mobilization in following years. Overcoming the fear of protest and embracing the right to demonstrate in a healthy democracy is a significant achievement of this cycle of mobilization. Successive cycles of mobilization would see more manifestations in both frequency and length of the cycle overall due to dismantling the culture of fear in 2001.
The creation of the ACES resulted in increasing returns for the students in the future: creating this previously-unseen type of student organization set off a chain reaction, wherein students learned how to organize themselves more effectively and represent the collective interests of all students in an efficient manner. Holding assemblies in which students voted equally and where all opinions were taken into account before making decisions about what grievances to pursue proved to unite the students and solidify their protest agendas in a more potent manner than had previously been possible.

The creation of the ACES, a horizontally-structured, representative organization based upon anarcho-democratic principles, was crucial in this cycle, and would continue to have effects in other cycles, particularly during 2006, when the ACES played a crucial role in the Revolución Pingüina. Previously, political parties had played a large role in student mobilization. Most students identified as members (militantes) of political parties, and often represented the policy views and ideologies of their respective parties when participating in student organizations. The ACES specifically prohibited the involvement of political parties, thus pre-empting domination by traditional political actors, and centering the voices of all students, no matter their political orientation (J. Reyes 2001; A.C.d.S. ACES 2001c). By eliminating the large roles political parties had previously played in student organizations, students effectively countered the most common critique used against them, that they were simply the political parties’ puppets. Forming the ACES helped the pingüinos establish themselves as actors in their own right in the eyes of the public and the government. The evolution of
grievances in 2001 established a foundation that 2006 and 2011 cycles would start with, allowing the following cycles to broaden and deepen the critiques and demands in comparison with the *Mochilazo*. Through the elaboration of their grievances, the students of 2001 created a master frame that students in 2006 and 2011 built upon and expanded.

**La Revolución Pingüina**

**Allies**

The most prominent ally the *pingüinos* had was Alejandro Traverso, SEREMI of the Santiago Metropolitan Region. The SEREMI formed the mesa de trabajo in 2005, as he was eager to work with the students to achieve their goals and prevent mobilizations at the beginning of the 2006 school year. The mesa involved both ACAS and ACES, the high school students’ organizations, as well as bureaucrats from the Ministry of Education and Traverso. During the weekly mesa meetings, Traverso and the bureaucrats educated the student representatives about the educational system, as well as the economic and political systems in Chile. The students gained an accurate picture of what was and was not possible under the current systems and conditions. They learned that any significant, wholesale changes to the educational system would be incredibly difficult to make without changing both the electoral and political party systems (Bulow and Ponte 2015, 186). In turn, the students took what they had learned and educated their peers. The mesa produced an impressive report that contained both short- and long-term goals and proposals. Traverso was a strong ally in that he not only educated the students, supplying them with knowledge they would transfer to
students in later cycles of mobilization, he assisted them in drafting a solid, professional, and reasonable report to submit to the government. The knowledge the students gained from Traverso and his efforts with the mesa were invaluable.

Michelle Bachelet, the incoming President of Chile in 2006, initially appeared to be more of a roadblock or non-supporter. When the mobilizations began, Bachelet and her administration ignored the students or commented only to chastise them for engaging in violence, a choice that served to ramp up the students’ efforts. The initial lack of response was quite surprising to the students, as Bachelet had campaigned on citizen participation and inclusion in government. Her campaign slogan in 2005 was “Bachelet, estoy contigo” [Bachelet, I’m with you], which prompted the students to carry signs saying, “Bachelet, ¿estás con nosotros?” [Bachelet, are you with us?]. The emphasis placed on more citizen participation in government signaled that there was an opportunity for the students to be heard, at best, and to experience less repression during mobilization, at worst.

Students were encouraged when Bachelet mildly signaled her allyship, condemning the repression of the Carabineros during a student march. However, she couched this condemnation by also condemning the violence some students had engaged in as well. Regardless, as a result of the repression the Carabineros inflicted on the students, Bachelet fired the head of the Carabineros’ Special Forces. This action sent a strong signal that the President would not tolerate repression of social movement activists. On June 1st, Bachelet addressed the concerns of the students in a televised presidential address. In her speech, she
offered several proposals that were direct responses to students’ grievances/demands. She also announced that she was creating the Presidential Advisory Council for Quality Education (*Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Calidad de la Educación*), which would tackle creating proposals for reform of the educational system, including the LOCE. Finally, Bachelet acknowledged that education is a right (Kubal 2010). The students had other allies in the Bachelet administration as well, one made comments to the press about how the demands had legitimacy and the administration recognized that it needed to get rid of the Pinochet-era LOCE, specifically saying “the movement was the impulse that we did not have; the strength that we needed to pursue the reforms” (Donoso 2013, 23). Thus, generally the administration was sympathetic to the students’ claims and many publicly voiced their support. Thus, the students had quite a few allies in the administration itself, as well as the President.

**Interactions**

Regarding interactions between government and students, the mesa de trabajo arranged by SEREMI Traverso was enormously influential, and has effects lasting to the present day. During the eight-month period, Ministry of Education officials, SEREMI Traverso, and students met weekly to discuss proposals to submit to the government. The Ministry personnel and Traverso educated the students about the educational and political systems, the LOCE, and how to interact with government officials. The students found this information so valuable that they went back to their schools in *paro* and formed committees to teach their classmates everything they had learned (Pavan and Felicetti 2019). This knowledge
has played a crucial role in 2006, 2011, and in all student mobilizations since. In fact, the students found the mesa de trabajo so useful that they invited the current Minister of Education, Sergio Bitar, to work with them during the 2006 school year on the proposals contained in the report. The knowledge gained in the 2006 cycle through interactions with government personnel cannot be underestimated, as it continues to play a role in mobilizations today.

Both ACAS and ACES were horizontally-structured organizations, without designated leaders. Yet, they displayed evidence in 2006 of learning from the 2001 cycle. When students were invited to negotiate with the government, Minister Aylwin repeatedly specified that they needed to send representatives to negotiate on their behalf, due to limited space. The students refused, and various students from different organizations, such as ACES, ACAS, and the Youth Parliament appeared to negotiate. Aylwin refused to admit them unless they limited their number. During 2006, ACAS and ACES nominated spokespeople to liaise with the government and the media, demonstrating learning from the previous cycle of mobilization in their interactions with the government.

Bachelet established a Presidential Advisory Council for Quality Education in direct response to the students’ mobilization. This council was tasked with formulating proposals for educational reform in Chile. Composed of representatives from many sectors of the population, including:

- Parliamentarians, education specialists, academics, people of different religious denominations, representatives of indigenous peoples and the different actors of the educational work of the country: parents, secondary and university students, teachers and education assistants, municipal and private education providers,
rectors of traditional and private universities. (C.A.P.p.l.C.d. Educación 2006, 6)

The Council met for six months, and submitted a final report with proposals for educational reform to the administration. During these six months, students worked with technocrats from the government, university rectors, teachers, other educational professionals, parents and guardians, and students from other student organizations. The pingüinos gained significant knowledge about the educational system and its issues. They also made valuable contacts with students from other student organizations, which they would use in future cycles of mobilization to engage in planning and execution of demonstrations.

Effects
Kolb’s framework reveals that the 2006 students had the strongest effects in the areas of agenda impact and policy impact. The students presented a strong challenge to the neoliberal system of education and the neoliberal economic system and saw their demands met in several areas.

Agenda Impact
The students’ continued mobilization forced the Bachlet administration to concentrate on the LOCE, the Pinochet-era education law, which had the force of the constitution (Ley Orgánica Constitucional, or Constitutional Organic Law, a law that deals with matters provided for in the text of the constitution and requires a 4/7ths majority to modify or annul). Bachelet’s publicly-stated goals, in her campaign and after she took office, made no mention of modifying or replacing the LOCE. Additionally, members of her administration had been quoted in the press as saying that the students spurred their efforts to replace the LOCE. The
pingüinos had a definitive impact on the agenda, forcing the administration to add replacing the LOCE to the agenda, and moving it to the high-priority list.

President Bachelet not only promised to introduce legislation to replace the LOCE, she acceded to many of the students’ other demands, including:

- Grants to pay for the poorest 80 percent of students to take the university admissions test;
- Free student transportation passes for the poorest 80 percent of students;
- An increase to the monthly government subsidies for the poorest students’ families;
- 500,000 more free school meals;
- Various other grants;
- Creation of the Presidential Advisory Committee to review the Full School Day and the LOCE;
- Infrastructure improvements in 520 schools;
- New furniture for 1,200 schools;
- Unlimited use of the student transportation pass; and
- Paid internships for technical school students.

Thus, the students had additional impact on the government’s agenda. The administration was obliged to make educational reform its highest priority, and it began to dedicate resources to implement the above proposals and to send the draft of a new educational law to Congress.

Policy Impact

The Presidential Advisory Council for Quality Education (PAC) issued its final report with its policy proposals and recommendations in December 2006. After receiving the final report from the PAC, Bachelet decided upon three main areas for reforming the educational system: 1. replacing the LOCE and creating a Superintendency of Education, to better oversee the system and monitor its quality; 2. more funding for needier schools and students, as well as eliminating
profit in the partially private (subvencionado, partially state-subsidized, partially private) schools (they could still receive state funding, but they must convert to non-profit in order to do so); 3. strengthening the system of public education with "an adequate system of school management and institutionality" (Manuel Antonio Garretón et al. 2011, 14). The third aspect will be discussed in the institutional impact section.

Clearly, the students were able to influence significant policies. The administration soon sent a bill for the new education law to Congress. The Ley General de Educación (General Law for Education, or LGE) passed Congress in September 2009. While students were disappointed in the content of the law (several proposals had been deleted in negotiations between the Concertación and conservatives in Congress, including the prohibition on schools that operated as for-profit ventures), there were several significant changes. These included the prohibition on state funding going to for-profit schools; an attempt to end selection discrimination – any school that accepted state funding (public or private) could not select students for enrollment. Students considered the continued municipal administration of schools and a lack of representation for students in the policymaking processes to be losses. However, even though not all the proposals were included in the final version that became law, students were able to witness many of their demands made into concrete policies, a clear and significant impact in the policy impact category.
Goods Impact

This cycle of mobilization also showed effects in the goods impact category. The Bachelet administration allocated many more additional funds as a result of the students’ demands. Among the newly-allocated benefits were:

- Grants to pay for the poorest 80 percent of students to take the university entrance exam;
- Free student transportation passes for the poorest 80 percent of students;
- An increase to the monthly government subsidies for the families of students who qualified for them;
- 500,000 more free school meals;
- Various other grants;
- Improvements to infrastructure in 520 schools;
- New furniture for 1,200 schools;
- Unlimited use of the student transportation pass;
- Creation of the Presidential Advisory Council (PAC)

The national budget for the Ministry of Education increased from 2.3 trillion pesos (2.8 billion USD) in 2005 to 2.5 trillion pesos (3.1 billion USD) in 2006, an increase of 200 billion pesos (247 million USD) overall. Funds designated specifically for aid to families and scholarships increased from 1.1 trillion pesos (1.4 billion USD) in 2005 to 1.4 trillion pesos (1.7 billion USD) in 2006. Additionally, the amount designated for subsidies to private schools decreased from 1.463 trillion pesos (1.806 billion USD) in 2005 to 1.431 trillion pesos (1.766 billion USD) in 2006, reflecting the ban on any for-profit educational establishments receiving state funds. The amount invested in improving and repairing infrastructure in schools was increased by 27.8 percent for 2006, a direct response to student demands. The increase of 300 billion pesos (370 million USD) in family aid and scholarships can be directly attributed to the students and their mobilization. The impact students had in the area of public goods is quite significant.
Institutional Impact

Changes in the area of institutional impact tend to be most durable. The most obvious change enacted as a direct result of mobilization in 2006 was the creation of the Presidential Advisory Commission, which was a temporary body. However, the creation of this commission and its actions helped to establish students as key players in policy debate and policy creation, which would be a lasting effect.

In addition to becoming part of the policy process, personnel changes were made as a direct result of student demands/grievances. President Bachelet fired the head of the Carabineros’ Special Forces division in response to the repression Carabineros engaged in during a student march. Interior Minister Andrés Zaldivar and Education Minister Martín Zilic were replaced as a direct result of student claims. However, personnel changes cannot be considered to be lasting institutional changes.

The creation of the Superintendency of Education was an enduring result of this cycle of mobilization. While its implementation was delayed, the impetus to create it originated in the 2006 protests. The institution serves an important oversight function:

Its function is to ensure, in accordance with the law, that the supporters of educational establishments officially recognized by the State comply with the laws, regulations and instructions issued by the Superintendency, as well as to supervise the legality of the use of the resources by the establishments that receive state contributions, in order to ensure quality education, safeguarding rights, promoting the fulfillment of duties and guaranteeing equal opportunities for all
children and young people in Chile, in nursery, basic, and secondary education establishments.\(^{12}\)

The Superintendency functions to the present day, and is easily classified as a durable institutional change.

**Findings**

The *Revolución Pingüina* was crucial in establishing foundations for future mobilizations as well. The strongest and most visible effects of this cycle can be seen in the areas of agenda impact, policy impact, and goods impact. With regard to the changes made in the policy impact area, the students were able to mount a significant challenge to the neoliberal ideology undergirding the educational system. The Bachelet administration agreed to stop funding for-profit educational establishments, signifying agreement with the students’ arguments\(^{13}\). Combined with the state’s agreement to write a new educational law, it was an acknowledgement that the market-based educational system was flawed and should be reformed. While the state began to acknowledge that education was a right that it had a duty to protect during the 2001 cycle, forcing the state to question the logic of a market-based educational system was a step towards questioning the logic of neoliberal policies as a whole. Future cycles of mobilization would begin with these ideas as their starting point, that education is a right the state is obligated to protect and guarantee, and that a market-based educational system results in poor quality and unequal education across social classes.

\(^{12}\) See [https://www.supereduc.cl/la-institucion/que-es-la-superintendencia-de-educacion/](https://www.supereduc.cl/la-institucion/que-es-la-superintendencia-de-educacion/). Translation by author.

\(^{13}\) This part of the educational law was not approved by Congress, thus, Chile still has *subvencionados*, schools that are private but also receive vouchers from the state (Kubal 2010).
The pingüinos demonstrated learning from the 2001 cycle, particularly in their interactions with the government. In 2001, students had repeated issues with clarifying who was actually empowered to represent them to the government. Due to the proliferation of different student organizations, and the horizontal structure of ACES, there was confusion about who actually represented the students. Additionally, Minister Aylwin insisted that the students stop mobilizing in order to participate in negotiations. Students eventually agreed to pause mobilization in order to negotiate, but the difficulty in determining who was really representing the students had resulted in lost time and frustration for government officials.

In 2006, students changed their approach drastically. They had gained significant amounts of knowledge from the mesa de trabajo with SEREMI Traverso in 2005 and now recognized the value of regular interactions with government officials. In contrast to 2001, students pursued further interactions with the state in 2006, realizing that they would be able to effect more change by actively negotiating with officials. As a result, the 2006 cycle of mobilization had much more of an impact, accomplishing much more than the 2001 cycle. This strongly supports the argument that interactions with government officials can result in more effects for mobilizers.

**El Invierno Chileno, 2011**

The Chilean Winter of 2011 saw the largest student mobilization yet since the end of the dictatorship. Nevertheless, it was not only students mobilizing. University students had gained many allies, who turned out to join the students.
As a result of the inclusive framing the movement used, students gained both the overwhelming support of the public and allies from all sectors of society.

**Allies**

University students framed their movement as a societal movement, emphasizing that it was not only students with these grievances, it was all of Chilean society. As a result of their inclusive framing, the students were joined by allies from a plethora of different groups. These included: teachers’ unions, workers’ unions (including the healthcare workers’ union, the miners’ union, and the primary labor union CUT, among others), as well as the Consejo de Rectores de las Universidades Chilenas (the Council of Presidents of Chilean Universities). Families with children joined the students for marches and cultural events, lending their support. While there were fewer allies in the executive branch, as President Sebastián Piñera’s government was conservative, many politicians in the Concertación, the coalition of leftist parties in Congress, were vocally supportive, as were left-wing political parties that were not part of the Concertación, such as the Communist Party. Many civil society organizations became allies of the students, as well, including: indigenous groups, environmental activists, feminists, etc. One of the most notable characteristics of the 2011 cycle of mobilization is that it truly broadened into a social movement, not just a student movement. There was an enormous amount of public support for the students and what they were trying to accomplish. Out of all of the three cycles analyzed here, 2011 had the most allies.

**Interactions**

For the three cycles studied, 2011 had fewer direct interactions with government officials. In this aspect, students refused many offers from the
government for *mesas de trabajo*, saying that they would not negotiate behind the backs of the public. The students did engage in some negotiations, but they were fewer than in 2006. Hence, the knowledge about the effectiveness of interactions with government carried from the 2006 cycle did not overly influence this cycle. Conversely, it can be argued that because this cycle of mobilization was facing a conservative government, the students reasoned that negotiating would not gain them as much as it had in 2006, when they were dealing with a democratic-socialist government. In fact, as a result of their disappointment with the final LGE (General Education Law), which had been modified significantly from the original proposal Bachelet sent to Congress, the students had concluded that negotiating with government was not a fruitful tactic and they opted to not negotiate with the Piñera administration. Nicolas Somma writes that the pingüinos learned two things from their decision to demobilize and negotiate with the government in 2006: “first, to be critical about attempts by politicians to institutionalize and co-opt the movement’s demands; and second, that mobilization should continue while negotiating with authorities” (Somma 2012, 299). As a result, students became more cynical and hesitant to engage in negotiations with government personnel. Regardless, the CONFECH did ask the government to prepare a proposal that addressed all twelve essential pillars in their proposal and invited the government to dialogue with the students, teachers, and parents ("Las Propuestas Para la Educación Que Se Han Debatido en Más Que Tres Meses de Manifestaciones" 2011; Espinoza and González 2013, 240). Piñera’s administration did not respond to this invitation.
In early September, Piñera was forced to act after a two-day national citizen strike drew more than 400,000 people. President Piñera called for a meeting between all actors involved in the manifestations and the government to “review the points demanded by the CONFECH [to determine if] it was possible to reach an agreement, and [to] bring the discussion to the Congress [for] those issues on which there was dissent” (Espinoza and González 2013). A meeting between government officials, parents, teachers, deans, and students was held on September 4, 2011. The government proposed *mesas del trabajo*, which students rejected because they “did not offer minimal guarantees for a negotiation on an equal footing to take place” (Pousadela 2013a, 688). Students repeatedly rejecting working committees after the positive experience with the SEREMI of Santiago in 2005 was initially a surprising finding. However, later in the 2006 cycle, the students felt that they were not heard well in some of the working committees. When the Presidential Advisory Commission sent its recommendations to President Bachelet, the students were dismayed that some of their recommendations, such as de-municipalization of schools and a greater representation for students in the policymaking process, were not present. Thus, there was a tendency to view *mesas de trabajo* as a conciliatory gesture that the government offered to co-opt and end manifestations. Students were wary of working committees after their experiences in 2006.

This skepticism towards negotiations with the government was displayed when student and teacher organizations presented four conditions for dialogue with the government: 1. Deferment of the debate of the education bills that had
already been sent to Congress; 2. Postponing the end of the first semester of the school year; 3. Broadcasting the debates of the *mesas del trabajo* live; and 4. Halting state funding to private universities that made profits. The Minister of Education sent back a counteroffer for dialogue, rejecting the first two conditions completely and only agreeing partially to the other two conditions (Pousadela 2013a, 688). The students refused again, wary of a non-transparent process and doubting the sincerity of the administration because they were unwilling to defer debate of the education bills in Congress.

The Piñera administration resorted to heavy-handed tactics in October, submitting a bill to Congress that would mandate jail time for students occupying schools, and arrested 40 students two days later (Cooperativa.cl 2011). Additionally, the administration refused to deliver funds from government-provided scholarships to some of the universities that were on strike, forcing the students to meet for a *mesa de trabajo* ("Confch Confirma Quiebre de la Mesa de Diálogo Con el Gobierno y Realiza Llamado a No Iniciar Segundo Semestre" 2011). After nine hours of negotiations, the CONFECCH announced that it would not participate in any further working committees because of the government’s attempts to quash the movement. Students said that the breakdown in communication was due to the intransigence of the Piñera government. They claimed publicly that Minister of Education Bulnes was hostile and flatly refused to consider some of their demands, such as free university education. In fact, Bulnes presented the students with the same proposal the government had presented three months prior, which had been rejected by the students. This
caused a critical breakdown in communication because the students, offended by being given a proposal they had already rejected, believed that the government was unwilling to negotiate or compromise at all.

Thus, the ultimate result of interactions in this cycle was that the students realized they would not make further progress with the Piñera administration. Students held assemblies and decided that it would be best to end the mobilization and try again when a friendlier, center or leftist government took power. Students initially approached interactions hesitantly, displaying a cynical view about being able to find solutions by working with the government (Somma 2012). When the Piñera administration’s actions became more heavy-handed and authoritarian, students decided they would not compromise on their largest demands. In later interviews, some of the participants in this cycle expressed regret that they had been unwilling to compromise on their demands because in the end, they gained very little in comparison to what they had initially demanded.

**Effects**

The 2011 cycle of mobilization did have some effects, despite the students’ frustration about what they were able to accomplish. First and foremost, the university students became important political actors. Bellei and Cabalin observe, “After months of public demonstrations, students became more than protesters in the streets: they became political actors with a clear agenda of transformation and a coherent discourse about justice in education” (Bellei and Cabalin 2012, 115; Ponce Lara 2023). Several students even became actual politicians: four ran successful campaigns to become Deputies in the Chamber of Deputies in the
Chilean Congress; and one ran an unsuccessful campaign to become mayor of a comuna and was later appointed by Bachelet to run the Division of Social Organizations during her second term as president. Gabriel Boric, who served two terms as a Deputy beginning in 2013, won the presidential election in 2021 and was inaugurated as President of Chile on March 11, 2022. Not only did the students become important political actors in the realm of educational policy, some literally became important political actors as they won elections to continue to advocate for change from the inside.

In 2011, students brought social justice in education to the forefront of public debate. Their mobilization and framing completely changed public political discourse in Chile, an effect that remains to the present day. Not only did the students force the issue of educational reform to the forefront of public political debate in Chile, they also enlarged the debate, expanding upon their rights-based framing to include a wider critique of the political and economic systems themselves. Structural issues were debated in Congress, in the executive branch, and in public. Neoliberalism has been put under a microscope and found to have caused many of the issues in Chile, particularly inequality of income and education. Debates over how to improve equity in the country continue and have affected the public political discourse enormously. Candidates for office are frequently asked about how they plan to solve or improve inequality in the country. In fact, Chile formed a Constitutional Convention to write a new constitution in 2021. Although the first draft was rejected in the popular vote, a second draft is currently being written (2023) as the majority of the population agrees that the dictatorship-era
1980 constitution must be replaced. The students’ grievances and framing in 2011 laid the foundation for a national conversation about the economic and political systems in Chile.

Framing was also used in 2011 to portray the movement as not just a student movement, but a citizen movement. Students put great emphasis on the cycle being representative of all of Chilean society, and expanded their claims to resonate with the majority of the public. The universitarios wanted to gain support from as wide a swath of the population as possible, in order to broaden support for demanding structural change in the economic and political realms. Not only did the students force the issue of educational reform to the forefront of public political debate in Chile, they also enlarged the debate, expanding upon their rights-based framing to include a wider critique of the political and economic systems themselves. By all measures, this was a successful effort. Public opinion of the movement was high for the duration, people were talking about the issues the students raised, and a national conversation about how the systems might be changed was happening. Students had successfully linked the major issues in education with concerns about the society at large.

_Agenda Impact_

In the government, structural changes became frequent debates, particularly in Congress and the executive branch. Politicians engaged in debates about inequality and the faults of the political and economic systems on the campaign trail. During the 2011 cycle, Piñera’s administration was forced to move education to the top of the agenda, as they attempted to formulate a response to
satisfy the students. Educational policy was not a priority for the administration prior to this cycle of mobilization.

*Policy Impact*

The Chilean Winter had several effects in the policy impact area. The immediate policy impacts were the significant lowering of the interest rates on student loans, from 5.6 percent to 2.0 percent. Piñera committed the government to paying the 4.6 percent difference to the private lenders. Additionally, administration of the student loan program was transferred from private banks to the state in 2012. The administration also promised to reschedule payments for students who had defaulted on their loans. Lastly, Piñera promised to create a 4 billion USD fund for higher education and to establish three competitive fund programs. Funding for state universities was increased. State resources for scholarships were also increased: scholarships given to students who scored higher than 550 points on the university entrance exam were increased by 523 percent. The administration also promised to promote the class ranking of graduates by secondary schools as a criterion for higher education admissions in addition to the admissions exam.

In order to address the grievances about private universities, the accreditation process was changed. The accrediting body, the CNA, added greater requirements for university accreditation and created an ethics committee for itself. A completely new institution was created, the Superintendency for Higher Education, to ensure quality in the educational system as a whole and to verify any reported irregularities in higher educational institutions. These measures were
implemented in hopes of appeasing students’ claims about universities that were illegally distributing profits to their stakeholders and about the lower quality of education at most private universities.

Michelle Bachelet ran for president again in 2013, and took office for her second term in 2014. The centerpiece of Bachelet’s campaign was enacting free university education by 2020 (Bachelet 2005). Educational reform was top priority for Bachelet in her second term, and she had adopted many of the students’ suggestions as policy proposals. Her first action in office was to release ten policy proposals for educational reform. From 2014 to 2018, Bachelet’s administration ushered 31 education bills through Congress to become law. Bachelet successfully ensured that the lowest-earning 60 percent of the population can attend a university without having to pay any tuition fees. All state universities are free for this sector of the population, and private universities can choose to participate in the program, in which case they must agree to tuition caps and the government will pay the students’ tuition. Bachelet also had a stated goal of ending profit in education, and enacted a policy change: any private educational establishment that received state funds could not be a for-profit institution. The school could continue to receive funding from the state, but it would have to convert to a nonprofit institution. Bachelet ran for President with many of the students’ main demands as her campaign platform. Once elected, she immediately got to work on education reform. While this is a long-term effect, it is directly attributable to the 2011 cycle of mobilization.
**Goods Impact**

Students saw several effects in the area of goods impact, including increased funding for universities, reduced loan rates, additional scholarships, and eventually, the free higher education plan. First and likely most important in its impact was the reduction of the student loan rate. Piñera lowered the interest rate on student loans significantly, from 5.6 percent to 2.0 percent, and committed the government to paying the 4.6 percent difference to the private lenders. The government took on the administration of student loans in 2012, which had previously been administered by private banks, and rescheduled payments for loan defaulters. The administration created a $4 billion USD fund for higher education and established three competitive funds for specific areas. Scholarships were established for the poorest 60 percent of students. Lastly, Michelle Bachelet began the Gratuidad program, which allows the lowest-earning 60 percent of the population to attend university for free.

**Institutional Impact**

During the Piñera administration there were several effects in the institutional impact area. Two new government institutions were created as a direct result of the mobilizations: the Sub-Secretariat for Higher Education and the Superintendency of Higher Education. The Superintendency oversees educational quality and investigates any reported irregularities in higher education institutions. Additionally, a new position was created in the Ministry of Education, the Undersecretary of Education. As Kolb notes, institutional impacts are the most durable types of effects. The changes made to the institutional structure of the Chilean state constitute state transformation as specified by Kolb, who explains,
“social movements can cause state transformation by altering the relationships between political institutions, or through the creation of new sub-institutions” (Kolb 2007, 34)

**Major Findings**

The 2011 cycle of mobilization had many more delayed effects than the cycles in 2001 and 2006. Generally, the students had more favorable outcomes when their demands fell within the area of education and financing of education. This is likely due to students being seen as having legitimate demands in the area of education. The more allies the students had, the more likely there would be effects on public policies and institutions. The more people the students were able to mobilize, the more successful they were at putting pressure on the government, and the students in 2011 were able to mobilize huge numbers of people from across the social strata. Similarly, the more allies students had within the government, the more likely were changes. Generally speaking, liberal administrations were more receptive to students’ demands and were ideologically aligned with their demands. The students in 2011 ran into many difficulties when dealing with the conservative Piñera administration.

The Chilean Winter achieved effects similar to those achieved by the *pingüinos* in 2006, however, the *universitarios* had a greater impact on public discourse/debates about education, rights, and the economic and political systems in Chile. These topics continue to be debated in the present. Part of the effectiveness of this cycle can be attributed to the transfer of knowledge from 2006. Much of the strategy for mobilization was based upon things students learned in
2006. Similarly, the hesitancy towards participating in mesas de trabajo and the skepticism of government officials was based on experiences in 2006. The innovation in tactics and framing can also be said to be a direct result of learning from 2006. Allies were consciously cultivated by students in 2011, they utilized deliberate strategies to gain allies via strategic meetings with different associations and unions\textsuperscript{14}.

Students were also more strategic with the press in 2011. In early 2011, the three major student organizations in Santiago (FECH, FEUC, and FEUSACH) hired a public relations firm to create a PR campaign about Chilean education\textsuperscript{15}. Students had become media savvy, based on dealings with the press in prior cycles of mobilization. Several attractive, charismatic student leaders spoke frequently with the press, always sticking to their message. There was also significant international coverage of the manifestations, consciously cultivated by students because Piñera is known to be very conscious of his reputation on the world stage.

The most lasting impact from this cycle was the election of several student leaders to government positions. Students won seats in Congress and were appointed to positions in the executive branch. Today, Gabriel Boric, the former president of FECH and a well-known figure in this cycle, is President of Chile. Those elected have promised to fight for students and education reform from inside the government, and noticeable progress has been made in educational reform as a result.

\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Camilo Ballesteros by Leesa Rasp, Santiago, Chile, June 2014.  
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Conclusion: Lessons from All Three Cycles of Mobilization

One characteristic was prominent and important in each of the three cycles: learning from prior cycles of mobilization and other activists. During 2006, learning from the mesa de trabajo with SEREMI Traverso in 2005 was crucial, as was learning from the mesas de trabajo during the 2006 cycle. The importance of this particular variable cannot be underestimated; it was absolutely fundamental for each cycle of mobilization and contributed to innovation in framing, strategy, and forms of mobilization.

Students learned about the political and economic systems in Chile, which would significantly modify their framing and demands. Not only did the mesas de trabajo teach the students about the political and economic systems in detail, they also taught the pingüinos to interact with government officials. Students learned what was possible with the current political and economic configurations in the country, and they also learned how to present arguments to officials in order to persuade them. Overall, students gained a better understanding of the pragmatic aspects the government needs to consider. They learned how politicians and technocrats need to navigate the political system to accomplish policy changes. This learning is evident in how the demands grew more sophisticated and broader with each cycle.

Successive mobilizations generally picked up where previous cycles had left off. Establishing the claim that education was a right that the government was obligated to protect and guarantee during the Mochilazo allowed the Penguin
Revolution to begin with that claim, not having to establish that education is a right themselves. The 2006 pingüinos began with the acceptance of education as a right and built upon that to form more sophisticated arguments about educational quality and profit in education, eventually linking these arguments to the neoliberal economic system and the market-based educational system. The Chilean Winter began with the idea that profit in education was detrimental and had led to inequality in education, and connected those issues directly to neoliberal ideology and the lack of representativeness and room for citizen participation in the Chilean system. Each movement was a step towards the Chilean Winter, which demanded wholesale change to Chile’s political and economic systems. The Chilean Winter was a direct precursor to the estallido social that began in October 2019.

Additionally, by engaging in longer-term interactions, students developed working relationships with government officials, gaining allies in the administration. Officials gained a better understanding of the needs and demands of the students. Interactions with government officials were significant in all of the cycles of mobilization.

Also significant were framing choices. During the Mochilazo, students created the first master frame of Chile’s student movement, that education was a right the government was obligated to guarantee and support. This frame resonated deeply with the Chilean public and became the master frame for all successive cycles of mobilization. Beginning with the rights-based master frame in 2006, the pingüinos added another master frame for the movement. Beginning
with the frame of profitmaking in education results in low-quality schools and unequal education, the students connected this frame to the system at large. They argued that the neoliberal ideology dominant in Chile had infused the educational system with Pinochet’s restructuring of education, and that the education law must be rewritten. They directly fault the neoliberal policies of Pinochet for these issues in the educational system, writing, “[t]he Organic Constitutional Law of Education [LOCE], dictated during the government of Augusto Pinochet, introduced the logic of the free market to education” (A.C.d.E.S. ACES 2005, 1). Extrapolating from this frame, they created the master frame: educational problems in Chile were the product of neoliberalism.

Additionally, 2006’s students linked municipalized education with poverty, another powerful frame that strongly resonated with the public. They demanded a Constituent Assembly, to restructure the Pinochet-era LOCE, as well as demanding the abolishment of the binomial voting system, which they said was undemocratic and constrained participation. Frames were being enlarged and broadened as the movement continued – students were demanding significant changes to the economic and political systems. The frame stipulating that the political system was not representative and was undemocratic was also embraced by the Chilean public. This frame led to Bachelet sending a proposal to Congress to change the binomial voting system to a proportional voting system in 2014, which was approved (Gamboa and Morales 2016). All of these, plus an additional frame about “the neoliberal way of life” being individualist, consumerist, overly competitive, lacking social awareness and willingness to mobilize, were carried forward to the 2011 cycle.
The Chilean Winter began with several master frames, including: education is a right that the state must protect and guarantee; neoliberalism is the cause of much of the inequality in Chile; the Chilean political system is not very representative and is undemocratic; and the neoliberal life needs to be changed, along with the political and economic systems in the country. Beginning with this base, which had been established by the students in 2006, students in 2011 were able to expand upon, broaden, and amplify these frames. Eventually, students were clearly demanding significant structural change, to the political, economic, and educational systems. This cycle began with a clear linkage from neoliberalism to inequality, poor-quality education, and non-representative, non-democratic politics. As such, students were able to expand and elaborate upon these much broader frames. The cycles had clearly built upon each other, transferring knowledge forward, which students utilized in future cycles. Each cycle, beginning with the Mochilazo in 2001, built upon what the previous cycle had established and expanded frames and claims.

Regarding my hypotheses, many have been supported by the three case studies. Details follow.

H1. I argue that students will see more outcomes favorable to the movement when the student movement’s demands concentrate on the area of educational change, versus economic, or political change.

Students did see some significant changes in the area of educational reform. The 2006 cycle displayed the strongest support for this hypothesis, as the LGE was passed to replace the LOCE, as a direct result of the student mobilization. The 2001 cycle also showed support for this hypothesis, as the transportation pass administration was reassumed by the state, and the state acknowledged that
education is a social right that the state has a duty to guarantee and protect. Similarly, the 2011 cycle saw many of their demands met in the area of education: student loan interest was lowered, private universities are now required to apply for accreditation, there is more oversight of private universities to prevent profitmaking through loopholes, and the Superintendency of Education’s oversight powers were strengthened. There is strong support for this hypothesis, likely because it is seen as legitimate for students to request changes in the area of education. They are viewed as being knowledgeable about the educational system, thus their demands are more likely to be seen as informed and valid, and changes are more likely to result when they demand them in the area of education.

H2. Students will see more outcomes in the political or economic realms when they combine resources or ally with other actors, such as unions or professionals, and when public opinion is favorable to the student movement.

This hypothesis is partially supported. Students did see more changes in the political or economic realms when they had more allies. However, this was due to the students having allies in the administration and Congress, not because they allied with unions or other social groups that contributed more resources to their cause. All three cycles of mobilization had high public approval ratings; thus it is difficult to tell if this was a determining factor in effecting changes. However, having a high public approval rating certainly did not hurt the students’ cause. President Bachelet submitted a bill to Congress to change the binomial electoral cycle in April 2014. While some scholars argue that this change was due mainly to party politics and that demands for reducing access to representation only played a secondary role (Gamboa and Morales 2016, 127), Bachelet had included a
promise to change the binomial system to a proportional representation system in her campaign. Influence from the 2006 and 2011 cycles cannot be ruled out in this case, as Bachelet formulated many of her campaign promises based upon the demands of these two cycles. This hypothesis is partially supported; however, resources did not factor into the impacts much.

H3. Powerful allies are always important, and there is no exception in the realm of social mobilization. The more allies SMOs have in government, the more likely they are to have effects on policies or institutions. I anticipate that the likelihood of outcomes favorable to the movement will increase with the increasing level of supporters and allies in the government. The more supportive governmental allies are publicly, the more likely the students are to have their demands met.

This hypothesis is supported by all three cycles of mobilization. In fact, the 2006 cycle had the most impact on institutions out of all three case studies, and it was during this cycle that the students had more allies in the administration and Congress, and those allies were outspoken about their support publicly. In contrast, the 2011 cycle confronted a conservative government and did not have allies in the administration. That cycle saw very little institutional change, and what impact it did have on institutions was small. However, 2011 did see a relatively significant amount of policy impact, thus this hypothesis may have erred in including both institutional and policy impacts in the same argument. The most likely explanation for the policy impacts the 2011 cycle had is the massive amount of public support for the movement and its goals, as well as the students’ ability to enlist allies from many different sectors of society. This explanation falls short of the requirements for substantive policy change as elaborated in Giugni’s joint-effect model, which states that three variables must be present: social mobilization, political alliances, and favorable social opinion. The 2011 cycle clearly lacked
political alliances in the Piñera administration, which is the most likely explanatory factor for the relatively few policy changes seen in this cycle.

H4. Students will have the most impact on policy implementation when they are able to use multiple methods of influence, e.g., disruption, persuasion, and/or bargaining.

This hypothesis has weak support from the case studies. The two cycles that had impact in the implementation impact area are the 2001 and 2006 cycles. Out of these two, 2001 can be said to have had the clearest effect in the implementation impact area, which involves having an influence in slowing, speeding up, or stopping the implementation of policies. As noted in the Mochilazo chapter, students had an impact on speeding up the implementation of policy, forcing the government to action before it had preferred to act. They essentially stopped a policy when they forced the government to administer the pass again, as the government took the power to administer the pass away from the CSTT and resumed it itself. The government was forced, on several occasions, to take action earlier than it had planned, due to protests.

The 2006 cycle is noted as having an impact as well, in that the government sent a bill to Congress earlier than planned to replace the LOCE. However, it could also be argued that Bachelet’s government had not planned to replace the education law at all, thus, this only gives weak support to this hypothesis. The 2011 cycle did not have effects in the implementation impact area.

H5. Stressing the interrelatedness of government and social organizations, I believe that the more contact students have with government officials, the more likely they will be to gain outcomes that coincide with their demands.
This hypothesis is supported strongly by the 2001 and 2006 cycles of mobilization. The 2001 cycle had significant interactions with government, participating in working committees to negotiate and resolve their issues. The students saw many outcomes that coincided with their demands. Similarly, in 2006, students were ultimately disappointed by the new education law, the LGE, because it did not contain all of their demands. However, it did contain the majority of their demands. The mesa de trabajo the students participated in with SEREMI Traverso in 2005 imparted considerable knowledge about the political, economic, and educational systems in the country, as well as practical knowledge about how to negotiate with technocrats and politicians. The 2006 pingüinos participated in many different working committees when they were mobilizing, as well as participating in the Presidential Advisory Committee for Quality Education. The Revolución Pingüina clearly had the most interaction with government officials out of all three cycles. The knowledge they gained in the 2005 mesa de trabajo would be utilized by students in the future, thus, the interactions between students and officials in 2005 and 2006 can be said to have influenced all following cycles of mobilization.

Conversely, in 2011, students participated in working committees and negotiations with government officials, but due to their skepticism about the government’s commitment to listening to them and making changes, they would frequently stop negotiating before agreements had been reached. Therefore, this hypothesis is supported by the 2001 and 2006 cycles, but not supported by the 2011 cycle. Interactions with government do tend to have powerful effects overall, as evidenced by the knowledge transfer from the 2006 cycle to future cycles. This
argument could likely be strengthened by combining the interaction variable with another variable, such as the ideology of the administration and/or public support. This hypothesis is partially supported by two out of the three case studies.

H6. The students are likely to have more effects when they use disruptive tactics, such as protests, demonstrations, takeovers, paralyzations, and strikes.

This hypothesis was supported by all three case studies. The argument could be strengthened by adding a measure of time as well, as the longer cycles of mobilization maintain the disruption for longer periods of time, thus putting more pressure on the government to solve the issues. Sustained mobilization having more effects was previously theorized by Charles Tilly (Tilly 1978). This argument could also be strengthened by adding another variable, such as the ideology of the administration.

H7. I anticipate that innovation in protest tactics/techniques will be more likely to result in outcomes favorable to the movement. The literature supports the idea that disruptive actions are more likely to have an effect. Thus, innovation in protest tactics and techniques should result in a new repertoire of disruptive actions, which will be more likely to result in outcomes favorable to the movement. If the actions are successful in disturbing the status quo, they will generally result in outcomes favorable to the student organizations’ goals, as a result of garnering more attention, both from government officials and news media.

This hypothesis is not strongly supported by the case studies. The 2001 and 2006 cycles did not demonstrate much innovation in protest tactics or techniques, they utilized the standard marches/protests, strikes, and school takeovers/paros. The 2011 cycle was notable for its innovation in protest tactics. While this innovation garnered significantly more press coverage, including from the international press, I cannot definitively declare that the outcomes were more
favorable to the students overall. The media attention, particularly in the international arena, was overwhelmingly positive. Yet the students were dealing with a conservative administration that was not sympathetic to their grievances. This hypothesis was not supported overall.

H8. I argue that each cycle of mobilization enlarges the sphere for public debate, enabling the successive cycles to enlarge their demands and scope.

This hypothesis was overwhelmingly supported by all three case studies. The students in each cycle expanded their arguments and demands, eventually linking the problems in the educational system to problems with the political and economic systems overall, and to neoliberal policies in particular. The 2011 cycle was particularly effective in generating massive public debate over these issues, and this debate has continued to the present day.

Overall, Kolb’s framework was an excellent tool for organizing and analyzing effects from each cycle of mobilization. Its basis in the state-movement intersection perspective is particularly useful. The students were able to effect change due to the nature of their relationships with the state. Each successive cycle accomplished more, likely due to the students being perceived as legitimate political actors after the first cycle in 2001. Utilizing this framework to analyze more case studies could help to create a strong mid-range theoretical approach for social movement studies and could lead to the development of predictive theory in the future.
Looking Ahead: What Does the Future Hold for Chile and Student Mobilization?

As previously noted, many of the former student leaders from 2011 entered into government service. The former Presidents of FECH and FEUC (the student organizations of Universidad de Chile and the Pontificia Universidad Católica) Camila Vallejo, Gabriel Boric, and Giorgio Jackson, along with Karol Cariola (President of the Universidad de Concepción’s student federation) ran for and won seats in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the National Congress, in 2013. Camilo Ballesteros, the former president of the Universidad de Santiago de Chile student federation and who was also a participant in the 2006 Revolución Pingüina, was appointed to an executive position during Bachelet’s second term, as the National Director of Social Organizations. The former student leaders were well-positioned to influence laws and public policy in Chile.

Before he won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, Jackson had formed a new political party in order to participate more effectively in the Chilean political system. Jackson formed the political party Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolution, or RD) in 2012 (Artaza 2022). Gabriel Boric became the leader of the Izquierda Autónoma (Autonomous Left, or IA), a Gramscian political movement, which allied with the RD party to form a bloc of leftist parties. Cariola and Vallejo both belonged to the Communist Party (PC), which joined the Nueva Mayoría (New Majority, or NM), the leftist coalition formed in Congress to replace the Concertación. Boric’s IA joined the Frente Amplio (Broad Front, or FA), a political coalition of leftist parties which was formed in 2017 to present an alternative to the
two major coalitions in Congress, the NM on the center-left and the *Chile Vamos* (Let’s Go Chile, or CV) coalition on the right. Jackson’s RD party also joined the FA in 2017 (Ponce Lara 2023). Boric and others merged several leftist coalitions to create the political party *Convergencia Social* (Social Convergence, or CS) in 2019 in order to balance the power that RD had obtained in the short time it had been in existence (Nuevo Partido del FA: Convergencia Social Inició Proceso de Legalización en el Servel 2019). All of the former student leaders worked to further leftist causes in Congress, and had pledged to represent the student movement in the legislature. They were all active participants in the congressional debates about the educational reform measures Bachelet had proposed.

After serving two consecutive four-year terms in the Chamber of Deputies, Gabriel Boric was the *Apruebo Dignidad* coalition’s presidential candidate in the 2021 election. Ponce writes:

> In 2021, an unprecedented campaign took place in post-dictatorial Chile. One pro-Pinochet candidate [José Antonio Kast Rist] and the other an activist from the student movement [Gabriel Boric Font] were vying for the presidency. Two visions of the world and of understanding Chile in the present were in dispute, and the most interesting thing is that neither of them were part of the coalitions that had ruled the country in the last three decades. The Concertation, later the New Majority, had been displaced by the Broad Front. While the Alliance for Chile or Chile Vamos on the [center] right had lost in the first round against an extreme right and [the center right] didn’t want to confront them because they were from the Republican Party, which was founded by Kast himself, they decided not to participate in the primaries for the right. (Ponce Lara 2023, 60)

Boric won in a runoff election with 55.87 percent of the vote, becoming the youngest President in Chile’s history (Ponce Lara 2023, 61). He is currently serving
out his term, which will end in March 2027. Presidents in Chile can only serve one term of four years. They may run for election again, but the terms cannot be successive. Boric brought many of the former 2011 student leaders into the executive branch, appointing them to his Cabinet, including Giorgio Jackson, Camila Vallejo, and Nicolás Grau. Karol Cariola has been reelected and continues to serve in the Chamber of Deputies in Congress. Thus, the active influence of the 2011 movement in government continues to this day.

Even though a leftist government has carried the ideals of the student movement into La Moneda, the presidential palace, the National Congress also has an important role in the political system. After the latest elections in 2021, the Chamber of Deputies has a slight left majority, at 77 leftist deputies. The right holds 72 seats, and 6 seats are held by independents16. The Senate has a conservative majority, with 25 senators from the right. The left holds 23 senate seats, and 2 are held by independents17. The very slight majority the left has in the Chamber of Deputies means that conservatives still hold considerable power in the chamber, and negotiations will be de rigueur. Conservative forces have always been overrepresented in the Senate, due to the use of a binomial electoral system and malapportionment (Carey 2016). Boric’s government will need to engage in significant negotiation to get measures passed, if they are able to get them passed in Congress.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the pingüinos began a planned campaign of fare evasion on the Santiago Metro in October 2019 in response to a rise in the price of the Metro fare by 30 pesos. The country exploded. Massive public demonstrations quickly spread from the capital throughout the entire country. During the 2019 estallido social, it was clear that the demands had roots in the demands of the 2011 student mobilizations, beginning where the students left off in 2011.

“It’s not 30 pesos, it’s 30 years”, “We will not return to normality, because normality was the problem”, "Never again will they have the comfort of our silence", “I have more fear of retiring than I do of your repression”, “No more abuse”, and “Neoliberalism was born and will die in Chile” are some of the slogans frequently seen on the signs of protesters, scrawled in graffiti on city walls, and on posters plastered to streetlight poles (Cortés 2022). The messages frequently referred to issues that had been raised during the 2011 cycle of mobilization. Alexis Cortés writes,

With the 30 years, a reference is made to the post-dictatorship period and it is questioning the inter-elite arrangement that gave stability to the country, in exchange for the substantive maintenance of the economic model and the political institutionality that guarded it, its main expression being the Political Constitution of 1980. (Cortés 2022, 80)

Protesters called for a solution to the massive inequality in Chilean society, a new Constitution to replace the Pinochet-era Constitution of 1980, more opportunities for participation for citizens in national politics and the political system, an end to privatized pension systems, universal healthcare, an end to an economic system
that benefits the very rich and leaves the middle class and the poor worse off. Cortés explains,

The social rebellion that began on October 18 can be understood as a popular uprising that responded dramatically to the processes of hyper-commercialization of social life, which leaves the majority of the country’s population in a situation of extreme vulnerability and unprotected from social risk. The generalization of the logic of abuse, given by the confluence of business interest and the complicity of the political system to allow these dynamics, consolidated a situation of abandonment of a population that feels abused. (Cortés 2022, 101)

The social rebellion was clearly targeting the negative effects of Pinochet’s neoliberal reforms, as well as mourning the lack of justice for victims of the dictatorship and the increasing economic and social inequality in the 30 years since it ended. The unrest continued on a daily basis, with numbers swelling on Fridays, as people left work and went to join the protesters in Plaza Italia (later rechristened Plaza de la Dignidad, or Dignity Plaza, by activists), the epicenter of the protest activity. As Cortés observes, “Chile was living in a state of permanent mobilization. The only thing that could stop, or rather, pause, the effervescence on the streets would be a health crisis of the magnitude of the coronavirus” (Cortés 2022, 102).

COVID-19 arrived in Chile in the first week of March 2020. By mid-March, President Piñera declared a state of emergency, sent the military into the streets to maintain order, and a curfew was established. By late March, several large counties in the Santiago Metropolitan area were being quarantined, and by mid-May, the entire city was on full lockdown (Beaubien 2020). In mid-March, protesters were still defying the curfew to come out and demonstrate, but their numbers began
dwindling as the seriousness of the health crisis set in, and the protests had
stopped by the end of March.

As Garcés, Ponce, Cortés, and others have noted, the Chilean government
suffered a crisis of legitimacy after the 2011 student mobilizations (Garcés Durán
2013; Ponce Lara 2022; Cortés 2022). Chile’s political institutions were in crisis,
something the 2019 movement exposed. Demands began with the call for a new
Constitution, and encompassed wholesale change to the political and economic
systems. Cortés elaborates,

Everything was in question, nothing seemed impossible to change. The
mobilization operated as a powerful denaturalizer of the entire political and economic model. What until yesterday was tolerated,
albeit reluctantly, from that moment on was openly questioned. The mobilization became transversal, there was no corner of the country that did not feel part of this "explosion". Quickly the economic demand to freeze the rise in the Metro fare was transformed into a highly politicized struggle, the criticism of the constitution being the greatest expression of that step (Cortés 2022, 85-86).

Faced with the collective, sustained, intense rage of the Chilean people, Piñera knew he had to make concessions. He called on Congressmembers to draft an agreement to write a new constitution. The Acuerdo por la Paz Social y la Nueva Constitución (Agreement for Social Peace and a New Constitution) was signed by representatives of all of the political parties in the governing coalition and some of the parties in the opposition on November 15, 2019 (Logran Histórico Acuerdo para Nueva Constitución: Participación Ciudadana Será Clave 2019). The agreement stipulated that a plebiscite would be held in April 2020 in which voters would select either a Mixed Constitutional Convention (half members of the current Congress and half directly elected constituents) or a Constitutional Convention (100 percent directly elected constituents) (C. Reyes 2021).

The Chilean public turned out in droves. 7.6 million people cast votes, which was the largest voter turnout (51 percent of registered voters) since voting became optional in 2013. There was a significant increase in the turnout of young voters and voters in the poblaciones (slums) of Santiago. An enormous portion of the people voted to write a new constitution, with 78.31 percent voting to approve and 21.69 voting to reject. The Constitutional Convention with directly elected constituents also had a resounding victory, with 79.18 percent of voters selecting

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this option over a mixed convention with Congressmembers comprising half of the convention (20.82 percent of the vote)\textsuperscript{19}. Chileans overwhelmingly confirmed their desire for major structural change via a new constitution.

Convention constituents were elected in May of 2021 (the convention was originally scheduled to being in April or May of 2021, but was postponed due to the COVID-19 crisis). The 155 constituents met and wrote the draft of the constitution from July 4, 2021 to July 4, 2022. They drafted the most progressive constitution ever proposed. Containing 388 articles, it would have acknowledged more rights than any constitution in history, including over a hundred provisions for rights to housing, education, food, sanitation, clean air, water, internet access, pensions, universal health care, sexual orientation, and gender identity. The draft provided protections for indigenous populations in Chile (including autonomous territories and a parallel justice system), required gender parity in government institutions, claimed that Chile is a “plurinational country,” called for free education, free universal health care, decent education and pensions, decent housing and legalized abortion, and eliminated Chile’s Senate, replacing it with a Chamber of Regions. It also protected the environment and charged the state with duties to fight climate change and other environmental threats (Rasp 2022). After a well-funded public relations campaign by the right, which spread falsehoods about the contents and what the new Constitution would mean for people in their daily lives, 62 percent of voters rejected the draft (Politi 2022).

\textsuperscript{19} See https://historico.servel.cl/servel/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=222.
After much debate about how the rewriting process would proceed, an expert commission, consisting of 24 people elected by Congress, began working on a preliminary draft on March 6, 2023, which will be completed in three months (Ojeda 2023). Voters will choose 50 delegates to the Constitutional Council on May 7, 2023, and the preliminary draft will pass to the Council in early June 2023. The Council will "approve, approve with modifications or incorporate new rules to the draft of the new Constitution" with the aid of a Technical Admissibility Committee composed of lawyers, after which it will return to the Expert Commission for possible revisions. Finally, there will be a ratification plebiscite on December 17, 2023 (Ojeda 2023).

As Cortés notes, a new constitution will not solve all of the problems in Chile, however, it will eliminate the primary obstacle to achieving real, substantive, structural change: the Pinochet Constitution of 1980 (Cortés 2022, 71). Once structural change is possible under the new constitution, Chile can begin to address its issues of socio-economic inequality resulting from the neoliberal economic system, as well as other issues.

All of these changes, including the drafting of a new constitution, were made possible by the student movement. The cycle of mobilization in 2011 established the demand for a new constitution, and the cycle of 2019 adopted and strengthened this demand. The 2019 cycle also echoed other demands previously made during the previous cycles of students’ mobilization. The pingüinos began the 2019 cycle, but it is clear that previous cycles, particularly 2011’s cycle, have influenced Chilean society, and that the majority of Chileans sympathize with the demands originally
put forth by the students. This could be predicted by the results presented in this dissertation, that successive cycles of mobilization would echo and expand upon demands made in previous cycles.

The Chilean people endured much during the 2019 protests, as the Piñera administration responded with massive repression of the uprisings. Data gathered by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) reveals 26 dead, 4,903 people injured (as of December 10, 2019, with suspicion that the number is actually higher), and “113 specific cases of torture and ill-treatment, and 24 cases of sexual violence against women, men and adolescent girls and boys, perpetrated by members of the police and army” (UNHCR 2020). The UNHCR report states "[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that, from 18 October onwards, a high number of serious human rights violations have been committed. These violations include excessive or unnecessary use of force that led to unlawful killings and injuries, torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence, and arbitrary detentions" (UNHCR 2020, 6).
When Chileans take to the streets, they are well aware of the dangers. The *carabineros* are well-known for using water cannon trucks, tear gas, and other anti-crowd repressive measures. Despite the awareness of the risks, there were over 154 demonstrations in the month of October 19, 2019 alone (Ledur and Levine 2019), a clear sign of the commitment of the protesters. After the election of Gabriel Boric to the presidency in 2021, there is an atmosphere of calm, while the new constitution is being written. Cortés writes,

> Neighborhoods, workplaces, public spaces, will never be the same again. Not only do we now know each other, but we have also seen that our rage, frustrations, and hopes are shared. It is possible that these profound political transformations will take time to express themselves, in a forceful way, in political-electoral terms, but at some point, they will be synchronized (Cortés 2022, 86).

The experience of the 2019 *estallido social* not only verified the importance of the student movement as a political actor, in that the claims advanced in 2011 were
again put forth in 2019, it also reunited the Chilean people. Today, a strong determination to reform the country and establish equity measures exists. The contents of the new Constitution will determine what types of measures will be taken in the future, however, without a doubt, Chileans will take to the streets again if the structural changes they are demanding do not happen.
## Appendix 1: Effects and Kolb’s Framework

### Effects of All Three Cycles of Mobilization, Classified According to Kolb’s Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agenda Impact</strong></td>
<td>Issue of transportation pass to top of agenda</td>
<td>Changed discourse about education for entire country</td>
<td>Forced administration to put education on the agenda and move it to top priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Began public debate about economic, political, &amp; educational systems.</td>
<td>Spurred public debate about inequality, the bad effects of neoliberalism, the legitimacy of the political and economic systems in Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forced Bachelet administration to put education at top of agenda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternatives Impact</strong></td>
<td>Modification of student transportation pass regulations</td>
<td>LOCE replaced with LGE (passed in 2009, submitted to Congress in 2007)</td>
<td>Private universities required to apply for accreditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eliminated subsidies for for-profit schools, only nonprofits could receive subsidies</td>
<td>Modifications to accreditation system</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forbade schools from selecting students based on socioeconomic criteria</td>
<td>More oversight of universities to prevent profitmaking in higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Impact</strong></td>
<td>Changed policy, gov’t would administer pass in 2002</td>
<td>Government forced to send education bill to Congress earlier than it would have</td>
<td>Superintendency of Education’s oversight powers strengthened</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation Impact</strong></td>
<td>Gov’t forced to take action earlier</td>
<td>Scholarships for university entrance exam</td>
<td>More scholarships and more funding for scholarships and student aid/grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goods Impact</strong></td>
<td>More free student passes</td>
<td>Municipality of Santiago subsidizes some passes</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Mochilazo (2001) led to the transportation pass issue being placed at the top of the agenda. This mobilization shifted the public discourse about education for the entire country, forced the Bachelet administration to place education at the top of the agenda, and spurred public debate about inequality, the bad effects of neoliberalism, and the legitimacy of the political and economic systems in Chile. The mobilization resulted in modifications to student transportation pass regulations, with the government taking more initiative earlier than it would have. The result was more free student passes and scholarships for university entrance exams. The revised policies included changes to student transportation pass regulations, the elimination of subsidies for for-profit schools, and the prohibition of schools selecting students based on socioeconomic criteria. The implementation was further strengthened by more oversight of universities to prevent profitmaking in higher education and the Superintendency of Education’s oversight powers were enhanced.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Outcomes</td>
<td>National gov’t subsides all passes to an extent in 2002, lowering price for everyone</td>
<td>Needier schools receive more funding</td>
<td>State funds dedicated to lowering the student loan interest rate by 4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More free lunches</td>
<td>Additional funding for institutional development funds</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>School infrastructure improvements</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New furniture for schools</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Family subsidies increased</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paid internships for technical schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedural Change</td>
<td>Minister Alywin insistent that students stop mobilization in order to negotiate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard-line stance from Piñera administration, reluctant to compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government was forced to take the students and their demands more seriously after months of sustained action on the part of the public</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Students invited to negotiate directly with government officials</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Students included in the policymaking process, being invited to take part in the debate about the national budget for 2012 when it was presented before Congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1: Effects and Kolb’s Framework

**Effects of All Three Cycles of Mobilization, Classified According to Kolb’s Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intra-Institutional Change</th>
<th>State Transformation</th>
<th>Disruption Mechanism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001: Mochilazo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government resumes</td>
<td>Created Superintendency of Education</td>
<td>Sustained strike/paro, many marches and demonstrations disrupt functioning educational institutions, some Ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administration of the</td>
<td>Presidential Advisory Council on the Quality of Education (temporary)</td>
<td>Disruption of public transport when not in school</td>
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<tr>
<td>transportation pass.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2006: Revolución Pingüina</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interior Minister Andrés</td>
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<td>Many marches,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaldivar and Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>demonstrations, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister Martín Zilic fired</td>
<td></td>
<td>protests disrupt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of the Carabineros’</td>
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<td>normal traffic and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Forces fired</td>
<td></td>
<td>often Line 1 of the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binomial voting system</td>
<td></td>
<td>Metro</td>
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<tr>
<td>replaced with a proportional, more representative system</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strikes and paros disrupt functioning of educational institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011: Invierno Chileno</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>Many different types of innovative mobilizations, disruption to car traffic and Metro Line 1 closures during protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquín Lavín forced to</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strikes and paros disrupt functioning of educational institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resign</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Felipe Bulnes resigns in</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Harald Beyer impeached</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>via a Constitutional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accusation in Congress,</td>
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<tr>
<td>found guilty of neglecting</td>
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<tr>
<td>his duties due to a</td>
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<tr>
<td>failure to uphold the law</td>
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<tr>
<td>against profiting from</td>
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<tr>
<td>higher education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>System for Access to</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher Education created</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Preference</strong></td>
<td>Approval in between 83-87% during mobilizations[^20]</td>
<td>Approval at approximately 87% until the last week of <em>paros</em>[^21]</td>
<td>Approval between 76-89%^[^22]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Access Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>Allies in the system: Joaquín Lavín (mayor of Santiago Centro), mayors of several other municipalities in the Santiago Metropolitan Area, several Deputies in Congress, administration officials</td>
<td>Many allies in government, including Bachelet and several others in her administration</td>
<td>4 former student leaders elected to Congress as Deputies, 1 student leader appointed to head Bachelet’s Office of Social Organizations, 1 student leader eventually elected to be President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Judicial Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>3 Deputies sued the CSTT over the irregularities in the money collected for the passes and the recycled passes. Lagos administration files a request for an investigation of the recycled passes.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Politics Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Students meetings with representatives of the OECD, the United Nations (UN), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the European Parliament, among other actors, and gained their support Significant coverage in the international media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^20]: Centro de Políticas Públicas de la Universidad del Desarrollo [Public Policy Center at Universidad del Desarrollo], Centro de Encuestas de La Tercera [Survey Center at La Tercera].

[^21]: Centro de Políticas Públicas de la Universidad del Desarrollo [Public Policy Center at Universidad del Desarrollo], Centro de Encuestas de La Tercera [Survey Center at La Tercera].

Student leaders argued that Chile's discrimination in education violated international treaties the country had signed.
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