Document Type

Thesis

Degree

Master of Arts

Major

Philosophy

Date of Defense

4-17-2020

Graduate Advisor

Billy Dunaway

Committee

Eric Wiland

Jill Delston

Abstract

This paper is about the paradox of supererogation and why supererogation is morally optional. I argue that supererogation is morally optional because it is supported by both moral reasons and nonmoral reasons. I understand moral reasons to be agent-neutral reasons that apply to everybody while nonmoral reasons are agent-relative reasons that don’t apply to everybody. By understanding supererogation in this way, I have rejected the common assumption that what makes supererogation supererogatory is moral. Instead I argue that the source of supererogation is nonmoral. One important upshot to this is that unlike those who claim that the source of supererogation is moral, I do not have to deny the moral overridingness of moral reasons.

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