The Virtue of Happiness as Affective State and its Centrality to Well-Being
Document Type
Thesis
Degree
Master of Arts
Major
Philosophy
Date of Defense
4-18-2011
Graduate Advisor
Anna Alexandrova
Committee
Wiland, Eric
Brunero, John
Abstract
Daniel Haybron has argued that welfare perfectionism articulated in Aristotelian terms is not plausible since it does not pay sufficient attention to one’s emotional state as a central constituent of well-being. To this end he provides counter examples which suggest that the Aristotelian account of well-being cannot possibly be right. In this paper I respond to the difficulties leveled against the perfectionist by arguing that the they should endorse a specific conception of happiness as a virtue, and that as a result the perfectionist is able to provide a more attractive and plausible account of well-being wherein happiness and moral virtue are its central constituents.
Recommended Citation
Summers, Christopher Ross, "The Virtue of Happiness as Affective State and its Centrality to Well-Being" (2011). Theses. 260.
https://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/260