Document Type
Dissertation
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Major
Political Science
Date of Defense
7-10-2018
Graduate Advisor
David Kimball
Committee
David B. Robertson
Andrew D. Glassberg
David C. Kimball
J. Martin Rochester
Abstract
Is defense policy more collegial than other policy issues addressed by Congress? More specifically, what are the institutional and political motives which drive a majority of the members of Congress to consistently transcend partisanship in order to pass defense focused legislation into law?
The purpose of this study was to test whether or not the consideration of defense policy in the House of Representatives is unique in its ability to transcend partisanship. And if so, why?
Hypothesis: The formulation of defense policy in the U.S. House of Representatives is approached with more collegiality than other policy issue areas, mainly due to institutional, domestic, and international political pressures on members that transcend competing partisan motivations.
Defense policy was operationalized by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). “Other types of policy” was operationalized by the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill. “Collegiality,” the primary dependent variable, was defined as exceptional and consistent cooperative interaction among colleagues over time that rendered legislation which garnered support of at least a bipartisan supermajority (two-thirds) of the House of Representatives upon its final passage.
A mixed methods approach was employed using the annual NDAA process as a study vehicle. Qualitative and quantitative analysis included case studies of U.S. legislative history that compared the NDAA process with that of the Farm Bill and Highway Bill. Deliberations over the bills were explored during three five-year periods of notable partisanship in U.S. politics that coupled with notable U.S. security concerns abroad: 1961-66, 1993-98, and 2007-12. Case studies were complemented by interviews with 25 members of the policy community
The study concluded that the NDAA is essentially a de facto annual omnibus authorization bill with unparalleled political and institutional momentum that serves individual policymaker interests as well as the public interest. As such, the NDAA is an institution unto itself and its annual process consistently demands House members approach it in a uniquely collegial manner, providing strong evidence defense policy formulation is more collegial than other policy areas.
OCLC Number
1065524760
Recommended Citation
Welter, Timothy, "The Political Nature of Defense Policy in Congress" (2018). Dissertations. 781.
https://irl.umsl.edu/dissertation/781
Included in
American Politics Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons